SAFETY ANALYSIS FOR OFFSHORE INSTALLATION OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

1. Introduction

1.1 Requirements
1.2 Operations Covered by this Report
1.3 Objectives
1.4 Reference Documents

2. Methos of Analysis

2.1 Components of the Safety Analysis

2.2 The Probability/Consequence Matrix
2.3 Definitions of Risk
2.4 Definitions of Events

3. Results

3.1 Method of Presentation

3.2 Tables of Events Considered
3.3 List of Abbreviations (Tables)

4. Summary of Recommendations

1. Introduction

1.1 Requirements

Micoperi, under Contract C-160022, is required to perform a 'Safety Analysis' for its operations, in accordance
with the Appendix to the Scope of Work. This report describes the work carried out and presents the results of
the analysis.

1.2 Operations Covered by this Report

The scope of this report covers the following operations:

a. Jacket and topside tows

b. Jacket installation
c. Pile installation
d. D.S.F. and leg insert installation
e. Topside installation.
1.3 Objectives

The objectives of the Safety Analysis are :

a. To verify that the operations are carried out within a satisfactory level of safety. Also, to verify that the
Temporary Systems have a satisfactory level of reliability.

b. To establish Design Accident levels which are to be taken into account during further detail design of jacket
and topsides by the Fabrication Contractors.

c. To establish design events, minor accidental events and design accidental events. These are to be taken into
account when preparing Operation Procedure Manuals.

1.4 Reference Documents

This report is based on a review of the Contract documents for Contract C-160022 and Contractor's Method of
Work Statements.

2. Method of Analysis

2.1 Components of the Safety Analysis

The Safety Analysis takes the form of an assessment of the risks involved followed by consideration of the
acceptability of those risks.

The Risk Assessment involves drawing up a list of possible accidental events and assessing the level of risk
attached to each event.

In the Risk Evaluation, the acceptability (or non-acceptability) of each event is determined by comparing the
level of risk with risks encountered in other equivalent marine operations and is based on professional judgement
and experience.

2.2 The Probability/Consequence Matrix

In the Risk Assessment, lists are drawn up of all possible accidental events. From experience, an estimate is
made of the probability of each event occuring, and of the consequence of it occuring; the product of these two
is defined as the Level of Risk.

i.e. Level of Risk = Probability x Consequence

For any one event, the Level of Risk may then be found to be either unacceptable, acceptable or excluded, as
shown on the matrix overleaf.
2.2 The Probability/Consequence Matrix (cont.)

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Probability N.A.D.E. Accidental Design Event

--------------------------------------------------------------Category CONSEQUENCE
None Minor Serious Catastrophic
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable

Low Excluded Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable

(MAE) (DAE)

Remote Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

(MAE and DAE are defined in 2.4 below)

NADE = Non Accidental Design Event.

When assessing 'Consequence', the following possible results of an event are

considered:

a. Occupational Injury
b. Damage to the Company Provided Items
c. Delay to the project schedule.

2.3 Definitions of Risk

The definition of the Levels of Risk is as follows:

a. Unacceptable Risks

These are events which either have high probability, or else have low probability and catastrophic consequence.
They are considered to be unacceptable and the design and/or procedures need to be changed in order to reduce
the probability of occurence and/or the consequences.

b. Acceptable Risks (MAE and DAE)

These are events which result in a level of risk which is acceptable subject to action being taken to control
probability and/or consequence.
c. Excluded Risks (EXE)

If the chance of encountering as given even is remote, then consideration of the level of risk attached to it is
excluded, and the event is omitted from further study. As a guideline, the level of risk is 'Excluded' from further
study if the chance of encountering it is less than 1 in 5*10^4. This is taken from the Statoil Sikkerhetshandbok
Del 2.

2.4 Definition of Events

Each event is classified under one of the following headings:

Non-Accidental Design Event: An event to which the operations may be subjected without an accident occuring.
This includes the results of encountering seastates which are up to, but not exceeding, the limiting seastate used
in design.

Minor Accidental Event (MAE): An accidental event which does not require work to be aborted and allows work
to be continued using reserve procedures and systems. In order to be an MAE, the event must not:

- lead to DAE

- result in an Occupational Injury other than to those person(s) causing the

MAE

- lead to a reduction in stability and/or local bearing capacity.

Design Accidental Event (DAE): The maximum accidental event which can occur without the likelihood of
death or chronic injury occuring outside the immediate vicinity of equipment, vessels and C.P.I. should be given
prime consideration in procedure development.

Excluded Event (EXE): An accidental event with very low probability.

