Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(ObliCon)
CONTRACTS
Criminal liability
Civil liability
with corresponding
civil liability (Art. 100, Independent civil
RPC) action (Arts. 2176 and
2177, NCC)
Culpa criminal
Culpa aquiliana/
quasi-delict
• Quantum of evidence
• However, the private complainant cannot recover
damages in BOTH cases.
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is
also obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence
of a good father of a family, unless the law or the
stipulation of the parties requires another standard of
care.
• Obligation to GIVE
• Determinate thing
Generic Determinate
Designated only by Particularly
class or genus designated or
physically
segregated from
others of the same
class or genus
• Unless proper diligence is exercised, there is
a danger that the property would be lost or
destroyed, thus rendering illusory the
obligation.
Diligence needed
• GR: Good father of a family
• Required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds to the circumstances of person,
time and place (Art. 1173, NCC)
• XPN:
• Law
• Common carriers – “utmost diligence of
very cautious persons;” extraordinary care
(Art. 1755)
• Contract
Obejera and Intak v. Iga Sy
• Plaintiffs Obejera and Intak along with
defendant Iga Sy sought refuge from the
Japanese invasion in the house of barrio
lieutenant Villena.
• Due to the advancing Japanese army, both
plaintiffs and defendant hid their valuables in
Villena’s dugout.
• The parties later discovered that their valuables
were missing.
• Defendant Iga Sy reported the loss of her money
and jewels, causing the arrest and investigation
of Villena, two others and the plaintiff Engracio
Obejera.
• Obejera was released only more than a week
later after he, with his wife, executed a document
where they agreed to transfer their own property
to the defendant in case they failed to return the
money and jewelry.
• Plaintiffs filed for the annulment of that
document.
• Defendant: She deposited her valuables with the
plaintiffs, who acknowledged their liability by
executing the document complained of.
• Held: Plaintiffs are not liable.
• The alleged deposit is unbelievable and contrary
to human nature.
• It is hard to believe that Obereja would assume
responsibility over the defendant's things hidden
in a place not belonging to him especially at a
time when the confusion and fear resulting from
the Japanese invasion and fast advance so
gripped everyone that nobody could be sure of
even of his life.
Negligence
• Omission of that diligence which is required by
the circumstances of person, place and time (Art.
1173, NCC)
• Failure to observe, for the protection of the
interests of the person of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury (US v.
Barrias)
Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.
• Cangco was preparing to step off a train which was
slowing down to a stop. When he alighted, he
stepped on a sack of watermelons.
• The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a
dark night. The railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away.
• The train platform where passengers alight begins to
rise some distance from the railroad company’s
office.
• He rolled from the platform and was drawn under the
moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated.
• After he alighted from the train, the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.
• Railroad co.: The direct and proximate cause of
the injury suffered by Cangco was his own
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the
train had come to a complete stop before
alighting.
• Held: The railroad co. is liable because it
negligently failed to provide a safe alighting
place.
• The test by which to determine whether the
passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway
train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care, or
whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the
age, sex and condition of the passenger,
would have acted as the passenger acted
under the circumstances.
• Care which a man of ordinary prudence
would use under similar circumstances to
avoid injury.
• Was there anything in the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the
train under the conditions then existing was
dangerous?
• Person
• Young man
• Familiar with the area
• Place
• No warning that the platform was not clear for
alighting
• Dimly-lit
• The distance from the steps of the car to the
spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was reduced,
thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off.
• Cement
De la Cruz v. Spouses Octaviano
• The sedan driven by de la Cruz hit the back portion
of the tricycle where Renato Octaviano was riding.
• De la Cruz: He saw a tricycle 100-120 meters away
from him going in the opposite direction. An Elf van
was parked along the road on the opposite side. He
flashed his low beam and high beam light to signal
the tricycle. The tricycle then slowed down and
stopped a bit, hence, he also slowed down.
Suddenly, the tricycle picked up speed from its stop
position and the two vehicles collided after the Elf
van.
