Public Money & Management

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Usability and actual use of performance

information in German municipal budgets: the
perspective of local politicians

André Jethon & Christoph Reichard

To cite this article: André Jethon & Christoph Reichard (2021): Usability and actual use of
performance information in German municipal budgets: the perspective of local politicians, Public
Money & Management, DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2021.1966193

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2021.1966193

Published online: 27 Aug 2021.

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PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT
https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2021.1966193

Usability and actual use of performance information in German municipal

budgets: the perspective of local politicians
André Jethon and Christoph Reichard
Finance Department, County Administration Recklinghausen, Germany; Department of Public and Nonprofit Management, University of
Potsdam, Germany

IMPACT KEYWORDS
German municipalities have prepared performance budgets for over 10 years. The incorporation of Councillor; performance
performance information into the budget is, however, still work in progress. Local politicians budget; performance
perceive the usability of non-financial information in the budget as low and do not use such information; politician;
information intensively for budget composition or other purposes. German municipal budgets are usability; use
usually voluminous because of their highly detailed structure and the large amount of displayed
performance data which rarely informs about outcomes. Such information does not meet the
needs of councillors, for example in their struggles with political opponents. Some options for
improving the usability of budgetary information are presented.

ABSTRACT
The article presents evidence about the use of performance information by councillors in the context
of performance budgeting in German municipalities. The usability of performance information by
politicians is assessed as low and the use of such data is limited. Councillors perceive performance
information in the budget as not very relevant, because it only exceptionally focuses on outcomes
and does not help them in political struggles and deals. Moreover, councillors are reluctant to
read budgets overloaded with data that is irrelevant to them.

