1. G.R. No.

218236, February 07, 2018

SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DANILO
CEREÑO AND CERINA CEREÑO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the Decision dated 20 May 20142 and the Resolution
dated 5 May 20153 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04008-MIN, which
affirmed the Orders dated 5 October 20104 and 11 November 20105 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 (RTC), denying the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by petitioner Sumifru
(Philippines) Corporation (Sumifru).
The Facts
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Sumifru is a domestic corporation engaged in the production and export of Cavendish
bananas and has its principal office at Km. 20, Tibungco, Davao City. It is the surviving
corporation in a merger, made effective in June 2008, among several corporations,
including the Davao Fruits Corporation (DFC).
DFC then, now Sumifru, entered into several growership agreements with respondents
spouses Danilo and Cerina Cereño (spouses Cereño) covering the latter's titled lands
with a total land area of 56,901 square meters (sq. m.) located in Tamayong, Calinan
District, Davao City, to wit:
Contract
Term
Land area covered
1. Production and Purchase Agreement date 29 November 1999 (PPA)6
22 July 1999 to 21 July 2009
9,176 sq. m.
2. Growers Exclusive Production and Sales Agreement (GEPASA) dated 10 January
20027
15 August 2000 to 14 August 2015
13,925 sq. m.
3. GEPASA dated 7 January 20028
15 November 2000 to 14 November 2015
13,800 sq. m.
4. GEPASA dated 9 December 20029
23 December 2000 to 22 December 2015
20,000 sq. m.
Under the parties' PPA and GEPASAs, the spouses Cereño, as growers, undertook,
among others, to sell and deliver exclusively to Sumifru the bananas produced from the
contracted areas, which conform to the volume and quality specifications defined by
their agreements.
On 4 August 2010, Sumifru filed a Complaint for Injunction and Specific Performance
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order10
against the spouses Cereño before the RTC. The complaint alleged that sometime in
February 2007, the spouses Cereño flagrantly violated their PPA and GEPASAs, when
they harvested the bananas without the consent of Sumifru, packed them in boxes not
provided by Sumifru, and sold them to buyers other than Sumifru. Sumifru made several
demands upon the spouses Cereño to comply with their contractual obligations, but
they refused to heed the demands.
Hence, in seeking the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory/Mandatory Injunction
and praying for a Temporary Restraining Order, Sumifru pleaded that the spouses
Cereño be restrained from committing any or all of the following acts: (a) harvesting the
bananas grown on the contracted growership areas without the consent of Sumifru, (b)
packing the bananas in boxes other than those provided by Sumifru, (c) selling the
produce to persons or entities other than Sumifru, and (d) committing any other act in
violation of their PPA and GEPASAs. Sumifru likewise prayed that the spouses Cereño
be compelled to faithfully comply with their obligations under the PPA and GEPASAs.
During the 24 August 2010 hearing for the preliminary injunction, the parties agreed and
were ordered to file their respective position papers. Consequently, both parties filed
their position papers. Meanwhile, on 29 September 2010, the spouses Cereño filed their
Answer to the Complaint. In their Answer, they claimed that their contractual obligations
under the PPA and GEPASAs were no longer in force for they already terminated the
agreements due to Sumifru's gross violations and serious breach thereof.
The Ruling of the RTC
In an Order dated 5 October 2010, the RTC denied Sumifru's application for issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction for lack of merit. The RTC
found that there was no urgency to issue the injunctive reliefs prayed for in order to
prevent injury or irreparable damage to Sumifru while the main case was being heard.
The RTC held that in seeking the issuance of the injunctive writ, Sumifru was practically
praying for a favorable ruling in the main case, which in effect would dispose of the
merits of the main case and leave only the matter of damages to be determined by the
trial court.11
Sumifru's motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 11
November 2010.12
Hence, Sumifru filed a petition for certiorari13 with the CA.
The Decision of the CA

In a Decision dated 20 May 2014, the CA denied the petition of Sumifru.14 The CA held
that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in not issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
since Sumifru did not satisfy all of the legal requisites for its issuance. The CA found
that Sumifru's rights under the agreements are disputed, and the injury, which Sumifru
claims it may suffer, is capable of mathematical computation and can be compensated
by damages. Moreover, the CA upheld the RTC in finding that the issuance of the
injunctive writ would have the effect of disposing of the main case. The CA concluded
that it will not interfere with the RTC's exercise of judicial discretion in injunctive matters,
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.
In a Resolution dated 5 May 2015, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Sumifru.15
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Sumifru raises the following issues for resolution:
I. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD
THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WAS PUT IN SERIOUS DOUBT BY RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT
THEY HAVE ALREADY TERMINATED EXTRA-JUDICIALLY THE GROWERSHIP
CONTRACT DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR;
II. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT HELD THAT THE GRANT OF APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DISPOSING OF THE MAIN CASE,
GIVEN THAT THE OBJECT THEREOF IS MERELY TO PRESERVE THE STATUS
QUO ANTE[;]
III. THE CONTINUING VIOLATION [BY] RESPONDENTS OF THEIR EXCLUSIVE
CONTRACT WITH PETITIONER WILL CAUSE GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE TO PETITIONER[;]
IV. THE GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY RESPONDENT[S]
CANNOT BE COMPENSATED UNDER ANY STANDARD COMPENSATION[.]16
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party,
court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. Section 3 of the same Rule provides the grounds for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may
be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether mandatory or prohibitory, will be issued: (1) the applicant must have a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and
substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate
remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.17
A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong
arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury to
actual and existing substantial rights.18 A right to be protected by injunction means a
right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.19 An
injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it
will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action.20 When the complainant's right is
doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, injunction is not
proper.21 While it is not required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for
seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at
least tentatively, that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
contradiction.22
The CA did not err when it ruled that Sumifru failed to establish a clear and
unmistakable right as to necessitate the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. As
aptly found by the CA, the spouses Cereño consistently disputed Sumifru's rights under
the agreements by claiming that the agreements were already terminated. In Australian
Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas Province,23 we held
that there can be no clear and unmistakable right to warrant the issuance of a writ of
injunction in favor of petitioners since their alleged rights under the MOA are disputed
by respondent
The CA likewise did not err when it found that there is no irreparable injury to be
suffered by Sumifru. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy.24 In its Complaint, Sumifru alleged that it
has "released to [spouses Cereño] cash advances and farm inputs in the amount of
Seven Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Eighty Nine and 81/100 Pesos (Php
720,189.81)."25 Clearly, the injury alleged by Sumifru is capable of pecuniary
estimation, and any loss it may suffer, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. As to
Sumifru's allegations of potential suits and damage to reputation, these are speculative
at best, with no proof adduced to substantiate them.
Finally, a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main
case subject to the latter's outcome, the sole objective of which is to preserve the status
quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case.26 The status quo usually
preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested
status which preceded the actual controversy, or that existing at the time of the filing of
the case.27 In this case, the status quo can no longer be enforced.

