1.

BON VS PP
A party’s verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who
heard it fall under Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision,
“the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.” This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration
against himself, unless it is true. The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in
evidence against him.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is
not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of
guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following
elements concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance.
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the
affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence, the regional trial court (RTC) considered the
following proven facts and circumstances: “Accused Virgilio Bon, being the tenant is in
actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees. Virgilio Bon has a
better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the barangay tanod, Julian
Lascano, with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the]
saw[ing thereof] by his son-inlaw, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was
corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber.
His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and not
under custodial investigation.”
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently
proved petitioner’s culpability: “x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence
of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi that he caused the cutting of the
questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x Rosalio Bon[,]
went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the
questioned trees which they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon
went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for cutting the trees.”
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the following
pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of
an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit
was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENRO’s computation of the value of the
timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial
evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as
charged.
2. PP VS ULYSSES GARCIA
Extrajudicial Confessions
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions13 that Garcia was not
assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after
the word “SAKSI.” Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had
not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had
signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness.
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the
ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the
Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower court’s action is manifest
error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The
basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and
executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that
the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and
consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first
question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing
of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights
of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not
enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The
Constitution states that “[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12
shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x.” Hence, the trial court was in error when it
admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on
the basis thereof.
3. PP VS VINECARIO
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain
exceptions, however. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search.
Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may
be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or
the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated
from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee.
In light then of appellants’ speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after
having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when
interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co- appellants sped away from the
checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to
dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were
offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some
offense.
As to Vinecario’s allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial
investigation conducted by the police officers, the same is relevant and material only when
an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused becomes the basis of
his conviction. In the case at bar, the trial court convicted appellants on the basis of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of SPO1 Haydenburge Goc-ong
and PO1 Vicente Carvajal.
Finally, Vinecario harps on his defense of denial.vThe defense of denial, like alibi, has
invariably been viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
The categorical and consistent testimonies, and the positive identification by prosecution
witnesses SPO1 Goc-ong and PO1 Carvajal, against whom no ill motive to falsely charge
appellants was shown, must thus then prevail over the unconvincing alibi and
unsubstantiated denial of appellants.
4. PP VS GUILLERMO
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes
at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For
constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles)
do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally
admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article
III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive power as
would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not
just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security
guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say
that he had killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos’
testimony was not rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellant’s
statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Rules of Court, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been through a
startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to Campos
was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before he
had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellant’s spontaneous statements made
to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by
the Miranda principles and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed
to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them.
He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David
of GMA Channel 7, who testified in court.
The TV news reporters’ testimonies on record show that they were acting as media
professionals when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and
control of the police. There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The
record also shows that the interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each
time, the appellant did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly
admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan,
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised
interview are voluntary and admissible in evidence.
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellant’s
alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellant’s guilt in
the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in
contrast to the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard
Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The positive evidence, including
the instruments of the crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies
of credible prosecution witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer,
Victor Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.
5. PP VS AYANGAO
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi.
Appellant’s alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the
prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis for an
acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility to be at the scene of the crime.