Introduction development of performance budgeting at the municipal

‘Politicians do not use performance data’. Does this rather
apodictic assertion by Donald Moynihan (2016, p. 479) also
apply to performance budgeting? This article sheds some
light on the empirical evidence behind this statement and
on the underlying reasons, with special reference to the use
of performance information (PI) for budgeting by elected
politicians in German local government.
The issue of performance information use (PIU) has been
the subject of intensive research over the past 15 years
with regard to various government levels and to different
types of actors like managers or politicians. Evidence about
PIU by local politicians in the context of budgeting is,
however, quite scarce. This particularly applies to Germany.
In a comprehensive reform of their financial management
practices, German municipalities introduced performance
budgeting in 2008. So far, there is not much internationally
accessible information available about the usability of PI in
municipal budgets and about PIU by local politicians in the
context of performance budgeting in Germany. Based on a
comprehensive literature review, we begin to close this gap
by responding to the following research question: How
intensively are local politicians using PI in the budgetary
context and how can their use behaviour be explained?
The article proceeds as follows: to provide some
conceptual orientation, we first draw a more general
picture of the state of research about usability and use of
PI in the specific situation of performance budgeting at the
local government level and from the perspective of local
politicians. Next, we discuss the results of a review of
existing literature presenting empirical evidence about the
PIU situation in Germany. After that, we analyse the
findings and discuss their implications for the further
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
level.
Politicians as users of performance information in
municipal budgeting—a conceptual orientation
Apart from various other applications, concepts of
performance management can be used in the context of
budgeting. Performance budgets provide information about
planned expenses and revenues, but also about the
intended outputs and outcomes of future governmental
activities (for more details about the use of PI in the budget
process, see Raudla, 2021 in this issue). Financial
information and PI can be connected with each other in
different intensities: from a strict ‘mechanical’ linkage to a
loose coupling of financial resources and equivalent
performance (OECD, 2007). In general, PI in municipal
performance budgets only has an informative function
illustrating the expected results of budgeted appropriations
(Bleyen et al., 2017).
PI is expected to contribute to a more substantiated
budget composition and to increased accountability of the
responsible actors. In addition, forms of political use of PI
are particularly relevant, for example as ‘ammunition’ for
political struggles or to legitimize and to justify policies (for
more details see Askim, 2007; Giacomini et al., 2016; Korac
et al., 2020; Micheli & Pavlov, 2020; Moynihan & Pandey,
2010; van Helden & Reichard, 2019).
Different actor groups are involved in the provision and
utilization of a performance budget. On the supply side of
the budgeting process (for a supply/demand perspective of
financial documents see Lüder, 2013; p. 293 and Grossi
et al., 2016, p. 588) are the preparers. The preparers are
2 A. JETHON AND C. REICHARD
expected to provide appropriate information about
anticipated financial figures and about future performance
which are usable in the various stages of the budgeting
process (Brun & Siegel, 2006; Grossi et al., 2016; van Helden
& Reichard, 2019). Budget preparers are primarily
accounting professionals working in the finance
department. They are generally not familiar with measuring
the performance of various municipal policies and tasks.
They need, therefore, the support of PI experts in the sector
departments. Compared with financial reports like balance
sheets or income statements, the process of performance
budget composition is thus much more complicated and
involves different kinds of preparers with diverging interests
and expertise.
On the demand side are the various users of the municipal
budget. Apart from managers and other employees, local
politicians can be considered as internal users of the
municipal budget. Furthermore, there is a large and diverse
group of external users, like representatives of oversight
bodies and auditing institutions, citizens in their various
roles as taxpayers, voters or consumers of public services,
representatives of civic society, media, and, finally,
investors, creditors, and suppliers.
There is evidence that the interests and expertise of
preparers and users of financial documents are quite
divergent and that preparers don’t pay much attention to
the needs and knowledge of the various users (Mack, 2004).
At the central government level, intermediaries may play a
mediating role, for example in the form of support staff in
