Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-019-7995-x

Risk assessment of an industrial wastewater treatment

and reclamation plant using the bow-tie method
Razieh Analouei & Masoud Taheriyoun &
Hamid Reza Safavi

Received: 21 November 2018 / Accepted: 26 November 2019

# Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Abstract At present, wastewater reuse and recycling in
water-stressed countries such as Iran has become a vital
option for better management of water scarcity. Howev-
er, despite the benefits of wastewater reuse, there is a
probability of incomplete treatment of wastewater in
accordance with the standards. Risk assessment of a
wastewater treatment plant is required in order to deter-
mine the causes and consequences of failure in the
treatment system. Among various methods used for risk
assessment, the bow-tie (BT) approach is an efficient
technique since it represents a failure event from causes
to effects. In this method, for a wastewater treatment
plant (WWTP), causes of an adverse event, including
the violation of the effluent water quality from the
standard limit is studied using fault tree analysis
(FTA). Then, the impacts of these adverse events are
classified in different scenarios by the use of event tree
analysis (ETA). In this study, the BT technique was
applied to assess the risk of the WWTP of the
Moorchekhort industrial complex (MIC), located in
the central part of Iran. The plant consists of two parts,
including activated sludge and advanced treatment
R. Analouei : M. Taheriyoun (*) : H. Safavi
Department of Civil Engineering, Isfahan University of
Technology, Isfahan, 84156-83111, Iran
e-mail: taheriyoun@iut.ac.ir
R. Analouei
e-mail: r_analooei@yahoo.com
H. Safavi
e-mail: hsafavi@iut.ac.ir
processes to provide reclaimed water for different in-
dustrial uses. Results showed a 41% risk of violation
from the effluent standard limit in the MIC WWTP. In
addition, analyzing the risk factors revealed that the
human error had the largest contribution to the risk
calculation of the WWTP failure. In this regard, a num-
ber of mitigation measures were proposed to improve
the reliability of the WWTP.
Keywords Risk assessment . Wastewater treatment
plant . Bow-tie method . Reclaimed water
Introduction
Nowadays, according to the problem of water shortage
in many regions, wastewater reuse has been consistently
increasing across the planet. Water reuse can be consid-
ered as part of a sustainable water management strategy
which reduces the exploitation of water resources and
may contribute to solving water-related problems (Chen
et al. 2017; Hocaoglu 2017). Due to water scarcity in
Iran, especially in recent years, the use of treated waste-
water in industrial complexes has gained more attention.
It has helped reduce the cost of water supply and over-
come the water shortage crisis in the region.
Despite all the benefits of wastewater reuse, there are
some concerns such as violation of the water quality
standard which may cause health risks and other adverse
impacts (Asano et al. 2007). Risk assessment is an
approach that can be applied to respond to these con-
cerns in a wastewater treatment and reuse system. Risk
 33 Page 2 of 16
has different definitions depending on the scientific
disciplines and applications. In this study, risk is con-
sidered as a combination of probability and conse-
quences of an adverse event. (ISO 2009; Ganoulis
2009). On the other hand, the concept of reliability is
the probability that a system will perform a required
function without defects under the specified conditions
for a given period of time (Vose 2008).
There are many methods for quantitative risk assess-
ment. The bow-tie (BT) model is one of the most com-
prehensive methods that provide a graphical representa-
tion of the causes and consequences of one or several
events (CCPS 2018). The BT method is composed of
causal analysis which leads the top event to occur and
the safety barriers that reduce the consequences of the
top event. The main advantage of the BT method is the
presentation of the causes and consequences of an un-
desirable event at the same time.
There are some methods used in the BT body such as
fault tree analysis (FTA), reliability block diagrams, and
influence diagrams for the casual analysis part and event
tree analysis (ETA), evacuation models, and conse-
quence models for the safety barrier part (Rausand and
Hoyland 2004). In this study, a combination of FTA and
ETA is applied in the BT model in order to evaluate the
probability of an effluent standard violation and its
consequences in a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP).
FTA evaluates the causes of a failure event while ETA
represents its consequences. In fact, first, the causes of
an undesirable event in the system are investigated using
FTA. Then, the effects of this event are classified in
different scenarios through ETA (Khakzad et al. 2012).
Limited studies have been carried out related to the
risk assessment of water and wastewater treatment
systems until now. Lindhe et al. (2009) applied FTA
for integrated and probabilistic risk analysis of a water
supply system based on the Monte Carlo simulation
method. The developed risk assessment model consisted
of three parts of influent raw water, treatment plant, and
water distribution network. The results showed that the
probability of exceeding the target level was 0.84 ± 0.01
with 95% confidence. Moreover, the greatest share of
the system failure was related to the quality of influent
raw water to the treatment plant. Beauchamp et al.
(2010) used the qualitative FTA to determine the risks
of ultrafiltration (UF) membrane in pathogen removal.
The results showed that FTA was an efficient way to
identify the technical and operational hazards of a water
treatment plant.
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
Taheriyoun and Moradinezhad (2015) used FTA and
the Monte Carlo simulation method to evaluate the
reliability of a WWTP. It was determined that the
greatest contribution to the failure of the system was
human error. In this regard, the climatic and mechanical
factors and the sewer system problems were in the next
ranks.
Recent studies in risk assessment of wastewater reuse
have focused on the health impacts of reclaimed water
including microbial risk assessment. Elgallal et al.
(2016) assessed the environmental and health risks
associated with the chemicals in the reclaimed water
used for irrigation based on the risk matrix method.
They evaluated the impacts of heavy metals, salinity,
nutrients, suspended solids, toxic organics on soil, plant,
human, surface water, and groundwater. Courault et al.
(2017) applied a quantitative microbial risk assessment
(QMRA) approach to assess the airborne enteric viruses
emitted from the wastewater reused for irrigation. They
concluded that the model could aid the development of
safe water reuse policies for wastewater reuse. Further-
more, Amoueyan et al. (2017) performed QMRA to
quantify the risk of microbial infection and compared
