Dreamworks Construction v. Janiolo, GR No.

184861, June 30, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC.

On September 20, 2006, private respondent, and her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages with the RTC. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.

Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in Criminal Case
on the ground that that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question.

Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings.

In an Order dated March 12, 2008, the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.

Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC which was later denied. Hence, we have this petition under
Rule 45.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases on the ground that Section 7,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded
the civil case.

DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT:

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either
before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORTY CONSTRUCTION:

Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

ISSUE:

WON the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted
to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.

RULING:
No. It is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent
with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system." This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible
of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil
action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The
clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during
the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the
trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the motion to
suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that
should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

Estate of Nelson R. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc and General Charterers, Inc., GR No.
172642 June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was an employee of [herein respondent] General Charterers Inc.
(GCI) who later died. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine
Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent.

Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001,
the grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by
the widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in
General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages.

On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received ₱20,000.00 from [respondents] pursuant to
article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing
AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety
Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the CBA

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. It took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article
217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a reasonable causal connection between the
employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. It ordered the petitioner to pay ₱4,621,300.00,
the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less ₱20,000.00, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled
that the proximate cause of Nelson’s death was not work-related.
On appeal, [the NLRC] affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision as to the grant of death benefits under the
CBA but reversed the latter’s ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson’s death.

Herein respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA contending that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the case.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the
interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the
voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution of April 18, 2006.

Hence, the instant petition.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:

Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000.00 already received by Joven Mar should be considered advance
payment of the total claim of US$90,000.[00].

DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT:

Respondents insist that in the present case, Article 217, paragraph (c) as well as Article 261 of the Labor
Code remain to be the governing provisions of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Under these provisions of law,
jurisdiction remains with voluntary arbitrators.

ROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORTY CONSTRUCTION:

Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and Article 217(c) of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

No. It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, a careful
reading of this special law would readily show that there is no specific provision thereunder which
provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or
implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general,
of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages." On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that
voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the
special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in
particular.5 In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the
NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson
are concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation
or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.
  Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, [March 5, 2010], 628 PHIL 181-193)
(Shiela)

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring
on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following records appear in
her passport: “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle
name. Petitioner whose marriage still subsists applied for the renewal of her passport prior to the expiry of
the validity of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
requesting to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner’s request
having been denied

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

Applied for the renewal of her passport with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
replacement passport.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

The Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act
of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is,
only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996.

RA 8239

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert
to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

COURT’S RULING:

NO, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to
the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These
instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since the
petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Petitioner’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be granted only based on the
severance of the marriage.

Basic principle in the statutory construction is that Special law prevails over General Law. Even if RA
8239 conflicts with the Civil Code. the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing
with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general
law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a
general law.

Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, GR No.163988, November 17, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners are the heirs of Leonilo S. Nuñez (Leonilo) who, during his lifetime, obtained three loans from
the GSIS Family Bank, formerly ComSavings Bank which in turn was formerly known as Royal Savings
and Loan Association (the bank).

On June 30, 1978, when the three loans were maturing, Leonilo purportedly obtained a "fourth loan"
which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage. On the maturity of the three loans or on June 30, 1978,
Leonilo executed a Promissory Note.

More than nineteen (19) years after Leonilo’s June 30, 1978 Promissory Note matured or on December
11, 1997, the bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties which secured the first two loans.

The auction took place as scheduled, with the bank as the highest and only bidder. A Certificate of Sale
was thus issued in favor of the bank.

Leonilo later filed on June 20, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a
complaint against the GSIS Family Bank, for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance
and Cancellation of Encumbrances.

RTC found for Leonilo who died during the pendency of the trial of the case, hence, his substitution by his
heirs - herein petitioners, declaring that the bank’s cause of action over the loans had prescribed and,
therefore, the proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages were null and void.

By Decision dated August 9, 2002, RTC ruled in favor of Nunez heirs.

The bank filed a motion for reconsideration.

The trial court denied the bank’s Motion for Reconsideration and accordingly ordered it stricken off the
record.

The bank thereupon elevated via petition for certiorari, the case before the Court of Appeals (CA) which
was granted, reversing the ruling of RTC.

