Case Digest Statcon

G.R. No.
L-19850 January 30, 1964
VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

Federico S. Arlos and P. H. del Pilar for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari to annul an order of respondent Public Service Commission.
Upon the filing of the petition and the submission and approval of the corresponding bond, we issued
a writ of injunction restraining said respondent from enforcing the order complained of Republic Act
No. 316, approved on June 19, 1948, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a
franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the purpose
of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for sale within the limits of several
municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur. Accordingly, petitioner secured from respondent on May
31, 1950, a certificate of public convenience to render electric light, heat and/or power services in
said municipalities and to charge its customers and/or consumers the following rates:
FLAT RATE
1 — 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................ P2.30

1 — 25 watt bulb per month ............................................................ 3.00
METER RATE
For the first 15

For the first 15 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ P0.40
For the next 35 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .30
For the next 50 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .25
For all over 100 Kw. hrs. ............................................................ .20
Minimum Charge: P6.00 per month for connection of 200 watts
or less; plus P0.01 per watt per month for connection in excess
of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY RATE
P0.01 per watt per night.
On May 22, 1957, petitioner, acting with respondent's approval, entered into a contract for the
purchase of electric power and energy from the National Power Corporation, for resale, in the course
of the business of said petitioner, to its customers, to whom, in fact, petitioner resold said electric
power and energy, in accordance with the above schedule of rates. About five (5) years later, or on
January 16, 1962, respondent advised petitioner of a conference to be held on February 12, 1962 for
the purpose of revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter, petitioner received a letter of
respondent informing the former of an alleged letter-petition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and
107 alleged residents of Vigan Ilocos Sur", charging the following:
We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in

blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal.
Said electric meters were imported from Japan by the Vigan Electric Light Company in behalf
of the consumers of electric current from said electric company. The Vigan Electric Light
Company has commercialized these privilege which property belong to the people.
We also report that the electric meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in
bad faith and they register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption. 1äwphï1.ñët
and directing the petitioner to comment on these charges. In reply to said communications,
petitioner's counsel wrote to respondent, on February 1, 1962, a letter asking that the conference
scheduled for February 12 be postponed to March 12, and another letter stating inter alia:
In connection therewith, please be informed that my client, the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc.,
has not had any dealing with the Avegon Co., Inc., relative to the 2,000 electric meter
mentioned in the petition. Attached hereto as Annex "1" and made an integral part thereof is
a certification to that effect by Avegon Co., Inc.
Furthermore, as counsel for Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc., I wish to inform this Honorable
Commission that the charge that said company installed the electric meters in bad faith and
that said meters registered excessive rates could have no valid basis because all of these
meters have been inspected checked, tested and sealed by your office.
On March 15, 1962, petitioner received a communication form the General Auditing Office notifying
him that one Mr. Cesar A. Damole had "been instructed to make an audit and examination of the
books and other records of account" of said petitioner, "under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 325 and in accordance with the request of the Public Service Commission contained in its letter
dated March 12, 1962", and directing petitioner to cooperate with said Mr. Damole "for the
successful accomplishment of his work". Subsequently, respondent issued a subpoena duces
tecum requiring petitioner to produce before the former, during a conference scheduled for April 10,
1962, certain books of account and financial statements specified in said process. On the date last
mentioned petitioner moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The motion was not acted upon in
said conference of April 10, 1962. However, it was then decided that the next conference be held on
April 30, 1962, which was later postponed to May 21, 1962. When petitioner's representatives
appeared before respondent, on the date last mentioned, they were advised by the latter that the
scheduled conference had been cancelled, that the petition to quash the subpoena duces tecum had
been granted, and that, on May 17, 1962, respondent had issued an order, from which we quote:
We now have the audit report of the General Auditing Office dated May 4, 1962, covering the
operation of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. in Vigan, Bantay and Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, for
the period from January 1 to December 31, 1961. We find from the report that the total
invested capital of the utility as of December 31, 1961, entitled to return amounted to
P118,132.55, and its net operating income for rate purposes of P53,692.34 represents
45.45% of its invested capital; that in order to earn 12% per annum, the utility should have a
computed revenue by rates of P182,012.78; and that since it realized an actual revenue by
rates of P221,529.17, it had an excess revenue by rates of P39,516.39, which is 17.84% of
the actual revenue by rates and 33.45% of the invested capital. In other words, the present
rates of the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. may be reduced by 17.84%, or in round figure, by
18%.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, and finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is
making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital,
we believe that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter
rates for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962, to wit:
METER RATE — 24-HOUR SERVICE
For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh
For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh
For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh
For all over 100 kwh per month at P0.164 per kwh
Minimum Charge: P4.90 per month for connection of 200 was or less plus P0.01 per
watt per month for connection in excess of 200 watts.
TEMPORARY LIGHTING
P0.01 per watt per night.