• De la Cruz appeared to be drunk.
• At the time of the incident, the tricycle driver had no
license. Renato Octaviano also violated a municipal
ordinance by riding behind the tricycle driver.
• Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
• Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against
that harm.
• Held: De la Cruz, the driver of the sedan, was
negligent.
• Drunk
• If the collision point was right ahead of the front
of the parked Elf van, it means that the tricycle
was already past the parked Elf and it was Dela
Cruz who forced his way into the two-way
road.
• De la Cruz swerved to the left.
• The tricycle was hit at the back portion meaning
it was already turning after passing the parked
Elf.
Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of
the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it
arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over
it until the same has been delivered to him.
When must delivery be made?
• If there is a term or condition, from the moment
the term arrives or the condition is fulfilled.
• If there is no term or condition, from the time of
the perfection of the contract.
Personal right Real right
Jus in personam; jus Jus in re
ad rem
Demandable against Power over a specific
another person thing; demandable
over the whole world
Kinds of delivery
• Actual delivery
• Tradition
• The property changes hands physically
• Constructive delivery
• Physical transfer is implied
• Traditio simbolica/Symbolical tradition
• Traditio longa manu/ Delivery by mere consent
• Traditio brevi manu/ Delivery by short hand
• Traditio constitutum possessorium (opposite of
brevi manu)
• Traditio by execution of legal forms and
solemnities (ex. execution of deed of absolute
sale)
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Wilson
• Wilson is a disbursing officer for a government agency.
The Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland
(“Maryland”), and the American Surety Company of New
York (“NY”) were the sureties of his official bond of $1,500.
• Wilson defaulted on his obligations and the two sureties
were made to pay $ 4,465 each.
• When Wilson was finally captured, he had with him c
which was confiscated.
• Marlyand filed a case against Wilson and NY, demanding
the payment of $ 4,465 and that the amount be applied to
the $ 785 in gold which was recovered from Wilson upon
his arrest.
• Terrell intervened in the case.
• Terrell: Wilson had ceded and transferred to him all of
Wilson’s rights to the said $785 in payment on account of
a larger sum then owed by Wilson to him.
• NY and Maryland: They have a better right to the
$785 in gold. The funds are part of government
money taken by Wilson. They became subrogated to
the rights of the government to that money.
• Who has a better right to the $785?
• What is the right of Terrell that $785?
• Held:
• A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from
the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However,
he shall not acquire a real right (and the ownership is
surely such) until the property has been delivered
to him (Art. 1905, Old Civil Code).
• The transfer of the ownership in the contract of
transfer in favor of Terrell does not produce the
effect by the fact of the mere consent, but is
acquired by tradition xxx.
• Therefore, by reason of the non-delivery Terrell
did not acquire the ownership of the property
transferred to him by Wilson. It is only the jus ad
rem (personal right or jus in personam), and not
the jus in re (or real right), that was acquired by
Terrell by virtue of the transfer.
• Terrell was adjudged to have the same right as
that of a creditor, and no other.
Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of
the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it
arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over
it until the same has been delivered to him.
Ex.
Article 1165. When what is to be delivered is a
determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to the
right granted him by article 1170, may compel the
debtor to make the delivery.
Accessions
• Additions to or improvements upon a thing
• Alluvium and whatever is built, planted or sown
on a person’s land
Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails
to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
• Obligation not to do
Creditor’s remedies if debtor fails to do
• To have the obligation performed (by the debtor
or by another) at debtor’s expense (only if
another can do the performance)
• Damages
• If the creditor can have it done by someone
else - damages alone cannot substitute for
performance
• If the obligation is purely personal or special -
only damages may be asked
What about specific performance?
• NOT a remedy in personal obligations (to do or
not to do)
• Involuntary servitude
• Agreement to marry
When a thing may be ordered undone
• If made poorly
• Performance by a third person + damages
• If the obligation is a negative one
• Undoing (if possible) + damages
Chavez v. Gonzales
• Chavez delivered his typewriter to Gonzales for routine
servicing and repair, although there was no specific
period for fulfilling the obligation. The latter was not
able to finish the job after some time despite repeated
reminders.
