RITA GUPTA

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS AND

ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS

Dharmakirti’s argument in Hetubindu

All of us are familiar with the saying, “nasau munir yasya matarb na bhinnarh
- “none is a sage whose views do not differ from those of others”. We find
the adage in action in the highly edifying controversy regarding the momen-
tary, or enduring nature of things that raged between the Buddhist and the
Nyaya schools of philosophy. In this paper I shall try to highlight the main
points around which the wrangle has been carried on by giants on both sides.
My analysis in based chiefly on a study of the doctrine of momentariness as
presented by Dharmakirti in his Hetubindu.

Everything in the phenomenal world, according to the Buddha, is characterised

by impermanence. This doctrine of impermanence of everything was later
developed by the Buddhist philosophers as the doctrine of momentariness of
everything. It was probably Dharmakirti who, for the first time, presented to
us, in a succinct manner, the logical arguments supporting this doctrine. The
gradual elaboration and unfolding of his arguments are traceable in the works
of Santaraksita, Kamalabila, JrGnaSri and Ratnakirti. I shall, however, confine
myself here mainly to an analysis of the fundamental arguments which are
contained in the theory as presented in Dharmakirti’s Hetubindu.
Buddhist logicians, led by Dharmakirti, maintain that everything in the
phenomenal world is in a flwc in the sense that it comes into existence at
one moment and goes out of existence at the next. How is it so? According
to Dharmakirti, anything, if it is to be called a really existent thing (as
opposed to an unreal thing), must have some causal efficacy (artha-kriya-
karitva). To put it more simply, ‘to be’, i.e., ‘to exist’, means ‘to do some-
thing’. But, as indicated in the next paragraph, in order to be causally effica-
cious, a thing must be momentary. Thus, it follows that, according to the
Buddhists, whatever exists and thereby has some causal effcapy, must also be
momentary.
In support of their premise that everything in the phenomenal world is

.Iourna~of~ndianPhilosophy 8 (1980)+7-68.0022-1791/80/0081-0047 $02.20

Copyright 0 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland. and Boston, U.S.A.
48 RITA GUPTA

causally efficacious, and, consequently, momentary, the Buddhists adopt the

argument of reductio ab absurdum (prasarhg~num&a). If a thing has causal
efficacy and is, at the sametime, non-momentary, i.e., enduring, then it
would have to be characterised by two contradictory predicates. But the co-
existence of contradictory properties in a thing is incompatible with the
identity of the thing. Hence, for the sake of logical consistency, we must
admit that an entity, to be causally effective, must be momentary. This is
demonstrated in a more detailed way asfollows:
Supposea non-momentary thing, like a seed,having causalefficacy,
produces another thing, viz., a sprout. Now, it can do its work only in two
ways, either gradually (kramqa) or instantly (jwgapat). Let us analyse the
first alternative. Let us supposethat the seedat moment r is not the cause
of the sprout, but at moment2 the seedbecomes,or is, the cause of the
sprout. Now, since the seedat moment2 is producer of the sprout, and since
the seedat moment, is non-producer of the sprout, therefore, it follows that
the seedof momentr must be different from the seedof moment2 ; (for,
otherwise, we shall have to maintain the absurd position that an identical
thing may be simultaneously the seat of two contradictory properties).
Therefore, we are forced to admit that, to be causally effective in a gradual
way, a thing must be momentary.
Let us now consider the second alternative of the seedproducing its effect,
the sprout, instantly. (Instances of this are available in such situations as the
lock opening the instant the key turns to the required position.) Here we may
reasonably ask, after having finished its job of producing the sprout, aZZat one
go, at a particular moment, say moment, , what is the seedsupposedto do at
a subsequent momer&? It cannot very well do the samething that it did at
moment r . Nobody can kill a bird that has been killed already! Thus, we have
to admit that the seedat momentr is producer of the sprout and at moment2
it is non-producer of the sprout. Now, in order to avoid the absurdity of
saying that two contradictory properties can belong to one and the same
thing, it is obligatory on our part to admit that the seedat moment, is
different from the seedat moment 2, and that in order to acquire instant
causalefficacy a thing must be momentary.
But the Naiyayikas say that if the Buddhists argued in that way, then they
would be guilty of producing an Inconstant Reason(anaikxintika hetu).’
Their Reason,“possessionof contradictory qualities (of being producer and
also non-producer)” (‘viruddha-dham’) is not invariably concomitant
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 49

with what is to be proven,2 “difference (between seed of moment i and seed

of momenta)” (‘bhinnatvarh’). As a matter of fact, it is the same seed which
was previously existing in the granary, and was not producer of the sprout,
which later came to produce the sprout in the field when it was assisted by
auxiliary causes like water, earth and sunshine. Therefore, the Buddhists
would be forced to admit that the existence of the seed in the granary re-
presents one stage of the same seed. Can any one claim that the seed in the
field, which is soon followed by the sprout, is a totally different entity from
the seed in the granary?
But the Buddhists reply that they are not guilty of advancing any such
defective reasoning as the Naiygyikas are trying to foist on them. To be
consistent, one has to admit that the seed in the granary is different from the
seed in the field which actually produces 3 the sprout. The seed in the granary
cannot, in strict sense of the term, be said to be the producer of the sprout.
The productive power of a thing must be its intrinsic property. That being
the case, if the seed in the granary had such a power, then why could it not
produce the sprout even while staying in the granary? Why did it have to
depend on the so-called auxiliary conditions, v4 If that seed were never able to
produce the sprout by itself, if it were necessarily dependent on the so-called
‘auxiliary conditions’ in order to produce, should we not, in all fairness, say
that the seed necessarily lacked productive power? Should we not say that
the so-called auxiliaries are producing the sprout? Why should we label the
auxiliaries as mere ‘helpers’? Therefore, productivity can be ascribed only to
such a thing which is intrinsically capable of producing its effect, and as
such produces it immediately without depending on anything else (ak;epa-
ktiy&&iti~a). Accordingly, one should be forced to admit that only the
joint action in the last stages of the seed (Qntya-bva = kurvad-bija), water,
sunshine, etc., which is immediately followed by the appearance of the
sprout, is the real producer of the sprout. How could the seed in the granary
then be called the producer of the sprout? From all this it would follow that
there is no identity between the seed in the granary (non-productive of the
sprout) and the seed in the field which actually produces the sprout.
There is no doubt that the seed in the granary appears to the ordinary
people to be the same as the seed in the field that actually gives rise to its
offspring. Yet, the logic of their arguments, the Buddhists urge, will reveal to
the intelligent people the absolute distinction between the two. The seed is at
first existing in the granary. The moment the farmer takes it out and puts it
50 RITA GUPTA