3. RESULTS

3.1 Method of Presentation

The results are shown on the tables in 3.2 below, which are drawn up as follows:

Each of the operations listed in 1.2 above were considered and for each operation a list of possible Events was
drawn up and an assessment was made of the possible results or consequences of each Event occuring. The
consequences considered included delay to the project schedule, damage to Company Provided Items and injury
to personnel. The probability of the Event occuring was categorised as either Low or Remote. The consequence
was also categorised as Minor, Serious or Catastrophic. Finally, from the consequence of Probability, the Level
of Risk was categorised as either Unacceptable, Acceptable or Excluded. Acceptable risks were either specified
as being Design Accident Events (DAE) or Minor Accidental Events (MAE).
3.2 Tables of Events Considered

The Events considered are listed on the following tables which are shown on the next pages.

Table 3.2a) Jacket and topside tows 9

Table 3.2b) Jacket installation 10 - 12
Table 3.2c) Jacket pile installation 13 - 14
Table 3.2d) D.S.F. and leg insert installation 15 - 16
Table 3.2e) Topside installation 17

Table 3.2a) - Jacket & Topside Tows

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Events Leading to Consequence Probability Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collision a. Flooding 1 barge M L Acc
compartment (MAE)

b. Flooding several barge S R Ex

compartments

Breaking Towline a. Grounding or collision S L Acc

(DAE)

b. Boarding vessel to M L Acc

reconnect (DAE)

Tow Seastate a. Barge instability C R Ex

criteria exceeded

b. Damage to Seafastenings, C R Ex
barge or structure.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.2b) - Jacket Installation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Leading to Consequence Probability Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.Bring barge along- a)Collision with SSCV S L Acc
side (DAE)

2.Breaking of a)Breakaway of barge S L Acc

mooring lines (DAE)

3.Seafastening not a)Damage to barge M L Acc

fully cut (DAE)
b)Increase in crane loads S L Acc
(DAE)

4.Adverse weight & a)Hookloads within crane/ M L Acc

C. of G. barge/sling capacities (DAE)

b)Hookloads in excess of C L Un
crane/barge/sling
capacities

5.Failure of rigging a)Premature release of C L Un

restraint system rigging

6.Secondary impact a)Damage to jacket/barge S L Acc

during jacket lift (DAE)
off from barge

7.Lower jacket into a)Wave slam on jacket M L Acc

water (DAE)

8.Loss of buoyancy a)Flooding of one S L Acc

compartment (DAE)

b)Flooding of more than C L Un

c)Release system u/water S L Acc

(DAE)

9.Spreader beams can a)Damage to SSCV/jacket & C L Un

not be removed unable to upend

10.Upending cannot a)Horizontal tow of S L Acc

be completed jacket in field (DAE)
 b)Hold jacket against C L Un
SSCV to modify flooding
system (Personnel on
Jacket)

11.Rip out diaphragms a)Revised upending M L Acc

fail sequence/piercing (MAE)
procedure

12.Docking pile ex- a)Delay to commencement M L Acc

tensions engagement of installation while (MAE)
incomplete (soil modifying pile/exten
plug/dimensional sions (divers in water)
control)

13.Docking sleeves a)Lift jacket & repeat M L Acc

miss locating pins operation (MAE)

14.TV cameras/light a)Rely on transponders M L Acc

fail ROV only (MAE)

15.Positioning equip- a)Rely on TV camera/ROV S L Acc

ment fails only (MAE)

16.Docking piles do a)Jacket unable to be C L Un

not fit into property positioned
docking sleeves

17.Mudmats sink into a)Relift, adjust jacket S L Acc

soil ballast and reset down (MAE)

18.Jacket out of a)Special pile install- S L Acc

level ation procedure (MAE)

19.Pile installation a)On bottom stability S L Acc

delayed exposure (DAE)

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Table 3.2c) - Pile Installation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Leading to Consequence Probability Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.Bring cargo barge a)Collision with SSCV S L Acc
alongside (DAE)

2.Breaking barge a)Breakaway of barge S L Acc

mooring lines (DAE)

3.Lifting clamp a)Modifications to equip- S L Acc

fails to engage ment & delay to project (DAE)

4.Pile slides along a)Shock loading to crane/ M L Acc

barge deck while damage to barge (MAE)
being uprighted

5.Pile clamp prema- a)Loss of pile/damage to C R Ex

turely releases project property or
vessel

6.Pile difficult to a)Damage to pile sleeve M L Acc

stab stabbing cone (MAE)

7.Pile clamp refuses a)Diver intervention to M L Acc

to release release clamp (MAE)

b)Retrieval of pile to S L Acc

deck (MAE)

