Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.

therefore, already under custodial investigation

and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §d12(1)
RULE 113 of the Constitution applied to him.
ARREST
Said constitutional provision applies to the
stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when
Sec. 1. Definition of Arrest the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect." RA 7438 has
People v. Domantay extended the constitutional guarantee to
307 SCRA 1 situations in which an individual has not been
formally arrested but has merely been "invited"
for questioning.
CASE PRINCIPLE:
For an extrajudicial confession to be
He was picked up by the police without any
admissible, it must satisfy the following
warrant of arrest, although his case did not fall
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
under any of the three instances where
must be made with the assistance of
warrantless arrests are authorized under Rule
competent and independent counsel; (3) it
113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
Procedure.
FACTS:
The Court however, agreed with OSG, that
In 1996, the body which bore several stab
accused-appellant's confession to the radio
wounds of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was
reporter is admissible since the Bill of Rights
found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in
does not concern itself with the relation
Pangasinan.
between a private individual and another
individual.
The investigation by the Malasiqui police
pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is
Domantay, a cousin of the victim's
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti,
grandfather, as the lone suspect in the
namely, the fact of death of Jennifer
gruesome crime. Police officers of the Malasiqui
Domantay.
PNP then picked up accused-appellant at the
Malasiqui public market and took him to the
police station where accused-appellant, upon
questioning by SPO1 Espinoza, confessed to Soliven v. Makasiar
killing Jennifer Domantay. November 14, 1988

The next day, SPO1 Espinoza and another

CASE PRINCIPLE:
policeman took the accused-appellant to
What the Constitution underscores is the
Bayambang and recovered the bayonet.
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
ISSUE:
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
Whether the CA erred in appreciating the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of
extrajudicial confession made by the accused-
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
appellant. (NO)
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses.
RULING:
For an extrajudicial confession to be
FACTS:
admissible, it must satisfy the following
This is a consolidated case. Appellant was
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
charged for the crime of libel. The Secretary of
must be made with the assistance of
Justice denied petitioners’ motion for
competent and independent counsel; (3) it
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscal’s finding of a prima facie case
When accused-appellant was brought to the
against petitioners. A second motion for
Malasiqui police station, he was already a
reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal
denied by the Secretary of Justice.
slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was,

1
 Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.

On appeal, the President, through the of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
the Secretary of. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary. With these developments,
petitioner’s contention that they have been Sec. 2. Arrest, how made
denied the administrative remedies available
under the law has lost factual support.
Petitioner was thereafter served with a warrant People v. Oanis
of arrest. 74 Phil 257

ISSUE:
CASE PRINCIPLE:
WON Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is
when he did not personally examine the
justified in using such force as is reasonably
complainants and witnesses for the
necessary to secure and detain the offender,
determination of probable cause. NO
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect
RULING:
himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima,
What the Constitution underscores is the
46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
unnecessary force or in treating him with
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
means when the arrest could be effected
existence of probable cause for the issuance of
otherwise
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his
FACTS:
witnesses. Following established doctrine and
Chief of Police Oanis received information that
procedure, he shall:
a notorious criminal Balagtas had escaped
1. Personally evaluate the report and the
Prison. According to the report Balagtas is with
supporting documents submitted by
a prostitute named irene.
the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis
Oanis was ordered to arrest the suspect, and if
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
2. If on the basis thereof he finds no
Oanis brought with him, Corporal Galanta,
probable cause, he may disregard the
together with other troops. When they arrived
fiscal’s report and require the
at Irene’s house went to room and on seeing a
submission of supporting affidavits of
man sleeping with his back towards the door,
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
simultaneously or successively fired at him
conclusion as to the existence of
with their revolvers.
probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise It turned out later that the person shot and
judges would be unduly laden with the killed was a tecson, an innocent person and
preliminary examination and investigation of not the notorious balagtas.
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their Cases were filed against Oanis and Galanta.
courts. (reason behind SC’s interpretation)
Oanis and Galanta contended that they should
be acquitted because:
The Supreme Court unanimously adopted
1. They acted in innocent mistake of fact
Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
believing that it was balagtas.
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure
therein provided is reiterated and clarified in
2. They acted in the fulfillment of a duty
this resolution.
(Justifying circumstance art 11)
It has not been shown that the respondent
ISSUE:
judge has deviated from the prescribed
1. WON the doctrine of mistake of fact
procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of
applies in the case
the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse

2

2.WON the all requisites in the justisfying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty is
satisfied
RULING:
1. No. Here, Oanis and Galanta found no
circumstances whatsoever which would
press them to immediate action. Given
Tecson being then asleep, appellants
had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made.
Thus, the defendants have no
justification for killing, be it Balagtas or
Tecson, when in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he
is asleep.
2. No. The requisites are: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office. In the case at bar,
only the first requisite is present. The
second requisite is wanting for the
crime by them committed is not the
necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty
was to arrest Balagtas or to get him
dead or alive if resistance is offered by
him and they are overpowered. As the
deceased was killed while asleep,
People v. Tudtud
G.R. No. 144036, Sept. 26, 2003
CASE PRINCIPLE:
● It is significant to note that the search
in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest
must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if
the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the
search. The question, therefore, is
whether the police in this case had
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
vprobable cause to arrest
appellants.|||
● The fact that a person failed to object
to a search does not amount to
permission thereto. ... As the
constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.
Thus, even in cases where the accused
voluntarily handed her bag or the
chairs containing marijuana to the
arresting officer, this Court held there
was no valid consent to the search.
FACTS:
Sometime during the months of July and
August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a “civilian asset”
named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been
complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in
their area. Relating to the report, the police
conducted surveillance in Solier’s
neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For
5 days, they gathered information and learned
that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.
According to his neighbours, Tudtud was
engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had
headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and
usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 pm that
same day, a team of policemen posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival.
All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men
disembarked from a bus and helped each other
carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing
some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto
and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men
fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also
toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1
Desierto then approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. PO1
Desierto informed them that the police had
3

received information that stocks of illegal drugs
would be arriving that night. The man who
resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he
was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if
he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud
then said “it was alright” and let them see the
box which contained bundles of dried fish, one
wrapped in a plastic bag and another in
newspapers. When the bundles were
unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
The police arrested Tudtud and his companion.
They were charged with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs before the RTC of Davao City
which convicted the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence
(Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is
considered a waiver. (NO).
RULING:
The right against unreasonable searched and
seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence,
if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
appellants lack of objection to the search
and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver
of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not come
under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence.
And as there is no evidence other than the
hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and
their informant, the conviction of appellants
cannot be sustained.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures if
the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the
second and third requisites. Records disclose
that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested appellant
that they see the contents of the carton box
supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant
Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and
opened the box himself.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights
is not to be presumed. The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to
permission thereto.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y
Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
Sec. 3. Duty of Arresting Officer
People v. Rodriquez
341 SCRA 645
CASE PRINCIPLE:
During custodial investigation, there are 4
requisites for an extrajudicial confession to be
admissible:
1. confession must be voluntary;
2. made in the presence of an
independent and competent counsel;
3. must be express; and
4. it must be written. In this case the
second requisite is lacking. It is also
the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the accused of the cause of the
arrest and read to him the Miranda
rights.
FACTS:
On October 11, 1991 a messenger of the Far
East Bank and Trust Company branch office in
Rizal cor. Batangas St. Sta Cruz, Manila
discovered the lifeless body of Matias, inside
the premises. It was found tied and suffered
32 stab wounds. At around 6am, SPO3
Mendoza and two other officers of WPD arrived
after receiving a report on the incident. They
conducted several interviews on the employees
and found out some guns were missing.
4

In the afternoon they returned and conducted
a follow up investigation. When they learned
about that there is an on-going construction on
the premises. They went to the site and they
found Rodriguez and the co-accused. They
found a worn-out maong pants and saw blood
stains on the shirt of Rodriguez. They arrested
Rodriguez and appellant and brought them to
the police station for interrogation.
During trial the prosecution presented various
testimonies to prove the guilt of the accused
including the written statement of Rodriguez
confessing that he together with the accused
committed the crime. Appellants then filed a
demurer to evidence on the grounds that the
prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Rodriguez even claimed that
he was mauled by policemen to confess to the
crime.
ISSUE:
WON the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez
is admissible even if the said was made
without counsel.
RULING:
No. Both the accused are acquitted. The
moment the Rodriguez et al were brought to
the custody of the police it ceased to be a
general inquiry but put them as suspects to the
crime. Hence they should be afforded their
rights guaranteed by the constitution
particularly the right to counsel. Extrajudicial
confession made without counsel is
inadmissible. There are 4 requisites for an
extrajudicial confession to be admissible: (1)
confession must be voluntary; (2)made in the
presence of an independent and competent
counsel; (3) must be express; and (4) it must
be written. In this case the second requisite is
lacking.
It was found out that the accused were already
detained for four days before Atty. Lao comes
in. It was clear that the confession of the
accused in writing is invalid for being violative
of the constitutional right to counsel.
Their right is all the more violated for they
were not informed of the miranda rights.
Sayo v. Chief of Police
80 Phil 859
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable
cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness
FACTS:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao,
charging Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero
with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of
Manila, arrested the Sayo and Mostero , and
presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for
habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo and
Mostero were still detained or under arrest,
and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed
charges against them with the proper courts of
justice.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid? NO
RULING:
Under the constitution, no person may be
deprived of his liberty except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable
cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness.
A peace officer has no power or authority to
arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other
person, except in those cases expressly
authorized bylaw. What he or the complainant
may do in such case is to file a complaint with
the city fiscal or directly with the justice of the
peace courts in municipalities and other
political subdivisions.
A fortioria police officer has no authority to
arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party
or other persons even though, after
investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged
George Antiquera y Codes v. People of
the Philippines
December 11, 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE:
When no crime is plainly exposed to the view
of the arresting officers, arrest without warrant
is not authorized.
5

FACTS:
Police officers were conducting a police
visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw
two unidentified men rush out of a house and
boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a
crime, the police officers approached the
house. When they peeked through the partially
opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz
engaged in a pot session. The police officers
entered the house, introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting
the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewelry box
which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of
illegal possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs. The court affirmed the
decision of RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest made by the police
officers was valid. (No.)
RULING:
There was unlawful arrest because the
circumstances here do not make out a case of
arrest made in flagrante delicto. Admittedly,
the police officers did not notice anything
amiss going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Indeed, even as they
peeked through its partially opened door, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the
view of the arresting officers that authorized
the arrest of accused Antiquera without
warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Sec. 4. Execution of Warrant
Mamangon v. CFI
189 SCRA 217
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Unlike a search warrant which is valid for only
10 days, a warrant of arrest remains valid until
arrest is effected or the warrant lifted.
FACTS:
A criminal case was filed against petitioner
charging him with “Execution of Deeds by
Intimidation.” An order of warrant of arrest
was issued by Judge Dunuan of respondent
court.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writ of
preliminary injunction assailing respondent
court’s jurisdiction. petition was dismissed.
Dates were set for preliminary investigation
but the petitioner did not show up and
disappeared for about a year.
A second amended information was filed
identifying the accused as “Andres Culanag”.
Petitioner surfaces and through alleged counsel
posted a bailbond.
An Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued by Judge
Dunuan. It is this challenged Alias Warrant that
was challenged herein. Petitioner alleged that
the Alias warrant of arrest is stale/functus
officio.
Petitioners filed an ex-parte motion to dismiss,
denied by respondent court.
A motion for reconsideration was filed asking
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the accused is already dead. the motion was
denied.
erroneously construing the German Decision as
a final judgment of conviction, respondent
Court reset the promulgation, ordered the
bondsmen to produce the body of the accused.
Realizing the mistake, respondent Court
vacated said order and ruled that "the warrant
of arrest issued by this Court through Judge
Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain
in full force and effect.
Petitioner resorted to CA praying for the
annulment of criminal case. Denied.
The counsel for petitioner-accused filed a
motion to quash. without awaiting disposition
on the motion to quash the present petition
was instituted.
ISSUE:
WON the alias warrant of arrest is valid.
RULING:
The petition is without merit.
The alias warrant of arrest is valid. Petitioner
had evaded arrest by disappearing from the
6

jurisdiction of respondent court. Neither is
there any indication in the records that the
property bond filed by petitioner accused had
been accepted by respondent court.
The Alias warrant of arrest is not “stale or
functus officio” as alleged by petitioner. Unlike
a search warrant which is valid only for 10
days, a warrant of arrest remains valid until
arrest is effected or the warrant lifted.
Respondent court cannot be faulted with grave
abuse of discretion for holding that said
warrant is in full force and effect.
Viudez v. CA
5 June 2009
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The determination of probable cause for
purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made
by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor. The function of the judge to issue a
warrant of arrest upon the determination of
probable cause is exclusive.
FACTS:
A complaint for the alleged murder of Honorato
Galvez and his driver was filed with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor against 5 identified
individuals and 3 John Doe. An additional
complaint against petitioner Enrique Viudez II
was filed by Estrella Galvez (widow) for the
same crime.
The State Prosecutor found probable cause to
indict petitioner and others for the crime of
murder and filed two information with the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued
warrants of arrest on the same day.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Suspend the
Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest,
Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of the
DOJ arguing that all the accused in the said
criminal cases had filed a timely petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and,
pursuant to Section 9 of Department Circular
No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
arrest against petitioner should be suspended
and/or recalled pending resolution of the said
petition for review; that denial would be
prejudicial to the petitioner’s interest.
The RTC denied petitioner’s Motion stating that
1) said warrant had already been issued for his
apprehension, 2) it cannot be recalled in the
absence of any compelling reason, and that 3)
jurisdiction over his person had not yet been
acquired by the court until he was arrested, or
petitioner surrenders voluntarily. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
Order but was denied.
Petitioner raised it to the CA through a
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction which was granted,
then set aside by the CA finding no
whimsicality on the part of the respondent
judge. They raised the matter to the Court.
While pending resolution, petitioner filed a
Manifestation informing the court that the
Secretary of Justice has sustained his petition
for review; that the State Prosecutor had
already filed with the RTC a motion to
withdraw the information against him and his
co-accused; hence, the instant petition may
already be moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Will a pending resolution of a petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice
concerning a finding of probable cause suspend
the proceedings in the trial court, including the
implementation of a warrant of arrest?
RULING:
It will not suspend the proceedings nor the
implementation of the warrant of arrest.
Petitioner believes that the suspension of
proceedings in court, as provided in the said
circular, includes the suspension of the
implementation of warrants of arrest issued by
the court. This is wrong.
There is a distinction between the preliminary
inquiry, which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and the
7

preliminary investigation proper, which
ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or be released.
The determination of probable cause for
purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made
by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of
arrest upon the determination of probable
cause is exclusive.
The consequent implementation of a warrant of
arrest cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review by the
Secretary of Justice as to the finding of
probable cause, a function that is executive in
nature. To defer the implementation of the
warrant of arrest would be an encroachment
on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.
Sec. 9 of the DOJ circular says, “The appellant
and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that,
pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance.”
Nowhere in the said provision does it state that
the court must hold the proceedings in
abeyance. The discretion of the court whether
to suspend the proceedings or the
implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon
the motion of the appellant or the trial
prosecutor, remains unhindered.
Once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests on the sound discretion of the
said court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it.
The cases cited by the petitioner pertained to
the suspension of the arraignment pending
resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a
petition for review on finding probable cause.
Not the arrest warrant.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant
People v. Bati
189 SCRA 103
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A valid warrantless arrest may be had provided
that the facts and circumstances of the case
fall within that provided in Section 5 of Rule
113 .
FACTS:
Upon being informed by their civilian informer
about a transaction involving the buying and
selling of marijuana which would take place on
that same day at the Doña Crispina Park
Subdivision, patrolmen Cuenca and Dimatulac,
with other law enforcement officers, were
dispatched in the said area. Upon arriving they
saw the defendants in a corner. They then saw
Marquez giving Bati something and thereafter,
Bati handed a wrapped object to Marquez who
then inserted the object inside the front of his
pants in-front of his abdomen. The two
defendants then parted ways and were
subsequently arrested by Cuenca and
Dimatulac. The defendants then question the
legality of their arrest as there were no
warrant issued for such purpose.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest of the defendants can be
considered as a valid warrantless arrest? YES
RULING:
Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal
Procedure clearly provides:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A
peace officer or private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person
1. When in his presence, the to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
2. When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed
it;
There was no need for Luciano and Caraan to
be armed with a warrant of arrest when they
8

arrested Marquez and the accused since they
had personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime. As the defendants
were caught in flagrante delicto. The
subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused
were made under the principle of `hot pursuit'.
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen
were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant of arrest.
People v. Claudio
160 SCRA 648
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Arrest without warrant; Legal where accused
was caught in flagrante delicto. The
warrantless search being an incident to a
lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
FACTS:
This an appeal from the decision of the RTC in
finding the accused guilty for violation of Sec.
4 RA 6425.
The lower court established her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of the
prosecution’s evidence. The prosecution was
able to present several witnesses to
corroborate the charge, which among others,
was Daniel Obina:
● a member of the PNP, who was
Detached Service with the ANTI-
NARCOTICS Unit;
● that on the said date, on board of the
Victory Liner, he was seated on the
second seat at the back; suspect
boarded the same bus and took the
same seat in front of him after putting
a bag which she was carrying at the
back of the seat of Obina;
● The bag placed by the suspect behind
his seat was a woven buri bag made of
plastic containing some vegetables.
● The act of the accused of putting
her bag behind Obina’s seat
aroused his suspicion and made
him nervous.
● Out of suspicion, he placed one of his
fingers in a plastic bag located at the
bottom of the buri bag and smelt
marijuana. (he could recognize the
smell because he was assigned at that
time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
● When they reached Olongapo City,
Obina intercepted her and showed her
his I.D. identifying himself as a
policeman and told her he will search
her bag out of suspicion that she was
carrying marijuana;
● - Accused was handcuffed and
boarded a tricycle right away and
brought to the police headquarters;
● - There, the bag was searched in the
presence of Investigator Tiongco,
Obina, the accused and Sgt. Bagang;
● - Inside the plastic bag was found a 1
kilo of marijuana.
ISSUE:
Among the issues raised by accused, the
warrantless search, seizure and apprehension
was unlawful
RULING:
No. The warrantless search being an incident
to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. The
applicable rule in this case are:
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)-A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Rule 126, Sec. 2: Search incident to a lawful
arrest- A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant.
In this case, Appellant Claudio was caught
transporting prohibited drugs. Obina did not
need a warrant to arrest her as the latter was
caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless
search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in
itself lawful. Therefore, there was no infirmity
in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
People v. Sucro
195 SCRA 388
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
9

