Working With Labor Laws (Samson&Young) Book Cases Compilation Chap 1 (Full Text)

LPS 4219 Book Cases Compilation
(Full Text)
CHAPTER 1
Cristobal v. ECC. et.al. G.R. No. L-49280. 30 April 1980
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1980/apr1980/gr_49280_1980.html
Luz G. Cristobal in her own behalf.

Manuel M. Lazaro for respondent GSIS.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent ECC.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the June 21, 1978 decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission filed by petitioner in forma
pauperis.
The deceased, Fortunato S. Cristobal was employed as Supervising Information Officer 11 of the National Science Development Board
(NSDB for short) based in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal. His original appointment was dated February 26, 1964 (p. 16, ECC rec.). On April 8, 1976,
he developed loose bowel movement which later worsened and his excrement was marked with fresh blood. Self-administered medications
were made but symptoms persisted until April 22, 1976 when he was brought to the Hospital of Infant Jesus and was there treated by Dr.
Willie Lagdameo, who diagnosed his illness as rectal malignancy. On May 28, 1976, he was discharged with improved conditions but just one
year thereafter, he was again confined at the UST Hospital for the same ailment. A second operation became necessary because of the
recurrence of malignancy in the pelvis. Despite earnest medical efforts, he succumbed to his illness on May 27, 1977 (p. 6, rec.).
The petitioner herein, as the decedent's widow and beneficiary, filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS for short), a claim
for income (death) benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The said claim was denied by the GSIS and in a subsequent
request for reconsideration, the System reiterated its decision stating that —
Under the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions set therein are satisfied. It
also allows certain diseases to be compensable whenever the claimant is able to prove that the risks of contracting such diseases were
increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. This is provided under Sec. l (b) Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 626 which took effect on January 1, 1975. As far as the degree of proof is concerned, the
claimant must be able to show at least by substantial evidence that the development of the ailment was brought largely by the working
conditions present in the nature of employment. In the case of your husband, it will be noted that the ailment which resulted in his death on
May 27, 1977 was Rectal Malignancy. This ailment, not being fisted as an occupational disease, therefore, required such degree of proof as
mentioned above. On the basis, however, of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it appears that you have not
established that the deceased's employment has any direct causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment. While it is admitted that the
aforementioned ailment supervened in the course of the deceased's employment as Supervising Information Officer II in the National Science
Development Board, Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal, there has not been any showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the
nature thereof (GSIS letter dated February 20, 1978 denying the request of petitioner for reconsideration).
The petitioner appealed to the ECC, which affirmed the decision of the GSIS.
Hence, this petition.
In resolving the issue of compensability, the respondents herein failed to consider these outstanding facts patent from the records. The
deceased, as Supervising Officer II of the NSDB, was actually assigned to the Printing Department of the said agency where he was exposed
to various chemicals and intense heat. This fact was corroborated by the affidavit of one Angel Peres, a co-employee of the deceased, to the
effect that —
I know personally Fortunato Cristobal because he was my Supervisor in the Bureau of Printing;
During the employment of Fortunato Cristobal at the Bureau of Printing, he contracted sickness which was later diagnosed as anorectal
cancer which caused his death;
Fortunato Cristobal continued working at the aforementioned Bureau of Printing even when he was already suffering from a rectal illness and
he had been complaining to me that said illness became more painful whenever he performs his job in the Bureau;
I also noticed that he oftentimes eat food in the Bureau without washing his hands;
The place where Fortunato Cristobal was assigned in the Bureau of Printing is very unhygienic and polluted with chemicals and he oftentimes
complain to me that the odor of the chemicals make him feel dizzy always;
Fortunato Cristobal always handle chemicals in the Bureau of Printing while in the performance of his duties (Annex C, Petition).
These statements find relevance in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman stating that "the illness may be aggravated by the
unhygienic conditions in the Bureau of Printing where he works. Handling of chemicals for printing, eating without proper washing of hands,
tension due to the pressure of work, plus neglected personal necessity which may be attributed to the inadequate facilities in the Bureau of
Printing" (Annex D, Petition).
Undisputed is the fact that the deceased entered the government free from any kind of disease. Likewise, it is admitted that the deceased
husband's ailment supervened in the course of his employment with the NSDB. The ECC, however, failed to appreciate the evidence
submitted by the petitioner to substantiate her claim. In denying the claim, it merely relied on the fact that the certification issued by the
physician of the deceased failed to indicate the actual causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy. This Court, however,
is of the opinion that the affidavit of Angel Peres substantiated by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman (in relation to the
medical findings of Dr. Willie Lagdameo of the Hospital of Infant Jesus [p. 17, ECC rec.] and Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, its own medical officer
[p. 9, ECC rec.]) sufficiently establish proof that the risk of contracting the disease is increased, if not caused, by the working conditions
prevailing in the respondent's (NSDB) premises.
In the case of Eliseo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 188), this Court held:
We cannot agree with the private respondent that the claim of the petitioner is without any factual or legal basis nor with the respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission that there is no evidence substantial enough to show that this leukemia which caused the death of
Isabel Eliseo has a causal relation to the nature of her work with the respondent G & S Manufacturing Corp. It may be true that the job of a
reviser or quality controller, which was the work of claimant Isabel Eliseo, does not entail physical exertion. It may also be true that all that is
required is alertness of the eye to see and detect any defect or flaw in a garment being and to point out those defects for correction or repair
before a garment can pass for distribution and use. However, it must be admitted that the nature of the work of the claimant required her to
deal with textiles or fabrics which involved chemicals of various kinds and composition and this exposure of the deceased to these chemicals
in private respondent's establishment probably led to the development of the disease of leukemia or at least aggravated the illness of the
claimant from which she died as a result. In Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 73 SCRA 84, We held that in testing the
evidence or the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty, is the touchstone, reiterated
in National Housing Corp. vs. WCC, 79 SCRA 281.
Section l(b), Rule III of the Implementing Rules and regulations of P.D. 626 provides —
For sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease fisted under
Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied- otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.
This Court is convinced that the petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has adequately satisfied the second part of the aforequoted
provision, following the theory of increased risk as laid down in the case of Amparo vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 0046 (August 18, 1976) and
reiterated in Corales vs. ECC, 84 SCRA 762 (August 25,1978).
Furthermore, in the case of Sepulveda vs. Employees'Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 771 [August 25, 1978]), this Court stated that —
... the respondent Commission, under Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more
compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the
Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other
borderline cases. ...
In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to
extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits
under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor
Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations
and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely "a lot of
meaningless patter." (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]).]
As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 —
It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after
continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases —
Occupational Disease Nature of Employment
1. Cancer of the epithelial Work involving exposure to
lining of the bladder (Papilloma of alphnaphtylamine, betanap-
the bladder) thylamine or benzidine or any part
of the salts; and auramine or magenta
2. Cancer epithellomatoma The use or handling of, ex
or ulceration of the skin of the cor- posure to tar, pitch, bitumen,
neal surface of the eye due to tar, mineral oil (include paraffin) soot
pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or or any compound product or
paraffin or any compound product residue of any of these substances
or residue of any of these
substances
xxx xxx
7. Cancer of the stomach Woodworkers; wood products
and other lymphatic and blood for- industry carpenters, loggers and
ming vessels; nasal cavity and employees in pulp and paper mills
sinuses and plywood mills
16. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, plastic
and brain workers
Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology. Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication
is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec., Empahasis supplied).
From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford
maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decendent's
rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong
to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology, cause or origin, is unknown. It is in this regard that the evidence submitted by the
petitioner deserves serious consideration.
As persuasively pointed out by the petitioner in her memorandum addressed to this Court dated April 6, 1979 —
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent GSIS said, 'It is unfortunate that despite the relatively fast pace in the march of progress, science to this day has not given us
the cause of cancer' (p. 11, GSIS Comment). Hence medical scientists are still venturing into the unknown, so to speak. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, GSIS has trodden the grounds on an unsure foot. It would seem to insinuate that petitioner must blame science for having not yet
discovered the actual cause of her husband's fatal illness.
Why is it then that petitioner must be required to prove causation-that her husband's cancer was caused by his employment - if science itself
is ignorant of the cause of cancer?...
WE give due consideration to the respondent's application of P.D. 626 in ruling on the claim since petitioner's husband died on May 27, 1977,
after the effectivity of the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees' Compensation. Moreover, medical records did not disclose the
date when the deceased employee actually contracted the disease, rectal malignancy having been discovered only on April 22, 1976 when
the deceased sought hospital confinement.
From the above discussion, it is undeniable that the petitioner is entitled to her claim.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
RESPONDENT GSIS IS HEREBY DIRECTED
1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS;
2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;
3. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS AS FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND
4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN (10%) PERCENT OF THE DEATH BENEFITS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
The cause of death of petitioner's husband was rectal malignancy. It is not listed as an occupational disease (Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation). Hence, it is not compensable (Section 1(b), Rule 111, Ibid.). Even assuming that rectal malignancy
may be classified as a borderline case under cancer diseases, it is evident from the list that not all cancer ailments are considered
occupational diseases. Until it is so listed, I believe that we should not substitute our judgment for that of respondent Commission, which
should be deemed to have the necessary expertise to decide on the matter. The dreaded disease of cancer of the rectum can develop
irrespective of the conditions of work. That petitioner's husband was exposed to various chemicals, intense heat and unhygienic working
conditions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the deceased became more prone to rectal malignancy.

