CASE #1.

G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making
an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows: Section 1. The
Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the
Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act.
Section 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees
promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand pesos,
or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. Pursuant thereto,
On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should
be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-
General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1,
2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang
Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of
eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of
Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30,
1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law
was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on
the 20th of August, 1919.

The defendant questions the validity of the proclamation by the Governor-General pursuant to Act No.
2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Legislative Department has the power delegate power to another, and, if so, was
that power an unconstitutional delegation of powers? The Act No. 2868, that delegated legislative
power to the Governor-General?
RULING:
YES, the act was an unconstitutional delegation of powers.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are
vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of
the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law,
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power
of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any
Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself
has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if
so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative
power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature,
and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-
General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act
no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-
General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created
the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does
not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a
crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.

The doctrine declares that governmental powers are divided among the three (3) departments of
government, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and broadly operates to confine legislative powers
to the legislature, executive powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the judiciary,
precluding one branch of the government from exercising or invading the powers of another.

CASE #2.
G.R. No. L-4221 August 30, 1952
MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO
vs.
GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO
FACTS:
On October 18, 1950, Maximino Montenegro, son of the petitioner, was arrested in Manila by agents
of the Military Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for complicity with a
communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. On October
22, 1950, The President issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. On October 21, 1950, the petitioner, submitted this application for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking the release of his son.

Opposing the writ, respondents admitted having the body of Maximino, but questioned judicial authority
to go further in the matter, invoking the above-mentioned proclamation. Petitioner replied that such
proclamation was void, and it did not apply to his son, who had been arrested before its promulgation.
Heeding the suspension order, the court of first instance denied the release prayed for.

ISSUE:
WON Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid.
RULING:
Yes. Proclamation 210 is valid.

The stay of the writ was ordered in accordance with the powers expressly vested in the President by
the Constitution, such order must be deemed an exception to the general prohibition against ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder. On the other hand, there is no doubt it was erroneous to include those
accused of sedition among the persons as to whom suspension of the writ is decreed. Under the
Constitution the only grounds for suspension of the privilege of the writ are "invasion, insurrection,
rebellion or imminent danger thereof." Obviously, however, the inclusion of sedition does not invalidate
the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial in this case, inasmuch as the petitioner's descendant is
confined in jail not only for sedition, but for the graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. Without
doing violence to the presidential directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of the land, the word
"sedition" in Proclamation No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the
decree as a whole.

Hence, petitioner’s appeal to release his son is denied.

CASE #3.
G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947
KRIVENKO
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS
Facts:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December 1941.
The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration
but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot
acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he
cannot own a land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Ruling:
No, an alien cannot own private lands in the Philippines.
Under Commonwealth Acts 122 and 123, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken
out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no
right of reciprocity. But later in 1947, Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 that allows a mortgage
of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage.
This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private
lands that are residental or commercial.
In the case at bar, the court construed the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be.
Perhaps the effect of construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning
sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, the court
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. They are also satisfied, however,
that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights
such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here
forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, the court hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
StatCon maxim: If the only issue is a constitutional question which is unavoidable, the court should
confront the question and decide the case on the merits.

CASE #4.
G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 (March 3, 1975)
Magtoto
vs.
Manguera
FACTS:
The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 20 Art. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect
on Jan. 17, 1973. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right…. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two
informations both dated Feb. 23, 1973. During the trial, his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. 15, 1972
was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive
custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. 15, 1972 is admissible as evidence.
2. W/N Sec. 20, Art. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively.
RULING:
1. Yes. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person
under investigation, who has not been informed of his right to counsel, is admissible in evidence if the
same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, since no law gave the accused
the right to be so informed before that date. Conversely, such confession is inadmissible if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
2. No. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. Giving such
provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor.