In its petition before us, Sumifru insists that its "claim that the GEPASA is still binding
and effective on the parties rests on the provisions of the very contract that the parties
entered into."28 The GEPASAs specifically provide that "[t]his agreement shall remain
in full force and effect for a term of Fifteen (15) years covering the period of x x x 2000
to x x x 2015 x x x."29 In Sumifru's Motion for Reconsideration filed on 19 October 2010
before the RTC, it alleged that "the GEPASAs will expire in 2015 or in five (5) years'
time."30 An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and is conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary
or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not.31
Considering that Sumifru admitted that the GEPASAs on which it anchors its right
expired in 2015, there is even more reason not to issue the writ prayed for. In Thunder
Security and Investigation Agency v. National Food Authority,32 we held that petitioner
cannot lay claim to an actual, clear, and positive right as to entitle it to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction based on an expired service contract. No court can compel
a party to agree to a continuation of an admittedly expired contract through the
instrumentality of a writ of preliminary injunction since a contract can be renewed,
revived, or extended only by mutual consent of the parties.33 This Resolution, however,
is without prejudice to Sumifru's action for breach of contract and damages, which can
only be determined after trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 20 May 2014
and the Resolution dated 5 May 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
04008-MIN.
SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. 215807, January 25, 2017

ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING, Petitioner, v. VICTOR ESPINOSA AND JUANA ANG,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated November 28, 2014 of petitioner Rosario E. Cahambing that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated
October 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the Order2 dated September
22, 2009 and Resolution dated February 25, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 25, Maasin City, Southern Leyte regarding the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. R-2912 for Annulment of Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.

The facts follow.

Petitioner and respondent Victor Espinosa are siblings and the children of deceased
spouses Librado and Brigida Espinosa, the latter bequeathing their properties, among
which is Lot B or Lot 354 with an area of 1,341 square meters, more or less, situated in
Maasin City, Southern Leyte, to the said siblings in the same deceased spouses'
respective Last Wills and Testaments which were duly probated.

Deceased Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over Lot 354 to
respondent Victor Espinosa, however, Brigida subsequently revoked and cancelled her
will, giving her one-half (1/2) share over Lot 354 to petitioner.
Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa, after the death of Librado Espinosa,
entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A,
with an area of 503.5 square meters adjudicated to Brigida Espinosa, and Lot 354-B,
with an area of 837.5 square meters, adjudicated to respondent Victor Espinosa, who
eventually obtained a certificate of title in his name.

Not being included in the partition of Lot 354, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent Victor Espinosa and his representative, respondent Juana Ang, for, among
others, the annulment of the Extrajudicial Partition of Real Property which was docketed
as Civil Case No. R-2912.

Incidentally, a commercial building named as Espinosa Building stands on Lot No. 354.
At the time of the filing of the complaint, the same building had twelve (12) lessees, four
(4) of whom pay rentals to petitioner, namely: Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle,
Ariane's Gift Items, and Julie's Bakeshop. Petitioner alleged that respondent Juana Ang
prevailed upon Pacifica Agrivet Supplies not to renew its lease contract with petitioner
but to enter into a contract of lease with respondent Victor Espinosa instead. According
to petitioner, respondent Juana Ang also threatened to do the same thing with Julie's
Bakeshop.

In one of the pre-trial conferences, the Clerk of Court, acting as Commissioner, issued
an Order dated April 16, 1998 directing the parties to maintain the status quo.

Thereafter, respondent Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
dated March 3, 2009 against petitioner alleging that the latter violated the status quo
ante order by allowing her sons to occupy the space rented by Jhanel's Pharmacy
which is one of respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. Respondent Victor Espinosa,
through his attorney-in-fact, private respondent Juana Ang, alleged that petitioner's sons
constructed a connecting door through the partition separating their cellular phone shop
from Jhanel's Pharmacy and that the contract of lease between the latter and
respondent Victor Espinosa is still subsisting, hence, the entry by petitioner's sons into
the pharmacy's commercial space disturbed the status quo ante.