• Gonzales then required money for spare parts.
• When Chavez finally asked for the return of the
typewriter, Gonzales delivered it to him in shambles
with parts missing.
• Chavez had to take his typewriter to another repairer.
• He filed a case for damages.
• Gonzales: Because his contract with plaintiff Chavez
did not contain a period, plaintiff-appellant should have
first filed a petition for the court to fix the period.
• Held: Gonzales contravened the tenor of his
obligation because he not only did not repair the
typewriter but also returned it in shambles.
• Liable under:
• Art. 1167 for compelling Chavez, the creditor,
find a second repairer to fulfill the obligation in
a proper manner (cost of the labor for the
repair of the typewriter)
• Art. 1170 for he failed or neglected to return the
typewriter in the same manner as he received it
(cost of the missing parts)
• There was no time specified within which to finish
repairing the typewriter.
• However, such time had passed without the work
having been accomplished, for Gonzales returned
the typewriter cannibalized and unrepaired, which
in itself is a breach of his obligation.
• By returning the typewriter in that state, he
virtually admitted non-performance of his
obligation.
• The fixing of a period would thus be a mere
formality and would serve no purpose than to
delay.
Vil-Rey Planners and Builders v. Lexber
• Vil-Rey and Lexber entered into a contract for
the completion of the remaining works under
two prior contracts involving a compacted
back-fill on Lexber’s property.
• Under the present contract, Vil-Rey must
complete the work by 15 January 1997. The
contract price of Php 1,168,728.37 shall be
paid on the following basis:
• 50% downpayment to be secured by a
surety bond; and
• 50% balance upon completion of the works.
• Vil-Rey requested for an extension of the
contract period until 31 January 1997 which
was granted by Lexber.
• Still, Vil-Rey did not comply with its obligation,
even with an additional five days granted to
it by Lexber.
• Lexber filed a complaint for sum of money.
• Vil-Rey: Denied breach of contract. It was
actually Lexber which breached the contract
for paying only 50% of the contract price. Vil-
Rey had fulfilled almost 100% of the contract
but was unable to finish it because Lexber did
not pay anymore. Thus, Lexber owed it the
balance of Php 668,728.37.
• Held: Vil-Rey is liable for breach of contract.
• Breach of contract is the failure of a party,
without legal reason, to comply with the terms
of a contract or perform any promise that forms
either a part or the whole of it.
• Vill-Rey failed to prove it fulfilled 95% of its
obligation. Even if it were true, it did not fulfill
100% of the work.
• Reciprocal obligations
• arise from the same cause, such that the
obligation of one is dependent upon that of the
other.
• Under the contract, Lexber is obliged to pay the
remaining 50% upon the completion of Vil-Rey of
its work by 15 January 1997.
• The next payment for Vil-Rey would have fallen
due upon completion of the works. Thus, it cannot
put up the defense that its failure to comply with its
obligation was because it was not paid.
• However, since it was not shown that Vil-Rey
acted in bad faith, it shall be liable for
damages only with regard to those that are the
natural and probable consequences of its
breach (Art. 2201).
• Failure of Vil-Rey to finish the works
compelled Lexber to secure the services of
another contractor, to which the latter paid a
total of P284,084.46.
Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something
incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary
in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the
obligation it appears that the designation of the time when
the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered
was a controlling motive for the establishment of the
contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has
rendered it beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
begins.
When is a debtor in default?
• GR: Demand must be made
• Judicial
• Extrajudicial
• XPN: No demand need when:
• The law provides
• Ex. Taxes
• The obligation expressly declares
• Time is of the essence of the contract
• Ex. Wedding dress for the wedding; agricultural
contracts
• Demand would be useless (obligor has rendered it
beyond his power to perform)
• The debtor has expressly acknowledged that he is in
default
• Mere asking for an extension is not an express
acknowledgment of default.