legislative departments (Jorge et al., 2019) but, at the local
level, this is most probably only feasible in large cities.
It makes sense to differentiate between usability and
actual use of accounting information (and particularly of PI;
see van Helden, 2016, p. 533; van Helden & Reichard, 2019,
p. 481). While the former is an expression of the general
perception of the usefulness of information by a specific
group of users, the latter refers to the concrete usage of
information by this user group.
Both aspects are influenced by different antecedents (van
Helden & Reichard, 2019, p. 489): usability of PI is primarily
depending on the information needs of the particular
group of PI users and on its relevance and
understandability. The relevance of a document is
determined by its usefulness, but also by its accuracy and
credibility. A specific issue of the usability of performance
budgets is their ‘digestibility’: a highly-detailed budget may
be a serious barrier for many users as it may cause
information overload. Understandability, in contrast,
depends on how complicated the document is and on the
user’s literacy. Literacy depends on a user’s education and
training, as well as on the length of a user’s experience with
such documents.
In contrast, the actual use of PI is not only dependent on its
usability but also on various situational factors, such as
pressure from an existing problem and the ability of the
user to ‘use’ and to ‘digest’ the available information
(Demaj & Summermatter, 2012).
Because of their particular interests and needs, various
groups of users perceive the usability of PI in the budgetary
context differently (Grossi et al., 2016, p. 588; Ouda &
Klischewski, 2019; van Helden & Reichard, 2019, p. 484). In
this article, we concentrate on local politicians as users of PI.
This user group consists of elected members of the local
council and of appointed aldermen (deputy mayors and top
managers, appointed by the council for usually eight years).
While the use of PI of the latter—because of their role as
top executives—can be expected to be quite similar to the
PIU of municipal managers, councillors’ PIU is somewhat
different. This is because this actor group has different
features: council members are part-time parliamentarians
and have therefore a limited time budget. They have
different functions and roles in the council: they either
belong to the ruling majority or to the opposition, they can
be backbenchers, members of the budget committee or
they may have some other specific functions in the local
council. Further, councillors have a variety of educational
backgrounds—most of them are laypersons in financial
management and only few will have a management
background. The usability of PI as perceived by councillors
is a rather unsettled and ambiguous issue. On the one
hand, such data may be perceived as easier understandable
compared to financial information. On the other hand,
politicians may assess PI as less relevant compared with
financial appropriations, seeing it only as an ‘add-on’ in
relation to scheduled spending. Next we will present some
evidence from Germany.
Usability of PI in German municipal budgets and
actual use of PI by local politicians—an empirical
picture
Design and implementation of performance budgets
in German municipalities
Although German public administration was a late and only
partial mover, it introduced some elements of New Public
Management, particularly at the local level (Reichard, 2003).
Part of the so-called New Steering Model of municipalities
was the introduction of performance budgets. The
incorporation of PI in the budget was part of a broader shift
towards goal and result orientation of municipal
management. Local politicians should set political goals
which then would be translated into performance targets
and indicators. Apart from other purposes, such PI should
be incorporated in the new performance budget to support
budgetary decision-making.
To some extent these reform ideas were translated into
the new concept of municipal budgeting and reporting
which was required by law in 2003 by the joint committee
of all ministries of interior of the German Länder. In contrast
to the detailed and binding regulation of the newly
implemented accrual accounting, the performance side of
the reform concept was codified by the various state
governments in a non-committal way. As a result, the
municipalities concentrated on implementing the accruals
concept, while the focus on results was considered to be of
secondary importance (Weiß, 2013).
After the legal order mentioned above, the majority of
municipalities moved from cash budgeting and accounting
to accruals and they have slowly introduced performance
budgets. While municipalities in two Länder made a start
on reforms in 2008, others began several years later. Due to
German federalism, the details of the renewed budgeting
and reporting concepts vary in a number of respects (Burth
& Hilgers, 2014; Jethon, 2019; Reichard & Küchler-Stahn,
2019). The Länder budget codes prescribe a highly detailed
 PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 3