The RTC, finding merit to the application for temporary restraining order filed by
respondent Victor Espinosa, granted the same on March 6, 2009. Thereafter, the RTC,
on September 22, 2009, issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the defendant's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Accordingly, upon defendant's filing, within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof, of the injunction bond in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(PhP50,000.00) conditioned on defendant's paying all damages, the plaintiff may
sustain by reason of this injunction in case the Court should finally decide that the
defendant is not entitled thereto, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining or
restraining the plaintiff and all those claiming rights under her from disturbing the
possession of the defendant to the leased premises or the "status quo ante" until after
this case shall have been decided on the merits and/or until further orders from this
Court.

SO ORDERED.

After the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated February
25, 2010, petitioner filed a petition on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it granted the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Victor
Espinosa. According to petitioner, respondents themselves violated the status quo ante
order when they wrested the space rented by Pacifica Agrivet Supplies from petitioner's
control and that there was no compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction.

The CA, on November 29, 2013, dismissed petitioner's petition on certiorari, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order and the Resolution, dated September
22, 2009 and February 25, 2010, respectively, both issued by respondent court in Civil
Case No. R-2912 STAND.

SO ORDERED.

In a Resolution dated October 28, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner comes before this Court with the following Issues for resolution:
I.
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

A.

HE WHO SEEKS EQUITY MUST DO EQUITY. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TOOK THE

LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS BY WRESTING CONTROL OF THE SPACE BEING
RENTED OUT TO PACIFICA AGRIVET SUPPLIES AND UNDER THE CONTROL OF
MRS. ROSARIO CAHAMBING. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN VALIDATING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION GRANTED BY THE HONORABLE RTC IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTER'S CONDUCT WHICH DIRTIED AND
SULLIED THEIR HANDS.

B.

THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS GRANTED ONLY IN

EXTRAORDINARY CASES WHERE THE REQUISITES ARE COMPLIED WITH. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN VALIDATING
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION GRANTED BY THE HONORABLE RTC
OF MAASIN CITY DESPITE THE LACK OF URGENCY AND DESPITE THE FACT
THAT RESPONDENTS' CLAIM FOR DAMAGES ARE QUANTIFIABLE.

According to petitioner, the CA turned a blind eye and failed to consider respondents'
violation of the status quo when it wrested possession and control of the space leased
to Pacifica Agrivet Supplies and tried to do the same with Lhuillier Pawnshop; thus,
committing a grave error and amounts to discrimination since the CA recognized the
status quo as the situation where petitioner was the lessor of Pacifica Agrivet Supplies.

Petitioner further claims that respondents failed to prove the elements before an
injunction could be issued and that the CA committed an error in validating the writ of
preliminary injunction without those requisites. In particular, petitioner avers the
following contentions: (1) the damage claimed by respondents is quantifiable at
P12,000.00 per month, hence, not irreparable; (2) respondent, Victor Espinosa is at
best a co-owner of the subject property, while respondent Juana Ang is a stranger, and
a co-owner cannot exclude another co-owner, hence, respondent Victor Espinosa's right
is not clear and unmistakable; (3) there is no urgency involved because the application
for injunction was filed more than one year after the incident in question; (4) contrary to
the conclusion of the CA, the space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy was voluntarily
surrendered to petitioner by the lessee; and (5) the CA committed grave legal errors
when it failed to correct the RTC's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

In their Comment3 dated June 4, 2015, respondents argue that they did not have sullied
hands when they applied for the writ of preliminary injunction. They also point out that
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was strictly in accordance with the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

Petitioner, in her Reply4 dated August 14, 2015, reiterated her arguments contained in
the petition for review.

The present petition is void of any merit.

A close reading of the arguments raised by petitioner would show that they are factual
in nature. A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law.5 The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are
generally conclusive and binding on the parties and are no longer reviewable unless the
case falls under the recognized exceptions.6 This court is not a trier of facts and we are
not duty-bound to re-examine evidence.7

Nevertheless, the CA did not err in ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.

In Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty and Development Corporation, et

al.,8 this Court exhaustively discussed the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction,
thus:

Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the
status quo until the merits can be heard.9 A preliminary injunction10 is an order granted
at any stage of an action prior to judgment or final order, requiring a party, court,
agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to
ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final
judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a
claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise,
the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.11

The grounds for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction are prescribed in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may

be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.

Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites
must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected, and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.12 Indubitably, this Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in
the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the
prevention of multiplicity of suits.13Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary
injunction in a pending case, rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance
of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.14 Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with
except when there is grave abuse of discretion.15 Grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16

This Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the elements for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction are present in this case. As aptly ruled by the CA:

In this case, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor Espinosa
had established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial space heretofore
occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy. He had an existing Contract of Lease with the
pharmacy up to December 2009. Without prejudging the main case, it was established
that, at the time of the issuance of the status quo order dated April 16, 1998, Jhanel's
Pharmacy was recognized as one of private respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. In
fact, petitioner identified only Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane's Gift Items
and Julie's Bakeshop. As such, pursuant to the status quo order, it is private respondent
Victor Espinosa who must continue to deal with Jhanel's Pharmacy. Correspondingly,
the commercial space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy must be deemed to be under the
possession and control of private respondent Victor Espinosa as of the time of the
issuance of the status quo order. The right of possession and control is a clear right
already established by the circumstances obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's act
of entering the premises of Jhanel's Pharmacy, through her sons, is a material and
substantial violation of private respondent Victor Espinosa's right, which act must be
enjoined.

