Minority Vs Culture - 77-102

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies
Vol: 1 No: 1 Summer 2008
Fatih University
2008
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Contents
Vol: 1 No: 1 Summer 2008
Casting Radical Uncertainty on the Precautionary Principle:

Shackle and Foucault revisited
Bilge Erten................................................................................... 1
Perspectives on Crisis Management in European Union Countries:

United Kingdom, Spain and Germany
Bahadir Sahin - Naim Kapucu - Ali Unlu ............................... 17
An Examination of Relationship between Burnout and Job

Satisfaction among Turkish Accounting and Finance Academicians
Adem Anbar - Melek Eker ...................................................... 39
A Glance to Turkey-EU Relations from the Security Perspective:

Incorporation of Turkey into the EU is Necessary for European
Security would Strengthen the Prospects of Turkey’s Integration.
Ümit Kurt ...................................................................................... 59
Modernity vs. Culture:

Protecting the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines
Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr.
Augencio C. Bagsic
Mylene M. Eguilos - Ryan Jaen
Maria Lourdes P. Respicio
Christopher Ryan T. Tan ........................................................... 77
-1 (1), 2008 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies
Casting Radical Uncertainty on the Precautionary

Principle:
Shackle and Foucault revisited
Bilge Erten*
ABSTRACT
This article interprets the Precautionary Principle in environmental regulation from the
perspective of radical uncertainty embedded in knowledge as well as the knowledge-power
networks formed in the existence of such uncertainty. In this sense, the article makes an epis-
temological critique of the current application of the Precautionary Principle (using Shackle)
and extends the paradox of uncertainty to read its implications for networks of knowledge
and power (using Foucault). Participatory decision-making is questioned as an alternative to
current environmental forms of regulation.
“There would be no uncertainty if a question could be answered by seeking additional
knowledge. The fundamental imperfection of knowledge is the essence of uncertainty
(Shackle 1955, 52).
“Time is a denial of the omnipotence of reason. Time divides the entirety of things into
that part about which we can reason, and that part about which we cannot. Yet the part about
which we cannot reason has a bearing on the meaning of the part that is amenable to rea-
son. The analyst is obliged to practice, in effect, a denial of time. For he can reason only
about what is in effect complete; and in a world where there is time, nothing is ever com-
plete (Shackle 1992, 27).
Key Words: Precautionary Principle, Uncertainty Inherent, Decision Making
* Ph.D Candidate, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, US, e-mail: berten@econs.umass.edu
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1. Introduction
The introductory quotes, one from Shackle’s earlier work Uncertainty in Economics
and Other Reflections (1955) and the other from his more recent work Epistemics and Eco-
nomics (1993), suggest a radically different understanding of uncertainty and time, which
shake the grounds on which mainstream ideas on environment rest. Every day social
choices are made that alter the distribution of benefits derived from environmental assets
as much as the costs externalized on such assets. However, the process under which such
choices are made cannot be understood by a simple analysis of costs and benefits as sug-
gested by the mainstream environmental economics. For individuals do never have
complete information about the future; as Shackle says, “knowledge of the future is a con-
tradiction in terms”—as future is unlived, and can only be imagined, not reasoned (Shack-
le 1993, 47). This principle appears to be recently recognized – over the last twenty ye-
ars – by environmental bodies all round the world as they change their legislations in line
with the Precautionary Principle.1
The Precautionary Principle is based on the notion of acting with caution. In particu-
lar, it emphasizes the necessity to act before potentially harmful activities to environment
and human health occur since the harmful impact is often irreversible. Various environ-
mental organizations and protection agencies thus recognized the time dimension in en-
vironmental regulation, which is tightly related to uncertainty inherent in scientific know-
ledge and its implications. An environmentally conscious agent has no longer the luxury
to rely on ‘scientific certainty’—proved by the statistical significance of the effect of a toxic
chemical on environmental pollution—for acting (1) to restrict its emissions and (2) to se-
arch for substitutes that will lead to less environmental problems. Such consciousness re-
quires not only restrictive action as claimed by some of the opponents of precautionary
principle, but also creation of alternative products, unconventional methods of production,
and substitutes for harmful emissions to nature. Precaution is not the regressive force that
limits and restricts the very activities causing pollution. Instead it is the positive force in the
imagination of novel ways of doing the same activities for attaining desirable future outco-
mes for the environment.
The paper will begin with a discussion of uncertainty in environmental decision-ma-
king, distinguishing it from the conventional concept of risk. Next, the role of time in envi-
ronmental decision making process will be elaborated, and finally we will analyze the
knowledge-power networks in the application of the Precautionary Principle.
2. Uncertainty Inherent in Knowledge

2.1 The Question of Knowledge
Discipline of economics, long ago, claimed to be a self-subsistent profession, consi-
1 Precautionary Principle is incorporated into several legislations some of which are 1982 United Nations World Charter for
Nature, 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1998 Wingsread Declaration, 2000 European
Commission Report. For a historical account see Jordan, Andrew and Timothy O’Riordan (1999).
2
dering questions of epistemology irrelevant and unnecessary. It was the business of phi-
losophy to ask the question of what is known and what is unknown. The assumption of a
rational agent that possessed the knowledge of preferences, endowments and technolo-
gies in order to reach optimal outcomes was indeed more than sufficient to avoid any kind
of epistemological question. Even the introduction of imperfect information into recent
forms of institutional economics did not abandon the assumption of economic agents ac-
ting to maximize self-gain, recognizing solely the asymmetries of incomplete information
set. Yet the individual capacity to imagine the unforeseen future and shaping future envi-
ronment through this creative process—transforming the future itself and the re-thinking
individual—is left out of the picture. This point is very explicit in the works of Shackle:
“...economic theory took on a character belonging to the manipulable, calculable, ex-
ternal world of things, not the void of time, the conscious mind whose being consists pre-
cisely in the endless gaining of knowledge” (ibid, 3).
The notion of “endless gaining of knowledge” is particularly important for Shackle’s
theory since it illustrates the idea that knowledge is in the process of being gained, and
therefore, it is neither sufficient nor complete. The future which will be created from indi-
viduals’ decisions does not exist right now, and therefore it cannot be known. But it is ima-
gined by every individual for himself/herself, and the imagination process is the site of ex-
pectations out of which decisions right now are made.
2.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis

The process of imagination cannot possibly be explored in mainstream environmen-
tal economics where the rational calculation of social marginal costs and benefits results
in the static optimum level of an environmentally degrading activity or activities as a who-
le. The typical methodology here is the cost-benefit analysis, and the agent to implement
the optimum of pollution is the rational policy-maker. To account for the lack of knowled-
ge of future outcomes, rational-agent models assume a “one size fits all” theoretical ap-
proach, which is solely based on rational expectations, and ignores the role of each indi-
vidual’s expectations on the resulting outcomes.
It is also assumed that the cost-benefit analysis can identify all the consequences of a
(potentially) harmful economic activity, and then evaluate the positivity/negativity of each
consequence. First of all, the claim for determining all the possible consequences is ab-
surd given that any act or event has an infinite number of effects now and in the future. Se-
condly, there is indeed no mechanism by which one can assign probabilities to these in-
finitely many consequences of a particular economic event on environment.
2.3 Probabilities, Risks, and Uncertainty

The sheer impossibility to set probabilities is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of uncertainty from the conventional concept of risk. It is possible to assign probabilities
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Bilge Erten
and construct a probability distribution for a set of risks if and when these risks are part of
a system that are already known to the subject. It is useful here to consider the analogy
provided by Keynes in distinguishing the two concepts:
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what
is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this
sense, to uncertainty. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect
of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years
hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in
the social system of 1970” (Keynes 1937, 213-4).
The game of roulette is the kind of ergodic-stochastic-process presupposed by the
probabilistic understandings of uncertainty. There are several mainstream theories of ex-
pectation formation, but they can be categorized into ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ in
terms of the kind of probability distribution that they use. While the subjectivists, i.e. Sava-
ge, Friedman, etc, argue that probability distributions are fundamentally epistemic and
need not conform to reality, the objectivist rational expectations theorists, for instance Lu-
cas, suggest that expectations of agents correspond to the nature of actual world. Some
post-Keynesians argued that these two positions are reducible to each other in terms of
the positivist claims they make. But more importantly, both subjectivist and objectivist po-
sitions are far more different than what Keynes was describing when he was addressing
the problem of uncertainty in economic decision making. For Keynes, the future is funda-
mentally uncertain, and “we simply do not know” (ibid, 214). Life, however, continues,
and we need to make decisions even though we are well aware of the fact that we do not
know the future. Those decisions that are most important economically are also those that
are most likely to be fundamentally uncertain. Shackle’s understanding of crucial or mo-
mentous choices illustrates this idea:
“A choice of one step or one policy rather than another can be called momentous if
it will drive the course of events down a road from which there can be no getting back to
any of the other roads which are available before the choice is made” (Shackle 1992, 384).
Such crucial choices are often referred as irreversible actions provided that the ef-
fects of the action cannot be reversed, either absolutely or because the costs of doing so
are extremely high. In Keynesian theory, such choices usually underline the irreversibi-
lity character of investment decisions. If an entrepreneur is planning to start up a business
whose profitability is unknown at the beginning and can only be known over time, then his
decision to invest on what type of activity and with what sorts of production method is cru-
cial because his investment can be irreversible, i.e. he may not be able to cover his fixed
capital back into the previous amount of money capital.
2.4 Crucial and Irreversible Decisions about Environment

Crucial decisions apply to any type of long-term economic activity that depends on
4
all kinds of ever-changing social conditions to achieve success. Now that the idea of res-
tricting the amount of green-house gas emissions to a socially desirable level is taken se-
riously, the investment in green technology required to achieve this goal gains importan-
ce. Such an investment is a crucial decision since the effects of these emissions could be
irreversible unless precautionary measures are taken. In this sense, the implementation of
the Precautionary Principle—by imagining ways to prevent global warming from reac-
hing unacceptable levels—is by no means less important than the investment decisions of
the firms. However, the application of the Precautionary Principle is not solely about pre-
venting pollution, but also constructing alternative imaginaries of environment.
Sunstein suggested to apply the minimax principle (‘choose the policy with the best
worst-case outcome’) in the face of uncertainty, i.e. when there is a lack of knowledge to
assign probabilities to outcomes (Sunstein 2003, 11). Implicit in his suggestion is the idea
that the policy-makers have the knowledge to assess which policy might lead to the best
worst-case outcome even if they cannot know what the probability of that outcome is. No-
te that this idea is incompatible with Shacke’s theory of uncertainty. For Shackle not only
the probabilities but also the outcomes themselves also uncertain since one cannot acco-
unt for all the possible effects of an economic event. Therefore, one can no means rely on
the ability of policy makers to compare the worst-case outcomes of different policies. Who
could determine, by what means, what the worst case outcome of a policy will be, let alo-
ne determine how would that compare to another policy’s worst case outcome? Sunstein
also argues that “risks that are in the realm of uncertainty will, over time, move into the re-
alm of risk” (ibid, 11). The implicit assumption at this point is the faith in progression of sci-
entific knowledge so as to eliminate the uncertainty about the harmful effects of a potenti-
al hazard. However, uncertainty can still exist in cases of potential hazards about which
plenty of information is available. While acquiring new information can decrease uncerta-
inty to some extent, it also has the potential to have the opposite effect, particularly if it
sheds light on the presence of uncertainties that were previously unknown or were unde-
restimated. Acquiring further knowledge about a potential hazard may demonstrate that
our understanding was more limited or the effects on bio-systems were more complex
than previously thought. The introductory quote from Shackle directly addresses this is-
sue:
“There would be no uncertainty if a question could be answered by seeking additio-
nal knowledge. The fundamental imperfection of knowledge is the essence of uncertainty”
(Shackle 1955, 52).
2.5 Is there an Uncertainty Paradox in the Precautionary Principle?

Asselt and Vos (2006) argue that Precautionary Principle, which recognizes the need
to take action even if the situation lacks scientific certainty, also includes in most of its le-
gal formulations a “knowledge condition”—“the level of proof needed to trigger applica-
tion”. This condition implies that the policy-makers need to appeal to scientists for some
level of scientific ‘proof’ before they can take precautionary actions (Asselt and Vos 2006,
5
Bilge Erten
5). The knowledge condition existing in legal formulations of Precautionary Principle thus
poses an “uncertainty paradox”: there is no need for scientific certainty to act in principle
and paradoxically there is still need for some form of scientific evidence before precautio-
nary action can be legally started.
It is possible to object the basis of Precautionary Principle by pointing out the thin li-
ne between the lack of scientific certainty and the presence of some scientific evidence. If
the absence of scientific certainty still implies the existence of some level of scientific evi-
dence, then there is no paradox in the statement of uncertainty within Precautionary Prin-
ciple. However, if the former does not imply the latter, and it is plausible that it may not
since lack of scientific certainty may also cover the cases in which there is no scientific evi-
dence at all, then the application of Precautionary Principle poses a paradox in its essen-
tial premise.
Distinct from the existence of ‘uncertainty paradox’, and more interestingly, one can
ask the question of ‘to what extent do policy-makers rely on science to exercise power,
and how does science in general serve the interests of policy-makers?’ The more conven-
tional answer to this question is provided by Kriebel, Tickner, Epstein, et al. (2001) as fol-
lows:
“There is a complicated feedback relation between the discoveries of science and
the setting of policy. While maintaining their objectivity and focus on understanding the
world, environmental scientists should be aware of the policy uses of their work and of
their social responsibility to do science that protects human health and the environment”
(Kriebel, Tickner, Epstein, et al. 2001, 875).
Their call for doing science with social responsibility is indeed a plea for scientists to
create material for policy-makers, which they can in turn use as a means for ‘knowledge
condition’ in order to apply the Precautionary Principle. Such a plea illustrates the subs-
tantial degree of policy-makers’ dependence on the existence of scientific knowledge
when it comes to taking precautionary action. This dependence is present despite the fact
that the Precautionary Principle already empowers them to act without having the suffici-
ent scientific evidence.
Asselt and Vos make an interesting comment on this very intricate relationship bet-
ween science and policy-making, or more generally knowledge and power:
“The precautionary principle is then seen as ‘tool to compensate’ in situations of una-
voidable uncertainty. However, it is not recognized that uncertainty may also erode the
traditional positivistic model of knowledge, in which science speaks truth to power. Altho-
ugh uncertainty is recognized, science is still expected to tell the truth about uncertain
risks. Strikingly, advocates of the precautionary principle are willing to rethink regulation,
but overlook the need to rethink science and its role in regulation” (Asselt and Vos 2006,
6, emphasis added).
Perhaps the growing support for Precautionary Principle has something to do with
the desire to move beyond the traditional positivist conception of knowledge. If the recog-
6
nition of uncertainty within the Precautionary Principle will be a key stone in the decons-
truction process of the hegemonic forms of knowledge creation, it can also be a means to
reconstruct non-positivist forms of knowledge, and thereby radically alter the modernist
power-knowledge networks.
3. Time in Environmental Decision-Making Process

3.1 Anticipation of Potential Hazards
Anticipation of potential hazards requires imagination if we live in a world where ti-
me intervenes into the process of decision-making. For introduction of time separates
what we can reason from what we cannot, and we need to form expectations by imagi-
ning what the future outcome could be. Thus, we simply anticipate, and cannot possibly
reason, the part of things that will be lived in the future. Anticipating the harmful effects of
environmentally degrading activities requires acting ex ante, or what Jordan and O’Rior-
dan called “pro-action”—‘a willingness to take action in advance of scientific proof of evi-
dence on the grounds that further delay may prove to be ultimately more costly to soci-
ety and nature’ (Jordan and O’Riordan 1999, 24). Pro-action underlines two themes that we
have discussed so far: uncertainty and irreversibility. But there is one more theme neces-
sary to characterize what we mean by anticipation: expectations. The future is uncertain
and the crucial decisions made ex ante will result in irreversible outcomes ex post. The-
re is only one way to bridge the gap between ex ante and ex post. Here our reason can-
not help us; we need to form expectations. Pro-acting, acting before the hazards are re-
alized, or before we have sufficient information that they will be realized, requires cons-
tructing expectations about what kinds of effects such a substance or activity can have on
environment and human beings. Such expectations are not just about preventing emissi-
ons of a potential hazard; but they are about anticipating such hazardous activity before-
hand and taking precautions accordingly.
One of the achievements of Precautionary Principle is to change the questions posed
in the process of decision making. In conventional mode of thinking, reason was the dri-
ving force, and the important question was the following: “How much pollution is socially
optimal given the social marginal cost and benefit curves?” If the society is seen merely
as a summation of rational individuals optimizing in the face of potential risks, then the only
problem faced in this social calculus is the aggregation problem, i.e. how to aggregate the
individual marginal cost and benefit curves in order to obtain the social cost/benefit cur-
ves. Once the aggregation problem is somehow solved, the rest of the issue was to find
the optimum and create policies, either command-and-control type or market-incentives-
based, in order to reach such an optimum. With the introduction of Precautionary Princip-
le, the entire set of questions is transformed because it is no longer the reason that guides
policy, but also the expectations. Tickner lists some of these questions as follows:
“How much contamination can be avoided while still maintaining the necessary valu-
es? What are the alternatives to this activity that achieve a desired goal (a service, pro-
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duct, etc.)? And do we need this activity in the first place?” (Tickner 1999, 163).
All of these questions have a forward-looking motivation, i.e. taking into account ac-
tively reconstructing future given fundamental uncertainities, instead of making a static so-
cial calculus.
3.2 Scientific Conservatism and the Burden of Proof