the risks of different potable reuse systems. Similar
studies of QMRA were carried out in assessment of
bioaerosol impacts in wastewater treatment plants
(Carducci et al. 2018) and the risks of direct potable
reuse (Soller et al. 2018).
According to the literature, the BT method was most-
ly applied in the risk analysis of oil and gas facilities and
it has not been used in the risk analysis of water and
wastewater treatment systems so far. Shahriar et al.
(2012) studied the probability of failure of an oil and
gas pipeline using fuzzy BT model. The main objective
of this research was to determine the social, environ-
mental, and economic consequences of pipeline failure.
The results were useful to prevent related accidents. In
another study, Thienen-Visser et al. (2014) applied the
BT model to evaluate the causes and effects of leakage
from the storage of gas oil in a salt cavern into the
aquifer. They concluded that the risk of groundwater
contamination was low due to the leakage and the
human error was the major cause of accidents arising
from subsurface storage.
According to the previous researches, none of them
proposed a comprehensive risk analysis procedure con-
sidering both causes and consequences simultaneously
for a wastewater treatment and reuse system. In most of
the related studies, FTA has been used for risk analysis
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
while a combination of FTA and ETA in a BT body has
not been applied so far. In the present study, the BT
method is used to evaluate the risk of an undesirable
event, including failure to meet the water quality stan-
dards for the reclaimed water. In this regard, the factors
of failure in a wastewater treatment system are priori-
tized and the most effective factors in the failure event
are specified. Finally, the overall risk of the treatment
and reuse system is determined based on the required
water quality for industrial use. In order to increase the
reliability of the system, control measures are presented
at the end.
Case study
The wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) of
Moorchekhort industrial complex (MIC) is located in
Isfahan province, Iran. This treatment plant with a ca-
pacity of 1000 m3/day is mainly composed of two parts.
The first part includes primary and secondary treatment
processes, and the second part consists of advanced
treatment processes to provide reusable water for indus-
tries. A flow diagram of the plant is shown in Fig. 1.
According to the flow diagram, the process chain of the
first part includes an inlet pump station and emergency
Fig. 1 The flow diagram of the MIC WWTP
Page 3 of 16 33
tank, a bar screen, a grit chamber, an equalization tank,
an upflow anaerobic baffled reactor (UABR), a moving
bed biofilm reactor (MBBR), secondary sedimentation
and chlorination. The advanced treatment part includes
chemical pretreatment, sand filtration, ultrafiltration
(UF), activated carbon, and reverse osmosis (RO).
The reclaimed water is used in cooling towers, in
boilers, and as wash water and process water in various
industries located in the MIC including textile, plastics
and rubber, steel and iron, and food industries. Water
quality requirements for the reclaimed water include
electric conductivity (EC) < 500 (μs/cm), turbidity < 1
NTU, and COD < 5 mg/L and pH in range 6–9 (DSSME
2010). The challenges associated with reaching this
quality stems from the probable failure in each of treat-
ment units. The consequences of the failure include
sedimentation, fouling, corrosion, and biofilm forma-
tion in the pipes and equipment of the industries.
Methodology
The bow-tie (BT) method is an integrated probabilistic
and graphical approach which represents an undesired
state of the system by developing a logical relationship
between the causes and consequences of an adverse
 33 Page 4 of 16
event (Beauchamp et al. 2010; Khakzad et al. 2013). In
this study, a combination of FT and ET has been used in
the body of BT. In a failure event scenario, the relation-
ship between the event and all its probable causes is
described using the fault tree (FT). Simultaneously, the
link between the failure event and its consequences can
be represented by the event tree (ET). In other words,
the BT method integrates the FT and ET where the
center event represents the top event as shown in
Fig. 2. According to this figure, the FT and ET models
are bow-tied and the top event of FTA is connecting
with the initiating event of ETA. This framework is
mainly useful for analyzing failure events since their
causes and consequences remain connected together.
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
FTA is a deductive approach to determine the potential
causes of an adverse event. This method is considered as
one of the practical and prospective tools for reliability
and risk analysis. By applying FTA, the arborous form
of a logical relationship between an undesired event and
its causes is built )Khakzad et al. 2011; Hu 2016).
In Fig. 3, on the left side, an FT diagram of the BT
model is shown. FT components, which are symbolized
in Fig. 3, include primary events (PE), intermediate
events (IE), and top event (TE). The top event indicates
the major failure event in the system. An intermediate
event denotes a transitional state of the system that is
related directly or indirectly to the top event with a logic
gate (Mokhtari et al. 2011). The events are connected by
means of logic gates including OR and AND gates. For
the AND gate, the input events must occur
Fig. 2 The schematic of the bow-tie method (adapted from Mokhtari et al. 2011)
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
simultaneously while for the OR gate, the occurrence
of at least one input event is required )Ruijters and
Stoelinga 2015).
The FT is analyzed as both qualitative and quantita-
tive models. In the qualitative analysis, the minimal cut
set (the minimum number of events that can cause the
top event) is determined using Boolean algebra. In the
quantitative part, the probability of the top event is
calculated in terms of the occurrence probability of the
primary events or in terms of the minimal cut
sets)Khakzad et al. 2011; Hu 2016). Assuming the basic
events are independent, the AND gate in the Boolean
algebra method is equivalent to the product of their
inputs as in Eq. (1) and the OR gate is calculated based
on Eq. (2) (Rausand and Hoyland 2004):
n
PT ðAND gateÞ ¼ ∏ Pi ð1Þ
i¼1
n
PT ðOR gateÞ ¼ 1− ∏ ð1−Pi Þ ð2Þ
i¼1
where PT represents the probability of failure at the
output of the gate and Pi indicates the probability of
input events. The importance factor which denotes the
significance or effectiveness of each primary event is
determined based on Eq. (3) (Vose 2008).
PðN Þ−PðN 0 Þ
IF ¼  100 ð3Þ
P ðN Þ
where IF is the importance factor, P(N) is the probability
of the top event considering all basic events, and P(N0)
is the probability of the top event without the specified
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33 Page 5 of 16 33