in the pot in order to take it to the field it becomesconjoined with a different

condition, and that causal condition must initiate some changein it. And
hence the seedis a different seed.When the seedis placed in the field it
becomesrelated with yet another different condition. The causalpotency of
that condition must make the seeddifferent from the seedin the pot. Once
the field is watered the seedcombines with yet another different causal
complex consisting of water, sunlight etc. That confluence of causesmakes
the seeddifferent from the seedin the dry field. The seedunderground
undergoesall sorts of changesas a result of its conjunction with more and
more causalconditions from moment to moment, and in this way the process
of sprouting starts underground. [SeeHez’ubindu-fika, p. 1161. When the
processreachessome maturity, the tiny sprout comesout of the earth with
which it was covered.
Innumerable metamorphoseshappen to the seedunderground although
the details of the transformation are not visible to us. In the sameway,
countless changeshappen to the seedfrom the moment of its being taken out
of the granary to its being sown in the field though these changesare also
not detected by the human eye. Hence, the seedin the granary is entirely
different from the seedin the field which (assistedby certain conditions)
ultimately brings the sprout to existence. The seedin the granary was
produced by a tree. It was competent to generate only a similar seedand
therefore went on generating a seed-seriesin the granary. The seedin the field
which ultimately begot the young plant could do so due to an assemblageof
causesthat are completely different from the causesattending the seedin the
granary. The seedin the granary, which was not associatedwith earth, water,
sunshine, etc., was endowed only with the potency to generate a similar seed,
whereasthe seedin the field, getting the contact of earth, water, etc., is
capable of setting up the sprout. Hence, the two seedsare endowed with
different causalpotencies. Each of them, again, owes its origin to different
causalconditions. Therefore, for the sake of logical consistency, one has
necessarily to admit that the two seedsare different, in spite of the similarity
in their looks. From all this, it is also evident that a particular seed(kirizcid)
alone (which has been invested with a special capacity, due to its being the
locus of various causalinfluences of different moments) is the matrix of a
particular (kasyacit) sprout. The reasonis that, that seedalone (and not the
seedof the granary) is forthwith followed by the effect, the sprout. [See
Zfetubindu, p. 53. Seealso p/Z, pp. 116-l 171.
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 51

II

The samematter is elucidated by the Buddhists in a more technical way as

follows:
All the so-called auxiliary or co-operating causesof any offshoot, accord-
ing to the Buddhists, are convergent streamsof efficient moments. They are
called ‘creeping causes’(upasarpaypratyaya) inasmuch as theirs is a ‘staccato’
movement (since the former moment of such a causeis completely different
from the later moment, one cannot be said to ‘flow into the other’). At the
meeting-point of such streamsof efficient causes,a new series,the effect
series,begins. [When the seriesof the moments of the said moisture, heat and
seedunite the last moments of each of those seriesare followed by the first
moment of the shoot. Seebelow] . That meeting-point, which has been
described in Buddhist philosophy as the locus (Hhraya)of such streamsof
converging, ‘creeping causes’(upasarpa+dz>, can alone be properly said to be
the only capable causeof the effect, since that alone is followed by the
advent of the effect. [SeeHetubindu, p. 53. Seealso D/M, p. 1171. The
ultimate moments of such efficient creeping causesare justly described by
Dharmakirti as “momentary entities which have neither any preceding nor
any succeedingstages,and which are incapable of existing in a different
manner and in a different place.”
[testi ca na piirvani, na pascanna prthag-bhiveti samarthan
api piirva-para-prthag-bhhva-bhavino do@ nopaliyante seeHetu-
bindu, p. 53.1

It is now evident that the Buddhists are not arguing with the help of an
‘inconstant’ (vyabhicti) Reason.It cannot be said that the sameseed is the
recipient of two contradictory properties of ‘fecundity’ and ‘infecundity’,
and yet it is an identical seed.The reason is: the last moments of each said
seriesof seed,moisture, heat, etc., which are properly called ‘causes’,could
not, by definition, be said to have existed before. The so-called ‘former
stages’of the seed,moisture, heat, earth, etc., are really the causesof the
‘convergence’of the streamsof seed-moments,moisture-moments, etc. This
‘conflux’ is, in its turn, capable of causing the emergenceof the effect - the
sprout. Hence, the so-called ‘preceding stages’of the seed,water, earth,
etc., could not be said to be the causesof the genesisof the seedling.(See
below).
52 RITA GUPTA