Remigio v. NLRC. G.R. No. 159887. 12 April 2006

PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
No. 67782 which affirmed the March 22, 2001 Resolution4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), awarding sickness allowance
of US$3,400.00 to petitioner but denying his claim for disability benefits.
The facts are undisputed.
On November 27, 1997, petitioner Bernardo Remigio entered into a Contract of Employment5 with respondent C.F. Sharp Crew
Management, Inc. (respondent agency), for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-respondent New Commodore Cruise Line, Ltd.
(respondent principal). The contract provided that the terms and conditions of the standard employment contract governing the employment
of all seafarers, approved per Department of Labor and Employment's Department Order No. 33 and the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration's Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 (1996 POEA SEC), were to be strictly and faithfully observed.6 Under the
contract, petitioner was to work as Musician II on board SS "Enchanted Isle," a vessel owned and operated by respondent principal, for ten
(10) months, at a basic monthly salary of US$857.00, overtime rate of US$257.00 per month and vacation leave with pay of three (3) days
per month.
After petitioner passed the pre-employment medical examination, he joined the vessel and started performing his job as a drummer in
December 1997. On March 16, 1998, while the vessel was docked at the port of Cancun, Mexico, petitioner went ashore to attend to some
personal matters. While walking, petitioner suddenly felt severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He returned to the vessel and
experienced another such episode on the same evening. When his chest pain recurred the following day, he went to the vessel's infirmary
where he again suffered from chest pain. Petitioner was brought and confined for seven (7) days at the Grand Cayman Island Hospital. His
pain worsened upon physical exertion but improved with rest. Thus, he was instructed to refrain from performing any kind of physical activity
and to have a complete bed rest. He rejoined the vessel on March 24, 1998.
Upon the vessel's arrival at the port of New Orleans, Louisiana, U.S.A., petitioner was brought to the West Jefferson Medical Center for a
more thorough check-up and evaluation. Dr. S. Kedia's "impression" was that petitioner's chest pains were "probable secondary to severe
coronary artery disease."7 Dr. Armengol Porta conducted a physical examination on petitioner, including a coronary angiogram,8 and found
that he had several blockages in his coronary arteries. A triple coronary artery bypass was performed on petitioner on April 2, 1998 by a Dr.
Everson.
On April 8, 1998, petitioner was transferred to the Marine Medical Unit for observation. After twelve (12) days of confinement, petitioner's
cardiologist found him "not fit for sea duty" and recommended for him to be "[r]epatriated to home port for follow up with a cardiologist."9 He
was repatriated to Manila on April 23, 1998.
In a letter dated April 27, 1998, Henry P. Desiderio, the manager of the Crewing Administration and Business Development Department of
respondent agency, referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic for medical check-up.10
On May 13, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, sent a formal communication11 to respondent agency demanding payment of unpaid wages,
sickness allowance and permanent total disability benefits. The demand, however, was refused.
In a letter dated June 25, 1998 addressed to the manager of respondent agency, Jose Enrique P. Desiderio, the company-designated
physician, Dr. Leticia C. Abesamis, of the American Outpatient Clinic wrote, viz:
Mr. B. Remigio who had Coronary Bypass (6x) abroad last April 2, 1998 has completed his cardiac rehabilitation here at the Phil. Heart
Center. Stress done on June 23, 1998 shows functional capacity at 8 METS.
Lately he has been complaining of epigastric discomfort probably from Ecotrin. He has been on ulcer regimen.
He may go back to sea duty as piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months.
He was unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998.12 (emphases supplied)
On November 12, 1998, petitioner filed the instant complaint13 for (a) recovery of permanent total disability benefits amounting to
US$60,000.00; (b) actual and compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity in the amount of US$154,260.00; and (c) moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.14 Private respondents made an offer to settle the case at US$30,000.00 as evidenced by fax
letters, to which petitioner made a counter-proposal of US$40,000.00.15 No agreement was reached as the parties proceeded to submit their
respective position papers and supporting evidence.
In support of his claims, petitioner submitted copies of: a) his Contract of Employment with private respondents; b) communication of
respondent principal to respondent agency informing the latter about petitioner's "heart attack," repatriation and replacement; c) History and
Physical Report of petitioner and Procedure Report of his cardiac catheterization; d) receipts from a drugstore and the Philippine Heart
Center; e) 2D Echocardiogram-Color Doppler Report; f) filled up form of the Exercise Testing and Cardiac Rehabilitation Laboratory of the
Philippine Heart Center showing the results of the tests done on petitioner; and g) the Discharge Summary of the Marine Medical Unit.16 On
the other hand, private respondents submitted copies of: a) the Contract of Employment; b) referral letter dated April 27, 1998 of respondent
agency to the American Outpatient Clinic; c) demand letter dated May 13, 1998 of petitioner's counsel; and d) medical report of Dr. Leticia C.
Abesamis of the American Outpatient Clinic addressed to the manager of respondent agency.17
On September 15, 1999, Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday rendered his decision,18 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay complainant, his
sickness allowance in the amount of US$3,400.00.
All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits, Labor Arbiter Caday noted that the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries
Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC does not provide for the payment of compensation
benefits in cases of cardiac catheterization or heart bypass. Even assuming that it was included, he held that no medical report was
presented to show that petitioner's disability was total and permanent as to be classified under Grade 1 of the said schedule of disability.
Nonetheless, petitioner's claim for sickness allowance was granted as there was no showing that private respondents paid petitioner's basic
wages after his repatriation, as provided under Section 20, B(3) of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner was awarded US$3,400.00 as sickness
allowance, computed on the basis of his monthly wage of US$850.00 multiplied by four (4) months.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.20 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC's resolution, to no avail. Accordingly, he filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order with the CA.21 On March 31, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition.22
The CA likewise did not find substantial evidence to prove that the heart ailment incurred by petitioner during the term of his employment
resulted to his disability, i.e., rendered him incapable of further seeking employment as a musician or to follow a substantially gainful
occupation. It noted that petitioner's medical records abroad never mentioned that his heart ailment resulted to a disability. Petitioner's
reliance on Dr. Abesamis's letter dated June 25, 1998 that he (petitioner) was "unfit from April 27, 1998 to June 25, 1998" was found as
insufficient to prove that petitioner's earning capacity was either lost or diminished. The statement that petitioner "may go back to sea duty as
piano player or guitar player after 8-10 more months" was likewise found as insufficient to prove that petitioner was actually "sidelined" or that
it was impossible for him to work and earn as a musician during the 8-10 months that he was not on board the vessel. Finally, it considered
that heart ailment is not included among the compensable sicknesses and injuries under the 1996 POEA SEC.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CA was denied.23 Hence, this petition in which petitioner prays that he be awarded
US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability benefits, US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance, attorney's fees and costs of suit. He assigns as
lone error, the following:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT AND DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
CONTRARY TO LAW.24
The main issue is whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
At the outset, private respondents' contention that the instant petition must be dismissed outright for being grounded on a question of fact
must be rejected. The issue of whether petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits is a question of law as it calls for the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on disability benefits to the established facts on record.25 It raises the following sub-issues, to wit:
1. Whether heart ailment suffered during the term of the contract is compensable under the 1996 POEA SEC even if there is no proof of work-
connection; and
2. Whether the concept of permanent total disability under the Labor Code applies to the case of a seafarer's claim for disability benefits
under the 1996 POEA SEC.
First. In ruling that petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits, the Labor Arbiter and the CA considered that "cardiac
catheterization," "heart bypass," or "heart ailment" is not found in the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases
or Illness Contracted under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC. Petitioner contends that the schedule of disability under Section 30 of the
1996 POEA SEC is not exclusive. Heart ailment, though not listed in the schedule, is compensable. Private respondents, on the other hand,
concede that while petitioner's illness is not listed under the 1996 POEA SEC, "this does not mean that the same is not compensable."26
However, since "heart ailment" is not listed under Section 30 of the 1996 POEA SEC, it is not an "occupational disease." It was therefore
incumbent upon petitioner to prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related. Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to
disability benefits.
We find merit in petitioner's argument.
Petitioner bases his claim for disability benefits under Section 20 in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:
Sec. 20. Compensation and Benefits
xxx
B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxx
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness[,] the seafarer
shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of [t]his Contract. Computation of his benefits
arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease
was contracted.
Sec. 30. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AND DISEASES OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED
xxx
CHEST-TRUNK-SPINE
1. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs resulting to severe limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 6
2. Fracture of four (4) or more ribs with intercostal neuralgia resulting in moderate limitation of chest expansion - Gr. 9
3. Slight limitation of chest expansion due to simple rib functional without myositis or intercostal neuralgia - Gr. 12
4. Fracture of the dorsal or lumber spines resulting to severe or total rigidity of the trunk or total loss of lifting power of heavy objects - Gr. 6
5. Moderate rigidity or two thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr. 8
6. Slight rigidity or one third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk - Gr. 11
7. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible without the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 4
8. Injury to the spinal cord as to make walking impossible even with the aid of a pair of crutches - Gr. 1
9. Injury to the spinal cord resulting to incontinence of urine and feces - Gr. 1
xxx
NOTE: Any item in the schedule classified under Grade 1 shall be considered or shall constitute total and permanent disability.
Sec. 30-A. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES
Impediment GradeImpediment
1 Maximum Rate x 120.00%
Maximum Rate: US$50,000
To be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. (emphases supplied)
"Disability" is generally defined as "loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness."27 Clearly, "disability"
is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness," the former being a potential effect of the latter. The schedule in Sec. 30 of the POEA SEC is a
Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness Contracted. It is not a list of compensable sicknesses.
Unlike the 2000 POEA SEC,28 nowhere in the 1996 POEA SEC is there a list of "Occupational Diseases."
The unqualified phrase "during the term" in Section 20(B) of the 1996 POEA SEC covers all injury or illness occurring in the lifetime of the
contract. The injury or illness need not be shown to be work-related. In Sealanes Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 29 we categorically held:
The argument of petitioners that since cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease it was incumbent upon Capt. Arante to prove
that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same, is not meritorious. It must be noted that his claims arose from the
stipulations of the standard format contract entered into between him and SEACORP which, per Circular No. 2, Series of 198430 of
respondent POEA was required to be adopted and used by all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen (sic) on board any ocean-
going vessel. His claims are not rooted from the provisions of the New Labor Code as amended. Significantly, under the contract,
compensability of the death or illness of seam[e]n need not be dependent upon whether it is work connected or not. Therefore, proof that the
working conditions increased the risk of contracting a disease or illness, is not required to entitle a seaman who dies during the term thereof
by reason of such disease or illness, of the benefits stipulated thereunder which are, under Section C(2) of the same Circular No. 2, separate
and distinct from, and in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. (emphasis supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the recent case of Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC.31
While indeed, the Labor Code's provisions on disability benefits under the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) require the element
of work-relation for an illness to be compensable, the 1996 POEA SEC giving a more liberal provision in favor of the seafarer must apply. As
a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between the
contracting parties.32 In controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation
of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former’s favor.33 The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees
who can avail of the benefits under the law, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.34
Second. Is the Labor Code's concept of permanent total disability applicable to the case at bar? Petitioner claims to have suffered from
permanent total disability as defined under Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 192 (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules; x x x
Petitioner likewise cites Vicente v. ECC35 and Abaya, Jr. v. ECC,36 both of which were decided applying the Labor Code provisions on
disability benefits. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner erred in applying the definition of "permanent total disability"
under the Labor Code and cases decided under the ECC as the instant case involves a contractual claim under the 1996 POEA SEC.
Again, we rule for petitioner.
The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best
terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being
of Filipino workers overseas."37 Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the]
Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties
and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that
the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."38 lawphil.net
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers
v. NLRC,39 seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to
work by the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico,40 GSIS
v. CA,41 and Bejerano v. ECC42 that "disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning
capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that
[he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean
absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC,43 that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but
rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad.44 In addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz45
and Ijares v. CA46 that "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or
not he loses the use of any part of his body."
Finally. Applying the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the facts on record, is petitioner entitled to permanent total disability
benefit?
Petitioner contends that the certification of the company-designated physician that he may go back to sea duty as a piano or guitar player
after 8-10 months even if his job was a drummer proves that he suffered from permanent total disability and thus entitled to permanent total
disability benefits of US$60,000.00 under the 1996 POEA SEC. Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that: 1) petitioner did not
present any proof that he suffered from permanent total disability, i.e., that his earning power is now reduced and that he is incapable of
performing remunerative employment; 2) petitioner did not present any medical certificate showing that he suffered any disability; 3) on the
contrary, the company-designated physician attested that petitioner could return to further sea duty; 4) even if he could not go back to sea
duty, this does not mean that his earning capacity is impaired since as a musician, he may still perform on land; and 5) having admitted that
he was a heavy smoker, petitioner is disqualified under Section 20(d) of the 1996 POEA SEC from recovering compensation for any
incapacity or disability he suffered.
There are three kinds of disability benefits under the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626: (1) temporary total disability, (2) permanent
total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code differentiates
the disabilities as follows:
Sec. 2. Disability.—
(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X47 of these Rules.
(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any
part of his body. (emphasis supplied)
In Vicente v. ECC:48
x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue
performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is
unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee
undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. (emphases
supplied)
A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be
such that the employee cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom.49 On the other hand, a total disability is considered permanent if it
lasts continuously for more than 120 days.50 Thus, in the very recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,51 we held:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any
part of his body.52 x x x
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he
was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.53 It does not mean
absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in
the impairment of one's earning capacity.54
Applying the foregoing standards, we find that petitioner suffered from permanent total disability.
It is undisputed that petitioner started to suffer chest pains on March 16, 1998 and was repatriated on April 23, 1998 after having been found
as "not fit for duty." The medical report dated June 25, 1998 of the company-designated physician, Dr. Abesamis, establishes the following
facts, viz: a) petitioner underwent a coronary bypass on April 2, 1998; b) petitioner was "unfit" from April 27, 1998 (date of referral) to June 25,
1998 (date of medical report); c) petitioner may not return to sea duty within 8-10 months after June 25, 1998; and d) petitioner may return to
sea duty as a piano or guitar player after 8-10 months from June 25, 1998.
These facts clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months -- from the onset of his ailment on March 16,
1998 to 8-10 months after June 25, 1998. This, by itself, already constitutes permanent total disability. What is more, private respondents
were well aware that petitioner was working for them as a drummer, as proven by the communication of respondent principal to respondent
agency referring to petitioner as "drummer with our enchanted isle quartet."55 Thus, the certification that petitioner may go back specifically
as a piano or guitar player means that the likelihood of petitioner returning to his usual work as a drummer was practically nil. From this, it is
pristine clear that petitioner's disability is total and permanent.
Private respondents' contention that it was not shown that it was impossible for petitioner to play the drums during the 8-10 months that he
was on land is specious. To our minds, petitioner's unfitness to work attached to the nature of his job rather than to its place of performance.
Indeed, playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed and endurance. It demands the performance of hitting strokes and repetitive
movements that petitioner, having undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become incapacitated to do.
The possibility that petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits. In the
same case of Crystal Shipping, Inc., we held:
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings [of permanent total disability] by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief
mate in March 2001. (citation omitted) Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was
unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that
he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.56 (emphasis supplied)
That the company-designated physician did not specify that petitioner suffered from any disability should not prejudice petitioner's claim for
disability benefits. In the first place, it is well to note that it was respondent agency which referred petitioner to the American Outpatient Clinic
giving only the specific instruction that the designated physician indicate in the medical report "the estimated treatment period and the exam
conducted."57 Moreover, what is important is that the facts stated in the medical report clearly constitute permanent total disability as defined
by law. It is well-settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits.58 Disability should
not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.59 As in the case of Crystal Shipping, Inc.,60 an award
of permanent total disability benefits in the petition at bar would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in
making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
We do not agree that petitioner's admission that he was a heavy smoker is enough ground to disqualify him from entitlement to disability
compensation under Section 20(D) of the 1996 POEA SEC, viz:1avvphil.net
Section 20.D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful
or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the
seafarer.
We have held that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment and while the employer is not the insurer of
the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability.61
In the case at bar, it is noteworthy that petitioner's habit of smoking was not a consideration when private respondents hired petitioner. It was
likewise not shown that petitioner suffered from any form of ailment prior to the heart ailment he suffered during the course of his employment
with private respondents. While smoking may contribute to the development of a heart ailment, heart ailment may be caused by other factors
such as working and living under stressful conditions. Thus, private respondents' peremptory presumption, that petitioner's habit of smoking
heavily was the willful act which caused his illness and resulting disability, without more, cannot suffice to bar petitioner's claim for disability
benefits. Ruling otherwise would run contrary to the constitutional mandate to extend full protection to labor.
Having suffered from permanent total disability, petitioner is entitled to US$60,000.00 which is the amount due for permanent total disability
under Section 30-A of the 1996 POEA SEC.
As to the claim for sickness allowance, petitioner prays that private respondents be held jointly and severally liable to pay him US$3,428.00,
as opposed to the award of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, of only US$3,400.00. We find this claim warranted by the
undisputed fact on record that petitioner's basic salary is US$857.00 per month.62 Multiplying the 120-day sickness allowance due petitioner
on the basis of the correct monthly rate of US$857.00, he should be awarded US$3,428.00 as sickness allowance.
Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for
indemnity under employer's liability laws. Attorney's fees is also recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to incur expenses to protect his interest. Such conditions being present in the case at bar, we find that an award of attorney's fees is
warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67782 dated March 31, 2003 and August 14, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner: a) permanent total
disability benefits of US$60,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; b) sickness allowance of US$3,428.00 at its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment; and c) attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award at its peso equivalent at the
time of actual payment. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
GSIS v. Alcaraz. G.R. No. 187474. 6 February 2013
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_187474_2013.html
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the decision2 dated December 12, 2008 and the resolution 3 dated April 7,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100381. These CA rulings reversed the decision 4 of the Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC) denying the claim for death benefits filed by petitioner Marilou Alcaraz following the death of her husband Bernardo
Alcaraz.
The Antecedents
Bernardo was employed for almost twenty-nine (29) years 5 by the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) in Makati City. He worked at
the MMDA as laborer, Metro Aide and Metro Aide I.
Sometime in February 2004, Bernardo was diagnosed with Pulmonary Tuberculosis ( PTB) and Community Acquired Pneumonia ( CAP). On
May 13, 2004, he was confined at the Ospital ng Makati. He was discharged on May 19, 2004 with the following diagnosis: Acute Diffuse
Anterolateral Wall Myocardial Infarction, Killips IV-1, CAP High Risk, PTB III and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2. 6
On January 15, 2005, Bernardo was found dead at the basement of the MMDA building. His body was brought to the Southern Police District
Crime Laboratory in Makati City for an autopsy. Medico-Legal Officer Ma. Cristina B. Freyra performed the autopsy and concluded that
Bernardo died of Myocardial Infarction, old and recent. 7 Bernardo’s widow, Marilou, subsequently filed a claim for death benefits with the
Govenment Service Insurance System (GSIS).
The GSIS Ruling and Related Incidents