Fig. 3 A typical BT model including FT (left) and ET (right)

primary event [4]. In this study, the OPENFTA software
provided by Formal Software Ltd. was used to evaluate
the risk of the MIC WWTP (Formal Software
Construction 2005).
Data collection
The available data records consisted of the effluent
concentration of three parameters including BOD,
COD, and TSS. The data was measured during a 38-
month period from April 2013 to June 2016. Table 1
shows information on the data collection including sam-
pling frequency, sampling method, analysis apparatus
and method, detection limits, and measurement uncer-
tainties of these parameters.
Regarding the available data, the top event was de-
fined as the non-compliance with BOD, COD, or TSS
standards. In fact, the failure occurs when at least one of
the three parameters violates the standard limit accord-
ing to DSSME (2010). Since the three parameters main-
ly characterize the performance of WWTPs, also be-
cause data for these parameters were readily available,
they were selected as the index for evaluating the failure
of the system. Moreover, these parameters can be rep-
resentative of the requirements for the advanced treat-
ment of wastewater after the secondary stage.
According to the availability of the field data which
can be used to evaluate the performance of the system,
the failure ratio (FR) is defined as the ratio of the number
of failure events to the total number of events based on
data records as presented in Eq. (4).
NF
FR ¼ ð4Þ
NT
where NF represents the number of records of the efflu-
ent water quality data violating the standard limit and NT

Table 1 Information on the data collection of the MIC WWTP

Parameter Sampling Sampling Analysis method Analysis apparatus Detection Measurement

(mg/L) frequency method limit uncertainty
(%)