without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof.
FACTS:
A police officer went to Regalado’s house to
monitor activities of Edison Sucro (accused).
Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at
a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado’s
house. Sucro was monitored to have talked
and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio. A third
buyer was transacting with appellant and was
reported. From that moment, the police
proceeded to the area and Macabante was
intercepted. Macabante saw the police and
threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground.
Macabante admitted buying the marijuana
from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested
Sucro and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags
of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and
another teabag from Macabante.
ISSUE:
W/O not the arrest without warrant is lawful
(YES)
RULING:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the instances where an
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. An
offense is committed in the presence or within
the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof.
From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw
Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the
chapel where he is 2 meters away monitoring
his nefarious activities then after the 3rd deal,
the police intercepted the buyer Macabante
and when confronted by the police, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the marijuana
from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just
committed an illegal act of which the police
officers had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored
accused-appellants nefarious activity.
Search and seizures supported by a valid
warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule
126, Sec 12 of ROC provides that a person
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. The failure of the
police officers to secure a warrant stems from
the fact that their knowledge required from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill
requirements for its issuance. However,
warrantless search and seizures are legal as
long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance
of the activities of the accused. As police
officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in performance of their duties. And
since the arrest was considered valid, the
evidence presented is admissible in evidence
People v. Aminnudin
163 SCRA 402
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The present case presented no such urgency.
It is clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who
was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from
the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance
of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort
was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his own authority
that a “search warrant was not necessary.”
FACTS:
Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo
City. The PC officers who were waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves
took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination.
When they were verified as marijuana leaves,
an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali
y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated.
Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
10

dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a
sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a “thorough investigation”.
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded
only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers
had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. He was Identified by
name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in
the evening and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. They detained
him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It
was found to contain three kilos of what were
later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis
of this finding, the corresponding charge was
then filed against Aminnudin.
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, that all
he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of
a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the
PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force
him to admit he was carrying the marijuana.
He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business
was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several
bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search and arrest of the
defendant–appellant was valid? (NO)
RULING:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was
not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest.
The Identification by the informer was the
probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him. While this is not to say that the
accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his
very own words suggest that he is lying, that
fact alone does not justify a finding that he is
guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even
if his defense is weak as long as the
prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.
Posadas v. Ombudsman
G.R. No. 131492, 29 September 2000
CASE PRINCIPLE:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests
without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule
113 must be based upon "probable cause"
which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
FACTS:
Venturina was killed in a rumble between 2
fraternities inside UP.
UP asked the help of NBI to investigate the
matter.
4 days after the said incident members of the
NBI went to UP, and was allegedly told by 2
eyewitnesses that it was Taparan and Narag
who killed Venturina.
With that information members of NBI tried
arresting Taparan and Narag without a warrant
of arrest. Taparan and Narag were inside the
campus to join the peace talk between the
fraternities.
11

Members of the UP Admin objected to the
arrest as there were no warrants for their
arrest.
NBI then file obstruction of justice against the
UP admin who objected to the arrest of
Taparan and Narag
ISSUE:
WON the NBI can validly arrest Taparan and
Narag without a warrant of arrest basing that
an offense has just been committed and that
they have personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it (NO)
RULING:
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had
personal knowledge of facts gathered by them
in the course of their investigation indicating
that the students sought to be arrested were
the perpetrators of the crime.
NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest
Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal
knowledge of any fact which might indicate
that the two students were probably guilty of
the crime. What they had were the supposed
positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the
arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without
a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113
must be based upon "probable cause" which
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
People v. Collado
G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must be upheld
in the absence of clear and convincing
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
evidence to overturn the same.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:
"(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." A common
example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one
made after conducting a buy-bust operation.
FACTS:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian
asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were
engaged in selling shabu and that drug users,
including out-of-school youth, were using their
residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin,
Pasig City, for their drug sessions. A buy-bust
operation team was thereafter formed. The
asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a
regular buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the
money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a
small metal container from which he brought
out a small plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police
officer went inside the house of Marcelino and
Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario gathered around a table littered with
various drug paraphernalia such as an
improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil
with traces of white substance, disposable
lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was
recovered from Ranada.
RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs.
5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165. CA
affirmed the decision with modification that
Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and Madarang are
accessories, not principals.
ISSUE:Whether or not irregularities attended
the arrest, detention, and the procedure in
handling the specimen seized from them(NO)
RULING:
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in
flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec.
12

5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in
his control and custody illegal drug
paraphernalia.
As for the specimen, the failure of the police
officers to inventory and photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized substance
were preserved, as in this case.
In Rañada’s case, he was actually caught having
custody and control of the confiscated drug
paraphernalia intended for smoking, injecting, etc. into
one's body. It was also indubitably shown that he
failed to present authority to possess the prohibited
articles, much less, an explanation of his possession
thereof. However, as regards the other accused who
were seen in the company of Rañada, the evidence of
conspiracy against them was insufficient. They were
in close proximity to Rañada at the time and place of
the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution
failed to show specific overt acts that would link these
accused to Ranada's possession of the said
contrabands. The CA erred in ruling that they were
accessories to the crime.
People v. Ng Yik Bun
G.R. No. 180452, Jan. 10, 2011
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An arrest made during the commission of a
crime (in flagrante delicto) does not require a
warrant.
FACTS:
Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana
received information from an operative that
there was an ongoing shipment of contraband
in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon
Province.
Upon instructions from his superior, Capt. Ibon
formed a team in coordination with a
PNPdetachment then proceeded to Villa Vicenta
Resort.
The team was able to observe the men from
50 meters away. They spotted six Chinese-
looking men loading bags containing a white
substance into a white van.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his
team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shiloh
Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the
van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and
pointed to Raymond Tan as the leader. A total
of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then
confiscated.
RTC found them guilty of violating Sec 16
(Possession and Use) of RA 6425.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
(YES)
RULING:
An arrest made during the commission of a
crime does not require a warrant. This is
reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
of the RRCP. It was a valid warrantless arrest
in flagrante delicto. Officers received info from
an operative re ongoing shipment of shabu.
They had probable cause to suspect that they
were loading and transporting contraband, and
when accosted, Hwan readily said that the
bags contained shabu and pointed to Tan as
the leader.
When a police officer sees the offense or hears
the disturbances although at a distance and
proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect
an arrest without a warrant on the basis of
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court -
offense is deemed committed in his presence
or within his view.
People v. Manlangit
G.R. No. 189806, Jan. 12, 2011
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The failure of the prosecution to show that the
police officers conducted the required physical
inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not
fatal and does automatically render accused-
appellant’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
To be admissible, the prosecution must show
by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into possession of the police
officers and until it was tested in the laboratory
to determine its composition up to the time it
was offered in evidence.
FACTS:
13

On November 25, 2003, an information was
filed charging Manlangit with violating Section
5 and Section 15 of RA9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act).
During the arraignment for both cases,
Manlangi pleaded not guilty, until the cases
were tried jointly.
Manlangit denied the buy-bust operation that
was conducted and claimed that the recovered
shabu was not from him.
He pointed out that he was not in the list of
suspected drug pushers of MADAC or of the
AIDSTOF. He further emphasized that the buy-
bust operation was conducted without first
conducting a surveillance or test buy to
determine the veracity of the report made by
the informant. He assailed the fact that despite
knowledge of his identity and location, the
buy-bust team failed to secure even a search
warrant.
Manlangit also raised the issue that the buy-
bust team failed to comply with the procedure
for the custody and control of seized prohibited
drugs under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. He argued
that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of o􏰂cial function was overturned
by the o􏰂cers' failure to follow the required
procedure in the conduct of a buy-bust
operation, as well as the procedure in the
proper disposition, custody, and control of the
subject specimen
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely erred in
finding that the procedure for the custody and
control of prohibited drugs was compiled with.
RULING:
No. The chain of custody of the seized drug
was unbroken.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulation of RA9165, provides that
non-compliance with the requirements and
procedure in the custody and handling of
seized dangerous drugs, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of custody over said
items, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.
Here, the accused-appellant does not question
the unbroken chain of evidence. His only
contention is that the buy-bust team did not
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
inventory and photograph the specimen on site
and in the presence of the accused-appellant
or his counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official.
Rontos v. People, G.R. No. 188024
June 5, 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE:
"It has been ruled time and again that an
accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails
to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground
before his arraignment."
FACTS:
At 4:00 p.m. on 19 October 2003, PO2 Emil
Masi of the Caloocan North City Police Station
dispatched PO1 Joven Pacis and PO1 Greg
Labaclado of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Task Force to conduct surveillance in Sampaloc
St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports
of illegal drug activity in the said area.
Upon coming closer, they saw that the plastic
sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline
substance similar to shabu. PO1 Pacis
approached petitioner and confiscated the
plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced
himself as a police officer and informed
petitioner of the offense the latter had
committed. The two police officers informed
petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he
just remained silent.
A Complaint for violation of Section 11
(possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of
R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred to the
city prosecutor for the filing of charges before
the court. RTC ruled that the prosecution was
able to establish the concurrence of all the
elements of possession of dangerous drugs and
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner contended that,
since his warrantless arrest was illegal, the
allegedly confiscated items were inadmissible
in evidence. The CA ruled that the question
over the legality of the arrest was deemed
waived by petitioner when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and
participating in the trial of the case. While the
arrest was without a warrant, it was with
14

probable cause since petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners warrantless arrest was illegal
RULING:
No. The CA correctly ruled that his failure to
question the legality of his arrest before
entering his plea during arraignment operated
as a waiver of that defense. "It has been ruled
time and again that an accused is estopped
from assailing any irregularity with regard to
his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before his
arraignment."
In his arraignment before the trial court,
petitioner never raised any issue and instead
"freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty to
the offense charged." Thus, he was estopped
from raising the issue of the legality of his
arrest before the trial court, more so on appeal
before the CA or this Court.
However, on the basis of the non-observance
of the rules of procedure for handling illegal
drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on
the ground of reasonable doubt. In illegal
drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the
drugs seized must be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that required
to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against
the accused hinges on the ability of the
prosecution to prove that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same one that was
recovered from the accused upon his arrest.
People v. Tangliben
April 6, 1990
CASE PRINCIPLE:
One of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant is a search incident
to a lawful arrest. Where the circumstances of
the case are pressed with urgency, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was no more
time to secure a warrant.
FACTS:
A group of patrolmen together with a barangay
tanod were conducting surveillance mission.
Later on, they saw appellant who was acting
suspiciously. Thereafter, they approached
appellant and ordered him to open his red
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
traveling bag. Appellant initially refused but
later acceded to the request when the
patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside
the bag were approximately a kilo of marijuana
leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. Appellant
was taken to the police station. He was tried
and the RTC convicted appellant for violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
admitting as evidence the package of
marijuana allegedly seized from defendant-
appellant as it was a product of an unlawful
search without warrant.
RULING:
No. One of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant is a search incident
to a lawful arrest. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provided that a police
officer may arrest a person even without a
warrant provided that the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."
Accused was caught in flagrante delicto since
he was carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within
the exception. The warrantless search was
incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid. Although the trial court’s decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes
reveals that there was an informer who pointed
to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana.J
This case is different from the case of People v.
Amminudin. Here, the case presented
urgency. The police officers here were faced
with on-the-spot information from an informer.
Hence, the police officers had to act quickly.
There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling
in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
15
 Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.

possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, Whether or not the accused could be arrested
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. without warrant and only based on the
would make it extremely difficult, if not information given by the Confidential informant
impossible to contain the crimes with which (NO)
these persons are associated.
RULING:
Therefore, the judgement by the RTC is Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known
affirmed. as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a
warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
People v. Bronola must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
4 April 2018 must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
CASE PRINCIPLE:
overt act is done in the presence or within the
the elements of an arrest effected in hot
view of the arresting officer. On the other
pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5
hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot
(arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an
pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5
offense has just been committed; and second,
(arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an
the arresting officer has probable cause to
offense has just been committed; and second,
believe based on personal knowledge of facts
the arresting officer has probable cause to
or circumstances that the person to be
believe based on personal knowledge of facts
arrested has committed it.
or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
FACTS:
Here, without the tip provided by the
On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a
confidential informant, accused-appellant could
confidential informant (CI) sent a text message
not be said to have executed any overt act in
to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr.
the presence or within the view of the arresting
(P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station
officers which would indicate that he was
Commander of Police Station 6, Puerto,
committing the crime of illegal possession of
Cagayan de Oro City, that an alleged courier of
marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers
marijuana together with a female companion,
have personal knowledge of facts indicating
was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The
that accused-appellant had just committed an
alleged courier had in his possession a
offense. Again, without the tipped information,
backpack containing marijuana and would be
accused-appellant would just have been any
traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro
other bus passenger who was minding his own
City. At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called
business and eager to reach his destination. It
P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged
must be remembered that warrantless arrests
drug courier had boarded a bus with body
are mere exceptions to the constitutional right
number and plate number KVP 988 bound for
of a person against unreasonable searches and
Cagayan de Oro City.
seizures, thus, they must be strictly construed
against the government and its agents. While
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen
the campaign against proliferation of illegal
stopped the bus bearing the said body and
drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same
plate numbers. P/Insp. Orate, Police Officer 3
must be conducted in a manner which does not
Teodoro de Oro (PO3 De Oro), Senior Police
trample upon well-established constitutional
Officer 1 Benjamin Jay Reycitez (SPO1
rights. Truly, the end does not justify the
Reycitez), and PO1 Rexie Tenio (PO1 Tenio)
means.
boarded the bus and saw a man matching the
description given to them by the CI. The man
was seated at the back of the bus with a People v. Bolasa
backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate 22 Dec. 1999
asked the man to open the bag, the police
officers saw a transparent cellophane
containing dried marijuana leaves. CASE PRINCIPLE:
An arrest is lawful even “in the absence of a
warrant”:
ISSUE:

16

1. when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
2. when an offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and,
3. when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. (A
person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the offense).
FACTS:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante
Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early
evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and
a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a
certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with
SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded
to the house of the suspects and parked their
car some three hundred (300) meters away.
They walked towards their quarry's lair
accompanied this time by their unnamed
informer. When they reached the house they
"peeped (inside) through a small window and
saw one man and a woman repacking
suspected marijuana." They entered the house
and introduced themselves as police officers to
the occupants and thereupon confiscated the
tea bags and some drug paraphernalia.
They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be
the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and
Roberto delos Reyes.
Subsequent examination of the tea bags by
NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed
the suspicion that the tea bags contained
marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos
Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec.
8, Art. II, of RA 6425 otherwise known as The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC
convicted them of the crime charged.
Both the accused however denied on the
witness stand ownership over the confiscated
tea bags and drug implements. Accused Bolasa
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
asserts that the search and her arrest was
illegal. She insists that the trial court should
not regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon
credible because he does not have personal
knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest
and search making his testimony a hearsay.
ISSUE:
WON the seizure and subsequent arrest were
valid? (NO)
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the arrest was
invalid because the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that at the time of their
arrest, accused-apellants had just committed,
were committing or about to commit a crime.
The arresting officers also have no personal
knowledge that a crime was committed nor
have a reasonable ground to believe that the
accused committed the crime. And accused
appellants were not prisoners who have
escaped from a penal establishment.
With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the
court held that it is also invalid because the
objects were not seized in plain view. There
was no valid intrusion and the evidence was
not inadvertently discovered. The police
officers intentionally peeped through the
window to ascertain the activities of appellants
inside the room. In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless arrest, a
customs search, or a stop and frisk situation.
The court stated that the arresting officers
should have first conducted surveillance
considering that the identities and addresses of
the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance
and determining the existence of probable
cause, they should have secured a warrant
prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.
The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was also illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal
search cannot be used against the accused-
appellants.
The Court held that the State cannot in a
cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its
citizens as well as into their houses, papers
and effects. The constitutional provision
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other
forms of restraint.
17

Decision of RTC REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable
doubt.
Antiquera v. People
11 December 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Arrest in In Flagrante Delicto cannot be invoke
when the circumstances of the arrest would
show that the crime was not committed in the
presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
FACTS:
Assistant prosecutor charged the accused with
illegal possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs.
Evidence shows that some police officers and
two civilian operatives on board a patrol car
and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City,
when they saw two unidentified men rush out
of house. Suspecting that a crime had been
committed, the police officers approached the
house from where the men came and peeked
through the partially opened door. They saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised
tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his
live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an
aluminum foil and an improvised burner.
This Police officers entered the house,
introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera
and Cruz. While inspecting the immediate
surroundings, they confiscated some
paraphernalia and plastic sachets with traces
of white crystalline substance. After
examination it was found out to be “shabu”
RTC convicted the accused as charged and this
was affirmed by CA. They acknowledged that
this was a case of a lawful warrantless arrest
since the accused were caught in flagrante
delicto.
And even if the arrest of the accused was
irregular, he is already considered to have
waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to
the court's jurisdiction by entering a plea of
not guilty.
ISSUE:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
1. WON the CA erred finding accused
Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
based on the evidence of the police officers
that they saw him and Cruz in the act of
possessing drug paraphernalia? YES
2. WON the evidence can be admitted
considering that the illegal arrest has been
waived? No.
RULING:
1. To invoke an arrest in In flagrante
delicto, the overt act constituting the
crime is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.
However, in the case at bar, Police
officers did not notice anything amiss
going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Also, during trial, it
was found out that the police officer
did not merely peek through the
opened door but also pushed the same
in order for them to take a good look
inside.
2. Waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to acquit the accused
People v. Edano
G.R. No. 188133, 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught
in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant and
Siochi with violation of Sec. 11 Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
presenting the following set of facts:
18

