Construction of Words and Phrases

I. General Words Construed Generally

A. BARTOLOME VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND SCANMAR MARITIME

SERVICES, INC. G.R. NO. 192531, NOVEMBER 12, 2014

Facts:
John Colcol was employed as an electrician at Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Emplyees Compensation Program or (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an
accident occurred on board the vessel steel plates fell on John causing his death.
John is childless and unmarried. Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome, Johns biological mother filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System in San Fernando, La Union.
However, the Social Security System in La Union Office in a letter dated June 10, 2009 denied the claim.
The denial was appealed in Employees Compensation Commission and affirmed the SSS
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable ECC committed gave abuse of discretion in denying the just, due
and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of the deceased biological son.
Rulling:
The Court disagree with ECC’s decision.
Examining the Amendment Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized legislation
Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines reads:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation and nonobservance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the Court declared the Law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or Constitution.
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At
the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject
to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean
legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The
manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent
parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
II. Provisos

B. FERNANDEZ VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 106090

Facts:
Petitioner was hired as a laborer at the D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction firm, on
November 5, 1974. He became a skilled welder and worked for private respondent until March
23, 1986 when his employment terminated on the ground that the project petitioner had been
assigned to was already completed and there was no more work for him to do.
Skeptic of private of private respondent’s reason, petitioner brought his plight before the
Labor Arbiter who consolidated the same with three other separate complaints for illegal
dismissal and various money claims against private respondent.
On May 12, 1988, Labor Arbiter Fernando V. Cinco rendered a decision, finding that
complainants worked continuously in various projects ranging from five to twenty years.
Private respondent questioned on appeal the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter on
the ground that the complainants were all project employees who were hired on a project-to-
project basis, depending on the availability of projects that the former was able to close with its
clients.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is regarded as regular employee in accordance with the Article
280 of the Labor Code.
Ruling:
The Court disagree. The proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor
Code has recently been explained in Mercado v. NLRC, where it was held that the said proviso
deems as regular employees only those “casual” employees who have rendered at least one year
of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken. It is not
applicable to “project” employees, who are specifically excepted therefrom.
The general rule is that the office of proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately
preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not the statute itself or to other
sections thereof.
Indeed, a careful reading of the proviso readily discloses that the same relates to
employment where the employee engaged to perform activities that are usually necessary or
desirable to the business or trade of the employer but hastens to qualify that project employment
is specifically exempted therefrom.

III. Ordinary Words understood in Ordinary Sense

C. CARANDANG VS SANTIAGO ET. AL., G.R. NO. L-8238, MAY 25, 1995

Facts:
In this case Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide
committed against the person of Cesar M. Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr.
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant
on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is attended by the intent to
kill.

Issue:
Whether the term “physical injuries” used in Article 33 means physical injury in the
Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury.

Ruling:
The term “physical injuries” could not be used in its specific sense, as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article, some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words,
the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code
Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact
as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by
the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states,
the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

D. Manila Herald Publishing vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-42668, January 18, 1951.

Facts:
Quirino filed a libel suit against the editors and reporters of Manila Herald, securing a
preliminary attachment in this case.

The Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed with the sheriff separate
third-party claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached.
Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash the attachment, the Manila Herald Publishing and
Printers commence a joint suit against the sheriff Quirino and Alto Surety in which the former
sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding the attachment of the properties and damages.
After the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Antonio Quirino filed an ex parte
petition for dissolution, and Judge Ramos, had in meanwhile been transferred, granted the
petition. However, Judge Ramos set aside the motion for reconsideration by the Manila Herald
Publishing and Pinter Inc.,
Upon the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Ramos declared that the suit was
“unnecessary, superfluous and illegal” and so dismissed the same.
Issue:
 Should the Manila Herald Publishing Inc., and Printers, Inc., come as intervenors into the
case for libel instead for bringing independent action?
Ruling:
Section 14 of Rule 59, which treat of the steps to be taken when property attached is
claimed by the other person than that defendant or his agent, contains the proviso that “Nothing
herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any
proper action.” Section 1 Rule of 2 defines action as “an ordinary suit in court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong,” while section 2 entitled “Commencement of Action,” says that “civil
action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”
“Action” has acquired a well-define, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted sense
that the word “action” is in the above rule. In employing the word “commencement” the rule
clearly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding. It would be strange indeed if the
framers of the Rules of Court on the Legislature should have employed the term “proper action”
instead of “intervention” or equivalent expression if the intention had been just that.