Hence, was elevated to SC.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

Invoking prescription, petitioner cited Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Code, Leonilo contended that his
first three loans and the "fourth loan" had already prescribed. When, on December 11, 1997 and
September 1, 1999 then, the bank filed the Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo
concluded that it no longer had any right as prescription had set in.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

Clutching at straws, the bank argues that the applicable provision is Article 1141, not Article 1142 of the
Civil Code.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Code

ISSUE:

Whether the banks right to collect already prescribed.

COURT’S RULING:

Yes, banks failure to failure to file a collection suit, the bank contended that it would have amounted to a
waiver of its right to foreclose. The argument of Respondent is without merit. Article 1141 of the Civil
Code speaks of real actions over immovables or rights. Article 1142 of the Civil Code speaks of a
mortgage action which prescribes in ten years. The strategic location of Article 1142 immediately right
after Article 1141 of the same Code, which speaks of real actions, indicates that it is an exception to the
rule in the previous article.

That an action for foreclosure of mortgage over real property prescribes in ten years is in fact settled. In
Buhat, et al. v. Besana, etc., et al. where an action was instituted on December 6, 1952 for the
foreclosure of mortgage over real property to secure an obligation payable on or before May 31, 1930,
this Court affirmed the dismissal of the action by the then Court of First Instance as the action was filed
more than ten years from May 31, 1930 or some 22 years after the obligation had become due and
demandable.

Hon. Gordon v. Judge Veridiano, GR No. L-55230 November 8, 1988

FACTS:

The issue before the Court is the conflict between the Food and Drug Administration and the mayor of
Olongapo City over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drug stores in the said
city. While conceding that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims he may nevertheless, in the
exercise of his own power, prevent the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the former.

There are two drug stores involved in this dispute, to wit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo
City Drug Store, both owned by private respondent Rosalinda Yambao.

This case arose when on March 21, 1980,a joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics
agents from the Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Store and was
sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. worth P410.00 without a doctor's prescription. A report on the operation
was submitted to the petitioner, as mayor of Olongapo City which directed the closure of the drug store for
three days and its payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of R.A. No. 3720. On April 29, 1980, the FDA
lifted its closure order after noting that the penalties imposed had already been discharged and allowed
the drug store to resume operations.

On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration
of the revocation of Mayor's Permit No. 1954. On the same date, Yambao requested permission from the
FDA to exchange the locations of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store for
reasons of "business preference. The request was granted. But when informed of this action, the
petitioner, in a letter to the private respondent dated May 13, 1980, disapproved the transfers and
suspended Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City Drug Store. The Yambaos then filed on May
15, 1980, a supplemental complaint questioning the said suspension and praying for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of prohibitory injunction.

On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA requesting reconsideration of its order of April 29, 1980,
allowing resumption of the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store. 18 The request was denied by the
FDA in its reply dated May 27, 1980. 19

A motion for reconsideration of the status quo order had earlier been filed on May 1, 1980 by the
petitioner. After a joint hearing and an exchange of memoranda thereon, the respondent judge issued an
order denying the petition.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
Petitioner, traces his authority to the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645, which inter alia empowers
the city mayor under Section 10.

An application to establish a drug store in Olongapo City must be filed with the Office of the Mayor and
must show that the applicant has complied with the existing ordinances on health and sanitation, location
or zoning, fire or building, and other local requirements. If the application is approved, the applicant is
granted what is denominated a "Mayor's Permit" providing inter alia that it "is valid only at the place stated
above and until (date), unless sooner revoked for cause.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

R.A. No. 4645

ISSUE:

Whether the mayor has the authotirity to revoke the license of the drugs store.

COURT’S RULING:

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the
same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.

A study of the said laws will show that the authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a condition
precedent to the grant of a mayor's permit to the drug store seeking to operate within the limits of the city.
This requirement is imperative. The power to determine if the opening of the drug store is conformable to
the national policy and the laws on the regulation of drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit
issued by the mayor to a drug store not previously cleared with and licensed by the said agency will be a
nullity.