COD Twice a week Grab APHA et al. (2017), 5220B COD reactor (45600-02) Hach 0.1 mg/L ±3
BOD Once a month Grab APHA et al. (2017), 5210B BOD meter (Hach BODTrak) 0.1 mg/L ±6
TSS Twice a week Grab APHA et al. (2017), 2540D Sartorius Entris 224-1S Bal- 0.1 mg/L ±4
ance
 33 Page 6 of 16
is the total number of records. The FR is used to see if
the FTA results are in line with the available observa-
tions. In fact, it is considered for validation of the model
results.
Event tree analysis (ETA)
ETA is an inductive technique for assessment of system
risk and reliability. This method is used to determine the
consequences of an undesirable event in the system
(Gheorghe and Mock 1999; Gheorghe and Nicolet-
Monnier 1995). As shown on the right side of Fig. 3,
an event tree (ET) diagram consists of an initiating event
(TE), safety barriers (SB), and consequences (Ci). An
initiating event can be a fault, error, undesirable event,
or even a normal operating instruction of the system. It
is the same as the top event (TE) provided by the FT part
of the BT model.
Safety barriers are the intermediate events of an ET in
order to mitigate the harmful effects of the initiating
event. The order of the barriers, i.e., SB1, SB2, SB3, is
based on their time of occurrence. The success or failure
of each barrier results in different scenarios.
Therefore, the ET begins from the TE and continues
toward each branch to determine the occurrence proba-
bility of each consequence. For example, the occurrence
probability of the consequence C1 in Fig. 3 is calculated
as in Eq. (5): (Rausand and Hoyland 2004)
PðC1j saftey barriers; TE Þ
¼ PðTE∩SB1∩SB2∩SB3Þ ¼
¼ Pð TE Þ:P ðSB1jTEÞ:PðSB2jTE∩SB1Þ:P ð5Þ
ðSB3jTE∩SB1∩SB2Þ
where P(C1) is the probability of the consequence, C1,
P(TE) is the top event probability, and P(SBi) refers to
the success and failure probability of each safety barrier
through the branches.
Expert elicitation
The probability of the basic events was calculated based
on experts’ opinions. The experts included the manager
and vice manager of the MIC WWTP, two operators of
the WWTP, the designer of the WWTP from a consult-
ing engineering company, and two faculties of the
chemical and environmental engineering field.
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
The questionnaires were provided based on the op-
eration and maintenance problems of different treatment
units discussed in the valid references (Tchobanoglous
and Burton 2014; Qasim 1999) and finally edited by the
opinions of some experts. The probability of the basic
events was calculated based on the average values of the
scores (in the range of 1–100%) derived from the
questionnaires.
In summary, the BT model is formed through the
following steps:
1. Understanding the system and how it operates to
find out the relationship between system compo-
nents and their interactions
2. Definition of the top event in the system
3. The logical construction and development of the
FT structure, including the factors affecting the
creation of the top event
4. Qualitative analysis of the FT model in order to
determine the minimal cut sets
5. Determining the probability of the basic events by
the experts’ opinions, valid references, and avail-
able data
6. Quantitative analysis of the FT model and deter-
mining the probability of the top event
7. Precise recognition of safety barriers in the ET of
the system
8. Determining the order of safety barriers and build-
ing the ET
9. Determining the probability of success and failure
of the safety barriers based on the experts’ opin-
ions and available data
10. Defining the possible consequences of each
branch in the form of scenarios (from the best to
the worst case)
11. Calculating the probabilities of the consequences
caused by the top event
12. Calculating the overall risk of the system
According to the challenges associated with
reaching the expected water quality for reuse, in-
cluding the dependency of successive treatment
units, the consequences of the top event are evalu-
ated in different scenarios. The probabilities of the
consequence scenarios are analyzed sufficiently
through the ETA with the aid of the safety barrier
concept. In this regard, both failure and non-failure
parts of the top event are analyzed in order to
interpret the results of different scenarios. Therefore,
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
in order to calculate the overall risk of the system,
the failure and non-failure probabilities of the top
event obtained from the FT are analyzed separately
by the ET part of the BT model.
Finally, the sum of the failure probabilities of the
consequences (Ci) in the ET model represents the over-
all risk of the wastewater treatment system as in Eq. (6):
R ¼ ∑P f ðC i Þ ð6Þ
where R is the risk of the system and Pf(Ci) is the failure
probabilities of the consequences obtained from the
ETA.
Fig. 4 The fault tree diagram of the MIC WWTP (part 1)
Page 7 of 16 33
Results and discussion
FTA results
In line with the process chain of the WWTP, the causal
relationship of the operation of each unit to the top event
(violation of effluent water quality from the standard
limit) was analyzed. The analysis was done based on the
literature, the available data, experts’ opinions, and the
plant operators’ experiences as discussed in the “Expert
elicitation” section.
The hierarchy of the factors resulting in the top event
occurrence was demonstrated in the form of the FT
diagram. Due to the numerous treatment units and in-
termediate events in the FT diagram, it was divided into
three parts as shown in Figs. 4, 5, and 6. In these figures,
 33 Page 8 of 16 Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33