The RTC was also able to make the following factual findings that shows the urgency
and the necessity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in order to prevent
serious damage:

By allowing the plaintiff to disturb the status quo ante which, for purposes of this instant
application, is limited to the admission by the plaintiff regarding the lease by twelve
lessees, including Jhanel's Pharmacy, of the subject commercial building, the rentals of
which only four pertains to her, excluding Jhanel's Pharmacy, great and irreparable
injury would result to defendant not just because he would be deprived of his right to
collect rent from Jhanel's Pharmacy but more importantly, because it would make doing
business with him risky, unstable and unsound, especially with respect to his other
tenants having existing contracts with the defendant.
All of the above findings and considerations expounded in the CA's assailed decision
and resolution contain no reversible error, thus, they should not be disturbed. It must
always be remembered that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely
on the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with except in cases of
manifest abuse.17 In this case, no manifest abuse can be attributed to the RTC that
issued the questioned writ. This Court has also held that no grave abuse of discretion
can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary injunction where a party
has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and it exhaustively presented
all its arguments and defenses.18 Verily, petitioner was given her day in court to
present her side but as in all litigations, only one party prevails.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
dated November 28, 2014 of petitioner Rosario E. Cahambing is DENIED.
Consequently, the Decision dated November 29, 2013 and Resolution dated October
28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Order dated September 22,2009 and
Resolution dated February 25,2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017 ]

EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V.
VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

In every application for provisional injunctive relief, the applicant must establish the
actual and existing right sought to be protected. The applicant must also establish the
urgency of a writ's issuance to prevent grave and irreparable injury. Failure to do so will
warrant the court's denial of the application. Moreover, the application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction may be denied in the same summary hearing as the
application for the issuance of the temporary restraining order if the applicant fails to
establish requisites for the entitlement of the writ.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the October 22, 2012 Decision[2]
and June 25, 2013 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112737.
The assailed judgments found that the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it denied Evy Construction and Development Corporation's (Evy
Construction) application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. This
application sought to restrain the Register of Deeds from compelling Evy Construction
to surrender its owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 168590 and from
further annotating encumbrances relative to a civil case between its predecessor-in-
interest and a third party.

On September 4, 2007, Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT

No. 134890 in Lipa, Batangas from Linda N. Ang (Ang) and Senen T. Uyan (Uyan).
They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, which was notarized on September 11, 2007.
At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated on the title, except for a
notice of adverse claim filed by Ang.[4]

On September 18, 2007, the Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy on

Attachment on TCT No. 134890.[5] This annotation was by virtue of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment issued by Branch 46, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga in Civil Case No. 13442 entitled Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation v.
Angeli Lumber and Hardware, Inc., and Linda Ngo Ang.[6] Two (2) other encumbrances
were also annotated on the title.[7]

Evy Construction registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds on
November 20, 2007. TCT No. 168590 was issued in its name; however, it contained the
annotation of the prior Notice of Levy on Attachment, as well as a Notice of
Attachment/Levy upon Realty dated October 2, 2007 and a Notice of Levy on
Preliminary Attachment dated November 8, 2007.[8]

Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 13442 in
favor of Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation (Valiant). A Writ of Execution and a
Notice of Levy were issued against the property covered by TCT No. 134890.[9]

Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-Party Claim in Civil Case No. 13442, informing
the court that it had already filed with the sheriff an Affidavit of Title/Ownership on May
20, 2008, in accordance with Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.[10] Valiant posted an
Indemnity Bond of P745,700.00 to answer for any damages that Evy Construction may
suffer should execution of the Regional Trial Court Decision proceed.[11]
By virtue of the July 18, 2008 Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case No. 13442, the
Sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property of Ang's properties,
including the property covered by TCT No. 134890.[12] A Certificate of Sale was
eventually issued to Valiant as the winning bidder of the property covered by TCT No.
134890.[13]

On October 29, 2009, Evy Construction filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City,
Batangas its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud, Annulment of Execution
Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages, with application for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction.[14]

It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from compelling it to surrender its copy of
TCT No. 168590 and from annotating any further transactions relating to Civil Case No.
13442.[15]

In the hearing for its application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, Evy
Construction claimed that it would suffer great and irreparable injury if the Register of
Deeds were restrained from compelling it to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of
TCT No. 168590. It claimed that potential investors interested in developing the property
"[would] back out of their investment plans if there [was a] cloud of doubt hovering over
the title on the property."[16]

On November 9, 2009, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying the application
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order for having no legal basis. Evy
Construction's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated
December 11, 2009.[17] Hence, it filed a Petition for Certiorari[18] with the Court of
Appeals.

On October 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision.[19] It held that Evy
Construction failed to sufficiently establish its right to the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.

According to the Court of Appeals, Evy Construction failed to sufficiently establish that it
would suffer grave and irreparable injury if additional recording and annotation of further
transactions, orders, or processes relating to the sale of the property to Valiant were
made on the title. It observed that the grounds raised already touched on the merits of
its Complaint, resolution of which would amount to prejudgment of the case.[20]

The Court of Appeals likewise pointed out that Evy Construction could still sue for
damages if the trial court eventually finds that the sale of the property to Valiant was
invalid. It also reminded Evy Construction that it had the remedy of proceeding against
the indemnity bond posted by Valiant for any damages it might suffer as a result of the
sale.[21]

Evy Construction filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution[22] dated June 25, 2013. Hence, this Petition[23] was filed.

