Swachh Bharat Mission: Scaling up the Mission to

Make Rural India Open Defecation Free (C)12

Introduction
The Government of India launched the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM, or Clean
India Mission) on 2nd October 2014, the birth anniversary of the Father of the Nation,
Mahatma Gandhi. The primary goal of SBM was to end the practice of open
defecation (i.e., not using a toilet or latrine) in five years by the symbolic deadline of
Gandhi’s 150th birth anniversary, 2nd October 2019. The newly elected Prime Minister
vested SBM with the highest level of political support by laying out the vision for an
open defecation-free (ODF) and clean India in his inaugural Independence Day
speech in 2014.
Despite the high political priority, the initial pace of SBM was insufficient to meet
the ambitious five-year deadline. The Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation
(MDWS) was charged with leading SBM, but three Secretaries (administrative heads
of the ministry) had passed through in the 17 months since its launch. A new
Secretary, Param Iyer, a former Indian civil servant recruited, unconventionally,
from The World Bank, took the helm in March 2016. His initial assessment was that
the scale of implementation for achieving the mission by 2019 was daunting,
progress had been slow thus far, and the massive public funding required was not
forthcoming. Moreover, at the heart of MDWS, the team he had inherited was
sceptical of the very achievability of SBM.
Initial moves to build momentum
One of the first things the new Secretary did was to initiate a change in work
culture. He determined that the MDWS would have to transform from a staid, file-
based, routine-paced ministry to an outcome-focused “Mission Mode” organization
to meet the SBM deadline. He started by hand-picking a new set of officers who
believed in the achievability of SBM. He hired a specialized Project Management
Unit (PMU) with professionals in public relations, communications, and social
media. He also recruited young professionals with the help of Tata Trusts, an Indian
non-profit organization, to support him with ideation and tracking progress. While
making these ‘mini-disruptions’, he kept the senior leadership of the civil service
and political establishments such as the Prime Minister’s office, Cabinet Secretariat,
Ministry of Finance, and NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India,
the top public policy think-tank) informed about the approach he was cultivating at
MDWS.

1
Written by Professor Parameswaran Iyer (JSW-SPP, IIMA), Professor Ajay Pandey (IIMA), Mahima Vashisht
(PGP IIM Bangalore, 2007-2009) and Daniel W. Smith (PhD Stanford University, 2021). As the former Secretary
to the Government of India, Iyer is also the protagonist of the case.
2
Cases of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, are prepared as a basis for class discussion. Cases
are not designed to present illustration of either correct or incorrect handling of administrative problems

1
 The new team developed an initial implementation strategy: Score quick wins. By
demonstrating to the government, civil service, and the public that SBM was
achievable in parts of India, they aimed to build momentum for securing the public
funding and popular support to end open defecation across the country. They thus
initially focussed much of their attention on eliminating open defecation in states
where its prevalence was lower. Sikkim, a small state in North-East, had already
been an open defecation-free at the start of the SBM. By the end of 2016, four more
states – Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Uttarakhand, and Haryana – joined the ODF list.
By October 2017, the third anniversary of the SBM, the initial strategy seemed to
be paying off. Real-time monitoring and capable teams were now in position in the
MDWS and States. National sanitation coverage (the proportion of rural households
with a toilet or latrine) had increased from 39% to 70%.3 With only two years left
before the sunset clause of SBM, however, several of the most populous states with
the highest baseline prevalence of open defecation remained far from the goal of
ODF. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and Jammu and Kashmir, with a combined
population greater than that of the USA, would be especially important to address.
Not only would they require greater funding and implementation support, but
some, such as West Bengal and Odisha, were governed by political parties not
aligned with the party ruling at the Centre (the federal government).
Managing state governments within the federal structure
The urgent progress required in the ‘difficult’ states to meet SBM’s national
goal presented a paradox. Whereas the MDWS team at the federal level was highly
motivated, the implementation structure of SBM was decentralized and sanitation
remained a state subject per the Indian constitution. SBM’s federal guidelines gave
the States complete flexibility on the modes of financing, toilet construction, and
State-run sanitation behaviour change campaigns. This strategy was intended to
encourage States to fund SBM and induce a sense of ownership over its
implementation and results. Yet the pace set by certain States was now insufficient to
meet the SBM deadline, but the MDWS team could not simply take over
implementation. To accelerate progress, they would have to tactfully find ways to
work through the federal system and political landscape.
Uttar Pradesh
An early stroke of luck came in March 2017 when the same political party as
the one running the Central (federal) government took charge in India’s most
populous state, Uttar Pradesh. Iyer capitalized on the opportunity by visiting the
State capital, Lucknow, to meet with meet in person with Yogi Adityanath, the
newly sworn-in Chief Minister (elected head of state government). Iyer made two
suggestions to replicate the MDWS strategy at the State level. First, invest in
motivated leadership by appointing a dynamic, young civil servant as the state SBM
Director. Second, go for quick wins by publicly announcing that 30 districts in the
3
As of June 2017, the SBM dashboard showed a national sanitation coverage of 63.73%, which had increased to
70% by October. An independent survey carried out by the Quality Council of India found the coverage to be
62.45%. Source: https://jalshakti-ddws.gov.in/sites/default/files/Final_QCI_report_2017.pdf