The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcon’s house where
appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only 10 meters from the
tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. Thus, the trial court was correct in
ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to
acquit her of the charges.
7. PP VS NAVARRO
Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that
he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has
an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial
courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones
of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her
testimony should be given credence. In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown
that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be
asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. The answer is in the affirmative.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated
by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the
tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are
those of the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that
he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A
sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an
entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving
petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
8. CANDIDO VS CA
Petitioners would impress upon us that the verified complaint and the affidavit presented
by petitioners to the DAR are proofs of the provisional rentals fixed by it and that it was
error for the trial court not to have taken cognizance of these documents.
We are not persuaded. It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has
been formally offered. 7 The affidavit of petitioner Natividad Candido mentioning the
provisional rate of rentals was never formally offered; neither the alleged certification by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Not having been formally offered, the affidavit and
certification cannot be considered as evidence. Thus the trial court as well as the appellate
court correctly disregarded them. If they neglected to offer those documents in evidence,
however vital they may be, petitioners only have themselves to blame, not respondent who
was not even given a chance to object as the documents were never offered in evidence.
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity
to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal
offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach
any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may
draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to
examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have
difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of documentary
evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such pleadings or
documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
9. SANTOS VS LUMBAO
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared
thereon. Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that
indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner
Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and
claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary
public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not
categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979.
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party
and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a
mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And
in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still
given leeway to consider other evidence presented. However, in the case at bar,
petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their
Answer that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document.
Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions
made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well- settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of
regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a
conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption,
there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed
where one’s signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the
jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a
voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and
convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to
overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and
the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
10. ACABAL VS ACABAL
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court, respondent Villaner having failed to deny under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the April 19, 1990 Deed of Absolute Sale.
Petitioners’ contention does not persuade. The failure to deny the genuineness and due
execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by
evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and
want of consideration.
On the merits, this Court rules in petitioners’ favor.
It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence,
relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent.
More specifically, allegations of a defect in or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason
of fraud or undue influence are never presumed but must be established not by mere
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence. For the circumstances
evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in
each case, assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many
different ways.
In the case at bar, it was incumbent on the plaintiff-herein respondent Villaner to prove
that he was deceived into executing the Deed of Absolute Sale. Except for his bare
allegation that the transaction was one of lease, he failed to adduce evidence in support
thereof. His conjecture that “perhaps those copies of the deed of sale were placed by Mr.
Cadalin under the documents which I signed the contract of lease,” must fail, for facts not
conjectures decide cases.
11. PROGRAMME INCORPORATED VS PROVINCE OF BATAAN
The evidence clearly established respondent’s ownership of Piazza Hotel. First, the title of
the land on which Piazza Hotel stands was in the name of respondent. Second, Tax
Declaration No. 12782 was in the name of respondent as owner of Piazza Hotel.
Third, petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. In the lease contract annexed to the
complaint, petitioner in fact admitted BASECO’s (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest)
ownership then of the subject property.
The Rules of Court states that “[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.”
Such admissions may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b) in the course of
the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of
the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case. Admissions obtained through
depositions, written interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered judicial
admissions.
“To be considered as a judicial admission, the same must be made in the same case in
which it is offered.”
In its own complaint for preliminary injunction and sum of money, petitioner acknowledged
that it was not the owner of the property when it stated that “BASECO leased to petitioner
the building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge xxx for monthly rentals of
P6,500.00.” Petitioner could not possibly be the owner of a building merely leased to it.
12. SISON VS PP
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled
at the Luneta — starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and
along Roxas Boulevard,— as he was being chased by his assailants and as he sat pleading
with his assailants. Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the
mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, Mr. and
Ms. Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Malaya. The admissibility of these
photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the
person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances
under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a
correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by
its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however,
is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie,
either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs,
therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who
can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack
of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty.
Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V",
"V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could
not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by
appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at
this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their
respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the
prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness
stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro
appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact
that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the
use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in
the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are
faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de
los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for
their presence thereat.
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of
the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily
seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant
Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely
running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures.
The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The
photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only
segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo,
they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants' denials and alibis
cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
13. PP VS CERVANTES
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the
payment for it. Implicit in these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence,
coupled with the presentation to the court of the traded prohibited substance, this object
evidence being an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of
regulated/prohibited drug. There can be no such crime when nagging doubts persist on
whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was
recovered from, or sold by, the accused. Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. This means that on
top of the key elements of possession or sale, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People, the “chain of custody requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.” So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the
prosecution’s failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory
examination was the same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as
ground for acquittal.
Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or the
“Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment,” defines “chain of
custody,” thusly:
“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The need for the punctilious
observance of the chain-of- custody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in
the following wise:
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering––
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not––dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
xxxx
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases––by accident or otherwise––in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another
or been contaminated or tampered with.
As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact
with or had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for
the specific purpose of identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not
indicate how he and his companions, right after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic
bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at Camp Vicente Lim to whom
he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for recording. What is
on record is Exhibit “C,” which, as earlier described, is a memorandum PO3 Ramos
prepared dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime
Laboratory Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance
confiscated by the buy-bust group. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered
the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at the laboratory were no-show in court to
testify on the circumstances under which they handled the specimen or whether other
persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the analyzing
forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen
was cared after following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v.
Ong, “[T]hese questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the
integrity of the evidence was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot
maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.”
It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain.
And she did not as she could not, even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the
specimen turned over for analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same
substance received from Arguson.
Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with
the procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as
embodied in Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drug shall:
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the [drug]
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made
on the seized articles at the crime scene.
Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal,
there is no reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the
time the police seized the black bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were
tested in the laboratory of the PNP R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a
heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity and necessarily the evidentiary value of the
seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that the six sachets seized
from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in court in
proving the corpus delicti.
Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of C/I
Geronimo and the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical
report C/I Geronimo prepared. While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I
Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the regular course of her duties, she, Inspector
Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen her former colleague analyzed was in
fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical analysis.
To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of
the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the
accused persons were convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who
prepared the corresponding laboratory report was not presented.
It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different
backdrop where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and
tested positive for shabu and presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of
prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout, a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2)
there was a compelling reason for not presenting the examining forensic chemist, i.e., the
parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been identified and
examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu.
In this case, C/I Geronimo’s resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying
factor for the prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al.
did not raise any objection to the chemical report during trial, unlike here where accused-
appellant objected to Inspector Tria’s competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical
report.
At any rate, Inspector Tria’s testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in
question only established, at best, the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the
results of the chemistry analysis. It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of
custody over the confiscated substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this
regard, the Court in effect stated in Malillin that unless the state can show by records or
testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been compromised by accounting for
the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the time it came into
the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, then the
prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. So it was that in People v. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the
corpus delicti, proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that “unwavering exactitude” be
observed, a demand which may be addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule.
Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the substance seized in front of the
McDonald’s was the same substance adduced in evidence as an indispensable element of
corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-
appellant’s guilt.
Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP
personnel at Camp Vicente Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is
tenable. This presumption is, however, disputable and may be overturned by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; any taint of irregularity vitiates the
performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the buy bust team
committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its
operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not
belabor this matter anew.
Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
always yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. We held in one case:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis
for affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because, “first, the presumption is precisely
just that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it]
cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and
the law of the case call for this kind of disposition.
14. PP VS RIVERA
In prosecutions for illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs, what determines if there
was a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the
offense. Conviction is proper if the following elements concur:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti as evidence.
Accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in a buy-bust operation which is a form
of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted to be a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, ways and means are employed for
the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their plan. The idea
to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him
to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
PO2 Llantino's testimony proved all the elements of the crime. He testified vividly on the
buy-bust operation. He positively identified accused- appellant as the seller of the shabu.
Per Report No. D-1162-02 of Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo, the substance, weighing
0.25 gram, which was bought from accused-appellant in consideration of P100.00, was
examined and found to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride. He testified that he was the
one who prepared the marked money, acted as the poseur-buyer, arrested the accused,
and turned-over the suspected shabu to the investigator. PO2 Llantino testified in a frank,
spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled
on cross-examination by defense counsel. His testimony was able to present a complete
picture detailing the buy-bust operation - from the initial contact between the designated
poseur-buyer PO2 Llantino and the pusher accused-appellant, the offer to purchase, the
promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The shabu subject of the sale was brought to
and properly identified in court.
Moreover, the chain of custody is unbroken and thus the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items have been preserved.
The procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of seized dangerous drugs is
outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which stipulates:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The same is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required
physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines,
is not fatal and does not automatically render accused- appellant's arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. Indeed, the implementing rules offer some
flexibility when a proviso added that `non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.' The same provision clearly states as well,
that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved.
This Court can no longer find out what justifiable reasons existed, if any, since the defense
did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, this Court has explained in People v.
Del Monte that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a condition
sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the crime and the fact of its existence is vital to
a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be
established beyond doubt. The chain of custody requirement performs the function of
ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so
much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police
officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time
it was offered in evidence.
In the case at bar, the totality of the testimonial, documentary, and object evidence
adequately supports not only the findings that a valid buy-bust operation took place but
accounted for an unbroken chain of custody of the seized evidence as well.
A certified true photocopy of the NPDO-DDEG logbook indicated that a team was officially
dispatched at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon for a buy-bust operation at Pitong Gatang,