The Naiyayikas can still agruethe case.They adroitly bring forth another
objection againstthe Buddhists. It runs asfollows:
As is obvious from the above,the Buddhists are reluctant to analysethe
causalsituation in terms of one main causeand other auxiliary causesmerely
helping the former in its job of production. They insist that the effect is
the result of the conjoint action of a number of causalfactors which are
arbitrarily divided as the ‘main cause’and its ‘helpers’. But the Naiyayikas
point out that, in such a case,the multiplicity of causesshould really result in
the origin of a plurality of effects. Yet, experienceshow that, even though a
number of causesand conditions may be present at the time of the produc-
tion of the effect, the resulting effect is of one uniform nature. Doesit not
prove that the effect is produced by one main cause,which is merely misted
in its task by someauxiliary causes?Dharmakirti meetsthis objection by
pointing out that, in fact, eachof the different causesand so-calledcondi-
tions doesindeed make its specialcontribution to the fact of the appearance
of the effect. Take the caseof the origination of an earthen pot. At least
three causesare present here: (i) clay, (ii) the potter and (iii) the thread.
Here the clay accountsfor the earthennessof the pot, which character
distinguishesthe pot from things like treeswhich are not madeout of clay.
The potter (with his wheel) is responsiblefor the peculiar shapeof the
pot which distinguishesit from things lacking such shapes,e.g., the unmani-
pulated lump of clay. The thread alsohas its own contribution to make. It
separatesthe earthen pot from the wheel and assuch makesit different from
the pot which could otherwise have been still attached to the wheel. Hence,
it is quite evident that eachof the three factors of the causalcomplex is
responsiblefor one character or the other of the effect. Yet, we easily gloss
over the details of the resulting thing, and wrongly think that, sincethe latter
is a singleentity like a pot, it could not be the end-product of three equally
indispensable,different causes.5
One must not, however, conclude, Dharmakirti reminds the critics, that
the multiple conditions produce multiple, separateand unrelated effects. The
various charactersof the effect in question do combine to form a unitary
effect. The earthen characterof the pot is due to the lump of clay; and the
particular shapeof the pot is derived from the potter. Yet the earthennessof
the pot cannot be conceivedof asan entity completely different from the
particular shapeof the pot. Had they been completely different, it would
havebeen possibleto perceivethat shapeof the pot in abstraction, without
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 53

having to perceive it as the sahpe of an earthen pot. In the sameway, it would

have been possible to perceive the earthennessof the pot in abstraction,
without having to perceive the peculiar shape6 in which the latter happens to
be encased.As a matter of fact, the shapeand the earthennessof the pot
combine to form a unitary effect. ’ And this explains why, on perceiving the
form of the pot, one also perceivesthe earthennessof the pot, and the
knowledge of the earthennessof the pot also brings in its fold the apprehen-
sion of the particular visual aspect of the pot.
[“na ca tayob Sakti-viSesa-visaya-bhede’
pi taj-janita-videga-
bhedasyakaryasya svabhsva-bhedah,mrt-sarhsthtiayor aparas-
par%‘tmatayi sarhsth%na-mrd-rtipabhyti tayor apratibhssana-
prasarhgst.Hetubindu, p. 491.
Men may come and men may go but this enlightened duel goeson, full-
blooded. The Naiyayikas bring forward another objection against the Budd-
hists: since substanceand attributes are two separatecategoriesof being, the
Buddhists are bound to admit that the claynessof the pot and its shapeare
two different entities, each resulting from its own cause,namely, the clay and
the potter. [Hence, claynessand the shapereally point to the existence of a
multiplici@ in a casewhich is erroneously believed to be a caseof unity.]
But the answer to this objection has already been given by Dharmakirti by
pointing out that, if the claynessof the pot and its shapewere different (and
completely separable)entities, then it would have been possible to perceive
the one without the other. On the contrary, Dharmakirti asksthe Naiygyikas,
“Does your supposition, that the claynessof the pot is different from its
shape,fare any better?” If the shapewere different from the clay, why could
the potter not produce them separately?The Naiysyikas try to hold on to
their position by urging that, since substanceand quality naturally imply one
another, therefore, the potter cannot produce them separately. But, then,
Dharmakirti points out that since substanceis the substrate of its quality, and
since the substrate and that which inheres in it are n~hrrully connected, the
role of the potter becomesredundant, here. The clay and the shape, then
would themselveshave been conjoined intrinsically, without the help of an
extrinsic joiner, viz., the potter. But the Naiyayikas try to get over this
difficulty by arguing that although the shapeas a quality must always be
related to some substrate or other, yet what makes the shapea quality fit for
being related to a particular substance(e.g., the clay of the particular pot) is
54 RITA GUPTA

the potter himself. If the purriculm shape intrinsically had the fitness for
being conjoined to the pmricuht clay, then the clay of the pot would have
acquired the shapeof the pot even before the potter exercised his productive
activities!
Taking the cue from the opponents, Dharmakirti urges: We would similarly
like to argue that, although the clay could not remain without having some
shapeor other, and although a particular shapemust be the shapeof some
thing or other, yet what makes the shapethe shapeof a pcvticulm thing (i.e.,
the pot), and what makes the pot have a particular shape,is the effort of the
potter. It is the potter who makesthe shapeand the clay of a particular pot
fit objects for entering into a special relation, known as the relation of
‘t&Ajltmya’ [Stcherbatsky, in his Buddhist Logic, vol. II, has translated the
word ‘t8datmya’, misleadingly, as ‘identity’. ‘TsdHtmaya really stands for ‘co-
extensiveness’,‘integral relationship’ and other similar relations.] One can
thus easily realise that the earthennessand the form of the pot are not two
completely independent and separateentities. They are rather like the two
ends of a pencil, or like the genus and the species.Although different, yet
they necessarilyimply one another. Hence, Dharmakirti argues,it would not
be unfair to say that the pot requires two different causes:clay and the
potter. Each of them makessome contribution, though the result, the pot, is
one uniform object. The shapeof the pot and its clay are, thus, not separately
and independently existing entities.
[“api ca yadi sarhstharuuhbhinnarh mIdah, kulr%lahkirir na prthak
karoti. gunasya dravya-paratantratvam iti na prthak karoti.
tat-sarhsthaMidh8rHtmakarhyadi svabhavenatad dravyti tat-
sarhsth%namva tadadheyatmakarh, kirk kul&ipeksayeti cet, na
tatah paraspara-sambandha-yogyats-pratilambhit,anyatha
vastuna eva yogyati dharmateti prag api rnrt-pmdasya sarh-
sthtia-viSesa-sambandhayogyatve sati sarhsth%na-viSesen?a-
sambandhaprasarigal-r.evam tarhi sa yogyata mrddravyasya
kul%llgdbhavatiti nanayoh svabhgva-bhedah,bhede hi prFigvat
prasajyeta. asti tavat eka-svabhavatve’pi kasyacid aneka-pratyayo.
pidheya-visesateti. na mrt-sarhsthtiayor eka-svabh&atva-tid-
htitiya nirbandhah”. Hetubindu, p. 49. Seealso pk.Z, pp. 96-
98.1
The Naiyayikas at this point try to hit the ball back into the opponents’
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 55