Minimum Charge: P1.00
Billings to customers shall be made to the nearest multiple of five centavos. The above rates may be
revised, modified or altered at anytime for any just cause and/or in the public service.
Soon later, or on June 25, 1962, petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul
said order of May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, since its Corporate inception in 1948, petitioner it
"never was able to give and never made a single dividend declaration in favor of its stockholders"
because its operation from 1949 to 1961 had resulted in an aggregate loss of P113,351.523; that in
the conference above mentioned petitioner had called the attention of respondent to the fact that the
latter had not furnished the former a "copy of the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo
and others"; that respondent then expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of
said letter to petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to ascertain
whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates; that petitioner objected to said
reduction without a hearing, alleging that its rates could be reduced only if proven by evidence
validly adduced to be excessive; that petitioner offered to introduce evidence to show the
reasonableness of its aforementioned rates, and even the fairness of its increase; that petitioner was
then assured that it would be furnished a copy of the aforementioned letter-petition and that a
hearing would be held, if a reduction of its rates could not be agreed upon; that petitioner had not
even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the order complained of is based; that
such order had been issued without notice and hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been
denied due process.
In its answer respondent admitted some allegations of the complaint and denied other allegations
thereof, particularly the conclusions drawn by petitioner. Likewise, respondent alleged that it granted
petitioner's motion to quash the aforementioned subpoena duces tecum because the documents
therein referred to had already been audited and examined by the General Auditing Office, the report
on which was on file with said respondent; that the latter had directed that petitioner be served a
copy of said report; and that, although this has not, as yet, been actually done, petitioner could have
seen and examined said report had it really wanted to do so. By way of special defenses,
respondent, moreover, alleged that the disputed order had been issued under its delegated
legislative authority, the exercise of which does not require previous notice and hearing; and that
petitioner had not sought a reconsideration of said order, and had, accordingly, failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies.
In support of its first special defense respondent maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function;
that legislative or rule-making powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of
hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in
which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public
Service Commission — is not in point because, unlike the order complained of — which respondent
claims to be legislative in nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the
exercise of judicial functions.
At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistently with the principle of separation of
powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except
to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern (Rubi vs. Provincia Board, 39 Phil.,
660; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S. 370). However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies
of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid
down by a which is complete in itself (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs.
Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221; People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil., 328; People vs. Vera, 65
Phil., 56; Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; U.S. vs.
Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil., 1; Schechter vs. U.S., 295 U.S., 495 Mulford vs. Smith, 307 U.S., 38; Bowles
vs. Willingham, 321 U.S., 503). Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or
pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another
legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or
enforce said Policy (People vs. Lim Ho, L-12091, January 28, 1960; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895,
April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Philippine Association of
Colleges vs. Secretary of Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805;
Antamok Gold Fields vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327;
Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S., 414; Ammann vs. Mallonce, 332 U.S., 245; U.S. vs. Rock Royal Corp.
307 U.S., 533; Mutual Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 276 U.S., 230). Otherwise, there would
be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its
authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a
branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not
only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers.
Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service
Commission.
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines —
may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact
— based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit
of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled
to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents
thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom
by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a
function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice
and hearing.
Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed
hearing. The pertinent parts thereof provide:
SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the
Commission may in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally
and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is use
principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business the net profits of said private
business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the
purpose of fixing the rates.
SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. — Subject to established limitations
and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public
service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of
the Commission previously had —
(a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint
rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary.
The Commission shall approve only those that are just and reasonable and not any that are
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public
services and other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard, ... .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since compliance with law must be presumed, it should be assumed that petitioner's current rates
were fixed by respondent after proper notice and hearing. Hence, modification of such rates cannot
be made, over petitioner's objection, without such notice and hearing, particularly considering that
the factual basis of the action taken by respondent is assailed by petitioner. The rule applicable is
set forth in the American Jurisprudence the following language:
Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings before a public service commission are
necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions applicable to such
proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by the commission,
and upon the nature and object of such proceedings, that is, whether the proceedings, are,
on the one hand, legislative and rule-making in character, or are, on the other hand,
determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial, affecting the rights an property of private or
specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be
heard as to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public
service commission.(43 Am. Jur. 716; Emphasis supplied.)
Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes
of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that having been issued without previous notice and
hearing said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and, hence, null and void, so that a
motion for reconsideration thereof is not an absolute prerequisite to the institution of the present
action for certiorari (Ayson vs. Republic. 50 Off. Gaz., 5810). For this reason considering that said
order was being made effective on June 1, 1962, or almost immediately after its issuance (on May
17, 1962), we find that petitioner was justified in commencing this proceedings without first filing said
motion (Guerrero vs. Carbonell, L-7180, March 15, 1955).
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court
hereby made permanent. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
1
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,

petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question said petitioners
2
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
3
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
4
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC : 7
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
8
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban sustained the right of a party
9
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither
10
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the 11
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. I am
1
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. It would indeed be to reduce it to
3
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
4
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
5
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
6
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, citing the settled principle based
1
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. To sustain respondents' misreading
2
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
3
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. I am
1
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. It would indeed be to reduce it to
3
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
4
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
5
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
6
That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, citing the settled principle based
1
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. To sustain respondents' misreading
2
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
3
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.
G.R. No. L-26549 July 31, 1970
EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the "MANILA, CHRONICLE and JUAN T.
GATBONTON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of respondent Court of

Appeals holding petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This Week Magazine, liable in damages
to the tune of eleven thousand pesos arising from the publication of a picture of respondent, Fidel G.
Cruz, as being responsible for the hoax of the year. The absence of any connection either fanciful or
remote with such event is admitted. The view is pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal
construction of the implications of press freedom, owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not
discovered until it was too late, and publishing a correction as an earnest of its good faith, that they
should not be made to pay at all. This Court, without discounting the elements of plausibility of their
contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the injury inflicted on respondent and indulge them in
such a plea. It is not disposed though to affirm respondent Court's decision in its entirety.
Considering all the circumstances, the damages awarded to private respondent appear to be far too
generous. A reduction is in order. The sum of one thousand pesos would be enough. So we decide.
The antecedents of the case follow: In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front
page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on
other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by
name, sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the
message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an
island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized
it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of
killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment
rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at
the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and his men found,
instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home
to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own
descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers
when referring to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted
a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story
turned out to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost
everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in
the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on
the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good
turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic.
Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made
to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a
murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He
was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year."
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.
Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of private respondent
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library
of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper
offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently
switched.
As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of petitioners, the following
correction was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were
rushing to meet: the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the
picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our
Own Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel
Cruz, who was connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here
express our profound regrets that such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction,
petitioners published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were
enclosed by four lines the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a
conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made. 1
Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. After trial duly
had, he was awarded five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand pesos as
moral damages, and one thousand pesos for attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal
to respondent Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already announced at the
opening of this opinion, that while respondent Cruz is entitled to Prevail, the damages awarded him
should be reduced.
1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate that no
action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz identified as
responsible for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all. It is easily understandable
why. No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the well-nigh all
embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what
items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the
insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant
on newspapers and other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing
could be plausibly made, however, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the
commission of such quasi-delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, that "the repeal of the
2
old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the civil action for libel." A libel was defined in that Act as
3
a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ...,
tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation,
or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule," There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict
4
action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing for
5
the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. 6
There has been no time then in our judicial history when civil actions for libel did not form a staple
part of litigations which had reached this Court. Such is the case in a far greater measure in the
7
United States. According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a
person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person
whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person." In 8
support of the above statement, he made reference to several cases. Other decisions to the same