For several theorists, including Dorman, the objection to the lack of scientific eviden-
ce as a criterion for taking precautionary action is not due to the uncertainty inherent in the
knowledge itself, but rather due to the so-called scientific conservatism. The notion of ‘sci-
entific conservatism’ refers to the bias in scientific research towards minimizing Type I er-
ror in the results, at the expense of larger Type II errors. Scientists are charged to be ex-
tremely cautious in avoiding Type I error, i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true,
while they are not so much concerned about avoiding Type II error, i.e. failing to reject
the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. Kriebel, Tickner, et al. clarify
the existence of scientific conservatism as follows:
“Twenty percent of the time, a real phenomenon will be missed because the data are
not strong enough to convincingly demonstrate its existence. There is an implicit bias he-
re: the test is set up to be more cautious about falsely detecting something than about fai-
ling to detect something” (Kriebel, Tickner, et al. 2001, 873).
For these theorists Precautionary Principle represents a corrective mechanism for
the implicit bias in scientific research so that ‘failing to detect’ a potential hazard does not
become the common mistake in policy-making. While Dorman agrees with them in figh-
ting against the ‘dogmatic minimization of Type I error’, he thinks that Precautionary Prin-
ciple is ‘overreacting’ such dogmatic view by going to the other extreme of ‘minimizing
Type II error’ (Dorman 2005, 171). His central problem with the formulation of Precautio-
nary Principle is shifting the burden of proof to those undertaking hazardous activities. His
opposition to such a shift comes from two reasons: (1) the problem of incentive compati-
bility, (2) the impossibility to ‘prove’ that some activity is safe (ibid, 172). When the envi-
ronmental research is conducted by the firms who are undertaking hazardous activities,
it is incompatible with their interests to highlight potential dangers involved with the pro-
duct they produce or the production method they use. It is possible to shadow the poten-
tial costs while making benefits seem larger in the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the
firms themselves. However, the problem of incentive compatibility is likely to arise even
if it is the government agencies that conduct the research on potential hazards since for
the most part they are connected to several business groups. Furthermore, even if they
are somewhat autonomous from those groups, it is likely that the government agencies
have a subjective position which might obscure some of the potential problems related to
the safety of a product. For example, central governments might be concerned with the
larger context of the national economy in the process of conducting environmental rese-
arch while local community institutions might be focused on a smaller scale at the expen-
8
se of the effects in the larger picture. Thus, it is not quite possible to totally avoid the prob-
lem of incentive compatibility even if it is not the firms themselves that conduct research
on environmental hazards.
The second problem that Dorman suggests concerns the failure to “prove” that so-
me activity is actually safe. However, none of the formulations of Precautionary Principle
actually state that the products or activities have to be “proven” safe before they are ap-
proved. Advocates of the Precautionary Principle are well aware of the impracticality of
attempting to prove that something is totally harmless for the environment. Yet the whole
purpose of shifting the burden of proof over to those who support hazardous activities is
to challenge the assumption that any activity is safe until proven dangerous. But challen-
ging that assumption requires courage since it puts all kinds of activities under scrutiny.
Since the governments lack funds to conduct research on all of them, it is plausible to ask
the active engagers of those activities to demonstrate that “no safer alternative exists be-
fore engaging in that activity” (Tickner 1999, 168). Note that such a statement is requiring
evidence for relative safety compared to alternative ways of conducting the same activity,
instead of demonstrating absolute safety. Furthermore, the problems with incentive com-
patibility can be overcome if an “independent peer review funded by the proponent of
the activity” is required before the approval of the activity under scrutiny (ibid, 169).
For the reasons of incentive incompatibility and the impossibility to prove the safety
of the activity, both Dorman and Sunstein reject the application of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple in the way it is formulated in legal documents right now. They both argue that the
Precautionary Principle leads to no direction at all, rather it overemphasizes the need to
escape from the minimization of Type I error, while falling into the trap of minimization of
Type II error instead. While Sustein does not propose an alternative method of decision-
making for environmental policy, Dorman suggests a time-consistency model where the
policy-maker acts as a rational agent to maximize social benefits at the expense of costs
given the updated information set available to him at each time period. I will evaluate this
model in the next section, and demonstrate that the assumption of rationality does not ta-
ke us far from the traditional models of static cost-benefit analysis due to the inconsistency
of rationality with time.
3.3 A Critique of Dorman’s Time-Consistency Model

The particular assumptions that Dorman presumes for setting up his model are the
following: (1) There are decision-makers who act as a body of rational agents in order to
maximize the best-practice determination of an activity that might pose potential harms to
society, (2) there is an information set available to the decision-makers at each point in ti-
me, (3) this information set is subject to ‘a sequence of random perturbations’, (4) for each
updated information set at time period t, the decision-makers decide on the best-practice
of the activity by some previously decided criterion, and (5) at each time period, they ta-
ke into account the random effects on the information set to update the best-practice acti-
vity (Dorman 2005, 174).
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One of the implications of the time-consistency model in this context is that the best-
practice chosen today is expectation of tomorrow’s best practice while taking into acco-
unt all available information set. The inclusion of expectations into the model is certainly
an improvement over the static cost-benefit analysis. However, the way that expectations
are introduced into the model suggests a simple expected-value calculation, leaving the
rational cost-benefit analysis still in force. Furthermore, the set-up of the model assumes
that E(x*t+1* Êt) = x*t, which implies that future’s best-practice is somehow taken into ac-
count when deciding on today’s best-practice. However, note that the information set is gi-
ven for time t. How could it be possible to determine future’s best-practice given today’s
information set which is subject to random perturbations in the future periods?
Apart from the intricacies involved within the dynamics of the model itself, it is also qui-
te possible to criticize it for violating fundamental uncertainty inherent in the knowledge it-
self. Moreover, it destroys one of reasons for implementing Precautionary Principle in the
first place: the insufficiency of scientific knowledge. If the decision-makers are thought as
rational agents maximizing with the given information set, then they would not be able to
anticipate the effects of potential hazards since there is no space for anticipation in this mo-
del. Rational agents can reason to find the best-practice given the decision-criteria. Since it
is not possible to reason for the part of time that we simply do not know, they are incapab-
le of acting to compensate for the insufficiency of knowledge. Shackle’s concept of the bo-
unds of rationality is illuminating at this point:
“Rationality cannot span a temporal succession of situations. Each situation in such a
series includes within its specification a specific collection of data available to a given in-
dividual. These data in the nature of things are confined at most to the present and the past.
But what is relevant for choice of action is the future, except in so far as available action is
strictly confined to the immediate now, a single moment divorced from any temporal se-
quel. Each present moment by itself can, conceivably, be so dealt with by suitable orga-
nization that its actions are pre-reconciled. But everything that one moment bequeaths to
a subsequent moment, everything now present which depends for its meaning, purpose
and value on a subsequent moment, removes choice of action from any possibility of be-
ing rational, in the strict sense of demonstrable superiority of outcome over all other ava-
ilable courses; demonstrable, that is to say, in advance of the taking of action” (Shackle
1992, 84-5).
The time-consistency model proposed by Dorman to replace the Precautionary Prin-
ciple, in the form it exists right now, is a typical attempt to have rationality act upon what
Shackle calls a temporal succession of situations. Such an attempt is doomed to failure
simply because the collection of data available to the policy-makers is limited to the past
and the present, not future; for data about the future is a contradiction in terms. Neither the
possibility of having the full relevant information, nor the ability to demonstrate that one
outcome is superior to all other outcomes is compatible with the Shackle’s conceptualiza-
tion of time and uncertainty. In a model where time and uncertainty are incorporated in a
realistic sense, there can be no rational decision-making in the way formalized by the ti-
10
me-consistency model. Thus, the time-inconsistency model, overall, is inconsistent with

the notions of time and uncertainty, and destroys the space for anticipation and imaginati-
on created under the formulations of Precautionary Principle.
3.4 Backcasting
In its current formulations Precautionary Principle suggests a challenge to traditional
ways of making decisions about environment and human health. In particular, it is a challen-
ge directed towards changing cost-benefit analysis and risk-assessment procedures as we
have discussed so far. The broader set of challenges that Precautionary Principle poses are
portrayed by Jordan and O’Riordan as follows:
“…challenging the authority of science, the hegemony of cost-benefit analysis, the
powerlessness of victims of environmental abuse, and the unimplemented ethics of intrin-
sic natural rights and intergenerational equity” (Jordan and O’Riordan 1999, 16)
Despite the on-going controversy over the methods to operationalize the Precautio-
nary Principle, it needs to be at least respected for the challenges it brings to revise the
contemporary political mechanisms. If the hegemony of cost-benefit analysis is undermi-
ned under the Precautionary Principle, what kind of other mechanisms of decision-making
can be imagined in order to act in advance of scientific certainty? Although there is certa-
inly not a single answer to this question and the principle’s history-to-come is non-existent
until people make decisions regarding its implementation, one can imagine the ways in
which the principle can actually become actively lived.
If the cost-benefit analysis and other risk-assessment methods try to forecast potenti-
al hazardous effects of a substance or an activity, then the Precautionary Principle can go
one step further and ask the question of “where should we be as a society?”, instead of
“where will we be?”—which is not possible to determine anyway, given the uncertainty
about the future. Tickner refers to this vision of setting up a goal and imagining policies
that would bring the society as “backcasting” contrasting it with “forecasting” (Tickner
1999, 167). A lived example of backcasting is the Dutch case where:
“The Dutch government establishes five-year environmental plans with clear goals
and then works with the municipalities, industry associations, and specific companies to
establish “covenants”. These covenants are voluntary agreements between the govern-
ment and the industry that establish interim and final goals but that place responsibility on
the company to achieve these goals in the most efficient way possible (without creating
new risks). The covenants are backed by strong enforcement and regulation if goals are
not met” (Tickner 1999, 167-8).
The backcasting mechanism illustrated as the Dutch case differs from the traditional
decision making mechanism in two respects: (1) The future is not forecasted, and its
knowledge is not attempted to be derived from the complete information set, (2) the futu-
11
Bilge Erten
re outcomes are imagined and put into long-term perspective by backing-up from the
imagined future outcome. The creation of a space for rethinking where the society should
be is an ultimate goal for implementing the Precautionary Principle. But it is still not clear
how the whole imagination process takes place. Next section will focus on how participa-
tory politics can serve as an instrument for the actual execution of the principle.
4. Participatory Decision-Making to Challenge the Authority of Science

4.1 Modern Science as form of Micro-Power
Modernity relied on science to control, manipulate, and radically alter the functioning
of modern societies. Science became an instrument for modernity to discipline the labor-
force, regulate the population increase, and build cultural values in support for capitalism
in general. Foucault (1977) refers to each particular science as constituting a micro-power
which justifies its workings through the truth claims spoken by science. An example to
micro-power would be biopower, which is a ‘political technology’ that allows for the con-
trol of entire populations. The modern nation state relies on biopower which entailed “an
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies
and the control of populations” (Foucault 1977, 140). Central to these techniques was the
development of relevant disciplines such as anatomy and statistics, as well as wide-spre-
ad application of regulatory controls that directly constructed reproductive practices.
Thus, sciences such as anatomy and statistics constituted mechanisms of biopower that
were crucial to the control exercised by the modern nation-state. Getting into the discus-
sion of the ways in which such a knowledge-power network was established is beyond
the purposes of this section.
4.2 Truth Spoken by Science

The sophistication of modern science went along with its creation of modern intelli-
gentsia. One had to be an expert in a scientific profession in order to make a truth claim.
For all other kinds of knowledges that are not based on positivism were excluded and ren-
dered useless. As the experts spoke science to the authorities, the authorities gained the
means to justify whatever aims they had for ‘protecting’ the ‘life’ of the individuals. Thus, sci-
ence itself became the authority to speak the truth to the ordinary people excluded from
the construction of scientific knowledge.
The authority of science came under attack from the need to act prior to the ‘truth’ of
science. Precautionary Principle identifies with that need and challenges the ways in which
environmental science has been speaking to the regulatory bodies so far. One of the pro-
jects implicit in Precautionary Principle is to democratize the decision-making process that
has so far characterized environmental policy-making.
12
4.3 Inclusion of People’s Voices: Participatory Decision-Making

In order to vitalize the project of Precautionary Action, society needs to design instituti-
ons that will work on including people who have been thus far excluded from the decision-
making process. We have seen how benevolent policy-makers have been so far, and we
know that we do not need them as long as we have some mechanism to participate into ma-
king decisions as a collective. Indeed, such participatory decision-making mechanisms,
which allow individuals to collectively imagine the future and act upon it, do currently exist
in “Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands”(Tickner 1999, 175). Examples of the-
se participatory decision-making bodies include “consensus conferences, scenario work-
shops, and science shops” (ibid, 175-6). Consensus conferences are organized to form a
consensus based on people’s opinions about a selected subject(s). In Scandinavian countri-
es, a group of citizens were randomly selected to participate in the conference where ex-
perts reported their knowledge, but did not create the final outcome. Instead, the final report
was produced by these individuals who are randomly chosen and do not have expertise on
the subject matter. Such a report led to the forbiddance of genetically-produced crops in
Norway (ibid, 175). Even though most of these conferences with participatory decision-ma-
king were made on the national level, it is plausible and even desirable that smaller confe-
rences can be held in local communities where more specific issues regarding the local en-
vironment can be discussed.
The implementation of Precautionary Principle bears upon the spread of partici-
patory democratic forms of decision-making in order to actively anticipate and imagine
future use of natural assets in a sustainable and equitable manner. Stripping away from the
disguise of scientific assessment, participatory decision-making enables individuals to ac-
tively participate into discussions with other individuals to attain a community imaginary,
and through backcasting, anticipate the steps to reach that imaginary. Here the point is not
to paint an optimistic picture and leave it there, but rather think about ways in which such
a participatory decision-making can produce results where Precautionary Principle is ta-
ken seriously. If it were possible in Denmark and Norway, why could it not be in other
parts of the world at different points in time?
Conclusion
When one of his long time friends asked Shackle in a private letter his opinion about
the key issues that need to be addressed in British economic policy, Shackle’s answer was
the following: “(1) Food: the need for self-sufficiency, (2) occupation: something interes-
ting to do for everyone, (3) education: conservation and the arts (music, painting, theatre,
etc.), (4) excellence: a universal dedication to beauty and efficiency in products and per-
formances, (5) clarity of tone in our lives: a muting of the blatancy of advertising; a pursu-
it of ends rather than distractions” (Littlechild 2003, 113). Although the last item in the list
concerning the pursuit of ends rather than distractions may be thought of looking ahead
for taking precautionary action, we see that environment did not appear in the key issues
list of Shackle. Indeed, as far as I know, Shackle never wrote anything that addresses en-
13
Bilge Erten
vironmental problems per se. However, his critique of economic doctrines is central in
evaluating the existing environmental economics, and rational actor models of decision-
making process. The wide-spread recognition of scientific knowledge as being insuffici-
ent to take precautionary action against potential hazards to environment and human he-
alth led to the incorporation of Precautionary Principle into several legal frameworks. Yet
the question of operationalizing the principle still remains. If the future is essentially unk-
nown and uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of knowledge, then the future of the en-
vironment will flow from the complication interaction of each individual’s choices falling
upon what they expect and imagine for their own future. Neither strong men nor queen of
the sciences can decide the future for the people; the people themselves need to imagi-
ne it in themselves.
14
References
Dorman, P. (2005) “Evolving Knowledge and the Precautionary Principle.” Ecologi-

cal Economics 53: 169- 176.
Foucault, M. (1977) History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I. Vintage.
Jordan, A. and T. O’Riordan. (1999) “The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary

Environmental Policy and Politics,” In C. Raffensperger and J. Tickner (Eds.), Protecting
Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle pp. 15-33
Washington D.C.: Island Press.
Keynes, J. M. (1964) General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York:
HBJ.
Kriebel, D. , J. Tickner, P. Epstein, J. Lemons, R. Lewins, E. L. Loechler, M. Quinn, R.

Rudel, T. Schettler, and M. Stoto. (2001) “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental
Science.” Environmental Health Perspectives 109(9): 871-6.
Littlechild, S. (2003) “Reflections on George Shackle: Three Excerpts from the Shack-
le Collection.” The Review of Austrian Economics 16(1): 113-117.
Shackle, G.L.S. (1992) Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines.