2
state would become ODF by the end of the year. The Chief Minister immediately
agreed with the suggestions. The next day, the local newspapers carried the
proclamation by the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister that 30 districts would become
ODF by the end of the year; within a few days, a new State SBM Mission Director
was appointed. With the weight of the Chief Minister behind the programme, the
priority given to SBM in state government, funding, and toilet construction began to
increase in Uttar Pradesh.
West Bengal
The government of West Bengal was led by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. Her
party was a rival of that leading the Central government, and she herself was a
political rival of the Prime Minister. Despite the potential for friction, she was
surprisingly supportive of SBM. She had even told the visiting Secretary that rural
sanitation was one of her top priorities. West Bengal was doing reasonably well at
the State level and had one of the earliest districts in the country to become ODF. As
an example of States’ flexibility, however, the SBM was known in West Bengal as
‘Nirmal Bangla’ (Bengali for ‘Clean Bengal’). In Odisha and Jammu & Kashmir, where
the Chief Ministers, both from different political parties, showed little interest in
prioritizing the SBM, Iyer’s strategy was to use his IAS network and deal more
directly with the civil servants in the states to get the job done.

Changing behaviour at scale

Even though SBM’s target of building 100 million toilets in five years was itself
dauting, the MDWS team believed that SBM would not succeed until the centuries-
old behaviour of open defecation was changed across rural India. The definition of
ODF called for 100% usage of toilets, not only 100% coverage. Promoting behaviour
change seemed particularly important in the States lagging in progress. After
consulting numerous experts and grassroots-level practitioners, the MDWS team
developed a twin strategy: 1) One-on-one and small-group communication at the
village level through trained motivators; and 2) promote using toilets on mass media
across the country. Although the team considered pursing either an in-person or
mass media approach, they considered both as strategic for the aims of the Mission.
The village-level campaign would focus on changing individual sanitation
behaviour. The mass media campaign would complement the in-person efforts
while creating a ‘buzz’ to raise swachhata (sanitation and cleanliness) and ODF to the
top of the national discourse and communicate to the world that India was
prioritizing sanitation.
Grassroots-level communication and engagement
The MDWS team implemented in-person behaviour change communication by
training an army of grassroots-level motivators, one for each of the country’s 600,000
villages. The Prime Minister christened this cadre ‘swachhagrahis’ (grassroots
sanitation practitioners). The name evoked Mahatma Gandhi’s powerful term
‘satyagrahi’ (practitioner of truth), which described those who practiced nonviolent
resistance to oppression during the Indian independence movement.