The appellant arrived on board a space wagon
driven by Siochi. The informant approached
the appellant and talked to him inside the
vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at
PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching
the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle
and ran away.
The other police officers chased the appellant;
PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant,
causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3
Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent
plastic bag from the appellant's right hand,
while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the
appellant's waist. The other members of the
police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police
brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized
items to the police station for investigation.
The seized items were examined and were
found to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The RTC acquitted Siochi due to reasonable
doubt, while the appellant was charged guilty
beyond reasonable doubt; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless arrest (NO)
RULING:
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. This is known as arrest in flagrante
delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught
in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise that could
be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he
(appellant) had just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the
appellant and the informant were just talking
with each other when he approached them.
Commerciante v. People
G.R. No. 205926, 2015
CASE PRINCIPLE: In both warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5
(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed.
FACTS:
An Information was filed with the RTC against
Alvin Comerciante of violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, Agent Radan and
PO3 Calag were on a motorcycle patrolling the
area on their way to visit their friend. Cruising
at a speed of 30 km/hr along Private Rode,
Mandaluyong, they spotted, at a distance of
ten meters, two men -later identified as
Comerciante and Dasilla - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. At a distance of around 5
meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested Comerciante and
Dasilla, and confiscated two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from
them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
RTC convicted Commerciante. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision and held that PO3 Calag had
probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest
of Comerciante, given that the latter was
committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
In a petition for review on certiorari,
Commerciante contends that PO3 Calag did not
effect a valid warrantless arrest on him.
ISSUE:
WON P03 Calag effected a valid warrantless
arrest on Commerciante.
RULING:
No. There could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on Comerciante.
19

In both warrantless arrest under Section 5(a)
and (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the officer's personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5
(a), the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that
a crime has just been committed.
In this case, it is highly implausible that PO3
Calag, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy especially from a distance
of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante.
The acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion
were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same
would not have been sufficient in order to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The balance lies in the concept of
"suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be
undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and
criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern - based on facts that they
themselves observe - whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit
act.
Pestilos v. Generoso
G.R. No. 182601, 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed
does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission
of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
circumstances, that the person to be arrested
has recently committed the crime.
FACTS:
The arresting officers went to the scene of the
crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of
his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than
one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the
alleged crime transpired in a community where
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside;
Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
and, notably, the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso lived almost in the same
neighborhood;
This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station
for investigation. In an Information dated
February 22, 2005, the petitioners were
indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
Regular Preliminary Investigation on the
ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid
warrantless arrest took place since the police
officers had no personal knowledge that they
were the perpetrators of the crime. They also
claimed that they were just "invited" to the
police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding
was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners were validly arrested without
a warrant. (Yes)
RULING:
The Court holds that the following must be
present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the
crime should have been just committed; and
2) the arresting officer's exercise of discretion
is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge.
The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance
with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.
In this case, with the said facts and
circumstances that the police officers gathered
20

and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, the Court deem
it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were
well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the
arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
police officers' personal observation, which
are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.
In determining the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon
the courts to consider if the police officers
have complied with the requirements set
under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically, the requirement of immediacy;
the police officer's personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of
the determination of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested committed the
crime.
Saraum v. People
G.R. No. 205472, 2016
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Arrest during the commission of a crime does
not require a warrant in accordance with
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the ROC. In arrest in
flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
FACTS:
Arrest during the commission of a crime does
not require a warrant in accordance with
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the ROC. In arrest in
flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Facts:
On August 17, 2006, a telephone call was
received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal
drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay
Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then
against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was
designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied
by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up,
and the rest of the team as the perimeter
security. PO1 Aniñon coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
regarding the operation. After preparing all the
necessary documents, such as the pre-
operation report and submitting the same to
the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject
area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as
he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the
house, which was divided with a curtain as
partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum
and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug
paraphernalia apparently in preparation to
have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered
from Saraum’s possession a lighter, rolled
tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter).
PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed
them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and
made initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P"
for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3
Larrobis marked as "AIS08-17-2006" the
paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After
the case was filed, the subject items were
turned over to the property custodian of the
Office of City Prosecutor.
Saraum denied the commission of the alleged
offense. He testified that on the date and time
in question, he was passing by Lorega
Cemetery on his way to the house of his
parents-in-law when he was held by men with
firearms. They were already with "Antik" and
"Pata," both of whom were his neighbors.
The accused was convicted in the RTC. The
decision of RTC was affirmed by the CA.
21

ISSUE:
WON Saraum's warrantless arrest was valid.
RULING:
Yes. The arrest was an in flagrante delicto
arrest w/c does not require a warrant of arrest.
Saraum was arrested during the commission of
a crime, which does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
ROC. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused
is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in
Kagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's
statement that he was not committing a crime
at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis
described in detail how they were able to
apprehend him, who was then holding a
disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin
foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand,
while they were in the course of arresting
somebody. The case is clearly one of hot
pursuit of "Pata," who, in eluding arrest,
entered the shanty where Saraum and
Esperanza were incidentally caught in
possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not
proffer any satisfactory explanation with
regard to his presence at the vicinity of the
buy-bust operation and his possession of the
seized items that he claims to have "countless,
lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution
witnesses have adequately explained the
respective uses of the items to prove that they
were indeed drug paraphernalia.
Sapi v. People
CASE PRINCIPLE:
For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto
to be affected, two elements must concur:
a. The person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime;
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
b. Such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting
officer
As to hot pursuit arrest, the rule requires that
an offense has just been committed. It
connotes "immediacy in point of time.” An
arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 (b) of the
Rules of Court entails a time element from the
moment the crime is committed up to the point
of arrest.
Mere passive conformity or silence to the
warrantless search is only an implied
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at
all. Whereas the presence of a coercive
environment negates the claim that petitioner
consented to the warrantless search.
FACTS:
An Information was filed before RTC charging
Veridiano with the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
According to the prosecution, a concerned
citizen called PO3 Esteves, informing him that
Veridiano was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs. Hence, PO1 Cabello and
PO2 Vergara were instructed to set up a
checkpoint at Laguna.
They chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and
asked the passengers to disembark. The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their
t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets. The police officers recovered from
Veridiano a tea bag containing what appeared
to be marijuana
For his defense, Veridiano testified that the
jeepney was being followed by 3 motorcycles,
each with 2 passengers in civilian attire. When
the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy,
Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the
jeepney. 2 armed men boarded the jeepney
and frisked Veridiano. However, they found
nothing on his person. Still, Veridiano was
accosted and brought to the police station
where he was informed that illegal drug was
found in his possession.
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial
court of his asserting that he was illegally
arrested. He argued that the tea bag
containing marijuana is "inadmissible in
22

evidence for being the 'fruit of a poisonous
tree”. Veridiano further argued that the police
officers failed to comply with the rule on chain
of custody.
Prosecution asserted that "the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused." Thus, by
entering his plea of not guilty, Veridiano
waived his right to question any irregularity in
his arrest. With regard to the alleged illegal
warrantless search conducted by the police
officers, the prosecution argued that
Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time
of the search" indicated that he consented to
the warrantless search. CA affirmed the guilt
of Veridiano, finding that Veridiano was caught
in flagrante delict" of having marijuana in his
possession.
ISSUE:
1. Whether there was a valid warrantless
search against petitioner (NO)
2. Whether there is enough evidence to
sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs (NO)
RULING:
1. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was
unlawful.
ITCAB, petitioner's arrest could not be justified
as an in flagrante delicto arrest. He was not
committing a crime at the checkpoint.
Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not
exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of
the law enforcers that would incite suspicion.
In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police
officers relied solely on the tip they received.
Reliable information alone is insufficient to
support a warrantless arrest absent any overt
act from the person to be arrested indicating
that a crime has just been committed, was
being committed, or is about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be
justified. The law enforcers had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed
an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is
what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search.
2. The warrantless search cannot be
justified under the reasonable
suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined as "the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s) or contraband." Thus, the allowable
scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to
a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons."
While probable cause is not required, a "stop
and frisk" search cannot be validated on the
basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers
must have a genuine reason to believe, based
on their experience and the particular
circumstances of each case, that criminal
activity may be afoot.
Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in
a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that
would give police officers reasonable suspicion
to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
Reasonable persons will act in a nervous
manner in any check point. There was no
evidence to show that the police had basis or
personal knowledge that would reasonably
allow them to infer anything suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of
resistance can hardly be considered as consent
to the warrantless search. Although the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be surrendered through a valid waiver,
the prosecution must prove that the waiver
was executed with clear and convincing
evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and
seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and unattended by duress or
coercion.
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of
a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se are not
invalid. Considering that routine checkpoints
intrude "on a motorist's right to 'free passage’,
they must be "conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine
inspections must be limited to a visual search.
23

However, an extensive search may be
conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when
law enforcers have probable cause to believe
that the vehicle's passengers committed a
crime or when the vehicle contains instruments
of an offense. That the object of a warrantless
search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle
does not justify an extensive search absent
probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers
cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or
tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no
matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion.
In the present case, the extensive search
conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They
had no probable cause to believe that the
accused violated any law except for the tip
they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
Therefore, the warrantless search conducted
by the police officers is invalid. Consequently,
the tea bag containing marijuana seized from
petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the
exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3
(2) of the Constitution. There being no
evidence to support his conviction, petitioner
must be acquitted.
Sec. 6. Time of making arrest
Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by
virtue of a warrant
People v. Palatin
311 SCRA 186
CASE PRINCIPLE:
any object, defect, or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters
a plea.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso
Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of
the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime
of robbery. The Amended information was
dated October 11, 1985.
In a Second Amended Information also dated
October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex
Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras
were charged before the same court with the
crime of robbery with multiple rape.
palatin argued that he was not identified by
witness Belisario and only heard the voice.
however, the accused also alleged that he was
arrested without warrant.
According to the accused Mijaque,, the police
of Iloilo, mandurriao received the complaint,
suspected Mijaque as thief and was picked up
by the agents of Manduriao without warrant
and was detained for 3 days. when the
manduriao officers saw the Labunao robbery
was flashed, the officers handed him for
custodial investigation for the robbery with
rape case.
Ras was testified to be in Antique argued that
his name wasnt mentioned.by the witnesses.
Patalin and Mijaque argued that they are
arrested without warrant. however, they did
not object before they enter into a plea.
They were convicted of robbery with multiple
rape committed in the evening of August 11,
1984 against the Aliman family. They were
meted the death penalty. At the time the
crimes were committed in 1984, robbery with
rape was punishable by death, however, by
virtue of the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the death penalty was abolished
and all death penalties already imposed were
reduced to reclusion perpetua. In 1987, when
the 1987 Constitution suspended the
imposition of the death penalty, the trial has
not yet been finished, hence, it was overtaken
by the Death Penalty Law effective January 1,
1994. Appellants now opposed that the trial
court erred in imposing the death penalty as
the same was suspended upon ratification of
the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Palatin and
Mijaque were arrested by virtue of warrant
RULING:
No. The accused were arrested without
warrant, suffice it to say that any objection,
defects or irregularities attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters into a
plea, as correctly pointed out, the record
shows no objection prior to the arraignment
24

and trial. thus the accused were convicted
jointly justified by the evidences.
Cadua v. CA
312 SCRA 703
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A peace officer may arrest a person without
warrant when an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
FACTS:
One evening, PO3 Burdeous and companions,
aboard a mobile unit, received a radio dispatch
concerning an alleged hold-up. There, the
victims, alleging that the holduppers had just
fled, boarded the patrol unit to search for the
holduppers. They saw two men walking
alongside the street and the victims identified
them as the culprits.
Burdeous approached the men but suspecting
that petitioner was about to pull something
tucked on the right side of his waist, Burdeous
pointed his firearm at petitioner then frisked
him and found in his possession a .38 caliber
"paltik" revolver.
Verification with the Firearms and Explosives
Unit revealed that petitioner is not a valid
license holder of the paltik revolver. Hence,
information on Illegal Possession of Firearms
was filed. On the investigation for robbery,
victims manifested doubts as to the identity of
the accused.
Petitioner was then tried and convicted of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and on appeal to
the CA, the same was affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether his right to be protected from any
unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated.
(NO)
RULING:
There was sufficient reason to justify a
warrantless arrest of petitioner of Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Applicable here is Sec.
5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
A peace officer may arrest a person without
warrant when an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
Here, through complainants, the police officers
ascertained that a robbery had just been
committed, and petitioner was directly
implicated as a suspect. Then, actual
possession of an unlicensed firearm, which
petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself,
amounts to committing an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer.
The fact that the robbery case was never
brought to trial does not depend upon the
indubitable existence of the crime. The
warrantless arrest of petitioner being lawful,
the incident search and subsequent seizure of
the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise
lawful and valid pursuant to Sec. 12 Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
All told, the arresting officers reasonably acted
upon personal knowledge at the time, and not
on unreliable hearsay information, to effect a
lawful arrest.
Genuino v. de Lima
G.R. No. 193730. 17 April 2018
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Issuance of HDOs is an exercise of this Court's
inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case
and the person of the accused.
FACTS:
Following the filing of criminal complaints filed
against former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA), then Secretary of Justice De
Lima (De Lima) issued DOJ Watchlist Order
(WLO) against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a
validity period of 60 days, unless sooner
terminated or otherwise extended.
GMA requested for the issuance of an Allow-
Departure Order (ADO), pursuant to Section 7
of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she may be
able to seek medical attention from medical
specialists abroad. She mentioned six different
countries where she intends to undergo
consultations and treatments. She likewise
undertook to return to the Philippines, once her
treatment abroad is completed, and participate
in the proceedings before the DOJ. (mao ni
katong na trend ang neck brace ug wheelchair
sa mga politiko lol).
25

Upon issuance of TRO in their favor, petitioners
went to NAIA to take their flight to Singapore.
However, the Bureau of Immigration officials at
NAIA refused to process their travel documents
which ultimately resulted to them not being
able to join their flights
Petitioners claimed that the issuance
unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to
travel even in the absence of the grounds
provided in the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON respondents De Lima as SOJ
violated the petitioners’ constitutional right to
travel through the enforcement of DOJ Circular
No. 41. YES
RULING:
Issuance of HDOs is an exercise of this Court's
inherent power "to preserve and to maintain
the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the accused. It is an
exercise of judicial power which belongs to the
Court alone, and which the DOJ, even as the
principal law agency of the government, does
not have the authority to wield.
Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial
and, unfortunately, not broad enough to
embrace the imposition of restraint on the
liberty of movement. (TN: In one of the
whereas clauses of the issuance it states:
"[HDO] shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [RTCs],"
said circulars are, however, silent with respect
to cases falling within the jurisdiction of courts
below the RTC as well as those pending
determination by government prosecution
offices;)
The apparent vagueness of the circular as to
the distinction between a HDO and WLO is
violative of the due process clause. An act that
is vague "violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Here, the distinction is significant as it will
inform the respondents of the grounds,
effects and the measures they may take
to contest the issuance against them.
Verily, there must be a standard by which a
HDO or WLO may be issued, particularly
against those whose cases are still under
preliminary investigation, since at that stage
there is yet no criminal information against
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
them which could have warranted the
restraint.
Indeed, the DOJ has the power to investigate
the commission of crimes and prosecute
offenders. Its zealousness in pursuing its
mandate is laudable but more admirable when
tempered by fairness and justice.
---- a little bg ----
(Framers’ interpretation) Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the right to travel
may be impaired ONLY in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health,
as may be provided by law.
Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer
without warrant
Dela Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 209387, 2016
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port
authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per
se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so as to
deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the
safety of the traveling public.
FACTS:
De la Cruz was at the port of Cebu to go home
to Iloilo. He left his bag on the floor to buy a
ticket. It took him 15 minutes to buy the
ticket. He then proceeded to the X-ray
machine. The xray operator saw the
impression of what seems to be a firearm. So
he informed an airport personnel. The airport
personnel asked if he could open the bag of
Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz affirmed. The airport
personnel confirmed that it is really a firearm.
When dela cruz was asked about the papers of
the firearms, he could not produce any.
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of
his violation of a crime punishable by law. He
was also informed of his constitutional rights.
Dela Cruz was then charged with 1)Violation of
Election Gun Ban. 2)Illegal possession
Dela Cruz contended that the arrest and
seizure made by the airport personnel violate
his constitutional right againt unreasonable
26

searches and seizures since there was no
search warrant.
ISSUE: WON Dela Cruz’s constitutional right
was violated.
RULING: No. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Given the circumstances obtaining here, we
find the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of his constitutional rights. The reason
behind this is that that there is a reasonable
reduced expectation of privacy when coming
into airports. With increased concern over
airplane hijacking it is important to strike a
balance between authority and an individual’s
liberty.
Moreover, there is no intrusion when the
airport personnel opened the bag because the
presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray
scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the
choice of whether to present the bag or not.
He had the option not to travel if he did not
want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray
machine scanning and actual inspection upon
showing of probable cause that a crime is
being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard
the passengers passing through ports or
terminals.
Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private
person
Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance
Sec. 11. Right of Officer to break into
building or enclosure
Sec. 12. Right to break out from
building or enclosure
Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue
Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to
visit person arrested
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
RULE 126
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Sec. 1. Search warrant defined
Nolasco v. Paño
139 SCRA 154
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
FACTS:
Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together
with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been
wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP.
The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August
6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her
premises were searched and 428 documents, a
portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a
search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s
leased residence allegedly an underground
house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the
documents seized, charges of subversion and
rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the
fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco
with illegal possession of subversive materials.
Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally
obtained and that the search warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does
not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and
that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant’s witness.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was valid? (NO)
27