New Brunswick: Transaction.
(1955) Uncertainty in Economics and Other Reflections. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press.
Sunstein, C. R. (2003) “Beyond the Precautionary Principle.” University of Pennsylva-

nia Law Review 151: 1003-1058.
Tickner, Joel A. (1999) “A Map Toward Precautionary Decision Making.” In C. Raf-

fensperger and J. Tickner (Eds.), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Imple-
menting the Precautionary Principle pp. 162-186 Washington D.C.: Island Press.
van Asselt, M. and B.A. Ellen Vos. (2006) “The Precautionary Principle and the Uncer-
tainty Paradox.” Journal of Risk Research 9(4).
15
Perspectives on Crisis Management in European

Union Countries: United Kingdom, Spain and
Germany
Bahadir Sahin*, Naim Kapucu**, Ali Unlu***,
ABSTRACT
Crisis management (CM) systems are gaining more importance than ever nowadays
because of the increasing number of crises. Yet there is not a unique policy offered in the lit-
erature; the CM systems are different from country to country. Even developed European
Union member countries apply different CM systems. Defining the CM characteristics of EU
countries may give an idea to understand the CM perspective of developed countries. The
paper explains the crisis management system in Germany, UK, and Spain. The paper also
provides case-analyses from these countries.
Key Words: Crisis management, European Union, Organizational Learning,

Emergencies, Crises and Extreme events
* Research analyst at the Department of Public Administration and a Doctoral Student at Public Affairs, University of Central
Florida. Address: Department of Public Affairs, University of Central Florida 3280 Progress Drive, Suite 101A Orlando, FL
32826-0544, Tel: 646 220 0628, e-mail: bahadir@mail.ucf.edu.
** Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Central Florida. Department of Public
Administration, University of Central Florida HPA II Suite 238M, Orlando, FL 32816-1395, Tel: 407-823-6096, Fax: 407-823-
5651, e-mail: nkapucu@mail.ucf.edu.
*** Research analyst at Department of Public Administration and a Doctoral Student at Public Affairs, University of Central
Florida. Address: Department of Public Affairs, University of Central Florida 3280 Progress Drive, Suite 101A Orlando, FL
32826-0544, Phone: 321 274 6008, e-mail: aunlu@mail.ucf.edu.
17
Bahadir Sahin - Naim Kapucu - Ali Unlu
Introduction
Crisis management has been a developing area recently because of the increasing
number of natural and man-made disasters and casualties and damages resulting from
those disasters. Various suggestions were made for better emergency management poli-
cies and administration techniques (Quarantelli, 1987; Stern and Sundelius, 2002; Perry
and Lindell, 2003; Alexander, 2005; Jaeger et al., 2007; Farazmand, 2007). However, there
is no consensus for one-single emergency planning policy. At the same time, public
expects an effective crisis response with higher performances from government agencies
(Kapucu and Van Wart, 2006).
This paper aims to show the characteristics of some important European Countries’
emergency management policies and thus, to understand what the key factors of success-
ful emergency policy in Europe are. Varieties of policies will be examined in terms of dif-
ferent public policy and management mechanisms of the countries. The relationship
between public administration policies and emergency management efforts will then be
discussed.
The study addresses the following research questions: What are the similarities and
differences between each country’s crisis management systems? What are the significant
incidents that shaped the crisis policy and management? What is the current policy and
crisis management system in these countries? These questions will be examined using
resources in the literature and analyses of news reports and government web pages. The
study will contribute to the crisis management literature from a comparative perspective.
It can also shed light to the CM efforts of European Union (EU) candidate member coun-
tries for their crisis management policies.
Crisis Management in the European Union

European Union member countries define emergency as “spatially limited events,
where sufficient resources are available to deal with the emergency and as an umbrella
term for incident, accident, disaster” (Europa, 2008). Similarly, disaster is “a spatially and
temporally expanded event where resources are insufficient to deal with; it is based on
different statutory regulations, it may develop suddenly or develop out of an emergency”
(Europa, 2008; European Commission, 2007). Crisis/Disaster/Emergency management
can be defined the rescue, preparedness, and mitigation efforts spent by governments,
volunteer organizations or other local departments before, during and/or after an “unex-
pected, uncontrolled public damage that disrupts or impedes normal operations, draws
public and media attention, threaten reputation/public trust and that can be perceived”
and prepared against (Smith, 2006; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985; Alexander, 2005).
The mitigation and preparedness efforts can seriously reduce the devastating effects
of an emergency/disaster (McEntire and Myers, 2004). IFRC’s (International Federation of
1 Crisis management, emergency management, and disaster management are used interchangeably time to time in the lit-
erature. We use crisis management for emergency management and disaster management in the paper.
18
Red Cross Red Crescent Societies) 2002 report indicated that material damage and
human loss after a disaster in an undeveloped country is likely to be excessively much
more than a disaster in a developed country that does the planning of mitigation, pre-
paredness and evaluation processes before and after a disaster (IFRC, 2002). Since the
emergency management is done by local and/or public organizations and since these
organizations’ structures vary from one country to another, the emergency management
efforts of different countries are various, as well. The quality of an emergency manage-
ment planning highly affects the success rate of the rescue and preparedness efforts
(Alexander, 2005).
Broader Introduction to Crisis Management in EU

Since the possible dangers dramatically changed and increased with the technolog-
ical advances, the crisis term evolved with the history of Europe (Farazmand, 2001: 336).
Besides the natural disasters like drought, flood and earthquake, Europe experienced
technological disasters such as wars, terrorist explosions, forest arsons and transportation
accidents that cost more lives and money than ever after 1940’s (Coppola, 2006:4).
Coppola also explained that the civil defense strategies of Western European countries
during the Second World War turned into emergency management policies after 1970’s
(2006: 5). Emergencies were also held in the national context among European countries
more than international level (Boin et al., 2005. The sovereignty problem caused every
country to have a unique-national policy controlled by a government agency (Coppola,
2006: 354) including the countries we examined in this paper.
EU changed its security policies after 9/11 attacks in the US by legislating European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) including the Solidarity Clause against terrorist inci-
dents. According to this new situation, EU became authorized to call the other countries to
help the terrorism victim country (Ekengren, 2006). Collaborative emergency decision-
making among EU members is a developing area because of the continuous evolution of
the Union and there are still problems with the EU and national authority of the country
members’ sovereignty (Ekengren, 2006).
EU’s other crisis interventions were not always as successful as expected. The com-
munication problem between the EU and the victim countries affected the intervention
negatively (Ekengren et al., 2006; Boin et al., 2006). The intervention organizations were
not aware about the actual problem in Turkey Earthquake in 1999 and Check Republic
Flood in 2002 (Boin et al., 2006; Stern and Sundelius, 2002). Moreover, in most cases, the
member countries seek help from their own resources, other non-governmental national
or international organizations or other countries that they have stronger ties with.
Ekengren et al. (2006) do not see this fact as a problem since the EU is not established to
provide a direct assistance but to coordinate the collective actions. On the other hand,
Boin et al. (2007) think that the unwillingness of the member countries for any kind of aid
intervention by EU may be because of the past emergency planning failures such as the
mismanagement of the Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as
19
mad-cow disease crisis in 1996 and Prestige accident in 2002.

Since the present capacity of the EU is found enough to cope with emergencies (Boin
et al., 2006), the future expectation for the evolution of the emergency handling policies in
Europe aims to develop coordination of the sources of emergency management mecha-
nisms. Boin et al. (2007) suggest a FEMA-like organization for Europe; EU Agency for
Emergency Management (EU-EMA). To them, a centralized, top-down approach can
resolve the communication and information failures. Therefore, increased collaboration
can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency management efforts in
Europe (Boin et al., 2007).
Ekengren et al. (2006) discusses the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) method
that is already being used by other EU policies in terms of emergency management. OMC
refers to “voluntary agreements, best–practice standards and ‘peer pressure’ to encour-
age convergence and cooperation” (Ekengren et al., 2006) which will increase the capac-
ity use in Europe if it is applied to emergency cases. Thus, localism should be promoted
to increase the perception of local reaction to disasters and emergencies. The actual goal
of the emergency management policies should first serve the people and properties at
risk (Handmer, 2002). The final document in the Conference HABITAT ‘96 in Istanbul
stresses the role of local action: "The most efficient and effective disaster preparedness
systems and capabilities for post-disaster response are usually provided through volun-
teer contributions and local authority actions at the neighborhood level."
To sum up general emergency management policies in the EU, there are central gov-
ernment agencies (generally, ministry of interior) that organize the workload needed for
greater national or international effort. Empowered local organizations do the first conduct
for rescue efforts with police and fire forces; locals report the need for preparedness and
mitigation and even for evaluation. EU usually handles international coordination of the
rescue and response efforts related to huge disasters that the local government cannot
cope with by itself. The study, in the following section, will provide detailed description of
three EU member countries’ emergency and crisis management systems and structures.
Methodology
The data related to the public administration units and emergency management poli-
cies of the case countries was obtained from literature and official web pages of the organ-
izations in the countries that are authorized to take action during emergencies and
extreme events. For all three countries, the top organizations were interior ministries
(Ministerio del Interior in Spain, Bundesministerium des Innern in Germany, Secretary of
State for the Home Department in the UK). The study also utilized various European Union
websites to process official and updated information about the topic.
There are 27 independent sovereign member countries in the EU. It would excess
the goals of this study to examine all countries’ emergency planning policies. To address
the general emergency management features in the EU, we selected economically and
20
socially important countries (Germany, Spain, and the UK) that show different character-
istics in terms of political structure and emergency management issues that are being
dealt within the EU and examined their policies instead of all the EU countries. The weak-
nesses and strengths of each country’s emergency planning policies will then be dis-
cussed to understand the general EU context.
Germany is the world’s third largest economy and it has the biggest population in EU
(Europa, 2008). It is also one of the founding members of the EU. Germany is a federal
republic of 16 states. Houben (2005:183) emphasizes that the government is more domi-
nant in Germany than other countries we chose to study. The country was divided into two
different countries after the Second World War, but in 1989, after the demolition of the
Berlin Wall, which had divided the country for half a century, Germany became a united
country again. Emergency incidents are generally caused by nature in Germany (Becker
and Grünewald, 2003). The 2002 Elbe flooding was the worst flood disaster ever in
Central Europe which caused $9 billion damage (Becker and Grünewald, 2003).
United Kingdom is another leading member country that is believed to have a devel-
oped understanding of democracy. UK is a constitutional monarchy. After the World War
II bombings by Nazi Germany, UK also suffered from terrorism attacks related to Ireland’s
separatist movements recently. Finally, the London bombings in 2005 brought the emer-
gency planning policies into light in the UK (O'Brien and Read, 2005). In addition to those
man-made disasters in the UK, there is also a danger for natural disasters that threaten
more than 5 million people annually (Crichton, 2005).
Spain joined the EU in 1986. The Spanish administrative system is similar to UK; par-
liamentary monarchy. It is another country suffered from ethnic terrorism for decades.
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna = Basque Homeland and Freedom) terrorist organization
took around 800 lives in Spain between 1960 and 1990s (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).
Like the UK, the capital of Spain has been a target for Al-Qaida attacks in 2004. A signifi-
cant number of floods, drought and forest fires have also occurred in Spain recently caus-
ing a significant material damage to the country (Gonzalez et al., 2007).
Germany
The Federal Ministry of Interior (BMI) controls the Federal Office of Civil Protection
and Disaster Assistance (BBK-Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe)
in Germany. This organization was established in May, 2004 as a governmental response
to new threats such as 9/11 and the 2002 Elbe flood because of the immediate need for a
central organizational element in charge of civil safety (BBK, 2008). The BBK provides
information about emergency management not only with the federal government agency
(BMI); it also works in coordination with the federal states (Land). The organization is
established for;
• fulfilling the tasks of the Federal government with regard to civil protection and
coordination of international cooperation,
21
• preparing national and area risk analyses, hazard cadastres and emergency plan-
ning, and providing coordination of the civil-military-police cooperation,
• providing conceptual planning and interdisciplinary coordination of the protection
of critical infrastructures,
• ensuring national information, communication and resource management in case of
damage,
• providing coordination of technical-scientific research with regard to civil protec-
tion and protection against weapons of mass destruction,
• ensuring threat-adequate civil protection training of executives at high and highest
administrative levels,
• providing national coordination of the European integration process in the area of
preventive civil safety,
• providing disaster medicine (BBK 2008:1).
BBK has other federal bureaus to accomplish those tasks. The organizational chart of
BBK shows those departments that perform important emergency management phases of
mitigation, preparedness, rescue and evaluation (Figure 1). The organization also has a
training institution; Academy of Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil
Protection (AKNZ) which serves with 80 employees and 32 lecturers about emergency
management issues in Germany.
BBK is the main coordination center for different agencies such as German disaster
relief (Katastrophenschutz) and civil defense (Zivilschutz) programs. Other federal organ-
izations such as the German fire department and the Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal
Agency for Technical Relief, THW) also take part in immediate response. BBK is responsi-
ble to call related federal ministries and other organizations such as telecommunications
companies, financial organizations and transportation institutions for help. The German
Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) can also be deployed for disaster relief operations by the
suggestion of BBK crisis committee. Other international organizations such as EU Disease
Control, IFRC and other border countries’ help are also coordinated by BBK in Germany
(BBK, 2008). Besides governmental institutions and authorities, non-governmental organi-
zations (e.g. German Red Cross, the Workers' Samaritan Federation Germany, the
Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (German Life Saving Federation), the Johanniter
Emergency Service and Malteser Germany) are integrated into the CM system as well as
the fire brigades (run by the municipalities), rescue services and the Federal Agency for
Technical Relief (Kley-Fiquet, 2005).
Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is an important non-profit organization in
the emergency management system of Germany (THW, 2008). Founded in 1950, it has
almost 80,000 employees around the world. Only 856 (roughly 1%) of these employees
22
are full-time workers and the rest of the organization rely on voluntary-based workers.
THW started as a civil protection unit in the era of Cold War to decrease the casualties of
a possible war. In time, the volunteers were used for disaster relief operations worldwide.
THW took part in the rescue efforts after the greatest tsunami disaster in 2004 and even in
the Katrina Hurricane disaster in the US in 2005 (THW, 2008).
THW Volunteers should be older than 17 and younger than 60. Anybody can be a vol-
unteer in THW; there is no age-sex or race restriction. Volunteer-based employment
brings the quality to the jobs undertaken by THW. Since the employees do not work for a
benefit, the effort produced is satisfactory if not perfect. To find and organize volunteers,
THW established employment bureaus. Federal Germany government forces the citizens
for a 6-month military service. The citizens that subscribe to THW as a volunteer for six
years are dismissed from this mandatory service, which is an important volunteer source
for THW (THW, 2008). THW is not the only volunteer-based disaster-relief organization in
Germany. There are approximately 1.3 Million volunteers in local fire brigades and relief
organizations like THW in Germany (BMFSFJ, 2008).
Federal German Government also funds some agencies to operate in only outside of
Germany. For example, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) is one of those agencies. GTZ provides aid to developing countries for disasters
and crises (GTZ, 2007). This international agency is connected to the Federal Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and other related agencies such as
Foreign Ministry in Germany. GTZ also works with EU, World Bank, UN, regional financial
institutions and also the CM agencies in the victim countries. Risk assessments and pre-
paredness studies are conducted for the target countries to diminish the possible bad
effects of disasters. GTZ has a billion-euro budget since 2006 for those worldwide efforts
(GTZ, 2007).
Case Study: Elbe Flood in August 2002

The floods of August 2002 in Central Europe caused total damage of 21.1 billion
Euros and 37 fatalities in Central Europe (Grünewald, 2006). The same weather conditions
resulted in floods in 1897, 1927, 1957 and 1997, yet the raindrop has never exceeded a
certain amount (Becker and Grünewald, 2003). Germany was hit the worst by the flood
disaster besides Czech Republic. The local fire brigades were the first ones to respond to
the case in Germany. After the Federal Government understood the scope of the disaster,
over 19,000 military troops were sent to Saxony and Dresden to take part in the rescue
efforts (Deutsche Welle(a), 2002).
Other than the official response by the Federal Government, more than 23,000 mem-
bers of the fire brigades and 11,000 personnel from the relief organizations such as
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB), German Red Cross (DRK), Deutscher Lebensrettungs-
gesellschaft (DLRG), Johanniter Unfallhilfe (JUH) and Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD) provided
immediate help for the victims in the disaster areas (DKKV, 2004; Deutsche Welle(b),
23
2002). However, DKKV report (2004) indicates the inefficiency in coordination among the
rescue groups. Report suggests that the success in the rescue efforts despite this lack of
co-ordinance was because of the social informal relationships among the groups. DKKV
report (2004) also suggests that this “informal channel” should be strengthened among
rescue groups for successful CM in the future disasters.
Some flood emergency infrastructures were not in use immediately after the incident
because of the lack of preparedness and mitigation studies (Keys, 2005). Therefore, the
majority of the efforts due to the disaster were crisis-driven (Kley-Fiquet, 2005). The lack
of early warning systems and inexperienced emergency workers increased the damage
of the tragedy (DKKV, 2004). To the DKKV Report (2004) the flood had already hit Dresden
when the weather stations issued a warning for excessive rain storms and flood danger.
The report also suggests a developed warning system for flood areas (DKKV, 2004). The
conventional war sirens that are designed to provide civil protection until 1950s need to
be changed with contemporary ones that can alert flood region with a standard code and
more developed techniques that can use SMS and radio channels instantly (Keys, 2005;
DKKV, 2004).
The non-flood-oriented city planning is another cause that increased the damage due
to the 2002 flood. Public and private infrastructures were very close to the Elbe River.
After the flood, an important part of the city of Dresden was under mud and water for that
particular reason (Keys, 2005). The Federal Government enacted a new law that prohibits
building any kind of buildings in the flood zones only after 2004 (Kley-Fiquet, 2005). The
German Government adopted a Five-Point-Programme for flood prevention for the dan-
gerous zones in that law.
The evaluation studies showed the weaknesses of current policies at the time of Elbe
Flood in 2002. Finally, considering the obstacles experienced and lessons learned during
the 2002 Elbe Flood Disaster, The German Government and the Federal States decided
to apply following rules in 2004 until present;
1- Existing federal and regional relief resources, especially THW and other local fire
brigades and relief organizations mentioned above will be integrated further. Studies
will be conducted to increase the co-operation and social capital among those agen-
cies to close the gap in a possible disaster environment.
2- New communication tools will be used during the disaster relief operations between
the German Government and the Federal States in the area of information manage-
ment.
3- “Development, training and implementation of a common management ethos.” To
make that happen, Academy for Crisis Management for Emergency Planning and
Civil Protection was founded under BBK for professional training and practice about
disasters (DKKV, 2004).
24
United Kingdom
Like those of other European countries, UK’s emergency management policies were
dependent on the Second World War plans and strategies (Paul, 1999). These strategies
aimed to decrease the civilian casualties during the Cold War by establishing a civil pro-
tection clause (O’Brien and Read, 2005). These policies, however, remained local and the
UK Government wanted the local authorities to manage emergencies and do the disaster
preparedness and evaluation by themselves (Rockett, 1994). As a response to the need of
a central governmental agency, The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in the Cabinet
Office was established in July 2001 (O’Brien and Read, 2005; Rockett, 1994). The increas-
ing number of terrorist incidents throughout the world beginning with 9/11 brought ques-
tions about the sufficiency of CCS. For that reason, the Civil Contingencies Act was passed
in 2004. The aim of the act was to provide collaboration to a range of organizations to
assess the UK’s potential man-made or natural emergencies (CCS, 2008). CCA explains
the local and governmental agencies’ responsibilities of the stakeholders of the emer-
gency planning system in depth (O’Brien and Read, 2005).
The CCA policies went into another change after the London Bombings in July 2005.
The civil protection term was changed into resilience which is used for organisms that
adopt themselves to the environment in a pro-active way to prevent damages and haz-
ards that will be sourced from the outside (O’Brien and Read, 2005). The CCS defines the
resilience as “The ability at every level to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disrup-
tive challenges” (Wood-Heath and Annis, 2004). UK Resilience is provided by CCS and
the other regional emergency organizations such as police, fire brigades and health insti-
tutions (CCS, 2008).
Emergencies are classified in CCA as terrorist contingencies and non-terrorist con-
tingencies. The head of any non-terrorist contingency responders in the UK is Civil
Contingencies Committee formed by the related ministries in the cabinet organized by
CCS. This committee is supposed to coordinate the emergency response by the UK
Government during a non-terrorist emergency such as a flood or an earthquake etc. In the
terrorist contingencies a committee headed by the Prime Minister gathers in Cabinet
Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) in the Cabinet Office. Although the cast changes due to the
attribute of the incident, the other members of the COBR are generally the fire service
minister, junior ministers from the Ministry of Defense, officials from the Department of
Transport and the Home Office, the representatives from the UK security services and civil
servants from other relevant departments (CCS, 2008).
CCS also does the co-ordination of volunteers. The greatest volunteer group is The
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) which includes most of other NGO Emergency
Organizations such as ActionAid, British Red Cross, CAFOD, Care International, Christian
Aid, Concern Help the Aged, Islamic Relief, Merlin, Oxfam, Save the Children, Tearfund,
and finally, World Vision (DEC, 2008). DEC organizes many rescue and disaster pre-
paredness studies worldwide. It is funded by public donations. Among other internation-
al aid organizations, DEC is supported by the UK Government as well (DEC, 2008).
25
The CCS trains the volunteers and other officials via the Emergency Planning
College. The college provides forums and lectures for “representatives of local and
Central Government, the emergency services, the private sector and volunteer groups to
network and share good practice” (EMC, 2007). The college also has a university part-
nership (Leeds University Business School) to inform the public as much as it can. This
partnership structures are effective and important to state UK Resilience (EMC, 2007).
Special Case: London Bombings in July 2005