budget structure: appropriations have to be specified for Results of a literature review about usability and use
each municipal service or product, and PI has to be of PI by local politicians
specified at least with regard to essential or particularly
The following findings are based on a comprehensive review
relevant products (key products).
of books, articles, reports and other statements by academics,
While the strenuous and time-consuming introduction of
as well as by practitioners, dealing with this issue and
accruals-based budgeting and reporting has been
published between 2010 and 2020. It is complemented by
completed by the majority of municipalities, the
web searches in the Web of Science and Google Scholar.
implementation of the performance side in the budget is
The majority of identified sources were in German. In total,
an ongoing process. This is because the introduction of the
69 sources could be identified which dealt to some extent
performance budget was perceived by municipalities as
with PI in the budgetary context. A third of these sources
much less important and not as urgent. Even the oversight
focused on municipal performance budgets and were
authorities in the various Länder, which exercise control on
based on primary data, i.e. on original and empirically
municipalities and which were quite strict and demanding
compiled data, while the others dealing with budgeting at
with regard to the accounting change, have been reluctant
the federal or Länder level did not use primary data.
to monitor the progress in implementing PI in municipal
However, only 18 of the 33 sources had PI as their main
budgets (Weiß & Schubert, 2020, p. 159; Knirsch, 2014). This
research focus—the rest mainly dealt with other issues such
has been largely taken by municipal managers and by
as the use of financial information (Burth & Hilgers, 2012;
councillors as a signal not to take the performance side of
Geißler et al., 2020; Nitzl et al., 2020). In the end, only nine
the new budget too seriously.
sources could be identified that included substantiated and
original empirical insights into the usability and use of PI by
Incorporation of PI in German municipal budgets German local politicians for budgeting purposes. Table 1
presents an overview of the nine core sources.
There is very little actual empirical data about PI
Nationwide studies were from 2010 and 2011, i.e. from an
incorporation in municipal budgets available. A survey by
early phase of budget reform. Most studies concentrated on
KGSt—a public management thinktank focusing on German
the period between 2010 and 2016. The majority of empirical
municipalities—provides empirical data about the whole of
studies had a broad focus on performance budget
Germany: 25.7% of the responding municipalities had at
implementation and use. Most of the researchers preferred a
that time incorporated PI in all partial budgets (KGSt, 2010).
mix of methods, but surveys were quite dominant at 66%.
The share of German municipalities without or with only
Interviews and document analysis also played a substantial
limited PI in their performance budget was about 40–50%.
role. Participatory observation was exceptional. Six of the
According to another survey a year later, only 16% of the
reviewed core sources referred to councillors’ responses; the
larger German municipalities had extensively incorporated
others had other types of respondents. Sometimes it was
PI in their budgets (DST & PwC, 2011). Interestingly, even
unclear whether presented statements about usability and PIU
municipalities in the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and
were based on assessments given by the politicians or on the
Rhineland-Palatinate—the two early movers in financial
researchers’ observations. Further, there was a lack of
management reforms—did not show higher shares of PI
empirical evidence about councillors’ specific demands with
incorporation.
regard to PI, i.e. on their information preferences concerning
Newer data is only available for a few single Länder. For
important policy fields, task areas and particular kinds of
example, in the state of Saxony-Anhalt, less than 45% of
information. Finally, we found that all sources dealing with
the municipalities have formulated targets and indicators
politicians’ PIU in the budgeting context focused on the first
for the essential products in their performance budgets
stage of the budget cycle, i.e. on the use of PI for budgetary
(Weiß, 2014). In Baden-Württemberg, this applies to 41%
decision-making. The accountability issue or other purposes of
of the municipalities and 53% of the counties (Fischer
PIU did not play any role in the reviewed literature.
et al., 2015). A recent survey from the state of Saxony
The empirical data presented in the reviewed core
shows that only 50% of municipalities have incorporated
literature referred to surveys and case studies which cover
targets and indicators for all of their essential products
municipalities of varying size. We did not find important
(Geißler et al., 2020, p. 28). There are even examples
indications that the size of municipalities or that the
where cities have abandoned their detailed outcome-
existing experience with performance budgets after
based performance budgets due to a perceived lack of
implementation had an impact on the usability or use of PI.
PIU by local councillors (for example the city of
The samples usually presented the perceptions of
Dortmund).
councillors belonging to different political parties in the
The available empirical data also shows that German
respective council.
municipal budgets rarely include outcome-oriented
performance targets and even fewer include outcome-
based performance indicators. See, for example, the case of
Usability of PI in the German municipal budgets
the city of Bonn in the comparative study of municipal
budgets by Bleyen et al. (2017), or the single case study of Referring to the reviewed literature, and with regard to the
a regional municipal association (Landschaftsverband selected user group of local councillors, we conclude that
Westfalen-Lippe) by Jethon (2017); see also Kroll and the usability of PI as included in German municipal
Proeller (2012). There is evidence that performance targets performance budgets is relatively low. All authors of the
are not always significant and/or easily measurable (Breyer, core sources came to the same conclusion (see Table 1).
2018) and that the connection between targets and First of all, this is the result of the poor ‘digestibility’ of PI
indicators is often quite weak (Grossi et al., 2016). provided in German performance budgets. These budgets
 4