RULING:
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing
description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be
used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent
a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact,
taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant
and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to
be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were
considered null and void for being too general.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff
133 SCRA 800
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or
justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
FACTS: 2 publishing firms were searched in
this case. The Metropolitan Mail and We
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Forum. Incidental to the search warrant issued
by Judge Cruz-Pano, office machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper were seized
The petitioner here prays that the search
warrant should be declared illegal based on the
grounds that: (1) Judge failed to conduct an
examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by
the above-quoted constitutional provision as
wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;
(2) two search warrants were issued but
pinpointed only one place where petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and
concealing the articles listed; (3) Articles
belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos,
Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media
Services, Inc. were seized although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone; (4) real property was seized under the
disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles,
instruments, etc.; (5) Search warrant was
based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s
that they conducted surveillance of the
premises could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of a probable cause.
The respondents here asserted that their case
is strong and that petitioners are estopped by
laches for they only impugned the validity of
the question search warrant six months after
the controversial search.
ISSUE: WON the search warrants issued are
valid.
RULING: No. The SC held in this case that the
issued search warrants are in the nature of a
general warrants. Probable cause was also not
determined in this case. The search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification. In short it must
be specific and not general.
The broad statement of Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner is in possession of
materials for subversion is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
28

probable cause. Lacking of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
the basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for the respondent
judge to have done so.
Corro v. Lising
137 SCRA 541
CASE PRINCIPLE:
SEC. 3.Rule 126 of ROC
Requisites for issuing search warrant.-
A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or
justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized
FACTS:
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon
application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the
Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation
Service, issued a search warrant authorizing
the search and seizure of articles allegedly
used by petitioner in committing the crime of
inciting to sedition.
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for
publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the
Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles,
printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording
machines,video machines and tapes
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall
warrant and to return documents/personal
properties alleging among others that the
properties seized are typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording
machines, video machines and tapes which are
not in any way, inanimate or mute things as
they are, connected with the offense of inciting
to sedition.
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion.
Hence, this petition praying that the search
warrant issuedby respondent Judge Esteban M.
Lising be declared null and void
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
ab initio that the padlocked office premises of
the Philippine Times be reopened. Respondents
would have this Court dismiss the petition
stating that probable cause exists justifying the
issuance of a search warrant, the articles
seized were adequately described in the search
warrant, a search was conducted in an orderly
manner and the padlocking of the searched
premises was with the consent of petitioner's
wife.
ISSUE:
WON there was sufficient probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant? NO
RULING:
The statements made in the affidavits are
mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language
used is all embracing as to include all
conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
The search warrant under consideration was in
the nature of a general warrant which is
objectionable.
Therefore, an application for search warrant
must state with particularity the alleged
subversive materials published or intended to
be published by the publisher and editor of the
Philippines Times, Rommel Corro.
In addition, the statements made by Col.
Castillo and Lt. Igancio in the affidavits are
mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause.
Search Warrant issued by respondent judge is
declared null and void.
Columbia Pictures v. Flores
223 SCRA 761
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The search warrant must contain a specific
description of the place to be searched and the
articles sought to be seized must be described
with particularity.
FACTS:
Petitioner (Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc) lodged a complaint before the
NBI against certain video establishments
(among them private respondent FGT Video
Network) for violation of PD No. 49 or the
Protection of Intellectual Property for the
"unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or
29

disposition of copyrighted film", and sought the
NBI's urgent assistance in the conduct of
search and seizure operations. Consequently,
the NBI applied for a search warrant with the
RTC. Judge Flores issued Search Warrant 45.
In the course of the search of the premises of
FGT, the NBI agents found and seized various
video. NBI also seized machines and
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia,
materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, statements of order, return slips,
video prints, flyers, production orders, and
posters (which according to FGT, were not
covered by the search warrant). FGT filed a
motion for the immediate release of these
seized items allegedly not covered by the
search warrant because as a licensed video
producer, it had the right to maintain
possession of the seized reproduction
equipment and paraphernalia which are not
contraband or illegal per se. The language
used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No.
45 is too all-embracing as to include all the
paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its
business. RTC granted the motion of FGT.
ISSUE:
The sole issue to be resolved is WON the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the immediate release and return of some of
the items seized by virtue of the search
warrant.
RULING:
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test
of legality. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court provide for the requisites in the
issuance of search warrants. In issuing a
search warrant, the judge must strictly comply
with the constitutional and statutory
requirements. The search warrant must
contain a specific description of the place to be
searched and the articles sought to be seized
must be described with particularity. As the
search warrant is in the nature of a general
one, it is constitutionally objectionable.
Application: Television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are
articles which can be found in a video tape
store engaged in the legitimate business of
lending or renting out betamax tapes. In
short, these articles and appliances are
generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving
piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Kho v. Makalintal
306 SCRA 70
CASE PRINCIPLE:
When the judge personally examined the
applicants and witnesses, he had the
opportunity to find out their personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough
to create a probable cause. The law does not
require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities.
FACTS:
NBI agent, Max Salvador, applied for the
issuance of search warrants by the respondent
Judge against Benjamin Kho, now petitioner in
his residence at BF Homes, Parañaque.
On the same day, Eduardo Arugay, another
NBI agent, applied with the same court for the
issuance of search warrants against the said
petitioner in his house at Brgy. Moonwalk,
Parañaque.
The search warrants were applied for after
teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal
surveillance and investigation in the two
houses referred to on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places
were being used as storage centers for
unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles.
Respondent sought for the issuance of search
warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be
instituted against petitioner Kho.
The judge conducted the necessary
examination of the witnesses provided by the
applicants. On the following day, armed with
search warrants the NBI agents searched
petitioner’s house at BF Homes while another
team of NBI agents also conducted a search in
his house at Brgy. Moonwalk. High-powered
firearms and ammunitions were recovered
during the simultaneous searches. It also
resulted to confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment. The confiscated
firearms and explosives were found to be
unlicensed.Likewise, the radio transceivers
were also unlicensed and unregistered. The
raiding teams submitted separate returns to
the judge requesting that the items seized be
in the continued custody of the NBI.
Petitioner presented a motion to quash the
said search warrants contending that:
30

1. The warrants were issued without
probable cause;
2. The warrants are prohibited by the
constitution for being general
warrants;
3. It is issued in violation of procedural
requirements set forth by
constitution;
4. It served in violation of rules of court;
and
5. Objects seized were all legally
possessed and issued. Respondent
judge denied the motion to quash.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrants were valid (YES)
RULING:
Petitioners contention is untenable. The
applicants for search warrants testified
unequivocally that they saw guns being carried
to and unloaded at the two houses. Thus, it is
clear that the application for the questioned
search warrants was based on personal
knowledge of the applicants and their
witnesses.
The Court discerns no basis for disturbing the
findings and conclusions arrived at by the
respondent Judge after examining the
applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge
had the singular opportunity to assess their
testimonies and to find out their personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances enough
to create a probable cause. The Judge was the
one who personally examined the applicants
and witnesses and who asked searching
questions vis-a-vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and
determine whether subject applicants and their
witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted
at the premises to be searched. In the absence
of any showing that respondent judge was
recreant of his duties in connection with the
personal examination he so conducted on the
affiants before him, there is no basis for
doubting the reliability and correctness of his
findings and impressions.
The contention of petitioners that the judge
failed to ask specific questions that they deem
particularly important is devoid of any
sustainable basis. Nothing improper is
perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under
oath, and asked them searching questions on
the facts and circumstances personally known
to them, in compliance with prescribed
procedure and legal requirements.
the As to the petitioners claim that said warrants
were general warrants and were issued in
violation of procedural requirements, the court
believes and so holds that the said warrants
comply with constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that
the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute detail as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities.
Verediano v. People
7 June 2017, G.R. No. 200370
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Law enforcers need not personally witness
the commission of a crime, but they must
have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person
sought to be arrested committed it.
FACTS:
A citizen informed PO3 Esteves that a certain
alias “Baho” who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.
PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the
information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin
Vergara who were both on duty. Chief of Police
June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2
Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally
knew Veridiano. They chanced upon Veridiano
at around 10PM inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged
down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the
passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for
possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a
tea bag containing what appeared to be
marijuana.” PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea
bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano
was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
31

rights. He was then brought to the police
station.
At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over
the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also
placed his initials. PO1 Solano then made a
laboratory examination request, which he
personally brought with the seized tea bag to
the Philippine National Police crime laboratory.
The contents of the tea bag tested positive for
marijuana.
RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana.
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial
court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."
The CA rendered a Decision affirming the guilt
of Veridiano.
The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was
caught in flagrante delicto" of having
marijuana in his possession.
Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was
denied.
Veridiano filed a Petition for Review
Certiorari. Petition was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid warrantless search
against petitioner
RULING:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires
that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; "the process
cannot be reversed." For there to be a lawful
arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a
valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also
be effected without a warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a
warrantless arrest.
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When
Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as
an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he [or she] has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.”
on
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court
pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule
requires that an offense has just been
committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of
time." That a crime was in fact committed does
not automatically bring the case under this
rule. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of
the Rules of Court entails a time element from
the moment the crime is committed up to the
point of arrest.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be
justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger
who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the
presence of the law enforcers that would incite
suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest,
the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest
absent any overt act from the person to be
arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about
to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be
justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
32

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any
fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is
what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of
resistance can hardly be considered as consent
to the warrantless search. Although the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be surrendered through a valid waiver,
the prosecution must prove that the waiver
was executed with clear and convincing
evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless search
and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by
duress or coercion."
In the present case, the extensive search
conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They
had no probable cause to believe that the
accused violated any law except for the tip
they received. They did not observe any
peculiar activity from the accused that may
either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.
Moreover, the search was flawed at its
inception. The checkpoint was set up to target
the arrest of the accused.
The warrantless search conducted by the police
officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag
containing marijuana seized from petitioner is
rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary
principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution. There being no evidence to
support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.
Te v. Breva
5 August 2015
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The search warrant is not similar to a criminal
action but is rather a legal process that may be
likened to a writ of discovery employed by no
less than the State to procure relevant
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an
instrument or tool, issued under the State's
police power, and this is the reason why it
must issue in the name of the People of the
Philippines
FACTS:
Respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest
upon the application of his co-respondent
investigator. This special investigator has
determined a probable cause for a violation of
Section 2 (b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 for
hoarding large quantities of liquified petroleum
gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to
respondent Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases)
against petitioner. The application for the
search warrant was filed at the instance of
Pryce Gases through a letter. Petitioner moved
to quash warrant and/or Suppress Evidence
and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising
therein the lack of probable cause, failure to
specify the single offense committed, among
others. These motions were denied by the
lower courts for having filed an appropriate
motion or manifestation to amend the petition
and to actually amend the petition in order to
implead the People of the Philippines as
respondents.
ISSUE:
WON it is a necessary requisite and an
indispensable condition that the People of the
Philippine be impleaded in a petition filed
assailing the denial of a motion to quash a
search warrant? YES
RULING:
The search warrant is not similar to a criminal
action but is rather a legal process that may be
likened to a writ of discovery employed by no
less than the State to procure relevant
evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an
instrument or tool, issued under the State's
police power, and this is the reason why it
must issue in the name of the People of the
Philippines
The sworn application for the search warrant
and the search warrant itself were upon the
behest of the People of the Philippines. It
defies logic and common sense for the
petitioner to contend, therefore, that the
application against him was not made by the
People of the Philippines but by the interested
party or parties. The petition was denied
Sec. 2. Court where application for
33

search warrant shall be filed
Pilipinas Shell v. Romars International
16 Feb. 2015
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An application for a SW is a “special criminal
process” rather than a criminal action. The
power to issue a special criminal process is
inherent in all courts.
FACTS: Petitioners received an Information
that respondent was selling, offering for sale,
or distributing liquefied gas (LPG) by illegally
refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by
and bearing the duly registered trademark and
device of respondent Petron.
Investigators went to the premises of
respondent to confirm and then and there
found that respondent was not authorized to
Petitioners then requested the NBI to
investigate on the matter, thereafter found
commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and
Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's
warehouse.
The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed
with the RTC Naga City, 2 separate
Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of
Sec. 155.1 in relation to Sec. 170 of RA 8293
against respondent and/or its occupants.
The RTC issued the SWs and the NBI served
them.
The respondent filed a MTQ the SW, later, a
new counsel of the respondent raised the issue
for the first time, the impropriety of the filing
of Application for SW at the RTC-Naga when
the alleged crime was committed in a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-
Iriga City.
The respondent failed to state any compelling
reason to justify the filing of the same in a
court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of the commission of
the crime, as required by Sec. 2(b) Rule 126 of
the RROC.
Petitioner opposed arguing that it was already
too late for respondent to raise the issue
regarding the venue of the filing of the SW, as
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
this would be in violation of the Omnibus
Motion Rule.
The RTC granted the MTQ.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that
venue in an application for SW is jurisdictional
RULING:
Yes. SEC. 2 of Rule 126 provides that, Court
where applications for search warrant shall be
filed:
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
Petitioner's application for a SW was indeed
insufficient for failing to comply with the
requirement to state therein the compelling
reasons why they had to file the application in
a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the alleged crime was
committed.
However, the RTC-Naga did not act properly in
taking into consideration the issue of said
defect in resolving respondent’s MFR where the
issue was raised for very first time. The
respondent failed to include said issue at the
first instance in a MTQ.
In accordance to the omnibus motion rule, the
trial court could only take cognizance of an
issue that was NOT raised in the MTQ if:
- Said issue was not available
or existent when they filed the
MTQ the SW; or (YES)
- The issue was one involving
jurisdiction over the subject
matter. (NO)
Clearly, the said issue was existent at the time
of filing of the MTQ and as held by the SC, an
application for a SW is a “special criminal
process” rather than a criminal action.
The CA gravely erred in equating the
proceedings for applications for SWs with
criminal actions themselves.
34

Proceedings for said applications are not
criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that
venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto.
Evidently, the issue of whether the application
should have been led in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-
Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because,
as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power
to issue a special criminal process is inherent
in all courts.
Thus, RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue
criminal processes such as a SW.
People v. Castillo
GR No. 204419, 2016
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A search warrant is merely a process, generally
issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no
criminal action has yet been filed, any court
may issue a search warrant even though it has
no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
committed, provided that all the requirements
for the issuance of such warrant are present
FACTS:
Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan issued a search warrant against the
premises of Rabino for violation of RA 9165. A
search was conducted wherein the PDEA and
PNP found 1 sachet of shabu inside the house
of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was
charged with violation of Section 11 of RA
9165. The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 6,
Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.
Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of
Illegally Acquired Evidence, citing lack of
probable cause among other grounds. Judge
Castillo granted the motion to quash, holding
that because the minimum penalty for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu is imprisonment of 12 years and 1
day to 20 years, which penalty is way beyond
imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the application
for and to issue the search warrant. As such,
the search warrant is null and void and all
proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise
null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
ISSUE:
May a municipal trial court issue a search
warrant involving an offense in which it has no
jurisdiction? (YES)
RULING:
miThe requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oatn or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a
motion to quash a search warrant may be
based on grounds extrinsic of the search
warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the
property seized are not those specified or
described in the search warrant; and (2) there
is no probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant.
The respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in quashing the search warrant on a
basis other than the accepted grounds. It must
be remembered that a search warrant is valid
for as long as it has all the requisites set forth
by the Constitution and must only be quashed
when any of its elements are found to be
wanting.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a
search warrant was filed within the same
judicial region where the crime was allegedly
committed. For compelling reasons, the
Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has
the authority to issue a search warrant to
search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in
the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a
place that is within the same judicial region.
The fact that the search warrant was issued
means that the MTC judge found probable
cause to grant the said application after the
latter was found by the same judge to have
been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore,
Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly
complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-
quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a
search warrant must also have jurisdiction over
the offense. A search warrant may be issued
by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and the resultant case
may be filed in another court that has
35

jurisdiction over the offense committed. What
controls here is that a search warrant is merely
a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in
certain cases when no criminal action has yet
been filed, any court may issue a search
warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly committed, provided that
all the requirements for the issuance of such
warrant are present.
Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized
Yee Sue Koy v. Alemeda
70 Phil 141
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The existence of probable cause had been
determined by the justice of the peace of
Sagay before issuing the search warrant
complained of, is shown by the following
statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After
examination under oath of the complainant,
Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
Department of Justice and Special Agent of the
Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he
presented, . . . and this Court, finding that
there is just and probable cause to believe as it
does believe, that the above described articles,
relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co.
of lending money at usurious rate of interest,
are being utilized and kept and concealed at its
store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing
& Co., all in violation of law."
FACTS:
In response to a sworn application of Almeda,
chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, the justice
of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after
taking the testimony of applicant's witness,
Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during
day time the store and premises occupied by
Sam Sing & Co. as well as the person of said
Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents,
notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes
being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in
connection with their activities of lending
money at usurious rates of interest in violation
of law, or such as may be found, and to bring
them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of
the peace of Sagay.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
On the same day, search was accordingly
made by Almeda, Estrada, 2 internal revenue
agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army,
who seized certain receipt books, vales or
promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal
book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing
& Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt
issued by Almeda to the owner of the
documents, papers and articles seized.
An information had been filed in the CFI
Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee
Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam
Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before
the trial of the criminal case, Yee Sue Koy and
Yee Tip filed the petition with the SC. The
petition is grounded on the propositions (1)
that the search warrant by the justice of the
peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished
thereunder are illegal, because the warrant
was issued three days ahead of the application
therefor and of the affidavit of the Estrada
which is insufficient in itself to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, and because the
issuance of said warrant manifestly
contravenes the mandatory provisions both of
section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General
Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the
aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant
for the purpose of using them as evidence in
the criminal case against the accused, is
unconstitutional because the warrant thereby
becomes unreasonable and amounts to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition
against compelling the accused to testify
against themselves.
ISSUE:
Whether the application of the search warrant
is supported by the personal knowledge of the
witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to
determine probable cause in issuing the
warrant. (YES)
RULING:
Strict observance of the formalities under
section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General
Orders 58 was followed. Almeda, in his
application, swore that "he made his own
personal investigation and ascertained that
Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without
license, charging usurious rate of interest and
is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store
and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks,
lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of
36

accounts and records, all of which are being
used by it in connection with its activities of
lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law."
Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of
the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that
Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without
license and charging usurious rate of interest,
because he personally investigated the victims
who had secured loans from said Sam Sing &
Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest;
that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was
keeping and using books of accounts and
records containing its transactions relative its
activities as money lender and the entries of
the interest paid by its debtors, because he
saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and
records of their debts and the interest paid
thereon.
As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada
swore that they had personal knowledge, their
affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they
could be held liable for perjury if the facts
would turn out to be not as were stated under
oath.
Laud v. People
G.R. No. 199032, 19 November 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Personal property" in the foregoing context
actually refers to the thing's mobility, and not
to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a
particular person
Article 416 of the Civil Code states that in
general, all things which can be transported
from place to place are deemed to be personal
property. Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place,
and considering further that they qualify under
the phrase "subject of the offense" given that
they prove the crime's corpus delicti,it follows
that they may be valid subjects of a search
warrant under the above-cited criminal
procedure provision.
FACTS:
A search warrant was issued by the RTC of
Manila to have the Laud Compound be
searched for human remains of the alleged
victims of a summary execution by the Davao
Death Squad.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Laud contends the validity of the search
warrant. Claiming that human remains are not
a proper subject of a search warrant. He claims
that only personal property can be subject of a
search warrant.
ISSUE:
WON human remains can be a valid subject of
a search warrant (YES)
RULING:
Personal property" in the foregoing context
actually refers to the thing's mobility, and not
to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a
particular person. Article 416 of the Civil Code,
which Laud himself cites, states that in
general, all things which can be transported
from place to place are deemed to be personal
property. Considering that human remains can
generally be transported from place to place,
and considering further that they qualify under
the phrase "subject of the offense" given that
they prove the crime's corpus delicti, it follows
that they may be valid subjects of a search
warrant under the above-cited criminal
procedure provision.
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant
Uy v. BIR
344 SCRA 36
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the foregoing constitutional
and statutory provisions. These requirements,
in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon
probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other
person;
(3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
37