In 2003 in Istanbul, Turkey, terrorists aimed HSBC bank, British Consulate and two
synagogues by simultaneous car bombings within 5 days and killed 52 persons including
the British Consul and injured hundreds most of whom were Turkish Muslims (BBC News,
2003). This terror incident was followed by the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings. Therefore,
the UK Government was aware of a possible terror incident that can target British Civilians
(HMG, 2006). The terrorist contingency difference in the CCA had been legislated and
related resilience efforts were going on before the attacks.
In the morning of 7th of July in 2005, at 8.50, three different terrorists detonated their
hand-made bombs in the trains on their way to different destinations around London. The
explosions in the trains killed 42 people including the perpetrators and injured hundreds
of them. Approximately one hour after this incident occurred, another terrorist detonated
his bomb on a bus killing 14 including himself and injuring 110 (HC, 2006).
Preparedness of the government can be understood from the timing of the first COBR
meeting organized by related Central Governmental agencies and Metropolitan Police.
The COBR meeting started at 9.30 in the same morning, 15 minutes before the second
attack. Even though the attack was not confirmed as a terrorist attack immediately, COBR
continued to stay steady at the moment. The Home Secretary and Metropolitan Police
Commissioner made their statements on the incidents by adding that “everything is under
control and the transportation will be halted for a moment” at 11.00 AM. In the following
days, the police investigation uncovered the identities of the terrorists took part in the inci-
dent by using CCTV records and crime scene investigation techniques (HC, 2006).
The central governmental approach to such an incident is important because of the
need for healthy information by public (Rockett, 1994). A completely decentralized-local
reaction to a major terror incident can create a danger for different information sources
which can lead to a greater chaos than the incident itself can create. Thus, COBR’s very
early correct statements were useful to handle the public pressure (HC, 2006). Local
police’s and health officials’ immediate response to the incident decreased the casualties.
More than 350 injured people were sent to the nearest hospitals. The coordination of the
CCS saved lives and helped the case solved (HC, 2006).
A simple change in CCA in November 2005 doubled the local’s fund in emergency
management policies in the UK (HMG, 2006). This increased the power of a local
response to any kind of emergency. It was the most criticized part of the British
26
Emergency Management system (Rockett, 1994; Paul, 1999; O’Brien and Read, 2005). It
was a cause for disorganization (Crichton, 2005). Government’s report also notifies the
importance of evaluation and preparedness works (HMG, 2006).
The funded but not audited local governments will fail during the emergencies
(Bertrand, 2004). The Central Government should establish some organizational mecha-
nisms to operate those inspections on local emergency authorities. In addition to inspec-
tion problem, lack of coordination in the immediate response time can be prevented by
volunteer training (Rockett, 1994), disaster planning (Crichton, 2005) and stronger cen-
tralized government policies (O’Brien and Read, 2005).
Spain
Ministry of Interior is the main responsible for national emergencies in Spain like in
other European countries we examined. Highly decentralized autonomous regions are
responsible for the first response, coordination of the rescue efforts, evaluation and pre-
paredness works if the case is not a national emergency (MDI, 2008). General Directorate
for Civil Protection and Emergency (Direccion General de Proteccion Civil y
Emergencias, DGPCE) is the national center for emergency management studies under
the Ministry of Interior (Figure 2). DGPCE is responsible for;
1- Preparation of national civil protection plans,
2- Simulation of those plans nationally or regionally, implementing risk analyses, build-
ing risk structures and planning, training of citizens and volunteers against disasters,
building and suggesting necessary infrastructure for mitigation and preparedness
efforts,
3- Coordinating, requesting help of international emergency management organiza-
tions and/or Military Units in Spain if necessary (MDI, 2008).
Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan defines the action boundaries for the emer-
gency managers. There are three levels for response to an emergency. The first level is
for one municipality. Only the related municipality responds to the incident in Level One.
The Level Two Alarm is for a regional activity among more municipalities. The highest
level for an emergency is Level Three. This is the national level and DGPCE takes respon-
sibility of the emergency efforts in this cross-regional or national level (Bolling et al., 2007).
Spain began to the democratization process after the death of Dictator Franco in
1975. The defense system for emergencies was basically the civil protection. Localism
was the main point of that system and the regional management organizations had the
power to handle the emergency cases. After ETA attacks began, the government enact-
ed a number of emergency laws that shared the responsibility among the regional and
national agencies. The local and national police, fire brigades, the task forces and volun-
teers were officially assigned to handle the emergencies especially after Madrid 2004
bombings (MDI, 2008).
27
DGPCE also trains volunteers and others assigned to the emergency efforts. The name
of the education center is National School of Civil Protection (la Escuela Nacional de
Protección Civil, ENPC) and it is directed by DGPCE. ENPC is responsible for making nation-
al disaster plans, training the local and national emergency forces and volunteers. ENPC is
connected to other education centers in Europe and thus shares experience with the other
colleagues in other countries via conferences and seminars worldwide (MDI, 2008).
Special Case: Madrid Train Bombings in March 2004

This incident was the worst terrorist attack ever in Europe. 14 different bombs were
established in different locations on Madrid train lines, 10 of them exploded simultaneous-
ly; the trains going to different directions in Madrid were targeted by the terrorists. 191
people including the perpetrators died and more than 1,500 injured. Similar to Istanbul,
London and New York bombings, the terrorists aimed the most casualties possible and
they attacked to the transportation system in the busiest time of the day; 7.39 A.M (Bolling
et al., 2007).
The response of Spain was never experienced before. The national and regional
emergency management organizations worked together to help the people affected by
the attack and to find the criminals behind the attacks. The national authorities were
involved in the case approximately one hour after the attack, by this time the regional
commanders had taken the injured to the nearest hospitals and secured the crime scene
areas for official investigation. Tent hospitals were established to decrease the workload
of normal hospitals and only 12 people died after brought to the emergency health depart-
ments (Cornall, 2005). The Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan was well established to
handle this kind of an emergency.
This preparedness against terrorist activities in Spain is a result of the emergency
efforts against the Basque Separatists and the ETA threat. The regional and national emer-
gency officials were well-aware of the extreme need for manpower in these situations and
for that reason, even though it was time for day-night shift change at the time of incident,
neither the police nor the health officials left for home which doubled the emergency
response force (Bolling et al., 2007). Medical groups, security officials and police organi-
zations worked in coordination with the other governmental departments according to the
Spanish Catastrophic Emergency Plan. After 90 minutes from the first blast, there was no
injured people in the area, after 11 hours, the transportation system was running like
before (Cornall, 2005).
The emergency telephone line took more than 20,000 calls in a day and the City of
Madrid became normal in 24 hours (Cornall, 2005). The importance of healthy informa-
tion source during a public emergency was proven again. Bolling et al. (2007) also explain
the coordination of emergency responders as another vital tool in an emergency. To
Bolling et al. (2007), the need for different agencies is possible related to the incident and
it must be practiced enough among the agencies. The government intervention for
28
Madrid Train Bombings began as a Level One threat, shortly after it was announced the
Level Three Alarm and the Government itself involved in the case.
Providing efficient emergency planning is dependent on effective preparedness and
mitigation efforts. The Spanish Government’s emergency planning is a highly decentral-
ized one; however, it is successful because of the coordination and practice studies.
Training of emergency managers is dealt with by the government, which is another rea-
son for successful coordination and intervention. Gonzales et al. (2007) showed that natu-
ral and man-made disasters and crises are in an increasing trend in Spain. To prevent
casualties and property damage during these emergencies, the coordination and prac-
tices among the agencies should be increased (Bolling et al., 2007).
Britz and Bremberg (2007) argue that the civil protection policy from the communist
era of the country seems to come back to replace the civil defense policy. Evidence for
that is the Spanish law that assigns Spanish Army to civil-protection in emergency times
(SL, 2005) according to Britz and Bremberg (2007). The law also specifies the unit that will
take command in an emergency as the Military Emergency Unit (Unidad Militar de
Emergencias, UME) (SL, 2007). This unit will remain in charge with army control until the
civilian authorities are back in power. This policy shift from “the protection of civilians in
times of war to a focus on peacetime crisis management” indicates the effect of Madrid
Bombings in Spain (Britz and Bremberg, 2007).
Conclusions
It was shown in this study that EU Member countries have similarities in terms of
emergency management policies. Each country mentioned in this study has a national
response plan and separate regional emergency response systems due to the impor-
tance of crises. The local authorities are empowered for non-cross boundary emergen-
cies. The national emergency plans are applicable only in the large-scope cases that a
central authority is needed to coordinate the resources in and out of the country, to take
immediate precaution against possible newer disasters, and to handle the preparedness
and mitigation efforts for possible national disasters.
The central CM organizations in these countries also have a central training mecha-
nism that provides emergency planning training for local and federal officials. These train-
ing facilities keep the emergency management system ready for newer, unusual disas-
ters. Each of the training centers hold annual conferences, seminars and other education
tools to keep the emergency culture in the country updated. Each training system also tar-
gets the ordinary citizens to increase civil protection. Volunteers are also coordinated by
these training centers and central emergency management organizations.
The regional emergency management is the first responder in each country in this
study. Localism is chosen to be the best tackler for an emergency. Local authorities are
responsible for all phases of emergency management; preparedness, mitigation, response
and evaluation. Empowered local authorities deal with the emergencies better than a cen-
29
tralized emergency management structure in the cases that do not need a national
response. In every article cited about the special cases, the authors insisted that the
resources were enough to handle the cases even though they seem to be huge disasters.
Besides the similarities mentioned above, the countries in this study have also differ-
ent characteristics to develop emergency management policies (Table 1). Although 9/11
has been a milestone especially for almost every central emergency management organ-
izations, individual cases the countries experienced have caused greater change in the
systems. The civil protection systems that were based on Cold War rules changed into
emergency management policies in different timelines in different countries according to
the democratization process in the countries.
Another differentiation point among the countries is the specialization in emergen-
cies; each country faces different kind of disasters which make them specialized on differ-
ent kind of disasters. For example, UK and Spain were ready for terrorist attacks because
of the recent separatist terrorist attacks in their countries. However, Germany was pre-
pared for the flood cases and became more prepared to the future flood cases after Elbe
2002. Thus, it can be said that a country is more prepared to particular emergency cases
that it faces more than the other kinds of emergencies.
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33
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Appendix:
Table 1: Similarities and Differences of the EM and PAD organizations of Case
Countries
Germay Spain UK
General PAD Style Centralized Decentralized Decentralized
EU Acceptance Date Founding member 1986 1973
BBK (Bundesamt für DGPCE (Dirección
Bevölkerungsschutz und General de Protección
Main EM Organization (All Katastrophenhilfe) Civil y Emergencias) Civil Contingencies
under Ministry of Interior) (Federal Offici of Civil (General Directorate of
Secretariat (CCS)
Protection and Disaster Civil Defense and
Assistance) Emergencies)
AKNZ (Akademie für ENPC (Escuela Nacional

Krisenmanagement, de Protección Civil)
Training Office for EM Notfallplanung und (National School of Civil EPC (Emergency
Studies Zivilschutz) (Academy of Protection) Planning College)
Crisis Nanagement)
KOST (Koordinierungs-
stelle fur groflchige SACOP (Sala de
Higher Emergency Network Gefah-renlagen) (Joint Coordinación Operativa) COBR (Cabinet Office
Durgn Extreme Events coordination centre Operative Coordination Briefing Rooms)
during extreme danger Centre)
situations)
Other EM Organizations DKKV, THW, GTZ ACF-E, Spanish Red Cross DEC, ActionAid, British
Red Cross, CAFOD)
34
Fig. 1: BBK Organization Chart
Source: Academy of Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection, 2006.
35
Fig. 2: DGCPE Organization Chart
Source: Sauvagnargues-Lesage et. al, (2006)
36
Fig. 2: UK Resilience Organization Chart
Source: Arbuthnot, 2005.
37
An Examination of Relationship between Burnout and

Job Satisfaction among Turkish Accounting and
Finance Academicians
Adem Anbar* & Melek Eker**
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to measure the burnout and job satisfaction levels of aca-
demicians and to explore the relationships between burnout and job satisfaction among aca-
demicians in Turkey. The data were obtained from 160 academicians that have been work-
ing in accounting and finance sub-department in Faculties of Economics and Administrative
Sciences in 78 public and private universities by using socio-demographic data form,
Maslach Burnout Inventory and “Job Satisfaction” scale. In the analysis of data, descriptive
statistics (mean and standard deviation), correlation analysis and regression analysis were
used. The study results indicated that the general burnout, emotional exhaustion and deper-
sonalization scores increase as “the recognition academics get for good work” satisfaction
scores decrease. However, general burnout and burnout subdimensions’ scores were found
to increase as the “the amount of variety in academics’ job” satisfaction scores decrease.
And also the emotional exhaustion scores were found to increase as the “academics’ salary
or rate of pay” satisfaction scores decrease.
Key Words: Burnout, depersonalization, emotional exhaustion, job satisfaction, per-

sonal accomplishment, Turkish academicians
JEL Categories: I23, J28, M12
* Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Business Administration,
Bursa/Turkey, Phone: +90 224 442 89 40, e-mail: adem_anbar@yahoo.com
** Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Business Administration,
Bursa/Turkey, Phone: +90 224 442 89 40, e-mail: melekeker@uludag.edu.tr
39
Adem Anbar - Melek Eker
Introduction
Burnout is a syndrome of emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and a sense of low
personal accomplishment that leads to decreased effectiveness at work. It is a prolonged
response to chronic job-related stressors and can be considered as one type of job stress.
Burnout term was first used by Freudenberger in 1974. Freudenberger (1974) defined
burnout as a state of fatigue and emptiness of physical and mental power, a state of being
worn out and he concluded that young social workers who were employed in substance
abuse projects could be subject to depression after a few years. In the most widely used
definition was done by Maslach (1993) as “a psychological syndrome of emotional
exhaustion, depersonalization, and reduced personal accomplishment that can occur
among individuals who work with other people in some capacity”. According to Maslach
and Jackson (1981), there are three components of burnout: emotional exhaustion, deper-
sonalization and reduced personal accomplishment. Emotional exhaustion is the feeling of
fatigue and lack of enthusiasm for work. Depersonalization is the emotional distancing
from direct care clients that result in a callous and uncaring attitude toward others.
Reduced personal accomplishment is the sense that nothing of value is being done at
work by the person. According to Maslach and Jackson (1981), a pattern of emotional
overload and subsequent emotional exhaustion is at the core of the burnout syndrome.
Burnout is an important problem in the working life because it has influence on work
performance, service quality, turnover, organizational commitment, job satisfaction and
stress related health problems. In general, burnout decreases work performance, job sat-
isfaction, organizational commitment and quality of service, and increases absenteeism,
low morale, and job turnover (Maslach & Jackson, 1984; Nowack et al., 1985; Schwab et
al., 1986; Rocca & Kostanski, 2001; Ing-Chung et al., 2003; Marchiori & Henkin, 2004;
Uskun et al., 2005; Toppinen-Tanner et al., 2005; Piko, 2006).
A broad range of professions can experience burnout. Therefore several studies
have done research on different occupations such as doctor, nurse, police, teacher, librar-
ian, manager. Burnout also has a special significance in higher education because acade-
micians can susceptible to burnout, because of their relationships with large numbers of
students, staff, and administrators. There have been a number of studies published that
have examined burnout in academic world. In these studies, a lot of factors were found to
be considerable predictors of burnout. Some of these factors are number of students that
one must deal with (Lackritz, 2004), level of job satisfaction (Seiler and Pearson, 1984),
reward systems (Todd-Mancillas and Johnson, 1987), promotion in occupation (Bilici et al.,
1998), level of income/salary (Briscoe, 1984; Bilici et al., 1998), teaching load (Todd-
Mancillas and Johnson, 1987), unappreciative students (Todd-Mancillas and Johnson,
1987), budget concerns (Jonhson, 1989), administrative style (Johnson, 1989), communi-
cation and environmental problems (Johnson, 1989), job security (University of Plymouth,
2003; Tytherleigh, 2005), time invested in various activities (Lackritz, 2004) and personal
characteristics such as age, gender, and marital status (Johnson, 1989; Bilici et al., 1998;
Faculty Recruitment & Retention Committee, 1999; Ozdemir et al., 1999; Barut and Kalkan,
2002; Lackritz, 2004; Jaschik, 2005).
40
Employees in any organization have attitudes about every aspect of an organization-

