Asian Development Bank Institute: ADBI Working Paper Series

ADBI Working Paper Series
IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON
HOUSEHOLDS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT
Peter J. Morgan and Long Q. Trinh
No. 1226
March 2021
Asian Development Bank Institute

Peter J. Morgan is Senior Consulting Economist and Vice Chair of Research at the Asian
Development Bank Institute (ADBI). Long Q. Trinh is a Project Consultant at ADBI.
The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments
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Suggested citation:
Morgan, P. J. and L. Q. Trinh. 2021. Impacts of COVID-19 on Households in ASEAN

Countries and Their Implications for Human Capital Development. ADBI Working Paper
1226. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available:
https://www.adb.org/publications/impacts-covid-19-households-asean-countries
Please contact the authors for information about this paper.
Email: pmorgan@adbi.org, ltrinh@adbi.org
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© 2021 Asian Development Bank Institute

ADBI Working Paper 1226 Morgan and Trinh
Abstract
The outbreak of the COVID-19 virus and the resulting falls in demand due both to
uncertainty and policy interventions such as lockdowns, “social distancing,” and travel
restrictions are having a severe impact on Asian economies and hence on Asian households.
These negative impacts come through a variety of channels, including loss of employment or
reduced working hours, loss of sales and income of a household business, inability to travel
to work, increased need to stay at home to look after children or sick household members,
higher prices and/or lack of availability of staple items, reduced access to schooling, etc.
In order to better understand these impacts, we carried out computer-assisted telephone
interviews of households in eight ADB developing member countries: Cambodia, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Viet Nam. Our empirical results suggest that various household characteristics,
including household income class (before COVID-19), household demographic factors, and
COVID-19-induced factors such as having at least one person who lost their job or being
located in lockdown areas, all affected the likelihood of a decline in income. In all countries,
having at least one person who lost their job or had reduced working time increases
the likelihood of experiencing financial difficulties by 17 percentage points. About 27% of
children who stopped attending school could not fully participate in online learning programs
due to weak/insufficient internet connections and a lack of digital devices. Two COVID-19-
related factors—having at least one person who lost their job or had working hours reduced
and experiencing financial difficulties—significantly affect the intensity of online classes
taken by children in an average household.
Keywords: COVID-19, ASEAN, household income, employment, consumption, household

finance, education, online learning
JEL Classification: D14, G51, H12, H84, I10, I24, J6
2
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................1
3. SPREAD OF COVID-19 AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES..................................... 3
3.1 COVID-19 in ASEAN Economies ...................................................................... 3

3.2 Government Responses ....................................................................................3
4. ADBI HOUSEHOLD SURVEY IN ASEAN COUNTRIES .............................................. 5
5. COVID-19 IMPACTS AND COPING STRATEGIES ..................................................... 6
6. IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON EMPLOYMENT .................................. 20
7. EDUCATION IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .......................................... 22
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS ..........................................................................................29
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................30
3
1. INTRODUCTION
restrictions are having a severe impact on Asian economies and hence on Asian
households. These negative impacts come through a variety of channels, including loss
of employment or reduced working hours, loss of sales and income of a household
business, inability to travel to work, increased need to stay at home to look after
children or sick household members, higher prices and/or lack of availability of staple
items, reduced access to schooling, etc. Low-income and vulnerable groups are likely
to be particularly susceptible due to a lack of resources they can draw on during
periods of reduced income. In order to develop appropriate policy responses, it is
necessary to obtain a correct understanding of the current situation of households. As
part of the Asian Development Bank’s overall strategy to deal with the current crisis,
ADBI has carried out surveys of households to better understand the size, aspects, and
incidence of impacts on them, especially vulnerable groups. In particular, this study
focuses on the implications for human capital formation of reduced access to education
due to reduced school attendance because of the pandemic and inability to access
online learning due to insufficient internet connectivity and a lack of devices to connect.
Specifically, we carried out computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATIs) and online
surveys of households in eight ADB developing member countries: Cambodia, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. (Face-to-face surveys were impractical due to the
lockdowns being implemented in response to the pandemic.) The surveys were carried
out from the end of May to the end of July. Representative samples of 1,000
households in each country were surveyed.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the first case was reported in Hubei province in the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in December 2019, the new coronavirus has spread rapidly throughout the
world, and the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a global pandemic in
March 2020 (Cucinotta and Vanelli 2020). The disease has since become one of the
largest public health crises in history, and it has led to economic and social crises
as well. In some ASEAN economies, the first cases of COVID-19 were reported quite
early, in January 2020. Since then, the disease has continued to spread in the region.
ASEAN economies’ governments have instituted various restrictions to contain the
spread of the disease within their boundaries, such as movement restrictions, border
closures, social distancing, quarantine, and closure of nonessential services.
Implementation of such stringent measures could disrupt the economy and ultimately
people’s living standards. Reports show that the region will face disruptions in several
ways, including the loss of jobs and income, and potentially reduced accumulation
of human capital for children (Demeke and Kariuki 2020; ILO 2020; UN-Habitat and
WFP 2020).
Many studies have shown profound impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on economic
activities. McKibbin and Fernando (2020) argue that pandemics can affect households,
governments, and businesses through increased business costs, increased public
healthcare expenditures, changes in labor supply due to mortality and morbidity, etc.
COVID-19-related restrictions have obstructed all stages of the food supply chain,
including production, distribution, processing, and consumption (Siche 2020; Torero
1
2020), and have caused damage to perishable agricultural commodities such as meat
and vegetables (Nicola et al. 2020).
While various studies have examined potential impacts of the pandemic on global and
national economic indicators such as poverty, government expenditures, GDP growth,
budget deficits, and employment (ILO 2020; Nicola et al. 2020; Sumner, Hoy, and
Ortiz-Juarez 2020; UN-Habitat and WFP 2020), there is limited information on how the
pandemic and associated lockdown policies are affecting individuals at the household
level. Economic effects of a pandemic may disproportionately impact members of
society, depending on their income status, livelihood strategies, access to markets, etc.
Therefore it is important to understand the household-level impacts as well as the
support mechanisms that could contribute to income smoothing.
Kansiime et al. (2020) assessed implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for household
income and food security in two East African countries, using online survey data from
442 respondents. They found that more than two-thirds of the respondents experienced
income shocks due to the COVID-19 crisis. Food security and dietary quality worsened:
the proportion of food-insecure1 respondents increased by 38% and 44% in Kenya and
Uganda, respectively. Results from probit regressions show that the low-income
households and those dependent on labor income were more vulnerable to income
shocks and consumed less food during the COVID-19 pandemic compared to other
respondent categories.
Ceballos, Kannan, and Kramer (2020) and Harris et al. (2020) studied the impacts of
COVID-19 and related restrictions on smallholders in India and reported a large degree
of heterogeneity in the impacts of COVID-19 responses on agricultural activity, income,
and food security. Ceballos, Kannan, and Kramer (2020) analyzed data from phone-
based surveys on disruptions to agricultural production and food security administered
to 1,515 smallholder producers in the states of Haryana and Odisha, India. They found
substantial heterogeneity in how the lockdown affected farmers in these two states,
which was likely related to existing structural differences in market infrastructure and to
differences in state-specific COVID-19-related policies. Harris et al. (2020) investigated
effects of the COVID-19-induced shock on the production, sales, prices, incomes, and
diets of vegetable farmers in India as both producers and consumers of nutrient-dense
foods. They undertook a rapid telephone survey with 448 farmers in four states. They
found that a majority of farmers reported negative impacts on production, sales, prices,
and incomes. Over 80% of farmers reported some decline in sales, and over 20%
reported very large declines (sold almost nothing). Price reductions were reported by
over 80% of farmers, and reductions of more than half by 50% of them. Similarly, farm
income reportedly dropped for 90% of farmers, and by more than half for 60% of them.
The data also showed a higher level of vulnerability among female farmers in terms of
both livelihoods and diet, and differential effects on smaller and larger farms, which
suggests that different farms may require different types of support in order to continue
to operate. Farms reported diverse coping strategies to maintain sales, though often
with negative implications for reported incomes. The ability to consume one’s own
produce may help to support diets.
We add to the growing body of literature on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic by
examining its implications for household income, household financial viability, and
schooling decisions, covering eight Southeast Asian countries: Cambodia, the Lao
PDR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The
1 Food insecurity is defined as the disruption of food intake or eating patterns because of a lack of money
and other resources.
2
results should contribute to guiding policy discussions on the provision of necessary

measures to cope with the potential negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. SPREAD OF COVID-19 AND GOVERNMENT