CASE #5.
G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999
PEOPLE
v.
MULETA
FACTS:
Charito Delgado went to Manila to work and landed a job in Ali Mall, Cubao. On April 29, 1993, Charito
left Tondo where she lived and moved to another place but returned to Tondo to pick up her remaining
baggage. It was the last time she was seen by her relatives. On April 30, her body was found naked in
Malolos, Bulacan. NBI took over the case. Based on Tolentino’s, NBI Agent, investigation, appellant,
Domingo Muleta, was Charito’s uncle; that on April 29-30, 1993, he was working within Tondo and that
on April 29, he left around 9:30 and only came home the following day. On September 19, the appellant
was ordered to go with the NBI for investigation. There, the NBI alleged that he admitted having raped
and later killed the victim with the presence of his counsel. However, it was found out that his counsel,
Atty. Daquis, assisted him on September 20. The prosecution also presented a witness that the
appellant became hysterical and muttered: "Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa,
nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na" On the appellant’s defense, he argued that, he was forced to
admit the crime by torture and he was forced to sign a document which he has not read and without a
counsel assisting him. RTC ruled that even in the absence of an eyewitness, the circumstantial
evidence is enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. It also upheld the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant; that his allegation is obviously self-serving for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:
1. Is the extrajudicial confession of the appellant admissible in evidence?
2. Are the pieces of evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant?

RULING:
1. No. Confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to the Constitutional requirements. Thus, it

is not admissible if it violates the following rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain
silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be provided with
counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to
have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, and to be informed of all these
rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against them in court. In this case, the
appellant’s right to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well
as his right to have said counsel present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation
have been violated.

First, the right to be apprised does not merely require the investigating officers to "inform" the person
under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be "informed". In this case, based on the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of the appellant, his answers where terse and perfunctory, which implies that it
did not consider whether he understood what was read to him. Second, the right to counsel was not
satisfied as well. In the cross-examination of the NBI Investigating Officer, he stated that he started
taking statements from the accused from September 19 in which the counsel of the appellant was only
present on the following day, September 20. Thus, it violates such right, for a counsel must be present
at all times when an accused gives his statement. Moreover, the Court held that, based on the
foregoing, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was also made without the presence of a counsel. Third, there
was no valid waiver of his rights. As stated, he was not assisted by his counsel. Further, even assuming
that there was the present of his counsel, the waiver was insufficient. The appellant stated. “Tinatalikdan
ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin
ko." Thus, according to the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly
required. It failed to show that the appellant understood its rights, and its implications thereof. Thus, the
extrajudicial confessions taken in this case is inadmissible. 2. No. They were not sufficiently
established. The prosecution failed to prove that he was work at around 9:30 pm on the day of the
crime, and that we just went home the day after. All it could present was the testimony of the NBI Agent,
who testified on what the appellant’s co-workers stated. This is clearly hearsay. Moreover, the co-
workers were not present on trial, thus, were not cross-examined. Furthermore, his strange behaviors
and the words he uttered could mean that the he was blaming himself for being unable to protect his
niece. These words only places the appellant under suspicion, and suspicion is not synonymous with
guilt. More importantly, even if they were proven, it is not enough to establish the guilt of the appellant.
The Court, finds the appellant not guilty and is hereby acquitted.

CASE #6.
GR. NO. 166510
PEOPLE
vs.
ROMUALDEZ
Facts:
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation
of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial
Governor of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the
offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad
faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner:... accused public officer being
then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his
influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or
assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries,... particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking),
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well
that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the
Ambassador or Chief of
Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself
to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial
Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine Hundred
Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million
Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two
Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both
Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
Romualdez moved to quash the information... facts alleged in the information do not constitute the
offense with which the accused was charged... criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription
The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution
Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument
People moved to reconsider this Resolution, citing "reversible errors" that the Sandiganbayan
committed in its ruling. Romualdez opposed the People's motion, but also moved for a partial
reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on prescription. The People opposed
Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution the People's motion for reconsideration
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in quashing the subject information.