al life, such as salary, level of position at work, promotion opportunity, top management,
the work they do, reward system, co-workers’ behavior, recognition, supervision, and
relationships in the work. Some of the most important attitudes within any organization are
attitudes related to job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is a general attitude toward the job; the
difference between the amount of rewards employees receive and the amount they
believe they should receive. A person with a high level of job satisfaction holds positive
attitudes towards the job, while a person who is dissatisfied with his or her job holds neg-
ative attitudes about the job (Rocca and Kostanski, 2001). The foundation for job satisfac-
tion or job motivation theory was introduced by Maslow with the five-stage hierarchy of
human needs, now recognized as the deprivation/gratification proposition. The premise
of the deprivation/gratification proposition is that when an individual identifies a need
which is not being met, behavior occurs which is directed toward gratifying the need
(Castillo et al., 1999).
Job satisfaction can be defined different ways but all definitions agree that it is a multi-
dimensional concept. Locke (1976) defined job satisfaction as “a pleasurable or positive
emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job or job experience”. Spector (1985)
defined job satisfaction as ‘‘an emotional affective response to a job or specific aspect of a
job’’. Wagner & Hollenbeck (1992) defined job satisfaction as “a pleasurable feeling that
results from the perception that one’s job fulfills or allows for the fulfillment of one’s impor-
tant job values”. In brief, job satisfaction can be defined as how much employees like or
dislike their work and the extent to which their expectations concerning work have been
fulfilled. Researchers have divided job satisfaction into two main categories: general satis-
faction and specific satisfaction. General satisfaction, referred to as overall satisfaction, has
been defined as an overall evaluation of a person’s feeling for his or her job. Specific satis-
faction has been defined as an evaluation of various aspects of the job. Examples of such
aspects have included working conditions, pay, relationships with other workers and
supervisor, organizational policies, and the nature of the job itself (Petty et al., 2005).
Understanding job satisfaction is critical to the success of an organization and most
organizations are concerned with their employees’ job satisfaction. Because job satisfac-
tion is related to employee motivation, employee morale, employee frustration, work per-
formance, employee absenteeism and turnover. In general, while high job satisfaction
contributes to job involvement, organizational commitment, greater quality of life and
improved mental and physical health, job dissatisfaction contributes to turnover, absen-
teeism, labor grievances, lateness, leaving early, labor problems, attempts to organize
labor unions and a negative organizational climate (Porter & Steers, 1973; Locke, 1976;
Youngblood et. al., 1983; Brown and Peterson 1993; Dahlke, 1996 ; Fisher, 2000; Barak et.
al., 2005). Therefore, job satisfaction is an important organizational variable in business life.
Although much of job satisfaction research has focused on employees in the private
sector, various studies have also been done to measure job satisfaction of academicians.
Job satisfaction level of academicians can show wide variations according to the various
41
dimensions of their jobs and their demographic characteristics. In other words, the factors
that contribute to job satisfaction or dissatisfaction can be divided into two groups: demo-
graphic (personal) factors and environmental (organizational and work-related) factors.
There are several studies that investigate whether job satisfaction is influenced by demo-
graphic factors such as gender, age, tenure, length of service in higher education, and
academic rank (Winkler, 1982; Pearson and Seiler, 1983; Hagedorn, 1996; Oshagbemi,
1997a; Oshagbemi, 1998; Oshagbemi, 1999; Oshagbemi, 2000; Bas, 2002; Terpstra and
Honoree, 2004; Castillo and Cano, 2004; Stevens, 2005; Koyuncu et. al., 2006; Gautam et.
al., 2006). Organizational and work-related variables such as pay, promotion, institution
(public or private university), unionization status, job security, number of students or insti-
tution size, co-workers’ behavior, management and administration, teaching and
research-related activities, supervision/supervisor behavior, area of academic discipline,
recognition, and relationships have also influence on job satisfaction level of academi-
cians. Several studies have been conducted examining the relationships of different orga-
nizational and work related variables and their impact on job satisfaction levels of acade-
micians (Diener, 1984; Satterle, 1988; Oshagbemi, 1997a; Oshagbemi, 1997b; Bas, 2002;
Bas and Ard›c, 2002; Nelsen, 2003; Terpstra and Honoree, 2004; Stevens, 2005). However,
there is not enough empirical data on the possible effects of demographic and organiza-
tional variables on the job satisfaction levels of academicians. Therefore this field contin-
ues to be a major topic of research interest.
Job satisfaction and burnout are both affective work responses. Job satisfaction and job
burnout present a closely linked behaviour, inversely, as job satisfaction increases burnout
presents low scores. The results of prior studies have confirmed the hypothesis that high
job satisfaction is associated with low burnout (Dolan, 1987; Penn et. al., 1988; Barrick, 1989;
Rocca and Konstanski, 2001; Brewer and Clippard, 2002; Sobreques et. al., 2003; Visser et
al., 2003; Faragher et. al., 2005; Tsigilis et. al., 2006; Ozyurt et. al., 2006). According to the
burnout subscales, job satisfaction is inversely correlated with emotional exhaustion and
depersonalization, and positively correlated with personal accomplishment.
The aim of this study is to explore the levels of burnout and job satisfaction among aca-
demicians and to investigate the relationship between burnout and job satisfaction. There
are a few studies about burnout among Turkish academicians and most of these studies
are related to relationship between burnout levels and demographic factors (Bilici et al.,
1998; Ozdemir et al., 1999; Barut and Kalkan, 2002). Among these studies, Barut and Kalkan
(2002) investigated the relationship between burnout and demographic characteristics
among academicians in Ondokuz May›s University; Ozdemir et al. (1999) compared the
levels of burnout among academicians in two faculties in Cumhuriyet University; Bilici et al.
(1998) investigated the association between the level of burnout and demographic factors
and depression in five faculties in Karadeniz Technical University. There is also very little
data about the satisfaction levels of academicians (Bas, 2002; Bas and Ard›c, 2002; Koyuncu
et al., 2006). Among these studies, Bas (2002) investigated job satisfaction profiles of aca-
demicians and compared satisfaction levels of academicians based on ten different job
dimension, and found that academicians enjoy especially for job itself, prestige, academ-
42
ic environment, supervision/supervisor behavior and co-workers behavior dimensions.

Bas and Ard›c (2002) investigated the job satisfaction of public and private university aca-
demicians and found that private university academicians’ job satisfaction level is higher
in many respects than that of academicians working at public universities. Koyuncu et. al.
(2006) investigated gender differences among academicians based on different variables
such as personal demographic and work situation characteristics, job behaviors, work and
extra-work satisfactions and psychological well-being, and found that female and male
academicians have similar satisfaction levels. As seen, there is not any study that investi-
gates the relationships between burnout and job satisfaction in higher education.
Therefore, one of the aims of this study is to address this informational deficiency.
Research Methodology
Population of the study and sample
The population of the study comprised of academicians that have been working in
accounting and finance sub-department in Faculties of Economic and Administrative
Sciences in 78 public and private universities in Turkey. The questionnaires were sent to
400 academic staff which constitutes the universe of the study through electronic mail. The
survey was conducted between May 1, 2006 and July 30, 2006. A total of 160 completed
questionnaires were received back, giving a response rate of 40%.
Data instruments
Data were collected using three different questionnaires. The first questionnaire was
socio demographic data form which was designed to gather information regarding gen-
der, age, marital status and children number, level of education, academic rank, institu-
tion, years in occupation and years in institution. This questionnaire consisted of nine ques-
tions. The second questionnaire was the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) which was
developed by Maslach and Jackson (1981) for measuring burnout. It consists of 22 items
forming three subscales: emotional exhaustion, personal accomplishment and deperson-
alization. The emotional exhaustion subscale consists of nine items which describe feel-
ings of being emotionally over extended and exhausted by one’s work. The five items on
the depersonalization subscale describe unfeeling and impersonal responses to co-work-
ers or recipients of services. The personal accomplishment subscale consists of eight
items, describing feelings of competence and success about one’s achievements. The
items are scored on a five-point scale ranging from “never” (0) to “always” (4). High
scores on emotional exhaustion and depersonalization, and low scores on personal
accomplishment are indicative of burnout. The third questionnaire was “Job Satisfaction
Scale” which was developed by Houston et al. (2006) for measuring subjects’ job satisfac-
tion level. This scale consists of seven items and is designed to measure seven dimensions
of job satisfaction. The frequency scale ranges from 1 (never satisfied) to 5 (strongly sat-
isfied), and a high score reflects high satisfaction.
43
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
As seen Table 1, 66% of the respondents were female and 34% of the respondents
were male. According to the age of academicians, 28,9% of the respondents were
between 21-30 years, 44,7% of the respondents were between 31-40 years, 19,5% of the
respondents were between 41-50 years. Only 1,3% of the respondents were 61 or above
years of age. Most of the participants were married (71%). 43,7% of the participants had
no any children while 56,3% of the participants had one or more children. According to
the level of education, %70,4 of the academicians had Ph.D. degree. According to the aca-
demic rank, 35,2% of the respondents were research assistant, 12,6% of the respondents
were lecturer, 30,2% of the respondents were assistant professor, 12,4% of the respon-
dent were associated professor and 9,4% of the respondents were professor. While 88,7%
44
of the participants had worked in a public university, 11,3% of the participants had worked
in a private university. According to the years in occupation or tenure, 22% of the partici-
pants had been in higher education between 1-5 years, 25,2% of the participants had
been in higher education between 6-10 years, 28,3% of the participants had been in high-
er education between 11-15 years and 11,9% of the participants had been in higher edu-
cation for more than 20 years. According to the years in institution, percent rates were
equal for 1-5 years, 6-10 years and 11-15 years. 15,6% of the participants had been at the
institution for more than 15 years.
Burnout and job satisfaction scores of academicians

The means and standard deviations of the general burnout, three burnout subscales
and job satisfaction are shown in Table 2. As seen Table 2, five different scores were cal-
culated: general burnout score, emotional exhaustion score, depersonalization score,
personal accomplishment score and job satisfaction score. Theoretical minimum - maxi-
mum-scores of MBI were 0-88, 0-36, 0-20, 0-32 and 5-35 for general burnout, emotional
exhaustion, depersonalization, personal accomplishment and job satisfaction, respective-
ly. The higher mean scores of the emotional exhaustion and depersonalization subscales
and lower mean scores on personal accomplishment subscale correspond to greater
degrees of burnout. The general burnout scores changed between 7-61, mean score of
the general burnout was 24,7 and standard deviations of the general burnout score was
10,25. The mean score on the emotional exhaustion subscale was 10,2 (SD=6,10) for aca-
demicians. The mean score on the depersonalization subscale was 2,9 (SD=2,64) for aca-
demicians. On the personal accomplishment subscale, the mean score was 11,6
(SD=3,45). The average scores showed that burnout levels of academicians were not
high. However the job satisfaction scores changed between 7-33, mean score of the job
satisfaction was 23,6 (SD=4,85).
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Burnout Scores
Correlation matrix for general burnout, burnout subscales and job satisfaction is
shown in Table 3. There were a positive significant relationship between general burnout
and burnout subscales. General burnout was strongly correlated with the level of emo-
tional exhaustion burnout (r = 0,94). Also, there were significant intercorrelations among
45
burnout subscales. The emotional exhaustion had positive and significant correlation with
depersonalization (r=0,66) and personal accomplishment (r=0,53). The relationship
between personal accomplishment and depersonalization was significant, but lower
(r=0,30). Job satisfaction was inversely correlated with general burnout (r=-0,53), emo-
tional exhaustion (r=-0,50), depersonalization (r=-0,36) and personal accomplishment
(r=-0,42). In Table 3, it is interesting that there was a negative relationship between job
satisfaction and personal accomplishment.
Table 3. Correlation Coefficients
** a= 0.01 significant level (Pearson Correlation)
Results of Multi Regression Analysis