Table 1. Major findings of reviewed core literature about PI in German municipal performance budgets and about its usability and use by local politicians.
important findings in core literature
Authors, and Main research issue Period and regional range Applied methods, sample Respondents to survey Assessment of usability of PI for Assessment of PIU intensity of Other identified information
year of of data collection and response rates (if and participants in the politicians (and mentioned politicians (and mentioned preferences of local
A. JETHON AND C. REICHARD

publication available) cases problems or deficits) arguments) politicians

Bogumil et al., Effects of financial 2010; one state Survey and additional case Mayors, staff Low usability (poor transparency, Low intensity (no sanction Personal experiences and
2011 management reform studies representatives, chairs incompatibility with political mechanisms of oversight expected resistances
of council groups rationality) authorities)
Bogumil et al., Causes of municipal 2013; four states Surveys (response rates Mayors, councillors Low usability (poor understandability) Low intensity NA
2014 budget deficits 54.9% and 41.2%) and
additional case studies
DST & PwC, Evaluation of the 2010; whole Germany Survey (211 municipalities; Mayors, heads of finance Low usability (goal conflict between Low intensity (distrust of NA
2011 financial management response rate 88%) and department political and financial steering) councillors towards
reform additional interviews administration because of its
information advantage)
Gärtner, 2014 Effects of financial 2013; one state Interviews in 13 selected Heads of finance Low usability (lack of transparency) Low intensity (lacking knowledge NA
management reform municipalities department and expertise in using PI)
Grossi et al., Appropriatenes and use 2009/10; three German Document analysis and Councillors, aldermen, top Low usability (poor relevance for Low intensity (poor literacy with PI derived from other sources
2016 of PI in the budgeting states and Italy interviews (five German manager political decision-making, regard to PI, refusal of high such as sector reports
process and four Italian inappropriate and implausible transparency, particularly by
municipalities) indicators) majority parties)
Jethon, 2017 Influencing factors for 2012-2017; one large Document analysis, Aldermen, chairs of Low usability (indigestibility of PI Low intensity (refusal of high Personal connections
low use of PI by local regional association of interviews and council groups, heads of because of the huge budget transparency, particularly by between majority members
politicians municipalities in one participatory observation finance department volume, duplication of data covered majority parties) and top managers of their
state by other reports) own political party
KGSt, 2010 Implementation status of 2010; whole of Germany Survey (1858 municipalities; Top manager Low usability (too detailed budgets) Low intensity NA
the financial response rate 30.9%)
management reform
Weiß, 2014 Evaluation of the 2014; one state Survey (133 municipalities; Local authorities No clear assessment (missing PI Low intensity (poor training of NA
financial management response rate 77.4%), quality standards and lack of councillors)
reform interviews, document benchmarks reduce usability)
analysis
Weiß & Implementation of 2019; three states Survey (1003 municipalities; Local authorities Low usability (poor relevance for Low intensity (councillors miss NA
Schubert, financial management response rate 26.5%) political decision-making) clear connections between PI
2020 reform and financials)
Notes: NA = Not applicable.