This is not to say, however, that the issuance of the mayor's permit is mandatory once it is shown that the
FDA has licensed the operation of the applicant drug store. This is not a necessary consequence. For
while it may appear that the applicant has complied with the pertinent national laws and policies, this fact
alone will not signify compliance with the particular conditions laid down by the local authorities like
zoning, building, health, sanitation, and safety regulations, and other municipal ordinances enacted under
the general welfare clause. This compliance still has to be ascertained by the mayor if the permit is to be
issued by his office. Should he find that the local requirements have not been observed, the mayor must
then, in the exercise of his own authority under the charter, refuse to grant the permit sought.

Philippine National Bank v. Hon. Asuncion, GR No. L-46095

FACTS:

Philippine National Bank (hereafter referred to as the petitioner), on January 16, 1963, granted in favor of
respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit accommodations. All of the credit accommodations are
secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo and Tomas L.
Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo- For failure of private respondents to pay
their obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all
private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo

On May 19, 1975, before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. In a Manifestation dated
June 6, 1975, counsel for private respondents informed the respondent Court of said death.

Subsequently, respondent Court issued an Order of dismissal dated November 29, 1976.

Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion dated December 14, 1976 praying for the reconsideration of
respondent Court's Order dismissing the case as against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal
should only be as against the deceased defendant Manuel H. Barredo.

In an order dated January 26, 1977, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
lack of meritorious grounds.

Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

Petitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case
against all the defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and
thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private respondents herein.

Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court was erroneous.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present
suit is for a money claim which does not survive the death of said defendant. Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was
erroneous.

COURT’S RULING:

Yes. Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.

A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein
prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up
the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of
the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the
option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said
provision gives the creditor the night to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of
them simultaneously

As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally,
Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner
has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision
diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the
solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require
citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code,
the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive

Moreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X, provides that rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, GR No. 159694 January 27, 2006

FACTS:

On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco (or ‘decedent’) died leaving a residential lot and an old house thereon
(or ‘subject property’). On May 10, 1998, the heirs of the decedent (or ‘heirs’) received a final estate tax
assessment notice and a demand letter,inclusive of surcharge and interest. "As the estate failed to pay its
tax liability within the deadline, the Chief, Collection Enforcement Division, BIR, notified [Reyes] that the
subject property would be sold at public auction. [Reyes] filed a protest with the BIR Appellate Division.
"Without acting on [Reyes’s] protest and offer, [the CIR] instructed the Collection Enforcement Division to
proceed with the auction sale. Consequently,[Reyes] filed a [P]etition for [R]eview with the Court of Tax
Appeals (or ‘CTA’). The CTA issued a [R]esolution dated ordering [the CIR] to desist and refrain from
proceeding with the auction sale of the subject property or from issuing a [W]arrant of [D]istraint or
[G]arnishment of [B]ank [A]ccount[,] pending determination of the case and/or unless a contrary order is
issued. "[The CIR] filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss the petition In a [R]esolution which the CTA denied.
"During the pendency of the [P]etition for [R]eview with the CTA, however, the BIR issued Revenue
Regulation (or ‘RR’) No. 6-2000 and Revenue Memorandum Order (or ‘RMO’) No. 42-2000 offering
certain taxpayers with delinquent accounts and disputed assessments an opportunity to compromise their
tax liability.

"On November 25, 2000, [Reyes] filed an application with the BIR for the compromise settlement (or
‘compromise’) of the assessment against the estate pursuant to Sec. 204(A) of the Tax Code, as
implemented by RR No. 6-2000 and RMO No. 42-2000.

"On February 19, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion to Declare Application for the Settlement of Disputed
Assessment as a Perfected Compromise.

"On March 9, 2001, the CTA denied [Reyes’s] motion, prompting her to file a Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam. In a [R]esolution dated April 10, 2001, the CTA denied the [M]otion for [R]econsideration
with the suggestion that[,] for an orderly presentation of her case and to prevent piecemeal resolutions of
different issues, [Reyes] should file a [S]upplemental [P]etition for [R]eview[,] setting forth the new issue of
whether there was already a perfected compromise.
"On May 2, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Supplemental Petition for Review with the CTA, followed on June 4,
2001 by its Amplificatory Arguments (for the Supplemental Petition for Review).

"On June 14, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; the motion was granted on July
11, 2001. After submission of memoranda, the case was submitted for [D]ecision

"On June 19, 2002, the CTA denied the petition.