(4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be
seized.12
The absence of any of these requisites will
cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants. The proceedings upon search
warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is
not a description of process known to the law,
the execution of which is more distressing to
the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites
such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect." The
warrants will always be construed strictly
without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions
of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify
under it.
FACTS:
Sept. 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee
of Unifish Packaging Corporation (UPC)
reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy,
manager of UPC, were engaged in activities
constituting violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993,
the BIR requested and successfully secured,
before the RTC of Cebu, a search warrant. On
the same day, a second warrant was issued
with contents almost identical to that of the
first warrant but consisted of only one page.
These warrants were issued for the alleged
violation by Uy of Section 253. A third warrant,
however, was issued on that same day for Uy’s
alleged violation of Section 238 in relation to
Section 263. On the strength of these
warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by
members of the PNP searched the premises of
the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the
items as listed on the said warrant. A return of
said search was duly made by Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu. Uy and UPC filed a motion to
quash the warrants before the RTC. Said
motion was denied. A petition for certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued was valid.
(YES)
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It
sustained the validity of the search warrant
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
and comprehensively discussed each and every
defect alleged by petitioners.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions. One of which is that, the
warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to
be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in
the description of the place to be searched as
indicated on said warrants, the Court ruled that
the description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officers enforcing the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. It was not
established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner
corporation, hence, inconsistency in identifying
the city where the premises to be searched is
not a defect that would spell the warrant’s
invalidation in this case.The warrants were also
inconsistent as to who should be searched—
one warrant was directed only against Uy while
the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court,
however, ruled that where the warrant was
issued not for search of the persons occupying
the premises, but only search of the premises
occupied by them, the search could not be
declared unlawful or in violation of the
constitutional rights of the owner or occupants
of the premises, because of the inconsistencies
in stating their name. Furthermore, the Court
said that where the apparent intent in issuing
another warrant was to supersede an earlier
warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked
by the former. Also the thing to be seized was
not clearly defined by the judge as she used
generic terms. As a rule, the use of a generic
term or a generic description in a warrant is
acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is
unavailable. But where, however, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must rather be general, it is not
required that a technical description be given,
as this would mean no warrant could issue. As
regards the terms “unregistered delivery
receipts” and “unregistered purchase and sales
invoices”, the Solicitor General correctly
argued that these documents need not be
38

specified as it is not possible to do so precisely
because they are unregistered. Lastly, general
description of most of the documents listed in
the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void the search warrant is severable,
and those items not particularly described may
be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants
authorize the search and seizure of
“unregistered delivery receipts” and
“unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the
warrants remain valid.
People v. CA
216 SCRA 101
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Scattershot warrants, or those which are
issued for more than one specific offense, are
null and void.
FACTS:
The properties consisted of units of distribution
transformers sold to UP and delivered. The
agreed price, including installation cost, was
fully paid by UP to the seller, Varona Trading.
These same properties were pulled out by
Varona on the excuse that they had certain
factory defects that had to be repaired. When
Varona failed to comply with UP's demand for
their return pending their replacement, UP
referred the matter to the NBI which found
that the properties were in the warehouse of
Ruben Siao, herein private respondent. NBI
applied for and secured the questioned search
warrant, which was issued by Judge Dayrit. On
the strength of this warrant, NBI seized the
said transformers, which were later
ascertained to be the same transformers sold
to UP, not only by their serial numbers but also
because the crates where they were contained
were marked "UP-Iloilo."
The search warrant issued by the trial court
left the space in the caption intended for the
nature of the offense in blank, indicating the
uncertainty of petitioner and the court as to
the crime committed and for which the search
warrant was issued. On the other hand, all that
the body of the search warrant stated was that
the transformers were "Stolen or Embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense, used or
intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense." But, since the
particular offense was not mentioned, the
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
reason for the issuance of the search warrant
could be anything under the sun.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
(NO)
RULING:
It is considered null and void. Section 3 of Rule
126 provides:
SECTION 3. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
Tambasen v. People
246 SCRA 184
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Issuance of search warrants for more than one
specific offense is prohibited.
Seizures of articles not described in the
warrant is violative of Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of the requirement is to limit the things
to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly describe in the search warrant - to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to
the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made and that abuses
may not be committed.
Evidence obtained in violation of right against
unreasonable searches and seizure is
inadmissible. Section 3(2) of Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
FACTS:
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel
applied for the issuance of a search warrant
from the MTCC, alleging that he received
information that petitioner had in his
possession at his house "M-16 Armalite Rifles
39

(Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal.
Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and
Subversive Documents," which articles were
"used or intended to be used" for illegal
purposes. On the same day, the application
was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the
seizure of the items specified in the
application.
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a
police team searched the house of petitioner
and seized the following articles: two (2)
envelopes containing cash in the total amount
of P14,000.00, one (1) handset w/antenae
(sic), one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R
w/Antenae (sic); one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D
Base; one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V.
13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC; one (1) brown
Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and
four (4) handsets battery pack.
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on
petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the
seized articles, issued an order directing Sgt.
Natuel to make a return of the search warrant.
The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a
report to the court. Not considering the report
as a "return in contemplation of law,"
petitioner filed another motion praying that
Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete
and verified inventory of the seized articles.
Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that
although he was the applicant for the issuance
of the search warrant, he was not present
when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the
MTCC a motion praying that the search and
seizure be declared illegal and that the seized
articles be returned to him.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an
order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the
money seized to petitioner. The court opined
that in the implementation of the search
warrant, any seizure should be limited to the
specific items covered thereby. It said that the
money could not be considered as "subversive
documents"; it was neither stolen nor the
effects of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed
before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a
petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of
the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331).
The petition alleged that assuming that the
seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return citing
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
(1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
(1986). In those cases, the Court held that
pending the determination of the legality of the
seizure of the articles, they should remain in
custodia legis. The petition also averred that a
criminal complaint for "any of the crimes
against public order as provided under Chapter
I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had been
filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239)
and therefore, should the money be found as
having been earmarked for subversive
activities, it should be confiscated pursuant to
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an
order granting the petition for certiorari and
directing the clerk of court to return to the
MTCC the money pending the resolution of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by
the city prosecutor on the criminal complaint.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition praying
for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order commanding the city prosecutor to cease
and desist from continuing with the preliminary
investigation and the RTC from taking any step
with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also
prayed that Search Warrant No. 365 and the
seizure of his personal effects be declared
illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989 be
reversed and annulled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the articles obtained in the
search and seizure are within the parameters
of the search warrant.
RULING:
NO. The articles obtained in the search and
seizure are not within the parameters of the
search warrant.
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specified offense.
Seizures of articles not described in the
warrant is violative of Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized.
The police acted beyond the parameters of
their authority by seizure of articles not
described in the search warrant. The money
was not indicated in the search warrant and
had been illegally seized from the petitioner.
40

The fact that the members of the police team
were doing their task of pursuing subversive is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of o􏰄cial duty cannot by itself
prevail against the constitutionally protected
rights of an individual.
People v. Tuan
G.R. No. 176066, Aug. 11, 2010
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant
rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
a7rmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe
the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.
FACTS:
Two separate Informations were filed before
the RTC against accused-appellant for illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession
of firearm.
January 24, 2000- At around 9 am, two male
informants namely, Jerry Tudlong and Frank
Lad-ing arrived at the offce of the 14th
Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group) at DPS Compound,
Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain
"Estela Tuan" had been selling marijuana at
Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City.
To verify the report, SPO2 Fernandez gave
Tudlong and Lad-ing 300.00 to buy marijuana,
and then accompanied the two informants to
the accused-appellant's house. Tudlong and
Lad-ing entered accused-appellant's house,
while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent
house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-
ing came out of accused-appellant's house and
showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves
they bought. After lab examination yielded
positive for marijuana, Fernandez together
with the informants filed an application for
Search Warrant before the MTCC Baguio
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Two hours later Judge Cortes issued a Search
Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of
probable cause.
Even though accused Tuan was not around,
the CIDG team was allowed entry into the
house by Magno Baludda, accused’s father,
after he was shown a copy of the Search
Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior
Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the
surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera
and PO2 Chavez searched inside. They
continued their search on the second Moor.
They saw a movable cabinet in accused-
appellant's room, below which they found a
brick of marijuana and a firearm. Later Tuan
arrivedand thereafter, the police officers asked
Tuan to open a cabinet, in which they saw
more bricks of marijuana.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as
charged. On appeal, the CA modified by
acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal
possession of firearm but affirming her
conviction for illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE:
1. Won there was probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant (yes)
2. Won the Search Warrant failed to
particularly describe the place to be
searched (no)
RULING:
1. the validity of the issuance of a search
warrant rests upon the following factors: a) it
must be issued upon probable cause; b) the
probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any
other person; c) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
d) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.
A magistrate's determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long
as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed,
41

and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the
issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-
appellant's residence after said judge's
personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the
applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the
informants.
2. Equally without merit is accused-appellant's
assertion that the Search Warrant did not
describe with particularity the place to be
searched. A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish
it from other places in the community.
In the case at bar, the address and description
of the place to be searched in the Search
Warrant was specific enough. There was only
one house located at the stated address, which
was accused-appellant's residence, consisting
of a structure with two floors and composed of
several rooms.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the
validity of the Search Warrant for accused-
appellant's house issued by MTCC Judge
Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the
search conducted by virtue thereof, may be
presented as evidence against the accused-
appellant.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant;
record
Asian Surety Inc. Co. v. Herrera
54 SCRA 312
CASE PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
Upon the sworn application by an NBI agent
and supported by the deposition of a witness,
respondent Judge issued a search warrant in
connection with an undocketed criminal case
for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and
tax evasion, against petitioner-corporation.
The search warrant is couched in the following
language:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
"You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time in the _____ of
the premises above-described and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss
Bordereau, Adjusters Report including
subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss
Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger,
check vouchers, income tax returns, and other
papers connected therewith . . . for the years
1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law
directs."
Thereafter, the NBI agents served the search
warrant to petitioner. After the search they
seized and carried away two (2) carloads of
documents, papers and receipts.
With that, the petitioner assailed the validity of
the search warrant. They claimed that the
search claiming that it was issued is in
contravention of the explicit provisions of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935
Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the
new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10
of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid
(NO)
RULING:
No. The search warrant is not valid for multiple
violations of the provisions of the Rules of
Court.
Firstly, the search warrant was issued for
violation of four separate offenses, thereby,
violating the provisions of the Rules of Court
which provides that “no search warrant shall
issue for more than one specific offense.”
Secondly, respondent Judge made no attempt
to determine whether the property he
authorized to be searched and seized pertains
specifically to any one of the three classes of
personal property that may be searched and
seized under a search warrant under Rule 126,
Sec. 2 (now, Section 3) of the Rules. The
respondent Judge simply authorized search
and seizure under an omnibus description of
the personal properties to be seized. In this
case, the search warrant herein involved reads
in part: ". . . property (Subject of the offense,
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense) should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.”
42

Thirdly, respondent transgressed Section 10 of
Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a
detailed receipt of the things seized. In the
seizure of two carloads of documents and other
papers, the possibility that the respondents
took away private papers of the petitioner, in
violation of his constitutional rights, is not
remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field
day with the broad and unlimited search
warrant issued by respondent Judge as their
passport.
Fourthly, the search warrant violated the
specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126.
The search warrant in question left blank the
"time" for making search, while actual search
was conducted in the evening of October 27,
1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the
morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing
untold inconveniences to petitioners herein.
Hence, the search warrant was not valid and
was therefore nullified.
People v. Peña
97 Phil 669
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The motive of the person accused of illegal
procurement of search warrants may be
established, not only by acts preceding, or
coetaneous with, the commission of the
offense charged, but, also by acts posterior to
the issuance of the process, such as, an
attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complaint.
FACTS:
Respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo
Ramos, are accused, in Criminal Cases Nos.
24746 to 24755 and 24824 to 24833 (20
cases) of said court, of illegal procurement of
search warrants, in violation of Article 129 of
the Revised Penal Code.
At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases,
before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge,
Honorable Ramon San Jose, the prosecution
placed on the witness stand, the offended
party in said case No. 24750, namely, Ty Kong
Tek, who testified that, while he was in his
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
house at 142 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, on March 1, 1951, at about 2:00 a.m.,
At this juncture, the prosecution inquired
whether he knew why his and nephew were
arrested, but, the defense objected thereto
upon the ground that the question referred to
an act subsequent to the issuance of the
aforementioned search warrant and, hence,
immaterial to the issue. Although the
prosecution explained that it sought to
establish the motive of De la Peña in securing
the search warrant, respondent Judge
sustained the objection. Thereupon, the
prosecution asked Ty Kong Tek whether he
knew whether or not his above mentioned son
and nephew had anything to do with the
reason for the search made, in their house, by
the party headed by De la Peña. The defense
objected to the question upon the same
ground, and the court sustained the objection.
Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness
stand, that De la Peña investigated him six (6)
times at Camp Murphy; that during the
investigation, De la Peña in the afternoon of
March 1, 1951; that thereafter, one of the
members of the party led by De la Peña, who
made a search in complainant's house,
namely, Koa San, approached the (witness')
nephew would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek)
gave him (Koa San) and De la Peña the sum of
P20,000. On motion of the defense respondent
Judge ordered the last statement of Ty Kong
Tek stricken from the record.
Although the prosecution explained that it was
trying to prove the unlawful motive with which
the search warrant had allegedly been
obtained, respondent Judge hold that
"anything that happened after that (issuance of
the search warrant) will be immaterial"
Respondents herein maintain that the alleged
illegal procurement of the aforementioned
search warrant may be established only by
proof of acts either preceding, or coetaneous
with, the commission of offense charged, not
by acts performed subsequently thereto. Upon
the other hand, petitioner herein contends that
the motive of the accused may be established
by the posterior acts, such as, for instance, an
attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complainant.
ISSUE:
43

Whether or not the Judge must look into the
motive of the one seeking to obtain the search
warrant. (YES)
RULING:
The motive of the person accused of illegal
procurement of search warrants may be
established, not only by acts preceding, or
coetaneous with, the commission of the
offense charged, but, also by acts posterior to
the issuance of the process, such as, an
attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complaint.
Referring to the issuance of a valid search
warrant, we declared:
". . . It has likewise been held by this
court that by probable cause are meant
such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant, that are in themselves
sufficient to induce a cautious man to
rely upon them and act in pursuance
thereof." (64 Phil., 667, 674)
The words "facts and circumstance antecedent
to the issuance of the warrant" had no relation
whatsoever with, and were not meant to
qualify, the evidence admissible to prove the
illegal procurement of a search warrant, in
violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal
Code, which was not in issue in the case. Said
expression merely referred to the norm that
should guide a Judge in determining whether
or not the process should be ordered issued. It
is not concerned, either with the liability of the
person procuring the warrant, or with the
competency of the evidence to establish his
guilt.
Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to
introduce the evidence in question and
respondent Judge was, consequently, "under
obligation by reason of his office" to admit said
evidence, "and in refusing to do so . . . he
failed to perform his judicial duty' — in the
language used by this Court in the case of
People vs. Concepcion (supra) — it follows that
said respondent Judge should be, as he is
hereby, ordered — in line with the rule laid
down in said case — to allow petitioner herein
to prove the motive of the accused in obtaining
the search warrant in question, even if the
evidence therefor should refer to acts posterior
to the issuance of said process, and that the
resolutions of the lower court sustaining the
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
objections to the questions above refers to,
propounded by petitioner herein, and directing
that portions of the testimony of Ty Kong Tek
be stricken from the record, should be, as said
orders are hereby, reversed and set aside, with
costs against respondents, Pedro de la Peña
and Osmundo Ramos.
Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search
warrant
WHO v. Aquino
48 SCRA 242
CASE PRINCIPLE:
General Rule: Custom or ports inspection,
although done without search warrants, are
not unreasonable searches per se.
Exception: Diplomatic immunity carries with it,
among other diplomatic privileges and
immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability
of the official's properties, exemption from
local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation
and customs duties. Courts may not so
exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that
"in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Dr. Verstuyft was assigned to Manila by the
WHO. He enjoyed diplomatic immunity, which
carried with it exemption from taxation and
local duties. When his personal effects
contained in crates arrived in the Philippines,
they were allowed free access.
Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)
subsequently applied for a search warrant on
Dr. Verstuft’s personal effects for alleged
violation of R.A. 4712 (Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines), which Judge Aquino
granted. Foreign Affairs Sec. Romulo informed
Judge Aquino of Dr. Verstufyt’s diplomatic
immunity. Nevertheless, Judge Aquino refused
to quash the search warrant.
44