court. They ask the Buddhists, how can the latter believe in a multiplicity of
co-operating causesand yet, at the sametime, insist on their momentariness?
It is all right for us, NaiyByikasurge, to speakof the causebringing about the
effect with the ‘co-operation’ of auxiliary causes,inasmuch aswe believe in
enduring causes.According to us, the seedin the granary did not produce
the sprout. Yet, when the identical seedlater comesto receive the ‘co-
o’peration’ of certain special auxiliaries, some changesoccur in it, it acquires
an excellence or afi&zya, and by virtue of this it eventually realizes the sprout.
But in order to receive such an excellence the seedmust be a continuant and
not a momentary and constantly functuating, object!
The Buddissts reply: There is no rule laying down that ‘co-operation’ is
possible only in the casesin which the synergistic auxiliaries are able to
generatesome excellence in the main cause.If a number of causal factors
jointly engendersan effect, than we can also speak of the different causesas
‘co-operating’ among themselves.Look at the example we have given. The last
moments of the seed,water, heat, earth, etc., are jointly working to make
the manifestation of the effect, the sprout, possible. There is no need for
an excellence being produced in the main causeif we are to maintain co-
operation among the causes.‘Concerted action of confluent causes’is really
the primary significance of the expression ‘sahakaritva’ or ‘acting in con-
junction’. The ‘auxiliary causes’left to themselvesare incompetent in the
production of the effect. Yet, these very causalfactors, when they combine
together, can bring about the effect. Consequently, ‘jointness in enterprise’
is the chief characterisitc of a so-called ‘auxiliary cause’.The Sanskrit word
for the term, ‘auxiliary cause’,is ‘sahaktiti kdrqa’. And a ‘sahakari’ is a
‘sahakari’ becauseit possessesthe characteristic of ‘sahakaritva’ or ‘conjoint
action’.

[“ksanikesu pratyayesu paraspararhkab sahakararthaiti cet , na

vaisarvatratisayotpadanam sahakriyi. kirk tarhi. Bahtin&ir yad
eksrtha-karanam api, yath$ntyasya ksrana-kalgpasya.tad evarn
mukhyarh sahak&itvam sahak2rimXrh”.Hetubindu, p. 5 1. See
also nki, pp. 113-l 15. Seeespecially the following lines of the
Tika: “ ‘tad eva’ eka-karya-1aksanari-r
‘mukbyarir sahak2ritvarn’
natisayotpadana-laksanam,tasyaiva gaunatvat, kuta etat? ity %ha-
‘tasyaiva antyasya’ vivaksita-karyam prati ‘klrar-iatvat’. Karanasya
ca sabakari-vyapadesahnak%ranasya.yatab s&a-yugapat kur-
56 RITA GUPTA

vantab sahaki@a ucyante; antyas ca karana-kalapaevarhvidha

iti.
YathH cl’ntyasyaikartha-karamuh sahakaritvamevarhptirvas-
yl’pi k~r~a-kal~pasyottarottara-visista-k+amintarMtmbhinaity
avaseyarir,antyasyodrlharanatayanirdesat. . . . Sarvatraikartha-
kriyaiva saha-karitvarh,na visesotpadanamiti”.]
Converting their reply to a challenge,the Buddhists are emphatic in pointing
out that the assumption of the growth of an excellence(atkzya) in the nature
of the main cause,due to its intercourse with the auxiliary causes,involves an
absurdity. Their reason, asDharmakirti elucidates it, is the following:
What would be the relation between this ‘excellence’ (ati&ya) and the
previous essentialnature of the seed?The former can hardly be something
like an additional entity loosely attached to the essentialnature of the seed.
For, if this ‘excellence’ (atikya) is not identical with the essentialnature of the
seed,then the seeditself cannot be said to possessthis ‘excellence’ (aMaya)
and consequently the seed itself cannot becomeparturient. Neither can it be
suggestedthat the seedleavesits former nature behind and becomescom-
pletely identified with this new fangled ‘excellence’ (atikzya). The seedcan, in
that case,no longer be claimed to be the sameseedas before! In addition,
this alternative position will give rise to the difficulty, I shall describebelow.
Becauseof its identity with this emergentquality, the seedat the last
moment, when it is supposedto effectuate the sprout, would becomea
totally different entity (bh@vbtara) from itself. Only after the seedhas been
completely transformed into something other than itself, a bhlnirztara, can
the product, the sprout, appearon the scene.Hence, the last moment of the
seed cannot be said directly to causethe effect, the sprout. An intermediate
_ _
entity, a bhavantara, would intervene between the last moment of the seed
and the emergenceof the sprout. What would then entitle us to say that it is
the last moment of the seed, that is immediately followed by the sprout?
Should we rather not admit that it is the other entity - the bhrivrintara - that
is directly succeededby the sprout? Should the logic of the Naiyayikas in
that casenot prevent them from christening the seed asthe matrix of the
sprout?
[‘tatra ca’ ksane’ntye ‘visesasyakartum asakyat’ natisayotpadanam
api sahaklritvam. kuto visesasyakartum asakyatvam?ity ata 5ha
- ‘ekasya’ anamsasya‘svabhavasyavivekat’.na hi tatra ‘ayam-
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKIRTI 57

anahiitatisayo bhagah sva-hetubhyo j&ah, ayarir tu sahakiribhir-

tiitatisayah’ iti viveko’sti. Yadi narnavivekah, visesastu kim iti na
kriyate? ity ata alra - ‘svabhavarrtarotpatti-laksanatvad visesot-
patteh’, nirbhage ca kutah svabhavantarsya vyavastha? Syan
matam - bhinnasvabhava evantyasya viseso’stu ity ata %ha
- ‘bhavantara’ ityadi. Yadi bhavantara-laksano viseso bhavet
tadantasyantyatvarh hiyate - hiyatam ko dosah? . . iti cet; ‘tatas ca’
anantyatvat ‘na saksat karanam syat’. Hetubindu, p. 5 1, nka,
pp. 114-l 15.1

