Eklund’s semantic attack on Quantifier Variance

Aurélien Darbellay

Supervisor: Dan López de Sa

Contents

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2
2 An Overall view of Quantifier Variance ................................................................................. 3
2.1 What counts as a quantifier? ........................................................................................ 4
2.2 Adequacy of the QMs .................................................................................................... 7
3 Eklund’s attack on QV ........................................................................................................... 9
3.1 The Tarskian argument.................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Replies to the Tarskian argument ............................................................................... 11
3.3 The threat of expressive impoverishment .................................................................. 14
3.4 The sameness argument against QV ........................................................................... 15
4 References ........................................................................................................................... 17

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1 Introduction1

According to Matti Eklund (2006a), there are three main lines of attack against quantifier
variance (QV).2 The two first lines, led by Cian Dorr and Ted Sider, involve substantive notions
of what it is to be a good language, ontologically speaking. As such, they are based on premises
likely to be rejected by anyone inclined to accept QV. Meanwhile, the third line of attack, led
by Matti Eklund, draws on semantic considerations to show that QV is an untenable position,
even under a minimal conception of what it takes for a language to be adequate, ontologically
speaking. In this essay, I argue that this third line of attack fails.

The main body of this paper divides into two parts.

In the first part (Section 2), I present an extended characterization of QV. I then offer more
detailed comments on two issues, which have a crucial bearing upon my discussion of Eklund’s
semantic attack on QV. I devote Section 2.1 to the discussion of how a quantifier variantist
may and should characterize quantifiers. In this section, I introduce two requirements that – as
I see it – should frame this characterization and any discussion of Eklund’s arguments against
QV. Very roughly, these requirements say a) that all the possible languages share the same
concept of quantifier; b) that there is no ‘biggest’ quantifier. In Section 2.2, I present what I
take to be Eklund’s minimal conception of linguistic adequacy for the purposes of ontology.
Roughly, this conception holds that, for any two quantifiers 1 and 2, 1 is less adequate than
2 if either, (a) 1 is a restriction of 2, or (b) 1 interprets a language which is expressively
impoverished with respect to the language interpreted by 2. I argue, then, that the quantifier
variantist should adopt only a part of this conception.

In the second part (Section 3), I introduce Eklund’s attack on QV and reply to it. I start by
offering a general version of Eklund’s main argument, which I call the Tarskian argument
(Section 3.1). Then (Section 3.2), I introduce and criticize Sider’s and Hirsch’s replies to the
Tarskian argument, and I suggest that in order to escape the Tarskian argument, the quantifier
variantist needs to adopt a characterization of quantifiers based on plural Logic (Turner, 2008).
In Section 3.3, I discuss a worry Eklund raises about this answer to the Tarskian. This worry
appeals to the notion of expressive power and I reject it as ultimately question-begging.
Finally, in Section 3.4, I present and reject another argument against QV, which Eklund labels
the sameness argument. My final conclusion, then, is that Eklund’s semantic attack on QV fails.

Before I start, let me just put forward two assumptions that frame my reflection in this essay.
The first assumption is that all the possible languages QV is concerned with share the same
concept of truth. By this I mean that, if S is a true sentence of L, this is something that can be
said in any language. This assumption is fair enough: it sticks to the view of Eli Hirsch, the main
current proponent of QV (Hirsch, 2009: 249).

1
Thanks to John Horden for his patient and meticulous correction of my English.
2
Eklund doesn’t call the view that is the topic of this essay “quantifier variance”, but “ontological
pluralism”. I’ll myself reserve the expression “ontological pluralism” for a different view, which, roughly
said, stresses that there are different ways of being and, therefore, that any complete ontological theory
needs to use different quantifiers (see Turner, 2008).

2
The second assumption I’m willing to make is more problematic. I’ll assume that any quantifier
may be absolutely unrestricted. This will obviously be unacceptable to someone who thinks
that absolute unrestriction is incoherent. Therefore my statement and defence of QV will not
be acceptable to him either.

2 An Overall view of Quantifier Variance

As far as I see it, Quantifier Variance (QV) can be introduced as a fourfold thesis:

i). It is possible to give different semantics to a string of symbols, so that it works as a

quantifier; thereby, there are3 many different possible quantifier meanings (QM).4
ii). There is a class of QMs such that we lack any reason to privilege one over the other
in the ontology classroom: as far as ontology is concerned, there are all adequate. In
particular, there are different absolutely unrestricted QMs.

In order to introduce the last two statements, let’s stipulate the following:

Alternative language (AL): In a dispute between proponents of two positions, P1 and P2, an
alternative language for P1 is a possible language such as, if proponents of P2 speak this
language, they speak the truth by P1’s lights (Hirsch, 2009: 235).

iii). In several ontological debates, plausible ALs are available for both sides of the debate
such as:
a. Expressions (individuated morphologically) have the same logical form in
the home language and the AL (quantifiers are quantifiers in both
languages, names are names in…)
b. The quantifier expressions of the home language (individuated
morphologically) receive a different semantics in the AL.
c. The meaning of the non-logical expressions (individuated morphologically)
is roughly the same in the home language and in the AL, except for names.
d. As far as ontology is concerned, neither side has any reason to stick to its
own language, rather than adopting the AL.
iv). Therefore, several ontological debates are shallow.

This characterization is helpful for two main reasons. In the first place, it meshes the approach
to QV that can be found in Sider (2007, 2009), Eklund (2006, 2007, 2008) and Hirsch (specially
2009), who are among the most important current debaters on the issue. In the second place,
each of its clauses has a very different dialectical status.