are the result of ‘German thoroughness’: they are highly
detailed, in larger cities they often have much more than
1000 pages, several hundred products and thousands of
indicators. As indicated above, this is also the result of a
very detailed budget structure with appropriations and PI
for a large variety of single services or products. According
to a survey of the State Audit Office in Rhineland Palatinate,
budgets of municipalities in this state containing 800
products, 230 targets and almost 1,700 indicators are not
an exception (LRH, 2011). Municipal performance budgets
in other countries are usually less voluminous, as a
comparison of the budget sizes of the German city of
Mannheim and of Eindhoven in the Netherlands shows
(Reichard & van Helden, 2021). While Mannheim’s budget
had 916 pages, Eindhoven’s had only 148 pages. Such a
difference is only to a minor extent caused by the size of
the city. Rather, it is the result of the highly fragmented
product-based structure of German budgets compared to
the much more aggregated programme-based structure of
the Dutch budget (see empirical evidence about the
Netherlands in Budding et al., 2020).
Voluminous documents are simply not digestible by
councillors—they do not generally read the entire budget
but concentrate instead on several budget sections for
which they are politically responsible or which are of
particular political interest for them (Jethon, 2017; KGSt,
2010). It is, however, not only size which can reduce the
usability of the budget. There is also evidence that the
product structure of the German municipal budgets is often
not in line with the distribution of political responsibilities
in the municipality (KGSt, 2010, p. 119). Councillors
therefore need experience for orientation and consequently
hesitate to study provided PI in the budget. Councillors are
part-time politicians with limited time and often with only
modest knowledge and skills in financial and performance
management. Another reason for low usability is a lack of
ownership, particularly with regard to the large amount of
small-scale targets in many performance budgets.
Politicians don’t perceive ownership with targets which
were mostly set by the administration and not by
themselves (according to KGSt, 2010, p. 94, councillors
participated in goal setting in only 20% of all municipalities).
Local politicians also indicate that they are not familiar
with the new format of the accrual based performance
budget and don’t have the necessary expertise to
understand provided PI and to use it for budgetary
decision-making or accountability purposes (Grossi et al.,
2016). To cope with this, several German municipalities
have offered training seminars to their councillors, but the
demand for these events was modest (Reichard, 2016; see
also Kroll & Moynihan, 2015).
The relevance of PI for budgetary decisions is perceived as
low by councillors because of their limited plausibility,
transparency and blurred relation to appropriations in the
budget (Bogumil et al., 2011; Bogumil et al., 2014).
Moreover, the bulk of PI deals with inputs, processes and
outputs, rather than with outcomes, and usually mirrors
past periods which adds to poor relevance (Weiß &
Schubert, 2020). Councillors also criticise the weak
plausibility and meaningfulness of PI (Grossi et al., 2016).
These are reasons why—from a politician’s point of view—
personal contacts, own experiences and informal
information provided by reliable political partners are
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 5
perceived as being more important than official data about
target achievements in the budget (Bogumil et al., 2011).
PI use by local councillors
As already indicated above, according to a Germany-wide
survey only 20% of municipal councils participated in
formulating performance goals and only 14.5% of political
interventions into budget composition in the council have
explicitly referred to PI (KGSt, 2010, p. 94). According to a
survey in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, about 50% of
interviewed politicians indicated no interest in PI in budget
related council debates (Bogumil et al., 2011). In a later
survey in four states, fewer than 45% of the councillors
indicated that performance targets played a role in
budgetary debates (Bogumil et al., 2014). A case study from
a large municipal association revealed that affiliation of
politicians to either the ruling majority or to the opposition
matters (Jethon, 2017). The former category of politicians
preferred informal information based on personal
connections to the aldermen in the organization for their
budgetary decisions over PI in the budget. In contrast,
politicians belonging to a political minority—not having
access to such informal connections—were much more in
favour of PI in the budget. Jethon’s case study provides
clear evidence that politicians from the opposition parties
are the main demanders of PI in the budgeting context.
There is some research in Germany about the change over
time of the willingness of councillors to use PI because of
increasing experience. Empirical results are ambiguous—
while some authors have observed this tendency (Burth &
Hilgers, 2014; Hilgers & Burth, 2015; Fischer et al., 2015),
other longitudinal comparisons could not confirm such a
trend (Jethon, 2017).
Several authors perceive the provision of targets and
indicators in the budget to inform politicians in their
budget related activities as the weak point of the whole
budgeting reform (DST & PwC, 2011). Others are concerned
that the incorporation of PI in the budget may increase the
complexity of the whole concept and cause additional costs
(Bogumil et al., 2011). They also expect that it is unlikely
that the municipal administration (and particularly the
finance department) will give up its influential position in
budget planning and execution by sharing their knowledge
with councillors (Bogumil et al., 2014).
Although the empirical evidence about councillors’ PIU in
Germany is limited in quantitative terms, the results are
unambiguous and clear. The authors did not identify a single
empirical finding about municipal performance budgeting in
Germany where councillors clearly appreciated the usability of
PI or where they had made substantial use of such
information. Various observers of financial management
reforms in local government have come to the same
conclusions. The few empirical studies about politicians’ PIU in
other countries have found more mixed results concerning
the intensity of PIU—some authors are skeptical (Bogt, 2004;