Petitioner argues that it was denied due process when its application for preliminary
injunction was denied in the same summary proceeding as the denial of its application
for a temporary restraining order.[24] Petitioner likewise submits that it was entitled to
the injunctive writ applied for since "real estate development is an industry built on trust
and public perception."[25] It explains that the doubt cast by the auction sale and its
annotation to the title caused investors to withdraw their investments from petitioner's
housing development project, despite the expenses it already incurred.[26]

Petitioner avers that the issuance of an injunctive writ is necessary to prevent further
damage since its "business reputation and goodwill as a real estate developer, once
tarnished and sullied, cannot be restored."[27] It insists that respondent's indemnity
bond in the amount of P745,700.00 was not only inadequate compared to petitioner's
investment in the property; it was immaterial since it would be insufficient to restore
buyer and investor confidence in the project or in petitioner's competence and
reputation as a property developer.[28]

On the other hand, respondent counters that the application for preliminary injunction
was never actually set for hearing or resolved by the trial court; thus, it was misleading
for petitioner to argue that it was denied due process by the trial court.[29] It maintains
that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that petitioner failed to establish the
requisites for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and that petitioner still had
adequate remedies in the indemnity bond.[30] Respondent likewise reiterates the Court
of Appeals' finding that petitioner already touches on the merits of its Complaint before
the trial court, which effectively prejudges the case.[31]
This Court is asked to resolve the following issues:

First, whether or not petitioner Evy Construction and Development Corporation was
denied due process when its application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied
in the same proceeding as its application for a temporary restraining order; and

Second, whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner Evy Construction and Development Corporation's application for injunctive
relief.

Injunction is defined as "a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a patty is

ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act."[32] It may be filed as a main action
before the trial court[33] or as a provisional remedy in the main action.[34] Bacolod City
Water District v. Hon. Labayen[35] expounded:

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final
injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an
action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or
until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.[36]

Petitioner claims that it was denied due process when "no valid hearing for the
application for preliminary injunction was ever set" by the trial court and it "was NOT
even allowed to present its summary arguments and its witness in support of its
application for a [temporary restraining order]."[37]

A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo until
the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex
parte."[38] Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even
without a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury."[39] In this
instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary
injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour temporary restraining order should
be extended.[40]

A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days "[i]f it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice."[41] The trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction
during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired.[42]
Notably, the Rules do not require that a hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction be conducted during this period.

While Rule 58, Section 4(d)[43] requires that the trial court conduct a summary hearing
in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a grant or denial, Rule
58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for preliminary injunction is
granted. Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined," Inversely stated,
an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the conduct of a
hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order.

In this case, the November 9, 2009 hearing was denominated as a "hearing on the
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction."[44] Petitioner's
counsel was allowed to present its arguments[45] and its witness[46] but conceded that
the issues before the trial court were legal in nature.[47] Thus, the trial court resolved
that there was no need to present the witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted
without objection:

COURT

[T]he only issue now is purely legal, so there is no need to present your witness.

ATTY. LIMBO
Yes[.] Your Honor.

COURT

We are submitting the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order for
resolution.

ATTY. LIMBO

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT

Alright, submitted.[48]

Petitioner cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary
injunction, considering that it accepted that its application would be submitted for
decision without the presentation of its witness. The trial court did not find any need to
conduct a further hearing on the application for preliminary injunction since petitioner
was unable to substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining order. In any case,
even if a separate hearing was granted, petitioner would have presented the same
arguments and evidence in the November 9, 2009 hearing. Thus, there can be no
denial of due process if the party alleging it has already been granted an opportunity to
be heard.

II.A

Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction "is an order granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or
a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts" or an order
"requir[ing] the performance of a particular act or acts."[49] It is an ancillary relief
granted by the court where the main action or proceeding is pending.[50]
In order to be granted the writ, it must be established:

(a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.[51]
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary event,"
being a "strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy."[52] Thus, the power to issue
the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and
deliberation.''[53]
An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing substantial
rights"[54] or rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show "that the invasion of the
right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage."[55] Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose
rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause
of action.[56]
In this case, petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the property covered by
TCT No. 168590, "[i]t has the undeniable right to the full use and possession [of it]."[57]
At the time of the sale between petitioner Evy Construction, Uyan, and Ang, TCT No.
134890 in Uyan's and Ang's names did not contain any liens or encumbrances, except
for a notice of adverse claim by Ang dated January 21, 1999. However, petitioner
admitted that while the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 2007, the
property was only registered in its name on November 20, 2007.[58] The encumbrances
in respondent's favor were annotated on September 18, 2007, October 2, 2007, and
November 8, 2007,[59] or when the property was still registered under Uyan's and Ang's
names.
Under the Torrens system of registration, a person who deals with the registered owner
of the property is not bound to look beyond the title for any liens or encumbrances that
have not been annotated.[60] TCT No. 134890 did not contain a notice of lis pendens
that could have warned petitioner that the property was under litigation.
The sale between petitioner Evy Construction, Uyan, and Ang was not annotated on
TCT No. 134890 at the time of its sale. A sale of property that is not registered under
the Torrens system is binding only between the buyer and the seller and does not affect
innocent third persons.[61] The Regional Trial Court could not have been faulted for
ordering the annotation of the notice of levy on attachment on TCT No. 134890
considering that when the September 18, 2007 Order was issued, the property was still
in Uyan's and Ang's names.