IV. Generic Words and Progressive Construction

E. GEOTINA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-33500, 30 AUGUST 1971

Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines. On December 22, 1970, the vessel M/V “Mindanao Sea” arrived at
the Port of Manila carrying 37,042 cartons fresh apples consigned to herein petitioner. After
payment of the taxes and duties on the portion of the shipment consisting of 10,000 cartons of
fresh apples covered by Bills of Lading Nos. PM-1, Pm-2, PM-3 and PM-4, the necessary transfer
of permits was issued by the Collector of Customs of Manila. While this portion of importation
was being unloaded from the carrying vessel and transported to the designated cold storage
house, the Collector of Customs issued warrant of seizure and detention for allegedly having been
imported in violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289,294 and 295.
Petitioner through its broker, requested the discharge of said articles from the carrying
vessel and their delivery to kit under bond. This was denied by the Collector of Customs on the
same day. Petitioner again requested the Collector of Customs to have the goods discharged from
the vessel and their delivery to it under bond. The Collector denied the request on the ground that
the importation of said goods is prohibited under Circulars of the Central Bank and Section
102(k) of the Tariff and Custom Code.
Issue:
Whether or not fresh apples are articles of “prohibited importation.”
Ruling:
If so, as the Court holds, then the tax court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
overturning the customs authorities proper exercise of their jurisdiction under section 1207 of the
 Customs Code, in preventing importation and refusing to allow the discharge of the shipment of
apples, which admittedly is not covered by the required Central Bank permit or release certificate.
Tax court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. The applicable provisions of the Tariff and
custom code quite indubitably prohibit the importation of the apples in question as “prohibit
importations” since their importation is prohibited by law under section 102, expressly enjoins
the port collector “to exercise such jurisdiction in respect thereto will prevent importation.”
Section 2301 make the apples liable to seizure and detention: they may not be released under
bond since they are “articles the importation since they are prohibited by law”, but they may be
subjected to forfeiture in the specific appropriate cases provided in Section 2530.

V. Use of Specific Words

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. MANANSALA

Facts:
Petitioner Microsoft Corporation is the copyright and trademark owner of all rights
relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software such as, but not limited to, MS-DOS,
Encarta, Microsoft Powerpoint, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Access, Microsoft Works, Microsoft
Flight Simulator and Microsoft Foxpro, among others their user’s guide/manuals.
Private Respondent Rolando Manansala is doing Business under the name of Datman
Trading Company and/ or Comic Alley. Private respondent Manansala, without authority from
petitioner, was engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs.
On November 19, 1997, the search warrant was served on the private respondent’s
premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft programs.
A resolution dated March 20, 2000; Prosecutor dismissed the charge against private
respondent for violation of Section 29 P.D. 49.
Issue:
Whether or not the release of fresh apples under prohibited importation.
Ruling:
The pertinent and applicable provisions of the Tariff and customs code quite indubitably
prohibit the importation of the apples in question as “prohibited importations” since their
importation is prohibited by law under section 102, while section 1207, expressly enjoins the port
collector “to exercise such jurisdiction in respect thereto as will prevent importation.” Section
2301 make the apples liable to seizure and detention, they may not be released under bond since
they are “articles of importation of which is prohibited by law” but they maybe subject to
forfeiture in the specific appropriate cases provided in section 2530.
VI. Use of Specific Words
MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. MANANSALA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 166391,21
OCTOBER 2015
 Facts:
Private respondent Manansala, without authority from petitioner, was engaged in
distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs.
On November 19,1997, the search warrant was served on the private respondent’s
premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft programs.
The Resolution dated March 20,2000; public respondent State Prosecutor dismissed the
charge against private respondent for violation of Section 29 P.D. 49.
Issue:
Whether or not printing or copying was not essential in the commission of the crime of
copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD No. 49
Ruling:
The CA stated in the assailed decision as follows:
A reading of Section 5 (a) of the Copyright Law shows that the acts enumerated therein
are punctuated by commas and the last phrase is conjoined by words “and”. Clearly, the same
should be interpreted to mean as “relating to one another” because it is basic in legal
hermeneutics that the word “and” is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to
denote a “joinder” or “union”.
The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show
the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. There was no need for the petitioner
to still prove who copied, replicated or reproduced the software programs.

VII. Mandatory and permissive words: Shall/May

MARCELINO VS. CRUZ, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-4712, 11 JULY 1952

Facts:
Plaintiff is the holder of a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of
the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304. On or about November 10, when
the action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation Finance contracted
therewith on January 27,1950, in the total sum of 50,000, covered by a mortgage on his property.
The defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff’s demand is not only not authorized by
section 2 of the Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions thereof.
The appeal involves the interpretation of Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 304. It is first
contended by the appellant that the above provision is mandatory, not only because it employs the
word “shall”, which in its ordinary significant is mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “shall” be imperative.
Ruling:
In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase “shall accept or
discount” has two modifiers namely, subject for availability of loanable funds” and “at not more
that two per centum per annum for ten years.” As to the second modifier, the interest to be
charged, there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does
the law use “at no more” but the legislative purpose and intent to conserve the value of backpay
certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been carried out by
fixing a maximum limit for discounts. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates to be
“subject” to the condition of the availability of a loanable funds, it is evident hat the Legislature
intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are available loanable
funds. In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.