Dampalit, in Malabon City, and brought with them one (1) piece of one hundred peso bill
with Serial Number HL 034748 to be used as buy-bust money. The testimony of PO2
Llantino established that the buy-bust operation occurred between 4:00 o'clock to 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon of 21 October 2002. Accused-appellant was brought to the
Larangay police station at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening. PO2 Llantino testified that
the seized evidence was turned over to the police investigator who put his markings "ERC-
BB." DDEG Chief Reynaldo Orante made the request for laboratory examination dated 21
October 2002. The request, together with the seized item (one sachet) was brought to the
NPDO-CLO at 11:30 o'clock in the evening that same night and received by Forensic
Chemist Albert S. Arturo at 11:35 o'clock in the evening. The parties stipulated on the
qualification and competence of the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory. It was
stipulated that the Forensic Chemist was the one who prepared the report on the
examination of the specimen submitted and that he can identify the specimen. While the
Court notes that there is a slight discrepancy in the Serial Numbers of the buy-bust money
as stated in the affidavit of PO2 Llantino vis-a-vis the Serial Numbers reflected in the NPDO-
DDEG Police Blotter[51] and the actual buy-bust money presented. This minor
inconsistency does not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. It
is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the shabu. Moreover, any discrepancy on the
the buy-bust money was resolved on the categorical statement of PO2 Llantino that he put
the markings AL on the buy- bust money, corresponding to his initials Allan Llantino.
Thus, beyond his bare allegations, accused- appellant has not shown any evidence that will
destroy the identity of the sachet.
15. PP VS DE LA CRUZ
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that
the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. The dangerous drug is the very
corpus delicti of the offense.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with
the guidelines prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs
despite its mandatory terms. While there was testimony regarding the marking of the
seized items at the police station, there was no mention whether the same had been done
in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no mention that any
representative from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the
inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.
Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in
accordance with law.
Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and
liberally in favor of the accused, the apprehending team's omission to observe the
procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs
significantly impairs the prosecution's case.
Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence of proof
of entitlement to such leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in
accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the Court save when it is accompanied
by proof. According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-
compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody
of the drugs only when: (1) such non- compliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2)
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were
met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso.
Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at
compliance with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any
justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the evidence had all along been
preserved.
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers' non-
compliance with the procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable
non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs,
thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant as every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Considering
that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant's
acquittal is in order.
16. PP VS DEL MONTE
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised the police officers' alleged non-
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time on appeal. This, he
cannot do.Itistoolateinthedayforhimtodoso. In People v. Sta. Maria in which the very same
issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during
trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial
court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least
intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal.
In People v. Pringas, we explained that non- compliance with Section 21 will not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. In the case at bar, appellant never questioned the custody and disposition of
the drug that was taken from him. In fact, he stipulated that the drug subject matter of this
case was forwarded to PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 3, Malolos, Bulacan for
laboratory examination which examination gave positive result for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. We thus find the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the drug seized from appellant not to have been compromised.
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the
making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will
not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which
forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject
only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. One example is that
provided in Section 31 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court wherein a party producing a
document as genuine which has been altered and appears to be altered after its execution,
in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. His failure to
do so shall make the document inadmissible in evidence. This is clearly provided for in the
rules.
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about
the non- admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with
said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to
be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on
the circumstances obtaining in each case.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
All these elements have been shown in the instant case. The prosecution clearly showed
that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was
brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer positively identified appellant as the
seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry Report No. D-728-2002 of Forensic Chemical Officer
Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought by PO1
Tolentino from appellant in consideration of P300.00, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
17. STATE VS TATUM
What quantum of authentication do courts require before a photograph may be admissible
in evidence? It is simply this--that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able
to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph
was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated.
The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury.
Witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as
that of the food store, and, as mentioned previously, she also testified as to the store's
standard procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who cashed a check at the store.
Phillip Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony of these
two witnesses taken together amounted to a sufficient authentication to warrant the
admission of the photograph (both the print and the negative) into evidence.
18. ADAMCZUK VS HOLLOWAY
The rule is well settled that a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue
and if verified. It does not have to be verified by the taker. Its verification depends on the
competency of the verifying witness and as to that the trial judge must in the first instance
decide, subject to reversal for substantial error.
Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), Vol. 2, sec. 792, p.97, says: The objection that a
photograph may be so made as to misrepresent the object is genuinely directed against its
testimonial soundness; but it is of no validity. It is true that a photograph can be
deliberately so taken as to convey the most false impression of the object. But so also can
any witness lie in his words. A photograph can falsify just as much and no more than the
human being who takes it or verifies it. The fallacy of the objection occurs in assuming that
the photograph can come in testimonially without a competent person's oath to support it.
If a qualified observer is found to say, "This photograph represents the fact as I saw it,"
there is no more reason to exclude it than if he had said, "The following words represent
the fact as I saw it," which is always in effect the tenor of a witness's oath. If no witness
has thus attached his credit to the photograph, then it should not come in at all, any more
than an anonymous letter should be received as testimony.
Section 793: The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some
qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth as its testimonial sponsor; in other
words, it must be verified. There is nothing anomalous or exceptional in this requirement of
verification; it is simply the exaction of those testimonial qualities which are required
equally of all witnesses; the application merely takes a different form.
In other words, if a witness is familiar with the scene photographed and is competent to
testify that the photograph correctly represents it, it should, if relevant, be admitted.
19. PP VS CARPO
After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to Appellant’s Brief urging that the
favorable result of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological
changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not
telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test
inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.
20. PP VS VALLEJO
DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic
code. Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different
sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or
discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant: In
conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
21. PP VS RUFINO
Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the
definitive key to the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a
result of the purported rape. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the
father of AAA’s child. If he is not, his acquittal may be ordained. We have pronounced that
if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the alleged victim’s child,
this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis. If he is
found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate decision in
this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and AAA’s child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the
