CASE 1 NOT AVAILABLE Held:

CASE 2 No. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that
determines the relationship between them.
Gelos v. CA
G.R. No. 86186, May 08, 1992, 208 SCRA 608 (1992) The indications of an employer-employee relationship are:

Facts: 1. the selection and engagement of the employee;

The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao,
Laguna, and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his
parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with
petitioner  Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily
wage of P5.00.
The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and entitled
"Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw," provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning
Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw,
walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate
of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that"Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na
siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw
ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party makes it known
that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work
on the said farm.)
On September 4, 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full
ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services
and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on
the land.
On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the
fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and
went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition.
2. the payment of wages;
3. the power of dismissal; and
4. the power to control the employee's conduct –– although the latter is the most
important element.
Tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-farm worker relationship in
that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee
thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant
the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer
and for his labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer
makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the
agricultural produce or harvest."
Here, the private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in
the produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on
the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer
thereon.

For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in the
Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the
assistance of the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court
of Agrarian Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos.
On appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared
proper for trial and so  reinstated.

RTC found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain
thereon as such.

CA reversed RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the
benefits of tenancy laws and not only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the
subject land ended with the termination of their contract of employment
CASE 3

Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR
GR No 103302                                                                                     August 12,
1993

Facts:
Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of
120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078
hectares, which are covered by TCT No. 31527. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637
set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation. Since private landowners were allowed to develop their
properties into low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC as
developer of Natalia applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location
clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia
thereafter became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to
effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered its objection to
the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.

Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands
when they were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the
townsite reservation. DAR then contended that the permits granted were not valid
and binding since they did not comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the properties.

Issue:
Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988
covered by RA 6657.

Ruling:
No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And
agricultural lands is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forst, residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus, the
underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as
agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.
CASE 4

Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR

G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the

Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage.

Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business,
avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13,
16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared
unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the
product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or
tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and
poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration
in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of
RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands”.

Issue:

Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for including

in its definition of “Agriculture” the livestock and poultyr industry?

Ruling:

The Court held YES.

Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning of the
word “agriculture”, it showed that the framers never intended to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform
program of the government.

Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the term
“farmworkers” rather than “agricultural workers” in the said law is because
“agricultural workers” includes the livestock and poultry industry, hence, since they
do not intend to include the latter, they used “farmworkers” to have distinction.

Hence, there is merit on the petitioner’s argument that the product-sharing plan
applied to “corporate farms” in the contested provisions is unreasonable for being
consficatory and violative of the due process of aw.

CASE 5 NOT AVAILBLE

CASE 6 compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of Agrarian Reform of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
G.R. No. 78742                        July 14, 1989 the power of eminent domain

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
CASE 7 NOT AVAILABLE
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, CASE 8 NOT AVAIABLE
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree.

Issue:  Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling:
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of

compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
CASE 9
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et
al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011
THE FACTS
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing
the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court
cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must,
by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to
remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the
said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or
practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest,
in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of
respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI,
which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its
earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this
case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only
to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the
President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior
to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority
stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed
to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they
want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July
5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the
SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then
the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.
Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian
reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were
supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and
these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded
per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway
in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual
qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall
determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and
have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)
and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-
hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of
the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s
SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November
21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the
FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda
Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on
November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that
the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to
receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the
landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to
review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or
conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation
patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs
or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the
10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is
the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under
CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to
sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform
would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be
transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share
of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).
The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall
short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]