Different kinds of delay/ mora
• Mora solvendi (default on the part of the
debtor)
• Mora solvendi ex re
• Mora solvendi ex persona
• Mora accipiendi (default on the part of the
creditor)
• Compensatio morae
• Reciprocal obligations
• Both parties are in default – it is as if neither
is in default
Mora solvendi
• Absent in negative obligations and natural
obligations
Mora solvendi; requisites
• Obligation must be demandable and already
liquidated or determinate in amount
• Non-performance of the debtor
• Demand
Demand
• Categorical assertion for the fulfillment of a
due and demandable obligation
• Must clearly require the performance of a
prestation
• Tolerance and benevolence of the creditor has
ended (Tolentino)
• Ex. Demand to vacate (Macaslang v. Zamora)
• “I will be taking over the occupancy of the said
property two months from date of this letter.”
• No other interpretation of the import of the
notice
• Alternatives were clear cut
Demand
• Ex. Inaccurate amount in demand letter
(United Planters Bank v. Beluso)
• Demand for a considerably bigger amount
• Held: The excess amount in such a demand
does not nullify the demand itself, which is
valid with respect to the proper amount.
• Valid, albeit excessive demand
Demand
• Demand is generally needed even if a period
has been fixed in the obligation. Without
demand, the effects of delay will not arise.
• “Due and demandable”
• Interest and damages
• Ex. Dates
De la Rosa v. BPI
• BPI started a contest of designs and plans for the
construction of a building, announcing that the prizes would
be awarded not later that on November 30, 1921.
• De la Rosa participated in the contest, having performed
work and incurred expenses for that purpose.
• BPI refrained from naming judges and awarding the prizes in
accordance with the conditions stipulated.
• Was BPI’s failure to award the prizes by November 30, 1921
as previously announced, a breach of contract?
• Held: No.
• BPI cannot be held to have been in default through the mere
lapse of time. For this judicial or extrajudicial demand was
necessary for the performance of the obligation, and it was
not alleged here, nor does it appear that before bringing this
action the plaintiff had ever demanded it from the defendant
bank in any manner whatsoever. The defendant bank,
therefore, was not in default.
Effects of delay/mora
• If the debtor is in default, he may be liable for
interest or damages
• Debtor may also bear the risk of loss.
• Debtor is liable for a fortuitous event
Acceleration clause
• Clause which would make all installments due
upon the default of one installment
• Default in one payment does not mean default
of the whole amount.
• The whole amount only becomes due.
However, in the absence of stipulation,
demand is still needed to put the debtor in
default.
La Compañia General De Tabacos De Filipina v. Araza
• Araza mortgaged his land to La Compañia General De
Tabacos De Filipina for Php 8,000.
• He promised to pay 500 pesos on the June 30, 1901,
and the remainder at the rate of 100 pesos a month,
payable on the 30th day of each month, until the entire
8,000 pesos was paid.
• There was no:
• Acceleration clause
• Provision for interest
• Express declaration that the failure to pay when due
should put the debtor in default.
• Araza paid only 400 pesos.
• La Compañía filed a case for foreclosure on June 12,
1903.
• What portion of the obligation may La Compania’s
action cover?
• Only the amount due and demandable on June
12, 1903, the date of filing of La Compania’s
action.
• There was no evidence any demand prior to the
presentation of the complaint. The plaintiff is
therefore entitled to interest only from the
commencement of the action.
Mora accipiendi
• The creditor unjustifiably refuses to accept
payment/performance at the time it can be
done.
• Obligations ex-delicto
• Debtor-criminal is responsible for loss even
through a fortuitous event, unless the creditor
is in mora accipiendi
• Consign the thing
• Keep it himself (still exercising due diligence)
Mora accipiendi
• Improper refusal of the lessor/creditor to
accept the rentals tendered by lessee
• Lessor/creditor must shoulder the accidental
loss of the leased premises
• Mora accipiendi is not cured by the
lessee/debtor’s failure to consign the rentals
but the lessee remains obligated to pay the
rentals he had tendered but did not deposit in
court (Vda. De Villaruel v. Manila Motor Co.)