Rules), which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.
DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence
is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining a more
accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty,
securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in
every case.
22. HERRERA VS ALBA
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not
necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all
concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
n [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile,
which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.
It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A
complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative
father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a
minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (“W”) prior to a paternity inclusion. W is a
numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the
probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference
population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute
for W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%.
However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child
are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted between the putative father
and child alone.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of
non- paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should
be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is
refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be
subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against
self- incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is
applicable only to testimonial evidence.
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self- incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative”
in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-
incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material.
23. PP VS YATAR
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s
DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the
DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root
and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals
have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one
from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva
which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the
assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact
between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or
assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of
the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de
Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the
appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2
9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal
canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in
the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine
in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert,
were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including
the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which
was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
24. PP VS CAJUMOCAN
Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts
concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable in use. It can only
establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone
cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or
even of a probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are
also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.
Appellant’s argument that the negative result of gunpowder nitrates from the paraffin test
conducted on him the day after the crime was committed, thereby showing an absence of
physical evidence that he fired a gun, is untenable. In the case of People v. Manalo, we
stressed:
xxx even if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative finding, it
cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is possible for one to fire a
gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates as when the hands are washed before
the test. The Court has even recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin
traces on the hand if, as in the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.
In People v. Abriol, et al., we reiterated the rule on the admissibility of this kind of
evidence: A paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand.
However, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrate was the discharge of firearms.
Nitrates are also found in substances other than gunpowder. A person who tests positive
may have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates
such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and leguminous plants.
Hence, the presence of nitrates should only be taken as an indication of a possibility that a
person has fired a gun. However, it must be borne in mind that appellants were not
convicted on the sole basis of the paraffin test.
Paraffin tests, it must be emphasized, merely corroborate direct evidence that may be
presented by the prosecution.
In the case at bar, the positive, clear and categorical testimony of the lone eyewitness to
the crime deserves full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative
results of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant. Verily, establishing the identity of
the malefactor through the testimony of the witness is the heart and cause of the
prosecution. All other matters, such as the paraffin test, are of lesser consequence where
there is positive identification by the lone eyewitness, Leo Mirabueno, of appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. Hence, a paraffin test cannot be considered as conclusive proof of
appellant’s innocence.
25. REVITA VS PP
Even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not
fire a gun. A paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable. The Court thus once held:
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable
in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates
or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or
more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants
such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or
nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which
may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when
the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing.
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court which are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings.
26. PP VS BUDUHAN
Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao
on the paraffin tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself
promptly stated that paraffin test results are merely corroborative of the major evidence
offered by any party, and they are not conclusive with respect to the issue of whether or
not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the positive and negative
results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions
surrounding the use of the firearm, namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject,
perspiration of the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the
length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.
27. AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO
Petitioner draws the SC’s attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus — "Q. You
mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A. When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of
the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What
for? and she said, 'We will note that you were transferred to the tourist class'. I said,
'Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer.' And I also said, You are
not going to note anything there because I am protesting to this transfer.
Q. A. Q. A. feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went
to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, 'I have recorded
the incident in my notebook.' He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded
in French — 'First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene.'
Was she able to note it? No, because I did not give my ticket. About that purser? Well, the
seats there are so close that you
MR. VALTE — I move to strike out the last part of the
testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony."
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in
his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against
his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the
impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement
had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It
forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition
of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
28. PP VS TAN
The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question and we need
not elaborate on the reasons for the rule. This matter has received consideration from the
foremost commentator on the Rules of Court thus:
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the
writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be
charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus
reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression,
all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may
be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.'
It has also been decided in favor of the petitioner by Us in the case of People vs. Quinones,
44 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 1520, 1525, thus:
"It is argued in the second assignment of error that the confession Exhibit B is not
admissible because it is merely a carbon copy. The said confession Exhibit B, being carbon
copy of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant, is admissible in
evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the same does not require
an accounting for the non- production of the original. (Sec. 47, Rule 123, Rules of Court)"
Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of th admissibility
of duplicate originals, as follows:
"SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip' has been held
to be primary evidence, p. 616.
"SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. - Where letters are produced by mechanical means and,
concurrently with the original, duplicate are produced, as by placing carbon paper between
sheets of writing on the exposed surface at the same time, all are duplicate originals, and
any one of them may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction
of the other.
"SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same
machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to be as much
primary evidence as the originals.
We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed by the
used of carbon papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting first for the loss
of the originals is incorrect and must be reversed.
29. PP VS TANDOY
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence,
like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the
original.