3
 A swachhagrahi could be a grass-roots worker from “any background, including a
local Accredited Social Health Activist, Auxiliary Nurse Midwife, anganwadi [rural
childcare centre] worker, water line man [or] pump operator, member of a non-
governmental/civil society organization, youth organisations,” 4 health centre staff,
or simply someone living in a village. The swachhagrahis were trained in a suite of
tools termed Community Approaches to Sanitation,5 which drew on various
behaviour change techniques developed in the global sanitation sector and theories
from behavioural economics, including Nudge Theory. 6 They then deployed the
tools, including social mapping, extensive interpersonal discussion, and health
messaging in community gatherings and door-to-door to convince people about the
usefulness of building a toilet and using it. Parents, especially mothers, were shown
how defecating in the open meant flies would carry the excreta back to the food at
home and consequently spread disease to their family and children. Swachhagrahis
also warned the community about the contamination of groundwater through open
defecation. The purpose of these messages was to evoke powerful emotions
including shame, disgust, pride, love, care and even fear of death at the habit of
open defecation that would induce people to feel compelled to use a toilet. 7
After the swachhagrahis’ intense face-to-face activities in their communities, the
village as a whole would be ‘triggered’, meaning psychologically primed to
reconsider the behaviour of open defecation and ready to commit itself to becoming
ODF in the shortest possible time. The triggering phase was followed up starting the
next day with a nigrani samiti (watch committee) that would go out in the fields at
the break of dawn to counsel any people still defecating in the open, and to convince
them to build a toilet at home and use it. Women, children, and senior citizens were
welcome in nigrani samiti.
An attempt was made to supplement the village swachhagrahi model in districts
that had a higher prevalence of open defecation. In partnership with the MDWS,
Tata Trusts led a fellowship program, Zila Swachh Bharat Prerak (ZSBP, District-level
Clean India Motivator), to place highly qualified young professionals in district
government offices.8 The fellows added technical capacity and motivation at the
district level, including by supporting the district governments with behaviour
change communication and progress monitoring. Despite the best attempts of the
MDWS and State governments, there was a possibility that some of the villages
would report toilets that did not exist. The cadre of ZSBPs was particularly useful to
promote accurate monitoring as the eyes and ears of MDWS in the field.

4
Pawar N. Swacchagrahis: The frontline workers of India's largest sanitation program. India Water Portal. Accessed 10
January 2022. Available from: https://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/swacchagrahis-frontline-workers-
indias-largest-sanitation-program#:~:text=A%20swachhagrahi%20is%20a%20volunteer,there%20was%20a
%20demonstrated%20need
5
MDWS & UNICEF. Community Approaches to Sanitation (cas) – Community Facilitator Training Module, Swachh
Bharat Mission – Gramin. Accessed 10 January 2022. Available from:
https://sujal-swachhsangraha.gov.in/sites/default/files/CAS-5-day-for-Community-facilitator-Module.pdf
6
Thaler R & Sunstein C. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New York: Penguin
Books.
7
Iyer P, ed. 2019. The Swachh Bharat Revolution: Four Pillars of India’s Behavioural Transformation. Noida, Uttar
Pradesh: HarperCollins India.
8
Tata Trusts. Zila Swachh Bharat Prerak Programme. Accessed 10 January 2022. Available from:
https://www.tatatrusts.org/our-work/water-sanitation-and-hygiene/sanitation-and-hygiene/zila-swachh-
bharat-prerak-programme

4
Mass media
The MDWS team orchestrated a mass media campaign that featured popular
icons such as Bollywood stars and national sportspersons, such as Sachin Tendulkar,
the cricket superstar and PV Sindhu, the badminton champion. In May 2017, a
campaign labelled Darwaza Band (Close the Door, referring to using closed-door
toilets) featuring the Bollywood megastars Amitabh Bachchan and Anushka Sharma
was launched with the support of The World Bank.9 In a first phase, the campaign
promoted eliminating open defecation; a second phase shifted the message to
sustaining the behaviour change. The campaign was translated into local and
regional languages and disseminated to the State governments for airing on popular
radio and television channels. Radio spots were particularly important as radio
penetration in India was about 99%, much higher than television. Outdoor
messaging such as murals and billboards was also done across the country.
Another Bollywood star, Akshay Kumar, starred in a mainstream movie
called “Toilet: Ek Prem Katha” (Toilet: A Love Story) which made headlines in the
country. The movie was based on the story of a woman’s staunch refusal to defecate
outdoors and her fight to get a toilet built in her new husband’s home. With the
might of a cultural icon behind it, the movie went on to become a blockbuster and
was used extensively to promote the message of ending open defecation.
Triggering Bihar
As of 2017, Bihar, a low-income state with a population over 120 million,10 still
had a sanitation coverage of 35%. The MDWS team saw the state as both difficult
and a threat to achieving ODF India. The challenge was further compounded by the
fact that Bihar, like West Bengal, was governed by a political party that was a rival to
the party in power of the Central government. Appealing directly to the state’s
political leadership to prioritize SBM seemed like a nonstarter.
Instead, in one of their brainstorming sessions, Iyer and his team germinated the
idea for ‘triggering Bihar’ by inducting swachhagrahis from across the country into
the state for a high-intensity behaviour change effort. This led to the initiative of
‘Chalo Champaran’ (Go to Champaran, a district in Bihar with low sanitation
coverage). Like other aspects of SBM, Chalo Champaran invoked Gandhian thinking
and history: 2017 was the centenary, and Champaran was the site, of the first
satyagraha or non-violent movement that the Mahatma led against colonial rule. 11
The initiative was formalized as the Satyagraha Se Swachhagraha Campaign,
symbolically linking the independence movement with the contemporary SBM.