As for clause i), it is not a controversial claim in the debate surrounding QV. Without a
definition of quantifier expression, it is still imprecise (see Section 2.1). Nevertheless, I take the

3
This suggests immediately that, if QV is to be statable in all possible languages, all the languages should
allow this sentence to be truly stated.
4
I’m assuming that two expressions have the same meaning only if they have the same semantics; I’m
not assuming the contrary. I understand that the semantics for an expression is the set of rules which
enable one to determine its contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which it occurs.

3
following to be quite commonsensical. Say I introduce an expression in English – “Bexists” –
and give it the following semantics:

“x Bexists” is true iff x exists and x is blue over more than a half of its surface

As I see it, “Bexists” should count as a quantifier expression under any definition. Therefore, i)
is true. Moreover, as noted by Dorr (2005), plenty of serious ontologists hold claims that are
incompatible with ontologically committing statements lay people make every day; they are
nevertheless not willing to say that lay people are massively wrong. Therefore, they need to
acknowledge that they speak different languages with different quantifier-meanings.

As for ii), I take it to be the crucial and controversial claim of the quantifier variantist.5 Thus
this claim is the target of most of the attacks against QV (Sider, 2009; Eklund, 2006, 2007,
2009; Hawthorne, 2006).

As for iii) – except for clause iii).d, which depends directly on ii) – it is not supposed to be
derivable from general considerations. On the contrary, it is allegedly grounded on the actual
construction of alternative languages for several ontological debates (see Hirsch, 2008, 2009).
Therefore both defending and attacking iii) is a detailed task (Hirsch, 2009; Dorr, 2005). The
semantic attack on QV doesn’t aim at undermining clause iii) – except iii).d, obviously. Thus I’ll
have little to say about it in this essay.

Finally, iv) is meant to express the devastating consequence QV has for metaphysics. Very
roughly said, this conclusion is reached (at least by Hirsch) as follows: in a debate in which
plausible alternative languages are available for both sides, interpretative charity dictates that
both sides speak the truth in their own language. Then, the debate is ‘merely verbal’. Much
more needs to be said to clarify this argument. Nevertheless, once again, this is not the target
of the semantic attack on QV and, therefore, I’ll not devote more space to this topic in this
essay.

2.1 What counts as a quantifier?

I have presented the thesis very broadly, speaking of quantifiers in general. This is correct;
since the interrelations between the quantifiers entail that their meanings cannot change
independently of each other. Nevertheless, for the sake of concision and clarity, I’ll henceforth
focus on the existential quantifiers (E-quantifiers). In order to answer the question I raise in
this section, I’ll first state and defend two requirements the characterization needs to satisfy, if
QV is to be a coherent and motivated view. I’ll then propose a characterization that meets
these requirements.

The first requirement is the following:

5
This is clearly what Sider suggests, for instance in Sider (2009). According to Turner (2008), it is the
claim that distinguishes an Ontological Pluralist, an Ontological Monist (or Realist) and a Quantifier
Variantist. The Ontological Pluralist claims that no quantifier alone is as adequate as a suitable set of
different quantifiers, while the Ontological Monist stresses that there is a unique fundamental
quantifier.

4
 R1: the E-quantifier predicate means the same in every possible language. In
particular, it has the same extension in every possible language.

This requirement doesn’t say that whenever a speaker of any possible language says
“quantifier”, he means the same as any speaker of any other possible language. This
would be implausibly strong. What it says is that speakers of different languages should
be able to agree on a definition of “existential quantifier” such as:

 Stated in any possible language, this definition picks up the same linguistic
items (out of different languages).
 The linguistic items the definition picks up play the role QV wants quantifiers to
play (see the characterization above).

I take this to be a necessary requirement, in the framework of QV. For if the

requirement isn’t met, then there can be no meaningful debate (or agreement) about
QV between speakers of different languages. Maybe I, speaking the language of
mereological organicism, say that QV is true and you, speaking the language of
mereological universalism, (apparently) agree. But, given that we don’t mean the same
by “existential quantifier” (and more generally “quantifier”), we just don’t understand
each other. Our agreement (or disagreement) is meaningless.

In order to present the second requirement, I need to introduce some stipulations. Say
an E-quantifier “*” is a (proper) restriction of another E-quantifier “”, if and only if the
intended domain of “*” is (strictly) included in the intended domain of “”. Say an E-
quantifier “*” is an (proper) as-if-restriction of another E-quantifier “”, if and only if it
is as if the intended domain of “*” were included in the domain of “” (and not vice
versa), i.e., if interpreting “*” as a restriction of “” leads to a suitable semantics for
“*” (and not vice versa).6 Let’s have a look now at the second requirement:

R2 : for each absolutely unrestricted E-quantifer “”, there is a possible quantifier

“*” that isn’t an as-if-restriction of “”.

In order to see why the quantifier variantist should accept R2, let’s first consider the
following claim:

C1: For each absolutely unrestricted E-quantifier “”, either there is an absolutely
unrestricted E-quantifier which is a proper as-if-restriction of “”, or there is an E-
quantifier that isn’t an as-if-restriction of “”.

A quantifier variantist must accept C1. For say C1 is false: then for (at least) one E-quantifier
“”,it holds that:

6
For example: the (absolutely unrestricted) quantifier used by someone who speaks mereological
organicism is an as-if-restriction of the (absolutely unrestricted) quantifier used by a proponent of
common sense ontology, which is in turn an as-if-restriction of the (absolutely unrestricted) quantifier
used by a proponent of mereological universalism.