Dharmakirti analyses a few casesof causal complexes which are imme-

diately followed by effects, and shows the utter futility of admitting the
concept of ‘excellence’ (atisaya) in those instances. Causal co-operation, in
such situations, means nothing but the concerted effort of a multiplicity of
factors directed towards a common result (ekartha-kriyi). For example, as
soon as there is a “proper concurrence” between a moment of the eye, a
moment of a colour and a moment of immediately preceding consciousness
(vij~~n~t~ka-sa~nanta~a-pra~aya), it is at once followed by a vision of a
colour. Here the causal complex does not await the fulfilment of any further
condition. The expression ‘proper concurrence’ used in the penultimate
sentence needs a little clarification. Each of the factors mentioned above
must coincide at a particular place and time. For instance, the distance
between the eye and the colour must be neither too much nor too little. The
presence of the perceptible colour must be simultaneous with the functioning
of the eye. No proper contact of the eye is possible with a past or a future
object. The coincidence of the triune factors at such a time and such a place
is what is known as a ‘proper concurrence’ among them, and as soon as such
a concurrence takes place, it is at once followed by a vision of a particular
colour. What role could any ‘excellence’ (atihya) possibly have in such a causal
happening? (See Hefubindu, p. 59 aksepa-karisu tv indriyadisu na visesotpattih
parasparatah . . . tatraikartha-kriyaiva sahakaritvarh).
The Naiyayikas thrust a further question at this stage. If the possession of an
‘excellence’ (atihzya) by the seed is not a gradual process, occurring as a result of
co-operation, then why does the seed not give rise to the sprout as soon as it is
sown in the field? Why is there a time lag between the sowing of the seed and
the emergence of the seedling? In answer, Dharmakirti points out that his
insistence that the cause does not come to attain any excellence or efficacious
58 RITA GUPTA

power (atiSaya) doesnot imply that a causalhappening is immune to any

changeswhatsoever. There is, indeed, somemetamorphosis involved in
the causalhappenings comprising the sowing of the seedand the eventual
germination of the seedling. Yet, this doesnot imply that the main cause,the
seed,comes to acquire an efficacious ‘excellence’. This exposition needssome
elaboration,
As soon as the heat, water, earth, etc., and the seedcome to propinquity
with each other, some changehappensin the seed.Heat, water, earth, etc.,
also undergo some changes,though their transformation is due not merely to
their coming in close contact with one another, but due to other causal
factors aswell. Yet, in line with the Buddhist way of thinking, such change
would have to be looked upon as resulting in complete replacement of the
previously existing entities by different entities arising out of the former.
In this way, the seedof the precedent moment, becauseof its association
with other concordant causal factors like heat, water, earth, etc., givesrise to
a new seeddiffering slightly in character from its former self. This novel seed
of the second moment also, due to its concourse with a different set of
causalfactors (i.e., the new moment of heat, water, earth, etc., coming into
existence in the second moment plus other causalelements), is supplanted by
a third seed,again a trifle different in nature from the second. The third seed
would, in this way, be replaced by a fourth seed.Since alI of these are strictly
causally connected with one another, they are all said to form one series.
Whatever qualitative changesthe causalco-operation of the seedswith heat,
water, earth, etc., might be said to bring about, is really in respect of the seed-
seriesonly, and not in respect of the individual seedsof any moment.* In
this way, even the heat-series,water-series,earth-seriesetc., do also gradually
undergo some changes9as a consequenceof the concurrence of their respec-
tive causalcomplexes. When all these echelons receive a particular amount of
change, their conflux is followed by the emergenceof the sprout. This
analysis makes it clear why there is a considerable time gap between the
sowing and the sprouting, even though the seeddoes not come to acquire any
‘atisaya’ by coming into contact with the auxiliary causes.
The advocatesof momentarinesshave, so far, put up a brilliant defence of
their position against the onslaughts of their powerful adversaries.Yet, the
protagonists of enduring causesmake a fmal attempt to fimd fault with the
reasoning of the Buddhists in the manner described below.
If the Buddhists deny the origin of any speciality in the causesas a result
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 59

of their mutual counteractions, and yet insist on the emergence of specialities

(cf. ati@us) within the series, then they will be led to an inpasse. The Budd-
hists cannot deny that the specialities occurring within the series must have
had their origin at a particular moment. But, then the question arises, how
does the first speciality come about? If the Buddhists do once admit the
origin of such a speciality from the concurrence of causes which are them-
selves devoid of any special quality, then what possible reason could there be
for denying the origin of the effect itself from such causes?What is the
necessity of first admitting the origin of a special quality which would even-
tually enable the cause to give rise to the effect? If a thing devoid of any
special quality can give rise to a special quality, why could such a thing
not give rise to the effect itself? [avisistad visesotpattau karyasyapi syat.
Herubindu, p. 61. See also pk@, pp. 130-131.1
There apparently seems to be a possible way out of this impasse. Is it not
possible that the co-operating causes already possessspecial qualities needed
for giving rise to the specialities in the series even at the very first moment of
their concurrence, though such special qualities are not the result of their
mutual counteraction? But the Naiyayikas are prompt enough to point out
that this is only the semblance of an exit out of this difficulty. It really is a
cul-de-sac. The Buddhist line of defence would really give rise to a vicious
infinite regress.
If the co-operating causes already possessedsuch specialities, then the
question becomes unavoidable, how did they come to have these specialities?
One would then have to analyse their origin as due to some previous set of co-
operating entities. If these latter coalescing elements, again, were already
possessedof specialities, then another previous set of co-operating causes
would be needed to explain the genesis of their specialities. In this way, the
Buddhists’ argument would lead to a vicious infinite regress! [atha sahakkma
krta-visesa eva visesotpattav apy upatistheta; evam anavastha syat. Hetubindu,
p. 61. See also pkti, p. 1311,
It follows that the Buddhists are not permitted to claim that the speciah-
ties within the series might come about from causes devoid of any speciality.
(See above). Nor are they allowed to argue that the co-operating causes are
already possessedof specialities at the first moment of their concurrence, as
this suggestion would be vitiated by an infinite regress.
Although the Buddhists seem apparently to be pushed to a very tight
corner by the advocates of enduring causes, yet they are able to produce a
60 RITA GUPTA