Issues:
Whether or not, that criminal charges against private respondent have been extinguished by
prescription.

Ruling:
Court agrees and... accordingly grants the instant motion.
Private respondent was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, committed "on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986". However,
the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November
2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The time span that
elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond
the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of
Rep. Act No. 3019.
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) had attempted to file similar criminal cases
against private respondent on 22 February 1989. However, said cases were quashed based on
prevailing jurisprudence that informations filed by the PCGG and not the
Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the
part of the PCGG to file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman as the
competent office to conduct the required preliminary investigation to enable... the filing of the present
charges.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when
the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.[6] As such
preliminary investigation was commenced more... than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were
committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

CASE #7.
G.R. No. L-29551 March 25, 1970
B.F. GOODRICH
vs.
ACEBEDO
FACTS:
B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. (petitioner) seeks the reversal of an award of Workmen's Compensation
Commission in favor of Emilio Acebedo (respondent) for partial permanent disability. The plea for the
setting aside of the above decision is sought to be justified by the alleged refusal of respondent
Commission to be bound by an opinion of its Evaluation Division to the effect that inguinal hernia "after
repair by surgery" does not call for the imposition of such a liability. Implicit in such a contention is the
view that respondent Commission must perforce yield unquestioning obedience to whatever medical
opinion may thus be arrived at, even if not brought to the attention of the claimant, upon pain of its
determination being stigmatized as arbitrary and improvident.

ISSUE:
Whether the phrase “after repair by surgery” should be given a liberal interpration

RULING:
Yes, it should have a liberal interpretation. The Supreme Court held that It would be a departure,
unjustified and unwarranted, for this Court not to manifest the same solicitude and concern for
respondent Emilio Acebedo when invariably it has accorded the Workmen’s Compensation Act a liberal
interpretation inescapable under the constitutional mandates of social justice and protection to labor.
CASE #8.
GR L-29755
SARCOS
VS.
CASTILLO
FACTS:
Here, the petitioner is Domingo N. Sarcos - the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, who
won the said election as independent candidate was charged with misconduct and dishonesty by then
Provincial Governor - respondent Recaredo Castillo for the act of having conivance with individuals to
cut, fell, and sell timber for their own use and benefit within the communal forest reserve of Municipality
of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur. The defense of Sarcos was the said timber and its proceeds will be utilized
for funding of police uniforms and arms. On the otherhand, Administrative Complaint was then filed by
the governor to mayor with Provincial Board, hence the respondent - Governor ordered the "immediate
suspension from his position of Mayor Barobo" and in lieu of the position, be replaced by the Vice Mayor
under the provisions of Sec. 6 RA 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967).

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the respondent former Prov. Governor is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967.

HELD:
No. Under the former law (Sec 2188 of Rev. Admin. Code) then in force which stands repealed by virtue
of the Decentralization Act, the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one
affecting his official integrity could order his preventive suspension. At present, no such authority is
vested in the provincial governor. Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate
such power in the provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then, that the action taken
by the provincial governor in issuing the order of preventive suspension in this case was in accordance
with law. "The purpose of Congress is a dominant factor in determining meaning." The purpose of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 is to grant to local governments greater freedom and ampler means to
respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more
equitable and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources. The absence of power
on the part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is buttressed by the
avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a different doctrine.

CASE #9.
G.R. No. 158920 November 20, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS.
MARAWI-MARANTAO GENERAL HOSPITAL INC. AND ATTY. MACAPANTO K. MANGONDATO
FACTS:
The Marawi-Marantao General Hospital Inc. (MMGHI) obtained a loan from Social Security Services
(SSS) secured by a real estate mortgage. For failure of the MMGHI to pay the monthly amortizations,
the SSS extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage. The mortgaged property was subsequently sold in
a public auction where the SSS was the highest bidder.
The sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered. Sometime in 1992, Atty. Mangondato, Acting Chairman
of the MMGHI board of directors and representing MMGHI, negotiated with the SSS for the repurchase
of the property and asked for an additional six (6) months within which to make the redemption.