RESPONSES
3.1 COVID-19 in ASEAN Economies
Table 1 presents the progress of COVID-19 in the eight ASEAN countries in which we
implemented our survey. It shows the progress of COVID-19 on four major dates: the
date when the first case of COVID-19 was identified in each country, end of May, end
of July, and 29 August. By the time our survey was completed, the COVID-19 spread
seemed to be under control in most countries except for Indonesia and the Philippines.
Indonesia and the Philippines also had by far the highest numbers of deaths due
to COVID-19.
Table 1: Progress of COVID-19 Pandemic in 8 ASEAN Economies

Viet
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Myanmar Malaysia Philippines Thailand Nam
First case (date) 28 Jan 02 Mar 25 Mar 24 Mar 25 Jan 30 Jan 13 Jan 24 Jan
Total cases (by 31 May) 125 25,773 19 224 7,762 17,224 3,081 327
Total cases (by 31 July) 234 106,336 20 353 8,964 89,374 3,310 509
Total cases (by 29 Aug) 273 165,887 22 656 9,306 209,544 3,411 1,038
First death (date) NA 12 Mar NA 01 Apr 18 Mar 2 Feb 01 Mar 01 Aug
Total deaths (by 31 May) 0 1,573 0 6 115 950 57 0
Total deaths (by 31 July) 0 5,058 0 6 124 1,983 58 0
Total deaths (by 29 Aug) 0 7,169 0 6 125 3,325 58 31
Source: Our World Database.
3.2 Government Responses

ASEAN governments have implemented various measures, including school closures,
lockdowns and social distancing requirements, and border closures. However, the
times at which each country implemented such policies are different. The intensity and
duration of such measures also differ by country. Figure 1 presents stringency indices
of the measures that ASEAN countries have adopted to contain the spread of
COVID-19, as calculated by a team at Oxford University (Hale et al. 2020). Among
those countries, Viet Nam adopted relatively strict measures quite early. As a result,
Viet Nam suffered less from the pandemic than did other populous countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines. While both Indonesia and the Philippines implemented
some measures such as border closures quite early, the intensity of such measures
seemed low, which allowed the rapid increase of cases in these two countries. This
forced Indonesia and the Philippines to prolong their nonpharmaceutical interventions,
especially in the Philippines. Some other countries such as Myanmar also implemented
strict measures in terms of nonpharmaceutical interventions, partly due to their
proximity to other countries that had a high number of COVID-19 cases.
ASEAN governments have also implemented various economic policies to mitigate the
negative effects of COVID-19 on firms and households, which are summarized in Table
2. Those policies range from direct money transfer to wage subsidies, (utility) price
subsidies, and training facilities to help individuals who lost jobs.
3
Figure 1: Stringency Index of Government Nonpharmaceutical

Intervention Measures
Source: Hale et al. (2020).
Table 2: ASEAN Countries’ Government Economic Support Policies

Country Policies Toward Households
Cambodia • Social assistance of nearly USD400 million (incl. USD300 million for a new monthly cash
transfer program for poor and vulnerable households and USD100 million cash for a work
program). USD64 million allocated for wage subsidies and skill training programs; several tax
relief measures.
Indonesia • About IDR710 trillion (about USD50 billion or 4.4% of GDP) in stimulus packages have been
approved; increased benefits and broader coverage of existing social assistance schemes to
low-income households; expanded unemployment benefit; and tax relief.
Lao PDR • Income tax exemption for low-income civil servants and employees of private sector;
compensation of 60% of workers’ salary (for eligible workers); an unemployment allowance
for terminated workers; and a new electricity tariff.
Malaysia • Four stimulus packages, accounting for 4.3% of GDP: electricity discounts and temporary
paid leave; cash transfers to low-income households; wage subsidies to help employers
retain workers; employees allowed special withdrawals from their Employment Provident
Fund (EPF); and hiring and training subsidies.
Myanmar • Deferred income tax payments; food provision for households without a regular income during
the long holidays; reduced electricity bills from April to December 2020; 40% of the social
security fees for about 1.3 million insured workers covered; and further tax relief on additional
salary and wage expenses.
Philippines • A PHP595.6 billion fiscal package (about 3.1% of 2019 GDP) for vulnerable individuals and
groups including cash aid program for 18 million low-income households (each is expected to
receive from PHP10,000 to PHP16,000) and social protection measures for vulnerable
workers, including displaced and overseas Filipino workers.
Thailand • 3 packages (amounting to 9.6% of GDP) to assist workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs
(including THB5,000/month/person for three months to about 14 million nonfarm workers
outside the social security system and 10 million farmers); support for individuals and
businesses through soft loans and tax relief; lower water and electricity bills; and coverage of
social security contributions.
Viet Nam • A fiscal support package valued up to 3.6% of GDP; measures including deferred tax
payments; deferred contributions to the pension fund and survivorship fund; cash transfer
package worth VND36 trillion (0.5% of GDP) for affected workers and households with
monthly cash transfers provided for no more than three months (about 10% of population).
Source: IMF (2020).
4
4. ADBI HOUSEHOLD SURVEY IN ASEAN COUNTRIES

We carried out our household surveys in eight ASEAN countries: Cambodia, Indonesia,
the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The survey
was designed by ADBI and implemented by five survey companies in those countries.
The survey was implemented from the end of May (including pilots test in all eight
countries). All the fieldwork was finished by the end of July. Major characteristics of the
survey included:
• Telephone survey (due to COVID-19)
• Respondent: Household head or person knowledgeable in HH finance
• Length of interview: 12‒15 mins (in some countries about 17‒19 mins, partly
due to screening questions)
• Questionnaire collected information on:
• Characteristics of the households, including number of members, gender,
number employed, number in school, age of head of household, education
level, urban vs. rural residence, and income, including types of income;
• Changes in income, employment, and working hours compared with the base
period of end-2019;
• Whether or not the household experienced financial difficulties, and, if so, what
coping measures it used, including reducing consumption, borrowing, delaying
payments, and applying for government aid; and
• Whether their children stopped attending school due to the pandemic, whether
the school offered online learning, how much the household children
participated in online learning, and the reasons for their scant or no participation
if that was the case.
Table 3 presents a summary of our sample (urban vs. rural and by income group).
Table 3: Characteristics of the Sample

SEC 1 SEC 6 DK/
Country Total Urban Rural (Richest) SEC 2 SEC 3 SEC 4 SEC 5 (Poorest) Refused
Cambodia 1,026 332 694 116 258 327 211 114 – –
Indonesia 1,046 443 603 129 193 235 362 127 – –
Lao PDR 1,000 348 652 74 25 139 117 400 245 –
Malaysia 1,006 638 368 59 108 426 401 – – 12
Myanmar 1,000 400 600 240 260 295 205 – – –
Philippines 1,000 520 480 9 – 48 165 479 299 –
Thailand 1,000 400 600 121 115 478 206 80 – –
Viet Nam 1,000 366 634 62 74 149 250 206 243 16
Total 8,078 3,447 4,631 810 1,033 2,097 1,917 1,406 787 28
SEC = income class.