9
effect have been promulgated since the fourth edition of Newell published in 1924. 0 Why libel law
1
has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one
hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of
value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches , an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To
redress this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand,
the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person
defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed
from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment." 1 1
The first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice Holmes. The case is Peck v. Tribune
Co. 2 Plaintiff there complained of her picture being published in an advertisement in defendant's
1
newspaper. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a brand of liquor
attributed to her when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and could not have made it,
as she was a total abstainer. The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out:
"There was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without
knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was
one, was no excuse. If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was said of such
matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' ... The reason is
plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements
concerning an individual, without other justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of
news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable if the statements are false, or are true only of
someone else." 3
1
Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would lie arising from a publication in an
advertisement of plaintiff's photograph yielding a "grotesque monstrous and obscene impression"
and that he was "substantially enough ridiculed" to complain reached the conclusion "that because
the picture taken with the legends was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it
was prima facie actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is
irrelevant; and that in consequence the publication is actionable." 4 It is likewise an accepted fact
1
that such publications do occasion greater injury to reputation than would mere words alone.
Cardozo so aptly put the matter thus: "'It has its genesis in evils which the years have not erased.
Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through the medium of speech. Not so,
however, when speech is caught upon the wing and transmuted into print. What gives the sting to
the writing is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abide and
Perpetuates the scandal.' ... When one speaks of a writing in this connection, one does not limit
oneself to writings in manuscripts or books. Any symbol suffices — Pictures, hieroglyphics shorthand
notes — if only what is written is intelligible to him who reads." 5 1
2. That is only one side of the picture, however. There is an impressive recognition in our decisions
of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously
scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional
right Thus, in the first leading case, United States v. Bustos, 6 Justice Malcolm could correctly
1
stress: "The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon
his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so
must expected criticism be born for the common good." 7 On this aspect of the question which, as
1
answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for
stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the
orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege." 8 1
In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed differently in this wise: "So long as it is
done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions.
To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." 9 The last word on the
1
subject, up to now at least, came from Quisumbing v. Lopez. 0 In the language of the then Chief
2
Justice Paras, who penned the opinion: "The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no
evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item under Consideration was
prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do harm,' and that on the other
hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without
self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a
good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of
this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be
given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually
have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should
not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words." 1
2
It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme Court had occasion to speak its mind on the
subject. In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, 2 the nature of the question
2
presented was set forth by Justice Brennan for the Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion:
"We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional
protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by
a public official against critics of his official conduct." 3 This is the Court's approach to such an
2
issue: "In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor Policy to give any
more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law. ... Like insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business,
and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment." 4 Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed
2
further: "Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. ... The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of
the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection." 5
2
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 6 The United States Supreme Court went further
2
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 7 where such immunity, was held as covering statements
2
concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials. Why there
should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed by press
freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can be more logical
and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a commentator: "Since
discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the men involved on both
sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but
agree that the Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public figures." 8
2
The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency is quite obvious.
No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what
otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory
imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the
case here complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of
a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire
consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to
underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal
values. If the cases moan anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call
for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party
allegedly offended a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of
a public character and to comment thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of
publishing cannot be ignored. To single out one decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones
loud and clear.
3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press freedom that
petitioners would seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing case
appeared in the headline. It was without basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself.
Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with vigor and clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no