After further negotiation, the Social Security Commission (SSC) approved Atty. Mangondato’s offer to
redeem the property. Consequently, a deed of conditional sale of the subject property was executed
by MMGHI. Thereafter, Atty. Mangondato demanded the SSS to immediately implement the transfer of
the subject property.

However, the SSS informed Atty. Mangondato that the conditional sale was a nullity. Aggrieved by the
action of the SSS, the MMGHI and Atty. Mangondato filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against the SSS in the RTC. The trial court ruled in favor of MMGHI and Atty. Mangondato.

The CA affirmed then RTC’s decision. Hence, this present appeal. SSS basically argues that no valid
redemption could have been effected by entering into the deed of conditional sale as the period of
redemption had already expired.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MMGHI and Atty. Mangondato validly redeemed the property under the deed of
conditional sale

HELD:
Yes, MMGHI and Atty. Mangondato validly redeemed the property. The alleged nullity of the deed of
conditional sale because the period of redemption had expired is wrong. The right of legal redemption
must be exercised within specified time limits. However, the statutory period of redemption can be
extended by agreement of the parties. Allowing a redemption after the lapse of the statutory period,
when the buyer at the foreclosure does not object but even consents to the redemption, will uphold the
policy of the law recognized in such cases as Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuñez, and in the more recent
case of Tibajia, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., which is to aid rather than defeat the right
of redemption.

CASE #10.
GR No. 176364, 2009-09-18
JUANITO R. RIMANDO
v.
COMELEC
FACTS:
On July 13, 2001, private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC accusing Jacinto Carag,
Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation
to Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code[5] and Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7166.

Resolution no. 3328

rules and regulations on: (a) bearing, carrying or transporting fire-arms or other deadly weapons; (b)
security personnel or bodyguards; (c) bearing arms by any member or security or police organization
or government agencies and other similar organizaton (d) organizations or maintenance of reaction
forces during the election period in connection with the may 14, 2001 national and local election

RA 7166 Section 32. Who May Bear Firearms. - During the election period, no person shall bear, carry
or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park,
private vehicle or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized
in writing by the Commission. The issuance of firearms licenses shall be suspended during the election
period.

That on or about February 27, 2001, and/or during the election period in Quezon City and Santa Rosa,
Laguna JUANITO R. RIMANDO, being then the President and General Manager of the Illustrious
Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. despite the COMELEC denial of his/its application for a Firearms
& Other Deadly Weapons Ban Exemption did allow permit and/or sanction his/its SECURITY GUARDS
JACINTO CARAG AND JONRY ENAYA, to work knowing that they had no prior written COMELEC
authority to do so.

That on February 27, 2001, respondent-Security Guard JACINTO CARAG, without any justifiable
cause, with intent to kill, taking advantage of nighttime, with treachery and use of firearm willfully,
feloniously and unlawfully shoot to death with a shotgun JONATHAN MAGNO, a 19-year old unarmed
and defenseless nautical student in his school uniform, said respondent-Security Guard CARAG
immediately fled from the scene of the crime.

In his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied having violated COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 and averred
that on the day of the shooting incident, security guards Carag and Enaya were within the vicinity of
Sta. Rosa Homes in Santa Rosa, Laguna, where they were assigned to provide security to the residents
and provided with licensed firearms, which they never brought outside the subdivision,

Petitioner contended only prohibited private security agencies, company security forces, government
security forces and their security guards are prohibited from bearing guns outside the immediate vicinity
of their places of work without written authority from the COMELEC.

In a Resolution dated October 8, 2001, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Santa Cruz, Laguna,
dismissed private respondent's complaint against petitioner and his security guards based on a finding
that the licensed firearms were carried and used by security guards Enaya and Carag within their place
of work, for which no exemption and/or permit was needed in accordance with Section 2(e) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328.