well-reasoneddefenceof their position. Dharmakirti admits that the attempts

to explain the origin of specialities within the seriesas due to causeslacking
any speciality is indeed infested with logical difficulties. But then why should
this be the only possible explanation of the genesisof such specialities?Why
could we not suggestthat these specialities come into being from causes
already endowed with such specialities asare not however due to any previous
causalinteraction? It is true that we sometimesaccount for the primal
appearanceof specialities with the help of the causalinteraction of an assem-
blage of co-adunateentities. But it is not binding upon us to explain the
emergenceof eachand every special quality in that fashion. Sometimeswe
can give a lucid account of the manner in which a specialquality appearson
the scenewhich does not in any way refer to the combined effort of a group
of co-operating causes.What Dharmakirti intends to say can also be explained
asfollows.
As soon as the seedis sown in the field and the field is watered, and the sun
shinesupon it, a special relation is establishedbetween the seed,the earth,
water, sunlight, etc. Such a relation may be termed a ‘relation of proximity’
(sannidhi). This relation invariably endows the relevant elementswith some
specialities. As a consequenceof their coming under the purview of such a
relation, these severalelementsgive rist to severalslightly different entities at
the moment that follows immediately. Each member of the secondset also,
due to its coming into contact with a different set of co-operating causes(i.e.,
the new moments of the seed,earth, water, sunlight, etc., emergingat the
moment following the establishment of the relation of proximity, plus other
causalfactors), is replacedby another member of a third set. The membersof
the third set are again slightly different in nature from the membersof the
preceding set. Although the membersof the first, secondand third sets
are slightly different from one another, yet they are strictly causally con-
nected with one another. As a result, the sequenceof the causally connected
membersof the different setsare said to form different ‘series’.Now, the
appearanceof the membersof a seriesis, at every subsequentmoment,
cdoured by the manifestation of a new speciality. And such speciality is
undoubtedly due to the causalfunctioning of a preceding set of co-operating
causes.For example, the secondand third membersof the seed-seriesare each
endowed with unique specialities which tend to mark them off from their
preceding members.Each of thesespecialities is obviously the result of the
functioning of a set of co-operating causes.But we must also note here that
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 61

the situation is completely different as far as the first moment, when the seed
is sown in the field and the latter is watered, is concerned. At this moment, a
special relation called the ‘relation of proximity’ (sannidhi) is established
between the seed, the earth, water and sunlight. This relation always bestows
upon the relata some specialities. Yet, these specialities are by no means due
to the interaction of a set of co-operating causes. They are simply due to the
relata entering into the ‘relation of proximity’. It is the concerted action of
such a combination of causes which is responsible for the gradual development
of specialities within the series of co-operating causes.
The foregoing explanation of the development of specialities within the
series of efficient causes involves no infinite regress, inasmuch as the special
qualities of the seed, earth, water, sunlight, etc., at the first moment of their
coming into each other’s propinquity are not due to any co-operating causes.
It is the subsequent specialities appearing within the efficient series of causes
that are really due to the causal co-operating of a group of entities.
[tatra sahakaribhyah santanopakarapeksa-karya-kairana-janmani
sahakarinam Hdyo visesah saha-kiri-k@a-visesa-janml na bhavati
anantara-karyavat, tatprabhrti ye vi&e@ te taj-janmanah, tasya
te@rir ca tat-prakrtitvad iti nanavasthi. Hetubindu, p. 63. See also
nkti, pp. 136- 137. Vide especially the following lines: “kiricid hi
kiryam kHranaGmagri-sannidhi-matra-janya-svabhavarh, tad anyat
tu tat-parir$mipeksam iti”. See also: “Yat karyam arirkuradikarir
taj-janma-nimittarir sahakari+ir prathama-ksanintararb vi$ista-
dvitiya-ksana-bhha-rtipo yo viSesah karyotpadarmgunah adyo
bhavati sa tes%rirsahakCirir$irir prathama-samparka-bhajam par-
aspara-krto yo vi&.esastaj-janma na bhavati parasparo-pasarpanid-
y&rayad eva pratyaya-visesat tasya bhavivat, . . iti tasmat nana-
vastha pragukta.]

As if they have been asked to explain their explanation, as Lord Byron

was, the Buddhists comme,nt: not only is causal cooperation perfectly intelli-
gible among instantaneous causes, there is logical absurdity involved in the
Naiyayikas’ alternative of co-operation among enduring causes. Such enduring
causes, Dharmakirti points out, would be impervious to change. Hence,
if they are capable of producing the effects, they must have been having
potency always. As a result, even the seed in the granary would have been
able to generate the sprout, just as much as the seed in the field. Hence, a
62 RITA GUPTA

causewould, in that case,be able to bring to light the effect even without the
assistanceof the other auxiliary causes.If, on the other hand, such static and
abiding causeslacked fecundity at the initial stage,then it would be illogical
to insist that they‘come to be endowed with such generativeefficacy at a
later stageof their being. The reasonis, causalefficacy (My&) and inefficacy
(&zj~) are two diametrically opposed qualities; how can they inhere in one
and the samething? Besides,if incapacity belonged to the thing as its innate
characteristic (asumartha-mub&~u), it would always remain incapable. A
transmutation in the nature of an abiding und invariable object is a contradic-
tion in terms.
[na tu sthiraika-svabhave!ubhavesu, svabtivasy%nyathatv%ambhav%t
samarthisamartha-sva-bhWUrh kriy%kriyanupapatteh. ffetubindu ibid.]
Faced with the difficulties involved in maintaining that a causecomer to
acquire the causal efficacy from its contact with the auxiliaries, he Naiyayikas
might try to savethe situation by urging that efficacy is indeed on intrinsic
property of the cause.Yet the causepossessesthis efficacy in a latent form.
When certain conditions are fulfilled, the latent capacity becomesfully
realized, and the effect gets produced.
The Buddhists, however, vehemently oppose such a line of arguing. They
point out that if x had the capacity to produce y by itself, then it must
actually produce it.
[Samartheti cet, kirh na karoti, a-kurvan katharir samarthah?
Hetubindu, p. 531.