The multi regression model below was been formed to test the effect of the job satis-
faction on general burnout level and burnout subscales levels of academicians.
y=ß0+ ß1x1+ ß2x2+ ß3x3+ ß4x4+ ß5x5+ ß6x6+ ß7x7 +e1
* Model explains ß0= Constant, y= general burnout and burnout subscales, x1= Freedom to choose your own method of
working, x2= The recognition you get for good work, x3= The amount of responsibility you are given, x4= Your salary or
rate of pay, x5= Your chance for advancement, x6= The amount of variety in your job, x7= Now taking everything into
consideration, how do you feel about your job as a whole?
46
Table 4: Results of Regression Model (y= Level of General Burnout)
The results of the multiple regression model which dependent variable is general
burnout are shown in Table 4. As seen in Table 4, 35,4% of the changes on the level of aca-
demics’ general burnout was explained by job satisfaction dimensions which we includ-
ed in the model. F-value was statistically significant (p<0,05). Hence, there was a mean-
ingful relationship between the level of general burnout and academics’ job satisfaction
variables. When the effect of each independent variable in the model is examined, it can
be seen that to express the general burnout level, apart from “the recognition academics
get for good work” and “the amount of variety in academics’ job”, other parameters did
not have any meaningfulness of their own (p<0,05). When the beta values are looked at
which are standardized coefficient in the table, it is seen that “the recognition academics
get for good work” variable affected the level of general burnout in a negative direction
with the meaningfulness level of p<0,05 with a powerful beta co-efficiency of –3.107, and
“the amount of variety in academics’ job” affected the level of general burnout in a nega-
tive direction with the beta co-efficiency of -3.324 and the meaningfulness level of p<0,05.
47
Table 5: Results of Regression Model (y= Level of Emotional Exhaustion)
Table 5 shows that 33% of changes on the levels of emotional exhaustion was
explained by independent variables which were included in the model. The F value is
indicated that there was a non-linear and meaningful relationship between the levels of
emotional exhaustion and independent variables (p<0,05). The beta value in Table 5
expressed that “the recognition academics get for good work”, “the amount of variety in
academics’ job” and “academics’ salary or rate of pay” affected in a negative direction
the levels of emotional exhaustion at meaningfulness level of p<0,05 with the powerful
beta co-efficiency such as -1.994, -1.869 and -0.842 by order.
48
Table 6: Results of Regression Model (y= Level of Depersonalization)
Table 6 shows the results of the multiple regression model which dependent variable
is depersonalization level of academicians. As seen in Table 6, 18,1% of the changes in the
levels of depersonalization was explained by used independent variables. Together with
this, F value indicated that the established model was statistically meaningful (p<0,05).
When beta values which are standardized co-efficiency are looked at in Table 6, it can be
seen that “the recognition academics get for good work” and “the amount of variety in
academics’ job” were the most important independent variables.
49
Table 7: Results of Regression Model (y= Level of Personal Accomplishment)
The results of the multiple regression model which dependent variable is personal
accomplishment are shown in Table 7. When Table 7 is examined, it can be seen that
22,6% of the changes related to the level of personal accomplishment was explained by
the independent variables which were included in the model. F value showed that the
established model was meaningful, in other words, there was a non-linear relationship
between dependent variable and independent variables (p<0,05). According to the beta
values in the Table 7, “the amount of variety in academics’ job” variable was the most
important independent variable.
According to the tables, it is possible to make these evaluations directed towards the
relationship between the variables: There was a meaningful relationship between “the
recognition academics get for good work” and the two dimensions of burnout which are
general burnout and emotional exhaustion, depersonalization. And also it can be said that
there was an important relationship between “the amount of variety in academics’ job”
variable and all of dependent variables. Also a meaningful relationship was found
between “academics’ salary or rate of pay” and the level of emotional exhaustion. In gen-
eral, the above established four models explained 35,4%, 33%, 18,1%, 22,6% of the
changes in general burnout, emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and personal
accomplishment, respectively.
50
Discussion
This study explored the relationships between burnout and job satisfaction among
academicians in Turkey. The population for this study comprised of academicians who
have been working in accountant and finance sub-department in Faculties of Economics
and Administrative Sciences in 78 universities. For the aim of the study, three question-
naires were used (socio-demographic data form, Maslach Burnout Inventory and Job
Satisfaction Scale) and these questionnaires sent to 400 academic staff through electronic
mail. 160 academicians responded the questionnaires. The response rate was 40%. In the
analysis of data, descriptive statistic (mean and standard deviation), correlation analysis
and multi regression analysis were used.
According to the means and standard deviations of burnout subscales, levels of
burnout of academicians were lower than expected. In our study the mean scores for
emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and personal accomplishment were 10,2
(SD=6,10), 2,92 (SD=2,64) and 11,6 (SD=3,45), respectively. Ozdemir et al. (1999) found
out that the mean scores on emotional exhaustion were 11,93 (SD=0,84) for academicians
in Faculty of Dentistry and 12,78 (SD=0,94) for academicians in Faculty of Economic and
Administrative Sciences. They found that the mean scores on depersonalization were 4,11
(SD=0,14) for academicians in Faculty of Dentistry and 5,26 (SD=0,69) for academicians
in Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences. In their study the mean scores on
personal accomplishment were also 21,86 (SD=0,73) and 22 (SD=0,78) for academicians
in two faculties. Barut and Kalkan (2002) found that the mean scores on emotional exhaus-
tion, depersonalization and personal accomplishment were 11,80 (SD=6,17), 3,6
(SD=3,44) and 21,7 (SD=4,9), respectively. While the mean score on emotional exhaus-
tion in our study was similar to the results of two studies, the scores on depersonalization
and personal accomplishment were lower than the other studies.
Particularly, the level of personal accomplishment was rather low. The low score on
personal accomplishment indicated that academicians who have been working in
accounting and finance discipline perceived low competence and success about their
achievements. The mean score of the job satisfaction was found to be 23,6 (SD=4,85) and
it indicated that job satisfaction level of accountant and finance academicians was fair and
moderate. In the correlation analysis, it was found that job satisfaction was inversely cor-
related with general burnout, emotional exhaustion, depersonalization and personal
accomplishment. Normally, there should be a positive correlation between job satisfaction
and personal accomplishment. But in our study, it was found to be a negative correlation
between job satisfaction and personal accomplishment.
The regression model was constituted for determining the relationships between
general burnout and subscales and job satisfaction factors. According to the results of this
analysis, it was found that there was a meaningful relationship between level of general
burnout, emotional exhaustion and depersonalization and “the recognition academics get
for good work” satisfaction factor. And this result support the hypothesis that the levels of
general burnout, emotional exhaustion and depersonalization increase as the level of
51
recognition academics get for good work” satisfaction scores decrease. However, in this
study the most significant predictor of general burnout and burnout subdimensions was
the “the amount of variety in your job” (job itself) satisfaction for academics. The study
results are consistent with the other studies in the literature (Castillo et al., 1999; Bas, 2002;
Bas and Ard›c, 2002; Castillo and Cano, 2004), because job itself is more important for
academics than the other job satisfaction factors. The study results indicated that general
burnout and burnout subdimensions’ scores were found to increase as the level of “the
amount of variety in academics’ job” satisfaction scores decrease. Also the related finding
of the research indicated that the feeling of emotional exhaustion increases as the level of
“academics’ salary or rate of pay” satisfaction of academics decrease.
Academicians do complex work in an increasingly demanding environment.
Universities are the only organizations focused on dual core functions of knowledge cre-
ation and knowledge transmission through the processes of research and teaching. But
academicians have faced some problems such as heavy teaching loads, unsatisfactory
reward structure, high number of students, budget concerns and insufficient research
funds, low salaries and long working hours. These factors affect the burnout and job satis-
faction levels of academicians. Job satisfaction and burnout are important topics for any
organizations, including universities, because of the financial and social effects of job sat-
isfaction and the damaging physical/psychological impacts of burnout. Job satisfaction and
burnout are related to employee motivation, work performance, turnover, organizational
commitment and stress related health problems. There is an inverse relationship between
job satisfaction and burnout. Increasing job satisfaction can be reduced burnout level, or
inversely, decreasing burnout level can be increased job satisfaction. Studies have
showed that individuals who are satisfied with their jobs contribute to positive organiza-
tional outcomes, for example, low turnover, low absenteeism and a high level of commit-
ment to the organization. This is true for universities and academicians. As a consequence,
job satisfaction and burnout have critical importance for universities as well as other
organizations. Therefore, university administrators should be aware of burnout syndrome
and job satisfaction, and they should identify the variables that contribute to job satisfac-
tion (or dissatisfaction) and burnout and they are concerned with ways of improving job
satisfaction level of academicians. The studies related to job satisfaction and burnout
among academicians can help and guide to university administrators.
52
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57
A Glance to Turkey-EU Relations from the Security

Perspective: Incorporation of Turkey into the EU is
Necessary for European Security would Strengthen
the Prospects of Turkey’s Integration.
Ümit Kurt*
ABSTRACT
This study argues that Turkey’s inclusion into the EU is important for the EU’s security
role. An essential reason behind the European Council decision to raise Turkey’s status to
that of candidate country is the EU’s evolving security role. In other words, the estimates
of the potential benefits of Turkey’s inclusion into the EU’s Common European Security and
Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion essentially shape the EU’s
policy towards Turkey. 1
Key Words: European security, the role of Turkey, the ESDP, security opportunities
and risks.
* PhD. Student and Research Assistant in Bo¤aziçi University, in Political Science and International Relations
1 Address: Bo¤aziçi Üniversitesi, Güney Kampüsü, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararas› ‹liﬂkiler Bölümü, Bebek / ‹stanbul, 34342.
Turkey. Tel: 02123596805, Fax Number: 02122875400
Baç, Meltem M. (2000) “Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies.” Security Dialogue 31–4: 489–502.
59
Ümit Kurt
Introduction
This study is based on rational intergovernmentalism-institutionalism (liberal inter-
governmental approach) approach of international relations theory by placing this issue
within a theoretical perspective of states’ preferences and policy making in the EU.
According to A. Moravcsik (1993), there are three essential elements at the core of liber-
al intergovernmentalism: the assumption of national state behavior, a liberal theory of
national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of intestate bargain-
ing or negotiation2. In this respect, understanding the EU states as rational actors and tak-
ing decisions with regard to foreign affairs based on their own benefits and preferences
(cost and benefit analysis) are the basic premises of this approach. Theoretically, bound-
aries of the EU will therefore in the last resort “depend on its ability to strike a balance
between the benefits and costs involved for each member state”3. This is why member
states’ egoistic interests and cost/benefit calculations determine major EU policies. In this
context, security is one of the major EU policies.
As A.Moravcsik explained (1993), according to rational intergovernmentalism, the
preferences of member states are the most important parameters that affect membership
status of a candidate country. These preferences incorporate material benefits being as
economic and security fields. Considering these theoretical parameters, this study argues
that, as far as security issues are concerned, the member states that support Turkey’s EU
membership into the EU would increase and Turkey’s prospective membership into the
EU might gain a huge amount of importance. Indeed, former minister of foreign affairs of
Germany, Joschka Fischer explained (2004) significant role of Turkey on European secu-
rity in that way: “Some old-minded persons are talking about that membership of Turkey
into the EU would affect negatively. However, I cannot ignore realities. Turkey has an
extremely important strategic actor for Europe”4. At the intergovernmental level, the rel-
ative power of member states determines which states’ preferences will be reflected in
EU policies. This statement implies that convergence of preferences of relatively more
powerful actors in the EU is an important factor in the process of interstate bargaining and
in EU policies such as enlargement and the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy).
For that reason, if the most powerful member states within the EU, particularly, UK, France
and Germany come to the concerted conclusion regarding the indispensable character
of Turkey for European security perspective and identity, then positions of the other mem-
ber countries would be formulated according to this point of view. Since, theoretically
speaking, according to rational intergovernmentalism, the EU policies are constituted and
determined ramifications of strategic partnerships and agreements, which take place
among the most powerful states within the Union.
2 Moravcsik, A. (1993) “Preferences and power in the European Communities: a liberal intergovernment approach.”
Journal of Common Market Studies 31–4: 482.
3 Baç, Meltem M. and Mclaren, L. (2003) “Enlargerment preferences and policymaking in the EU: Impacts on Turkey.”
Journal of Common Market Studies 25: 17–30.
4 Hürriyet, 08.09.2004, in Baç, Meltem M. A Glance to the relationships between Turkey and the EU from a security dimen-
sion, ‹stanbul: TESEV Yay›nlar›, November 2006, p. 7.
60
One of the most important obstacles in front of Turkey in the terms of its membership
into the EU is the fact that Turkish identity is seen out of the European identity. In this con-
text, if the importance of Turkey for interests of the EU is conceived, the Europeanness of
Turkey might be questioned less. In other words, the more emphasis on cost and benefit
analysis in the Turkish case could pave the way for altering identity perceptions. To put it
crudely, if both governments and peoples understand considerable opportunities that
Turkey might bring for European security, interactions between Turkey and the EU may
go up and what Meltem M. Baç called , this socialization process might facilitate a com-
mon identity constitution.
As Meltem M. Baç (2006) correctly underlines that the role of Turkey that has played
so far and will play in the future for European security is closely related to what sort of
actor that EU is in the field of security. It is widely known that since 1949, by the establish-
ment of NATO, European states left their security affairs to the NATO and USA at a greater
level. Needless to say, international role of the EU in the global arena is entirely different
from that of USA. In the case of the latter, USA carries, hard power features along with its
technological superiority and military capabilities as a hegemonic leader in Gramscian
terminology and shapes world politics. Whereas the former are quiet often defined as soft
power. For instance, Robert Kagan in his “Power and Paradise” resembled Americans
coming from ‘Mars’ as Hobbesian world where conflicts are inescapable and on the other
hand resembled Europeans coming from ‘Venus’ as Kantian peaceful world where inter-
national institutions would solve world-problems by means of peaceful means. This epito-
mizes the way in which USA and Europe look at the world affairs and clear differences
between their perspectives of world and international affairs. That is the reason why Ian
Manners (2002) describes the EU as a civil power by saying that “the concept of norma-
tive power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed in a normative basis,
but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics” . With
regard to Turkey, in this respect, probable international role of the EU, whether it will
decide to be a hard/military power or soft/civilian power is going to determine the role of
Turkey for European security as well.
The fundamental reason behind incapability of the EU to develop an efficient foreign
and policy is interest and preference based conflicts among member-states. The basic
issue affecting relations between Europe and Turkey has always been one of security.
Nevertheless, the existence of common enemy, the significant Turkish contribution to
European security and the multi-national character of NATO has had the effect that Turkey,
for the first time in its history, has come to be perceived as a key component of the
European security framework. In 1963, Turkey signed an agreement with Brussels indi-
cating the possibility of membership. In 1995, the EU signed a customs agreement with
Turkey and in 1999; Turkey was officially declared a candidate nation. The key condition,
which also applied for Eastern European applicants, was that Turkey must fulfill the
Copenhagen economic and political Criteria (laid down at the EU summit in December
2002). However, the Copenhagen criteria do not consider security issues to be as impor-
tant as economic and political ones. Though Turkey does not underestimate the require-
61
Ümit Kurt
ments of the Copenhagen Criteria, they are also well aware that the world after 9/11 has
changed dramatically. Within the EU, the main problem is the dysfunctional nature of
European collective politics concerning security and foreign policy. Hence, the insistence
on politicizing security issues and seeking political compromise has caused the European
Union to be regarded internationally as a less of a “super-power” than a “super-market”
. Therefore, I argue that, Turkey with its important geopolitical role, superior military capa-
bilities and its significantly crucial strategic position as its assets, could behave strategical-
ly and demonstrate itself as security opportunity for the EU by making use of these con-
flicts among member-states in a rational way.
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP):

EDSP is a project on developing the EU’s ‘military and non-military crisis manage-
ment capability, as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and
defense’, in cooperation with NATO . This capability known as the “Petersberg Tasks”, as
agreed by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, involves humanitarian and rescue
tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and the tasks of the armed forces in crisis management
including peace-making . The ESDI controversy between Turkey and the EU evolves
around whether and how Turkey would participate in discussions and decisions within the
EU concerning the ESDP from the beginning of a crisis to the actual use of force to achieve
the Petersburg task. Although the origins of the ESDP could be traced back to the EU
Summit in Maastricht in 1991 , the controversy itself had started to dominate the agenda
of the Turkish-EU relations in 1999. Furthermore, The ESDP was built on an EU/NATO
common acceptance of the “Berlin Plus” agreement , which enabled the EU to develop an
effective and capable military dimension by providing a channel for the EU to access
NATO’s military assets and planning capabilities. The EU has also been building its own
rapid response capability under the “Petersberg Tasks”, which is specifically related to
humanitarian and rescue work, peacekeeping, and combat tasks. These include military
and police units, as well as civil administration, rule of law experts, and civil protection
teams, for running UN-mandated crisis management operations . While the “Berlin Plus”
agreement facilitates the realization of the “Petesberg Tasks” through EU/NATO politico-
military cooperation with possible non-EU members’ participation, the ESDP provides the
necessary mechanism to realize the same tasks with an autonomous EU defense capaci-
ty, “backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readi-
ness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis . In order to realize an autonomous
EU defense capacity, the EU agreed at the Helsinki European Council meeting to estab-
lish a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sus-
tainable for at least one year , as well as a new idea for the creation of 13 rapidly deploy-
able, each 1,500 men strong, EU “Battle Groups”.
While NATO, with its operations in the Balkans and successful enlargement, has
established itself as the central military-security institution, the EU has started to claim a
larger role, gradually incorporating the WEU. This process developed throughout the
62
1990s, but had accelerated greatly by the end of the decade. Overall, the EU has become
an important actor in the restructuring of the European security system, advancing the
ESDI with the aim of strengthening the European pillar of NATO and ensuring that it has
the capability to act on its own when NATO chooses not to act . As far as NATO is con-
cerned, it certified the ESDI as the European pillar of the Alliance at its 1996 Berlin Summit
and reiterated this endorsement at its 1999 Washington Summit. As Meltem M. Baç cor-
rectly puts forward (2000) that it is within this context that Turkey’s incorporation into the
EU becomes essential. In fact, exclusion of such an “integral actor” from the European
security structures would bear significant risks, while its inclusion would boost European
capabilities and allow the EU to take advantage of Turkey’s geopolitical value. For
instance, since any EU operation can be implemented- according to Washington Summit
decisions- only after NATO Council approval, including Turkey’s vote, the EU has in each
case to find a way to accommodate Turkey.
The Role of Turkey on European Security