The SC nullified the search warrant, stating
that Dr. Verstufyt did enjoy diplomatic
immunity, and was thus free from all customs
duties and taxes.
ISSUE:
WON Dr. Verstuyft the search warrant should
be quashed in view of his diplomatic immunity.
(YES)
RULING:
The search warrant should be quashed because
of Dr. Verstuft’s diplomatic immunity. The
executive branch of the Philippine Government
has expressly recognized that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to
the provisions of the Host Agreement.
The DFA formally advised respondent judge of
the Philippine Government's official position
that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the
subject of a Philippine court summons without
violating an obligation in international law of
the Philippine Government" and asked for the
quashal of the search warrant, since his
personal effects and baggages after having
been allowed free entry from all customs
duties and taxes, may not be baselessly
claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in
violation of the tariff and customs code as
claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The
Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the
Government, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity.
World Wide Web Corporation v. People
G.R. No. 161106, Jan. 13, 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to
be seized when the things described are
limited to those that bear a direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.
FACTS:
Police Chief of PNP filed applications for
warrants before the RTC to search the office
premises of Worldwide Web Corporation and
Planet Internet Corporation. It was alleged that
petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of PD. 401 (unauthorized installation
of telephone connections) since PLDT lines and
equipment had been illegally connected by
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
the international calls and bypassed PLDT's
IGF.
Trial court required the identification of the
office premises/units to be searched, as well as
their Boor plans showing the location of
particular computers and servers that would be
taken. RTC then issued the warrants against
the office premises of petitioners, authorizing
police officers to seize various items which
mostly includes innocuous goods such as
computers, routers, etc.
These warrants were later on quashed by the
trial court upon the motion of the accused on
the grounds that these were general warrants
and that these were issued although there was
no crime of theft committed.
CA reversed the findings contending that the
warrants were not general warrants and that
the crime of theft was actually committed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the assailed search warrants
were issued upon probable cause,
considering that the acts complained of
allegedly do not constitute theft? Yes
2. WON the CA seriously erred in holding
that the assailed search warrants were not
general warrants? No, they are not
general warrants.
RULING:
1. In the issuance of search warrants, it is a
matter wholly dependent on the finding of
trial judges in the process of exercising
their judicial function. They determine
probable cause based on "evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was
committed" by the offender. Upon
examination of the facts petitioners are
charged with the crime, not of toll bypass
per se, but of theft of PLDT's international
long distance call business committed by
means of the alleged toll bypass
operations. They were stealing the
business interest of PLDT.
2. Considering that items that looked like
"innocuous goods" were being used to
pursue an illegal operation that amounts
45

to theft, law enforcement officers would
be hard put to secure a search warrant if
they were required to pinpoint items with
one hundred percent precision. A search
warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the
things to be seized when the things
described are limited to those that bear a
direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued. PLDT was able to
establish the connection between the
items to be searched as identified in the
warrants and the crime of theft of its
telephone services and business
People v. Nuñez
G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009
CASE PRINCIPLE:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized.
— A search warrant may be issued for
the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense.
FACTS:
In a search and seizure conducted based on
reports of drug possession, the appellant’s
room was surveyed in his presence while his
family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay
officials remained in the living room. 31
packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners,
tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue
and a lady’s wallet inside the appellant's
dresser were found.
The group also confiscated a component,
camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on
suspicion that they were acquired in exchange
for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan
issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a
Certification of Orderly Search which the
appellant signed.
The RTC convicted appellant guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of RA 6425, as
amended. Appellant elevated the case to this
Court on appeal, but the case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals where the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming
appellant’s conviction.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
ISSUE:
WON there was irregularity in the seizure of
personal property conducted (YES)
RULING:
As a rule, only the personal properties
described in the search warrant may be seized
by the authorities. In the case at bar, the
search warrant specifically authorized the
taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an
irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly,
the lady's wallet, cash, grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw,
electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo
were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the
use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the
said items then, the police officers exercised
their own discretion and determined for
themselves which items in appellant's
residence they believed were "proceeds of the
crime" or "means of committing the offense".
This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement
that the articles to be seized be particularly
described in the warrant is to limit the things
to be taken to those, and only those
particularly described in the search warrant —
to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should
seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate
any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects
taken which were not specified in the search
warrant should be restored to appellant.
Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to
effect search
Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or
premises, to be made in presence of two
witnesses
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago
162 SCRA 840
CASE PRINCIPLE:
46

An arrest without a warrant may be effected by
a peace officer or even a private person (1)
when such person has committed, actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in his presence; and (2) when an
offense has, in fact, been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it.
FACTS:
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22)
suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by Commission on Immigration
and Deportation agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Seized during petitioners' apprehension were
rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the
sex act. There were also posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes.
Petitioners question the validity of their
detention on the ground that respondent
violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures since the CID agents were not
clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search
and seizure as required by the said provision.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner’s contention is meritorious that
there was a violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable search and
seizures. (NO)
RULING:
The Court reject petitioners' contentions and
uphold respondent's official acts ably defended
by the Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of crime or
not. One of the constitutional requirements of
a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is
that it must be based upon probable cause.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was
based on probable cause determined after
close surveillance for 3 months during which
period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause justified the
arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. Those articles were
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest
and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
That petitioners were not "caught in the act"
does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners
were found with young boys in their respective
rooms, the ones with John Sherman being
naked. Under those circumstances the CID
agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined
as 9"psycho- sexual perversion involving
children".
Salazar v. Achacoso
183 SCRA 155
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
The exception is in cases of deportation of
illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
FACTS:
Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint
against Salazar. Having ascertained that the
petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a
closure and seizure.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of
Salazar to implement the order. There it was
found that petitioner was operating Hannalie
Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the
team served said Closure and Seizure order on
a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily
allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs.
Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie
Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required
to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon
twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting
outside. The team confiscated assorted
costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs.
Flora Salazar.
A few days after, Salazar sent a letter to POEA
demanding the return of the confiscated
properties. They alleged lack of hearing and
47

due process, and that since the house the
POEA raided was a private residence, it was
robbery.
Salazar appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
May the POEA or the Secretary of Labor may
validly issue warrants of search and seizure
under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
RULING:
No. Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. It is
only a judge who may issue warrants of search
and arrest. Mayors may not exercise this
power, neither may it be done by a mere
prosecuting body.
The 1987 Constitution states:
" . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Former President Marcos, through PD 2018,
amended Art. 38 (c) of the Labor and gave the
Labor Minister search and seizure powers. SC
declared Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect.
People v. Punzalan
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
authorizes Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and
Quezon City to issue search warrants to be
served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as
those involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
as in this case, for as long as the parameters
under the said section have been complied
with.
The rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality"
must be present applies only in the absence of
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
either the lawful occupant of the premises or
any member of his family.
FACTS:
Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan and her
team implemented a search warrant to make
an immediate search of the premises/house of
accused and to seize and take possession of an
undetermined quantity — of assorted
dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or
fruits and bring said property to the court.
In denying the charge, accused-appellant Jerry
Punzalan testified that they were at his store
when he saw men running toward their main
house, carrying a tank with hose attached to it.
Jerry followed them and saw the men applying
acetylene on their steel gate. Jerry shouted at
them but the men poked their guns at him and
when he answered in the affirmative after
being asked if he is Jerry, they placed him in
metal handcuffs, held him at the back of his
shirt and brought him to his garage. He was
later made to board a van where his wife
Patricia was already bound therein. Then, they
were brought by the PDEA agents to their main
house with their belongings scattered.
In its findings, the trial court observed that
there were actually two phases of the search
done in the Punzalan house.
1st Phase: Ground floor of the house,
immediately after the PDEA agents gained
entry and was made in the presence of both
accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs
were found, confiscated and consequently
marked. But the barangay officials were not
able to witness the said initial search and their
failure to arrive on time to witness the first or
initial search at the ground floor of the
Punzalan house.
2nd Phase: Upper floors of the house after the
markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated
specimens were completed by IO1 Pagaragan.
This was witnessed and participated in by the
barangay officials.
Accused claim that the PDEA agents who
applied for a search warrant failed to comply
with the requirements for the procurement of a
search warrant particularly the approval of the
PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants
also contended that the court which issued the
search warrant, the RTC of Manila had no
authority to issue the search warrant since the
48

place where the search is supposed to be
conducted is outside its territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant was in fact
illegally procured and unlawfully implemented.
Whether the search was valid absent the
presence of the witness, in this case, the
kagawads
RULING:
1. In the instant case, aside from their
bare allegation, accused-appellants
failed to show that the application for
search warrant of the subject premises
was not approved by the PDEA
Regional Director or his authorized
representative.
Moreover, Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes
the Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila
and Quezon City to issue search
warrants to be served in places outside
their territorial jurisdiction in special
criminal cases such as those involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long
as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with.
2. Even if the barangay officials were not
present during the initial search, the
search was witnessed by accused
themselves, hence, the search was
valid since the rule that "two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality" must be present
applies only in the absence of either
the lawful occupant of the premises or
any member of his family.
Sec. 9. Time of making search
Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant
Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized
Quintero v. NBI
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
162 SCRA 467
CASE PRINCIPLE:
the officer seizing property under the warrant
must give detailed receipt for the same to the
person on whom or in whose possession it was
found or in the absence of the person , must ,
in the presence of at least 1 witness , leave a
receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property
FACTS:
Petitioner is a delegate of the first district
obligated to the 1971 constitutional
convention. He delivered the privilege to
speech at the plenary session and disclosed
that certain persons are bribing some
delegates.He eventually released from his
hospital bed the sworn statement the names of
the persons give him the money implicating
the first lady among others. On the basis of a
search warrant,agents of the respondent
national Bureau of Investigation raided the
petitioner's house a
seized bundles of money amounting to
379,000 and charged with direct bribery.
the court issued TRO restraining the use of the
seized items and the questionable search
warrant.
ISSUES:
Whether receipt was properly given to the
concerned parties.
RULING:
No. the receipt issued by the seizing party in
the case showed that it was signed by a
witness, Sgt. Veracruz who was a policeman
who accompanied the NBA during the conduct
of the search.the requirement of the rule was
not complied by it. the requirement of the
rules was rendered nugatory, when the one
who attested to the receipt from the raiding
party was himself a member of the raiding
party.
Sec. 12. Delivery of property and
inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon
Vlason Ent. Corp. v. CA
155 SCRA 186
CASE PRINCIPLE:
49

It is immaterial which court takes cognizance
of that civil suit, whether it be the court issuing
the search warrant or any other. No possible
inconsistency or contradiction in disposition of
the property could in the circumstances
possibly arise between it and the court where
the civil action is pending, since only the latter
could and would render a judgment on the
question of title.
FACTS:
Two (2) pieces of a salvaged bronze propeller
of a sunken vessel had been seized by
METROCOM agents from Florencio Sosuan on
the strength of a search warrant issued by
another branch of the same CFI of Manila
presided over by Judge Maceren.
The search warrant was issued at the instance
of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation (Vlasons),
which claimed to be the owner of the propeller.
After the METROCOM officers had taken
custody of the propeller pieces, Vlasons filed a
complaint accusing Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto
Valenzuela of theft of said propeller and a
second complaint charging Florencio Sosuan
with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Meanwhile, Sosuan filed a civil action to
recover possession of the propeller, pending
before Judge Cruz' Branch, who authorized the
former for such possession in view of the fact
that no criminal action has been filed in Court
in connection with the seizure of the
propellers-in-question.
Said order was challenged by Vlasons in the CA
but declined the former’s theory that Judge
Cruz had no power to authorize the release of
the propeller pieces because these articles
were in custodia legis of another Branch of the
Court, presided over by Judge Maceren; and
that in authorizing the release thereof, Judge
Cruz had interfered with the jurisdiction and
prerogative of a co-equal court.
According to CA, Rule 126 of ROC does not
provide that things seized under a search
warrant could be released only by the court
issuing the warrant; that the articles were not
in fact in the custody of the court but of the
authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City; and
no criminal case had been filed in the sala of
Judge Maceren involving the articles in
question.
ISSUE:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Whether the Cruz Branch had jurisdiction over
the civil action filed by Sosuan for the recovery
of title to the personal property in question
valued at more than 20,000 pesos. (YES)
RULING:
The order for the issuance of the warrant is
merely the first step in the process to
determine the character and title of the
property.
In the case at bar, no criminal prosecution was
ever instituted in the Maceren Branch of the
Manila CFI with respect to the propeller pieces,
subsequent to the issuance by said Branch of a
search warrant and the resultant seizure of
those articles.
Record shows that civil action for recovery of
propellers was commenced by Sosuan because
of the conflicting claims of title over the
property. The Maceren Branch could not take
cognizance of the issue of title because the
action regarding that issue had not been
raffled to it.
Absent any contemporaneous or subsequent
criminal action involving the crime or crimes
for which the search warrant had been issued,
and specially in the light of the dismissal of the
criminal complaints in connection therewith,
said search warrant and the proceedings
thereon were rendered inconsequential as far
as the resolution of the civil action involving
the conflicting claims of title to the property
was concerned.
It is therefore immaterial which court takes
cognizance of that civil suit, whether it be the
court issuing the search warrant or any other.
No possible inconsistency or contradiction in
disposition of the property could in the
circumstances possibly arise between it and
the court where the civil action is pending,
since only the latter could and would render a
judgment on the question of title.
Nothing in the record therefore justifies the
Order of Judge Cruz transferring possession of
the property in controversy to the plaintiff
pendente lite. That relief can be awarded only
after trial, by final judgment declaring in whom
the title to said property rests. What may be
done in the meantime, as already above
pointed out, is simply the transfer by the
Maceren Branch, upon proper application, of
custody over the property to the Cruz Branch,
there to await the outcome of the suit.
50

PDEA v. Richard Brodett, et al.
G.R. No. 196390, Sept. 28, 2011
CASE PRINCIPLE: Objects of lawful
commerce confiscated in the course of an
enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (RA No. 9165) that are the
property of a third person are subject to be
returned to the lawful owner who is not liable
for the unlawful act. But the trial court may
not release such objects pending trial and
before judgment.
FACTS: An information was filed against
herein accused for the possession and sale of
Methamphetamine, a dangerous drug, in
violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002 . In the course of the
proceedings in the RTC, Brodett filed a Motion
To Return Non-Drug Evidence.
He averred that during his arrest, PDEA had
seized several personal non-drug effects from
him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car; and
that PDEA refused to return his personal
effects despite repeated demands for their
return. He prayed that his personal effects be
tendered to the trial court to be returned to
him upon verification.
The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to
the return of the car because it appeared to be
the instrument in the commission of the
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to
its being the vehicle used in the transaction of
the sale of dangerous drugs. RTC granted the
release of the car.
PDEA’s MR and appeal to CA by petition for
certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction were both dismissed. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the order of release of accused’s
personal effects by the RTC was premature and
in contravention of RA 9165? YES
RULING: The Court has interpreted and
applied Article 45 of the RPC. Such
interpretation is extended by analogy to
Section 20 of RA 9165. To bar the forfeiture of
the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person, there must be an indictment charging
such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
not suffice to prevent the return of the tools
and instruments to the third person, for a mere
suspicion of that person’s participation is not
sufficient ground for the court to order the
forfeiture of the goods seized.
ITCAB, it is undisputed that the ownership of
the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett,
who was not charged either in connection with
the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the
subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC,
or even in any other criminal proceedings.
RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion To
Return Non-Drug Evidence when the criminal
proceedings were still going on, and the trial
was yet to be completed. Ordering the release
of the car at that point of the proceedings was
premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or
transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been
confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency
of the proceedings in the Regional Trial
Court. Section 20 further expressly requires
that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all
that time and that no bond shall be admitted
for the release of it.
The status of the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for
the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in
custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve
it as evidence and to ensure its availability as
such. To release it before the judgment is
rendered is to deprive the trial court and the
parties access to it as evidence. As such, the
RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention
with the express language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.
SC emphasized that RTC shall comply strictly
with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165, and should not release articles, whether
drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial
and before the rendition of the judgment, even
if owned by a third person who is not liable for
the unlawful act.
TN: Although the RTC erred in prematurely
releasing the personal effects of the accused,
the prosecution failed to establish all the links
51