Hence, this Petition.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

[the CIR] countered that[,] without the approval of the NEB, [Reyes’s] application for compromise with the
BIR cannot be considered a perfected or consummated compromise.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

In said motion, she alleged that [the CIR] had not yet signed the compromise[,] because of procedural red
tape requiring the initials of four Deputy Commissioners on relevant documents before the compromise is
signed by the [CIR]. [Reyes] posited that the absence of the requisite initials and signature[s] on said
documents does not vitiate the perfected compromise.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

RR No. 6-2000 and RMO No. 42-2000

ISSUE:

whether the compromise entered into is also valid.

COURT’S RULING:

It would be premature for this Court to declare that the compromise on the estate tax liability has been perfected
and consummated, considering the earlier determination that the assessment against the estate was void. Nothing
has been settled or finalized. Under Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, where the basic tax involved exceeds one
million pesos or the settlement offered is less than the prescribed minimum rates, the compromise shall be subject
to the approval of the NEB composed of the petitioner and four deputy commissioners.

Finally, as correctly held by the appellate court, this provision applies to all compromises, whether
government-initiated or not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

Yapdiangco v. Hon. Buencamino, GR No. L-28841 June 24, 1983

FACTS:
The city Fiscal of Quezon City filed an information on February 1,1965 before the City Court for
slight physical injuries against the petitioner Rafael Yapdiangco, which he allegedly committed
on December 2, 1964, against Mr. Ang Cho Ching.

The petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the
information having been filed on the 61 day following the commission of the offense,  but The
st

City Court of Quezon City denied the motion  to  quash  stating  that  the  60th  day  fell  on  a 
Sunday  and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a
Sunday, the same may be filed on  the  next  succeeding  business  day.

After a motion   for reconsideration was denied   by   the   City   Court, the   petitioner-appellant  
filed   a   petition   for   certiorari   and   mandamus   with preliminary   injunction   before   the
CFI of   Rizal. CFI of   Rizal   dismissed   the   petition.   A   motion   for reconsideration was
subsequently denied. Hence, this appeals.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:

Petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information
having been filed on the sixty first day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days
prescriptive period had lapsed.

DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT:

City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a Sunday
and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the
same may be filed on the next succeeding business day, the action had not been prescribed.

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses are prescribed in two months.

Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months, it shall be
understood that months are of thirty days each

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code: Computation of prescription of offenses.—The Period

of Prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which interrupts the
prescription of an offense.

HELD: The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1,
Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular
act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint,
taking an appeal, etc. The said provision does not apply to lengthen the period fixed by the
State for the prosecution of those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of the
right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. In which the 60th and the
last day to file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be
extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically executed. There is no
remedy for the fiscal or prosecution, but to file the information on the last working day before the
criminal offense prescribes. 

FACTS:

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

PROVISION SUBJECT TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

ISSUE:

COURT’S RULING:

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, GR No.

206844-45 July 23, 2013

March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then
participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with
the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, Senior
Citizen was given one seat.

Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of
the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and
was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee,
Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).

Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board
resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with the term-sharing agreement
made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation
saying that it is against public policy. The term of public offcials cannot be made subject to any agreement
of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject
to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-
list.

December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed
COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots for the May 2013
elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.
Salvador v. Mapa, GR No. 135080 November 28, 2007

FACTS:

On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (There have been
allegations of loans, guarantees, and other forms of financial accommodations granted,
directly or indirectly, by government-owned and controlled bank or financial institutions, at the
behest, command, or urging by previous government officials to the disadvantage and
detriment of the Philippines government and the Filipino people). The committee was tasked
to inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal
officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for
granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof and determine the courses of action
that the government should take to recover those loans, and to recommend appropriate
actions to the Office of the President.

By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee
were subsequently expanded by broadening the scope of the fact-finding mission of the
Committee to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-behest
loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 also laid down a criteria which may be utilized as a frame
of reference in determining a behest loan. 

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The PCGG filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

After examining documents relative to the loan transactions between MEA and BDP, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61.

DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT:

The offenses charged had already prescribed, and the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13.
Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the
criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if
these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses
committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. 