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.
5
5. COVID-19 IMPACTS AND COPING STRATEGIES

Figure 2 presents the impact of COVID-19 on household income. The figure shows that
about 73% of the households in our sample experienced a decline in income. Among
households with a declining income, most of them (33%) reported that their income had
fallen by 26%‒50%, 23% reported that their income had declined by more than 50%,
while only 16% experienced a slight decline of 1%‒25 %. In Malaysia, the highest-
income country, the percentage of households with no change in income was quite
high (41%). Not surprisingly, the two countries that suffered from the COVID-19
pandemic the most (Indonesia and the Philippines) had the largest shares reporting
declining incomes, 81% and 84%, respectively. While Myanmar did not experience
a rapid increase in COVID-19 incidence, the strict interventions imposed by the
government may have had strong effects on household income. Nearly 80% of
households in Myanmar reported that they experienced a decline in income and,
among those, more than 67% reported that their income declined by more than 25%.
Figure 2: Effects of COVID-19 on Household Income, % of Households
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database. Relative to base period of end-2019.
Figure 3 presents declines in income by source. Income from household businesses or

self-employment declines the most, with more than 80% of households with income
from those sources reporting declines. This may not be surprising, as government
restriction measures may directly affect their business activities. On the other hand,
income from agriculture-related activities and from wages and salaries and remittances
did not decline as much as that from household business or self-employment, although
still about 60% of households with income from these sources reported declines.
We further examine whether the COVID-19 pandemic has had different effects on
different household types. Overall, the effects are not very different (Figure 4). For
example, 73.2% of poorer households 2 have experienced a decline in income while the
figure for richer groups (the remaining households) is about 72.9%. Rural households
seem to suffer somewhat more with 74.1% of households in rural areas experiencing
2 The poorest group comprises households in income classes 3, 4, and 5 in Cambodia, Indonesia, and
Thailand; households in income classes 4, 5, and 6 in the Lao PDR and Viet Nam; households in
income classes 3 and 4 in Malaysia and Myanmar; and households in income classes 5 and 6 in
Philippines.
6
income decline versus 71.8% of urban households. However, there is no significant

difference between poorer urban households and poorer rural households (72.9% vs.
73.4%).
Figure 3: Change in Income, by Source of Income, % of Households
Figure 4: Change in Income, by Income Class, Urban and Rural,

% of Total Subgroup
Notes: Poorer are households in Socio-economic Classes 3, 4, 5 and 6 while richer are households in the Socio-
economic Classes 1 and 2.
Figure 5 further documents sources of income decline for each country in our sample.
Household business/self-employed income fell the most in all countries except
Indonesia, where agricultural/fishery income showed the highest percentage of decline.
7
Figure 5: Sources of Income Decline, by Country, % of Households
Determinants of Household Income during the Pandemic

We examine the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on household income by
estimating the following equation:
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 (1)
in which 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes value of one if household i

experienced a decline in income during the COVID-19 period; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is a set of dummy
variables indicating the income class that household I belongs to 3 ; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is a set of
household characteristics including sources of income, household head’s education,
age, and gender, household location (i.e., rural vs. urban areas), dependency ratio (the
ratio of adults aged from 18 to 60 to the total number of household members), and
household size (measured by the total number of household members); 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a set
of variables reflecting COVID-19-induced effects such as whether household I had
anyone who lost their job or had their working time reduced, and whether the house
was located in a lockdown area or not, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. We estimate the above
equations for pooled data of eight countries (with country dummy being controlled) and
separately for each of the eight countries.
Table 4 presents our estimation results. The first column reports the results using
pooled data and the subsequent columns show results for the individual countries. The
income class of household on average is not related to the likelihood of experiencing a
decline in income, suggesting that the COVID-19 pandemic affects the income of
all households regardless of their economic status before the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, in Cambodia and the Philippines, the COVID-19 pandemic does have
different effects on different households. For example, in Cambodia, lower-income
households are less likely to experience a decline in income than those in higher-
income classes. In the Philippines, households in the lower-income classes are more
likely to have income declines than those in the upper-income classes. This implies
3 Due to differences across countries in categorizing income classes (some countries have four classes,
some have six classes, and some use wealth rather than income to construct income classes),
we reconstruct our own income classes. There are four groups of income by the income quartile
(25%, 50%, and 75%).
8
that the income inequality may be widened after the COVID-19 pandemic in the
Philippines and narrowed in Cambodia.
Different sources of income may also have different effects on the likelihood of a
decline in income. In general, those households with income from agricultural
production and from household businesses or self-employment are more likely to
experience a decline in income. This situation is observed in nearly all countries in
our sample. Cambodian, Indonesian, and Filipino households that have income from
agricultural production are not different from other households that do not have this
source of income. This may suggest that people in these ASEAN economies lack a
well-developed social safety net to support them when there is a shock. Households
whose income is mainly from salaries are less likely to experience income declines.
However, this relationship is only observed in three countries: Indonesia, the Lao PDR,
and Thailand. In other countries, the likelihood of experiencing a decline in income is
not affected by whether the households have wages/salaries from formal sectors as an
income source. This finding shows that households with remittance income are not
different from other households that do not have remittance income. Also, households
with income from other sources, such as house rental, moneylending, or receiving
regular government support/aid, are less likely to suffer from income declines, but this
is only observed in three countries: Myanmar, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
The education level of the household head in general is negatively associated with the
likelihood of experiencing an income decline. For example, household heads with a
high school degree have a lower probability of income decline by 2.5 percentage points
than those who have lower degrees. The figure for those who have a higher education
level than high school is 8.7 percentage points lower. However, the role of the
household head’s education level is not observed in all countries in our sample. In the
Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, the household head’s education
did not determine whether the household experienced a decline in income.
Household head’s age is not associated with the COVID-19-induced income decline in
our pooled sample, but it has some effects in some countries. In Cambodia and
Malaysia, the likelihood of experiencing a decline in income is lower for households
whose head is older than 50, but in the Lao PDR and the Philippines, households
whose head is aged between 30 and 39 may be more likely to experience a decline
in income than younger or older households. The effects of other household
characteristics such as household size, dependency ratio, and house location are
generally not found to be significant in most countries.
Two variables that are directly related to the COVID-19 pandemic are significantly
associated with income declines. Being located in a lockdown area increases the
likelihood of having an income decline in half of the countries (Indonesia, the Lao PDR,
the Philippines, and Viet Nam). While the effects of this in Indonesia and the Lao PDR
are quite small and marginally significant, the effect is much stronger in other two
countries, especially in the Philippines. Malaysia is an interesting case, where those
living in lockdown areas have a lower likelihood of experiencing income decline. A
potential explanation for this negative relation is that those living in lockdown areas
receive government aid, which may help to keep their income stable.
Having someone in the household who has lost their job (or has had to reduce working
hours) is positively associated with income decline in all countries. However, the effect
differs widely, with the smallest effect being observed in Indonesia and the largest
in Thailand.
9
Table 4: Determinants of Having Income Decline Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All
Countries Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia
SEC 2 0.024 –0.070* 0.024 0.000 –0.065
[0.017] [0.042] [0.045] [0.059] [0.073]
SEC 3 0.019 –0.093** 0.045 –0.077 0.013
[0.016] [0.043] [0.043] [0.063] [0.065]
SEC 4 0.025 –0.105** 0.037 –0.014 0.032
[0.016] [0.044] [0.042] [0.049] [0.068]
Income source: Agriculture related 0.070*** –0.020 0.054 0.108*** 0.152**
[0.013] [0.034] [0.039] [0.035] [0.074]
Income source: Household 0.186*** 0.268*** 0.113*** 0.229*** 0.251***
business/self-employed [0.011] [0.031] [0.030] [0.034] [0.051]
Income source: Wage –0.031*** 0.029 –0.070** –0.063* 0.007
[0.012] [0.031] [0.029] [0.034] [0.056]
Income source: Remittance 0.010 0.059 0.052 0.032 –0.209
[0.023] [0.099] [0.054] [0.046] [0.163]
Income source: Others –0.068*** –0.068 –0.096* 0.032 –0.044
[0.017] [0.076] [0.051] [0.038] [0.082]
HH head with high school degree –0.025** –0.043 –0.058** 0.018 –0.054
[0.012] [0.032] [0.029] [0.037] [0.048]
HH head with more than high school –0.087*** –0.166*** –0.133*** –0.043 –0.163***
degree [0.013] [0.045] [0.035] [0.042] [0.038]
Household head being male –0.013 –0.005 –0.025 –0.017 0.030
[0.011] [0.029] [0.025] [0.031] [0.047]
Household head aged 30‒39 0.017 –0.055 0.061 0.113*** –0.075
[0.017] [0.049] [0.049] [0.042] [0.055]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.002 –0.079 0.057 0.059 –0.051
[0.017] [0.050] [0.048] [0.045] [0.055]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.018 –0.081 0.042 0.062 –0.129**
[0.017] [0.050] [0.052] [0.051] [0.056]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.029 –0.134** 0.010 –0.024 –0.091
[0.020] [0.060] [0.065] [0.069] [0.063]
Household size 0.004 0.015** 0.016* –0.000 0.006
[0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
Dependency ratio 0.010 0.026 –0.070 –0.126 –0.055
[0.023] [0.064] [0.069] [0.085] [0.077]
Located in rural areas –0.006 0.068** –0.021 0.028 –0.016
[0.010] [0.030] [0.024] [0.035] [0.033]
Located in lockdown areas 0.027* 0.127 0.042* 0.083* –0.056*
[0.014] [0.077] [0.024] [0.043] [0.031]
At least one HH member lost job or 0.239*** 0.221*** 0.118*** 0.168*** 0.246***
reduced work [0.010] [0.026] [0.024] [0.032] [0.032]
Intercept 0.598*** 0.610*** 0.724*** 0.424*** 0.488***
[0.032] [0.082] [0.078] [0.089] [0.109]
Number of observations 7736 950 1,045 889 953
continued on next page
10
Table 4 continued
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Myanmar Philippines Thailand Viet Nam
SEC 2 0.072** 0.134** –0.018 0.049
[0.036] [0.064] [0.048] [0.051]
SEC 3 0.039 0.152** 0.065* 0.044
[0.036] [0.063] [0.039] [0.048]
SEC 4 0.016 0.212*** 0.065 0.042
[0.040] [0.066] [0.045] [0.046]
Income source: Agriculture related 0.066* 0.043 0.147*** 0.086**
[0.036] [0.035] [0.034] [0.039]
Income source: Household business/ 0.107*** 0.089*** 0.258*** 0.192***
self-employed [0.032] [0.030] [0.033] [0.034]
Income source: Wage –0.037 0.029 –0.094** –0.027
[0.030] [0.032] [0.037] [0.036]
Income source: Remittance –0.026 0.055 0.056 –0.184
[0.070] [0.040] [0.063] [0.123]
Income source: Others –0.117** –0.151*** –0.036 –0.072
[0.047] [0.040] [0.047] [0.047]
HH head with high school degree 0.002 –0.030 –0.040 0.015
[0.031] [0.028] [0.031] [0.037]
HH head with more than high school degree –0.038 0.009 –0.057** –0.041
[0.035] [0.031] [0.028] [0.041]
Household head being male 0.008 –0.013 0.004 –0.040
[0.036] [0.026] [0.024] [0.031]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.034 0.086** –0.009 –0.014
[0.044] [0.039] [0.047] [0.054]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.047 0.062 –0.021 –0.043
[0.045] [0.041] [0.044] [0.055]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.012 0.063 –0.001 –0.098*
[0.042] [0.041] [0.044] [0.059]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.050 0.067 –0.036 –0.070
[0.049] [0.053] [0.050] [0.063]
Household size –0.006 0.003 –0.001 0.008
[0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.011]
Dependency ratio 0.183** –0.042 0.013 0.045
[0.072] [0.060] [0.049] [0.076]
Located in rural areas –0.016 –0.035 –0.004 –0.045
[0.028] [0.024] [0.025] [0.032]
Located in lockdown areas 0.036 0.992*** –0.008 0.178***
[0.059] [0.043] [0.029] [0.066]
At least one HH member lost job or reduced 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.465*** 0.278***
work [0.027] [0.031] [0.026] [0.030]
Intercept 0.624*** –0.504*** 0.475*** 0.294***
[0.079] [0.094] [0.077] [0.108]
Number of observations 999 998 988 914
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence
levels, respectively. We control for country dummies in the pooled sample (column 1).
Source: Authors’ estimation using ADBI database.
11
Only 37% of households in our sample reported that their expenditure declined, which
was much lower than the approximately 73% of households that experienced a decline
in incomes (Figure 6). Nearly 30% of households actually increased their expenditure.
Figure 6: Changes in Household Expenditure, % of Households
There are several reasons for the expenditure increases. Figure 7 reports unexpected
expenditures by households during the COVID-19 period. Nearly 80% and 50%
of households had to spend more for healthcare products and household cleaning
products, respectively. Unexpected (higher) utility bills were also a source of increasing
expenditure. Nearly 34.4% of households had to pay more for food.
Figure 7: Types of Unexpected Expenditure, % of Households