Fig. 5 The fault tree diagram of the MIC WWTP (part 2)

the symbol for the “AND” gate is “ ” and the symbol the operator error and lack of sufficient equipment ser-
for the “OR” gate is shown as “ ”. In addition, the vice occur simultaneously, then the failure in the aerobic
reactor takes place.
connection of each figure to the next part is shown by a
The failure in the anaerobic reactor (B5) as shown in
triangular symbol. In these figures, letter “O” stands for
Fig. 5 is dependent on one of the events including lack
basic events; “N” for the top event; and letters “A,” “B,”
of regular washing of anaerobic beds in UABR (C1),
“C,” and “D” are symbols representing the events from
improper temperature (C2), improper pH (C3), high
levels 1 to 4 respectively.
toxic entry (C4), and failure in the equalization tank
According to Fig. 4, intermediate events in level 1 are
(C5). Basic events include improper design (O8, O13),
connected to the top event by the “OR” gate. Thus,
operator error (O9, O10, O12, O14, O17), bad weather
effluent water quality violation may occur mainly due
conditions (O11), failure in the emergency reservoir
to the malfunction of the aerobic reactor (A1) or the
tank (O15), and lack of sufficient equipment service
secondary sedimentation tank (A2). Furthermore, the
(O16 and O18) that are connected with AND gate
malfunction of the aerobic reactor is dependent on the
pairwise. It should be noted that the bad weather condi-
occurrence of failure in one of the related operations
tions refer to the raining conditions in which the storm
including anaerobic reactor operation (B5), oxygen lev-
water infiltrates to the sewage network and raises the
el control (B4), return sludge pumping (B3), high toxic
WWTP influent flow rate.
entry (B2), and improper volume of moving bed plastic
The malfunction of the secondary sedimentation tank
media (B1). The basic events in Fig. 4 (O2–O7) are
(A2), as shown in Fig. 6, is related to the occurrence of
connected in pairs by the “AND” gate. For instance, if
the events connecting with the “OR” gate, including
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33 Page 9 of 16 33

influent overloading (B6), sludge rising (B7), bulking Table 2 The probability of the basic events based on the average
scores derived from the experts’ opinions
(B8), and irregularly sludge discharge (B9).
Overloading is caused by the occurrence of inflow Basic Occurrence Basic Occurrence
solids or hydraulic shock loads. Moreover, improper events probability (%) events probability (%)
design (O23, O28, O30), operator error (O19, O21,
O1 1.5 O17 1
O24, O25, O29, O31, O32), high rate of inflow (O20,
O2 7 O18 7
O22), and lack of sufficient equipment service (O26) are
O3 4 O19 1
basic events in the diagram of Fig. 6. O4 6 O20 7
The probabilities of the basic events were calculated O5 5 O21 1.2
based on the experts’ opinions. The average values of O6 5 O22 8
the scores (in the range of 1–100%) derived from ques- O7 5 O23 9
tionnaires are presented in Table 2. O8 4 O24 8
The minimal cut sets of the MIC WWTP including O9 7 O25 6
first- and second-order type attained by Boolean algebra O10 1 O26 6
are shown in Table 3. The first-order type contains only O11 7 O27 6
one basic event while the second-order contains two O12 7 O28 7
basic events. For example, for the first-order type, if O13 1 O29 6
only O1 cut set (improper design of media in aeration O14 1 O30 5
tank) occurs, it will cause improper performance of the O15 1.5 O31 7
WWTP and, for the second-order cut set, simultaneous O16 1 O32 7
occurrence of O10–O11 (operator error and bad weather
conditions) causes the top event in the FT model.