When is demand not needed
• Law
• Stipulation
• Time is of the essence
• Demand would be useless (obligor has
rendered it beyond his power to perform)
• The debtor has expressly acknowledged
that he is in default
When is demand not needed; time is of the essence
Barzaga v. CA
• The deceased wife of Barzaga specified that she
wished to be buried before December 25.
• Barzaga contracted with Alviar for the delivery of
materials for the niche on December 22.
• It would take 2 days to finish the construction of
the niche.
• Alviar’s delay in delivering the materials wasted so
much time that the construction could only start on
December 23.
• Work on the niche had to be put off on December
25
• Prolonged the wake
When is demand not needed; time is of the essence
Abella v. Francisco
• Francisco bought from the government on
installment certain parcels of land. He had already
in debt for some of the installments.
• He sold the parcels of land at Php 100/lot to
Guillermo, who paid a downpayment of Php 500.
The balance is to be paid on or before December
14.
• Francisco intended to apply the proceeds of the
sale to certain obligations which will be due on
December.
• Abella did not pay on time. It was only on January
the following year that he attempted to pay.
• May Abella compel Francisco to execute a
sale of the subject parcels in his favor?
• Held: NO.
• Time was an essential element in the
transaction. Francisco wanted to sell those
lots to the plaintiff in order to pay off certain
obligations which fell due in the month of
December, 1928. The time fixed for the
payment of the price was therefore essential
for him.
• The contract is rescinded.
When is demand not needed; demand is
useless
• Debtor delivered the specific thing to
another person
• Debtor destroyed the specific thing to be
delivered
Reciprocal obligations
• Created and established at the same time, out
of the same cause and results in a mutual
relationship of creditor and debtor between the
parties
• Performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of the other.
• Ex. Contract of sale (buyer must pay and the
seller must deliver)
Reciprocal obligations
• If the performance is not set on different dates,
it must be simultaneous.
• One party cannot demand performance by the
other if the former himself cannot perform.
• If both did not perform, there is compensatio
morae (mutual delay).
• Both of them are in default so it is as if no
one is in default.
• If one party performs and the other does
not, the latter would be in default.
Phil. Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. V.P.
Eusebio Construction, Inc.
• State Organization of Buildings (SOB), an Iraqi
government agency, awarded the construction of the a
medical rehabilitation building (Project) to Ajyal Trading
and Contracting Company.
• 3-Plex International, Inc., a Filipino contractor
engaged in the construction business, entered into a
joint venture agreement with Ajyal. 3-Plex undertook
the execution of the entire Project, while Ajyal would be
entitled to a 4% commission of the contract price.
• 3-Plex, not being accredited by or registered with the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB),
assigned all its rights and interests under the joint
venture agreement to VPECI.
• After the required performance bonds were
executed, SOB and the joint venture VPECI and
Ajyal executed the service contract for the
construction of the Project to be finished within 18
months.
• Under the Contract, the Joint Venture would
supply manpower and materials, and SOB would
refund to the former 25% of the project cost in
Iraqi Dinar and the 75% in US dollars.
• The agreement between the parties was a periodic
payment by SOB to the contractors depending on the
percentage of accomplishment within the period. The
payments were, in turn, to be used by the contractor to
finance the subsequent phase of the work.
• The status the Project was 51% accomplished,
meaning the structures were already finished. The
remaining 47% consisted in electro-mechanical works
and the 2%, sanitary works, which both required
importation of equipment and materials.
• SOB paid for the remaining 75% of the Project using
Iraqi dinars, which are not freely convertible to other
currency. The Iraqi government prohibited the bringing
of Iraqi dinars outside of the country.
• Was the JV of VPECI and Ajyal in default for not
accomplishing the remaining 49% of the Project?
• Held: NO.