30. U.S. VS GREGORIO

In criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the

judges and courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated,
counterfeited, or falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced
in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed, and also, at the
same time, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendant's liability in the
falsification under prosecution. Through the lack of the original document containing the
memorandum alleged to be false, it is improper to hold, with only a copy of the said
original in view, that the crime prosecuted was committed; and although, judging from the
testimony of the witnesses who were examined in the two consolidated causes, there is
reason to entertain much doubt as to the defendant's innocence, yet, withal, this case does
not furnish decisive and conclusive proof of their respective guilt as coprincipals of the
crime charged. Defendants in a criminal cause are always presumed to be innocent until
their guilt be fully proven, and, in case of reasonable doubt and when their guilt is not
satisfactorily shown, they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal. In view of the evidence
produced in both of the aforesaid criminal causes, said causes can only be terminated by
such a finding.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, to acquit, and we hereby do acquit Eustaquio Balistoy and Bernardo
Gregorio, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.

31. FISCAL OF PAMPANGA VS REYES

The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or
slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of
procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present
case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and
its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the
best evidence of an article published in it.

32. COMPANIA MARITIMA VS ALLIED WORKERS UNION

After analyzing the nature of the damages, awarded, how the same were computed, and
the trustworthiness of the company's evidence, we find the first assignment of error
meritorious.

The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have been the sales invoices
instead of the oral testimony of Teves. He did not produce the sales invoices.

We have already stress that, on the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the
damages, claimed by the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the sum
of P 450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants' reports and
in the statement made by the consignees chief clerk amount to P349,245.37, or much less
than P450,000.

The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence because of
the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the original writings need not
be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).

That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records,
on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established (U. S. vs. Razon
and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am Jur 2nd 529).

It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be
made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be tested
on cross-examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S. 111).

What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a
private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of
accounts, reports or the like" (Anno 52 ALR 1266).

That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a
preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the
records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court (29 Am Jur
2nd 529).

33. VILLA REY TRANSIT VS FERRER

The evidence shows that when the Corporation was in its initial months of operation,
Villarama purchased and paid with his personal checks Ford trucks for the Corporation.
Exhibits 20 and 21 disclose that the said purchases were paid by Philippine Bank of
Commerce Checks Nos. 992618-B and 993621-B, respectively. These checks have been
sufficiently established by Fausto Abad, Assistant Accountant of Manila Trading & Supply
Co., from which the trucks were purchased9 and Aristedes Solano, an employee of the
Philippine Bank of Commerce,10 as having been drawn by Villarama.

Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers
showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those
made in the name of the Corporation, are very illuminating evidence. Villarama has
assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no evidentiary value
whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the
originals, the best evidence being the originals themselves." According to him, at the time
Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof
because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to
produce the alleged photostat copies thereof.

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility
of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus: (1)
opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the
original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to
produce the original in court.11 Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth
requisites.12 As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files of the
Corporation and also that he had seen some of them.13 Regarding the first element,
Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces
tecum, the originals were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in
possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce
secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It
is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his
possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody
of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his
possession.14 Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his
possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the
case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has
been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court."15 The originals of the vouchers in
question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss.
Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits
6 to 19 and 22.