9
See, for example, Darwaza Band videos oriented toward men’s open defecation behaviour at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDX4z-xBO08, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxqWBbUqx1s.
10
Government of India. Bihar Population 2011-2022. Census 2011. Accessed 10 January 2022. Available from:
https://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/bihar.html
11
In 1917, Mahatma Gandhi raised his voice against forced indigo farming in Champaran, which laid
the groundwork for passive political resistance and the national movement for freedomon from
British rule. Satyagraha means the insistence (agraha) for truth (satya).

5
 The campaign paired 10,000 swachhagrahis from Bihar with 10,000 from other
states to trigger behaviour change in villages across Bihar. The campaign had two
additional motives. First, it accelerated the construction of toilets, resulting in
800,000 being built in a single week. And second, it strategically brought the nation’s
attention to sanitation in Bihar with the aim of encouraging the State government
and officials to increase the pace of SBM implementation. In April 2018, the Prime
Minister addressed a gathering of all 20,000 swachhagrahis in Champaran, reinforcing
the Central Government’s political commitment to SBM. 12
The wins
By 2018, most States were already “green” on the SBM dashboard, signalling
that they had declared themselves ODF. Yet while the additional efforts engaging
the new Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh, triggering Bihar, and in Odisha and Jammu
and Kashmir had begun to yield progress, the pace was still not enough to achieve
ODF by 2nd October 2019 in these states.
Again confronted with needing to strategize for the ‘difficult’ States, Iyer
proposed to the Prime Minister’s Office that a direct interaction be held between the
Prime Minister and the civil service in these States to encourage them to progress
faster. They accepted, and such a review was undertaken by the Prime Minister via
video conference with the Chief Secretaries, Principal Secretaries in-charge of
sanitation, and senior officers of the four States on 13th March 2018. The Prime
Minister interacted with the Chief Secretaries and asked them about the steps taken
so far and the strategy adopted by their governments to declare all the districts in
their respective states ODF. The Chief Secretaries presented their respective plans
and, with this mandate directly from the Prime Minister, the MDWS began
following-up on an almost a daily basis to hold the States accountable to their plans.
This tactic leveraged the Prime Minister’s clout to motivate the civil service directly
rather than going through the States’ political leadership.
Ensuring that ground realities reflected ODF claims
In order to ascertain that the claims of ODF made by the reporting authorities
were genuine, the SBM guidelines required at least two verifications after a village
had declared itself ODF. The first verification had to be carried out within 90 days of
a village declaring itself ODF. A second verification, termed the Sustainability
Verification, was to be carried out 180 days or more after of the first. The MDWS
developed verification parameters to support States and Districts to undertake the
second verification. Both verifications had to include community representatives.
Another centralized mechanism to verify progress was the National Annual
Rural Sanitation Survey (NARSS), a nationally representative sanitation survey
supported by The World Bank. An independent verification agency was hired to
conduct the survey following a competitive bidding process. An Expert Working
Group was convened to supervise the NARSS. The group’s members consisted of
academics, former bureaucrats, and professionals from organizations working in the
sanitation sector in India and the globally, including the World Bank, UNICEF,
12
MDWS. Satyagraha se Swachhagraha: PM to address 20,000 Swachhagrahis in Champaran tomorrow.
Accessed 10 January 2022. Available from: https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?
PRID=1528409