Fig. 6 The fault tree diagram of the MIC WWTP (part 3)

 33 Page 10 of 16 Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33

Table 3 The minimal cut sets of the FTA Table 4 The classification of the primary events and the impor-
tance of the risk factors
Cut set Minimal cut set
order Risk factors Primary events Importance
factor (IF)
1 O1, O18, O27, O28, O31, O32 (%)
2 O10 O11, O12 O13, O14 O15, O16 O17, O19 O20,
O21 O22 Operator error O2, O4, O6, O9, O10, O12, 55
O23 O24, O25 O26, O29 O30, O2 O3, O4 O5, O6 O14, O17, O19, O21, O24,
O7, O8 O9 O25, O27, O29, O31, O32
Improper design O1, O3, O8, O13, O15, O20, 25
O22, O23, O28, O30
Lack of sufficient O5, O7, O16, O18, O26 19.9
The probability of the top event for the WWTP was equipment
determined equal to 31% based on Eqs. (1) and (2) using service
OPENFTA software. The importance factor (IF) was Bad weather O11 0.2
condition
also calculated according to Eq. (3) for each basic event.
Figure 7 shows the basic events with the highest IF. As
seen in the figure, four events have the IF values of
22.4% including O18 (lack of sufficient equipment ser- results, the human error with IF = 55% has the highest
vice of the equalization tank in the anaerobic reactor), contribution to the overall risk in the system. It is worth
O28 (improper design for bulking prevention in the noting that 16 out of 32 basic events are included in the
secondary sedimentation), O31 (operator error for operator error which may be the reason that the human
bulking prevention in the secondary sedimentation), error got the highest IF. In addition, the improper design
and O32 (operator error related to irregular sludge dis- with IF = 25% and the lack of sufficient equipment
charge in the secondary sedimentation). service with IF = 19.9% are in the next priority. The
In order to classify the most effective risk factors in bad weather conditions are the least effective factor in
the WWTP system, the primary events were categorized the risk of the WWTP system.
into four groups as shown in Table 4. According to the

Fig. 7 The basic events with the highest IF

Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
Table 5 The statistics of the effluent concentrations of COD, BOD, and TSS
Parameter Total Min. (mg/L) Ave.
(mg/L) number (mg/
of data (NT) L)
COD 261 11 57
BOD 28 6 24
TSS 111 2 47
Validation of the FTA result using the field data
The statistics of the data including minimum, maxi-
mum, average, standard deviation, skewness, and kur-
tosis coefficients are shown in Table 5. In addition, the
time series of the parameters are plotted as shown in
Fig. 8 and the probability distribution and box plot of the
data are presented in Fig. 9. The results show that the
data do not follow a normal distribution.
The FR was calculated based on the field data ac-
cording to Eq. (4), and it was obtained equal to
FR ¼ NN TF  100 ¼ 300
99
 100 ¼ 33%. Comparing with
the risk value obtained from the FTA (31%), it is con-
cluded that the difference between the two values is
within the acceptable range with an error difference of
33  100 ¼ 6%. Therefore, the results of the FT mod-
33−31
el are valid for the case study.
ETA results and BT model
By determining the risk of the main part of the waste-
water treatment plant, the BT model was prepared as
shown in Fig. 10. In this figure, the chemical pretreat-
ment, the sand filtration, the ultrafiltration, the activated
carbon, and the reverse osmosis were safety barriers
(intermediate events) of the ETA. For each barrier, the
probability of success was placed in the upper branch
and the probability of the failure was in the lower
branch. These probabilities were determined based on
the experts’ opinions and valid references for WWTP
design and operation.
According to the BT model in Fig. 10, the occurrence
of 46 probable scenarios was found. Based on the cal-
culations of the ETA model and multiplying the proba-
bility values of the branches of 46 scenarios, the overall
probability of each scenario was determined. According
to Table 6 and ETA results, scenarios C1, C2, and C3
Page 11 of 16 33
Max. (mg/L) Standard Skewness Kurtosis Effluent
deviation standard
limit (mg/L)
337 37 3.5 16.5 60
75 17 2.6 8.6 30
220 40 2.3 3.2 40
were evaluated as the final consequences of the BT
model.
Regarding Fig. 10, scenario C1 occurs when all
advanced treatment units work successfully. Conse-
quently, the fouling, the corrosion, and the biofilm will
not occur in the facilities of the industry. The probability
of this scenario in the BT model is 58.6% (= 58 + 0.6) as
shown in Fig. 10. The C2 scenario occurs when no more
than 2 of 5 units of advanced treatment processes work
successfully. As a result, the fouling, the corrosion, and
the biofilm occur in the industrial facilities of the water
consumers in the long term. The probability of the
occurrence of this scenario in the model is 21.1%. The
C3 scenario occurs when at least 3 units of 5 advanced
treatment units do not function properly. Therefore, in
the industrial facilities of the water consumer, the con-
sequences of the fouling, the corrosion, and the biofilm
will occur in the short term. The probability of this
scenario in the model is 20.3%. The results of the BT
model show that the risk in the overall WWTP system in
order to supply water for industrial uses is 41.4%. Thus,
the system has a reliability of 58.6%.
According to the results, human error has the greatest
negative impact on the performance of the system with
the aim of providing safe water for the industrial facil-
ities. As a result, it is necessary to determine mitigation
measures to increase the reliability of the wastewater
treatment system. In this regard, the following measures
are proposed:
& Increasing the level of technical knowledge of op-
erators and raising the labor force to improve the
accuracy of surveys and equipment services, in or-
der to reduce the human error in different parts of the
MIC WWTP
& Using the online monitoring system which gives a
better understanding of the system failure with re-
spect to new data, also more precise detection and
 33 Page 12 of 16 Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33