5
 A. For each absolutely unrestricted E-quantifier “*”, “*” is an as-if-restriction of “”:
then there is a formula “ϕ” such that, for each formula “ϒ”, it is the case that “*xϒ(x)”
is true iff “x[ϒ(x) & ϕ(x)]” is true.
B. For each absolutely unrestricted E-quantifier “*”, “” is an as-if-restriction of “*”:
then there is a formula “λ” such that, for each formula “ϒ”, it holds that “xϒ(x)” is true
iff “*x[ϒ(x) & λ(x)] ” is true.

But then, “x[ϒ(x) & ϕ(x)] ” must have the same truth conditions as “xϒ(x)”. For, given A and
B, we have:

C. “
x¬ϕ(x)” is true iff “*x[λ(x) & ¬ϕ(x)]” is true iff “x[λ(x) & ϕ(x) & ¬ϕ(x)]” is true

and then “xϕ(x)” is true. And parallel reasoning yields that “*xλ(x)”. The upshot is that “*”
and “” are equivalent:

D. For each formula “ϒ”, “*xϒ(x)” is true iff “xϒ(x)” is true.

But then, why would we posit the hypothesis that “*” and “” differ in meaning? I can see no
reason. QV would then be completely unmotivated, if not false, with respect to “*” and “”.
But now, we should see that, given the transitivity of the relations involved, the result we
gathered for the double {,*} generalizes to all doubles of absolutely unrestricted quantifiers.
Therefore, if C1 doesn’t hold, QV is completely unmotivated, if not false.

Given this, if a quantifier variantist wants to reject R2, she needs to insist that there is (at least)
one quantifier “” such that all the E-quantifiers are as-if-restrictions of “”, and some E-
quantifiers are proper as-if-restrictions of “”. But then, how could the quantifier variantist
resist the claim that “” (or the class of equivalent E-quantifiers) is the fundamental quantifier.
All the other E-quantifiers could be interpreted as if their domain were included in the domain
of “”. How should we explain this? The natural answer is that the domain of “” is the domain
of quantification; then all the other E-quantifiers aren’t only as-if-restrictions of “”, but simply
restrictions. And then, QV is false: only “” is adequate for the purposes of ontology –
whatever they might be.

We shall now move on to the task of characterization. Consider two criteria proposed by
Turner (2008):

Inferential criterion: “an expression is an existential quantifier if and only if it

obeys the right inference rules. Which ones? Existential instantiation and
existential generalization are the usual suspects. (Turner, 2008: 91)”

Semantic criterion: “an expression is an existential quantifier if and only if its

semantic function is to say that there is something which satisfies the formula it
prefixes. If  is an existential quantifier, its semantics must imply that xF(x) is
true only if there is something that satisfies the open formula F(x). (Turner, 2008:
92)”

Turner presents these two criteria in order to clarify what an ontological pluralist may mean
when she asserts that there are different kinds of existence, so that different quantifiers are

6
needed to depict reality entirely. On behalf of the strength of her thesis, Turner suggests that
an ontological pluralist should adopt both criteria; this way, she cannot be suspected of
making quantifiers too cheap.

Unfortunately for the quantifier variantist, she cannot adopt the move Turner recommends to
the ontological pluralist. She must abandon the semantic criterion.7

She must abandon the semantic criterion, because such a definition of E-quantifier would
directly violate R1. For imagine I speak the language of mereological organicism and you speak
the language of mereological universalism. If we both were to define our predicate “E-
quantifier” (at least partially) by means of the semantic criterion, our respective predicates
wouldn’t have the same extensions. For instance, your expression “existU”8 would be in the
extension of your predicate “E-quantifier” – for (*) “ ‘Fs existU’ is true only if there is something
that satisfies the open formula F(x)” is true, stated in your language; but “existU” wouldn’t be
in the extension of my predicate E-quantifier, for (*) is false stated in my language.

As for the inferential criterion, it satisfies R1. For remember that we assumed that the
different languages deploy equivalent predicates for sentential truth. Therefore, if you can say
that an expression of your language obeys some inference rules – that is, if you can say that
whenever a sentence of your language involving this expression is true, another sentence with
a determinate form is true –, I can say it too.

However, I don’t think that the inferential criterion would satisfy R2, as far as the inferential
rules involved are the classical rules of existential generalization and instantiation. I’ll have
more opportunity to talk about this, and to suggest that the quantifier variantist shouldn’t use
the inferential rules of classical logic to characterize E-quantifiers, when replying to Eklund’s
arguments against QV. I propose then that we suspend that task for now and stick, as a
temporary upshot of the discussion, to the view that, in the framework of QV, E-quantifiers are
characterized by some inferential rules, in the vicinity of those of classical logic.

2.2 Adequacy of the QMs

Two of the three main lines of attack on QV in the current literature (Eklund, 2006: 323-325),
draw on a substantive notion of adequacy of the QMs. Cian Dorr (2005) argues that charity
requires us to interpret ontologists as engaged in the kind of enterprise they think they are
engaged in, if we can. Eventually, he puts forward several constraints the language of ontology
must meet, in order to be faithful to the conceptions ontologists have of their own practice. He
argues, then, that all possible languages but one are ruled out by such constraints. Charity,
then, requires us to say that ontologists are engaged in serious debates, in the unique
language that satisfies the constraints in question.

As for Sider (2009), he stresses that ontology is engaged not only in the production of true
theories of the world, but of fundamental theories. A theory is fundamental insofar as its
primitive expressions carve the world at its joints. As far as the adequacy of quantifiers is

7
Indeed, like the ontological pluralist (Turner, 2008: 104-106), she also needs to specify the inferential
criterion. I’ll talk about that later on (Section 3.2).
8
“…U” for mereological universalism.