Taking account of the foregoing evidence, together with Celso Rivera's testimony,16 it
would appear that: Villarama supplied the organization expenses and the assets of the
Corporation, such as trucks and equipment;17 there was no actual payment by the original
subscribers of the amounts of P95,000.00 and P100,000.00 as appearing in the books;18
Villarama made use of the money of the Corporation and deposited them to his private
accounts;19 and the Corporation paid his personal accounts.

The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that Villarama has
been too much involved in the affairs of the Corporation to altogether negative the claim
that he was only a part-time general manager. They show beyond doubt that the
Corporation is his alter ego.

34. DE VERA VS AGUILAR

Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary
Evidence states:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and
loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission
of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case.

A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and
due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the
alleged deed of sale.

In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the
presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.

In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or
persons who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or
by any person who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.

We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the
due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit:

Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared
Exhibit A. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to
be that (sic) of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as
Notary Public who ratified the document.

After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that
said document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be
proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable
to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court
that the instrument is indeed lost.

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For,
since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no
excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it
appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third
person or the like).

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document
testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all
originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This
petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of
four or five original copies.

35. THE CONSOLIDATED BANK VS DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS

The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the “best evidence
rule or primary evidence must be applied as the purpose of the proof is to establish the
terms of the writing – meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the
recovery of the money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein).”[28]

According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, “the only actual rule that
the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original
writing the rationale being:

(1)that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than
average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as
deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making
a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony purporting to give
from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case
of attempts at describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection, largely avoided
through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original
writing is justified.

Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the
justification for the “best evidence rule,” we declare that this rule finds no application to
this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of
the promissory note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are
concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room for
disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents’ principal defense rests on the
alleged lack of consideration of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also
claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do
not question the “precise wording” of the promissory note which should have paved the
way for the application of the “best evidence rule.” It was, therefore, an error for the Court
of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.

Besides, the “best evidence rule” as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not
absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of exceptions one of which is when the
original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out
by petitioner in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo,
it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit “A” was in the possession
of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the “best
evidence rule.”

Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution
of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the
original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the
genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to
petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note.

Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution
and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that
fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant.

36. ARCEO VS PP

Applicability of the Best Evidence Rule

Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua
non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130,
Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the
rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where
the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding
its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence,
the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.

Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal
testified that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent
documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his
complaint-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a
prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding
information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among
the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16,
1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence and
loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during
the trial of the case.

Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the
check was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds.

37. MAGDAYAO VS PP

The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. As to the second element, knowledge
on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit
with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the
drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law creates a prima facie
knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit, coincidental with the attendance of the
two other elements.

We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in
evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more
specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor
thereof, as well as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of the
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of
fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents
inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is
withheld from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its
production would expose and defeat. As long as the original evidence can be had, the court
should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies,
in the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weight.

Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a
writing may be admitted when the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of
a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides
that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce
the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving
notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a
motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the
original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence may be admitted.

In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latter’s
offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for
P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his
obligation to Olvis.

In his “Motion to Suspend Proceedings” in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he
received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that
he caused the non- payment of the dishonored check. The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967,
and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy thereof
because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion
dated February 8, 1996, and in his Special Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the
petitioner complained of the prosecution’s violation of the best evidence rule. The
petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much less offered to
produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a
bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his
defense, which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified postponements as shown
by the records.

There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of the
drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored check to
testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The
petitioner had already been informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor
when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as shown by the testimony of
Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks, one for P400,000.00 and
the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored check.

Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that of
the prosecution’s.

The petitioner’s contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the subject
check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was ready to identify the petitioner after
his direct examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear. The
direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to point to and identify the
petitioner as the drawer of the check.

38. SY VS CA

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are
the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless,
these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which
shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution.

Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15,
1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the
adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof
of the facts contained therein.

39. HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ VS CA

To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale,
testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the
originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. These
petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even
presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not
be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said
office.

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all

duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-
production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts
are unavailable.

Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private
respondents failed, not only to object, but even to cross- examine the notary public, Atty.
Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to
Exhibit "A" when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even
if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative
value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its
tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence
should not be confused with its probative value.