The GSIS denied the claim for death benefits on the ground that myocardial infarction, the cause of Bernardo’s death, was directly related to
diabetes which is not considered a work-connected illness; hence, its complications, such as myocardial infarction, are not work-related.
Marilou appealed to the ECC which affirmed the GSIS ruling. Aggrieved, she sought relief from the CA through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, contending that (1) the ECC misappreciated the facts. She argued that even if the undelying cause of
Bernardo’s death was diabetes, the illness was acquired in the course of his employment and was further aggravated by the nature of his
work; and (2) the ECC gravely abused its discretion for giving scant consideration to the medical findings on Bernardo’s true condition prior to
his death.
The GSIS, on the other hand, prayed that the petition be denied, contending that in the absence of satisfactory evidence that Bernardo’s
nature of employment predisposed him to contract the ailment, the widow’s claim must fail.
The CA Decision
In its challenged decision, the CA granted the petition and set aside the ECC ruling. It opined that while myocardial infarction is not among the
occupational diseases listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, the ECC, pursuant to Resolution No. 432,
laid down conditions under which cardio-vascular diseases can be considered as work-related and therefore compensable, as follows:
18. CARDIO-VASCULAR DISEASES. Any of the following conditions:
a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his/her work.
b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-four hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during
the performance of his/her work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
It pointed out that, as this Court held in Salmone v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,8 "[t]he claimant must show, at least, by
substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job."
The CA found sufficient proof of work-connection between Bernardo’s ailment and his working conditions. It believed that his work as laborer
and metro aide must have substantially contributed to his illness.
The CA ordered the GSIS to pay Bernardo’s heirs the proper benefits for his death consistent with the State policy to extend the applicability
of the employees compensation law, Presidential Decree No. 626, to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the
law, in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9
The GSIS moved for, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, the petition.
The Petition
In asking for a reversal of the CA decision, the GSIS submits that the appellate court erred in: (1) finding that Bernardo’s illness was work-
connected and/or the risk of contracting the illness was increased by the nature of his work; and (2) reversing the factual findings of the GSIS
and of the ECC which are accorded respect by the courts.
The GSIS insists that myocardial infarction which caused Bernardo’s death cannot be said to have been aggravated by the nature of his
duties. It stresses that on the contrary, there was no evidence showing that it was the performance of his duties that caused the development
of myocardial infarction as it was a mere complication of diabetes mellitus, a non-occupational disease. His heart ailment, therefore, cannot
be considered an occupational disease.
It faults the CA for disregarding its factual findings, as well as those of the ECC when the appellate court awarded death benefits to
Bernardo’s heirs.
The Case for Marilou

In her Comment,10 dated September 24, 2009, Marilou asks that the petition be denied for "utter lack of merit," arguing that the CA did not err
in finding that Bernardo’s illness was compensable as it was work-related. She takes exception to the GSIS’ argument that there was no
evidence showing that the nature of Bernardo’s work had increased the risk of his contracting myocardial infarction. She maintains that the
GSIS failed to consider that while diabetes mellitus does increase the risk of the development of the illness, the same thing is true with CAP, a
compensable disease that Bernardo had been earlier diagnosed with. She adds that stress is another predisposing factor for heart diseases
as this Court recognized in Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuanang .11 Marilou thus insists that the GSIS erred in singly
attributing the occurrence of Bernardo’s fatal heart attack to diabetes mellitus, when Bernardo had been suffering from CAP and experiencing
physical stress at the same time. She argues further that the Court had previously held that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction,
whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for requiring compensation. 12
Finally, she maintains that the GSIS hastily concluded that myocardial infarction was a mere complication of diabetes mellitus as there was no
explicit finding that it was solely caused by his diabetic condition.
Our Ruling
Diabetes mellitus not the sole predisposing factor to myocardial infarction
Bernardo died after almost three decades of service with the MMDA (July 1, 1976 to January 15, 2005). His death occurred within his
employer’s premises, at the basement of the MMDA building while he was at work. The GSIS and the ECC denied the claim of his widow for
death benefits on the ground that his death was due to myocardial infarction which they declared to be non-compensable; they opined that it
is not work-related as it is simply a complication of diabetes mellitus. They pointed out that diabetes mellitus is not in the list of occupational
diseases13 and, for this reason, its complications such as myocardial infarction, are not work-related.
We disagree with the GSIS’s position. The conclusions of the two agencies totally disregarded the stressful and strenuous conditions under
which Bernardo toiled for almost 29 long years as a laborer and as a metro aide. By so doing, they closed the door to other influences that
caused or contributed to Bernardo’s fatal heart problem – an ailment aggravated with the passage of time by the risks present in the difficult
working conditions that Bernardo had to bear from day to day in his employment.
The CA vividly captured Bernardo’s hazardous working environment (the streets of Makati City) and its effects on his health when it stated:
Petitioner contends that the ECC erred in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to claim benefits for her husband’s death. She pointed out that as
early as May 3, 2004, the deceased was already complaining of shortness of breath and dizziness; that despite such condition, he still
continued performing his work until he was confined at the Ospital ng Makati from May l3 to 19, 2004 where he was diagnosed with Acute
Diffuse Anterlateral Wall Myocardial Infarction; that the short intervening period between his confinement at the hospital and his last day of
duty with the MMDA on January 14, 2005, indicate that he had been suffering from such disease at the time that he was employed; that his
[everyday] exposure under the sweltering heat of the sun during summer and his constant exposure to rain during the rainy season,
aggravated by his contact to smoke emitted by vehicles passing as he cleaned the streets of Makati, are enough proofs of the strenuous
nature of his work; that his everyday exposure to these elements not only resulted to his developing myorcardial infarction, but also
aggravated pre-existing illness which were pulmonary tuberculosis and community acquired pneumonia. 14
While diabetes mellitus was indeed a complicating factor in Bernardo’s health condition and indisputably aggravated his heart problem, we
cannot discount other employment factors, mental and physical, that had been indisputably present; they contributed, if not as a direct cause
of the heart condition itself, as aggravation that worsened and hastened his fatal myocardial infarction.
For instance, it is undisputed that Bernardo was earlier diagnosed with CAP which could also be a predisposing factor to myocardial
infarction.15 There is also stress due to the nature of Bernardo’s work. As Marilou pointed out, this Court recognized that stress could
influence the onset of myocardial infarction.1âwphi1 The Court declared in Goverment Service Insurance System (GSIS) v.
Cuanang:16 "Myocardial infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a ‘coronary,’ is a life threatening condition. Predisposing factors
for myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery Disease, and these factors include stress. Stress appears to be
associated with elevated blood pressure."17
The CA, therefore, is correct in holding that there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that myocardial infarction in Bernardo’s
case is work-related.
Cardio-vascular disease compensable

The CA’s conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the ECC itself, the government agency tasked by law 18 to implement the employees
compensation program (together with the GSIS in the public sector and the Social Security System [SSS] in the private sector), included
cardio-vascular diseases in the list of occupational diseases, making them compensable, subject to any of the conditions stated in its enabling
Resolution No. 432.19 With the resolution, it should be obvious that by itself, a heart disease, such as myocardial infarction, can be considered
work-related, with or without the complicating factors of other non-occupational illnesses. Thus, the Court so ruled in Rañises v. ECC,20 where
it emphasized that the incidence of acute myocardial infarction, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for
compensation.
Resolution No. 432 provides (as one of the conditions) that a heart disease is compensable if it was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his
work. Based on the evidence on record, we find as the CA did, that the nature of Bernardo’s duties and the conditions under which he worked
were such as to eventually cause the onset of his myocardial infarction. The stresses, the strain, and the exposure to street pollution and to
the elements that Bernardo had to bear for almost 29 years are all too real to be ignored. They cannot but lead to a deterioration of health
particularly with the contributing factors of diabetes and pulmonary disease.
Bernardo had in fact been a walking time bomb ready to explode towards the end of his employment days. Records show that the debilitating
effect of Bernardo’s working conditions on his health manifested itself several months before his death. As early as May 3, 2004, Bernardo
was already complaining of shortness of breath and dizziness. From May 13 to 19, 2004, he had to be confined at the Ospital ng Makati and
was diagnosed with acute myocardial infarction which caused his death on January 15, 2005 while he was at work. To be sure, a reasonable
mind analyzing these facts cannot but arrive at the conclusion that the risks present in his work environment for the entire duration of his
employment precipitated the acute myocardial infarction that led to his death.
We thus find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error nor any grave abuse of discretion in awarding death benefits to
Bernardo’s heirs. As a final point, we take this occasion to reiterate that as an agency charged by law with the implementation of social justice
guaranteed and secured by the Constitution – the ECC (as well as the GSIS and the SSS) – should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employees in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection to the
accident or to the illness.21 This is what the Constitution dictates.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s DIVISION
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Carbajal v. GSIS and ECC. G.R. No. L-46654. 9 August 1988