7
concerned, the basic insight is that the world has an objective quantificational structure, and
that quantifiers are more natural or fundamental in virtue of their capacity to mirror the
world’s quantificational structure.

Both notions of adequacy are very substantive, and aren’t likely to sway a convinced quantifier
variantist. Now, as I see it, Eklund’s line of attack on QV is more ambitious; for it intends to rely
on a very minimal notion of adequacy, a notion such that, even the most convinced quantifier
variantist should reasonably agree with it. This notion relies on two different principles:

1) If an E-quantifier is a restriction of another E-quantifier, the former isn’t as adequate

as the latter for the purposes of ontological inquiries.
2) If the language interpreted by an E-quantifier is expressively impoverished with
respect to the language interpreted by another E-quantifier, then the former isn’t as
adequate as the latter for the purposes of ontological inquiries.

On the basis of what I have said about how to characterize quantifiers in Section 2.1, the
reader must have concluded that I’m willing to accept the first clause. In general, I think it is
quite uncontroversial that in order to talk about what there is, you can’t restrict your
quantifiers to a subset of all the things there are.

As for 2), I think that the quantifier variantist could accept it, provided that “expressively
impoverished” is interpreted in the convenient way. The quantifier variantist can (and must)
obviously accept an interpretation of “expressively impoverished” among the following
intensional lines:

Intensional expressive power: L1 has more intensional expressive power than L2 “just
in case there is some set of worlds that provides the truth-conditions of some
sentence in L1 but not L2 (and not vice versa)” (Hawthorne, 2006: 55).

The quantifier variantist can and must accept something like this because equivalence of
intensional expressive power is entailed by the quantifier variantist’s requirement that there
be alternative languages available for both sides, as a necessary condition for a debate to be
‘merely verbal’. Contrariwise, a quantifier variantist shouldn’t accept the following criterion:

Hyperintensional expressive power: “say that a theory is hyperintensionally more

expressive than another if the former can express thoughts that the latter cannot, but
not vice versa” (Hawthorne, 2006: 56).

The quantifier variantist must reject this criterion as useless. For, since quantifiers (of different
languages) have different meanings, the hyperintensional criterion makes any possible
language impoverished with respect to any other possible language (provided they don’t share
their quantifiers). This can be seen more clearly with a toy example: say that, in L1,
mereological organicism is true, while, in L2, mereological universalism turns out true. Then,
(*)“there are no composite non-living things” is true in L1 and false in L2, while (**) “there are
composite non-living things” is true in L2 and false in L1. Now, it looks like, on the basis of the
hyperintensional criterion, both sides of the debate could claim that the other side is
expressively impoverished. For, if we assume that two thoughts having different propositional

8
contents cannot be the same thoughts, then (*) and (**) express different thoughts in L1 and L2
– for their propositional contents have different truth-values and, therefore, aren’t identical.

Neither should the quantifier variantist accept a criterion like the following one:

Expressive impoverishment: a language L1 is expressively impoverished with respect to

L2, if L2 can talk about objects L1 can’t talk about.

The quantifier variantist can’t accept such a criterion as a measure of adequacy for
ontological purposes, because it would immediately lead to the conclusion that only the
languages that can talk about all the objects our language can talk about could be
adequate, ontologically speaking. Aside from being parochial, this criterion is then question
begging – as long as no strong case is made on its behalf.

This means that the criterion a quantifier variantist may accept will be situated (on a scale of
stringency) in between the first criterion, on one side, and the second and the third criteria, on
the other. Not being able to provide a necessary and sufficient criterion for adequacy might be
seen as a weakness of QV. But I think the quantifier variantist shouldn’t worry too much about
that. At the end of the day, she is not committed to show that we have good reasons to think
that different quantifiers are equally and maximally adequate, but only that we lack any
reason to favour one quantifier over another, as far as ontology is concerned. In other words,
maximal and equal adequacy for the purposes of ontology isn’t a claim of the quantifier
variantist. This is a claim her opponents puts in her mouth (Sider, 2007, 2009, for instance).
Given that she thinks ontology is somehow a shallow enterprise, amounting to conceptual
analysis, she may even say that such a claim is weird. Contrariwise, adequacy is a weapon in
the hands of QV’s opponents; therefore, they bear the burden of providing a notion of
adequacy the quantifier variantist should accept and that would be enough to defeat QV.

3 Eklund’s attack on QV

3.1 The Tarskian argument

In several places, Matti Eklund (2006, 2007, 2008) presents different versions of what I shall
call the Tarskian argument against QV.9 It deserves to be labelled as such because it is based
on the following principle, derived from Tarskian semantics for atomic sentences containing
singular terms:

TP:10 In any language, sentences with the syntactical form “X(α)” - where “X”
designates a predicate, and “α” designates a name - are true only if the object
referred to by α exists.

Eklund’s versions of the argument are based on particular examples. This makes them easy to
follow; nevertheless, I find the strategy unsatisfactory for, at the end of the day, the way the

9
John Hawthorne offers a similar argument (Hawthorne, 2006)
10
For Tarskian Principle.

9
conclusion generally undermines QV isn’t clear enough. Here goes then a more general version
of the argument:

i. I talk L.
ii. Let L* be a possible language such as:
 “Fs exist”L* is true.
 “‘a’ is a name for an F” L* is true
 and then, “F(a)” L* is true.
iii. TP
iv. “F(a)”L* has the syntactical form “X(α)”, where “X” is a monadic predicate and “α” is a
name.
v. Then, by TP, a exists.
vi. Then, Fs exist.