in the chain of custody. Thus, the accused
were acquitted.
Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest
Padilla v. CA
269 SCRA 402
CASE PRINCIPLE:
FACTS: A balut vendor was hit by Pajero.
A certain Manarang heard the incident and
went to the scene. When manarang was in the
scene, the Pajero quickly fled. Manarang then
radioed the incident to the Police.
The police flagged down the car. When the car
was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the
windows with his hands raised. The officers
then noticed that it was the famous actor,
Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of
the hit-and-run incident, the police saw the
revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So,
the police insisted that the gun be shown in
the office if it was legal.
The crowd had formed and Robin was shaking
their hands. Since robin’s jacket is short, the
gesture then revealed a magazine clip of a rifle
which made the police suspect that there is a
rifle inside the vehicle. The police searched the
vehicle and found out several high caliber
firearms which were unregistered.
Now, Robin’s defense was that his arrest was
illegal as there was no arrest warrant and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions
taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in
evidence under the exclusionary rule.
ISSUE:1. WON the arrest is valid
2. WON the firearms are admissible in
evidence.
RULING:1. Yes. It is a valid warrantless
arrest. Under the first instance of in flagrante
delicto, the Private citizen personally witnessed
the incident, and when he effected the arrest,
the appellant fled. So, there is a necessity to
inform the police.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
It is also valid under the second instance of hot
pursuit, because the crime has just been
committed, and the apprehending officer has a
probable cause to believe that it is padilla who
committed it pursuant to the report of
Manarang.
2. Yes. There was no intrusion of privacy, when
padilla was shaking his hands to the crown, the
magazine and the pistol were evident in his
waist. And also, the rifle in his car was visible.
It is allowed because the evidence was
confiscated in plain view.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that it was not
search in plain view, nonetheless can still be
justified under a search incidental to a lawful
arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest
was effected, the police may undertake a
protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle
which are within petitioner's grabbing distance
regardless of the nature of the offense.
People v. Guzman
351 SCRA 573
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The legal parameters of this rule limit its
application to instances when the search is
made contemporaneous to the arrest and
within a permissible area of search.
FACTS:
De Guzman was found by the RTC guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the
Unlawful Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition.
SPO1 Cuevas conducted a surveillance at the
Villamar Beach Resort pursuant to the order
issued by their Police Chief Inspector. De
Guzman was at the Villamar Beach Resort and
rented a resort cottage. SPO1 Cuevas climbed
the ladder which he perched on the concrete
wall of the cottage then, peeped through the
window of the cottage and saw Danilo and
Edsel seated face to face while using shabu.
However, instead of rushing to the cottage of
De Guzman, the police officers decided to wait
for them to come out of the cottage. When De
Guzman finally came out, the police officers
nabbed him upon seeing that his waist was
bulging with a gun. Other police officers,
accompanied by the chambermaid and a boy
from the resort, went up to the cottage and
52

saw the same paraphernalia which SPO1
Cuevas saw.
The police officers were without warrants of
arrest or search warrants at the time of the
arrests and seizure of evidence. As the
operation was conducted largely during
nighttime, the police officers were unable to
secure the necessary warrants for fear of
leaving the place of surveillance.
De Guzman contends that his arrest and the
search conducted incidental to his arrest were
illegal as the surrounding circumstances of the
arrest were not within the purview of the
allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent search made by the
police officers in the cottage and on De
Guzman was lawful.
RULING:
First, the police officers' manner of conducting
De Guzman's arrest was not tainted with any
constitutional infirmity. As the situation would
have it, the arrest was necessitated by the
presence of De Guzman with a gun obviously
tucked in his pants. The mere possession of a
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a
criminal offense under PD No. 1866. The crime
is immediately consummated upon mere
possession of firearm devoid of legal authority.
In the case at bar, De Guzman was caught by
the police officers in flagrante delicto while
carrying a firearm without the necessary
permit or license. Necessarily, the search
conducted immediately after De Guzman's
arrest was valid under Rule 126, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure.
Moreover, it was impossible for the police
officers to obtain a search warrant as they
were merely on surveillance, and to do so
might abort any possible illegal activity that
was taking place.
The search conducted immediately after De
Guzman was apprehended was made more
necessary by the presence of his companion
inside the cottage which was just a few steps
away from where he stood. The presence of De
Guzman's companion posed a danger to the
police officers' life and limb, hence, it became
necessary for them to locate him. Upon entry
at the rented cottage, the police officers saw
the shabu and drug-related paraphernalia
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
scattered on top of the table. Jurisprudence
allows the seizure of personality despite
absence of warrant under the "plain view
doctrine," so long as the area of search is
within the immediate control of the arrested
person and that the object of the search was
open to the eye, as in the instant case.
People v. Musa
217 SCRA 609
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A search incidental to a lawful arrest to be
valid, must have been conducted at about the
time of the arrest or immediately thereafter,
and only at the place where the suspect was
arrested, or the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control.
FACTS:
In this case the accused sold 2 wrappers of
marijuana leaves to Sgt. Ani in a buy-bust
operation.
A test-buy was conducted the day prior to the
said buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust
operation, after Sgt. Ani handed the money to
Musa, Musa entered his house to get the
wrappings. Upon his return and with the
inspection of the wrappings, Musa was
arrested, but the marked money used as
payment cannot be found with him, prompting
the agents to go inside his house. There, they
could not find the marked money, but they
found more marijuana leaves hidden in a
plastic bag inside the kitchen.
The defense gave a different version of what
happened they asserted that the NARCOM
agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside
their house since the door was open, and upon
entering, declared that they were NARCOM
agents and searched the house, despite
demands of the couple for a search warrant.
The agents found a red bag whose contents
were unknown to the Musas.
Musa was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt by the trial court. Musa contests that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
He also questioned the credibility of the
witnesses, as well as the admissibility of the
seized plastic bag as evidence since it violates
his constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures provided in Art. III, Sec.
2.
53

ISSUE: WON the search incidental to the
lawful arret is valid and the seized plastic bag
containing marijuana is admissible as evidence
RULING: No. Although the warrantless search
done falls under Sec. 12 of Rule 126 and that
the search may include premises or
surroundings under the accused’s immediate
control, it does not fall under the “Plain View”
doctrine. The agents found the plastic bag
inside the kitchen, and upon asking about the
contents of the bag, the accused did not
answer, making the agents open the bag and
find marijuana leaves. Even if an object is
observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the "plain view" of
the object.
"A person lawfully arrested maybe searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant."
To be valid, the search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or
immediately thereafter, and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested, or the
premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.
People v. Rodriguez
205 SCRA 791
CASE PRINCIPLE:
As provided in the present Constitution, a
search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by
the proper government authority.
FACTS:
The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City,
received a confidential information regarding
an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in
Tagas, Daraga, Albay.
The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-
buyer. He was told by the informant to look for
a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited
drugs.
Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along
the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Segovia where be could find Don and where he
could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while
and when be returned, he was accompanied by
a man who was later on introduced to him as
Don, herein appellant.
After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100
grams of marijuana, Don left Taduran and
Segovia and when he came back, he’s already
bringing with him a plastic containing
Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his
said purchase of marijuana. Based on that
information, they apprehended the accused
without a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a
search warrant the house of the father
(Jovencio Rodriguez) of herein accused-
appellant. During the raid, they were able to
confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe, among others.The next 2 days, the
father was released and Don and co-accused
remained.
The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras)
presented different versions of their alleged
participation.
RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article
II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the
two co-accused were acquitted.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was in consonance
to his constitutional right? NO
RULING:
The arrest and seizure were illegally
conducted.
As provided in the present Constitution, a
search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by
the proper government authority. True, in
some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches
and seizures even without a search warrant:
● when the owner of the premises waives
his right against such incursion;
● when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest;
● when it is made on vessels and aircraft
for violation of customs laws;
54

● when it is made on automobiles for the
purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws;
● when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view;
● in cases of inspection of buildings and
other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations,
In the case at bar, however, the raid
conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house
of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search warrant.
It does not appear, either, that the situation
falls under any of the aforementioned cases
above.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable
search and seizure was clearly violated. The
NARCOM agents could not have justified their
act by invoking the urgency and necessity of
the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place
had already been put under surveillance for
quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because
they easily could, have first secured a search
warrant during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and
ambiguity in the identification of the
confiscated marijuana leaves and other
prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as
evidence against appellant.
From the records of the case, Taduran
(poseur-buyer) bought 100 grams of
marijuana from Don but the evidence
presented were the prohibited articles were
among those confiscated during the so-called
follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza.
The unanswered question then arises as to the
identity of the marijuana leaves that became
the basis of appellant's conviction. In People
vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule
that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana
leaves contained therein constitute the corpus
delicti of the crime. As such, the existence
thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal
to the cause of the prosecution.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to
sustain the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence,
the prosecution has failed to establish its
cause. It has not overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded to appellant. This being
the case, appellant should not be allowed to
suffer for unwarranted and imaginary
imputations against him.
People v. Usana
323 SCRA 754
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Even though there was ample opportunity to
obtain a search warrant, the search will be
valid when there are indications that there was
consent to the search done.
FACTS:
During a COMELEC gun ban, some law
enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a
checkpoint. They were checking the cars going
to Pasay City, stopping those they found
suspicious, and imposing merely a running
stop on the others. At about past midnight,
they stopped a Kia Pride. P03 Suba saw a long
firearm on the lap of the person seated at the
passenger seat, who was later identified as
Usana. They asked the driver, identified as
Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the
long firearm from Usana. When Escaño, upon
order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat
Ave., and the other passengers were searched
for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45
caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño.
The three passengers were thereafter brought
to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride
driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the
precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the
desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was
suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escaño
to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and
opened the trunk himself using his key. They
noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked
Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel
wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by
NBI Forensic Chemist, was found positive for
hashish weighing 3.3143 kg. Usana and Lopez,
together with Escaño, were charged before the
RTC of Makati City for violation of RA 6425 and
convicted for the same.
55

Usana and Lopez argued that the trial court
erred in admitting in evidence the hashish
seized without a search warrant when the
police officers already had the opportunity to
secure a search warrant before searching the
bag found at the baggage compartment at the
back of the car.
ISSUE:
WON the search conducted by the officers were
valid despite the absence of a search warrant.
RULING:
Jurisprudence recognizes six generally
accepted exceptions to the warrant
requirement: (1) search incidental to an
arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches;
(5) consented warrantless search; and (6)
stop-and-frisk situations.
Even though there was ample opportunity to
obtain a search warrant, the SC did not
invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there
are indications that the search done on the car
of Escaño was consented to by him. Both
Lopez and Usana testified that Escaño was with
the police officers when they searched the car.
There was no apparent objection made by
Escaño as he seemed to have freely
accompanied the police officers to the car.
People v. Che Chung Ting
328 SCRA 592
CASE PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
The respondent is a hongkong national who
was guilty of delivering, distributing, and
dispatching in transit shabu and having in his
possession and control same regulated drug.
He was meted two death sentences. Thus case
is before the SC on automatic review.
A series of buy-bust operation apprehended
Maben Mei Po after she delivered a bag
containing crystalline substance to an
informant in full view of NARCOM agents. She
cooperated with the government and revealed
the name Che Chung Ting as the source of the
drugs.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Thus, the narcotics command deployed a team
of agents for the entrapment and arrest of
respondent.
During the operation, at the Roxas Seafront
Garden, Mabel went to Unit 122. The 2
NARCOM agent, who waited inside the car
parker 2 meters away saw the door of the unit
open as a man went out to hand Mabel the bag
containing a white crystalline substance. The
agents alighted and arrested the surprised
man who was positively identified by Mabel
and Che Chun Ting.
The agents coordinated with the security
guards on duty and searched Unit 122 wherein
they seized a black bag with several plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance
in an open cabinet at the second floor.
The defense had different version. They
contended that when Noli Ortiz the brother of
respondent’s girlfriend, rang the doorbell of the
unit and when Nimfa (the girlfriend of
respondent) opened the foor, 2 NARCOM
officers suddenly forced their way inside and
searched the premises. Noli denied the black
bag. The defense assailed the lower court for
relying on the testimony of Mabel who turned
hostile witness in the course of the trial.
ISSUE:
WON the shabu seized inside Unit 122 is
admissible as evidence since it was seized
without a search warrant (INADMISSIBLE)
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution ordains that no arrest,
search or seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority. It further mandates that any
evidence in violation thereof shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. However, this right is not absolute
and admit of certain well-recognized
exceptions.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for
the validity of the warrantless search under the
exception, the same must be limited to and
circumscribed by the subject, time and place of
the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless
search is sanctioned only with respect to the
person of the suspect, and the things that may
be seized from him are limited to “dangerous
weapons” or “anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense” With
respect to the time and place of the
56

warrantless search, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.
Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must
have been conducted at about the time of the
arrest or immediately thereafter and only at
the place where the suspect arrested, or the
premises or surroundings under his immediate
control.
The accused was admittedly outside unit 122
and in the act of delivering the shabu to mabel
when he was arrested by NARCOM operatives.
Thus, the court ruled that the search in unit
122 and the seizure therein of shabu do not
fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for
being violative of one’s basic constitutional
right.
However, his arrest was lawful because he was
caught in flagrante delicto as a result of an
entrapment operation.
Valeroso v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 164815, Sept. 3. 2009
CASE PRINCIPLE:
One well-recognized instances where searches
and seizures are allowed even without a valid
warrant is the Plain View Doctrine. In lawful
arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of
the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a
valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The phrase "within the area
of his immediate control" means the area from
within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of
arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping
for ransom was released. Valeroso was found
and arrested and was bodily searched and
after which a firearm with live ammunition was
found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm
was later confirmed and revealed to have not
been issued to the petitioner but to another
person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that
Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
search warrant) in the boarding house of his
children. They pointed their guns on him and
tied him and pulled him out of the room as the
raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Later, an operative came
out of the room exclaiming that he has found a
gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by
virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for
illegally possessing a revolver bearing serial
number 52315 without securing the necessary
license/permit. The petitioner through a letter
of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of
the firearm and ammunition has merit and
valid
RULING:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search
and seizure are as follows: A person who was
arrested lawfully may be searched so that the
officer may remove any weapons that the
accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to
protect the welfare of the officers and to make
sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to
find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed
by the accused. Further, a valid arrest allows
the seizure of evidence or any weapons either
on the person or within the area of his
immediate control. Based on the statement of
the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist
arrest, He was tied and placed outside the
room where the gun was found; therefore the
room where the gun was found could not be
“in his immediate control.” Incidental searches
without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can
inadvertently found during the arrest under the
“plain view doctrine.” However, the firearm
was not found accidentally but was actually
searched and therefore not incidental. Clearly,
the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s
right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Therefore, the evidence obtained is
inadmissible to court and cannot be used
against him.
People v. Collado
G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013
CASE PRINCIPLE:
57

The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must be upheld
in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the same.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:
"(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." A common
example of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one
made after conducting a buy-bust operation.
FACTS:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian
asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were
engaged in selling shabu and that drug users,
including out-of-school youth, were using their
residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin,
Pasig City, for their drug sessions. A buy-bust
operation team was thereafter formed. The
asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a
regular buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the
money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a
small metal container from which he brought
out a small plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police
officer went inside the house of Marcelino and
Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario gathered around a table littered with
various drug paraphernalia such as an
improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil
with traces of white substance, disposable
lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was
recovered from Ranada.
RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs.
5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165. CA
affirmed the decision with modification that
Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and Madarang are
accessories, not principals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not irregularities attended the
arrest, detention, and the procedure in
handling the specimen seized from them (NO)
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
RULING:
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in
flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in
his control and custody illegal drug
paraphernalia.
As for the specimen, the failure of the police
officers to inventory and photograph the
confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized substance
were preserved, as in this case.
In Rañada’s case, he was actually caught having
custody and control of the confiscated drug
paraphernalia intended for smoking, injecting, etc. into
one's body. It was also indubitably shown that he
failed to present authority to possess the prohibited
articles, much less, an explanation of his possession
thereof. However, as regards the other accused who
were seen in the company of Rañada, the evidence of
conspiracy against them was insufficient. They were
in close proximity to Rañada at the time and place of
the incident. But mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution
failed to show specific overt acts that would link these
accused to Ranada's possession of the said
contrabands. The
CA erred in ruling that they were accessories
to the crime.
Sy v. People
G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 1011
CASE PRINCIPLE:
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the
arrest must precede the search, generally, the
process cannot be reversed. With the
exception, if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.
FACTS: Under an Information, petitioner Sy
was indicted for violation of Sec 11 of Art. 2 of
RA 9165 for having illegally possessed 0.02
gram of “shabu”.
Upon his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
58