The Naiyayikas retort by saying that there is no rule laying down that,
if a thing has the capacity to produce another thing, then it must actually
produce it then and there! (nlyarh niyamah yat samartha-svabh%vatvenavaSyam
eva karyam kartavyam, anyathapi darsanat,Hetubindu(ik&, p. 119). A weaver
certainly has the capacity to produce a piece of fabric, even though he may
not be actively engagedin producing it! (kuvindadayah patidikriyayy8m
samarthapi na sarvadakurvantiti. Hetubindu, p. 55).
The Buddhists are only too eagerto point out the inanity of such a line of
arguing. If ‘being the producer ofy’ is an intrinsic property of x, then no
power on earth can stop if from producingy then and there. (This argument
has, as a matter of fact, been put forward at severalplacesin the Hetubindu
and its pkti. Cf. especially: “tatha hy etad bijHdyupanylse nirlothitam.
tasmat svabhLvasytiyathiitv%arnbhavZt, tad-dharmanastath%bh&o’ntya
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 63

vasth&-vadaniv&ryw’,Hetubindu, p. 55. Seealso the commentary on that

passageon p. 119 of the pk~@.Only in respect of an ucquired property can
it be sensibly said that the thing concerned does not possessit now, but will
come to do so at a later stagewhen certain conditions will be fulfilled. But
such a statement cannot be made with regard to a connate property. Since
coldnessis an intrinsic property of ice, we cannot contend sensibly with
regard to a block of ice that though it has the potentiality to freeze my hand
yet it does not actually do so now. It will, however, do so provided certain
conditions are fulfilled! In the light of all this, it must be admitted that, if the
weaverhad the capacity to produce the fabric intrinsically, then he would
have necessarilyproduced it at once. Thus, nothing can be said to have any
capacity to progenerate another thing if it does not uc?uuZZyset about to do
so.

III

The doctrine of momentarinesshas been the target of scathing criticisms

levelled against it. The proponents of the doctrine have sometimesbeen
successfulin defending their thesis against some of these chargesand some-
times they have failed to do so. In this paper I try neither to defend the
doctrine nor to attack it. My main purpose in this paper is to reveal some of
the fundamental assumptions on which the doctrine seemsto be basedand
to examine their propriety.
The doctrine seemsto be basedon at least four fundamental assumptions.
They are: (i) Causalefficacy must be the intrinsic property of a cause(ii)
There is no such thing as an unrealised capacity. (iii) Causalefficacy is the
hall-mark of the real as opposed to the unreal. (iv) The identity of a thing
is destroyed not only if it happens to be concurrently invested with two
contradictory properties, it is destroyed even if the contradictories charac-
terize the thing at different times.
As far as the first assumption is concerned, it is unlikely to raise any severe
storm of protest. If something has the capacity to produce something else,
then the former must processthat capacity intrinsically. If this causal capacity
were derived from some other auxiliary causes,then the causecannot really
be said to have the capacity to produce the effect. If the sweetnessof honey
were derived from something else, then honey cannot really be said to be
sweet.
64 RITA GUPTA

They second presupposition, however, is bound to causestrong resentment

among the critics. This seemsto be shaking the foundation of our common-
sensicalbeliefs very badly. After all, we are so much used to talking in terms
of so and so and such and such having the ‘potentiality’ of doing such and
such. What explanation can the 3uddhists possibly give so as not to upset
such a common conception?
Now, the Buddhists undoubtedly contend that any talk of ‘capacity’ as
such is mere balderdash unless we mean by it a ‘power which is at once
productive of the result’. If we say that ‘fire has the capacity to burn’ then
this would imply that ‘if any combustible object is thrown’into it, it would
at once go into flames’. It would be sheer chicanery to say, with regard to a
particular fire, that it undoubtedly has the capacity to bum a piece of paper
thrown into it, and yet this capacity exists in it only as a possibility or
potentiality.
Now, the Buddhist position might seento be quite an absurd one in the
light of the meaning commonly attached to the conception of ‘potentialities’.
But, on closer scruitiny, we shall find that the Buddhist position, in fact,
involves no absurdity. It seemsto me that the dispute between the Buddhist
view and the commonsensical one is really a controversy arising out of the
adoption of different languages,and not any debate with regard to any facts
about causation. I shall elucidate my position with the help of the following
example.
Supposethat a mixture of lemon juice, honey and hot water cures a bad
type of cough. Now, each of these ingredients, in isolation, is incapable of
curing the cough. Yet, we tend to think, though wrongly, that since the
capacity to cure is attributable to the combination of the three, it must also,
somehow, be attributable to each of them in separation. And the only way
such a capacity can be attributed to any one of them singly, seemsto be,
by using the terminology of unrealised potentiality. We can say, for example,
that honey is potentially capable of curing a cough, although the full realiza-
tion of this latent capacity depends upon the fulfilment of certain conditions.
If we said simply that honey by itself is capable of curing, that statement
would plainly be untrue. And we avoid saying this by suggestingthat honey is
potentially capable of curing.
We must, however, realise that, in order to explain the causal situation
referred to above, we need not necessarily use the terminology of ‘potential
capacity’. The situation can also be analyzed in terms of properties in actual
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKIRTI 65