• In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in
delay if the other party does not comply or is not
ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him (3rd par., Art. 1169).
• The non-completion of the Project was caused by
factors not imputable to the VPECI. It was rather
due mainly to the persistent violations by SOB of
the terms and conditions of the contract,
particularly its failure to pay 75% of the
accomplished work in US Dollars.
• SOB cannot yet demand complete performance
from VPECI because it has not yet itself
performed its obligation in a proper manner,
particularly the payment of the 75% of the cost of
the Project in US Dollars. VPECI cannot yet be
said to have incurred in delay.
• Even assuming that there was delay and that the
delay was attributable to VPECI, still the effects of
that delay ceased upon the renunciation by the
creditor, SOB, which could be implied when the
latter granted several extensions of time to the
former.
• Besides, no demand has yet been made by SOB
against the respondent contractor. Demand is
generally necessary even if a period has been
fixed in the obligation. And default generally
begins from the moment the creditor demands
judicially or extra-judicially the performance of the
obligation. Without such demand, the effects of
default will not arise.
Price v. Rilloraza
• Camus leased to Price, Inc. a certain property. Under the
contract:
• Price will pay monthly rentals without need of demand;
• Price will construct a factory and warehouse on the lot,
and insure the structure with Camus as the beneficiary.
Camus will then become the owner upon termination of
the contract;
• In case of a breach of the contract by Price, Camus
may, while the default shall continue, and without
notice or demand, enter upon the premises and
terminate the lease and may thereupon expel and
remove Price; and
• Camus will, within one year from the signing of the
contract, fill and elevate a portion of the leased
property and enclose it with a concrete fence with
barbed wires.
Breach of reciprocal obligation
• In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a
proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the
moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by
the other begins (3rd par., Art. 1169).
• Camus breached his obligation to elevate the area and
enclose it with a concrete fence and barbed wire.
Title of the warehouse/factory
• Title to the building would pass from Price to Camus upon
the termination of the lease. However, said right of Camus
to terminate the lease could be exercised only "while the
default (of Price) shall continue," and Price is not in default
as long as - in the words of Article 1169 - Camus "does
not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner
with what is incumbent upon him" and there is prima facie
proof of breach of contract by Camus.
When damages or interest may be lost
• A creditor entitled to damages or interest
because of default may lose the same if:
• The principal obligation is allowed to
prescribe
• Damages or interest are allowed to prescribe
• Damages or interest are condoned
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Grounds for liability for damages
• Fraud
• Deceit/ dolo/ intentional evasion of
fulfillment
• Negligence
• Fault/ culpa
• Default
• Mora
• Violation of the terms of the obligation
• Breach; contravention of the tenor
Fortuitous event?
Examples of violation of the contract giving rise to
liability:
• When a landlord fails to maintain a tenant in legal
possession of the land because the landlord was
not the owner and the true owner now wants to
occupy the land
Examples of violation of the contract giving rise to
liability:
De la Cruz v. El Seminario de la Archdiocesis de
Manila, et al.
• Methodist Episcopal Association, with de la Cruz
as its president, leased a parcel of land from the
Archbishop of Manila.
• MEA built a chapel on the leased premises.
• Just when the chapel was completed, a certain
Sinsuangco filed an ejectment case against the
MEA and the agent of the Archbishop who
executed the lease.
• The ejectment case prospered and no appeal was
taken.
• De la Cruz filed a case for damages.
• Held: The defendants are liable.
• When this rental contract was executed, the
lot in question was vacant. The agent, Miller,
led the plaintiff de la Cruz to believe that he
could place him in legal possession of the lot.
It was upon this theory that the plaintiff
entered into this contract and paid the rent for
the first year.
• Under their contract of lease, it was the duty of
the defendants to give the plaintiff the legal
possession of the premises. This they did not
do.
• The person who fails in the performance of his
obligations shall be subject to indemnify for
the losses and damages caused thereby.
• The true measure of damages for the breach
of such a contract is what the plaintiff has lost
by the breach (Locke v. Fruze).