On May 6, 2002, the COMELEC En Banc rendered a Resolution affirming the dismissal of the complaint
against security guards Jonry Enaya and Jacinto Carag, but directing its Law Department to file the
proper information against petitioner Juanito Rimando for violation of Article XXII, Section 261,
paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, in said Resolution conflict between Section 2(e) and
Section 3(d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, interpreted Section 261(s) of the Omnibus Election
Code as requiring a permit from the Commission before the security guards of a security agency can
bear firearms in their place of assignment during the election gun ban.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the aforesaid Resolution went beyond the
scope of the law, there was no conflict between Sections 2 and 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3382,
the application for exemption filed by petitioner's security agency with the COMELEC through the PNP-
SAGD was for the authority to transport firearms and not to bear arms inside or within the vicinity of the
place of work of petitioner's security personnel since no election offense was committed, the filing of a
criminal case against petitioner was unwarranted and contrary to law.

Issues:
Can respondent Rimando be held criminally liable for such failure to secure the necessary exemption
from the gun ban?
Ruling:
A perusal of Section 261 (s) in its entirety would show that, as a rule, the bearing of arms by a member
of security or police organization of a government office or of a privately owned security agency outside
the immediate vicinity of one's place of work is prohibited.

However, Section 261 (s) also lays down exceptions to this rule and states that the general prohibition
shall not apply in three instances:
(a) when any of the persons enumerated therein is in pursuit of another person who has committed or
is committing a crime in the premises the former is guarding;
(b) when such person is escorting or providing security for the transport of payrolls, deposits, or other
valuables; and
(c) when he is guarding private residences, buildings or offices.

In the case at bar, the cause of the confusion appears to be the fact that the security guards who were
being charged with violation of the election gun ban were bearing firearms within the immediate vicinity
of their place of work, but their place of work happened to be a residential subdivision where they were
guarding the residences of private persons.

Here, it is undisputed that security guards Carag and Enaya were bearing licensed firearms while
performing their assigned task as guards inside the subdivision, which was their place of work. That
being the case, there was no need to secure a written authority from the COMELEC under Section
261(s) of the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, there was no violation at all.

CASE #11.
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-22443 (May 29, 1971)
Commissioner of Customs
v.
Philippine Acetylene Company
FACTS:
Charles Butler, manager of Respondent Company, imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to
contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. RA 1394
provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and
necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. The Tax Court held that the term
industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any enterprise employing
relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Philippine Acetylene Co., Inc. may be considered engaged in an industry as
contemplated in Sec. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax
with respect to the gas tank in question.

HELD:
Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. Tax exemptions are held strictly against
the taxpayer. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities
that tend to produce or create or manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the
ordinary and general definition. In granting the exemption, it would have been illogical for Congress to
specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the
same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general.
NO CASE #12 yet.

CASE #13.
G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR., Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and was administratively
charged before the PNB Management Hearing Committee. At the close of the hearing on the merits,
the Committee found that he was guilty of gross misconduct in misappropriating of funds and of gross
neglect in extending unwarranted credit accommodations. Thereafter, respondent appealed to the
CSC and submitted his Memorandum on Appeal which the CSC dismissed for being filed out of time.
Respondent then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review. Before the appellate
court, respondent, ascribed error to the CSC in denying due course to his appeal on the basis of the
privatization of PNB. According to respondent, the CSC could no longer assume jurisdiction and
dispose of the appeal on the merits, considering that jurisdiction once acquired generally continues
until the final disposition of the case.
The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal, it issued the assailed Decision reversing the
twin resolutions of the CSC. The appellate court pointed out that respondent’s appeal before the CSC
had been filed on time and that the said commission had not lost jurisdiction over it despite the
supervening privatization of PNB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of
respondent which was already pending before the CSC at the time the said law converted PNB into a
private banking institution.