The Prosecution presented several persons in
the PNP while the defense presented petitioner
as the sole witness.
Prosecution’s side:
While PO3 Faelogo, a member of the PNP,
while he was on duty, received a telephone call
from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug
trade was going on at a certain Barangay in
Dumaguete City. With him at that time was
PO3 Paquera. PO2 Faelogo averred that 2 of
them immediately went to said barangay.
About 2 meters away, they saw a man, later
identified as petitioner Sy, examining a
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu
powder by flicking the same. They approached
Sy and introduced themselves as police officers
and announced his arrest for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. He apprised Sy of his
constitutional rights but later interrupted by
Sy’s attempt to escape by boarding his
motorcycle, but later on subdued. While
wrestling with the petitioner, a sachet of shabu
dropped on the ground.
Defense:
He averred that he was in the midst of
awaiting for a masseuse when he was
immediately handcuffed by the 2 policemen
and later brought to the police station for
investigation.
RTC rendered a decision convicting petitioner
of violation of Sec 11 Art 2 of RA 9165.
The petitioner appealed before the CA, which
the latter affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding
that the right of petitioner against unlawful
searches and seizures was not violated
RULING: NO. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails
to raise the issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground
BEFORE arraignment.
In the case at bar, petitioner never objected to
the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Thus, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court trying the case. Sec. 5 Rule 113
of RROC provides:
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just
been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
conned while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
WoA must precede the SW, however, with
exceptions:
Warrantless arrest incidental to a lawful arrest;
Search of evidence in “plain view”; Search
of a moving vehicle; Consented warrantless
search; Customs search; Stop and frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the
arrest must precede the search, generally, the
process cannot be reversed. With the
exception, if the police have probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
In the case at bar, the policemen received an
information from a concerned citizen that an
illegal drug trade was going on; that while
petitioner was caught flicking a transparent
sachet of shabu from a distance of 2 meters;
that while being informed of his rights during
the arrest, petitioner tried to escape by
boarding his motorcycle.
From the foregoing, sufficient evidence
supports the warrantless arrest of petitioner as
it falls under Sec. 5(a) or arrest in flagrante
delicto.
The policemen witnessed petitioner flickering a
transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing
their suspicion that such sachet contains
shabu, the arresting officers immediately
59

approached petitioner, introduced themselves
as police officers and effected their arrest.
Under these circumstances, petitioner was
clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was
then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the
police officers. At the time of his arrest, the
police officers were actively performing their
duties, since they were following up a tip that
there was an illegal drug trade being
conducted in the area.
This fact, coupled with the overt acts of
petitioner, formed sufficient basis on the part
of the police officers to believe that a crime
was actually being committed. Thus,
petitioner's case falls within the exception to
the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an
arrest. Consequently, the results of the
ensuing search and seizure were admissible in
evidence to prove petitioner's guilt of the
offense charged.
Miclat v. People
G.R. No. 176077, Aug. 31, 2011
CASE PRINCIPLE:
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who
has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The
object must be open to the eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent.
FACTS:
On November 8, 2002, 1PM: Police Inspector
Jose Valencia called upon his subordinates
after being informed of drug-trading activities
in Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving the
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
accused – Abraham Miclat. The informant
directed the surveillance team to the residence
of the accused. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio positioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while
the rest of the members of the group deployed
themselves nearby.
Through a small
opening in the curtain-covered
window, PO3 Antonio peeped
inside and there at a distance
of 1½ meters, he saw Abe
arranging several pieces of
small plastic sachets which he
believed to be containing
shabu. Slowly, he inched his
way in by gently pushing the
door as well as the plywood
covering the same.
Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio introduced
himself as a police officer while Abe on the
other hand, after being informed of such
authority, voluntarily handed over Antonio 4
pieces of small plastic sachets he was earlier
sorting out. He was then arrested.
Accused claimed that he was just watching TV
with his father and sister when they heard a
commotion prompting them to go down and
check. He said that one of the operatives
kicked him when he tried to resist the arrest,
and that shabu was only planted on him when
he was already arrested. Accused also claimed
that the arrest and seizure was unlawful.
ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid – (YES)
WON the seized drugs were admissible– (YES)
RULING:
Sec 5(a) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that a warrantless
arrest is reasonable and valid when the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Two elements must be present in
order to fall under this: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
The established facts reveal that Miclat was
caught in flagrante delicto and the police
60

authorities effectively made a valid warrantless
arrest.
The right against warrantless searches and
seizure is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the plastic
sachets from the petitioner was not only
incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls
within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine.
(See Case Principle)
x
An object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. Petitioner was caught
in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic
sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he
voluntarily surrendered them to him upon
learning that he is a police officer.
Since petitioner’s arrest is among the
exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant
before effecting an arrest and the evidence
seized from the petitioner was the result of a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,
which incidentally was in plain view of the
arresting officer, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence
to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense
charged.
Valdez v. People
G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007
CASE PRINCIPLE:
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to
operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged for the violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued
with the prosecution presenting the three (3)
barangay tanods namely, Bautista, Aratas and
Ordoño, who arrested the petitioner.
Bautista testified that he was conducting the
routine patrol along the National Highway in
Barangay San Benito Norte together with
Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-
bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who
appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be
looking for something. They approached him
but the latter purportedly attempted to run
away. They chased him, put him under arrest
and thereafter brought him to the house of
Barangay Captain Mercado where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado
to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen
pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was
then that petitioner was taken to the police
station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s
testimony on most material points. On cross-
examination, however, Aratas admitted that he
himself brought out the contents of petitioner’s
bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at
Mercado’s house, it was petitioner himself who
brought out the contents of his bag upon
orders from Mercado. Ordoño testified that it
was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioner’s bag and that it was then that they
saw the purported contents thereof.
The prosecution presented the forensic chemist
who conducted the examination of the
marijuana allegedly confiscated from
petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen
submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the
substance contained in a plastic bag, tested
positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge
neither of how the marijuana was taken from
petitioner nor of how the said substance
61

reached the police officers. Moreover, he could
not identify whose marking was on the inside
of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana
leaves.
ISSUE:
WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
(NO)
RULING:
When petitioner was arrested without a
warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest
effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on petitioner
was incidental to a lawful arrest. It is obvious
that based on the testimonies of the arresting
barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time
petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an
offense at the time he alighted from the bus,
nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense. The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioners warrantless
arrest.
Here, petitioners act of looking around after
getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he
purportedly attempted to run away as the
tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot
by itself be construed as adequate to charge
the tanod with personal knowledge that
petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact
spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even
assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot
be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the
prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been
harboring based on petitioners behavior.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following
Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless
arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine
reason, in light of the police officers experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Abelita III v. Doria
G.R. No. 170672, Aug. 14, 2009
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular
area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
FACTS:
● Judge Abelita claims that on their way
home he was approached by P/Supt
Doria and 10 other police officers.
Doria asked Abelita to come with them
to the police station.
● Doria was investigating a shooting,
where Abelita was implicated by the
victim.
● Abelita supposedly agreed to the
request of Doria but suddenly sped up
his vehicle and proceeded to his
residence.
● Doria gave chase. Abelita upon arriving
in his residence ran towards his house.
This is where the police saw a gun in
the front seat of Abelita’s car.
● The police arrested Abelita and
confiscated the guns found in his car.
● Abelita alleged that the arrest is
unlawful and the search after his arrest
is also unlawful
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure were illegal
(NO)
RULING:
● For the warrantless arrest under this
Rule to be valid, two requisites must
62

concur: (1) the offender has just
committed an offense; and (2) the
arresting peace officer or private
person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
● In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a
report about the alleged shooting
incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated
the report and learned from witnesses
that petitioner was involved in the
incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the
police headquarters to shed light on
the incident, petitioner initially agreed
then sped up his vehicle, prompting
the police authorities to give chase.
Petitioner's act of trying to get away,
coupled with the incident report which
they investigated, is enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause
● The plain view doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (1) the
law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area;
(2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
● In this case, the police authorities were
in the area because that was where
they caught up with petitioner after the
chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the
door. Since a shooting incident just
took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident,
it was apparent to the police officers
that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in
seizing the firearms
People v. Calantiao
18 June 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the
exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control.
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
FACTS:
Nov. 2003, PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain
EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a
shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it
appears that while driving a towing truck and
traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon
City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a
white taxi cab prompting him to follow said
vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue
Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City.
Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one
of them was accused Calantiao, alighted and
fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do
anything but continued his driving until he
reached a police station nearby where he
reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were MARIANO
and RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano testified that they
immediately responded to said complaint by
proceeding to 5th Avenue corner 8th Street,
Caloocan City where they found the white taxi.
While approaching said vehicle, two armed
men alighted therefrom, fired their guns
towards them (police officers) and ran away.
PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them
but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano
recovered from Calantiao a black bag
containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana
fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez
recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38
revolver.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was
corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified
that he personally saw those bricks of
marijuana confiscated from the accused. He
confirmed that he was with PO1 Mariano when
they apprehended said accused and his
companion and testified that while PO1
Mariano recovered from the accused a black
bag containing marijuana, on his part, he
confiscated from accused’s companion a .38
revolver.
STORY OF THE ACCUSED:
According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi
he and his companion Rommel Reyes were
riding almost collided with another car. Reyes
then opened the window and made a "fuck
you" sign against the persons on board of that
car. That prompted the latter to chase them
and when they were caught in a traffic jam,
63

PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on
board of that other car alighted and kicked
their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and
PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered,
"Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo
ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his
gun again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao tried
to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes
were then handcuffed and were brought to the
police station. Thereat, they were subjected to
body frisking and their wallets and money were
taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some
documents and informed them that they will be
charged for drugs. A newspaper containing
marijuana was shown to them and said police
officer told them that it would be sufficient
evidence against them. They were detained
and subjected to medical examination before
they were submitted for inquest at the
prosecutor’s office.
ISSUE:
WON the marijuana in his possession cannot
be admitted as evidence against him because it
was illegally discovered and seized, not having
been within the apprehending officers’ "plain
view. (NO)
RULING:
Under Section 13 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s
safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In lawful arrests, it
becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect,
but also in the permissible area within the
latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest
allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in
a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or
dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As
the black bag containing the marijuana was in
Calantiao’s possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers
could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana
cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the
Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the
exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and
premises under his immediate control. This is
so because "objects in the ‘plain view’ of an
officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence."
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence; where
to file
Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue.
G.R. No. 174570, Dec. 15, 2010
CASE PRINCIPLE:
A search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one
specific offense alleged in an application on the
basis of the applicant’s personal knowledge
and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue
of the search warrants issued in connection
with the case of Robbery in a separate case of
Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated
from the same incident.
FACTS:
Petitioner Romer Sy Tan filed a criminal case
against Sy Tiong Gue. The respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration wherein
respondents informed this Court, albeit
belatedly, that the RTC granted their motion
for the withdrawal of the Information.
As such, respondents prayed that the decision
be reconsidered and set aside and that the
quashal of the subject search warrants be
rendered moot and academic on the basis of
the dismissal of the criminal case.
64

This Court issued a resolution granting the
motion to withdraw the Information without
prejudice on the ground that the elements of
Robbery i.e.unlawful taking with intent to gain,
with force and intimidation, were absent.
Thus, there was lack of probable cause,
warranting the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the
Information for Robbery, the quashal of the
subject search warrants and the determination
of the issue of whether or not there was
probable cause warranting the issuance by the
RTC of the said search warrants for
respondents alleged acts of robbery has been
rendered moot and academic.
Petitioner filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor a Complaint for Qualified Theft
against the respondents based on the same
incidents and that should the Information for
Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court,
the items seized by virtue of the subject search
warrants will be used as evidence therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search
warrants issued in connection with the case of
Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft,
even if both cases emanated from the same
incident. (NO)
RULING:
Verily, there is no more reason to further delve
into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal
effect. Even if an Information for Qualified
Theft be later filed on the basis of the same
incident subject matter of the dismissed case
of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized
items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary
to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the
items seized as evidence in any other offense
except in that in which the subject search
warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
and things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if
there is probable cause in connection with only
one specific offense alleged in an application
on the basis of the applicant’s personal
knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner
cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized
by virtue of the search warrants issued in
connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both
cases emanated from the same incident.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of
the Information was based on the findings of
the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there
was no probable cause to indict respondents
for the crime of Robbery absent the essential
element of unlawful taking, which is likewise
an essential element for the crime of Qualified
Theft, all offenses which are necessarily
included in the crime of Robbery can no longer
be filed, much more, prosper. Based on the
foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the
motion.
World Wide Web v. People
13 Jan. 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
An application for a search warrant is not a
criminal action; conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give the
aggrieved party personality to question an
order quashing search warrants.
An order quashing a search warrant, which was
issued independently prior to the filing of
criminal action, partakes of final order that can
be the proper subject of an appeal.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the
exercise of their judicial functions. A trial
judge;s finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is accorded
respect by reviewing courts when the finding
has substantial basis.
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional
Intelligence Special Operations Office of the
PNP filed applications for warrants before the
RTC of Quezon City to search the office
premises of Worldwide Web Corporation and
Planet Internet Corporation located at the 11th
floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood
65

City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office
premises of petitioner Planet Internet
Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald
Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.
The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which
amounted to theft and violation of P.D. No.
401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation
of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections,
the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters
and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice
of the PLDT.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the
applications for search warrants. The
applicants Rivera and Gali of the Alternative
Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT
testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international
long distance call should pass through the local
exchange or public switch telephone network
(PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the
international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the
Philippines.
The call is then transmitted to the other
country through voice circuits, either via fiber
optic submarine cable or microwave radio
using satellite facilities, and passes the toll
center of one of the IGFs in the destination
country.
The toll center would then meter the call,
which will pass through the PSTN of the called
number to complete the circuit. In contrast,
WWC and Planet Internet were able to provide
international long distance call services to any
part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone
lines, but bypassing its IGF.
This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method
of routing and completing international long
distance calls using lines, cables, antenna
and/or wave or frequency which connects
directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the originating country or the
country where the call is originated."
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone
number serviced by PLDT and registered to
WWC was used to provide a service called
GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international
call service, which can be availed of via prepaid
or billed/post-paid accounts."
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed
the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the
given access line. After a voice prompt
required him to enter the user code and PIN
provided under a GlobalTalk prepaid account,
he was then requested to enter the destination
number, which included the country code,
phone number and a pound sign. The call was
completed to a phone number in Taiwan.
However, when he checked the records, it
showed that the call was only directed to the
local number 6891135. This indicated that the
international test call using GlobalTalk
bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone
number 6891135 is registered to WWC.
However, upon an ocular inspection conducted
by Rivera at this address, it was found that the
occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which
also uses the telephone lines registered to
WWC. These telephone lines are
interconnected to a server and used as dial-up
access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines
and equipment had been illegally connected by
petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed
the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s
IGF, they violated P.D. No. 401 as amended,
on unauthorized installation of telephone
connections.
Petitioners also committed theft, because
through their misuse of PLDT phone
lines/numbers and equipment and with clear
intent to gain, they illegally stole business and
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT.
Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and
intent of R. A. No. 7925, because in bypassing
the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of
access and bypass charges in its favor while
"piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar
facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its
business revenues from international long
distance calls.
Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of
Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the
National Telecommunications Commission
prohibiting the use of customs premises
equipment without first securing type approval
license from the latter.
PLDT alleged that petitioners deprived it of
foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the
payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to
the prejudice of the government.
66

RTC:granted the application for search
warrants.
Three warrants were issued against the office
premises of petitioners, authorizing police
officers to seize various items in the office
premises of WWC and Planet Internet, which
includes various telecommunications
equipment to support the illegal toll bypass
operations.
The warrants were implemented on the same
day by RISOO operatives of the NCR-PNP.
Over a hundred items were seized, including
15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.
Planet Internet notes that even personal
diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s
Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as
reserve and broken computers, were also
seized.
Petitioners filed their respective motions to
quash the search warrants, citing basically the
same grounds:
(1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of
did not constitute theft;
(2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not
a crime;
(3) the search warrants were general
warrants; and
(4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were
"fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the
motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash, the
test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were
shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. and of
Capital Wireless.
Planet Internet explained that Eastern and
Capwire both provided international direct
dialing services, which Planet Internet
marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement."
Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first
phase of the call; but for the second phase, it
used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire.
Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its
domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
for its IGF usage. None of these contentions
were refuted by PLDT.
RTC:granted the motions to quash on the
ground that the warrants issued were in the
nature of general warrants.
Thus, the properties seized under the said
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied on the ground that it had failed to
get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior
to filing the motion, as required under Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
CA:reversed and set aside the RTC Resolutions
and declared the search warrants valid and
effective. Petitioners separately moved for
reconsideration of the CA ruling.
Among the points raised was that PLDT should
have filed a petition for certiorari rather than
an appeal when it questioned the RTC
Resolution before the CA. The appellate court
denied the Motions for Reconsideration. Hence,
this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not quashing a search warrant
issued independently prior to the filing of a
criminal action is deemed a final order that can
be subject of an appeal
RULING:
Yes. An order quashing a search warrant,
which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, is not merely an
interlocutory order.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial
process conducted either as an incident in a
main criminal case already filed in court or in
anticipation of one yet to be filed.
Whether the criminal case (of which the search
warrant is an incident) has already been filed
before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy
from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a
search warrant. Where the search warrant is
issued as an incident in a pending criminal
case, the quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory.
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied
for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case
yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant
67

(and denial of a motion for reconsideration of
the grant) ends the judicial process.
When the search warrants issued were
subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was
nothing left to be done by the trial court.
Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were
final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal
may be properly taken therefrom.
People v. Calantiao
18 June 2014
CASE PRINCIPLE:
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the
exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest outside the suspect's person and
premises under his immediate control.
FACTS:
Medario Calantiao was charged before the RTC
of violation of violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
While PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain
EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and
asked for police assistance regarding a
shooting incident. Edwin Lojera narrated that
while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA, he had a traffic dispute with a
white taxi cab prompting him to follow said
vehicle. Thereat, the passengers of said
taxicab, one of them are Medario Calantiao
(accused), alighted and fired their guns.
Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but
continued his driving until he reached a police
station nearby where he reported the incident.
The officers on duty, PO1 Mariano and PO3
Ramirez immediately proceeded to the scene
where they found the white taxi. While
approaching said vehicle, two armed men
alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards
them (police officers) and ran away. The
officers chased them and recovered from the
armed men a black bag containing two cricks
of marijuana and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, and recovered from
Calantiao’s companion, Rommel Reyes, a .38
revolver.
On Calantiao’s defense the taxi he and his
companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost
Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.
collided with another car. Reyes then opened
the window and made a “fuck you” sign against
the persons on board of that car. That
prompted the latter to chase them and when
they were caught in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson
Mariano; one of the persons on board of that
other car alighted and kicked their taxi.
Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano
slapped the latter and uttered some words,
police officer poked his gun against Reyes and
when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired.
Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and
were brought to the police station. Thereat,
they were subjected to body frisking and their
wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano
then prepared some documents and informed
them that they will be charged for drugs. A
newspaper containing marijuana was shown to
them and said police officer told them that it
would be sufficient evidence against them.
RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to
the prosecution's case and affirmed by CA
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged seized items are
inadmissible evidence in accordance to plain
view doctrine. (NO)
RULING:
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana
cannot be said as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the
plain view doctrine is misplaced. The plain view
doctrine is not applicable in Calantiao’s
situation because the police officers purposely
searched him upon his arrest. The police
officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiao’s
possession; they deliberately opened it, as part
of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful
arrest.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed
by the person arrested, who might be armed
with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the
latter from destroying evidence within reach."
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in
a black bag in Calantiao's possession and
within his immediate control. He could have
easily taken any weapon from the bag or
dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As
the black bag containing the marijuana was in
Calantiao's possession, it was within the
68
 Criminal Procedure| Atty. Soleng | A.Y.

permissible area that the apprehending officers

could validly conduct a warrantless search.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the

exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest outside the suspect's person and
premises under his immediate control.

This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC

and the Court of Appeals, which both found the
chain of custody of the seized drugs to have
not been broken so as to render the marijuana
seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there
was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the
evidence, the presumption that the integrity of
the evidence has been preserved will remain.

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and

convincing evidence that the apprehending
officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to
properly perform their duties, their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit.

69