Given the arbitrariness of L, L* and F, this shows that, whatever may be the language I speak; it
is the case that, for any possible language Li, “xF(x)”Li is true only if Fs exist. How does this
undermine QV?

A first thought – indeed, this is how Eklund drives the point home: given this conclusion, I can’t
consistently held both that Fs don’t exist and that “FLs existL” is true in a possible language L, in
which “FL” designates the property “F” designates, and “existL” is an E-quantifier. But then, in
an ontological debate, I face the following dilemma: either I can say that my opponent is
wrong, each time her ontological claims (apparently?) contradict mine – but then I’m not a
quantifier variantist with respect to this debate; or I must concede that I’m wrong each time
my ontological claims contradict those of my opponent – and I’m at fault twice: wrong about
my ontological position and wrong about QV being pertinent in this debate.

Now, this reasoning doesn’t undermine QV completely generally. For the Tarskian argument
wouldn’t apply in a debate in which I argue that Fs exist and my opponent argues that “Fs
don’t exist”.11 In order to obtain a more general conclusion, then, I suggest that we use the
apparatus we developed in Section 2.1. Remember that we accepted that the quantifier
variantist is committed to the following claim:

R2: for each E-quantifer “”, there is a possible quantifier “*” that isn’t an as-if-
restriction of “”.

Now, what the Tarskian argument shows is that all the E-quantifiers are as-if-restrictions of the
spoken language, whatever it is (remember, L is arbitrary). But then, R2 is false, and QV is
false. Indeed, the point can be driven even further. Remember that we are assuming that all
the languages deploy the same concept of truth. Combining this assumption with the Tarskian
argument, we arrive at the conclusion that all possible languages use equivalent E-quantifiers:
they are all as-if-restrictions of each other.

In the next section, I’ll discuss the main replies the Tarskian argument has received. Before I do
this, let me just underscore that, were it sound, the Tarskian argument would also constitute a

11
Trying to use this way out to save QV would require a radical reformulation of the thesis, which would
surely make it less convincing and interesting. But, I think it is nevertheless feasible.

10
powerful weapon in first-order ontological debates. Let’s say I’m a mereological organicist, for
instance. If the Tarskian argument is sound, it shows that I must choose one of the following
two options: either I abandon my stance that tables don’t exist, or I say that common people
are wrong (not only that they don’t use a fundamental language) when they say “there are
tables”. Therefore, the quantifier variantist is not the only one who needs an answer to this
argument.

3.2 Replies to the Tarskian argument

Sider (2007: 216-217) offers a reply to the Tarskian argument that rejects step iv). His idea is
that the quantifier variantist should hold that two different possible languages that express
different QMs do not share their stock of names. Let L1 and L2 be two such languages. What
this means is that in the language I speak there are two predicates “namei”, different in
extension, corresponding to these two languages.

How does this conclusion undermine the Tarskian argument? Well, if namesL* does not have
necessarily the same extension as namesL, then the argument is an instance of fallacy of
equivocation. Step iv) only grants that “a” falls into the extension of nameL*; but, given that
the argument is crucially stated in L, step v) requires “a” to be a nameL. This means that step
iv) doesn’t grant that TPL can be applied to “F(a)”L* and, finally, the conclusion does not follow.

Sider’s reply is particularly attractive, because it also offers a way out of what is known as the
“there can be only one” argument. Here is the argument:

Let L1 and L2 be two different languages, interpreted by different QMs – call them 1
and 2. If 1 and 2 obey the usual inference rules then they will be provably
equivalent. For we will have:12

┌ ┐
1. 1x(F(x)) A
┌ ┐
2. F(a) A
┌ ┐
3. 2x(F(x)) 2, 2-introduction
┌ ┐
4. 2x(F(x)) 1, 1-elimination
Following Sider:

The defender of quantifier variance ought to reply that … the notion of name, predicate, function
symbol, and quantifier are all connected. If ‘1’ is a quantifier in one sense – a quantifier1 – then it is
only names1, predicates1, and functions symbols1 that connect to it in the usual ways. And
expressions that inferentially connect to quantifiers2 are not names1, etc.; they are names2, etc…
(Sider, 2007: 217)

This would block the argument: the application of the 2-introduction rule requires “a” to be a
name2 and “F” to be a predicate2; but the application of the 1-elimination rule requires them
to be name1 and predicate1. So that it looks like Sider’s move is quite interesting: it allows the
quantifier variantist to dispel two different threats.

12
This is almost exactly the version of the argument presented by Sider (2007:21); the only difference is
that this version avoids introducing a third language “made out” of the L 1 and L2 – a move with which I
feel uncomfortable.

11
Notwithstanding this, I think Sider’s reply is flawed. He says “If ‘1’ is a quantifier in one sense
– a quantifier1 – then it is only names1, predicates1, and functions symbols1 that connect to it in
the usual ways. And expressions that inferentially connect to quantifiers2 are not names1, etc.;
they are names2, etc…” What does this mean? Does it mean that when a speaker of L i uses the
word “quantifier”, he only refers to quantifiersi? It shouldn’t: for this would contradict the first
requirement on the characterization of quantifiers (see Section 2.1):

R1: the predicate E-quantifier means the same in every possible language. In
particular, it has the same extension in every possible language.