existence - not potential ones. We can, for example, talk of certain things
possessingcertain capacities in such a way that a desired result can be brought
about only with the help of a certain combination of these things, each of
which, however, by itself is incapable of bringing about the result. The
Buddhists have, as a matter of fact, adopted such a parlance. A combination
of all of these three things is both necessaryand sufficient for bringing about
the desired result, and yet none of these, by itself, is sufficient for that
purpose; and this is really what is expressedin a different way, by saying
that each of them has the ‘capacity, which is yet to be realized’, to bring
about the result. It thus appearsto me that those who speak of ‘unrealized
potentialities’ have not really discovered a sort of queer entity, which is
completely different from the positively existing properties that are inherent
in objects. No object can be said to possesssuch elusive and mysterious
properties. Objects possessonly positively instantiated properties, and, with
the help of such properties alone, they can perform various causalactivities.
What the advocatesof ‘unrealized potentialities’ are doing, is, thus, not
pointing to any additional fact about causation, which the Buddhists have
failed to notice, but merely describing the samefact about causation with
the help of a languagedifferent from that adopted by the Buddhists.
With regard to the third presupposition, viz., that causalefficacy is the
hall mark of the real, one might ask the following question:
Supposea man jumps to his feet on noticing in his path something looking
like a snake but not really a snake. This is an illuminating illustration of an
imaginary and unreal serpent bringing about all sorts of behavioural responses
typically associatedwith a man considering himself in great danger of his life.
Such instancescan in fact be multiplied from the daily walks of our life. Do
they not exemplify the generative aptitude of the illusory, mendacious and
unreal elements?How, in the face of such an abundance of instances, can the
Buddhists ‘stubbornly plead’ that causalefficacy is the unmistakable mark of
the real?
But I presume that such instancesneed not necessarilydeprive the Bud-
dhists of their defensive armour. They can reasonably come forward with the
following rejoinder:
What brought about trepidation in our traveller is no false and <onexistent
element like a square-circle or a barren-mother. What generatedthe fear and
its auxiliary characteristic responsein the man is a genuine thing, viz., the
memory of a snake the man had come acrossin the past. The reminiscene of
66 RITA GUPTA

this previously sighted snake can, on no account, be called unreal, non-

existent and false like the square-circle. Neither can it, by any stretch of the
imagination, be proved to be a figment of the imagination like a hare’s horn.
It is a real experience happening to the frightened person, and has to be
recognisedas a real thing on that count.
Let us now have a look at the fourth presupposition: A thing cannot be
said to be identical with itself both (a) in the event of its being the locus of
contradictory properties at the sametime, and also (b) if it is the substratum
of such properties at consecutive moments.
One might react to this principle by saying that, of course, a thing x
cannot, at one and the sametime, both be the author ofy and not be the
author ofy. But why can the thingx, which is not the procreator ofy at tl ,
not be the procreator ofy at t,?
A Buddhist can come forward with the following reply:
If x intrinsically lacked fertility at tl , then it can never come to secureit
even at a subsequenttime. In the event of x’s coming to be blessedwith the
generative power at a subsequentmoment, it is doubtful whether the locus
of the causalproperty (cause of u) is really the samex. The reason is, if x
intrinsically lacked causal capacity at tl , and if x’s productive efficacy at
t2 happens to be its connate property, then the intrinsic character of x at
tl must be supposedto be completely different from the innate character of
x at t2. And, if the inborn qualities of two things happen to be diametrically
opposed, how can you still insist that they must be identical?
Supposethe opponents of the Buddhists want to changetheir stance a
little at this juncture. They may argue that x of tl, when it later comesto be
conjoined with other conditional factors at t2, comesto acquire generative
potency. Faced with such a challenge to their position, the Buddhists can
rejoin that, in the above illustration causalpower to procreate y cannot really
be attributed to x itself, as initially at tl . If a red rose looks purplish under
neon light, can that purple colour strictly be said to inhere in the rose?And,
if the causalefficacy is not literally and entirely ascribableto x, then how
can the demurrer claim that x itself is the receptacle of two contradictory
properties of ‘being the causeof y’ and ‘not being the causeof y’?
We should, incidentally, try to avoid giving a wrong interpretation to the
position as put forward by the Buddhists.
One might be under the impression that the Buddhists are trying to insist
that, in order to retain its sameness,a thing must go on producing an identical
 MOMENTARINESS AND DHARMAKiRTI 67

thing throughout the long course of its life history. And, is it not a wildly
unjustified demand?
The Buddhist thinkers are not exactly making a demand as conteded
above. What they urge is: we shall have to seewhether the thing, whose
identity is under consideration, still has the capacity to produce the thing
which it produced before. If it no longer possessessuch a capacity, it will
not be ‘regarded as the identical thing any longer’. Diamond has the capacity
to make impression on glass.If a stone, closely resembling diamond in all
other respects,neverthelessdoesnot possessthe aptitude to cut a piece of
glass,how can it be designatedas diamond? The distinction of different
entities dependson their distinctive causalefficacies. As a result, if a thing
is no longer in possessionof its creative ability by virtue of which it has
once brought about a particular effect, how can it still deserveto be called
the sameidentical thing? If x had producedy at ml , and if later, at mz , it
lacks this generative capacity, what reasonscould we possibly have for
regarding it to be the samething? Thus, what the Buddhist philosophers are
really demanding is that the distinction between one thing and another is
determined by observing their productive ability. And this demand is, after
all, not as unreasonableas it might seemat the first sight.

North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, India

.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am indebted to ProfessorB. K. Mat&l for his generoushelp in the inter-

pretation of someof the difficult passagesof the Hetubindu and its pk3.

NOTES

’ See Hetubindu, pp. 45f. and ckd.

2 ‘S&dhya’.
3 We must point out that we areusingthe word ‘producer’herein a loosesense.As a
matterof fact, the Buddhists say that nothing at all is produced in the real sense of the
term. Everything merely comes into existence ‘depending’ on some condition.
4 Hetubindu, p. 45.
’ Hetubindu, pp. 47-49.
6 I.e., the shape of the clay pot.
’ What makes it a composite unit is not, however, a particular substract of these
qualities. It is rather the particular function which the shape and the earthenness serve
68 RITA GUPTA

together, e.g., the job of drawing water with untensils of the shape of the pot.
8 “Tatra santLnLSrayena, vifesotpgdanarh pratyayangm saha-kriyocyate, na dravyFrSra-
yena”. Hetubindu, p. 59. See also )“ikd, pp. 127-130.
9 One must not, however, think of the series as a static thing which had been existing
previously, and which came to inherit some specialities as a result of coming Into contact
with some causal complexes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[ 1 ] Dharmakirtis Hetubirzduh, Teil I; Edited by Ernst Steinkellner Wien, 1967.

[ 21 Hetubindu tika by Arcata Bhatta as found in Hetubindu-prakara~a~, Gaekward’s
Oriental Series, No. CXIII, Baroda, 1949.