6
Water Aid, Knowledge Links, India Sanitation Coalition, NITI Aayog and the
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. The survey was conducted
annually from 2018 with nearly 100,000 households (summary of findings for 2017-
2020 in Exhibit A).
The guidelines issued by MDWS further suggested sanitation surveys to be
conducted at the state level by all state governments to verify the sanitation coverage
and ODF declarations of their districts. At the local level, the task of monitoring and
verification was done on an ongoing basis by swachhagrahis, nigrani samitis, the gram
panchayat (elected village council), and community-based organizations.
Impact Assessment
In 2019, the National Geographic channel aired a documentary film13 about
how the SBM was being implemented at the grassroots and how it was harnessing
the power of a huge population to bring about substantial and sustainable change in
the centuries-old habit of defecating in the open.
The impact of SBM began to be projected as implementation proceeded. In
2017, a UNICEF study14 estimated that households in an ODF village would save an
annual average of Rs 8,024 (US$124) in medical costs an Rs. 25,000 (US$382) in time
saved from reduced sickness and seeking a place for open defecation. In 2018, a
WHO study15 estimated that SBM would avert more than 300,000 deaths in the
period from 2014-2019.
An ODF India
On October 2, 2019, at a gathering of 10,000 Village Heads at the Sabarmati
Ashram in Ahmedabad, the residence from which Mahatma Gandhi had led India’s
independence movement, the Prime Minister declared SBM a success. In addition to
invoking the symbolic connection with national independence, he highlighted a
change that his prioritization of sanitation and SBM’s one-on-one and mass media
behaviour change campaigns had made:
“The toilet, which was once a hush-hush topic to talk about, has become an important
part of the thinking of the country.”
As Iyer drove back from Ahmedabad on that night, he was still reeling from
the Prime Minister’s mega-announcement of the success of SBM. However, he
reminded himself, that the task was far from over.

What next? Sustainability, expansion, and global impact

The Shape of SBM 2.0
Even before the official conclusion of SBM, Iyer and his team had needed to carefully
allocate their precious, waning time between sprinting the home stretch towards
ODF India and thinking about what would come next. The Cabinet Note that had
authorized SBM did not expressly include a mandate for sustaining the expected
13
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7wHfMiMu-Y
14
https://www.unicef.org/india/media/1206/file/Financial-and-Economic-Impacts.pdf
15
https://www.who.int/india/news/detail/27-07-2018-health-gains-from-the-swachh-bharat-initiative

7
gains in sanitation access. But the team felt that it was their role to provide a vision
for continuing to advance sanitation in rural India. The strategy for the continuation
of SBM, what would come to be referred to as “SBM Phase II”, however, posed
important questions.
What should be the scope and key strategies of SBM Phase II? Large gains had been
made in access to rural sanitation, but experience in the sanitation sector and
behavioural science indicated that sustaining new sanitation habits was uncertain. 16
In addition to the behavioural aspects of toilet use, there was a looming
infrastructural issue: More than 10 crores (100,000,000) new toilets would now need
to be maintained and emptied from time to time. Sanitary issues in rural India other
than toilets remained pressing as well, including inorganic solid waste disposal,
uncontrolled animal excreta, drainage, menstrual hygiene, handwashing with soap,
and on-premises supplies of household drinking water. There were thus
opportunities to include other connotations of swachhata, but it might risk diluting
the focus of SBM. What should be the role of the MDWS in any or all of these areas?
Then there was the question of implementation mode. Should SBM Phase II be
conducted in the aggressive “Mission Mode” like its predecessor, or would a
different implementation framework prove more strategic for a new set of goals?
Mission Mode had galvanized SBM, but the team knew well how effortful it was to
maintain a Mission Mode pace of implementation while keeping sanitation at the
forefront of the national discourse for even five years.
Global impact?
Although it was a domestic policy, SBM rose to worldwide prominence as an
example of political support for and massive public investment in sanitation. 17 It had
leveraged investment from leading international development organizations,
including The World Bank, which invested US$1.5 billion;18 and UNICEF;19. The
MDWS even hosted 55 sanitation ministers at the Mahatma Gandhi International
Sanitation Convention in New Delhi in 2018 to promote the global goal of universal
access to sanitation, codified in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goal
6.2.20