Let’s assume then that what Sider refers to with quantifier1 isn’t all the linguistic items that are
(or might be) in the extension of the predicate “quantifier” in L1, but the subset of those items
that are actually quantifiers of L1. But then, if the extension of the predicate “quantifier” in any
possible language Li, might include linguistic items that aren’t quantifiers of Li, couldn’t this be
the case for the predicate “name”? I think that, if the quantifier variantist wants to satisfy R1
she must acknowledge that. Remember that we argued in favour of a characterization of
quantifiers essentially based on inferential rules. Remember, furthermore, that these rules
crucially involve names. Therefore, if the predicate “name” has different extensions in
different languages, so will the predicate “quantifier” – and we would again end up violating
R1. Thus the quantifier variantist should say that in any possible language Li, namesi – the
names of Li – are a subset of the extension of the predicate “name”.13

But then Sider’s answer to both the Tarskian and the “there can be only one” arguments
doesn’t go through. Consider first the “there can be only one” argument: L1 and L2 have
different stocks of name. But the notion involved in the inferential rules which characterize
quantifiers isn’t namei –read name of Li – but name simpliciter. Then, as far as we hold that
quantifiers are to be characterized by the inferential rules of classical logic, the quantifiers of L1
and L2 are still provably equivalent. And the same remark applies in the case of the Tarskian
argument: for the Tarskian principle – as it is stated in the argument – doesn’t apply to namei,
but to name simpliciter.

Another reply to the Taskian argument has been formulated by Hirsch. It is based on the
rebuttal of premise iii of the argument, i.e. the Tarskian principle itself. Hirsch suggests that we
distinguish between two versions – a strong and a weak – of the Tarskian principle.

S-TP: In any language, sentences with the syntactical form “X(α)” - where “X”
designates a predicate, and “α” designates a name - are true only if the object
referred to by α exists.

W-TP: In this language, sentences with the syntactical form “X(α)” - where “X”
designates a predicate, and “α” designates a name - are true only if the object
referred to by α exists.

Then, Hirsch argues, all that is shown by the Tarskian argument is that S-TP – i.e. premise iii –
comes out false in L. L is a weak Tarskian language: it only accepts W-TP.

13
Eklund (2009: 152) offers something like this in reply to Sider’s point.

12
This sounds like an acceptable reply. Nevertheless, they are at least two different reasons why
we could reject it. On the one hand – this is Eklund’s point (Eklund, 2007, 2009) – we should
reject it if a language in which S-TP comes out false is radically impoverished, in a way that
entails that we shouldn’t consider its quantifiers as adequate, ontologically speaking. I’ll talk
about this worry in Section 3.4. On the other hand, we shouldn’t be convinced by this reply if
S-TP were an analytic truth in the possible languages possessing the concepts of names,
predicates and quantifiers required by a consistent statement of QV. This will be the topic of
the remainder of this section; and the conclusion of my gloss will be that, if the quantifier
variantist wants to avoid the conclusion of the Tarskian argument, he must abandon the
characterization of quantifiers based on the inferential rules of classical logic. And so I’ll
conclude that both the “there can be only one” and the Tarskian arguments can be resisted by
the same move: adopting the rules of plural logic to characterize quantifiers (Turner, 2008:
106).

To see why the quantifier variantist cannot stick to the rules of classical logic, let’s consider a
principle in the vicinity of S-TP:

MTP:14 In any language, sentences with the syntactical form “X(α)” – where “X”
designates a predicate, and “α” designates a name – are true only if Xs exist.

First of all, notice that, if we characterize quantifiers on the basis of the rules of classical
logic, MTP is an analytical truth. “X” is a predicate, “α” is a name, “exist” is an E-
quantifier of this language, and it is part of what it means – given the inferential
definition, which include the rule of existential generalization – to be such linguistic
items that “X(α)” allows inferring “Xs exist”. Now, my point is that MTP suffices to
formulate an argument almost identical to the Tarskian argument:

i. I talk L.
ii. Let L* be a possible language such as:
 “Fs exist”L* is true.
 “‘a’ is a name for an F” L* is true
 and then, “F(a)” L* is true.
iii. MTP
iv. “F(a)”L* has the syntactical form “X(α)”, where “X” is a monadic predicate and “α” is a
name.
v. Then, by MTP, Fs exists.

The upshot is, I think, quite obvious: if QV is stated using the inference rules of classical logic,
it is defeated. For the conclusion of this argument is exactly as devastating for QV, as the
conclusion of the ‘original’ Tarskian argument. Therefore, the quantifier variantist should
search for another set of rules to define quantifiers. As a suggestion (Turner, 2008: 106), I
would say that she can endorse the following plural logic inference rules:

PLURAL EXISTENTIALi GENERALIZATION

14
For: Modified Tarskian Principle.

13
 F(a) & ix(x=a) Ⱶ ix F(x)

PLURAL EXISTENTIALi INSTANTIATION

If Q, R,…, F(a), and ix(x=a) Ⱶ P, and if a does not occur in P, Q, R,…, or F(x),
then, Q,R,…, and ixF(x) Ⱶ P.

These inferential rules would do the trick: the rule for plural existential generalization blocks
the derivation of “xF(x)” on the basis of “F(a)”. This means that, if quantifiers, names and
predicates are defined by plural logic inference rules, MTP isn’t an analytic truth. And the same
can be said of S-TP. Pace the threat of expressive impoverishment (see Section 3.3), we can
then reject S-TP (and MTP) to preserve QV from the Tarskian argument.

And the same can be said of the “there can be only one” argument. As Turner points out, in
defence of Ontological Pluralism (Turner, 2008: 106-107), this argument is blocked by the
adoption of inference rules similar to those of plural logic. Finally, then, both the “there can be
only one” and the Tarskian arguments can be answered with the same move.