with Unexpected Expenditures
12
Impacts of Pandemic on Household Finance

The pandemic has had profound impacts on household finance. About 55% of
households in our sample reported that they had experienced financial difficulties
(which is defined as a lack of financial resources for at least a week) (Figure 8).
However, there is quite a significant difference across countries. While more than half
of households in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Viet Nam did not
experience financial difficulties, about three quarters of Thai respondents reported that
they had experienced financial difficulty, and the figure is even higher in Indonesia
(84%) and the Philippines (85%). The lower figures in Cambodia, Myanmar, the
Lao PDR, and Viet Nam could be due to the fact that these economies have suffered
less from the pandemic than the other countries did, while Malaysia is a richer country
and therefore households are more financially secure. Although Thailand has not
suffered from the pandemic as much as Indonesia and the Philippines, the pandemic
may have severely affected tourism, which is a very important sector in that country.
Figure 8: Households Experiencing Financial Difficulty during the Pandemic,

% of Total Households
Factors Affecting Financial Vulnerability Due to COVID-19

This section analyzes which households are more likely to be financially vulnerable to
the pandemic (or any expected shock) than others. We estimate the following equation:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 (2)
in which 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if household 𝑖𝑖

experienced financial difficulties (which is defined as a lack of financial resources
for daily expenditure if all the income sources have dried up in a week) during the
COVID-19 period; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 are similar to Equation (1) and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is the error
term. As before, we estimate the above equations for pooled data of eight countries
(with country dummy being controlled) and separately for eight countries.
13
Table 5 presents our estimation results. The first column reports the results using
pooled data and the subsequent columns are the results for the individual countries.
We found that, in contrast to the results presented in Table 1, the income class of
household on average is associated with the likelihood of having financial difficulty.
Households in the lowest income class are more likely to get into financial difficulty
than households in the highest income class by about 20 percentage points. The
differences in the likelihood among the richest group and the poorest group ranged
from 14.4 percentage points in Viet Nam to about 40 percentage points in the
Philippines. This may be due to the fact that some households suffered from income
decline, but they also had to increase their expenditure. The likelihood of getting into
financial difficulty is also higher for other income classes in our pooled sample and
in some countries, except for Cambodia and the Lao PDR, where we only observed
differences between the richest and the poorest income groups.
Different sources of income may also have different effects on the likelihood of getting
into financial difficulty. In general, households with income from agricultural production,
household businesses, or self-employment and remittances are not different from
households that do not have such income sources. However, households with income
from wages and salaries and with other income sources are less likely to have financial
difficulty than those households that do not have such income. This finding, to some
extent, is corroborated by the results presented in Table 4. We also find that the effect
of income source differs by country. For example, Indonesian households with income
from agricultural production, household business/self-employment, and wages/salaries
are more likely to be in financial difficulty while this is not the case for Malaysian
households.
The education level of the household head in general is negatively associated with the
likelihood of getting into financial difficulty. For example, household heads with a high
school degree have a lower probability of having financial difficulty by 2.7 percentage
points than those who have a lower level of education. The respective figure for those
who have a higher education level than high school is 7.8 percentage points. However,
the effect of the household head’s education level is only significant in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Viet Nam. Households with a household head aged over 50 are less
likely to be in financial difficulty than other households in the pooled sample, and those
in Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. In contrast to our results regarding
the likelihood of having an income decline, household size and household dependency
ratio are positively associated with the likelihood of getting into financial difficulty. For
example, having one more person in the household increases the likelihood of being
in financial difficulty by 1 percentage point (2 percentage points in Indonesia and
Thailand). The dependency ratio is also positively associated with a higher likelihood of
getting into financial difficulty in five out of eight countries.
The estimation results also suggest that having someone in the household who has
lost their job or had to reduce working hours is positively associated with the likelihood
of being in financial difficulty in all countries, although the size of the effect varies.
Being located in a lockdown area also increases the likelihood of having financial
difficulty in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar as expected, but the effect is
negative in Viet Nam.
14
Table 5: Determinants of Getting into Financial Difficulty

