1 Death of a debate?

I don’t refer to Asian values. . . . I talked about Confucianist values, not

Asian values. There are as many Asian values as there are different types of
Asians. There are Hindu values, Muslim values, Buddhist values and
Confucianist values. Even among Confucianists, there are differences,
though they form one coherent group. Those values are not going to change
fundamentally. I’m not trying to defend Asian values. . . . I’m saying that
you’re not going to have culture change overnight. These are deep-seated
habits, embedded in the subconscious of a people.
(Lee Kuan Yew, Asiaweek, 21 May 1999)

Lee Kuan Yew is the undisputed architect of the ‘Asian values’ argument. In
1977, when he was prime minister of Singapore, he launched the term at
arms-length through an academic seminar on ‘Asian values and
1
modernization’. He has been the most forthright – and probably the most
intelligent and articulate – of all of the advocates of the arguments usually
referred to as the ‘Asian values’ position. In the 1970s, he attri-buted
Singapore’s success to the fact that ‘we were an Asian-Oriental-type
society, hardworking, thrifty and disciplined, a people with Asian values,
strong family ties and responsibility for the extended family which is a
2
common feature of Asian cultures, whether Chinese, Malay or Indian’. In
the 1980s, he urged parents to ‘transmit . . . Asian values to their children’,
warning them not to forget that Singapore’s success ‘is largely due to the
strong spirit of diligence among Asians and to the importance attached to
3
family relationships and parents–children obligations in Asian soci-eties’.
As recently as 1995, he juxtaposed ‘Asian and Western values’, referring to
the influence of ‘core Asian values’ on Singaporeans, and twice in October
1998 – in the midst of the financial crisis – he praised the ‘East Asian values
of hard work, sacrifice for the future, respect for education and learning, and
4
an entrepreneurial spirit’. It is odd, there-fore, that in 1999 Lee would deny
ever having used the term ‘Asian values’, and even implicitly conceded to
his critics their argument that talk of contrasting Asian and Western values
is creating a false and misleading
4 Cultural politics
dichotomy. His statement raises fundamental questions about the ‘Asian
values’ debate, not least of which is whether the argument was ever
more than a sterile debate among Western academics. Since this book
is yet another contribution by a Western academic to the ‘Asian values’
debate, it is difficult to begin without meeting Lee’s challenge and
defending the continued use of the term.

THE ARGUMENT

Despite Lee’s contention to the contrary, the ‘Asian values’ debate is real
and it has important consequences in the real world. It is a generic term for
a set of political arguments that rest on cultural or pseudo-cultural premises
of varying veracity – which is why this author has described it as an
exercise in ‘cultural politics’. The outcome and the very process of the
debate affects processes of democratisation, the conception of human
rights, the parameters of international trade and diplomacy, and the conduct
of international agencies such as the United Nations, the Inter-national
Monetary Fund (IMF), and development and humanitarian aid agencies.
The argument’s most articulate exponents are Lee himself and Malaysian
Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, although their senti-ments have been
echoed – and sometimes challenged – in the actions and words of
politicians, diplomats and academics throughout Pacific Asia.
Although the term ‘Asian values’ carries the suggestion that there is a set
of values that is intrinsic and specific to the whole of Asia, this line of
argument has been posited only rarely. The prime tactical premise of the
‘Asian values’ argument is rather one of cultural relativism. It claims not only
that many of the hegemonic political, social and cultural norms of the late
twentieth century (especially liberal democracy and the main-stream human
rights agenda) are Western, rather than universal norms, but that they are
no more legitimate than alternative norms that could be considered ‘Asian’.
A classic but little known example of this phenomenon was the Vietnamese
government’s 1993 campaign to legitimise its human rights abuses by
5
referring to ‘Vietnamese values’ and even ‘Buddhist values’. Such tactics
are designed to taint the claimed hegemonic norms – in this case
universalist conceptions of human rights – with the odour of cultural
imperialism. Thus in 1991 the Chinese government argued that there are
legitimate, national variations of human rights, and that ‘owing to
tremendous differences in historical background, social systems, cul-tural
tradition and economic development, countries differ in their understanding
6
and practice of human rights’. Two years later Indonesian Foreign Minister
Ali Alatas attempted to deflect accusations of human rights violations with a
similar call for ‘understanding of the traditions and social values of
developing nations, many of which were endowed with ancient and
7
sophisticated cultures’. The tactical position thus established
 Death of a debate?
5