Can it be argued that this move is illegitimate? That it makes, for instance, quantifiers far too
cheap? I don’t think so. For, as I said before, the Tarskian argument isn’t only a threat to the
quantifier variantist. If it is sound, it also forces ontologists15 who hold a view contradicting
common sense ontology either to abandon their position, or to push that lay people are
massively wrong. Given this, if the characterization of quantifiers on the basis of plural logic is
the only way out of the Tarskian argument, many serious ontologists had better not consider it
an illegitimate move. Moreover, the quantifier variantist isn’t committed to use an ‘expensive’
notion of quantifiers. She only needs to put forward a notion substantive enough do the job
she wants to be done.

3.3 The threat of expressive impoverishment

Against the solution to the Tarskian argument suggested by Hirsch, Eklund argues that a
language in which S-TP comes out false is impoverished in such a way that it cannot be
adequate, ontologically speaking.16

“What I claim on behalf of the Tarskian argument is that a language whose ontological expressions
work in such a way that the Tarskian assumption (or the statement of that language which is its
counterpart) fails to come out true is simply expressively impoverished: it fails to be able to state
everything relevant to semantics.” (Eklund, 2007: 389)

This worry has been answered both by Sider and Hirsch. Roughly, their answers are along
the following lines: yes S-TP is true in some languages, and in others it is not; and, yes,
again, making semantics of foreign languages is easier in a language in which S-TP comes
out true. But this doesn’t entail that such a language is better as far as ontology is

15
I should say certain ontologists: those who hold that for some predicate “F”, Fs don’t exist, while
common sense ontology grants “Fs exist”.
16
Indeed, Eklund doesn’t say that being impoverished in that way must rule out a language as a
candidate for the ontology classroom; but if his point is to be pertinent, he must assume this.

14
concerned.17In other words, what both Sider and Hirsch argue is that the quantifier
variantist has no reason to accept that “being able to state everything relevant to
semantics” is a measure of the adequacy of a language for the purposes of ontology.
Moreover, as far as intensional expressive power is concerned (which is the only kind of
expressive power the quantifier variantist must accept as a measure of adequacy for
ontological inquiries (see Section 2.2)), in the languages in which it turns out false, S-TP
could be translated by:

S-TPT: In any language L, sentences with the syntactical form “X(α)” – where “X”
designates a predicate, and “α” designates a name – are true only if “x(x=a)”, where
“” is the E-quantifier of a language in which S-TP is true.

Now, I think that this answer would be roughly satisfactory if it were needed. But I don’t
think the quantifier variantist needs it. For remember that we granted that QV is tightly
linked to the following claim:

R2: for each E-quantifer “”, there is a possible quantifier “*” that isn’t an as-if
restriction of “”.

But it should be clear that, if S-TP is true, then all the E-quantifiers are as-if restrictions
of “”, the quantifier of the language in which S-TP is true. This is, indeed, the
conclusion of the Tarskian argument. But then, if QV is true (or a least minimally
motivated) only if R2 holds, granting that S-TP is true in a possible language would
obviously be begging the question.

Well, Eklund may reply, “If QV somehow requires the truth of R2, I don’t even need the
Tarskian argument to defeat it.” For let’s consider the language in which maximalism is
true, where maximalism is defined as follows: for any predicate “F”, if “Fs exist” is true in
any possible language (where “exist” is an E-quantifier), then “Fs exist” is true by the
maximalist’s lights. Now, obviously, if the maximalist language were a possible language,
R2 would be false. And then, we shall have serious doubts about the viability of QV. But,
as Eklund himself points out (2006b), maximalism isn’t a coherent position. So
maximalism fails to define a quantifier meaning; thus there is no maximalist possible
language.

3.4 The sameness argument against QV

Eklund offers two different versions of what he calls the sameness argument against QV. Since
they are quite different, I’ll quickly discuss both.

Take the sentences “2 is prime” of the languages [of Nominalism and Platonism]; SN and SP. Since the
former is untrue and the latter is true, SN and SP must have different truth-conditions. But since they
have different truth-conditions, they must have different meanings. The point generalizes. The
pluralist must say that there are massive meaning differences between L N and LP. Call this argument
the sameness argument.
[here is the problem] it poses… the ontological pluralist wants to be, precisely, a pluralist about
ontologies. Intuitively, what she wants to say is that there are different languages, with different

17
As Sider says “French may be the language of love, but it’s not better for it ontologically speaking”
(Sider, 2007: 218).

15
 existence-like concepts, such that (say) numbers exist in one sense of “exists” and not the other. But
if “number” automatically means different things in the two languages she does not get to say this.
(Eklund, 2009: 147)

First of all, notice that Eklund has chosen a very bad example; for in the same volume, Hirsch
(2009: 252-256) argues that the dispute between the Platonist and the Nominalist is probably
not merely verbal.

Second: this version of the sameness argument only shows that the numerical symbols cannot
have the same meanings in the language of Platonism and the language of Nominalism. In the
language of Platonism, they are names, referring to numbers; in the language of Nominalism,
whether they are names or not, they obviously can’t refer to numbers. Why would these
differences in meaning be so puzzling? I can see no reason.

Third: Eklund thinks that the problem the sameness argument poses to the quantifier
variantist is that it forces her to acknowledge that “number” means something different in the
language of Platonism and the language of Nominalism. This would indeed be a problem, for
then both the idea that different ontological positions come out true in different languages18
and the idea that quantifiers have a special role in the configuration of the different languages
evaporate. But the problem is that you can’t infer from the fact that the Platonist and
Nominalist don’t use the symbols with which we refer to numbers in the same way as each
other,19 that they don’t share a predicate “number” with the same meaning. The argument
hence doesn’t get off the ground.