Thus, in determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief, the courts
would have to pass upon the inevitable issue of which between petitioner and
respondent has the better right over the property, the very issue to be resolved in the
main case.
The facts of this case mirror that of Spouses Chua v. Hon. Gutierrez,[62] where this
Court was confronted with the issue of whether or not a registered lien of attachment is
superior to that of an unregistered deed of sale. In Spouses Chua, the property was
already registered in the Spouses Chua's names when the property was levied. Thus,
they argued that, not being the judgment debtors, the property should not have been
subjected to an execution sale.
This Court found the argument unmeritorious and held:
[A] levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale
and, even if the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on
execution but after the levy is made, the validity of the execution sale should be upheld
because it retroacts to the date of levy.[63]
The prior levy on attachment carries over to the new certificate of title, effectively
placing the buyers in the position of their vendor under litigation.
However, Spouses Chua stated an exception in that "[k]nowledge of an unregistered
sale is equivalent to registration."[64] If a party presents evidentiary proof that the
judgment creditor had knowledge of a valid sale between the judgment debtor and an
innocent third party, that knowledge would have the effect of registration on the
judgment creditor.
As in Spouses Chua, respondent's attachment liens dated September 18, 2007,
October 2, 2007, and November 8, 2007, if valid, may have been superior to whatever
right petitioner may have acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was
only registered on November 20, 2009. However, the validity of the liens and the validity
of the Deed of Absolute Sale are factual matters that have yet to be resolved by the trial
court. The trial court must also determine whether or not respondent had prior
knowledge of the sale.
Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of petitioner's
actual and existing right over the property. The grant of an injunctive writ could operate
as a prejudgment of the main case.
II.B
Even assuming that there is already a final determination of petitioner's right over the
property, petitioner still failed to prove the urgent and paramount necessity to enjoin the
Register of Deeds from making further annotations on TCT No. 168590.
Petitioner prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and irreparable
damage to its reputation as a real estate developer.[65] Indeed, injunctive relief could
be granted to prevent grave and irreparable damage to a business entity's goodwill and
business reputation.[66]
Injury is considered irreparable if "there is no standard by which [its] amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy."[67] The injury must be such that its pecuniary
value cannot be estimated, and thus, cannot fairly compensate for the loss.[68] For this
reason, the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being unquantifiable would be
considered as grave and irreparable damage.
In Yu v. Court of Appeals,[69] this Court granted an exclusive distributor's prayer for an
injunctive writ to prevent a competitor from selling the same product on the ground that
the continued sale would "[render] illusory . . . the very purpose for which the exclusive
distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized
distributor."[70]
In Semirara Coal Corporation v. HGL Development Corporation,[71] this Court upheld
the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction to prevent Semirara Coal Corporation's
(Semirara) continued intrusion on HGL Development Corporation's (HGL) property. It
also found that Semirara damaged HGL's business standing when it prevented HGL
from operating its cattle-grazing business on its property, which ''[was] perceived as an
inability by HGL to comply with the demands of its customers and sow[ed] doubts in
HGL's capacity to continue doing business."[72]
In Philippine National Bank v. RJ Ventures Realty & Development Corporation,[73] this
Court affirmed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the extrajudicial
foreclosure of Rajah Broadcasting Network's radio equipment pending the resolution of
the main case questioning the mortgage. This Court found that the foreclosure would
stop the operations of Rajah Broadcasting Network's radio stations. The loss of its
listenership and the damage to its image and reputation would not be quantifiable, and
thus, would be irreparable.
However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must also prove
the urgency of the application. The possibility of a grave and irreparable injury must be
established, at least tentatively to justify the restraint of the act complained of.[74] It is
"[a]s the term itself suggests. . . temporary, subject to the final disposition of the
principal action."[75] Its sole objective is "to preserve the status quo until the merits can
be heard."[76]
Petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the prior annotations on its title caused
''crucial investors and buyers"[77] to withdraw, "notwithstanding the considerable costs
and expenses [it] already incurred."[78] This is the grave and irreparable damage it
sought to be protected from. However, the feared "damage" was caused by the
execution sale and the annotations already made on the title. It even admits that the
annotations were "impairing the progress of [its] housing development."[79] In other
words, petitioner failed to establish the urgent and paramount necessity of preventing
further annotations on the title.
Thus, what petitioner actually seeks is the removal of the annotations on its title, which
is precisely what it asked for in its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud,
Annulment of Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages before the trial
court. Injunctive relief would have no practical effect considering that the purported
damage it seeks to be protected from has already been done. Therefore, its proper
remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to thresh out the merits of its
Complaint before the trial court.
In Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut,[80] this Court held:
[T]he grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment and
evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for
its conclusive determination.[81]

The court's discretion is not interfered with unless there is a showing that the grant or
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[82]

The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that petitioner would still have sufficient relief in its prayer for damages in its
Complaint.[83] In the event that the annotations on petitioner's title are found by the trial
court to be invalid, petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of the
annotations and in the award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the
bounds of its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

4. GR No. 214073, Oct 04, 2017 ]

BICOL MEDICAL CENTER v. NOE B. BOTOR +
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good
and sufficient on its face to establish a fact constituting a party's claim or defense.[1]
This resolves the Petition for Review[2] filed by Bicol Medical Center and the
Department of Health, assailing the February 28, 2014 Decision[3] and August 26, 2014
Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129806.
Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital (Provincial Hospital) was established in 1933 as a
25-bed provincial hospital located along Mabini Street, now Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga
City. The Camarines Sur Provincial Government eventually subsidized the operations of
a private hospital located at Concepcion Pequeña, Naga City and transferred the
Provincial Hospital there.[5]
Road Lot No. 3, which stretched from Panganiban Road to J. Miranda Avenue, is a
service road which leads to the Provincial Hospital.[6]
The Provincial Hospital was eventually converted to the Bicol Regional Training and
Teaching Hospital (Training and Teaching Hospital).[7]
Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated about five (5)
hectares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health,[8] as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13693.[9] The Training and
Teaching Hospital and Road Lot No. 3 were included in this donation.[10]
The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in 1995.
[11]
Sometime in 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to control
the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises.[12]
On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva (Dr. Nerva), BMC Chief I, issued Hospital
Memorandum No. 0310,[13] which ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC
Compound. Salient portions of this Memorandum read:

To: All Officials and Employees

This Center
Subject: Traffic Re-routing inside the BMC Compound
In line with the Traffic Re-routing of the Center, the exit gate at the MCC Quarters shall
be closed and the OPD Exit Gate shall be used for the exit of pedestrians and motor
vehicles effective April 1, 2012.
For information and dissemination purposes.[14]
This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J.
Miranda Avenue, relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side
effective April 1, 2012.[15] The relocation of this gate was implemented for security
reasons and to make way for "[m]assive development within the Complex."[16]
The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the community, and on May 19, 2012, Atty.
Noe Botor (Atty. Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat (Mayor Bongat), asking
for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance.[17]
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor
Bongat to dismantle the gate.[18] However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed
a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-0073 and raffled to Branch 24, Regional
Trial Court, Naga City.[19]
Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and
Josefina F. Esplana (Intervenors) were allowed to intervene and submit their complaint-
in-intervention.[20]
A few months later, ground-breaking ceremonies for the construction of the Cancer
Center Building[21] were conducted, with construction intended to begin in January
2013. When fully completed, the Cancer Center Building would take over ''about three-
fourths (¾) of the width of Road Lot No. 3."[22]
On December 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied Naga City's application for
injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to
the writ prayed for.[23]
On February 22, 2013, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the Intervenors.[24]
Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.[25]
On February 28, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and emphasized that
only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an application
for writ of injunctive relief.[26]

The Court of Appeals opined that the Intervenors were able to prove the public
character of Road Lot No. 3, considering that "the general public had been using [it]
since time immemorial," with even Dr. Nerva admitting that he passed through it when
he was young. The Court of Appeals also gave due weight to the 1970s Revised
Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map, which support the
Intervenors' assertion of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.[27]
The Court of Appeals concluded that Naga City and the Intervenors were able to
present prima facie evidence of their right to the writ. However, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that whether or not the Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll should
prevail over BMC's title over the property is a factual matter that should be threshed out
in the trial court.[28] The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
court a quo is hereby DIRECTED to issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injm1ction in
the case a quo.
SO ORDERED.[29] (Emphasis in the original)
On August 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals[30] denied the motions for reconsideration
filed by BMC and the Department of Health. However, the Court of Appeals emphasized
that the injunction was not directed against the construction of the Cancer Center
Building but against the relocation of the service road and gate closure.[31]
On September 29, 2014, petitioners BMC and the Department of Health filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari[32] before this Court. Petitioners claim that although
Road Lot No. 3 has been open to vehicles and pedestrians as BMC's service road, it
was never intended for use by the general public and was not owned by Naga City, as
evidenced by the certification issued by the Office of the City Engineer of Naga City.[33]
Petitioners assert that they have set up a gate on Road Lot No. 3, which is closed at
night, on weekends, and during holidays for security reasons and for the welfare of
patients and hospital staff.[34]
Petitioners maintain that Dr. Nerva's closure of the road and relocation of the gate was
in preparation for the construction of the Cancer Center Building.[35] Thus, the
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court of Appeals had the effect of halting
construction of a government project, a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1818[36]
and this Court's Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, which reiterated the prohibition on
the issuance of injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.[37]
Petitioners claim that the P51,999,475.26 contract for the Cancer Center Building has
been awarded to OCM Steel Corporation, the winning contractor, and the Notice to
Proceed dated February 3, 2014 has been issued, signalling the mobilization stage of
the construction of the Cancer Center Building.[38]
Petitioners emphasize that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the injunction over
the relocation of the service road and closure of the gate did not violate Presidential
Decree No. 1818 because the Cancer Center Building, a government project, will be
constructed right where the gate stands.[39]

Petitioners point out that the Cancer Center Building will be constructed along Road Lot
No. 3; hence, there is a need to close this road due to the excavation and construction,
which will make it dangerous for pedestrians and vehicles alike to pass through.[40]
Petitioners likewise underscore that the intervenors, now respondents, failed to support
their claim that Road Lot No. 3 was a public road[41] or that they had a clear right to the
injunctive relief prayed for.[42] Furthermore, respondents also allegedly "failed to prove
that the invasion of the[ir] right sought to be protected [was] material and substantial"
and that there was an urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious
damage.[43]
Finally, petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the reopening of the gate since doing so would affect the
construction of the Cancer Center Building.[44]
On October 8, 2014, this Court issued two (2) Resolutions. The first Resolution[45]
granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition. The second Resolution[46]
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the Court of
Appeals February 28, 2014 Decision and August 26, 2014 Resolution, which directed
the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3. The second Resolution also required respondents to
comment on the petition.[47]
On January 13, 2015, respondents filed their Comment on the Petition,[48] where they
disputed petitioners' claim that Road Lot No. 3 was always a component or service road
of BMC. Respondents contend that Road Lot No. 3 existed as a public road long before
any hospital was constructed on it and assert that it remains to be a public road to this
day.[49]
Respondents also dispute petitioners' claim that the road closure was for the
construction of the Cancer Center Building since Dr. Nerva's memorandum was for no
other purpose than to reroute traffic within the hospital complex.[50]
Respondents likewise point out that when they filed their intervention before the
Regional Trial Court and their petition before the Court of Appeals, there were still no
plans to construct the Cancer Center Building. Furthermore, BMC allegedly failed to
support its claim that there were indeed plans to build the Cancer Center Building.[51]
Nonetheless, respondents explain that they are not against its construction but are
merely asking that it not be illegally built on a public road.[52]
Finally, respondents ask that this Court lift its issued temporary restraining order against
the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.[53]
In its Resolution[54] dated February 25, 2015, this Court noted respondents' comment
and denied their prayer to lift the temporary restraining order. It likewise directed
petitioners to file their reply to the comment.
In their Reply,[55] petitioners reiterate their stand that Road Lot No. 3 is a private
property.[56] Petitioners also rebut respondents' assertion that they only belatedly
brought up the construction of the Cancer Center Building because this project was
nonexistent.[57] Petitioners attached photos[58] to prove that the construction of the
Cancer Center Building was in progress.[59]