Examples of violation of the contract giving rise to liability:
Arrieta v. NIRC
• Arrieta and NIRC entered into a Contract of Sale of
Rice.
• Arrieta will deliver to NIRC 20,000 metric tons of
Burmess Rice at $203.00 per metric ton.
• NIRC promised to pay for the imported rice "by means
of an irrevocable, confirmed and assignable letter of
credit in U.S. currency in favor of Arrieta and/or
supplier in Burma, immediately."
• Despite the commitment to pay immediately through a
LOC, however, it was only on July 30, 1952, or a full
month from the execution of the contract, that the
NIRC started its application for an LOC with PNB.
• NIRC does not have sufficient deposit so it asked for
special consideration from PNB.
• Arrieta reminded NIRC of the extreme necessity for the
immediate opening of the LOC by August 4.
• She had by then made a tender to her supplier in
Rangoon, Burma, "equivalent to 5% of the F.O.B. price
of 20,000 tons.
• This 5% will be confiscated if the required letter of
credit is not received by her supplier before August 4.
• However, NIRC was unable to open the LOC because
it failed to come up the marginal cash deposit required
by PNB.
• NIRC was only able to open its LOC on September 8.
• As a result of NIRC’s failure to open the LOC
by August 4, Arrieta’s 5% tender to her
supplier was forfeited.
• Held: NIRC is liable for damages.
• Its culpability arises from its willful and
deliberate assumption of contractual
obligations even as it was well aware of its
financial incapacity to undertake the
prestation.
• “Those who in the performance of their
obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable in
damages.”
• Under this provision, not only debtors guilty of
fraud, negligence or default in the
performance of obligations are decreed liable;
in general, every debtor who fails in
performance of his obligations is bound to
indemnify for the losses and damages caused
thereby.
• The phrase "any manner contravene the
tenor" of the obligation includes any illicit act
which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment
of the obligation or every kind or defective
performance.
Examples of violation of the contract giving rise to
liability:
• When a person agreed to supply cinematographic
films but cannot do so because of his fault
• When a common carrier fails to take its
passengers to their destination
• If a taxi passenger is intentionally killed by the
driver
Kinds of damages:
• MENTAL
• Moral
• Exemplary
• Nominal
• Temperate
• Actual
• Liquidated
Kinds of damages; moral damages
• Physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury.
• Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act
or omission.
Kinds of damages; exemplary damages
• To serve as a deterrent to future and subsequent
parties from the commission of a similar offense
• Corrective
• “Punitive” or “vindictive” damages
Kinds of damages; nominal damages
• Recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present
loss of any kind
• Where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown
• When no other right can be recovered
• Discretion of the court
Kinds of damages; temperate damages
• Moderate damages
• The amount of plaintiff’s loss cannot be proved
with certainty, but the fact that there has been
loss on his/her part was established.
• More than nominal but less than
compensatory
Kinds of damages; actual damages
• Actual losses, unrealized profit
• Compensatory damages
• Cannot be presumed so the party alleging
must use the best evidence possible
• To be recoverable, actual damages must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with reasonable degree of certainty.
We cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the
amount of damages.
Kinds of damages; liquidated damages
• Agreed upon by the parties in case of breach
• When intended as a penalty, the courts may
reduce liquidated damages if unconscionable.
GF Equity v. Valenzona
• GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of
the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine
Basketball Association under a Contract of
Employment.
• “3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the
COACH, in the sole opinion of the
CORPORATION, fails to exhibit sufficient skill
or competitive ability to coach the team, the
CORPORATION may terminate this contract.”
• During his stint as Alaska’s head coach, the
team placed third both in the Open and All-
Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988.
GF Equity v. Valenzona
• GF Equity terminated Valenzona’s services by
citing Par. 3 of their contract.
• Valenzona filed a case for breach of contract with
damages, praying for:
• actual damages
• moral
• exemplary damages
• attorney’s fees
• costs of suit.