Let’s now consider Eklund’s other version of the sameness argument. Assume first that, in our
language, incars don’t exist and that “Herbie” is the name of a white car. Label then L* any
possible language in which “incars exist” is true and assume that “Herbie* is the name of a
white incar” and “at any time, Herbie* is Herbie’s part which is in a garage” are true in L*.
Then:

consider the true sentence of L* ‘Herbie* is white’ (1*) and the counterpart sentence ‘Herbie* is
white’ of our language augmented with the name ‘Herbie*’ purporting to refer to an incar (1). By
the ontological pluralist’s light, (1) is untrue, but (1*) is true. But this, I submit, is impossible, given
that ‘Herbie*’ of L* and the name ‘Herbie*’ of our language purport to refer to the same
object…*this+ suggests that (1) and (1*) cannot differ in truth-values after all, and hence that
ontological pluralism must be false. (Eklund, 2007: 390)

I have to say that this version of the argument is quite obscure to me: how can we introduce a
name in our language purporting to refer to an entity that doesn’t exist? Let’s be charitable
and say that we can – after all, “Santa Claus” seems to be a name for something that doesn’t
exist. What then is the meaning of “Herbie*” in our language? A hard question. Of course it
can’t be an individual; maybe it is an empty definite description; or maybe Eklund’s phrasing

18
Even in a minimal sense of ontological position, along the lines of: a theory is a coherent ontological
position if and only if is it composed of a set of sentences using (something very close to) English lexicon
that are true under an (at least one) interpretation such as:
a. The sentences components have the logical form they have in English (i.e. quantifier are
quantifier, names are names, predicates are predicates,…).
b. The non-logical expressions have roughly the same meaning as in English (except for some
names).
19
For the sake of simplicity, I’m assuming that in our language platonism is true; or, at least, that we can
truly say that “2” refers to a number, and likewise.

16
must be taken at face-value: “Herbie*” purports to refer to an incar – nothing more, nothing
less. Is “Herbie*” then an empty name?

Anyway, however we finally decide to settle this question, this is not the main reason why we
should reject the sameness argument. We should reject it because it is not true that “Herbie*”
in L* purports to refer to an incar. Whatever may be the trick we use to provide a semantics
for names of languages using different quantifiers (see Dorr, 2005: 14-16), what we know for
sure is that, stated in our language, the semantics for the name of L* “Herbie*” doesn’t say
that it purports to refer to an incar. And we know this precisely because such a semantics
would yield the wrong truth-value for the sentence of L* “Herbie* is white”.

I imagine that, in order to secure this point, I should provide a possible semantics for
“Herbie*”L*. In order to do this, we can follow Dorr’s counterfactual proposal (Dorr, 2006: 14;
see also, Hirsch, 2009: 246). This would lead to a semantics along the following lines:

(*) If incar existed, the word “Herbie*” in L* would refer, at any time, to the parts of
Herbie that are in a garage.

I guess that such a semantics would yield the correct truth-conditions for the sentence of L*
“Herbie* is white”. And now, whatever may be the semantics of “Herbie*” as a name of our
language, it clearly differs from (*). So there is no mystery left about the difference in truth-
values between (1) and (1*).

4 References

Dorr, C. (2005). What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology. In M. E.

Kalderon (Ed.), Fictionalist approches to metaphysics, Oxford UP, pp. 234-286.

Eklund, M. (2006a). Metaontology. Philosophy Compass, 1(3), pp. 317-334.

Eklund, M. (2006b). Neo-fregean ontology. Philosophical Perspectives: Metaphysics, 20, pp.

95-121.

Eklund, M. (2007). The picture of reality as an amorphous lump. In T.Sider, J. Hawthorne &

D.J. Zimmerman (Eds.), Contemporary debates in Metaphysics, Blackwell, pp. 382-396.

Eklund, M. (2009). Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R.

Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology,

Oxford UP, pp. 130-156.

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Hawthorne, J. (2006). Plenitude, convention and ontology. Metaphysical essays, Oxford UP,

pp. 53-71.

Hirsch, E. (2002). Quantifier variance and realism. Philosophical Issues, 12, pp. 51-73.

Hirsch, E. (2005). Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense. Philosophy

and Phenomenological Research, 70, pp. 67-97.

Hirsch, E. (2009). Ontology and alternative languages. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley & R.

Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology,

Oxford UP, pp. 231-259.

Hirsch, E. (2008). Language, ontology, and structure. Noûs, 42(3), pp. 509-528.

Lewis, D. (1999). New work for a theory of universals. Papers in metaphysics and

epistemology, Cambridge UP, pp. 8-55.

Lewis, D. (1999). Putnam's paradox. Papers in metaphysics and epistemology, Cambridge

UP, pp. 56-77.

Lewis, D. (2004). Tensed quantifiers. In D. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in

metaphysics, Oxford UP, pp. 3-14.

McGrath, M. (2008). Conciliatory metaontology and the vindication of common sense. Noûs,

42(3), pp. 482-508.

Sider, T. (2003). Against vague existence. Philosophical Studies, 114, pp. 135-146.

Sider, T. (2007). Neo-fregeanism and quantifier variance. Aristotelian Society,

Supplementary 81, pp. 201-232.

Sider, T. (2009). Ontological realism. In D. Chalmer, D. Manley & R. Wasserman (Eds.),

Metametaphysics: New essay on the foundations of ontology, Oxford UP, pp. 384-423.

Turner, J. (2008). Ontology, Quantification, and Fundamentality. Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers

University.

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