Fig. 8 The time series of the effluent concentration data. a COD, b BOD, c TSS
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33 Page 13 of 16 33

Fig. 9 Probability distribution

with the normal curve and box
plot of the effluent concentration
data. a COD, b BOD, c TSS
 33 Page 14 of 16 Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33

Fig. 10 The bow-tie diagram of the MIC WWTP

control of the entrance of chemicals and toxics to the probability of failure due to the lack of sufficient
biological treatment units equipment service
& Services and repairs to various parts of the system in & Equipping the laboratory of the MIC WWTP and
a regular and periodic manner to decrease the performing regular tests of various parameters in
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
Table 6 The results of the scenarios
Symbol of Scenarios Probability of
scenarios scenarios (%)
C1 Without fouling, corrosion, and 58.6
biofilm in the facilities of an
industry
C2 Creating fouling, corrosion, and 21.1
biofilm in the facilities of an
industry in the long run
C3 Creating fouling, corrosion, and 20.3
biofilm in the facilities of an
industry in the short run
accordance with the standards of industrial waste-
water (DSSME 2010). It decreases the measurement
uncertainty which can help strengthen the analysis
of the failure and validate the model results.
Conclusion
In this study, the BT model was used to determine
the risk of an industrial wastewater treatment system
in violating the effluent water quality parameters
from the standard limits. The case study was the
MIC WWTP located in Isfahan, Iran. The input data
of the ET and FT models were obtained through the
experts’ opinions, the effluent concentration data of
the WWTP, and the valid references of the design
and operation of the WWTP. Ultimately, the total
risk of the system was calculated equal to 41.4% by
applying the BT model. Prioritizing the risk factors
resulting from the BT model in the main part of the
WWTP was obtained as the human error, the im-
proper design, the lack of sufficient equipment ser-
vice, and bad weather conditions. Human error has
the greatest impact on the improper performance of
the system. Finally, the mitigation measure for in-
creasing the system reliability was proposed. The
results showed the capability of the BT model in
the improvement of WWTP operation and mainte-
nance based on the systemic approach.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Dr. Seyed
Alireza Momeni and Mrs. Mahnaz Heydari and Mrs. Hamideh
Ebrahimi from the MIC WWTP for preparing the plant operation
data and filling the questioners and Eng. Hamidreza Oroomieh for
sharing his experience about treatment plant design and operation.
Page 15 of 16 33
In addition, the efforts of anonymous reviewers in preparing the
insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper, are kindly
acknowledged.
References
Amoueyan, E., Ahmad, S., Eisenberg, J. N., Pecson, B., & Gerrity,
D. (2017). Quantifying pathogen risks associated with pota-
ble reuse: a risk assessment case study for cryptosporidium.
Water Research, 119, 252–266.
APHA, AWWA & WEF. (2017). Standard methods for the exam-
ination of wastewater (23th ed.). Washington: America
Public Health Association, American Water Works
Association, Water Environment Federation.
Asano, T., Burton, F., Leverenz, H., Tsuchihashi, R., &
Tchobanoglous, G., (2007). Water reuse: issues, technolo-
gies, and applications. 10–13.
Beauchamp, N., Lence, B., & Bouchard, C. (2010). Technical
hazard identification in water treatment using fault tree anal-
ysis. Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 897–906.
Carducci, A., Donzelli, G., Cioni, L., Federigi, I., Lombardi, R., &
Verani, M. (2018). Quantitative microbial risk assessment for
workers exposed to bioaerosol in wastewater treatment plants
aimed at the choice and setup of safety measures.
International Journal of Environmental Research and
Public Health, 15(7).
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). (2018). Bow ties in
risk management: a concept book for process safety. John
Wiley & Sons.
Chen, Z., Wu, Q., Wu, G., & Hu, H. Y. (2017). Centralized water
reuse system with multiple applications in urban areas: les-
sons from China’s experience. Resources, Conservation and
Recycling, 117, 125–136.