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/aug1988/gr_l_46654_1988.html
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in
ECC Case No. 0168 dated June 27, 1977, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System, denying
petitioner's claim for benefits under the New Labor Code as amended (P.D. No. 626) for the death of his spouse, Nenita P. Carbajal (Rollo,
Annex "A," p. 14).
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern Samar. On February
2, 1976 while typing tax declarations and making entries in their books, which were her duties aside from campaigning for tax collections, she
suffered from bleeding per vaginum due to incomplete abortion. Her hospitalization and treatment at the Bagacay Mines Hospital due to
profuse hermorrhage of one month duration secondary to complete abortion and shock were of no avail for on March 8,1976, petitioner's wife
died.
On May 12, 1976, he filed his claim for benefits for the death Of his wife with the respondent Government Service Insurance System under
P.D. No. 626, as amended.
On June 3, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager of the Underwriting and Claims Department of GSIS, Mr. Domingo N. Garcia, denied
the petitioner's claim stating that the ailments of his wife were not occupational.
Petitioner requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling. However, his request was also turned down by respondent GSIS
reiterating its previous stand that ailment which resulted in his wife's death is not causally related to her duties and conditions of work. From
this decision, a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).
On June 27, 1977, the respondent ECC rendered its questioned decision in ECC Case No. 0168 based upon the findings of its Medical
Officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, that there is no proof to establish the compensability of the sickness in relation to claimant's occupation.
Neither was there an increased risk arising from the working conditions affirming the GSIS decision denying the claim.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue raised in the case at bar is the compensability of petitioner's wife's ailments.
Section 1, P.D. No. 626, amending Article 165 of the Labor Code, defines a compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as
occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working conditions."
Respondent ECC in its decision denying petitioner's claim, stressed that the causes of abortion are: (1) fetal, as when there is defective
development of the fertilized ovum; (2) maternal, as in acute infections, disease, and when the spermatozoa is inadequate to give ovum the
necessary generative impulse (Obstetrics, J.P. Greenhill, 12th Edition, 1060).
Respondent ECC asserted that there is absence of any proof that the abortion suffered by petitioner's wife was caused by her employment
and that petitioner failed to establish risk of his wife's contracting it was increased by working conditions attendant in her employment.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of his late wife. Petitioner claims that
the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated/increased by the working conditions as evidenced by Report of Injury/Sickness/Death,
Municipal Mayor Matilda A. Operario of San Julian, Eastern Samar (ECC, Records, p. 11); Medical Certificate of the two attending physicians
of the deceased (ECC, Records, Annex "A," p. 15; Annex "B," p. 14); and the affidavit of the Municipal Treasurer of the aforementioned town
(ECC, Records, Annex "C," p. 13) which confirmed that the illness was connected with her work as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office.
Further, petitioner cites the travels of his wife and the of heavy tax declaration books in connection with her work thereby causing her "two
attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain."
Claimant's contention is meritorious.

Under Article 1167 (I), Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, a "compensable sickness means (1) any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the ECC; or (2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by working conditions."
Records reveal that petitioner's wife while working as Campaign Clerk in the Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern Samar, suffered "two
attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain" attributing said ailment to the lifting of heavy tax declaration books, due to abortion
incomplete.
This opinion of the decedent's physicians is in accord with the findings/analysis of medical authorities which read as follows:
Pregnant women become tired more readily, therefore, the prevention of fatigue must be stressed very emphatically. The body is made up of
various types of cells, each type with a specific function. Depletion of nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and fatigue causes certain reactions
in the body that are injurious. (Maternity Nursing 12th Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder and Mastroianni, Jr.).
It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be employed in the following types of occupation and they should, if possible, be
transferred to lighter and more sedentary works:
(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work;

(b) occupation involving continous standing and moving about. (One of the Standards for Maternity Case and Employment of Mothers
recommended by the Children's Bureau of the United States). (Rollo, p. 12,).
Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the influence of periodicity as the uterine muscle reaches a certain state of detention; or in
various accidents as a fall, strain or overmuscular exertion when the uterus reacts and expels its load. (Emphasis supplied; "Anatomy and
Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181).
Therefore, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer (ECC Record, p. 20) that there was no causal relation between the ailment of petitioner's
spouse and the nature and/or conditions of his wife's employment cannot overcome the substantial evidence submitted by petitioner (See
Calvero v. ECC et al., 117 SCRA 461 [1982], cited in Parages v. ECC, 134 SCRA 73; Ovenson v. ECC, GSIS; G.R. No. 65216, December 1,
1987).
Additionally, medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection (Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67; San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC, Sept. 24, 1986, 144 SCRA
421).
Thus, in the cases of Mercado, Jr. v. ECC, 139 SCRA 270 and Mora v. ECC and GSIS, G.R. No. 62157, December 1, 1987 citing Cristobal v.
ECC, 103 SCRA 329, this Court ruled as follows:
While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been
abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of
the law in general still subsists.
... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions respondents
should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability specially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection. (Cristobal v. ECC, supra).
Moreover, "this kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4
of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'" (Cristobal v. ECC, supra). The policy is to extend the applicability of
the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 209 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC and GSIS, L-65648, September
24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Employees Compensation
Commission is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering respondents to pay herein petitioner the full amount of compensation
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Sarmiento JJ., concur.
Cruz v. Hon. Medina et.al. G.R. No. 73053. 15 September 1989

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/sep1989/gr_73053_1989.html
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner, by way of a special civil action for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dismissing petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal from employment and for
damages.
Petitioner Dr. Carmelita U. Cruz is a 1968 mathematics graduate of the University of the Philippines. She earned a doctoral degree in
Mathematics Education from Centro Escolar University in 1977. She wrote several books in mathematics and statistics and likewise attended
numerous seminars, workshops and conferences, either as a delegate, resource person or consultant. She rose from the ranks, starting out
as a high school teacher in 1958 to college instructor and eventually Dean, until her services were terminated in 1984 by her employer and
herein private respondent, Roosevelt Colleges, Inc.
The whole controversy started when in October 1983, Agro-Industrial Management and Consultancy, Inc. (AIMCON) submitted a proposal to
Roosevelt Colleges, Inc., to start a Distance Study Program leading to a Degree of Master of Arts in Education Teaching Elementary
Agriculture (MAETEA). Roosevelt Colleges, Inc., in accepting the proposal, designated petitioner, being the Dean of the Institute of Education
and Graduate School, to head the committee to work for the approval of the program with the Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports (MECS).
The program which is a joint venture between AIMCON and Roosevelt Colleges, will have its own operational budget and a Board of Trustees
composed of two representatives from Roosevelt Colleges, the College President and one other person. In view of this, petitioner was offered
the post of Deputy Director as well as the second seat allotted to Roosevelt Colleges in the Program's Board of Trustees.
The Ministry of Education however, issued the authority to operate the Program on the condition that such shall only be an extension of the
Graduate School of Roosevelt Colleges. The masteral degree was changed to Master of Arts in Education, Major in Elementary Agriculture
(MEAMEA). Considering that she was already the Dean of Graduate School, a post higher than the Program's director, the offer to make
petitioner as Deputy Director did not push through. During that time petitioner was receiving P4,330.50, including P1,747.50 representing
remuneration for six (6) teaching loads. 1
On September 26, 1984, pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Board of Trustees, the President of Roosevelt Colleges, Romeo P. de la Paz,
sent petitioner a letter informing her, as follows:
... the issue concerning the amount of remuneration or honorarium to be added to what you are presently receiving in view of the institution of
the Agro-Forestry Program in the Institute of Education was discussed by the board yesterday. The final decision is given below:
1) You will be given monthly honorarium equivalent to the amount you are now receiving for teaching 6 loads.
2) This amount is chargeable to the Agro-Forestry Program and to be drawn from the Cashier's Office in Sumulong.
3) This shall take effect as soon as the monthly remuneration you are receiving for teaching 6 loads ends.
4) Effective the second semester of SY 84-85 you are not allowed to accept teaching assignment be it in the undergraduate or graduate
programs.
5) It is expected that you will devote more time to effective and efficient administration and supervision of the Institute of Education including
the Agro-Forestry Program. ... 2
In response to the above letter, petitioner Dr. Cruz sent a letter dated October 1, 1984, stating that:
... with a few considerations to reckon with, I think it would be better that I, much to my regret, be no longer involved in the Agro-Forestry
Program. ...3
In addition, she expressed her wish to retain her teaching loads citing professional reasons as well as her desire to be in constant contact
with her students.
On October 8, 1984, President de la Paz informed Dr. Cruz of the Resolution of the Board, to wit: (a) that Dr. Cruz be required to appear in its
next meeting to be held on 30 October 1984; (b) that Dr. Cruz is expected to continue functioning as Dean of Education including the new
Agro-Forestry Program under the Institute of Education; and (c) that Dr. Cruz be directed to send to the Board within twenty-four (24) hours
upon receipt of this communication her reply to these resolutions. 4 Dr. Cruz manifested her willingness to appear before the Board. In the
meanwhile, President de la Paz informed the Board that he will go on leave until the issue in connection with Dr. Cruz shall have been
resolved.
The Board held several meetings to thresh out this problem. During these meetings, Dr. Cruz reiterated her desire to retain her teaching loads
in lieu of handling the Agro-Forestry Program. The Board on the other hand, remained firm on its stand to enforce Resolution No. 5. Several
attempts were made to amicably settle the issue, but to no avail. A deadlock occurred. On October 19, 1984, the Board issued Dr. Cruz a
letter terminating her services, the text to wit:
Even before the receipt of your letter of October 16, 1984, the Board was aware of your intractable stand not to be involved in the Agro-
forestry Program unless your teaching loads are retained.
The Board has been too patient with you aside from the fact that Dr. Isidro was unofficially designated to talk to you and clarify things to avoid
misunderstanding. You are aware that the course of Master of Arts in Education in Teaching Elementary Agriculture is a part of the Graduate
School of Education including the Institute of Education wherein you are the Dean. Your refusal to accept involvement in the said program,
unavoidable as it is, is a defiant disregard of the Board's action, and leaves us no other recourse except to terminate your relationship with the
school effective immediately. 5
On November 16, 1984, Dr. Cruz filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital
Region. This case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Apolinar L. Sevilla. The parties were required to submit their respective position papers,
supplemental pleadings and supporting documents, after which the case was deemed submitted for decision. On Mach 19, 1985, Labor
Arbiter Sevilla rendered a decisions 6 finding petitioner guilty of insubordination and thus dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal
for lack of merit. Dr. Cruz appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which on June 26, 1985 promulgated a
Resolution 7 dismissing petitioner's appeal and affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision in toto. Not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsiderations 8 on September 30, 1985 which was likewise denied on October 3, 1985. 9 Petitioner then filed a special civil action
for certiorari 10 before Us on December 13, 1985. This was dismissed for lack of merit by the First Division in a Court resolution 11 dated July
7, 1986.
Still not satisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 12 on August 8, 1986. On October 27, 1986, the Second Division to which the
case was raffled on August 29, 1986 granted the motion for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition. 13 Said Second Division
eventually became the present Third Division.
Petitioner raises the following issues:

1) Whether or not the June 26, 1985 Resolution of the NL RC is replete with factual findings unsupported by substantial and credible
evidence; and, therefore, not binding on and subject to review by the Honorable Supreme Court;
2) Whether or not the 26 years of petitioner's continuous, efficient and devoted service to the private respondent should be taken into account
in deciding the case;
3) Whether or not the alleged loss of trust and confidence on the petitioner was validly justified so as to warrant her dismissal vis-a-vis her
recent promotion and manifestation to handle the Program even without pay;
4) Whether or not the petitioner could be dismissed from her position as Professor III, an ordinary employee when the basis of her dismissal
was loss of trust and confidence on her as a Dean or managerial employee;
5) Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of insubordination;
6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to a writ of certiorari, annulling the NLRC Resolutions, and
7) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to damages and for how much. 14
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty of insubordination resulting in loss of confidence sufficient to warrant a
dismissal.
Before attempting to resolve this issue, the employment status of petitioner must first be looked into. Petitioner contends that she was
divested of her Deanship of the Graduate School and retained as Dean in the Institute of Education. This is of no moment. The fact remains
that she was a Dean, a position which is on the managerial level. In the case of Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC , 15 this Court held that
managerial personnel and other employees occupying positions of trust and confidence are entitled to security of tenure, fair standards of
employment and the protection of labor laws. While it is true that the decision to dismiss or lay-off an employee is management's prerogative,
it must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only the employee's position but also his means of livelihood. 16
However, the rules on termination of employment, penalties for infractions and resort to concerted actions in so far as managerial employees
are concerned are not necessarily the same as those for ordinary employees. 17 Employers, generally, are allowed a wider latitude of
discretion in terminating the employment of managerial personnel or those of similar rank performing functions which by their nature require
the employer's trust and confidence, than in the case of ordinary rank and file employees. 18
With these principles in mind, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondents in ruling petitioner's dismissal legal.
Considering the fact that she was holding a managerial position, her refusal to abide by the lawful orders of her employers would lead to the
erosion of the trust and confidence reposed on her. Loss of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee and proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. All that is needed is for the employer to establish a sufficient basis for the dismissal of an employee. The
grant of teaching loads was only a privilege since as Dean, her first and primary function was to administer the particular college under her
care and authority. Hence, the decision of Roosevelt Colleges to take away her six (6) teaching loads so that she can handle the Agro-
Forestry Program, with the same pay is found to be reasonable and lawful. In the case of Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation and
Tokuichi Satofuka v. NLRC & Olga Quinanola, 19 We held that:
It is the employer's prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move
them around in the various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the
company. An employee's right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the company of its
prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where he will be most useful. When his transfer is not unreasonable, nor inconvenient,
or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee
may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every
dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of simple fair play. Although the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld his cause in
his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. 20
But considering that petitioner Cruz had spent the best years of her professional life in the service of the employer and that her work as a
Dean and teacher was, as manifested by the Faculty Evaluation Results By Students," 21 beyond reproach, the ends of social and
compassionate justice would be served if she will be given some equitable relief.
The grant of equitable relief in the form of separation pay finds support in a number of decisions promulgated by this Court. In the case
of Eduardo V. Reyes v. Minister of Labor and PACWOOD, Inc ., 22 this Court adopted the ruling in Baby Bus, Inc. vs. Minister of Labor, 23 to
wit:
... it does not necessarily follow that if there is no illegal dismissal, then no award of separation pay may be made.
and in the case of San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment 24 where this Court held that:
... the trust and confidence in the private respondent having been lost, the respondent Regional Director acted correctly in allowing
termination of employment but with retirement or separation benefits.
Furthermore, in the case of Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 25 We held that:

Where an employee who had been dismissed for violation of company rules had been employed for 18 years, he may be afforded some
equitable relief due to the past services rendered by him by granting him separation pay equivalent to one month salary for his every year of
service to the company.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby affirmed with the modification that petitioner, Dr.
Carmelita U. Cruz is hereby adjudged entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month latest salary for every year of service. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. v. NLRC
and Cedol. G.R. No. 186180. 22 March 2010
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010marchdecisions.php?id=1097
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the December 15, 2008 decision[2] and January 28, 2009 resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 105625 that affirmed the April 30, 2008 and July 31, 2008 resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The NLRC resolutions affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision granting respondent Rommel M. Cedol ( respondent)
disability benefits and attorney's fees in the amounts of US$60,000.00 and US$6,000.00, respectively.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On July 14, 2004, the respondent entered into a seven-month contract of employment with petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
(Magsaysay Maritime) for its foreign principal, Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. ( Cruise Ships); he was employed as an
assistant housekeeping manager on board the vessel Costa Mediterranea with a basic monthly salary of US$482.00. The respondent
submitted himself to the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination ( PEME), and was pronounced fit to work. He boarded the
vessel Costa Mediterranea on July 19, 2004.
Prior to the execution of this employment contract, the respondent had previously worked as housekeeping cleaner and assistant
housekeeping manager on board the petitioners' other vessels from 2000 to 2004. [4]
In November 2004, the respondent felt pain in his lower right quadrant. He was brought to and conferred at the Andreas Constantinou
Medical Center in Cyprus for consultation. On January 18, 2005, he underwent a procedure called exploratory laparotomy which revealed a
massive tumor in the terminal ileum and in the ascending colon near the hepatic flexture. On the same day, the respondent underwent a
surgical procedure called right hemicolectomy with end to end ilectransverse anastomosis .[5] The Histopathology Report showed the following
findings:
CONCLUSION
The appearances are consistent with a malignant lymphoid infiltration of the ileum and the mesenteric lymph nodes.
The appearances are consistent [with] the interstinal lymphoma of small and large sized lymphoid cells. x x x x [6]
The respondent was discharged from the hospital and repatriated to the Philippines on February 1, 2005.
Upon repatriation, the respondent was placed under the medical care and supervision of the company-designated physician, Dr. Susannah
Ong-Salvador (Dr. Ong-Salvador). In Dr. Ong-Salvador's Initial Medical Report [7] dated February 10, 2005, she found the respondent to be
suffering from lymphoma, and declared his illness to be non-work related.
On April 14, 2005, the respondent was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where he underwent a surgical procedure called excision
biopsy.[8] Dr. Ong-Salvador's Medical Progress Report found the respondent's recurrent lymphoma to be in complete remission, and declared
him "fit to resume sea duties" after undergoing six (6) sessions of chemotherapy. [9]
On June 16, 2006, the respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of
medical and hospital expenses, damages, and attorney's fees [10] against the petitioners. He claims that he contracted his illness while working
on board the petitioners' vessel.
The Labor Arbiter's Decision
Labor Arbiter Marita V. Padolina (LA Padolina) ruled in respondent's favor. She found the respondent permanently and totally disabled and
awarded him disability compensation of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent; and US$6,000.00 attorney's fees.
LA Padolina ruled the respondent's illness to be work-related, hence compensable. She held that the respondent's illness was aggravated by
his work, as he had always passed the company's physical examinations since 2000. She explained that the respondent's work need not be
the main cause of his illness; it is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree to the development of the disease.
LA Padolina likewise held that each person has his own physical tolerance. That it was only the respondent who had contracted lymphoma
among the petitioners' workers did not remove the fact that his illness was aggravated by his employment. She also ruled that the respondent
was not fit to work as a seafarer because he had undergone chemotherapy. [11]
The labor arbiter likewise awarded attorney's fees in respondent's favor, as he was forced to litigate to protect his rights.
The NLRC Ruling
The NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision in toto in its resolution dated April 30, 2008. [12] The NLRC held that the respondent is not fit to
work as a seafarer because he is suffering from recurrent lymphoma - a sickness that required him undergo chemotherapy. The NLRC
explained that the respondent is in a state of permanent total disability because he can no longer earn wages in the same kind of work, or
work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment
could do.
The NLRC ruled that there was a reasonable connection between the nature of the respondent's work as assistant housekeeping manager
and the development of his illness. The NLRC explained that the respondent had passed every PEME before signing the six employment
contracts with the petitioner from 2000 to 2005, and was declared "fit to work" each time. It was only after the respondent was exposed to an
extreme working environment in the petitioners' vessel that he developed his sickness. At any rate, the law merely requires a reasonable work
connection, and not a direct causal connection for a disability to be compensable.
The petitioners moved to reconsider this resolution, but the NLRC denied their motion in its resolution of July 31, 2008. [13]
The CA Decision
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order[14] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 105625. The CA, in its decision [15] of December 15, 2008, denied the petition for lack of
merit.
The CA held that under the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract ( POEA-SEC), it is enough that the work has contributed,
even in a small degree, to the development of the worker's disease. The CA further held that the Courts are not bound by the assessment of
the company-designated physician. According to the CA, Dr. Ong-Salvador's pronouncement that the respondent is "fit to resume sea duties"
was inconsistent with the fact that the respondent had previously undergone chemotherapy, and needed to undergo periodic check-ups.
The CA affirmed the award of attorney's fees because Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of attorney's fees in actions for
indemnity under the workman's compensation and employer liability laws.
The petitioners moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied their motion in its resolution of January 28, 2009. [16]
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners argue that the CA erred in holding the petitioners liable for US$60,000.00 in total and permanent
disability benefits despite the company-designated physician's finding that the respondent's illness was not work-related. They assert that
under the 2000 POEA-SEC, only work-related injury or illness is compensable. They likewise maintain that the company-designated
physician's finding that the respondent's illness was not work-related should be given credence. Aside from the fact that lymphoma is not
listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, the respondent's work could not have exposed him to carcinogenic
fumes or chemicals that cause cancer because his duties merely involved housekeeping and cleaning.
The Respondent's Position
In his Comment,[17] the respondent claims that the company-designated physician had no factual basis in ruling that his illness was not work-
related. He posits that the opinions of company-designated physicians should not be taken as gospel truth because of their non-independent
nature. Finally, he claims that his illness could have only been acquired on board since he passed the company's PEME.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The petitioners essentially claim that the evidence on record does not support the findings of the labor tribunals and the CA that the
respondent's illness was work-related. This argument clearly involves a factual inquiry whose determination is not a function of this Court. We
emphasize, however, that we are reviewing in this Rule 45 petition the decision of the CA on a Rule 65 petition filed by the petitioners with
that court. In so doing, we review the legal correctness of the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it.
In this task, the Court is allowed, in exceptional cases, to delve into and resolve factual issues when insufficient or insubstantial evidence to
support the findings of the tribunal or court below is alleged, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare and
incomplete facts submitted by the parties, to the point of grave abuse of discretion. [18] The present case constitutes one of these exceptional
cases.
The Rule on Disability Benefits
Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract.
The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No.
4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement ( CBA) bind the seaman and
his employer to each other.[19]
Section 20 (B), paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA-SEC [20] reads:
Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness.
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. [ Emphasis
supplied.]
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must
be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. [21] In other
words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has
rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury
and the work for which he had been contracted. [22]
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
Under Section 20 (B), paragraphs (2) and (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task
of assessing the seaman's disability, thus:
Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness.
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxxx
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to
the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he
is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within
three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within
the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as
he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-SEC and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120-day initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, [23] subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at
any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. [24]
In the case before us, there is no dispute that the respondent reported to the company-designated physician for treatment immediately upon
repatriation. Problems arose when he was diagnosed with lymphoma, and the company-designated physician ruled this illness to be non-
work-related.
Lymphoma is a cancer that begins in the lymphocites of the immune system and presents as a solid tumor of lymphoid cells. Like other
cancers, lymphoma occurs when lymphocytes are in a state of uncontrolled cell growth and multiplication. It is treatable with chemotherapy,
and, in some cases, radiotherapy and/or bone marrow transplantation, and can be curable, depending on the histology, type, and stage of the
disease. These malignant cells often originate in lymph nodes, presenting as an enlargement of the node (a tumor). [25]
Lymphoma is neither listed as a disability under Section 32 (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and Diseases Including
Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted) of the 2000 POEA-SEC nor listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A thereof.
Nonetheless, Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) provides that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
work-related." The burden is therefore placed upon the respondent to present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal connection between the nature of his employment
and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. This, the respondent failed to do. In fact, a
careful review of the records shows that the respondent did not, by way of a contrary medical finding, assail the diagnosis arrived at by the
company-designated physician. For clarity and precision, we reproduce the pertinent parts of Dr. Ong-Salvador's Initial Medical Report dated
February 10, 2005, thus:
WORKING IMPRESSION: To Consider Lymphoma
Status post Right hemilectomy with anastomosis with end to end ileotransverse anastomosis with extensive removal of the mesenteries
Lymphoma is the cancer of the lymph nodes. It has 2 types: Hodgkins and Non-hodgkins lymphoma. Etiology of this condition may arise from
genetic predisposition (family history of cancer), cytogenetic abnormalities, viral infection or exposure to highly carcinogenic fumes.
By history, the patient has not been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes nor did he contact any viral infection such as Epstein Barr virus in his
workplace nor was there a family history of cancer. His condition may be brought about by cytogenetic abnormalities. Hence, his condition
is non-work related.
x x x x[26] [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is true that medical reports issued by the company-designated physicians do not bind the courts, our examination of Dr. Ong-
Salvador's Initial Medical Report leads us to agree with her findings. Dr. Ong-Salvador was able to sufficiently explain her basis in concluding
that the respondent's illness was not work-related: she found the respondent not to have been exposed to any carcinogenic fumes, or to any
viral infection in his workplace. Her findings were arrived at after the respondent was made to undergo a physical, neurological and laboratory
examination, taking into consideration his (respondent's) past medical history, family history, and social history. In addition, the respondent
was evaluated by a specialist, a surgeon and an oncologist. The series of tests and evaluations show that Dr. Ong-Salvador's findings were
not arrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in the company's favor.
The respondent, on the other hand, did not adduce proof to show a reasonable connection between his work as an assistant housekeeping
manager and his lymphoma. There was no showing how the demands and nature of his job vis-Ã -vis the ship's working conditions increased
the risk of contracting lymphoma. The non-work relatedness of the respondent's illness is reinforced by the fact that under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (ECC Rules), lymphoma is considered occupational only when contracted by operating room
personnel due to exposure to anesthetics . The records do not show that the respondent's work as an assistant housekeeping manager
exposed him to anesthetics.
In short, the evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how the respondent contracted or developed lymphoma and how and why
his working conditions increased the risk of contracting this illness. In the absence of substantial evidence, we cannot just presume that
respondent's job caused his illness or aggravated any pre-existing condition he might have had.
The fact that respondent passed the company's PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the past the PEME is not exploratory in nature.
It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. The PEME merely determines
whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. [27] In short, the "fit to work"
declaration in the respondent's PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus
we held in NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC:[28]
While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied
upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer's true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent's illness considering that the
examinations were not exploratory.
The respondent was declared fit to resume sea duties
Another factor that further militates against the respondent's claim for permanent and total disability benefits is Dr. Ong-Salvador's Medical
Progress Report declaring him to be "fit to resume sea duties." The relevant portions of this report are hereunder reproduced:
MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT
xxxx
CT Scan of the abdomen
- Comparison is made with the previous examination dated November 29, 2005
- The previously noted irregular soft tissue module inferior to the pancreatic is no longer evident
- There is no gross lymph node enlargement
- Fatty changes in the liver and gallstones are again demonstrated
- The rest of the findings are stationary
- Impression: Further disease regression since November 2005.
Our Oncologist examined the patient today who opines that patient has responded well after undergoing 6 sessions of chemotherapy. His
present state of remission is supported by further disease regression in his latest CT Scan of the abdomen. Blood chemistry result of his
createnine and lactate dehydrogenase levels are within normal limits. Check-up from year to year was suggested to evaluate periodically his
health condition. Since Mr. Cedol is noted asymptomatic he is therefore cleared from Oncology standpoint.
After thorough evaluation by our specialists, Mr. Cedol is now deemed fit to resume sea duties.
FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Recurrent Lymphoma, in complete remission. [29]
As previously discussed, it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability. Since Dr.
Ong-Salvador deemed the respondent as fit to resume sea duties, then such declaration should be given credence, considering the amount
of time and effort she gave to monitoring and treating the respondent's condition. [30] It bears emphasizing that the respondent has been under
the care and supervision of Dr. Ong-Salvador since his repatriation in February 2005 and no contrary medical evidence exists on record
disputing Dr. Ong-Salvador's medical conclusions. The extensive medical attention she has given the respondent undeniably enabled her to
acquire familiarity and detailed knowledge of the latter's medical condition. We cannot help but note that the Medical Progress Report was
replete with details justifying its "fit to work" conclusion. In addition, the respondent did not contest the findings contained in this Medical
Progress Report; neither did he seek the opinion of other doctors.
We emphasize that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. [31] We should always
be mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.[32]
In sum, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for his failure to refute the company-designated
physician's findings that: (1) his illness was not work-related; and (2) he was fit to resume sea duties. The CA thus erred in not finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the latter affirmed the labor arbiter's decision to grant permanent and total disability benefits
to the respondent despite insufficient evidence to justify this grant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 105625 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the respondent's complaint before the Labor Arbiter is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura*, Abad, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC and Toribiano. G.R. No. 80600. 21 March 1990
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/mar1990/gr_80600_1990.html
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the resolution 1 of respondent commission, dated August 21, 1987, which affirmed with modification the
decision of Labor Arbiter Nicolas S. Sayon, the decretal portion of which resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, modifying the Labor Arbiter's decision dated November 14, 1986,
ordering respondent:
1. To reinstate complainant to his former position without payment of backwages;
2. To pay complainant his unpaid wages for the month of July, 1985; and
3. To pay complainant his entitlement on holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay for three years starting from August 23, 1982 to
August 23, 1983. 2
We quote the generative facts of the case as synthesized by Labor Arbiter Sayon and implicitly adopted by respondent commission:
Complainant was employed with the respondent since February 1, 1979 at its branch station at General Santos City, first as a collector and
later on as a counter-clerk and long distance operator. On August 24, 1985 complainant was terminated by the respondent for tampering
(with) the vodex receipt by writing the amount of P41.15 as appearing in the duplicate while the original copy issued to the customer was
P113.25.
Complainant alleged that he explained to the respondent's Branch Supervisor that the discrepancy of the amounts reflected in the duplicate
and the original of said receipt was done by inadvertence and without malicious interest to defraud the respondent. Complainant contended
that at the particular incident on July 26, 1985, he was alone in the office attending to customers who filed their respective telegrams wherein
he has to count the number of words, determine the amount payable, collect the payment and file with the telex operator; that in addition,
there were several customers placing long distance calls and (he) had to wait (for) them (to) furnish their calls to determine the minutes
consumed. Complainant argued that it is in this process that he forgot to take the number of minutes used up and he estimated that one
customer who was issued a receipt used eleven minutes and in haste (he) wrote the particulars but he failed to use a carbon paper for the
duplicate and when he summarized the duplicate receipts issued for that day, the latter found out that duplicate receipt bearing 324698 has
no particulars. Considering that he could not anymore recall how much he had actually wrote ( sic) in the original, the complainant wrote
through a carbon paper the amount of P41.15. Complainant now alleged that without proper investigation and warning, he was terminated by
the respondent effective August 24, 1985. He is also claiming for his salary for the month of July, 1985 which was withheld by the respondent,
his holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay.
Respondent, on the other hand, alleged that a regular audit was conducted at their PT & T General Santos City branch on August 14 to 19,
1985, by its Internal Auditor; that, it was discovered during the audit that complainant on July 26, 1985 had accepted and receipted a long
distance call in the amount of P113.25 under TOR No. 324698 (Annex "A" of respondent) but what was reflected in the duplicate copy was
only P41.15, with a difference of P72.10 which was used for his own personal comfort. Respondent argued that while this fact has been
admitted by the complainant, his explanation was flimsy and shallow; that the fact that there was no carbon placed for the duplicate is enough
evidence for (sic) his illegal interest and that his intention to tamper (with) and malverse company funds is very glaring to be ignored. It was
further argued that the acts of the complainant reflect that he is morally deprived and, therefore, could not be trusted considering that he
violated the trust and confidence reposed upon him which constitutes a valid reason for his termination. 3 (Corrections in parentheses
supplied).
After a careful review of the records, Labor Arbiter Sayon rendered his decision, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, responsive to the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered against the respondent, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation PT & T General Santos branch:
1. To reinstate complainant, Bobby Toribiano, to his former position without loss of seniority rights plus backwages and emergency living
allowance equivalent to six (6) months;
2. To pay complainant his unpaid wages for the month of July, 1985; and
3. To pay complainant his entitlement on holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay for three years starting from August 23, 1982 to
August 23, 1985.4
As earlier stated, respondent commission affirmed said decision with modification, deleting therefrom the award of backwages. Not satisfied
therewith, the employer corporation resorted to the instant petition.
Petitioner submits for consideration substantially the same arguments it adduced in the labor arbiter's office and on appeal to respondent
commission on the matter of private respondent's dismissal.
The petition is without merit.
The labor arbiter made a finding that private respondent was indeed alone in the office on July 26, 1985 busily performing his duties as
counter-clerk and long distance operator at the same time, the functions of which dual positions precisely caused him to commit a mistake in
the entry receipt through negligence. Further, it was found that private respondent had repeatedly brought to the attention of petitioner his
predicament of having to singly perform manifold duties but the same were ignored by the latter. 5
We find no cogent reason to disturb such findings. Well entrenched is the rule that when the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently
corroborated by the evidence on record, the same should be respected by appellate tribunals since he is in a better position to assess and
evaluate the credibility of the contending parties. 6 Not even the failure of petitioner to present witnesses or counter-affidavits will constitute a
fatal error as long as the parties were given a chance to submit position papers on the basis of which the labor arbiter rendered a decision. 7
Considering all the attendant circumstances, even assuming that there may have been a valid ground for dismissal, the imposition of such
supreme penalty would certainly be very harsh and disproportionate to the infraction committed by private respondent, especially considering
that it was private respondent's first offense after having faithfully rendered seven (7) long years of satisfactory service. These, and the fact
that the imputed defalcation involved the sum of only P72.10, bolster the credibility of private respondent's explanation in his defense.
While an employer has its own interests to protect and, pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to
dismiss or lay off an employee must not be abusively exercised. Such power should be tempered with compassion and understanding. The
employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee's position but his livelihood
as well. 8
This ruling is only in keeping with the constitutional mandate for the State to afford full protection to labor such that, when conflicting interests
of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced by the
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. 9
Parenthetically, petitioner's claim that the offense in actuality partakes of the nature of falsification, which would justify outright dismissal, is of
no moment. Whether or not the infraction committed constitutes a criminal act is not for this Court to rule upon in the present petition.
It is not to be misconstrued, however, that private respondent's act is being condoned, much less tolerated. As ratiocinated by respondent
Commission:
However, considering that complainant is not entirely faultless as to entirely absolve him from liability, we believe that a modification of the
Labor Arbiter's decision is in order in that reinstatement to his former position without backwages would be the proper relief. Of course, his
reinstatement is subject to the condition that commission of similar offense will justify his outright dismissal. 10
Apropos of the award of unpaid wages, the finding of the labor arbiter that private respondent was indeed not paid his salary corresponding to
the month of July, 1985 11 was not contradicted by petitioner, for which reason it must be upheld.
A contrario sensu, regarding respondent commissions pronouncement on the award of holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay for
three (3) years from August 23, 1982 to August 23, 1983 ( sic), 12 we are inclined to subscribe to the position taken by the Solicitor General.
On appeal to respondent commission, petitioner submitted uncontracted evidence 13 showing payment to private respondent of his holiday
pay and rest day pay, and private respondent's non-entitlement to incentive leave pay due to his enjoyment of vacation leave privileges,
consistent with Article 95, Chapter III, Title I, Book III of the Labor Code. Such evidence was, however, rejected by respondent commission on
the erroneous justification that it was not presented at the first opportunity, presumably when the case was pending with the labor arbiter. 14
The belated presentation of the evidence notwithstanding, respondent commission should have considered them just the same. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, who has impartially taken a contrary view vis-a-vis that portion of said decision of respondent
commission which he is supposed to defend, technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every and
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. 15
Thus, even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to respondent commission is
enough basis for the latter to have been more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said
evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic
notions of fairness.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the resolution of respondent commission, dated August 21, 1987 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that
the award of holiday pay, rest day pay and incentive leave pay is DELETED. In all other respects, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Marcopper Mining Corporation v. NLRC et.al.. G.R. No. 103525. 29 March 1996
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Social justice and full protection to labor guaranteed by the fundamental law of this land is not some romantic notion, high in rhetoric but low
in substance. The case at bench provides yet another example of harmonizing and balancing the "right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth." 1
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, Marcopper Mining Corporation impugns the decision
rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on 18 November 1991 in RAB-IV-12-258888 dismissing petitioner's appeal,
and the resolution issued by the said tribunal dated 20 December 1991 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
There is no disagreement as to the following facts:
On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in
the business of mineral prospecting, exploration and extraction, and private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor federation duly organized and
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive bargaining agent
of all rank-and-file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 1 May 1984 until 30
April 1987.
Sec. 1, Art. V of the said Collective Bargaining Agreement provides:

Sec. 1. The COMPANY agrees to grant general wage increase to all employees within the bargaining unit as follows:
Increase per day on
Effectivity the Basic Wage
May 1, 1985 5%
May 1, 1986 5%
It is expressly understood that this wage increase shall be exclusive of any increase in the minimum wage and/or mandatory living allowance
that may be promulgated during the life of this Agreement. 2
Prior to the expiration of the aforestated Agreement, on 25 July 1986, petitioner and private respondent executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of the CBA, specifically on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance, were modified as follows:
1. The COMPANY hereby grants a wage increase of 10% of the basic rate to all employees and workers within the bargaining units (sic) as
follows. (a) 5% effective May 1, 1986.
This will mean that the members of the bargaining unit will get an effective increase of 10% from May 1, 1986.
(b) 5% effective May 1, 1987.
2. The COMPANY hereby grants an increase of the facilities allowance from P50.00 to P100.00 per month effective May 1, 1986. 3
In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage increase due on 1 May 1986. 4
On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage
Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987. 5 Consequently, effective on 1 May 1987,
the basic wage rate of petitioner's laborers categorized as non-agricultural workers was increased by P9.00 per day. 6
Petitioner implemented the second five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May 1987 and thereafter added the integrated COLA. 7
Private respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage increase was effected. It argued that the COLA should first be
integrated into the basic wage before the 5% wage increase is computed. 8
Consequently, on 15 December 1988, the union filed a complaint for underpayment of wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV,
Quezon City.
On 24 July 1989, the Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision in favor of the union. The dispositive part reads, thus:
WHEREFORE consistent with the tenor hereof, judgment is rendered directing respondent company to pay the wage differentials due its
rank-and-file workers retroactive to 1 May 1987.
SO ORDERED. 9
The Labor Arbiter ruled in this wise:

First and foremost, the written instrument and the intention of the parties must be brought to the fore. And talking of intention, we conjure to
sharp focus the provision embossed in Section 1, Article V of the collective agreement, viz:.
x x x x x x x x x
It is expressly understood that this wage increase shall be exclusive of increase in the minimum wage and/or mandatory living allowance that
may be promulgated during the life of this Agreement . (Emphasis ours.)
The foregoing phrase albeit innocuously framed offers the cue. This ushers us to the inner sanctum of what really was the intention of the
parties to the contract. Treading along its lines, it becomes readily discernible that this portion of the contract is the "stop-lock" gate or known
in its technical term as the "non-chargeability" clause. There can be no quibbling that on the strength of this provision, the wage/allowance
granted under this accord cannot be credited to similar form of benefit that may be thereafter ordained by the government through legislation.
That the parties therefore were consciously aware at the time of the conclusion of the agreement of the never-ending rise in the cost of living
is a logical corollary. And while this upward trend may not be a welcome phenomenon, there was the intention to yield and comply in the
event of an imposition. Of course, there cannot likewise be any rivalry that if the Executive Order were to retroact to 2 May 1987 or a day after
the last contractual increase, this question will not arise. It is in this sense of fairness that we cannot allow this "one (1) day" to be an
insulating medium to deny the workers the benediction endowed by Executive Order No. 178. 10
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision and on 18 November 1991 the NLRC rendered its decision sustaining the Labor Arbiter's
ruling. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal filed is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 11
The NLRC declared:

. . . Increments to the laborers' financial gratification, be they in the form of salary increases or changes in the salary scale are aimed at one
thing — improvement of the economic predicament of the laborers. As such, they should be viewed in the light of the State's avowed policy to
protect labor. Thus, having entered into an agreement with its employees, an employer may not be allowed to renege on its obligation under a
collective bargaining agreement should, at the same time, the law grants the employees the same or better terms and conditions of
employment. Employee benefits derived from law are exclusive of benefits arrived at through negotiation and agreement unless otherwise
provided by the agreement itself or by law. (Meycauayan College v. Hen. Franklin N. Drilon, 185 SCRA 50). 12
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated 20 December 1991.
In the present petition, Marcopper challenges the NLRC decision on the following grounds:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER
JOAQUIN TANODRA DIRECTING MARCOPPER TO PAY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS DUE ITS RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
RETROACTIVE TO 1 MAY 1987 CONSIDERING THAT SANS E.O 178, THE FUNDAMENTAL MEANING OF THE BASIC WAGE IS
CLEARLY DIFFERENT FROM, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COLA AT THE TIME THE CBA WAS ENTERED INTO. THUS, PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS READING OF THE CBA, AS AMENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 25 JULY 1986,
ULTIMATELY DISREGARDED THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE PHRASE "BASIC WAGE", OTHERWISE INTENDED BY THE PARTIES
DURING THE TIME THE CBA WAS EXECUTED.
II
THE LABOR ARBITER AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC'S RELIANCE ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE V OF
THE CBA WHICH STATES: "IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAGE INCREASE SHALL BE EXCLUSIVE OF ANY
INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE AND/OR MANDATORY LIVING ALLOWANCE THAT MAY BE PROMULGATED DURING THE LIFE
OF THIS AGREEMENT" IS MISPLACED AND WITHOUT BASIS BECAUSE SAID PROVISION HARDLY OFFERS A HINT AS TO WHAT
BASIC WAGE THE PARTIES HAD IN MIND AT THE TIME THEY EXECUTED THE CBA AS AMENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT.
III
PETITIONER COMPUTED THE 5% WAGE INCREASE BASED ON THE UNINTEGRATED BASIC WAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INTENT AND TERMS OF THE CBA, AS AMENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. THIS WAS IN FULL ACCORD AND IN
FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE WITH E.O 178. HENCE, PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY UNDERPAYMENT.
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION IN FAVOR OF LABOR IN CASE OF DOUBT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE. 13
Stripped of the non-essentials, the question for our resolution is what should be the basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic
wage without the COLA or the so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178, includes the COLA.
It is petitioner's contention that the basic wage referred to in the CBA pertains to the "unintegrated" basic wage. Petitioner maintains that the
rules on interpretation of contracts, particularly Art. 1371 of the New Civil Code which states that:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
should govern. Accordingly, applying the aforequoted provision in the case at bench, petitioner concludes that it was clearly not the intention
of the parties (petitioner and private respondent) to include the COLA in computing the CBA/MOA mandated increase since the MOA was
entered into a year before E.O. No. 178 was enacted even though their effectivity dates coincide. In other words, the situation
"contemporaneous" to the execution of the amendatory MOA was that there was yet no law requiring the integration of the COLA into the
basic wage. 14 Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to undertake an obligation it never assumed or contemplated under the CBA or
MOA.
Siding with the petitioner, the Solicitor General opines that for the purpose of complying with the obligations imposed by the CBA, the
integrated COLA should not be considered due to the exclusivity of the benefits under the said CBA and E.O. No. 178. He explains thus:
A collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. It is distinct from an obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a
CBA constitute the law between the parties. Thus, employee benefits derived from either the law or a contract should be treated as distinct
and separate from each other. (Meycauayan College vs. Drilon, supra.)
xxx xxx xxx
Very clearly, the CBA and E.O. 178 provided for the exclusiveness of the benefits to be given or awarded to the employees of petitioner.
Thus, when petitioner computed the 5% wage increase based on the unintegrated basic wage, it complied with its contractual obligations
under the CBA. When it thereafter integrated the COLA into the basic wage, it complied also with the mandate of E.O. 178. Petitioner,
therefore, complied with its contractual obligations in the CBA as well as with the legal mandate of the law. Consequently, petitioner is not
guilty of underpayment.
To follow the theory of private respondent, that is to integrate first the COLA into the basic wage and thereafter compute the 5% wage
increase therefrom, would violate the "exclusiveness" of the benefits granted under the CBA and under E.O. 178. 15
Private respondent counters by asserting that the purpose, nature and essence of CBA negotiation is to obtain wage increases and benefits
over and above what the law provides and that the principle of non-diminution of benefits should prevail.
The NLRC, which filed its own comment, likewise, made the following assertions:
. . . However, to state outright that the parties intended the basic wage to remain invariable even after the advent of EO 178 is unfounded and
presumptuous a claim as such inevitably works to the utmost disadvantage of the workers and runs counter to the constitutional guarantee of
affording protection to labor. Evidently, the rationale for the integration of the COLA with the basic wage was primarily to increase the base
wage for purposes of computation of such items as overtime and premium pay, fringe benefits, etc. To adopt the statement and claim of the
petitioner would then redound to depriving the workers of the full benefits the law intended for them, which in the final analysis was solely for
the purpose of alleviating their plight due to the continuous undue hardship they suffer caused by the ever escalating prices of prime
commodities. 16
We rule for the respondents..
The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and true. 17 However, the present controversy involves
not merely an interpretation of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of an executive order on the terms
and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be, the focus of the instant case.
It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the
CBA and MOA were executed because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage of workers,
or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the
COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the parties must conform.
Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance with the law is mandatory and beyond contractual
stipulation by and between the parties; consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA becomes
immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner, said
law, by some uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became effective. Therefore, there cannot be
any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA.
Petitioner's contention that under the Rules Implementing E.O. No. 178, the definition of the term "basic wage" has remained unchanged is off
the mark since said definition expressly allows integration of monetary benefits into the regular pay of employees:
Chapter 1. Definition of Terms and Coverage.
Sec. 1. Definition of Terms.

xxx xxx xxx
(j) "Basic Wage" means all regular remuneration or earnings paid by an employer for services rendered on normal working days and
hours but does not include cost-of-living allowances, profit-sharing payments, premium payments, 13th month pay, and other monetary
benefits which are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the employee on the date the Order became effective .
(Emphasis ours.)
What E.O. No. 178 did was exactly to integrate the COLA under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic pay so as to increase the
statutory daily minimum wage. Section 2 of the Rules is quite explicit:
Sec. 2. Amount to be Integrated. — Effective on the dates specified, as a result of the integration, the basic rate of covered workers shall be
increased by the following amounts: (Emphasis ours.)
Integration of monetary benefits into the basic pay of workers is not a new method of increasing the minimum wage. 18 But even so, we are
still guided by our ruling in Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, 19 which we herein reiterate:
While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied
the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus,
it must yield to the common good. As such it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a
practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to
serve.
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to
and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the
interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, 20 it insists that what is involved here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold..
Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v . NLRC, 21 we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be
counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC, 22 we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
The purpose of E.O. No. 178 is to improve the lot of the workers covered by the said statute. We are bound to ensure its fruition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ditan v. POEA Administrator et.al.. G.R. No. 79560. 3 December 1990

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1990decemberdecisions.php?id=6
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner had the rare experience of being taken hostage in 1984, along with a number of his co-workers, by the rebels in Angola. His
captivity for more than two months and the events that followed his release are the subject of the present petition.

Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private
respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00
weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers.
Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central
maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress, that would be transferred to
Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate
workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that
Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover — and this was more persuasive — he was told he would be
sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed.: nad
On December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him
and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days
to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border. They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of
them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of
their governments and the International Red Cross. Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines. 1
The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of
them were taken back. Ditan having been excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract
and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his
contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral
and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees.
All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in
toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.
Going over the record, we find that the public respondent correctly rejected the petitioner's claim for paid vacation leave. The express
stipulation in Clause 5 of the employment contract reads:
Should the Employee enter into a further 9 to 12 months contract at the completion contract, he will be entitled to one month's paid vacation
before commencement of his second or subsequent contract.
It appears that the petitioner had not entered into a second contract with the employer after the expiration of the first. Such re-employment
was not a matter of right on the part of the petitioner but dependent on the need for his skills in another project the employer might later be
undertaking.
As regards the cost of his belongings, the evidence shows that they were not really lost but in fact returned to him by the rebels prior to their
release. If he had other properties that were not recovered, there was no proof of their loss that could support his allegations. They were
therefore also properly rejected.:-cralaw
We find, though, that the claims for breach of contract and war risk bonus deserve a little more reflection in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case.
The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his
reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area. This same place had earlier been the target of a rebel
attack that had resulted in the death of two Filipino workers and the capture of several others. Knowing all this, INTRACO still pressured Ditan
into agreeing to be transferred to that place, dismissing his initial objection and, more important, threatening to send him home if he refused.
We feel that in failing to provide for the safety of the petitioner, the private respondents were clearly remiss in the discharge of one of the
primary duties of the employer. Worse, they not only neglected that duty but indeed deliberately violated it by actually subjecting and
exposing Ditan to a real and demonstrated danger. It does not help to argue that he was not forced to go to Kafunfo and had the option of
coming home. That was a cruel choice, to say the least. The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could
share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of
an expectant family.
It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages
were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they
would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not fulfilled.
It would seem that his work was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo.:-
cralaw
The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular
place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When
INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract
that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled
to monetary redress.
The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the
mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing
Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985, "after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently,
the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect.
A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the position taken by the respondents. However, we are dealing here not with
an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of the worker. As the
Solicitor General observes in his Comment supporting the petitioner, the Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic
concern of the State for the working class conformably to the social justice policy. This is a command we cannot disregard in the resolution of
the case before us.
The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor
of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances
attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief.
The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good
faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel
attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the
salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority
in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was
left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection.
In these circumstances, the Court feels that the petitioner should be paid the salary corresponding to the 17 unserved weeks of his contract,
which was terminated by the private respondents despite his willingness to work out the balance of his term. In addition, to assuage the
ordeal he underwent while in captivity by the rebels, the Court has also decided in its discretion to award him nominal damages in the sum of
P20,000.00. This is not payment of the war risk claim which, as earlier noted, was not provided for in the employment contract in question, or
indemnification for any loss suffered by him. This is but a token of the tenderness of the law towards the petitioning workman vis-a-vis the
private respondents and their more comfortable resources.: nad
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. That is why our judgment today must be for the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and
severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance
of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
GSIS V. CSC et.al. G.R. No. 98395. 28 October 1994