8.Pile hammer mech- a)Delay to installation/ M L Acc

anical breakdown deploy back-up hammer (MAE)

b)Back-up hammer failure S R Ex

9.Follower fails to a)Modification to S L Acc

engage in piles follower/delay to (DAE)
installation

10.Follower failure a)Follower repairs/delay S L Acc

to installation (DAE)

b)Unable to reach final C R Ex

penetration of piles

11.Unexpected soil a)Premature refusal piles S L Acc

conditions /pile drill-out require- (DAE)
ment/delay to installation

12.Failure to prelim. a)Requirement to use back S L Acc

grout manifolds up grout inlet (DAE)

13.Failure of back-up a)Requirement to use ter- S L Acc

 grout inlets tiary inlets/stinger (DAE)

14.Failure of grout a)Requirement to set grout S L Acc

packers plugs/delay to installation (DAE)

15.Failure of pile a)Unable to hold/level S L Acc

grippers jacket (DAE)
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Table 3.2d) - D.S.F. & Leg Insert Installation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Leading to Consequence Probability Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.Bring barge along- a)Collision with SSCV S L Acc

side (DAE)

2.Breaking of a)Breakaway of barge S L Acc

mooring lines (DAE)

3.Seafastening not a)Damage to barge M L Acc

fully cut (DAE)

b)Increase in crane loads S L Acc

(DAE)

4.Adverse weight/ a)Higher loading to slings S L Acc

C. of G. D.S.F. (DAE)

b)Tilt of D.S.F. M L Acc

(DAE)

5.D.S.F. legs fail a)Welders on jacket to S L Acc

to engage with cut bracings (DAE)
jacket (dimen-
sional error
b)D.S.F. having to be M L Acc
placed on deck (DAE)

6.Bad fit-up of a)Contingency welding M L Acc

welded joint procedure (buttering) (DAE)
7.Stabbing points to a)Leg inserts unable to C L Un
D.S.F. cannot be be installed
removed

8.Leg insert slides a)Shockloading to crane M L Acc

along barge deck and damage to barge or (MAE)
while being up- leg insert
righted

9.Leg insert diff- a)Damage to D.S.F. M L Acc

icult to stab (MAE)

10.Failure of grout a)Requirement to use back M L Acc

piping system up/stinger (DAE)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3.2e) - Topside Installation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Leading to Consequence Probability Risk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.Bring barge along- a)Collision with SSCV S L Acc

side (DAE)

2.Breaking of a)Breakaway of barge S L Acc

mooring lines (DAE)

3.Seafastening not a)Damage to barge M L Acc

fully cut (DAE)
b)Increase in crane loads S L Acc
(DAE)

4.Adverse weight/ a)Higher loading to slings S L Acc

C. of G. D.S.F. (DAE)
b)Tilt of D.S.F. M L Acc
(DAE)

5.Stabbing points of a)Welder on D.S.F. to cut S L Acc

deck fail to engage bracings (DAE)
with DSF
(Dimensional error) b)Int. deck having to be C R Ex
replaced onto cargo barge

6.Bad fit-up of a)Contingency welding M L Acc

 welded joints procedure (buttering) (DAE)

7.Derrick lower sec- a)Welders to cut guide or S L Acc

tion fails to en- bumper (DAE)
gage with base on
deck b)Unit to be replaced C R Ex
onto cargo barge

8.Derrick upper sec- a)Welders to cut guide S L Acc

tion fails to en- or bumper (DAE)
gage with lower
derrick section b)Unit to be replaced C R Ex
onto cargo barge

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3.3 Lift of Abbreviations (Tables)

Consequence Probability Risk

----------- ----------- ----

N = None R = Remote Ex = Excluded

M = Minor L = Low Acc = Acceptable

S = Serious P = Probable Un = Unacceptable

C = Catastrophic H = High

4.0 Summary of Recommendations

a) Towing
Standard emergency two line connection procedures to be reviewed for jacket where large overhangs exist.

b)Jacket Installation
Weight and C.of G. of jacket to be accurately defined to ensure no overload to slings, crane and barge
capabilities.
Failsafe operation of rigging restrain system and spreader bar release system is paramount for successful jacket
installation.

Secondary impact during jacket lift-off to be checked by simulation system.

Compartmentation of buoyancy on jacket to be designed to reduce damage stability effects.

Soil plug inside docking piles and dimensional checks to be confirmed early in the project to allow jacket
docking system to incorporate any misalignments.

Pile gripper devices to be checked for multi operation capability.

c) Pile Installation
Pile lifting clamps to be function tested prior to use to ensure adequacy of release systems.

Pile barge to be fitted with upending pad.

Follower to be designed for MHU 3000 hammer for contingency purposes.

d) D.S.F. & Leg Insert Installation

Accurate dimensional central system to be implemented to ensure accurate fit-up of D.S.F.

A contingency/repair welding procedure to be available in the event of bad fit-up of jacket/DSF legs (buttering).

e) Topsides Installation
Dimensional control and weld procedure comments for D.S.F. equally apply to topside installation.