liability was deemed incurred by the then publisher of the Manila Chronicle A newspaper, it is
stressed, "should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words." The above ruling, coupled with the requirement in the New York
Times decision of the United States Supreme Court, would for the writer of this opinion, furnish a
sufficient basis for the success of this appeal. The Court, however, is not inclined to view matters
thus. Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure of a daily
deadline to meet no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent was published in a
weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by such
decision which from the facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then
that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not ignored,
but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not
have a controlling significance. So we hold.
4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction, which has all the force of a retraction,
as a basis from being absolved from any pecuniary responsibility. The present Chief Justice
in Policarpio v. Manila Times 9 restated the controlling principle: "We note that the news item
2
published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating
that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's
office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this
rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first
article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52)." 03
The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded.
It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary logs arising from the above
publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the
part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being "more likely to reduce damages for
libel than to increase them." 1
3
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming the lower
court decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners Eugenio Lopez and Juan T.
Gatbonton being ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 as moral damages and the
additional amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees. Costs against petitioners.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., dissenting:
Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the scholarly opinion penned for the majority by
Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando.
I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on pp. 2-3 of the majority opinion and, precisely
on the basis thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed from should be reversed.
The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the 'light of New York Times Company vs. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the ruling therein laid down was amplified in Curtis Publishing Company vs.
Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967). After considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid down in said
cases, the majority opinion says that for liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous
publication, without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made
with actual malice — that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.
Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no criminal liability for libel. As far as liability
in damages is concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that there is no evidence of actual
malice — that is, there is no evidence showing that petitioners or their subordinates knew that the
imputation made to respondent Cruz was false or that, in publishing that imputation, they had
recklessly disregarded the question of whether it was false or true.
On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part of petitioners, on the basis of tort would
seem to be equally untenable. In the first place, the alleged hoax to which respondent Cruz person1
was related as a result of the publication in question — if considered without passion and in the right
perspective-ascribes to him nothing immoral or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the case, whatever negligence there might have been on the
part of petitioners or their subordinates would amount only to what might be legitimately considered
as "excusable negligence" — thus eliminating any idea of malice or intention to cause injury, on their
part.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from.
# Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., dissenting:
Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the scholarly opinion penned for the majority by
Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando.
I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on pp. 2-3 of the majority opinion and, precisely
on the basis thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed from should be reversed.
The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the 'light of New York Times Company vs. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the ruling therein laid down was amplified in Curtis Publishing Company vs.
Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967). After considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid down in said
cases, the majority opinion says that for liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous
publication, without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made
with actual malice — that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.
Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no criminal liability for libel. As far as liability
in damages is concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that there is no evidence of actual
malice — that is, there is no evidence showing that petitioners or their subordinates knew that the
imputation made to respondent Cruz was false or that, in publishing that imputation, they had
recklessly disregarded the question of whether it was false or true.
On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part of petitioners, on the basis of tort would
seem to be equally untenable. In the first place, the alleged hoax to which respondent Cruz person1
was related as a result of the publication in question — if considered without passion and in the right
perspective-ascribes to him nothing immoral or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the
light of the circumstances surrounding the case, whatever negligence there might have been on the
part of petitioners or their subordinates would amount only to what might be legitimately considered
as "excusable negligence" — thus eliminating any idea of malice or intention to cause injury, on their
part.

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G.R. No.

L-19850 January 30, 1964

VIGAN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

1 — 20 watt bulb per month ............................................................ P2.30

For the first 15

P0.01 per watt per night.

We also denounce the sale of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) ELECTRIC METERS in

METER RATE — 24-HOUR SERVICE

For the first 15 kwh per month at P0.328 per kwh

For the next 35 kwh per month at P0.246 per kwh

For the next 50 kwh per month at P0.205 per kwh

P0.01 per watt per night.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

I shall explain why.

That is as far as it goes.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

I shall explain why.

That is as far as it goes.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

G.R. No. L-26549 July 31, 1970

Salonga, Ordoñez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of respondent Court of

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur in the result.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from.

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