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All
Countries Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia
SEC 2 0.057*** 0.074 0.084* 0.103 –0.109*
[0.019] [0.049] [0.051] [0.070] [0.065]
SEC 3 0.130*** 0.053 0.197*** 0.104 0.067
[0.017] [0.048] [0.047] [0.073] [0.060]
SEC 4 0.196*** 0.173*** 0.207*** 0.179*** 0.229***
[0.018] [0.055] [0.046] [0.064] [0.064]
Income source: Agriculture related 0.023 0.048 0.072** 0.046 0.105
[0.014] [0.041] [0.034] [0.039] [0.078]
Income source: Household business 0.014 –0.050 0.060** –0.093** 0.067
[0.012] [0.037] [0.026] [0.038] [0.052]
Income source: Wage –0.032** –0.067* 0.060** 0.014 –0.062
[0.013] [0.037] [0.029] [0.040] [0.058]
Income source: Remittance –0.002 –0.027 –0.036 0.035 0.040
[0.025] [0.111] [0.060] [0.051] [0.162]
Income source: Others –0.057*** –0.111 –0.027 –0.015 –0.049
[0.017] [0.088] [0.046] [0.041] [0.070]
HH head with high school degree –0.027** –0.021 –0.024 0.026 –0.101**
[0.012] [0.036] [0.027] [0.044] [0.043]
HH head with more than high school –0.078*** –0.053 –0.102*** –0.053 –0.095***
degree [0.013] [0.046] [0.033] [0.045] [0.036]
Household head being male –0.037*** –0.028 –0.013 –0.027 0.026
[0.011] [0.036] [0.023] [0.035] [0.043]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.015 –0.042 0.011 0.048 –0.131**
[0.018] [0.055] [0.046] [0.046] [0.051]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.026 –0.123** 0.035 0.015 –0.097*
[0.018] [0.055] [0.045] [0.051] [0.052]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.044** –0.095* 0.066 0.067 –0.148***
[0.018] [0.056] [0.049] [0.057] [0.054]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.104*** –0.056 –0.032 –0.134* –0.096
[0.021] [0.070] [0.064] [0.072] [0.059]
Household size 0.011*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.006 0.015*
[0.003] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Dependency ratio 0.089*** 0.184*** 0.125** –0.016 0.131*
[0.024] [0.071] [0.061] [0.090] [0.071]
Located in rural areas 0.004 0.036 –0.032 –0.015 –0.026
[0.011] [0.033] [0.023] [0.039] [0.031]
Located in lockdown areas 0.033** 0.335*** 0.068*** –0.047 –0.015
[0.015] [0.099] [0.022] [0.044] [0.030]
At least one HH member lost job or 0.174*** 0.259*** 0.044* 0.127*** 0.308***
reduced work [0.011] [0.037] [0.023] [0.037] [0.030]
Intercept 0.184*** 0.248*** 0.485*** 0.402*** 0.250**
[0.033] [0.087] [0.073] [0.100] [0.105]
Number of observations 7,731 950 1,045 889 950
continued on next page
15
Table 5 continued
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Myanmar Philippines Thailand Viet Nam
SEC 2 0.012 0.211*** –0.022 0.101*
[0.033] [0.073] [0.057] [0.052]
SEC 3 0.133*** 0.339*** 0.133*** 0.092*
[0.037] [0.069] [0.046] [0.050]
SEC 4 0.222*** 0.398*** 0.204*** 0.144***
[0.043] [0.070] [0.052] [0.052]
Income source: Agriculture related –0.096*** –0.062* 0.089** 0.005
[0.034] [0.036] [0.037] [0.041]
Income source: Household business –0.024 –0.025 0.142*** 0.046
[0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.036]
Income source: Wage 0.032 –0.083** –0.052 –0.050
[0.031] [0.035] [0.036] [0.039]
Income source: Remittance –0.130*** –0.046 0.065 0.057
[0.046] [0.044] [0.070] [0.144]
Income source: Others 0.022 –0.039 –0.097* –0.145***
[0.042] [0.033] [0.056] [0.046]
HH head with high school degree –0.012 –0.016 –0.037 –0.034
[0.034] [0.024] [0.035] [0.040]
HH head with more than high school –0.041 –0.016 –0.042 –0.161***
degree [0.036] [0.028] [0.033] [0.042]
Household head being male –0.083** –0.022 –0.002 –0.146***
[0.041] [0.024] [0.028] [0.033]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.031 0.012 –0.018 0.037
[0.051] [0.036] [0.052] [0.058]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.011 0.009 –0.001 –0.063
[0.051] [0.037] [0.050] [0.059]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.083* 0.019 –0.041 –0.108*
[0.049] [0.040] [0.050] [0.061]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.125** –0.093* –0.103* –0.151**
[0.053] [0.051] [0.060] [0.067]
Household size 0.011 0.001 0.018** 0.002
[0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010]
Dependency ratio 0.146* 0.134** 0.034 0.079
[0.076] [0.054] [0.056] [0.079]
Located in rural areas 0.065** –0.039* 0.108*** –0.097***
[0.031] [0.023] [0.029] [0.035]
Located in lockdown areas 0.287*** –0.020 0.040 –0.104*
[0.083] [0.038] [0.030] [0.061]
At least one HH member lost job or 0.077*** 0.143*** 0.243*** 0.172***
reduced work [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.032]
Intercept 0.173** 0.519*** 0.393*** 0.560***
[0.081] [0.093] [0.087] [0.110]
Number of observations 997 998 988 914
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
We control for country dummies in the pooled sample.
16
Strategies for Coping with Financial Difficulty

In order to cope with financial difficulty, households in our sample adopted various
coping strategies (Figure 9). Among those households, the three coping strategies that
were most widely adopted were reducing consumption and expenditure, drawing down
cash and savings, and borrowing from friends and relatives. Households deferred
payments and debt reimbursement and applied for social and government aid. Some
households coped by making homemade foods and selling them online.
Figure 9: Strategies for Coping with Financial Difficulty,

% of Households Experiencing Difficulty
Nearly 80% of respondents who suffered from financial difficulty reduced their food
consumption. This may have some implications for food security. Other items that
people reduced include utilities and nonessential daily expenditures (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Types of Consumption Reduced, % of Households

Reducing Consumption
17
Figure 11 shows the time period for which households have enough resources to cover
daily necessities if they lose all of their income sources. On average, nearly 50% of
households in our sample could only survive less than a month. About 86.6% of
Indonesian households reported that they could only afford about two weeks if they did
not have any income. The situation is also serious in the Philippines, with less than
30% having enough resources to cover necessary expenditures for more than a month.
This suggests that if the COVID-19 pandemic is prolonged, many households in these
countries may suffer from hunger and potentially increased poverty.
Figure 11: Duration over which Resources Could Cover Basic Necessities,
% of Households
Factors Affecting the Duration of Financial Viability

Various health and international agencies such as the WHO and the US’s CDC have
warned that the COVID-19 pandemic may last a long time, which could severely strain
the sustainability of household resources. This section examines which factors are
related to the duration of financial viability among households in our sample. To do so,
we estimate the following equation:
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 (3)
in which 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is the duration of financial viability of household i; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
are as in Equation (1), and 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 is the error term. We also controlled country dummies in
our estimation using pooled data. Based on Likert-type measures, we constructed
three dummy variables indicating the duration of financial viability: (1) being able to
survive up to a month; (2) being able to survive from one month up to three months;
and (iii) being able to survive more than three months. Due to the nature of our
dependent variable (Likert-type variables), the ordered probit estimation method
is used.
Table 6 presents our estimation results using pooled sample data. The marginal effects
are calculated for each of three possible outcomes. We find that household income
class has a statistically significant correlation with the duration of financial viability.
Households in lower income classes have a higher likelihood of being financially viable
for less than one month than those in the highest income class by 10, 15, and 21
percentage points, respectively. Similarly, those in the highest income class have a
18
higher chance of being financially viable for more than three months by about 10, 13,
and 17 percentage points compared with the low-income groups. This result suggests
that if the COVID-19 pandemic is prolonged, poorer households will suffer much more
than richer households.
Table 6: Determinants of Duration of Financial Viability