To begin with, there are both military sphere that articulates hard power traits and
civil sphere that shows soft power features within the EU for Turkey to play a potential role
on European security. For instance, according to Meltem M. Baç maintains (2000), there
are three assets that make Turkey an indispensable actor in the European security system
in the post-Cold War era: its membership in NATO, its military capabilities, and its
geostrategic position. First , by exercising its vote in the North Atlantic Council, Turkey has
an institutional lever that can affect the EU’s defense aspirations. Second , Turkey’s military
capabilities are vital for operations in the expanded European security area. Third ,
Turkey controls a pivotal intersection between Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, the
Balkans, and the Caucasus, which allows it to qualify as a major player all these regions.
Furthermore, broad military capabilities of Turkey and worthwhile experience of its
army constitute a solid ground of Turkey’s contributions to the EU’s security dimension. As
we have emphasized earlier, from a geo-political point of view, it is clear that Turkey,
because of its geographic positioning at the crossroads of South East Europe, the Middle
East and the Caucasus- Caspian region, is destined to play a key role in European secu-
rity and foreign policy issues. It will do so whether it becomes a member state or not. The
acceptance of Turkey, would bring two major benefits: the unquestionable strengthening
of European military capabilities (Turkey's army consists of around 400.000 troops -Ed),
and a direct physical presence in the Middle-Eastern and Caucasus-Caspian region. In
the Caucuses, the most visible aspects of an EU presence, thus far, has been the monitor-
ing of elections, whose outcomes are usually regarded as not having been carried out
freely and fairly. The hope is, that Turkey's undeniable status as a neighboring country,
will finally force the EU to implement a more rational approach toward Turkey, and to
come up with a functional strategy, whose aim will be the combination of political dia-
logue, financial aid and real military strength. In addition to these, Turkey is one of the
largest investors in Central Asia. From the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey has closed
63
Ümit Kurt
more than 400 bilateral and multilateral agreements of a technical and even political
nature . Thousands of students from Central Asian Republics such as Kazakhstan, study at
Turkish Universities. These future technical and intellectual elite present the possibility of
a significant flow of investment and political discourse into this strategically important
region.
Turkey’s institutional role in the Union’s common foreign and security policies, its sig-
nificant military capabilities, and its pivotal geographical position determine Turkey’s
strategic importance for the EU in the post-Cold War era. As Richard Holbrooke has put it
, “Turkey stands at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance on the European
continent-including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, Russian rela-
tions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and transit routes for Caspian oil and gas”.
First, Turkey’s participation in the EU’s possible military operations could contribute
significantly to their success and, maybe, could determine their feasibility. For instance,
the EU’s declared goal of being able to deploy 60,000 soldiers- the kind of force that could
serve as peacekeeper in hot spots like Bosnia and Kosovo- will require up to 200,000 sol-
diers because of rotation needs. Yet, the European allies, with 2 million soldiers on paper,
had trouble-fielding 40,000 for peacekeeping in the Balkans . In addition, the allies lack the
huge transport planes required to project military power beyond their borders . This sit-
uation, despite all the post-Kosovo plans for a European army, is not going to change in
the near future. According to Lord Robertson , “Kosovo was only an alarm calm. The sim-
ple, but brutal message was: we made promises that we could not keep”. The EU will
have either to rely on the USA or to involve a European power, which is capable of sus-
tained military effort and has a large standing army-Turkey. Indeed, Turkey spends 4.4%
of its GNP on defense. On the other hand, defense budgets have been falling across much
for Europe such as Germany, France and Britain. As an indication of its willingness to con-
tribute to the EU’s rapid deployment force, Turkey offered in February 2000 to provide a
brigade-size unit supported by air naval components .
As far as the Turkey’s geographic significance for European security is concerned,
four specific aspects can be identified. The first one encompasses Iraq, and the key refer-
ence point here is certainly the 1990-91 Gulf War, which has shown how much the secu-
rity of Europe could be damaged by turnmoil in the Gulf area. Turkey’s participation in the
allied coalition against Iraq was crucial for the victory, because of the high value of the
Incirlik air base for conducting the air campaign . Turkey’s position was vital again, much
the same way as in 1991. Turkey’s participation and its military bases would be crucial for
the success of any possible NATO/EU operation in the Middle East.
The second aspect of Turkey’s place and role in the Middle East that carries implica-
tions for the EU involves its closeness to and alliance building with Israel. Since 1993,
Turkey has been engaged in extensive cooperation with Israel, formalized in a range of
agreements stretching from cultural to military matters. These latter are certainly of par-
ticular importance since the agreements on military cooperation brought Turkey and
Israel together as security partners in the Middle East. More recently, Turkey furthered its
64
ties with Egypt by signing an agreement on cooperation between two nations’ security
and police agencies in May 2000. Turkey has already played an important role in the mul-
tilateral track of the Middle East Peace Process and is able to act as an intermediary role
between Palestine and Israel, as illustrated by its diplomatic efforts in August 2000, when
Palestine leader Yassir Arafat, Israeli Foreign Minister Sholomo Ben Ami, and Israel’s
Prime Minister Ehud Barak visited Turkey one after another. With these assets, Turkey
with its secular character and dynamic economy can play an important role in the EU’s
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Process in terms of ensuring economic
development in the Mediterranean region and eliminating the economic and political
causes of immigration from North Africa to the EU and also with Turkey’s close ties with
Israel can help achieving the peace between Israel and Palestine. Thus, Turkey’s role in
Barcelona Process would help the EU to deal with such security challenges as ethnic con-
flicts, the rise of political Islam, immigration, and instability in the Middle East (Baç M.
Meltem, 2000: 497).
The third aspect of Turkey’s geostrategic weight is related to its role in Southeast
Europe and the Balkans, the region that in the 1990s posed the most serious challenges to
European security and stability. Turkey’s role in the Balkans is highlighted by its partici-
pation in resolving the Bosnian crisis of 1992-95 and the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99. In both
cases, Turkey provided substantial humanitarian aid, its troops served under UN com-
mand, and it accommodated many thousands of refugees. Turkey has contributed an
infantry battalion group (1300 officers and soldiers) to NATO’s
Implementation/Stabilization Force in Bosnia, as well as 26 police officers to the UN
Mission in Bosnia; its mechanized battalion (940 officers and soldiers) is deployed in
Kosovo . As the EU-with its Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe –shifts the emphasis
on economic development aid as a means to discharge security challenges, Turkey can
capitalize on its active economic role in the Balkans . Therefore, Turkey has great poten-
tial for contributing militarily, politically, and economically to the EU’s Balkan policies. Its
ties with the people of Southeastern Europe are historical, cultural, ethnic, and- in the case
of Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albians-religious. One should note that these ties might
well increase the EU’s security problems, because they make Turkey a party to Balkan
politics. As for the Cyprus problem, this definitely constitutes a special case, but as Meltem
M. Baç argues (2000), if the EU were able to pressure Turkey towards a resolution of this
problem, using the additional leverage of Turkey’s candidacy, this would increase stabil-
ity in Southeastern Europe.
The fourth aspect of Turkey’s potential geopolitical contribution to European securi-
ty is related to its role in the Caspian region. Turkey has for years played the role of an
energy corridor for Europe, as some of the oil from the Middle East is transported through
its territory. One should notice that this role would increase extraordinarily when the ener-
gy resources of the Caspian area reach the world markets. It is rather essential to know
the fact that these resources are of such a scale that whoever controls them would hold the
key strategic balances for the 21st century, so, it can be argued that Turkey’s position will
shape key regional balances.
65
Ümit Kurt
In brief, parallel to these explanations above, Turkey’s inclusion into the EU trajecto-
ry brings various benefits for the Union’s foreign and security policies through Turkey’s
capabilities and its ties in the regions around. Meanwhile, its exclusion would be problem-
atic and even risky because of Turkey’s ability to influence EU military operations and
decisions through its vote in the NATO Council. Therefore, if the process of Turkey’s can-
didacy is reconsidered, the lesson that was driven would be: “geopolitical and security
risks that Turkey’s exclusion entails for the EU and the potential benefits its inclusion would
bring driven the EU’s decision to grant Turkey a candidate-country status” . Turkey’s con-
tribution to the EU’s CESDP is derived from its military capabilities and its role in the
Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Caspian area, while its ability to affect EU
operations through its vote in the NATO Council cannot be underestimated (Baç M.
Meltem, 2000: 499). Turkey is an important players in the changing European security
arena, and, without its participation, EU-led operations may stand less chance of success.
Turkey’s role in the EU’s security perspective particularly, is certainly different from the
one that Turkey played during the Cold War, but it is no less than vital Turkey’s integra-
tion into the EU carries therefore an additional advantage that the Central and Eastern
European countries cannot match. Therefore, it would be a more healthy consideration to
see granted candidate status to Turkey in the Helsinki Summit, in 1999 by taking into
account Turkey’s salient and considerable security role for the EU.
This clearly indicates that Turkey bears remarkable advantages to EU’s security. The
EU that incorporates Turkey as a full member will be more active actor in the global arena.
Turkey’s enormous military capability will make a considerable contribution to hard
power of the EU. Indeed, success of the EU’s military operations in the Balkans and the
Middle East that depends on the Turkey’s support and its logistic assistance proves the
importance of Turkey geostrategic position. In addition to this, Turkey’s geographical
position, its pivotal role within the Balkans and Caucasus and its secular and democratic
characteristics as an overwhelmingly Muslim country will enable the EU to enhance its sin-
cerity of soft power quality.
As M. Bali Aykan points out (2005) with Europeans have not appeared willing to
accept Turkey’s becoming a full member in the foreseeable future, they have agreed with
American and Turkish political leaders concerning its strategic importance in securing
regional stability and peace. It appears that, Turkey’s case constituted a dilemma for the
European states. Modern Turkey had a strong military with an effective deterrent capabil-
ity integrated into the NATO establishment: “an army, experienced in and capable of car-
rying out various peace-keeping and war-making missions, maintaining historically close
ties and a “strategic partnership” with the USA, the one and only superpower in the post-
Cold War era” . As such, Turkey was a credible factor to be accepted in the maintenance
of regional order and security. According to the Europeans, who had been living through
an ambitious but a sensitive integration process, as M. Bali Aykan remarkably emphasizes
(2005) these characteristics made Turkey too important to be disregarded and alienated.
66
Moreover, Turkey was now a status quo-oriented moderate country in relation to her
Ottoman past. Specifically in this respect, Verheugen expected that Turkey would demon-
strate its good will by arranging a settlement of the Cyprus conflict with Greece in order
to secure full membership in the EU . Apparently, this expectation was shared by govern-
ment’s decision in the Helsinki Summit not to use any veto against membership status
being given to Turkey appeared to be that the Greek Premier Simitis believed that a
Turkey that was oriented toward Europe would pose fewer security risks to Greece than
a Turkey focused away from Europe .
Complexity of Turkey’s Security Environment

As far as Turkey’s role and its security-oriented characteristics are concerned, nature
of the relationship between Turkey and the EU is both intricate and complicated. The EU
door is bound to remain close to Turkey for the foreseeable future, a situation that poses
problems not only for both sides, but also for the whole framework of security in the
Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Since the US is more enthusias-
tic about Turkish membership of the EU than are most EU members, it could even dam-
age transatlantic relations. In that context, Barry Buzan & Thomas Diez focus on the com-
plexity nature of Turkey’s security environment.
Common interests between the EU and Turkey start with Turkey’s strategic geogra-
phy. Turkey places at the edge of three more-or-less distinct regions of conflict- the
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus- and has a role in two more that are at a slight
geographical remove from it- west Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) region. According to B. Buzan and T. Diez, from a systemic per-
spective, it plays the role of an insulator, a peripheral actor in all of the security regions
surrounding it, but not centrally involved in any (1999: 41-57). This should not be read as
Turkey being unimportant to its neighbors; its main function, in practice, is to separate
other regional security dynamics from each other . Given the complexity of its security
environment, agreed by B. Buzan and T. Diez (1999) Turkey needs to promote stability on
as many fronts as possible if it is to avoid living in a region of permanent conflict. Whether
this can be achieved by bringing Turkey into the EU seems doubtful. They argue (1999)
that it is more likely that such a situation would lead to a direct entanglement of the EU in
the security dynamics of the Middle East and the CIS. For the time being, Turkey’s secu-
rity links to the Western powers via its NATO membership should be sufficient to meet its
own security concerns. The strategic interests shared reciprocally by Turkey and the EU
should be obvious. For the EU, Turkey can provide security insulation from the Middle
East, and a partner in stabilizing the Balkans. For Turkey, the EU can provide a stable and
supportive relationship, a partner in containing conflict in the Balkans generally, and the
Greek-Turkish conflict in particular . Both sides should want to prevent the growth of any
linkage between the security dynamics of the Middle East and those of the Balkans.
67
Ümit Kurt
Security opportunities of Turkey for the EU-1:

In non-military security relations between Turkey and states in Central Asia in terms
of vision of intense system of cooperation on the basis of common language and cultural
heritage like these, there is undoubtedly considerable scope for Turkey to play some kind
of bridging role between the EU and countries further a field. There must be a role for
Turkey as a regional dynamic in the Balkans, where it shares the EU’s interest in stabiliza-
tion. As a rule, Turkey’s Middle Eastern engagements create more ties with the US than
with Europe, whereas its Balkans and Black Sea engagements create more ties with the
EU than the US.
Security opportunities of Turkey for the EU-2:

The logic behind the ESDP is that the EU will be involved in crisis management in a
wider geographical area from the Balkans to the Caucasus and from Middle East to North
Africa where Turkey is at the crossroads of region. These are conflict regions have a
direct bearing on international peace and security. The EU plays a significant role in estab-
lishing a stable environment in its neighborhood with strategies such as The European
Neighborhood Policy , and a Turkey, as a country with significant military capabilities and
a growing civilian sector that is active in humanitarian efforts, has been the net contribu-
tor to international peace and security in key international organizations such as the UN,
NATO and the OSCE.
S. Gürsoy strongly puts forward (2005) that this is the manifestation of one of the most
important trends in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies: investment in the military sec-
tor, which inevitably resulted in identifying Turkey as a “security consumer” at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, shifted to investment in the civilian sector in peace-keeping and peace-
making operations by visualizing the country as a “security provider” towards the end of
the 1990s. Moreover, Turkey, as a country that began accession negotiations for EU mem-
bership on 3 October 2005, has also taken active part in EU-led civilian and military crisis
management operations .
Turkey’s historic contribution to efforts to build a greater regional capacity for peace
operations continues in the EU efforts to create a Rapid Reaction Force and a Civilian
Crisis Management Capacity since December 1999; in the OSCE’s Rapid Expert
Assistance and Cooperation Team (REACT) to support timely deployment of police and
other civilian expertise since April 2001; and in the NATO Response Force (NRF) since
November 2002. (In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia).
With regard to EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations, Turkey has
participated in :
• The first EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 14 police officers,

where Turkey had contributed 186 police officers under the UN International
68
Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2003 .

• The EU’s first military mission Operation Concordia in Macedonia with 11
personnel. The EU took over the mission on 31 March 2003, from the NATO
Operation Allied Harmony. Turkey’s contribution continues in the follow-up civil-
ian crisis management operation “Proxima” with eight personnel .
• The first EU autonomous military operation “Artemis” in Democratic
Republic of Congo with nine personnel, which lasted from 15 June until 1
September 2003 .
• The EU Operation Althea in Bosnia with over Turkish 350 troops, as well
as contributing personnel to the Integrated Police Unit of this operation with
Turkish gendarmerie forces, which was launched following the termination of
the mission of NATO’s Stabilization Force.
H. Tar›k O¤uzlu considers (2003) that the EU’s final decision on Turkey’s accession
is dependent both on Turkey’s performance in adopting the EU’s distinctive security iden-
tity and on the continuation of the EU member states’ commitment to turning the EU into an
international actor with vital security interests in Turkey’s neighborhood. On the basis of
this reasoning, it can be concluded that the longer the accession process lasts and the
more ambiguously the EU reacts towards Turkey’s membership, the more likely Turkey
and the EU view each other as “security threats” rather than “security providers” .
Turkish public has been continuously supportive of its country’s bid for membership
as it sees inclusion within the EU as a “logical consequence” of its Kemalist Western ori-
entation and as a means of finally confirming Turkey’ European identity . However,
Turkey’s inclusion in the EU has been considered problematic because of its economic
problems, shortcomings in promoting democratic principles, the Kurdish issue, the
Cyprus problem, and size of population . While these factors could be considered as
obstacles to membership, they are not exclusive to Turkey; previous candidates have also
had the same problems, yet have gained membership (for example, Spain and Poland).
EU member-states have all had the same point that Turkey must meet the prerequisite
entry standards framed as Copenhagen Criteria and regard that an overall settlement with
Greece of bilateral dispute and a solution to the Cyprus problem would almost certainly
be a sine qua non for Turkish membership . Fundamentally, as S. Desai points out (2005),
the central part of the debate is about how this particular enlargement would affect the
future security and identity of the EU .
After 11 September (positive developments in EU-Turkey relations in terms of

security in the post-September Era:
In the post-September era, one can correctly claim that Turkey’s chances of
being included within the EU have drastically increased from a security perspective. First
69
Ümit Kurt
of all, if the ideational boundaries of Western civilization, of which the EU constitutes an

important part, are defined by the struggle against global terrorism, then Turkey’s case
for EU membership will likely become stronger. This is so because Turkey has struggled
with separatist and fundamentalist terrorism for decades.
Second, if the EU wants to see its security interests preserved and its security model
applied to the global struggle with terrorism, then Turkey’s incorporation into the EU fam-
ily is highly significant. This is so mainly for following reasons. The post-September era
has increasingly exposed Europe to the challenges of global terror. Given that the sources
of global terrorism mainly originated from the Middle East, Turkey’s inclusion within the
EU would enable the latter to rely on Turkey’s advanced military capabilities in its strug-
gle with such threats. Turkey’s membership into the EU would support the claims of those
who argue, “the war on terrorism should not be continued on the basis of a clash of civi-
lizations between the developed Christian North and the undeveloped Muslim South” .
Moreover, Turkey’s EU membership would also imply that it is not predestined that a
country whose population is overwhelmingly Muslim and whose economic power lag far
behind those of the developed countries can never join the EU, currently, a Christian club
of developed European states. Third, if the EU’s security is based on efforts to embrace
and engage with regions to the East and South, the EU will not be able to achieve ultimate
security by fixing borders at some definite point and excluding a number of countries out-
side the EU area (O¤uzlu T., 2003: 285-299). In line with this argument, leaving Turkey out-
side the EU and treating it as a barrier against soft and hard security threats will not oper-
ate in today’s environment because of the globalized and trans-regionalized nature of
security issues in this special part of the world . It seems that there is a close relationship
between the quality of the Turkey’s accession process with the EU and the quality of the
EU’s security sensitivity. Indeed, as T. O¤uzlu states (2003), the further Turkey’s domestic
structures depart from those of the EU, the more turbulence and chaos takes place inside
the country (pp.285-299). The more internal instability takes root in Turkey, the less
secure the EU will fell because the kind of security threats that the EU is trying to eliminate
would increase.
Fourth, if the transatlantic rift between the EU and the USA further widens in the years
to come , Turkey’s placement in this equation will become fundamentally important for the
EU. If Turkey continues to ally with the USA and Israel in the region, this would unquestion-
ably limit the potential geopolitical influence of the EU. After all, what would be at stake
would be the promise of EU’s security model. The debate on Turkey’s membership into
the EU would affect the future security and identity of the EU. This debate moved to cen-
ter stage after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when Turkey finally granted candidate status and
intensified especially after the events of 9/11. It is correct to argue that Turkey’s member-
ship would change the EU forever. The EU would share common borders with the Middle
East and the South Caucasus, and its predominant Christian population would expand
considerably to include a substantial Muslim minority . Several EU member states are
alarmed by this prospect, perceiving Turkey’s position in the middle of unstable regions
and the influx of Islamic radicalism as threats to Europe : “Europe would implode” (Frits
70
Bolkestein, Dutch European Commissioner) . Other EU member states have a different,

perhaps strategic, perspective. They believe that Turkish accession would promote
greater stability in its near-abroad ultimately benefiting the EU, and finally dispel
Huntington’s notion of a “clash of civilizations” along the cultural fault-lines of Christianity
and Islam: “Turkey anchored in Europe... would deal a heavy blow to those who stoke up
mistrust and division and it could be an inspiration to many others in the Muslim world”.
(Jack Straw, UK Foreign Minister) .
This situation can be best summarized as two groups within the EU that have drawn
contradicting conclusions about Turkey’s membership of the EU, with one side viewing it
as a security risk and the other seeing it as a security opportunity. It depends on the way
where you can look at. Actors that share identical or similar values and views of the world
are better able to cooperate . It can be talked about the notion of convergence that exists
between the EU and Turkey when identifying security threats, geographic priorities, secu-
rity collaborates (NATO and the UN) and recognition of the strategic role of the US and
Russia. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies the key threats to EU security to
be international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict,
failed states and organized crime , and these are reflected in the Turkish Defense White
Paper 2000: “Turkey also believes that… the fight against international terrorism in the
world, the illegal arms trade, drugs smuggling and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction occupy an important place in providing regional and world peace” . EU mem-
ber states may perceive Turkey as a security opportunity if its values and views of the
world converged with those of the EU. If that is not so, Turkey would be perceived as
security risk.
Contribution: Turkey-An attractive prospect for the EU