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/oct1994/gr_98395_1994.html
QUIASON, J.:
Before us are two petitions docketed as G.R. No. 98395 and G.R. No. 102449. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involved
the same issue and parties.
We grant both petitions.
I
G.R. No. 98395
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to reverse and set aside four orders of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), namely: (1) the Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16, 1990, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes the
service of private
respondent Manuel Baradero, who served as Sangguniang Bayan member on a per diem basis from January 1, 1976 to October 20, 1978;
(2) the Order dated September 20, 1990 directing the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 90-642; (3) the Order dated December 7, 1990
directing the President and General Manager of petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to show cause why they should not
be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of Resolution No. 90-642; and (4) the Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991,
which dismissed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 20, 1990.
Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied the position of Medical Officer IV in the Philippine Medical Care
Commission, until he reached the mandatory age of retirement of 65 years old.
He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from November 17, 1942 until June 30, 1945. He resumed his government career on
January 1, 1976, when he was elected a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental. As
such, he received per diem for every session attended. He resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan on October 10, 1976. On October 20,
1978, he was appointed Medical Officer I at the Philippine Medical Care Commission, where he served until he reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years old (Rollo, p. 28).
Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory retirement with petitioner, which credited in his favor 13 years of
government service, excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan member. He requested an extension of service from the CSC to enable him
to complete 15 years of government service. This was necessary so that he may avail of retirement benefits.
The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16, 1990. Instead, it ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-year stint as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as creditable service, hence completing the mandatory 15-year service and making him
eligible for retirement benefits (Rollo, p. 28).
The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:

(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the definition of compensation in RA 1573 on June 16, 1956. Prior to this, services paid on per
diem basis were considered creditable.
(2) Per diems were excluded from the definition of compensation because " per diems, by themselves are usually of minimal amounts which
cannot actually support an insurance coverage" (Office of the General Counsel Opinion 08-85, June 3, 1985). It had been maintained that
"salary is essential to insurance in the System, as it serves as the basis for the determination of the monthly premiums or contributions"
(Government Corporate Counsel Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).
(3) In the case of the late Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security System , Commissioner Ferrer received per diems not only
for attending meetings of the Commission but also for hearing cases as hearing officer. With the almost daily hearings of Commissioner
Ferrer, he was said to have been performing full-time service and received substantial amount of per diems such that "the so-called per
diems that
he received were not really per diems but compensation" (OGC Opinion 08-85). Hence, his services as hearing Commissioner were
considered creditable, but his per diem for attending the board meetings were excluded in the computation of his retirement benefits ( Rollo,
p. 32).
The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero until he completes the required 15 years so that he may avail of
retirement benefits.
On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the GSIS to implement Resolution No. 90-642 ( Rollo, p. 35).
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order ( Rollo, p. 37), which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 91-526 dated April
23, 1991. The resolution further directed the GSIS to comply with the CSC resolution and order under pain of contempt ( Rollo, p. 49).
Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (1) services rendered on a per diem basis
is creditable for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of services which are creditable.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment," which submitted its position that the law expressly
excludes services rendered on per diem basis in determining creditable government service for retirement purposes.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions and order crediting such services were in violation of the law, and
encroached on the power of the GSIS to administer and implement retirement laws. He therefore recommended that the instant petition be
given due course (Rollo, p. 100).
G.R. No. 102449

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to reverse and set aside three orders of the CSC, namely: (1) the
Resolution dated June 7, 1989, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes the services rendered by respondent Matilde S. Belo,
who served as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over capacity from December 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979; (2) the Order dated July 18, 1991
directing the President and General Manager of petitioner to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368; and (3) the Order dated October 3, 1991, finding the President and General Manager of
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt with penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 per day of defiance until the implementation of CSC Resolution
No. 89-368.
Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2, 1988. At the time of her retirement, Belo was the Vice-Governor of Capiz in a
hold-over capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January 25, 1972 until February 1, 1988.
As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of P13,000.00 per annum from January 25, 1976 until December 31, 1976.
Thereafter, she held the same position in a hold-over capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from December 31, 1976 until January 1,
1979, she received per diem for every session attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from December 31, 1979 until February 1,
1988, she received a fixed salary ranging from P23,000.00 to P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo, p. 25).
Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services she rendered from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, in which
period she was paid on a per diem basis, is creditable for retirement purposes.
In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368 dated June 7, 1987, which affirmed that her services for said period was
creditable (Rollo, pp. 25-26).
Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims, which adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC.
On August 6, 1991, the GSIS received the Order dated July 18, 1991, which directed its President and General Manager to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368 ( Rollo, pp. 28).
The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it cannot implement the resolution considering that it has a pending petition
for certiorari before this Court in the case of Dr. Baradero (G.R. No. 98395), where the same issue was raised ( Rollo, p. 30).
On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the President and General Manager of GSIS guilty of indirect contempt. Both were
meted a penalty of P1,000.00 fine for each day of defiance until the implementation of Resolution No. 89-368. The CSC noted that the mere
pendency of the case of Dr. Baradero cannot prevent the implementation of its resolution unless this Court issues a temporary restraining
order, and that said case had nothing to do with the case of Belo ( Rollo, p. 34).
The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with committing the same errors in G.R. No. 98395.
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting its "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment" filed in G.R. No. 98395,
holding the view that the law excluded services rendered on a per diem basis, in crediting the length of service for retirement purposes
(Rollo, p. 62).
In her comment, Belo insisted that CSC was correct in finding that her services rendered on a per diem basis are creditable for retirement
purposes. She claimed that the case of Commissioner Ferrer of the Social Security Commission applied to her case by analogy.
She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) vests in the CSC jurisdiction over matters regarding
the accreditation of government services. She particularly cites Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V thereof which enumerates the powers and
functions of the CSC, among which is to:
xxx xxx xxx
17. Administer the retirement program for government employees and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement
(Emphasis supplied);
xxx xxx xxx
II
The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for computing the length of service for
retirement purposes; and (2) Is petitioner the proper government agency in determining what service is creditable for retirement purposes?
Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests in petitioner the power to implement the provisions of said
law, which includes the guaranty of retirement benefits.
Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for the computation of service, and reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Computation of Service. —
For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time service with compensation: Provided, That part-time and other
services with compensation may be included under such rules and regulations prescribed by the System (Emphasis supplied).
It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the employee should have rendered service with compensation.
"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance
Act), thus:
(c) "Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or
compensation given in addition to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations (Emphasis supplied).
A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:
(i) Compensation — the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointments, excluding per diems,
bonuses, overtime pay, and allowances (Emphasis supplied).
The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation." Originally, per diem was not among those excluded
in the definition of compensation (See Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the amending laws which redefined it to
exclude per diem.
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it from other forms of remunerations. Such distinction is significant
not only for purposes of computing the contribution of the employers and employees to the GSIS but also for computing the employees'
service record and benefits.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:

. . . That such receipt of salary is an indispensable requirement for membership, especially in the Retirement Insurance Fund , is logically
inferred from these provisions of the GSIS Act: Section 5 which requires that to receive the benefits provided for and described in the GSIS
Act, each official or employee who is a member of the System and his employer shall pay the prescribed monthly rates of contributions or
premiums based on a percentage of the "monthly salary" of the employee or official; Sections 11 and 12, providing that the amount of
retirement annuity or gratuity, or death or disability benefits granted thereunder, shall be based on the monthly " salary"; and Section 13,
providing that the term "service" for purposes of computing the aggregate period of service which forms the basis for retirement, shall
include only service with "compensation" (Emphasis supplied; G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, p. 67).
In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the part of the employee to contribute to the insurance fund of
petitioner. Such obligation only arises where the employee is receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and not per diem, which is not capable
of paying off the premium contributions to petitioner.
Also enlightening is the "Joint Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management and Government Service Insurance System
Circular No. 1-89" dated July 13, 1989. It prescribes the guidelines on the filing and processing of retirement applications, and we quote:
IV. Certification of Services Rendered.

xxx xxx xxx
C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads and Personnel Officers/Administrative Officers of agencies shall be guided by the existing laws,
rules and regulations followed by GSIS in determining creditable services for retirement purposes which are as follows:
1. All previous services rendered by an official/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment, including those of Presidential
appointees, to a position in the Civil Service with compensation or salary or pay whether on permanent, provisional, temporary, emergency,
substitute, or casual status, and whether paid monthly, daily, or hourly, subject to these conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Services of government employees paid on per diem basis up to June 15, 1956 only .
D. All cases not covered by the procedures/guidelines above shall be referred to GSIS for final determination (G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, pp. 75
and 77; Emphasis supplied).
The circular is clear that services rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable for retirement purposes. It likewise confirms that it is the
GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in determining services which are creditable for retirement purposes.
In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member
is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of government
service. By analogy, we reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench.
The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security System is unapplicable. While it is true that Commissioner Ferrer was
granted retirement benefits notwithstanding being paid on a per diem basis, we find merit in the GSIS explanation that the grant was
consistent with its policy, since the service which was creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's favor was his full time service as Hearing Officer,
and not his attendance at board meetings, which was not credited.
Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program . . . and accredit government services . . . for retirement" (Administrative Code
of 1987, Book V, Chapter 3, Section 12), we rule that CSC role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely means acknowledge. It must not be confused
with the power to determine what service is creditable for retirement purposes. It has been established that such power belongs to the GSIS
(cf. Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
The aforementioned provision relied upon by public respondent is derived from the Administrative Code of 1987, which is a general law. It
cannot prevail over the Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, which is a special law (cf. Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA
179 [1992]).
With the passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, members of the Sangguniang Bayan are no longer paid per diem, but are now
receiving compensation. Thus, services rendered after the effectivity of the law may therefore be considered creditable for retirement
purposes.
Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal
construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions, where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or
construction. Moreover, to accommodate private respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for which the law was enacted, and will defeat
the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216 SCRA 720 [1992])
WHEREFORE, the petitions are both GRANTED. The CSC resolutions and orders in question are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
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Working With Labor Laws (Samson&amp;Young) Book Cases Compilation Chap 1 (Full Text)

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LPS 4219 Book Cases Compilation

Luz G. Cristobal in her own behalf.

Hence, this petition.

1. Cancer of the epithelial Work involving exposure to

lining of the bladder (Papilloma of alphnaphtylamine, betanap-

the bladder) thylamine or benzidine or any part

of the salts; and auramine or magenta

2. Cancer epithellomatoma The use or handling of, ex

or ulceration of the skin of the cor- posure to tar, pitch, bitumen,

pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or or any compound product or

paraffin or any compound product residue of any of these substances

or residue of any of these

7. Cancer of the stomach Woodworkers; wood products

sinuses and plywood mills

16. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, plastic

and brain workers

Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Remigio v. NLRC. G.R. No. 159887. 12 April 2006

The facts are undisputed.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

We find merit in petitioner's argument.

Sec. 20. Compensation and Benefits

B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

Sec. 30-A. SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES

Again, we rule for petitioner.

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA CANCIO C. GARCIA

The GSIS Ruling and Related Incidents

The Case for Marilou

Cardio-vascular disease compensable

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Carbajal v. GSIS and ECC. G.R. No. L-46654. 9 August 1988

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Hence, this petition.

Claimant's contention is meritorious.

(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work;

SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Sarmiento JJ., concur.

Cruz v. Hon. Medina et.al. G.R. No. 73053. 15 September 1989

Petitioner raises the following issues:

Furthermore, in the case of Soco v. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 25 We held that:

The Labor Arbiter's Decision

The NLRC Ruling

The Respondent's Position

THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

The Rule on Disability Benefits

Section 20 (B), paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA-SEC [20] reads:

Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness.

Section 20-B. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness.

WORKING IMPRESSION: To Consider Lymphoma

The respondent was declared fit to resume sea duties

MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT

CT Scan of the abdomen

FINAL DIAGNOSIS: Recurrent Lymphoma, in complete remission. [29]

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura*, Abad, and Perez, JJ., concur.

The petition is without merit.

There is no disagreement as to the following facts:

Sec. 1, Art. V of the said Collective Bargaining Agreement provides:

The Labor Arbiter ruled in this wise:

The NLRC declared:

We rule for the respondents..

Chapter 1. Definition of Terms and Coverage.

Sec. 1. Definition of Terms.

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v . NLRC, 21 we categorically stated that:

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC, 22 we declared:

Working With Labor Laws (Samson&Young) Book Cases Compilation Chap 1 (Full Text)

Working With Labor Laws (Samson&Young) Book Cases Compilation Chap 1 (Full Text)