CHAPTER 2

ABSTRACT FUZZY LOGIC

1. FUZZY SUBSETS FOR VAGUENESS

Let 'P be a "well defined" property in a set S, i.e., a property such that given any
element x in S, either x satisfies 'P or not. Then, the axiom of separation in classical
set theory enables us to assert that the elements of S satisfying 'P define a subset of
S we denote by {x E S : x satisfies 'P}. As an example, if S is the set of natural
numbers and 'P is the property "odd", then the set {x E S : x is an odd number} is
defined. Now, there are properties that are "vague" and therefore not well defined.
This since they can be satisfied with several different degrees. For instance,
"short", "big", "near", are vague properties. Then, the question arises whether
these properties isolate some type of subset and therefore whether we can give a
precise meaning to intuitive notions as "the set of short men", "the set of big
numbers", "the set of shops near to the station", and so on.
An answer can be obtained by starting from the notion of characteristic
function of a subset. Recall that every subset X of S can be represented by its
"characteristic function" Cx: S ~ {0,1} defined by setting cx{x) = 1 if x E X, and
cx{x) = 0 if x Ii" X. Hear, 1 represents the truth-values "true" and 0 the truth-value
"false". The idea is that, by admitting truth-values different from 0 and 1, we can
represent the extension of a vague predicate by a generalized characteristic
function, namely a function assuming values in the interval [0,1] or, more
generally, in a complete lattice U.

Definition 1.1. Let U be a complete lattice and S a set. Then afuzzy subset or U-
subset of S is any map s : S ~ U from S into U. We denote by 'liS) or by U~ the
class offuzzy subsets of S (see Zadeh [1965]).

For every XES, we say that sex) is the degree of membership of x to s. For
instance, if S is the set of cakes, we can represent the fuzzy subset of big cakes by
a suitable map s : S ~ [0,1]. Then, for any XES, the number sex) is the truth-value
ofthe sentence "x is big". From this point of view:
- sex) = 1 means that x is big,
- s(x) = 0 means that x is not big,
- sex) = 0.5 means that x is half-big,
and so on.
Definition 1.1 is basic for the whole theory of fuzzy subsets and in this book
we refer constantly to it. Nevertheless, vagueness cannot be captured by such a
G. Gerla, Fuzzy Logic 19
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001
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simple notion. Indeed, in everyday linguistic activity not only several notions are
vague but also the interpretations of these vague notions are, in turn, vague. For
instance, it is reasonable that the value sex) depends on the diameter of the cake x,
i.e., sex) = n(h(x» where hex) is the diameter of x and n : R ~ [0,1] is a suitable
function able to "normalize" the information contained by hex). Then, since there
are an infmity of reasonable normalization functions, infinite fuzzy subsets exist
that are adequate to represent the intuitive notion of "big". This is a basic feature
of vagueness because the interpretation of any vague concept is "elastic", in a
sense. This interpretation depends on the context and it is subjective in a relevant
way.
Nevertheless, we can transmit information by a vague language!
For example, imagine that John says by telephone to Mary that a big cake is on his
table. Then, some kind of information was transmitted since Mary is able to give a
meaning to words as "big", "cake", "table". Now, by using fuzzy formalisms, we
can interpret the vague notion "big" by a fuzzy subset, obviously. But we cannot
assume that the fuzzy subset (unconsciously) used by John to interpret the word
"big" is equal to the fuzzy subset used by Mary. The same argument holds for the
words "cake" and "table". As a matter of fact, as observed in Hajek [1999]b, when
two persons speak it is not clear whether they speak about the same things or not.
This leads to the question:
how do we communicate?
We agree with Hajek's idea that conversation is a cooperative game where in each
person the meaning of the words may change (see also Section 1 in Chapter 10).
We can ask ourselves whether vagueness can be avoided by defining an ideal
language where only precise concepts are admitted. Certainly, classical
mathematical logic seems to furnish such a language but, unfortunately, it has
achieved success only in speaking and reasoning about mathematical structures.
As a matter of fact, we have learned to tolerate a range of vagueness and
inaccuracy both in our communication and in our thinking only because this is
necessary. Any attempt to do otherwise would generally obstruct rather than
facilitate these activities. Imagine that a rigid discipline conditioned John to speak
only in a completely precise way. Then, the only way John can communicate that a
big cake is on the table is to communicate the exact diameter of the cake. Probably
this is not possible. In actuality, nobody constantly carries a ruler in his pocket to
avoid the vagueness of natural language. Very probably, this is not useful (see also
Section 1 in Chapter 10). Then, in our opinion:
the aim of a logician cannot be to eliminate vagueness by an ideal language but
to try to explain how and why vagueness is so useful.
For further information on fuzzy set theory and its philosophical implications
readers may refer, e.g., to Goguen [1968/69], Hajek [1998] and Novak, Perfilieva,
Mockor [1999].
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we will give some basic notions on fuzzy subsets. In
these sections there is no foundational ambition since fuzzy set theory (in
particular, fuzzy logic) is considered only as a chapter of classical mathematics.
Interesting attempts to give a general foundation to fuzzy set theory are related to
category theory (see, e.g., Hohle [1991] and Hohle [1996]).