(1) (2) (3)
Less than More than
1 Month 1‒3 Months 3 Months
SEC 2 0.103*** –0.009*** –0.094***
[0.016] [0.002] [0.015]
SEC 3 0.156*** –0.021*** –0.135***
[0.015] [0.002] [0.014]
SEC 4 0.213*** –0.039*** –0.174***
[0.016] [0.004] [0.014]
Income source: Agriculture related –0.059*** 0.015*** 0.044***
[0.012] [0.003] [0.009]
Income source: Household business –0.033*** 0.009*** 0.025***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.008]
Income source: Wage –0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.011] [0.003] [0.008]
Income source: Remittance 0.002 –0.000 –0.001
[0.022] [0.006] [0.016]
Income source: Others –0.075*** 0.020*** 0.055***
[0.015] [0.004] [0.011]
HH head with high school degree –0.048*** 0.013*** 0.035***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.008]
HH head with more than high school degree –0.097*** 0.024*** 0.073***
[0.012] [0.003] [0.009]
Household head being male –0.072*** 0.021*** 0.052***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.007]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.008 0.002 0.005
[0.015] [0.004] [0.011]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.027* 0.007* 0.020*
[0.016] [0.004] [0.011]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.022 0.006 0.016
[0.016] [0.004] [0.012]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.054*** 0.014*** 0.041***
[0.018] [0.005] [0.014]
Household size 0.008*** –0.002*** –0.006***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Dependency ratio 0.113*** –0.030*** –0.084***
[0.022] [0.006] [0.016]
Located in rural areas 0.010 –0.003 –0.008
[0.010] [0.003] [0.007]
Located in lockdown areas 0.044*** –0.012*** –0.033***
[0.014] [0.004] [0.010]
At least one HH member lost job or reduced work 0.049*** –0.013*** –0.036***
[0.010] [0.003] [0.007]
Number of observations 7,439 7,439 7,439
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
We control for country dummies.
19
The source of income also matters for the duration of financial viability. Households
with income from agricultural production, household business, and other sources
tend to have a longer duration of financial viability. Therefore, despite the fact that
households with income from agricultural production and from household business/self-
employment are more likely to experience a decline in income (as shown in Table 1),
these households have a higher probability of financial viability than other households.
Household characteristics also matter for the duration of financial viability. Households
whose head has an education level of at least a high school degree are more likely to
be financially viable for a longer time than those whose education level is lower. For
example, the former group is more likely to be financially viable for more than three
months than the latter by 3.5 and 7.3 percentage points. Households headed by a man
are also more (less) likely to be able to survive financially for more than three months
(less than a month) than households headed by a woman. Household size and the
dependency ratio are also associated with the duration of financial viability.
With regard to COVID-19-induced variables, both living in a lockdown area and having
at least one person who lost their job or had working time reduced are associated with
the duration of financial viability. Households in the latter group are more likely to
survive less than a month and less likely to survive from one to three months and for
more than three months by 4.9, 1.3, and 3.6 percentage points, respectively, than other
households.
6. IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

ON EMPLOYMENT
Figure 12 presents the employment distribution of household members in our sample
before the pandemic. More than 22% are full-time agricultural workers, and 28%
are full-time household business owners and self-employed. About 36% are full-time
salaried workers and 15% are seasonal salaried workers (or informal workers).
The distribution of employment differs by country. For example, the share of salaried
workers is nearly 60% in Malaysia but only 20%‒25% in the Lao PDR and Myanmar.
The shares of seasonal and informal workers in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia
are higher than in other countries.
Figure 12: Employment Distribution (before the Pandemic), % of Households
20
On average, 44.4% of employees in our samples had either lost their jobs (temporarily
or permanently) or had experienced a workload cut. Notably, 73.5% of Filipino
employees in our samples had either lost their jobs or had to reduce their working time.
In Viet Nam, Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia, the figures were high, in the range of
45%‒50%, while the share in Indonesia was relatively low.
Figure 13: Households with Job Loss or Workload Reduced, % of Households
We further looked at types of job loss or workload reduction. Figure 14 shows types
of job loss. It should be noted that, in contrast to Figure 13, which looks at total
employment (by summing up the total number of people who lost jobs or had reduced
working time), Figure 14 shows types of jobs lost at the household level. This is
because we cannot distinguish between types of job lost and working time reduced
among household members (i.e., we cannot identify how many people in a certain
household lost jobs and how many of them are forced to reduce their working time).
Among all households, 8.8% had at least one person who lost their job permanently,
10.1% had at least one person who lost their job temporarily, 6.6% had at least one
person who was forced to reduce their working hours, and 8% had at least one person
who was forced to reduce their working days.
The pattern of job losses is quite similar in Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand,
and Viet Nam. The proportion who lost jobs permanently accounted for about a quarter
of all households that have at least one person who lost their job or were forced to
reduce working time (i.e., accounting for about one tenth of the total sample). The
proportion of households with at least one person who lost their job or had work time
reduced is lowest in Cambodia and the Lao PDR. More than 70% of households in the
Philippines had at least one person who lost their job or had to reduce working time.
More strikingly, the proportion of those in the Philippines who lost their job permanently
or temporarily is very high (22.5% and 28.5%, respectively). While the proportion of
households with at least one person who lost their job in the Lao PDR is low, the
proportion of those who lost their jobs permanently is quite high (12.5%), second only
to the Philippines.
21
Figure 14: Breakdown of Job Losses or Workload Reductions, % of Households
7. EDUCATION IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Table 7 shows the shares of households with children going to schools. On average,
54% of households in our sample had children going to school before the pandemic
(the proportion of households with children going to school is quite low in Thailand and
Myanmar). In general, during the pandemic currently, most children in the Lao PDR,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Viet Nam are still going to school. On the other hand, nearly
46% and 52% of children in Myanmar and the Philippines, respectively, who used to go
to school before the pandemic stopped going to school during the pandemic.
Table 7: Households with Children and Going to School

Before and During the Pandemic
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Myanmar
Households with children going to 61% 60% 56% 53% 44%
school before pandemic, % of total
% of households with children going to 3% 3% 0% 9% 52%
school before pandemic but not
attending school during pandemic
Philippines Thailand Viet Nam All
Households with children going to 67% 41% 53% 54%
school before pandemic, % of total
% of households with children going to 46% 13% 0% 15%
school before pandemic but not
attending school during pandemic
Table 8 shows the breakdown in school attendance by country and type of household.
There are no significant differences in school attendance between children in richer
and poorer households or between rural and urban households. Even in Thailand, the
children in rural areas were more likely to attend school than children in urban areas.
This may be due to the fact that most of the COVID-19 cases identified in Thailand
were in urban areas.
22
Table 8: Going to School after the Pandemic, % of Subgroup

Richer Households Poorer Households Urban Households Rural Households
Cambodia 96% 97% 97% 97%
Indonesia 99% 97% 98% 97%
Lao PDR 100% 100% 100% 100%
Malaysia 92% 91% 91% 92%
Myanmar 48% 50% 50% 48%
Philippines 56% 55% 53% 58%
Thailand 89% 89% 83% 92%
Viet Nam 101% 100% 100% 100%
During the pandemic, many schools closed physically and offered online classes
(Figure 15). For example, 94% of Indonesian children studied in schools that offered
online classes. In other countries, including Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaysia, and
Cambodia, around 70%‒77% of children studied in schools with online classes. The
figure is slightly lower in the Philippines at only 57% of children. Conversely, most
children in the Lao PDR and Myanmar who were still going to school still went to school
rather than taking online classes. The figures presented in Table 8 and Figure 15
indicate that all Lao PDR pupils are still going to school and only 10% of children are
studying in online classes. This suggests that most Lao PDR pupils continued going to
school during the pandemic. Meanwhile, only 48% of Myanmarese pupils continued
their education during the pandemic. This may be because only a small number of
schools in Myanmar can offer online courses. Our data indicate that only 6% of children
studied in schools with online classes there.
Figure 15: Whether Attending Online Classes during the Pandemic,