As earlier stated, Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the
alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any
of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed
Exhibit "A," the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify
the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty.
Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the
petitioners' predecessor-in- interest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable.

40. MEYERS VS US

The [best evidence] rule is limited to cases where the contents of a writing are to be
proved. Here there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing; the issue was what
[the defendant] had said, not what the transcript contained. The transcript made from
shorthand notes of his testimony was, to be sure, evidence of what he had said, but it was
not the only admissible evidence concerning it. [The witness's] testimony was equally
competent, and was admissible whether given before or after the transcript was received
in evidence. Statements alleged to be perjurious may be proved by any person who heard
them, as well as by a reporter who recorded them in shorthand.

41. SEILER VS LUCAS FILM LTD

The best evidence rule embodied in Rules 1001-1008 represented a codification of

longstanding common law doctrine. Dating back to 1700, the rule requires not, as its
common name implies, the best evidence in every case but rather the production of an
original document instead of a copy. Many commentators refer to the rule not as the best
evidence rule but as the original document rule.

Rule 1002 states: "To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original
writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by Act of Congress." Writings and recordings are defined in Rule 1001 as "letters, words,
or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or
other form of data compilation."

The Advisory Committee Note supplies the following gloss:

Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon accumulations of data and
expressions affecting legal relations set forth in words and figures. This meant that the rule
was one essentially related to writings. Present day techniques have expanded methods of
storing data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately assumes for usable
purposes is words and figures. Hence the considerations underlying the rule dictate its
expansion to include computers, photographic systems, and other modern developments.

Some treatises, whose approach seems more historical than rigorously analytic, opine
without support from any cases that the rule is limited to words and figures.

We hold that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the meaning of Rule 1001(1); they
consist not of "letters, words, or numbers" but of "their equivalent." To hold otherwise
would frustrate the policies underlying the rule and introduce undesirable inconsistencies
into the application of the rule.

43. NPC VS CODILLA

Issue: Whether the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the
functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.

Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court,
the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic
evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section
1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that
an "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is
produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the section’s catch-all proviso:
"any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means".

Ruling: We do not agree.

An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest
that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents.
However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will

reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents
as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies
are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and
excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings,
"I", "J" and its sub- markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings,
"O", "P" and its sub- markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was
correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. The importance of
the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human
memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss
or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which
can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a
diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the
proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering
the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made
in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of the
photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

44. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES VS SSANYONG CORPORATION

Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic data message," it
was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not
apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations
model law on electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned
after the E- Commerce Law of Canada, Senator Defensor- Santiago had in mind the term
"electronic data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the UNCITRAL Model
Law's terminology of "data message," has assumed a different context, this time,
consonant with the term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It accounts for the
addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy
is that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the term "electronic record," as
drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen.
Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations:

"Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be
any medium. It is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system
or similar device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on
cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except
computer-generated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
It would also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations, since the information is
not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the information has been recorded in or by
a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records are not covered, though when the
video is transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement of the computer.
Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would be covered.

In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar
device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not
extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form. Although things that are not
recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are omitted from this Act, they may well
be admissible under other rules of law. This Act focuses on replacing the search for
originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual records, and using
standards to show systems reliability.

Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are
themselves electronic records, being just the means of intelligible display of the contents
of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules
about copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose computer origin is
never again called on, are treated as paper records. See subsection 4(2). In this case the
reliability of the computer system that produced the record is relevant to its reliability.

There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data
message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada
law. This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or
faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce
Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that
it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions on
paperless and digital transactions.

Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.

A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined
into a highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a physical
document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a phone line, and
the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document. Thus, in Garvida v.
Sales, Jr., where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax machines,
we ruled that:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of

printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The
current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position
and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces
a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.

x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based

information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress
intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same
legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment,
technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality
are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's
definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
"electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an
original paper- based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These
two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress
anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it
drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared
to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
"electronic data message."

Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the
UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the intention of
Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase
in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative
agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the
Legislature.91 Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a
mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by
the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit
of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic

document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present
case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2- POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits
"E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic
evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

45. NUEZ VS CRUZ-APAO

Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages
from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former's pending case
with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same
are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence 65 which
provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text

messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same
or who is not a party but who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from which the messages
originated was hers. 66 Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed
and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. 67 It is
also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied. 68 We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.