16
Dreibelbis, R.; Winch, P. J.; Leontsini, E.; Hulland, K. R.; Ram, P. K.; Unicomb, L.; Luby, S. P. The Integrated
Behavioural Model for Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene: A Systematic Review of Behavioural Models and a
Framework for Designing and Evaluating Behaviour Change Interventions in Infrastructure-Restricted Settings.
BMC Public Health 2013, 13(1), 1015.
17
Curtis, V. Explaining the Outcomes of the “Clean India” Campaign: Institutional Behaviour and Sanitation
Transformation in India. BMJ Glob. Heal. 2019, 4 (e001892), 1–11.
18
World Bank. World Bank Approves US$1.5 Billion to Support India’s Universal Sanitation Initiatives. Available from:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/15/world-bank-approves-usd-1point5-billion-
support-india-universal-sanitation-initiatives
19
UNICEF. 2022. A Clean (Sampoorna Swachh) India. Accessed 21 January 2022. Available from:
https://www.unicef.org/india/what-we-do/ending-open-defecation
20
Government of India. Mahatma Gandhi International Sanitation Convention September 29, 2018 - October 2, 2018
Event Report. Available from:
https://jalshakti-ddws.gov.in/MGISC_Newletter_20_02_2019/images/mgisc_report_new_text.pdf

8
Some governments of other countries seeking to address open defecation and their
development partners may thus look to SBM as an example. However, the political,
cultural, economic, and environmental context in which SBM was conceived and
implemented was unique. Other countries have their own set of advantages and
disadvantages related to sanitation. What lessons might other governments and
international development organizations take from SBM to inform their own rural
sanitation strategies? Under what conditions would SBM’s playbook be most likely
to induce lasting changes in sanitation infrastructure and behaviour in countries
other than India? Answering these questions can help craft policies that aim to
eliminated open defecation worldwide and achieve Sustainable Development Goal
6.2.

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 Exhibit A: Summary of findings of National Annual Rural Sanitation Survey

NARSS 2019-20
 94.4% of households were found to have access to toilets during the survey
period
 95.2% of the people who had access to toilets used them
 90.7% of villages which were previously declared and verified as ODF were
confirmed to be ODF. The remaining villages also had sanitation coverage of
about 93%
 84.6% of the villages at national level were found to have minimal littering.
85.2% of villages were found to have minimal water logging.
NARSS 2018-19
 93.1% of households were found to have access to toilets during the survey
period (the corresponding figure as per the SBMG MIS in November 2018 was
96%)
 96.5% of the people who had access to toilets used them
 90.7% of villages which were previously declared and verified as ODF were
confirmed to be ODF. The remaining villages also had sanitation coverage of
about 93%
 95.4% of the villages surveyed found to have minimal litter and minimal
stagnant water
NARSS 2017-18
 

 77% of households were found to have access to toilets during the survey
period
 93.4% of the people who had access to toilets used them
 95.6% of villages which were previously declared and verified as ODF were
confirmed to be ODF. The remaining 4.4% villages also had sanitation
coverage of over 95%
 70% of the villages surveyed found to have minimal litter and minimal
stagnant water

Exhibit 2: Budgetary allocations for SBM Phase 1

Allocation and Releases under SBM (Grameen) 2014-2022

10
 Rs. In crore
Year Budget Estimates Revised Estimates Actual Release
2014-15 4260.00 2850.00 2850.00
2015-16 2625.00 6525.00 6524.52
2016-17 9000.00 10513.00 10509.00
2017-18 13948.27 16948.27 16941.96
2018-19 15343.00 14478.10 12932.96
2019-20 9994.00 8338.22 8246.00
2020-21 9994.10 6000.00 4189.04
2021-22 9994.10 NA 1256.69
  75158.47 65652.59 63450.17

Extra-budgetary Resources
Rs. In crore
  Released under EBR
2018-19 8698.20
2019-20 3600.00
  12298.20

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 Exhibit 3: Examples of behaviour change efforts under SBM
Source: https://jalshakti-ddws.gov.in/sites/default/files/SBMG%20IEC
%20Guidelines.pdf

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13
14
15