% of Households with Schoolchildren
Even when schools offered online classes, not all children attended them. About 8%
did not attend any online classes, 19% attended only a few, and 16% attended some
but not all (Figure 16). A high proportion of children in Indonesia and Viet Nam
attended all online classes if offered (79%‒80%), while the figure was very low in the
Philippines (only 21%) and only moderate in Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia. Fully
23
35% of Filipino children did not attend any online classes. In Myanmar, nearly 70% did
not fully attend online classes.
Figure 16: Attendance of Online Classes, When They were Offered,

% of Households for which Online Courses Were Available
Table 9 shows the share of children from different household types attending all online
classes if offered. Children from richer households tended to attend all online class
more than those from poorer households in all countries except Cambodia and the
Lao PDR. It should be noted that the differences between richer and poorer
households are larger for the subgroup of those who did not attend (or attended only a
few) online classes (data available upon request). There were no significant differences
in attendance of online classes between rural and urban households except in the
|Lao PDR and Myanmar.
Table 9: Attending All Online Classes if Offered by Type of Household,

% of Households in Subgroup
Richer Households Poorer Households Urban Households Rural Households
Cambodia 48% 50% 54% 47%
Indonesia 85% 79% 80% 81%
Lao PDR 43% 47% 42% 50%
Malaysia 40% 36% 38% 35%
Myanmar 40% 20% 22% 50%
Philippines 26% 21% 23% 22%
Thailand 42% 32% 35% 35%
Viet Nam 84% 81% 82% 81%
24
Intensity of Taking Online Courses when Offered

We examine factors that determine the intensity of online class taking during the period
of the COVID-19 pandemic in ASEAN countries. We estimate the following equation:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 (4)
in which intensity takes the value of either (1) not taking any online class; (2) taking a
few online classes; (3) taking some, but not all online classes; and (4) taking all online
classes; 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 are as in Equation (1) and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is the error term. Since
our dependent variable is a Likert-type variable, the ordered probit estimation method
is used. However, the results of this regression analysis should be interpreted
cautiously since the sample used is limited to those children who study in schools that
offer online classes.
Table 10 presents the results for the determinants of the intensity of online course
attendance. The marginal effects are calculated for each of the four possible outcomes.
Household income class has a statistically significant correlation with the intensity
of online course attendance. For example, those in lower-income classes are more
likely not to take any online classes and less likely to take all classes than those in the
highest income class (SEC 1 as the reference group). However, we did not see any
significant difference between households in the lowest SEC classes and the highest
SEC classes.
Household characteristics also matter for the intensity of online class taking. Children
from households whose head has an education level higher than high school education
were less likely not to take any online classes and more likely to take all online classes
than children in households with lower education levels (our reference group), although
this was only significant at the 10% level. We do not find any difference between
children living in households whose head has only a high school education and
children in the reference group. The education level of the household head is also not
significantly associated with whether children take few or some online classes. The
gender of the household head is also not correlated with the intensity of the online
class attendance of children. However, the age of the household head is related to
the level of online course attendance. Children in households whose heads are older
than 39 are less likely not to take any online course and more likely to take all online
courses offered. This may be because the older the household head is, the more
resilient the household is to external shocks and therefore children are given more
resources for their education.
With regard to COVID-19-induced variables, living in a lockdown area is positively
associated with taking all online courses, but the relationship is only significant at the
10% level. A change in income is not significantly correlated with the level of online
courses taken, but living in households with at least one person who has lost their job
or experienced a working time reduction is positively associated with a lower intensity
of online course attendance. A similar and statistically stronger pattern is observed for
children living in households experiencing financial difficulty.
25
Table 10: Factors Determining the Intensity of Online Course Taking

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not Take Take Few Take Some Take All
SEC 2 0.013 0.017 0.007 –0.037
[0.011] [0.015] [0.006] [0.032]
SEC 3 0.021** 0.028** 0.010* –0.059**
[0.010] [0.014] [0.006] [0.029]
SEC 4 0.026** 0.034** 0.012** –0.072**
[0.011] [0.015] [0.006] [0.031]
SEC 5 0.007 0.010 0.004 –0.021
[0.014] [0.019] [0.008] [0.040]
Household head with high school education –0.013 –0.015 –0.005 0.033
[0.008] [0.010] [0.003] [0.022]
Household head with higher education –0.014* –0.017 –0.006 0.037*
[0.008] [0.010] [0.004] [0.022]
Household head being male –0.003 –0.004 –0.001 0.009
[0.007] [0.009] [0.003] [0.019]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.019 –0.020 –0.005 0.044
[0.018] [0.017] [0.004] [0.038]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.030* –0.032* –0.009** 0.071*
[0.017] [0.017] [0.004] [0.037]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.036** –0.040** –0.011** 0.087**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.004] [0.039]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.053*** –0.065*** –0.022*** 0.139***
[0.019] [0.021] [0.007] [0.046]
Dependency rate 0.007 0.008 0.003 –0.018
[0.022] [0.026] [0.009] [0.056]
Household size 0.001 0.001 0.000 –0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005]
Living in rural areas 0.003 0.003 0.001 –0.007
[0.007] [0.008] [0.003] [0.017]
Located in lockdown areas –0.015* –0.018* –0.006* 0.039*
[0.009] [0.011] [0.004] [0.023]
Household income declined –0.006 –0.007 –0.002 0.015
[0.009] [0.010] [0.003] [0.022]
Household income increased 0.002 0.003 0.001 –0.006
[0.023] [0.026] [0.008] [0.058]
Having at least one person with lost job or 0.014** 0.017** 0.006** –0.037**
reduced work [0.007] [0.009] [0.003] [0.018]
Household experienced financial difficulty 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.010*** –0.066***
[0.008] [0.010] [0.003] [0.021]
Number of observations 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,298
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. We
control for country dummies.
Source: Authors’ estimation using ADBI data.
We examined the reasons why some students did not fully attend the online classes,
given that the school offered them (Figure 17). There are four major reasons: doing
household chores; lack of computer/iPad/tablet; lack of internet connection; and
weak/unstable internet connection. On average, about a third of households with
children who did not attend online classes fully did not have facilities for online learning
(i.e., devices and connections). This situation was most common in the Philippines
26
where more than 70% of households reported that their children did not attend online
classes because they did not have a computer or tablet for their children to use, and
nearly 80% said that they did not have internet connection.
Figure 17: Reasons for Not Attending Online Classes Fully (if School Offered),
% of Households
We further examine underlying factors correlated with why some children could not fully
take the online courses. We estimate the following equation:
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝜕0 + 𝜕𝜕1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜕𝜕2 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝜕𝜕3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (5)
in which 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the reason why household i’s children cannot take all online classes
(when offered); 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 , 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 , and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 are as in Equation (1) and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is the error
term. The dependent variable takes one of four alternatives: (i) doing household
chores/working with the family; (ii) not having a computer/iPad/tablet; (iii) not having
internet connection; and (iv) unstable internet connection.4
Table 11 presents the results for factors related to each of the four reasons why
children in an average household could not attend all online classes. Household
income class is correlated with the likelihood of not taking all classes because of doing
household chores, not having a computer/iPad/tablet, or not having an internet
connection, among others. Household income is not related to the reason regarding the
unstable/weak internet connection. We also find that household characteristics play a
role for some reasons why children did not take all classes. For example, those who
did not take all online classes due to not having a computer/iPad/tablet or not having
an internet connection tend to came from households whose head has a lower
education level. Children in households whose head is older were less likely not to
attend online classes because of doing household chores than children in households
with a younger household head. An unstable internet connection was less likely to be
the reason for not attending all classes for children whose parents are aged 30‒49.
Children in households with a high dependency ratio were more likely not to attend
online classes due to not having a computer/iPad/tablet or not having an internet
4 The survey also asked for other reasons but, due to a lack of clear information about this type of reason,
we did not use other reasons as an alternative reason for not taking online classes.
27
connection. Living in a rural area was more likely to be the reason for not attending all
classes due to not having an internet connection.
Table 11: Reasons for Not Fully Attending Online Classes