then provides the basis for a positive assertion of the legitimacy, if not
the superiority of a favoured political, social or cultural argument or
practice, which is identified as being or springing from an ‘Asian value’.
Cultural relativism, therefore, acts as a cover for cultural and polit-ical
assertion, which is the heart of the ‘Asian values’ argument.
Once the basic premise of cultural relativism has been set, it can be used
to support a choice of varied and sometimes contradictory argu-ments.
Nevertheless, at its core the ‘Asian values’ argument is remarkably
consistent. Its proponents advocate a hierarchical view of society that
emphasises the interdependence and social nature of human beings. The
cultural source of ‘Asian values’ is most commonly Confucianism. It is
important to note, however, that the Confucianism referred to here is not the
original set of ethics advocated by Confucius, but rather the state-centred
form developed from the second century BC onwards. At heart,
Confucianism is about people and relationships, and it governs how
everyone acts in a traditional Chinese hierarchical society. The relation-ship
between rulers and subjects, for instance, is likened to that between fathers
and sons: the subject/son is expected to give his ruler/father obedience and
respect, and the ruler/father is urged to be a junzi [virtuous gentleman], and
to govern the state/family by his example and by exhort-ation and education
rather than by the arbitrary imposition of his will. The character of
Confucianism will be studied in greater detail in Chapter 10, but for the
moment we might risk oversimplifying it as an ethical system and
humanistic worldview that places great emphasis on forms of conduct within
relationships, and on personal virtue, obedience to authority, family loyalty,
social harmony and education.
Most Southeast Asian cultures also contain significant elements of
hierarchy and paternalism, none of which have been challenged by an
indigenous equivalent of the European Enlightenment or the French
Revolution, with their emphasis on freedom and reason. In Buddhist
Thailand, for instance, the king is accorded immense respect because he is
presumed to have accumulated good karma in previous lives, and is
therefore an intrinsically positive moral force. Muslim Malays, reflecting an
afterglow of early Hindu–Buddhist influence, also grow up extremely
conscious of their place in a strictly hierarchical society, and even today
tend to define themselves by their relationship with their Sultan. Muslim
Javanese have also grafted Islam onto a Hindu–Buddhist conception of
a highly structured society ruled by a benevolent and all-powerful ruler who
brings prosperity through the imposition of peace, order and harmony.
Cultural perspectives originating in the region therefore stem from and tend
to lead to a web-like relational or communitarian view of society where
everyone knows his or her place in a social hierarchy. This worldview is
usually juxtaposed to ‘Western’ liberal and atomistic views of society that
emphasise the autonomy of persons and lead to decadence. This contrast
enables advocates of ‘Asian values’ to present communitarian
6 Cultural politics
and authoritarian arguments that have strong cultural resonance –
arguments that emphasise the ‘rights’ of the state, the community (e.g.
religious, ethnic or economic community) and the family ahead of the rights
of the individual person. The symbiotic linkage between the anti-Western
and the anti-decadence themes of Vietnam’s ‘Social Evils Cam-paign’ in the
mid-1990s is symptomatic of the way in which this mindset lends itself to
such manipulation. The ‘West’ equals ‘Western values’ equals ‘foreign
contamination’ equals ‘decadence’, against which the Vietnamese people
8
and government must show communal and vigilant solidarity. A
Vietnamese academic spelled out the finer rationale in March 1999:

In line with tradition, Vietnamese people always put the interests of

the society above those of the family and of themselves. The rights
of each individual are respected on condition that they are not
opposite to those of the family, village and country.
. . . We do not accept those individual interests, which are opposite to
the social interests. We always consider that correct relationships
between society and the individual are a good value in the Vietnamese
9
tradition.

Communitarian arguments have been advanced with profound bluntness on

occasion, such as when the Chinese foreign minister declared to the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993 that ‘individuals must put the state’s
10
rights before their own’. More often, however, the argument is put more
gently – such as when Indonesia’s Ali Alatas called upon the United Nations
to redress the West’s excessively ‘individualistic approach’ to human rights,
11
which he maintained lacked ‘balance’. In its milder forms this argument is
able to muster considerable support in both Asia and the West, since it
appeals to conservatives and communitarians in both cultures. Based on
such premises, proponents of ‘Asian values’ argue for a paternalistic,
illiberal state, which can take any form from the Leninist dictatorships of
Vietnam and China to the relatively benign regimes of Singapore and
Malaysia.
The primacy of the community over the needs of the individual is
generally based on a strong affirmation of the state’s duty to the people as a
12
collective – a duty to deliver peace, stability, and economic development.
This in turn is often linked to an absolutist approach to state sovereignty.
Thus, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) argued in July
1991 that human rights ‘should remain within the competence and respon-
sibility of each country, having regard for the complex variety of economic,
social and cultural realities’ and emphasised that the ‘international applica-
13
tion of human rights [should not] violate the sovereignty of nations’.
Another important corollary of the ‘strong state’ argument is the
deconstruction of ‘liberal democracy’ into its component elements –
 Death of a debate? 7

liberalism and democracy – and the advocacy of ‘illiberal democracy’ as a legitimate, if not superior
alternative theory of government. Dr Mahathir, for instance, is adamant that democracy is ‘the best form
14
of government, even though we cannot adopt a liberal democracy as practised by the West’, but also
warns of democracy deteriorating into an ‘excess of free-dom’ which in ‘extreme cases’ can become
‘virtual anarchy’. He argues that Asia needs ‘strong, stable governments prepared to make decisions in
15
the best interests of the nation’ because these factors ‘are a prerequisite for economic growth’.