The single issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in directing the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3.

The Petition is meritorious.

I
Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp.[60]
defined a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:
[A] writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result
of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the
judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot
simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full requirements of a case
being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude of
discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right
materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of
the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to
be suffered is irreparable.[61]
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to:
[P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts
sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.[62]
Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction
may be granted when it is established:
(a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c)
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first
before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:
(1)The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
in esse;
(2)There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3)There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4)No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.[63]
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her
claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence[64] or a
sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits."[65]
Tan v. Hosana[66] defines prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and sufficient
on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and
which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."[67]
Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank[68] then discussed the requisites and the proof
required for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or
she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which
injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the
injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a
preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.
However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence
to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The plaintiffs are
only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in
their complaint. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or
incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give
the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on
the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be
decided.[69] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before
the trial court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the
Province of Camarines Sur.[70] Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to
corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.[71]
Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use
Road Lot No. 3, a public road.[72]

On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693,[73] which covered a total land area
of 53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now
Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is
part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.
BMC likewise presented a certification[74] from the City Engineer of Naga City which
read:
This is to certify that the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of
Bicol Medical Center is not included in the list of Inventory of City Road[s] of Naga City.
Given this 14th day of December 2012 for record and reference purposes.[75]
A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish
prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they
sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the
Department of Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement
that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of [BMC] was not
included in the list'' of city roads under Naga City's control.[76]
Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or
respondents should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road
Lot No. 3.
Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.[77] explained that a clear legal
right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right 'clearly
founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief."[78]
Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over
Road Lot No. 3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail
over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's
ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right to use and enjoy this
property, must be respected.
Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by
the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because
customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation;[79] hence, it does not
ripen into a right.
II

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely
to the evidence presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether
petitioners' evidence,[80] which had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and
respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the nature of the
ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order.
During the hearing for the application for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly weighed the evidence presented by both parties before dismissing Naga City's
application:

On 21 December 2012, the court a quo handed down the first assailed Order denying
the application for injunctive relief. According to said court, Naga City failed to comply
with the jurisprudential requirements for the issuance of said injunction, to wit: 1) the
right of the complainant is clear and unmistakeable; 2) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; and 3) urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
Anent the first requirement, the court a quo noted that even on the assumption that the
1970's Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map were
both authentic documents, the same would not overcome BMC's ownership of the
property as evidenced by its title. BMC 's title covers all property within its bounds,
which naturally included Road Lot No. 3.
The court a quo thereafter proceeded to conclude that since Naga City failed to clearly
establish its right over the said road, then logically, it would not also be able to show
compliance with the second requisite, which necessitates a material and substantial
invasion of such right.
On the third requirement, the court a quo took into consideration the testimonies of two
of the herein petitioners, Eliza M. Quilon (hereinafter Quilon) and Josefina F. Esplana
(hereinafter Esplana), who both have businesses in the area and who said that their
respective enterprises started suffering from losses after the closure of Road Lot No. 3.
However, according to the court a quo, the losses of Quilon and Esplana hardly qualify
as irreparable injury required by jurisprudence in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction. This is so, as the court declared, because the alleged business losses that
had been purportedly caused by the closure of Road Lot No. 3 were easily subject to
mathematical computation.[81] (Emphasis supplied)
Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to
be enjoined and upon their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period
of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the
executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours
from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding
section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the Judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours (72) hours provided
herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary
restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders.
Thus, Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,"[82] giving the applicant an
opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued and
allowing the opposing party to comment on the application.
On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is heard only with the evidence
presented by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to preserve the status quo until the
hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted, Miriam College Foundation, Inc v.
Court of Appeals[83] explained the difference between preliminary injunction and a
restraining order as follows:
Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy,
injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo
until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. Under the former §5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by §5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge (or
justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from
date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary
injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically
vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction
within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on
the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the
TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of
Court.[84] (Citations omitted)
It is true that some issues are better threshed out before the trial court, such as if the
donation to the Department of Health by the Camarines Sur Provincial Government
contained an encumbrance for the public to continue using Road Lot No. 3, or the
validity of this donation.[85] The Court of Appeals, however, erred when it completely
disregarded the evidence presented by petitioners, reasoning out that the question of
whether or not Naga City's evidence should prevail over BMC's title over the property
was supposedly a factual matter that should be threshed out in the trial court.[86]

By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there was
prima facie evidence to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case was being
heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals misappreciated the nature of a writ of
preliminary injunction. To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued
after due hearing where both parties are given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, there was no reason for the Court
of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of respondents' application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents were unable to present prima facie
evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The assailed February 28,
2014 Decision and August 26, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129806 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in its October 8, 2014 Resolution is
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.