(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household
Chores/ Not Having Not Having Unstable
Working with Computer/ Internet Internet
the Family iPad/Tablet Connection Connection
SEC 2 –0.029* 0.022 0.049** 0.030
[0.017] [0.020] [0.020] [0.025]
SEC 3 0.007 0.052*** 0.034* 0.031
[0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.023]
SEC 4 0.001 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.030
[0.016] [0.019] [0.018] [0.023]
Household head with high school 0.020 –0.014 –0.046*** –0.015
education [0.014] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019]
Household head with higher education –0.001 –0.039** –0.062*** –0.017
[0.013] [0.018] [0.016] [0.021]
Household head being male 0.003 –0.001 –0.001 0.006
[0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016]
Household head aged 30‒39 –0.077** –0.032 –0.007 –0.081**
[0.034] [0.038] [0.034] [0.040]
Household head aged 40‒49 –0.073** –0.020 –0.009 –0.071*
[0.033] [0.037] [0.033] [0.040]
Household head aged 50‒59 –0.093*** –0.020 0.002 –0.057
[0.034] [0.038] [0.035] [0.041]
Household head aged 60 or over –0.079** –0.071 –0.052 –0.069
[0.038] [0.044] [0.040] [0.049]
Household size 0.003 0.005 –0.007 –0.000
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Dependency ratio –0.032 0.154*** 0.085* 0.060
[0.038] [0.052] [0.047] [0.053]
Located in rural areas 0.004 0.020 0.021 0.035**
[0.010] [0.014] [0.013] [0.015]
Located in lockdown areas 0.026* 0.018 –0.021 0.042**
[0.014] [0.017] [0.016] [0.020]
Household income declined 0.022* 0.046*** 0.028* 0.025
[0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019]
Household income increased 0.037 0.008 –0.030 0.034
[0.036] [0.038] [0.034] [0.050]
At least one HH member lost job or 0.003 0.007 0.024* 0.019
reduced work [0.011] [0.015] [0.014] [0.016]
Household experienced financial 0.019 0.051*** 0.033** 0.025
difficulty [0.012] [0.018] [0.015] [0.019]
Number of observations 2,298 2,298 2,298 2,298
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. We
control for country dummies.
Source: Authors’ estimation using ADBI data.
With regard to COVID-19-induced variables, living in a lockdown area may be the

reason for not taking all online classes due to doing household chores, or having
no internet connection. A decline in household income is associated with not taking
online classes due to doing household chores, not having a computer/iPad/tablet,
and not having an internet connection. Children in households experiencing financial
28
difficulty were more likely not to attend all online classes due to not having a
computer/iPad/tablet and not having an internet connection than children in households
not experiencing financial difficulty.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
restrictions are having a severe impact on Asian economies and hence on Asian
households. In this paper, we implemented household surveys in eight ASEAN
countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Viet Nam) to understand the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
samples were representative of the income classes, and rural and urban population in
each country.
The paper presents several interesting results. First, most households in all countries
experienced significant declines in income and employment, although there was
significant variation by country. Nearly three quarters of households experienced a
declining income (mostly in the range of 26%‒50% compared with the base period).
Income from all sources declined, but that of household enterprise/self-employment fell
most. About a third had household members who lost their jobs or had to reduce their
workload. Our empirical results suggest that various household characteristics,
including household income class (before the COVID-19 pandemic) and household
demographic factors, affect the likelihood of a decline in income. COVID-19-induced
factors such as having at least one person who lost their job or being located in
lockdown areas also affect household income.
Second, nearly half of households experienced financial difficulties. Nearly all
households experiencing financial difficulties had to reduce consumption, about half
drew down cash and savings, while roughly a third did the following: (i) borrowed from
friends or relatives; (ii) delayed payments and debt repayment; and (iii) applied for
government aid. Furthermore, the share of households that could only survive without
any income for less than a month is quite high, at about 50% of all households in our
sample. In addition to household characteristics such as household head’s education,
age, and gender, COVID-19-induced factors also play an important role in the
likelihood of experiencing financial difficulties and the duration of financial viability. In all
countries, having at least one person who lost their job or had reduced working time
increases the likelihood of experiencing financial difficulties by 17 percentage points.
This factor is statistically significant in all eight countries.
Third, about 27% of children stopped going to school (especially in Myanmar and the
Philippines) as a result of the pandemic. Many schools offered online classes, but there
was great variation by country. About 27% of children who stopped attending school
could not fully participate in online learning programs due to weak/insufficient internet
connections and a lack of digital devices. Of all the factors possibly determining the
intensity of online class taking, two COVID-19-related factors—having at least one
person who lost their job or had working hours reduced and was experiencing financial
difficulties—significantly affect the intensity of online classes taken by children in an
average household.
29
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30

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ADBI Working Paper Series

Peter J. Morgan and Long Q. Trinh

Asian Development Bank Institute

Morgan, P. J. and L. Q. Trinh. 2021. Impacts of COVID-19 on Households in ASEAN

Please contact the authors for information about this paper.

Email: pmorgan@adbi.org, ltrinh@adbi.org

Asian Development Bank Institute

© 2021 Asian Development Bank Institute

Keywords: COVID-19, ASEAN, household income, employment, consumption, household

JEL Classification: D14, G51, H12, H84, I10, I24, J6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................1

3. SPREAD OF COVID-19 AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES..................................... 3

3.1 COVID-19 in ASEAN Economies ...................................................................... 3

4. ADBI HOUSEHOLD SURVEY IN ASEAN COUNTRIES .............................................. 5

5. COVID-19 IMPACTS AND COPING STRATEGIES ..................................................... 6

6. IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON EMPLOYMENT .................................. 20

7. EDUCATION IMPACTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .......................................... 22

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS ..........................................................................................29

results should contribute to guiding policy discussions on the provision of necessary

3. SPREAD OF COVID-19 AND GOVERNMENT

Table 1: Progress of COVID-19 Pandemic in 8 ASEAN Economies

Source: Our World Database.

3.2 Government Responses

Figure 1: Stringency Index of Government Nonpharmaceutical

Source: Hale et al. (2020).

Table 2: ASEAN Countries’ Government Economic Support Policies

Source: IMF (2020).

4. ADBI HOUSEHOLD SURVEY IN ASEAN COUNTRIES

Table 3: Characteristics of the Sample

SEC = income class.

5. COVID-19 IMPACTS AND COPING STRATEGIES

Figure 2: Effects of COVID-19 on Household Income, % of Households

Figure 3 presents declines in income by source. Income from household businesses or

income decline versus 71.8% of urban households. However, there is no significant

Figure 3: Change in Income, by Source of Income, % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Figure 4: Change in Income, by Income Class, Urban and Rural,

Figure 5: Sources of Income Decline, by Country, % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Determinants of Household Income during the Pandemic

in which 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes value of one if household i

Table 4: Determinants of Having Income Decline Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Figure 6: Changes in Household Expenditure, % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Figure 7: Types of Unexpected Expenditure, % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Impacts of Pandemic on Household Finance

Figure 8: Households Experiencing Financial Difficulty during the Pandemic,

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Factors Affecting Financial Vulnerability Due to COVID-19

in which 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if household 𝑖𝑖

Table 5: Determinants of Getting into Financial Difficulty

Strategies for Coping with Financial Difficulty

Figure 9: Strategies for Coping with Financial Difficulty,

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Figure 10: Types of Consumption Reduced, % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.

Factors Affecting the Duration of Financial Viability

Table 6: Determinants of Duration of Financial Viability

6. IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Figure 12: Employment Distribution (before the Pandemic), % of Households

Source: Authors’ calculation based on ADBI’s database.