Courault, D., Albert, I., Perelle, S., Fraisse, A., Renault, P.,
Salemkour, A., & Amato, P. (2017). Assessment and risk
modeling of airborne enteric viruses emitted from wastewater
reused for irrigation. Science of the Total Environment, 592,
512–526.
Deputy of Strategic supervision of the Ministry of Energy
(DSSME) (2010). Code no. 535, Environmental regulations
for the reuse of wastewater and wastewater. Bureau of the
Technical Management System of Engineering and Technical
Standards for Water and Wastewater.
Elgallal, M., Fletcher, L., & Evans, B. (2016). Assessment of
potential risks associated with chemicals in wastewater used
for irrigation in arid and semiarid zones: a review.
Agricultural Water Management, 177, 419–431.
Formal Software Construction. (2005). Open FTA user manual
ver. 1.0. Formal Software Construction (FSC) (pp. 5–83).
Wales: Ltd Cardiff.
Ganoulis, J. (2009). Risk analysis of water pollution (pp. 32–34).
John Wiley & Sons.
Gheorghe, A., & Mock, R. (1999). Risk engineering: bridging risk
analysis with stakeholders values. New York: Springer
Science+Business Media.
 33 Page 16 of 16
Gheorghe, A., & Nicolet-Monnier, M. (1995). Integrated regional
risk assessment (Vol. II) Consequence Assessment of
Accidental Releases. Netherlands: Springer.
Hocaoglu, S. (2017). Evaluations of on-site wastewater reuse
alternatives for hotels through water balance. Resources,
Conservation and Recycling, 122, 43–50.
Hu, Y. N. (2016). Research on the application of fault tree analysis
for building fire safety of hotels. Procedia Engineering, 135,
524–530.
ISO/Guide 73 (2009). Risk management — vocabulary, p.2, avail-
able on, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:guide:73:ed-
1:v1:en. Accessed 15 Sept 2018.
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2011). Safety analysis in
process facilities: comparison of fault tree and Bayesian
network approaches, reliability engineering and system safe-
ty (Vol. 96, pp. 925–932).
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2012). Dynamic risk
analysis using bow-tie approach. Reliability Engineering
and System Safety., 104, 36–44.
Khakzad, N., Khan, F., & Amyotte, P. (2013). Dynamic safety
analysis of process systems by mapping bow-tie into
Bayesian network. Process Safety and Environmental
Protection, 91, 46–53.
Lindhe, A., Rosén, L., Norberg, T., & Bergstedt, O. (2009). Fault
tree analysis for integrated and probabilistic risk analysis of
drinking water systems. Water Research, 43(6), 1641–1653.
Mokhtari, K., Ren, J., Roberts, C., & Wang, J. (2011). Application
of a generic bow-tie based risk analysis framework on risk
management of sea ports and offshore terminals. Journal of
Hazardous Materials, 192(2), 465–475.
Qasim, S. R. (1999). Wastewater treatment plants: planning,
design, and operation. Routledge.
Environ Monit Assess (2020) 192:33
Rausand, M., & Hoyland, A. (2004). System reliability theory:
models, statistical methods, and applications (2nd ed.). New
Jersey: Wiley and Sons.
Ruijters, E., & Stoelinga, M. (2015). Fault tree analysis: a survey
of the state-of-the-art in modeling, analysis and tools.
Computer Science Review, 15–16, 29–62.
Shahriar, A., Sadiq, R., & Tesfamariam, S. (2012). Risk analysis
for oil & gas pipelines: a sustainability assessment approach
using fuzzy based bow-tie analysis. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 25, 505–523.
Soller, J. A., Eftim, S. E., & Nappier, S. P. (2018). Direct potable
reuse microbial risk assessment methodology: sensitivity
analysis and application to state log credit allocations.
Water Research, 128, 286–292.
Taheriyoun, M., & Moradinejad, S. (2015). Reliability analysis of
a wastewater treatment plant using fault tree analysis and
Monte Carlo simulation. Journal of Environ Monit Assess,
187(4186), 1–13.
Tchobanoglous, G., & Burton, F. L. (2014). Wastewater engineer-
ing: treatment and resource recovery (15th ed.). New York:
Metcalf & Eddy, McGraw-Hill Education.
Thienen-Visser, K., Hendriks, D., Marsman, A., Nepveu, M.,
Groenenberg, R., Wildenborg, T., van Duijne, H., den
Hartogh, M., & Pinkse, T. (2014). Bow-tie risk assessment
combining causes and effects applied to gas oil storage in an
abandoned salt cavern. Engineering Geology, 168, 149–166.
Vose, D. (2008). Risk analysis: a quantitative guide (pp. 11–12).
John Wiley & Sons.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.