Facts:

This case is a petition in seeks for the reversal of the decision for the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by
the petitioner namely Roberto S. Conception (President) and Normandy P. Amora (Vice-President) of the Finance
and Marketing to the private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola.

Petitioner Conception and Amora filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22- AN
ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS
OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) against private respondent Janiola. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a
criminal information for violation of BP 22 with the MTC on Feb. 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 55554-61.

On Sept. 20, 2006, Janiola joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filling a complaint
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for the damages with the RTC
docketed as Civil case No. LP-06-0197. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent Janiola filed a Motion to
Suspend the Proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the ground that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question against the criminal case, alleging that the two cases involved facts and similar issues or intimately related
such that in the resolution of the issues in civil cases, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
determined. Petitioner opposed the private respondents Janiola Motion to Suspend Criminal proceedings based on
prejudicial questions on the grounds:

1. there’s is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing
checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue whether the private respondent violated BP 22 and;
2. Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one element of a prejudicial questions is that “the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action”, thus this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the
civil case.

Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus, suspend
a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case.

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must
be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the
criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent
conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have
presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

On Oct. 16, 2007, the MTC granted the private respondent the Motion to Suspend the Criminal Proceedings.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a petition, thereafter, the RTC denied the petition on Aug. 26, 2008.
Hence, this petition raised.

Issue:

Whether or not the prejudicial question is present in this case since the criminal action preceded before the filing of
civil action.

Ruling:

No, the prejudicial question is not present in this case.

SEC. 7 RULE 111 of the RULES OF COURT. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial
question are:

a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and;

b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of
law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had." In the instant case,
the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent"
directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to be consistent with
itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system." This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. Ï

In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is
impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that
the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor
or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial question
to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is
absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy. And private respondent, on the other
hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is declared null and void for want of
consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot
be the basis of a criminal prosecution.

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for
lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It
is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.ςηαñrοblεš νιr� υα¹brαrÿ

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of
the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.