Grossi et al., 2016; Moynihan, 2016), but others are more
positive (George et al., 2020; Liguori et al., 2012).
Discussion and conclusions
In this section we discuss the reasons of the low usability and
of the poor use of PI by local politicians, as identified by
6 A. JETHON AND C. REICHARD
critical observers of the budgeting processes in German
municipalities. The low usability of PI is the result of the
poor relevance of provided PI as perceived by the
councillors. If this actor group is interested in PI at all, it
prefers—as empirical studies show (Liguori et al., 2012;
George et al., 2020)—information about policy effects
(outcomes), information about the corresponding
performance targets and information about the own
performance in comparison to other municipalities
(benchmarks). Such data is, however, rare in most German
municipal budgets. Consequently, the PI provided in these
budgets is only marginally relevant for councillors. In
addition, budgets are often overloaded with a variety of
highly detailed indicators further reducing the readability
and digestibility of the data.
Understandability
Another antecedent influencing usability of PI is
understandability. Even after a few years of practice, the
format of a performance budget is still novel and unfamiliar
to many councillors. In their role as part-time politicians
and laypersons in financial management, councillors spend
most of their time becoming acquainted with the
complicated new format of accrual budgeting and
reporting. In contrast, they tend not to invest time in
training to use PI (Reichard, 2016). In addition, councillors
are free in how they choose to read and interpret the
budget. Formal rules, provisions or other forms of mimetic
pressures concerning PIU, which may apply to the
administrative staff of the respective municipality, don’t
exist for politicians.
User needs
The reviewed literature points to another—even more
important—antecedent of usability: the user needs of
councillors. These needs are influenced by the rationality
and attitudes of political actors. Councillors tend to decide
about the budget from their particular party political and
clientele-centered view (Naschold & Bogumil, 1998;
Bogumil, 2001; from a budgetary view: Rubin, 2019). They
are constrained by a quite limited time frame (their term of
office), and their decisions are influenced by motives like
maintaining power, fighting for re-election and competing
with other parties in their council (Brunsson, 1982; 1985).
Further, politicians try to avoid too much transparency—for
example about performance and with regard to goals—if
this could weaken their power position (Bogumil, 2001).
They are used to making deals with political partners and
to participating in blame games (Rajala, 2020). Formal
statistics and indicators in budgets following a managerial
logic are not very relevant to councillors, particularly in a
competitive democracy (Bogumil et al., 2011; DST & PwC,
2011, p. 64; Grossi et al., 2016).
To better understand the PIU of politicians, it may be
useful to analyse also the power structures between the
councillors and the municipal management from a
micropolitical perspective (Burns, 1961; Crozier & Friedberg,
1980; Reiners, 2012; Jethon, 2017). Management can restrict
the provision of relevant PI in the performance budget and
instead supply only the members of the majority party with
‘really important PI’ via more informal channels which are
not accessible to the opposition. Consequently, opposition
members have less relevant data in the performance
budget (Bogumil & Kißler, 1998). Similarly, management
may be inclined to restrict the provision of relevant PI in
the budget to maintain its own power position against the
council or to avoid political struggles in the council about
ambiguous or politically controversial data (see Jethon,
2017, pp. 131–133 for such a case). In all these cases, the
significance and relevance of provided PI in the budget will
be moderate and their usability accordingly low. If
politicians of the opposition use such data, they will,
however, employ it primarily as ammunition to weaken the
majority’s power position (Giacomini et al., 2016).
Use of PI
Actual use of PI is mainly determined by the perceived
usability of PI. In addition, use intensity depends on
particular features of the use situation (van Helden &
Reichard, 2019, p. 489). In the context of budget related
PIU, time pressure of councillors because of their part-time
role is such a situational factor: A local politician will be
reluctant to study detailed performance indicators in a
voluminous budget document. A highly detailed budget
may confuse the user, as they can perceive it as a ‘data
cemetery’ (DST & PwC, 2011, p. 70). The financial situation
of the municipality is another important factor. In cases of
financial distress, politicians tend to make budgetary
decisions on financial data at the expense of performance
data (Björnholt et al., 2016). Only worrying problems in
certain parts of the budget may be a reason for a councillor
to study provided PI in the respective budget chapter.
Furthermore, the intensity of political competition among
the parties in the council, and the degree of political
instability, may influence the willingness of councillors to
use PI. To sum up, low use of PI by local politicians can be
explained with the observed poor usability of such data
and with additional situational factors.
Interpreting the findings
Is the framework of influence factors as presented in van
Helden and Reichard’s (2019, p. 489) model appropriate to
interpret the present findings? In general, the links between
the various antecedents and the two major variables
influencing usability and use appear to be realistic and
plausible. However, it is possible to further differentiate the
antecedents. User needs are heavily dependent on
the rationality and goals of the user group but also on the
power relations between users. Furthermore, relevance and
understandability are separate factors; each one is
dependent on several antecedents (for example the
credibility, relevance and accuracy of data, and user
experience and training).
After 10 years of experience with a highly detailed
municipal performance budget in Germany and its low
acceptance by councillors, some conclusions can be drawn.
The major focus of the budget is still on the financial side;
performance data is mainly an ‘add-on’. As much as
possible, PI should concentrate on essential products and
focus at strategic issues or pressing political challenges like
sustainable development. There are a number of ways to