RULING:
No, the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such
a way as to abort the continued exercise by the CSC of its appellate jurisdiction over the appeal filed
before the privatization of PNB became effective. Suffice it to say that nowhere in the said Section can
be found even the slightest indication that indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from
the CSC to another tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said
Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.
All told, the Court finds that no error was committed by the Court of Appeals in reversing the twin
resolutions issued by the CSC. The Court also agrees that because the merits of respondent’s appeal
with the said Commission have not been completely threshed out, it is only correct and appropriate to
remand the case back to it for further proceedings.
With this disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues propounded by the
parties.

PRINCIPLES
where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any interpretation or even construction. laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not
be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.
CASE #14.
No. L-1740 December 22, 1955
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee
vs.
Esteban Zeta, defendant and appellant
FACTS:
Eugenio Albiza, an enlisted man of the Philippine Army and later of the United States Armed Forces in
the Far East suffered a disability while in the line of duty. On November 26, 1942, he executed a contract
with the defendant-appellant, Esteban Zeta, that he will pay the latter five percent of any amount he
may receive of his claim for backpay or any other privileges granted by law, for Zeta’s services to
prepare the necessary paper for the disability compensation. Albiza received the sum of P5,919 from
the United States Veterans Administration. To honor the contract, Albiza paid Zeta a total amount of
P300.

The law at the time of the execution of the agreement was Commonwealth Act. No. 675. Section 11
specifically provides that:

“No attorney, agent, or other person in charge of the preparation, filing, or pursuing of any claim for
arrears in pay and allowances under this Act shall demand or charge for his services fees more than
five per centum of the total money value of such arrears in pay and allowances, and said fees shall
become due and demandable only after the payment of the said arrears in pay and allowances is
received by the widow or orphan entitled thereto. The retention or deduction of any amount from any
such arrears in pay and allowances for the payment of fees for such services is prohibited. A violation
of any provision of this section shall be punished by imprisonment of from 6 months to 1 year, or by a
fine of from six hundred to one thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and fine.”

On June 14, 1947, Republic Act No. 145 was passed providing:

“Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for
benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration
who shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, contract for, charge, or receive, or who shall attempt to solicit,
contract for, charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in any one claim, or
who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed
guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined not exceeding one
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both, in the discretion of the court.”

The trial court held that the passage of RA No. 145 rendered the old agreement void and compliance
therewith became illegal.

ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act No. 145 has a retroactive effect.

RULING:
No. Republic Act No. 145 does not have a retroactive effect on agreements made prior to the enactment
of the Act.
US vs. Diaz Conde provides that a law impairing the obligations of a contract is null and void; that a
law must be construed prospectively not retroactively. What was legal upon its inception cannot be
declared illegal by subsequent legislation, otherwise the sanctity of contracts will be violated in violation
of the organic law.
In addition, it does not appear that the Legislature had intended to give the statute a retroactive effect.
In this case, the contract was executed and the services had already been rendered before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 145. The latter having no retroactive effect, the agreement is considered
valid.
The judgment appealed from was reversed and the defendant-appellant was acquitted.

CASE #1.5
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner,
vs.
BRITISH AIRWAYS, Respondent.
Facts:
On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent
British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28,
2005, she took respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board,
she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist
her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to
help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this
flight, I would have a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant,
Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class
section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be
ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane.
Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a frequent
traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the
petitioner and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay ₱5 million
as moral damages, ₱2 million as nominal damages, ₱1 million as exemplary damages, ₱300,000.00
as attorney’s fees, ₱200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.
The case was dismissed by the RTC for lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PHILIPPINE COURTs HAVE JURISDICTION OVER A TORTIOUS
CONDUCT COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL
OF A FOREIGN CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF ANY FOREIGN
COUNTRY; AND THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION.

Held:
The petition is without merit.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. Under Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before –

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional
rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the
passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that
the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has
the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and
respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the
routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring
her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it
does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.