LAWS OR PROVISIONS UNDER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

 Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee

on Behest Loans
 Memorandum Order No. 61 defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
determining behest loans.
ISSUE (related to Ex post facto):

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto
laws

RULING:

No. 

RATIO:

The Court cannot sustain the Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws for ostensibly
inflicting punishment upon a person for an act done prior to their issuance and which was
innocent when done.

The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a

clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain. Even this Court does not decide a question of constitutional dimension, unless that
question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to a
determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.

An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which
assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum
24

orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for
its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest
loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining
behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order
No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post
facto.
Banat Party-List v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508 August 7, 2009

FACTS:

On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed
RA 9369, which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties
on election day. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369
on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007. BANAT (Petitioner) filed a petition
for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction and enjoining respondent COMELEC from implementing the statute.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:

BANAT assails the constitutionality of RA 9369. Petitioner argues that the provision violates the freedom
of the parties to contract and their right to fix terms and conditions of the contract they see fair, just, and
equitable. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be
regulated by law.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

Petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this clause only applies to previously
perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contract and, therefore, no obligation will be
impaired.

LAWS/ PROVISIONS UNDER STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:

 Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed.
 Sec. 34 of RA No. 9369

ISSUE: 

Whether or not RA 9369 violated Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

RULING: 

No

RATIO:

First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. 32 There is
impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new
conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the
rights of the parties.33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the
14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in
their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. 34 The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional because
the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the general welfare
of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public
interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard the votes of their
respective candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted.
Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the elections
are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the poll watchers of
the dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general welfare of the community and is a
valid exercise of police power.

 People v. Adviento, GR No. 175781 March 20, 2012

Facts:

 The case is an automatic review of the decision of CA in accordance with section 2 of

Rule 125 in relation to section 3 of rule 56 of the Rules of the Court. 
 CA affirmed with modification of the judgment rendered by RTC branch 38 of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-appellants Norberto Adviento, Renato Ramos, and
Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced the to death
 Accused before RTC Urdaneta with murder. Accussed killed Melving Alipio with a
handgun
 During PI, Lolita Aquino admitted that he and co-accused conducted a surveillance on
Atty Alipio
 RTC Rendered judgment finding accused Talaro, Adviento, Ramos, Duzon and Aquino
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to death and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.
 Case was brought for automatic review in veiw of the penalty of death imposed.
 During detention, Aquino and Ramos guilt was indicated when they escapred from
detention while the case was pending with the trial court. 

Petitioner’s Arguments: Testimonies showed that the three co-accused met and conspired to kill
Atty Alipio. Francisca Talaro would give the three co accused 30,000 and another 30k after
killing Alipio. Witness Balanga heard three gunshots coming from the garage of the clinic.
Another witness said that a man arrived looking for Dr Alipino and sat at the benh with Atty
Alipio. Atty. Alipio came out to the garage and talked to the two wo,em. The witness saw the
man who shot Atty Alipio three times. 

Respondent’s Argument: Adviento’s defense is denial and alibi. He claimed that he was not
present during the April 24,1994 meeting helod to plan the killing of Atty alipino. Said that he
was in the house of Congressman Armadito Perez for whom he works as a driver messenger. 
Statcon Provision: Section 1 of RA 9346 states that “ the imposition of death penalty is
prohibited.” Section 2 of RA 9346 states that “ in liu of the death penalty the following shall be
imposed: penalty of reclusion perpetua when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of Revised Penal Code.” Section 3 states that “ persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
the reason of this act shall not be eligible for parole under Act no 4103 otherwise as the
indeterminate Sentence Law.” 

Issue: Whether or not the sentence of the accused should be modified?

Ruling: Yes. The decision should be modified upon adoption of RA 9346. Death penalty is
reduced to reclusion perpetia without possibility of parole in accordance with RA 9346 and
increased the award of moral damages from 50,000 to 75,000 and the award of exemplary
damages from 25,000 to 30,000. 

Court ruled that penal laws should have a retroactive effect as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony who is not a habitual criminal. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. (People v. Adviento, G.R.
|||

No. 175781, [March 20, 2012], 684 PHIL 507-525)