improve the relevance, as well as the understandability and
digestibility, of PI in a budget.
Our findings about the PIU of local politicians have some
limitations. There are only few empirical studies about the
specific case of budgeting and the majority are from an
early stage of performance budget implementation. All
these studies, however, found both a low usability and a
low use of PI with regard to this actor group. Another
limitation was the concentration of studies on the first
stage of the budget cycle, i.e. on budget composition.
Empirical data about PIU in the stage of budget control was
not available. As well, other purposes of PIU like
‘ammunition’ for opposition politicians have not been
studied in the German context. Furthermore, the reviewed
empirical studies do not always present unambiguous
results based on explicit statements given by the
councillors themselves. Instead, some of the studies refer to
impressions about councillors’ perceptions of PI and about
their PIU given by other municipal actors like managers or
by the researchers. In addition, there is still no information
available about the appreciation and use of PI by other
municipal actor groups as aldermen or managers.
Future research
There is a strong need to gather more data about the
particular information needs and preferences of local
councillors. This will require appropriate methods, for
example participatory observation of budget debates
(Buylen & Christiaens, 2016; Bogt et al., 2015). Additionally,
the range of empirical investigations of PIU should be
extended to other stages of the budget cycle, like budget
operation or budget control. Further, more comparative
research is important, both with respect to different
government levels in the same country as well as
comparisons between countries. After all, a thorough study
of the effects of PIU in budgeting and of its ‘added value’
seems to be a widely unresolved issue: does it matter if
councillors take notice of PI in the budgetary process? Will
politicians’ PIU result in a better allocation of resources or
in increased accountability? After more than 50 years of
quite mixed experiences with performance budgeting in
various countries, expectations are not really promising
(Schick, 2014).
Lessons
What lessons can be learnt from the German case?
Experiences from other countries point to possible
improvements to the supply side of PI (Bleyen et al., 2017).
PI can be made more attractive and more digestible for
councillors, for example by reducing the amount of PI in
the performance budget and by enhancing the significance
and relevance of PI. Another option my be to introduce a
separate section of the whole budget concentrating on
strategic options and on key PI (DST & PwC, 2011, p. 70). An
appropriate place would be the—already legally prescribed
—general financial statement (in German Vorbericht); an
example is the budget case of Mannheim, presented in
Reichard & van Helden, 2021, p. 192). Finally, in an era of
opportunities provided by digitalization, more customized
versions of a performance budget may be attractive to
councillors. If politicians are interested in PI about a certain
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT 7
policy field—for example as a member of a council
committee—they should be able to access more details via
a scroll-down menu while other policy areas are presented
in a compact summary.
To conclude, findings from German local government
confirm the observations in other countries and at different
government levels that PI in budgets is rarely seen as
relevant, particularly by involved politicians. A budget is
predominantly a financial document, performance data is
perceived as an ‘add-on’ at best.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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