Turkey’s entrance into the European Union as a full member is expected to bring new
capabilities and interests that pave the way the EU’s ability to realize its security objectives
.
Turkey could also positively contribute to the EU’s future economic security through
its various plans for securing oil and gas for itself and others in Europe . EU member states
are already fearful about being too dependent on oil from the Middle East or from Russia,
as there are concerns that as the latter’s economy develops oil supplies will dwindle. The
construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, following the emergence of the
Caspian basin as a significant source of oil and natural gas highlights the fact that Turkey
is geographically and culturally close to 65% of all world oil and natural gas reserves .
Turkey in the EU could act as the frontline against transnational crimes that constitute “soft
threats” through beneficial cooperation in JHA.
Turkey’s inclusion within the EU could create two effects. First, at a strategic level it
would demonstrate that ‘Christian Europe” is not the enemy of Islam. Second, Brussels
could utilize Turkey’s advanced military and intelligence capability in its struggle against
71
Ümit Kurt
international terrorism, which is an overt threat against security of the EU. It could be
argued that Turkey being at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle
East and at the door of Central Asia, holds a strategic position which gives its a role of
major importance, on the one hand as a pole of stability in this particularly troubled region,
and on the other hand, as a moderating element in the many regional conflicts at its door
step Turkey has a complex web of relationships with these regions where the EU wishes
to develop the European Neighborhood Policy, including commercial, cultural, linguistic,
ethnic and historical links .
Turkey’s geographical location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical
means constitute an indispensable environment for European military power projection to
theaters of operation outside the EU. In short, Turkey could become a force multiplier in
ESDP, especially when considering that the EU member states have armed forces that
number of 1.2 million, yet only 80,000 of these can be deployed overseas . Turkey also
has the second largest army in NATO and thus already has a long experience of working
with many European armed forces, sharing the same defense doctrines and training pro-
cedures. Turkey has also been involved in numerous UN missions, notably in Somalia,
East Timor, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo demonstrating its politi-
cal willingness and ability to contribute to global security. Turkey’s success as lead nation
for operations in Afghanistan during 2002 was considered due in part to the Turks’ cultur-
al awareness and sensitivity for the Afghan people based on long-standing relations .
Turkey’s exclusion would mean that the EU would lose the opportunity of influ-
encing an important regional actor. In the wider geopolitical context, against the condi-
tions of growing Islamic-based terrorism, the EU needs a secular, democratic and stable
Turkey for several reasons. First, to demonstrate that Huntington’s well-known thesis is not
true and second, to demonstrate to the wider world that the EU can act as an inspiration
for greater democratic reform leading to security and stability.
In brief, needless to reiterate, it can be clearly noticed that Turkey’s real contri-
bution to regional peace operations stems not only from its military capabilities and its cru-
cial geopolitical location, but also from its ability to contribute to the civilian sector of peace
operations. Turkey, as a full member of NATO and a country entered into accession nego-
tiation for the EU membership, has a crucial role to play in UN-mandated and not UN-man-
dated regional and multilateral peace operations. Thus, arguably, Europeans should
press for the establishment of readily deployable EU/UN post-conflict multi-national mili-
tary and civilian units, with possible participation of key regional powers, such as Turkey.
In that respect, Turkey bears very huge impact and greater importance.
72
Conclusion
As we know, in today’s world the term ‘security’ is an essentially contested term. A
simple definition for security may be ‘the absence of threat’; a more sophisticated one
may be ‘security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of
states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity against
forces of change which they see as hostile’ . In the post-Cold War era, the security envi-
ronment is perceived to be more complex because of its multifaceted nature. Security is
now broader than the traditional military focus including interrelated economic, political,
social and environmental factors, with the referent object of security being at multiple lev-
els; individual, community and state . The challenges in the twenty-first-century are
diverse, as are the methods needed to be employed in dealing with them. It is a decisive
moment for the EU and other international organizations like UN concerning how they
could best reform their structures in order to be able to maintain international peace and
security in today’s uncertain, troubled and unstable the world. Rather than asking whether
Turkey’s membership in the EU is a security risk or opportunity, perhaps the significant
question is what is the risk of not having Turkey in the EU? The answer to this question,
assuming the Turkey has made the necessary transformations, will be dependent on the
Europe of 2015- “Old Europe” or “New EU”. Perhaps, the situation of Iraq and unresolved
Iranian question would invoke the EU to reconsider on Turkey’s prospectus EU member-
ship. Briefly speaking, in this article, I tried to indicate importance of Turkey’s past and
prospective contributions to EU’s foreign, defense and security policies and how Turkey
could fill security holes of EU. I would argue that Turkey would be a crucial player for fill-
ing security and foreign policy gaps of EU and in that respect security would be regard-
ed as a bridge-building for Turkey’s EU membership.
73
Ümit Kurt
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76
Modernity vs. Culture:

Protecting the Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines
Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr.*, Augencio C. Bagsic**,

Mylene M. Eguilos***, Ryan Jaen***, Maria Lourdes P. Respicio***,
Christopher Ryan T. Tan***
ABSTRACT
The indigenous peoples of the Philippines (IPs) held a distinct culture before the
arrival of the Spanish, American, and Japanese colonizers in the archipelago. Once, they
were original settlers with revered customs and rituals. Over time, the IPs evolved into a
minority group of decreasing social, economic, and political power. Gradually, they trans-
formed into one of the most ignored sectors of Philippine society. Progress looked down
on their civilization. Technology threatened their traditions. Modernity infringed on their
rights. This paper examines the plight of the IPs using historical, cultural, legal, and politi-
cal viewpoints. It shall gauge their current situation, and recommend viable ways to
improve their present condition and secure their future.
JEL Categories: H83, K11, K32, O18, O20
* De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines, address: 45 Mapalad St., SFDM, Quezon City, Philippines 1104
Tel.: (632) 374 47 01; (63) 9178324124, e-mail: miketedting@yahoo.com
** University of Auckland, New Zealand
*** Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
77
Michael Teodoro G. Ting Jr. et al.
Introduction
Who are the Indigenous People? “Indigenous” denotes an anthropological category —
a dying sector of humanity which needs to be salvaged from the throes of extinction, either
by ensuring the survival of its ‘noble’ primordial culture, or if that is no longer possible, by
preserving the socio-cultural and physical remains in the museum (Ratuva 1998, p. 53).
José Martinéz-Cobo1, characterizes the indigenous peoples (IPs) as “those which,
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now pre-
vailing in those territories, or parts of them” (UNDP 2001). In addition, he further stated that
the IPs at present “form the non-dominant sectors of society” and are “determined to pre-
serve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and their eth-
nic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their
own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems” (UNDP 2001).
In the Philippines, the IPs refer to 110 major ethno-linguistic groups with a population
of about 12 million. They thrive in at least 61 out of 77 provinces nationwide (Austria 2000,
p. 2). Most inhabit the remote interiors of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar,
Leyte and the Palawan and Sulu groups of islands. They comprise some forty ethno-lin-
guistic communities classified into the following (Abelardo 1996, pp. 2-3):
1. Mindanao Lumads of the highlands of the Provinces of Davao, Bukidnon,

Agusan, Surigao, Zamboanga, Misamis, Cotobato. Forming the largest grouping
of the tribal Filipinos, the Lumad peoples are the Subanen, Manobo, B‘laan,
T’boli, Mandaya, Tiruray, Higaonon, Bagobo, Bukidnon, Tagakaolo, Banwaon,
Dibabawon, Talaandig, Mamnua, Manguangan, and Ubo.
2. Igorot tribes of the Cordillera Mountain ranges in Northern Luzon.
Famous for their rice terraces, the Cordillera peoples are the Ifugao, Bontok,
Kanakana-ey, Yapayao, Kalinga, Ibaloi, Tingguian, and Isneg.
3. Caraballo tribes of the Caraballo Mountain range connecting the
Provinces of Nueva Ecija in Eastern Central Luzon. Some of them Christianized,
the Caraballo peoples are the Ibanag, Ilonggot, Gaddang, Ikalahan and Isnai.
4. Negrito Tribes. Widely dispersed throughout Luzon, some islands in the
Visayas, and some Provinces in Mindanao, the Negritos are the Ata, Aeta, Alta,
Agta, Ati, Pugot, and Remontado.
5. Mangyans of the mountains and foothills of the island of Mindoro. Known
for their gentleness and their pre-conquest poetry ambahan, the Mangyans are
classified as the Batangan, Iraya, Hanunuo, Alangan, Ratagnon, Buhid and
Tadyawan.
6. Palawan Tribes of the Palawan cluster of islands. They are: Tagbanua,
Batak, Kalamianes, Cuyonin, and Ken-uy.
78
Most tribes rely in agriculture-based subsistence. Unfortunately, such dependence

on land for subsistence has been continuously threatened through the years. Most of them
have become squatters in their own land.
Historical Background
Through the various periods of history, the IPs have been called the non-Christian
tribes, cultural communities, hill tribes, national minorities and tribal Filipinos–all to the effect
of distinguishing them from the majority of the Filipino people (IPRAP-TABAK 1992, p. 6).
During the 300-year Spanish occupation, while the rest of the Philippines have been
subjugated by the Spaniards, the IPs successfully resisted their dominion either by with-
drawing to the hinterlands or fighting against them triumphantly. Living in their relatively
isolated and self-sufficient communities, indigenous Filipinos subsisted on food-gathering,
hunting and slash-and-burn farming. As a result of their refusal to abandon their tradition-
al practices, they soon became an alienated minority (DLAC 1990, p. 11).
When the United States replaced the Spanish colonial rule in the country, the new for-
eign power aggravated the oppressed conditions of both the indigenous Filipinos and the
majority. The pace and rhythm of development gradually accelerated. Consequently, the
forces of market economy, central government, and Western cultural influences have
slowly but steadily caught up with them undermining the tribal lifeways in varying
degrees (DLAC 1990, p. 5). Hence, they referred the indigenous peoples as savages, illit-
erates and non-Christians.
In 1916, the charters of Commission for National Integration (CNI) and the Bureau of
Non-Christian Tribes further perpetuated the division of the indigenous peoples and the
lowlanders when it reflected an ‘assimilationist’ approach which presumed tribal Filipinos
to be inferior citizens of the Philippines politically, economically and culturally (DLAC
1990, pp. 11-13). Jurisprudence even established such distinction of the IPs when the
Supreme Court, in a 1919 court decision, referred to the Manguianes (Mangyan ethnic
group) as signifying savage, mountaineers, pagans and negro (Rubi 1919).
By resisting the political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, they have histor-
ically differentiated themselves from the majority of the Filipinos (Rubi 1919). The lowlan-
ders, through the use of documents, laws and court decisions, abused the ignorance of the
indigenous peoples regarding their rights over their ancestral domains. The mechanisms
introduced by the colonizers became effective instruments of the State in dispossessing
the IPs of their territories, the most outstanding of which is the Regalian doctrine.
Since such doctrine provides that all lands belong to the State, it becomes an imper-
ative to produce titles evidencing ownership to particular lands for those who wanted to
prove otherwise. In general, the IPs have failed to obtain such titles under the doctrine due
to government prescriptions and restrictions and to their being largely illiterate and
socially and politically marginalized. Thus, a big portion of the ancestral domains has been
taken over by other people and groups (DLAC 1990, p. 3).
79
IP Struggles from Marcos to Arroyo Administration

Though dispossessing the IPs of their ancestral domains have been pervasive for
more than four centuries, it gained a new intensity in the 1970s under the martial law rule
of President Ferdinand Marcos. He utilized martial law to advance his economic agenda
which was supported by the US to the disadvantage of the IPs’ remaining resources.
However, this proved to be a tactical mistake on the part of Marcos. It catalyzed the IPs to
support the rebel groups. The Presidential Assistant for National Minorities (PANAMIN)2
brought the full force of martial law in the tribal communities. Initially, PANAMIN is a hand-
out style charity program of the government to help the IPs resolve their problems
regarding poverty and landlessness. However, upon the declaration of martial law, it
became the political and military arm of the government to guard the indigenous commu-
nities against rebel groups (IPRAP-TABAK 1992, p. 9). Though most of the ICs were relo-
cated to distant places, some still welcomed the establishment of PANAMIN, believing that
such relocation would mean having a piece of land to till. Unfortunately, such movement
was used to allow big businesses to take over such abandoned tribal lands.
Upon Corazon Aquino’s assumption as the Philippine President, IP organizations and
advocates actively lobbied for the protection of their rights. As a result, provisions pur-
porting to protect IP rights were included in the 1987 Constitution.3 However, these are
subsumed subject to conditions of the “national development policies and programs” ren-
dering the provision inutile and government pronouncements mere rhetoric (IPRAP-
TABAK 1992, p. 12).
In 1988, after the collapse of the peace talks between the government and the
National Democratic Front (NDF), the military adopted the “gradual constriction” strategy
(IPRAP-TABAK 1992, p. 13). This includes the process of separating the civilians from the
insurgents, of food supply lines and removing of suspected supporters – known as popu-
lation control. Some of its various types are hamletting,4 evacuation,5 food and medical
blockade,6 zoning,7 checkpoint,8 and illegal arrest.9
In the process, many IPs were displaced or forced to evacuate from their ancestral
lands. In 1989, the IPs made up only 15% of Mindanao’s population, comprised nearly 33%
2 PANAMIN was originally established as a private foundation in 1968 under the chairmanship of Filipino billionaire
Emmanuel Elizalde. Ironically, no member from the IPs was included in its board.
3 Article II, §22; Article XII, §5; Article XIII, §6 and Article XIV, §17 of the 1987 Constitution are the provisions protecting, rec-
ognizing and respecting the rights of the indigenous peoples.
4 Hamletting means the military grouping of village residents for the purpose of denying insurgents of food, cash and emo-
tional support.
5 Evacuation means the mass withdrawal of people from residences due to military operations.
6 Food and medical blockade means the limiting of food and medicines to villagers in order to keep from falling into insur-
gent hands.
7 Zoning is a military practice of securing a residential area that usually involves house-to-house searches.
8 Checkpoint is a place for searching of motor vehicles and civilians by military or police.
9 Illegal arrest means taking a person into custody without a legal arrest or without witnessing the person committing a
crime.
80
of all internal refugees (IR)10 in the island. In Luzon, the IPs constitute a mere 6% of the pop-
ulation, but comprised 42% of all refugees (IRAP-TABAK 1992, p. 17). The proportion of
the IRs coming from the indigenous population consistently increased as the term of
Aquino concluded.
IP advocacy groups joined the IPs in actively asserting their rights not only over their
ancestral domains but also “to social justice and human rights, self-governance and empow-
erment and cultural integrity” (PANLIPI 1999, p. 59). With their combined efforts, Republic
Act 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act was signed into law on October 29, 1997.
In his enactment speech, President Fidel Ramos declared: “Through the RA 8371, we
accelerate the emancipation of our Indigenous People from the bondage of inequity. This
social injustice bred poverty, ignorance and deprivation among our indigenous cultural
communities and further alienated them from people from the mainstream” (PANLIPI
1999, p. 59).
Unfortunately, the enactment of the IPRA culminated with the end of Ramos adminis-
tration. The supposed implementation of the programs and projects designed to realize
the provisions of the Act must endure the biases of the Estrada administration against the
IPs. Such predispositions are apparent in several measures made to prevent the effective
implementation of the law.
The Estrada administration appropriated low budgets to the National Commission on
Indigenous People (NCIP). In 1999 and in 2000, the allocations for NCIP amounted to only
363 million and 360 million, respectively (Women and Men 2000, pp. 4-6). Moreover, pro-
gram funds for the agency were withheld. On September 21, 1998, Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora issued Memorandum Order NO. 21 which freezed all NCIP project funds
except salaries of rank-and-file employees. Another is Administrative Order No. 108
issued by the Malacanang, which created the Presidential Task Force on Indigenous
People (PTFIP) to assist the NCIP in rendering its functions (Malanes 2000, p. 8). Lastly, no
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) or Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)
has been issued (Hamada 2001, p. 3).
After the ouster of Joseph Estrada, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was cast into the presi-
dency with the push of civil society, the business community, and military concession. Her
political debt allowed civil society some form of leverage with the government in the form
of a few key government positions. For issues concerning IPs, Secretary Ging Deles of the
National Anti-Poverty Commission and Ambassador Howard Dee of the Office of the
Presidential Adviser for Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs provided these links to the executives
(Hamada 2001, p. 3).
However, Arroyo, as a Senator and Vice-President, was staunch supporter of globaliza-
tion and the WTO Agreements. As an economist, she has clearly enunciated that her gover-
10 Internal refugees are those people who flee from their homes because of the population control but remain inside the
country.
81
nance will be guided by the principles of the market. In her inaugural speech, policy direc-
tions for basic and marginalized sectors were not clearly articulated (Hamada 2001, p. 5).
Moreover, in her State of the Nation Address (SONA) delivered in Congress on July
26, 2001, the President summed up her IP land policy under the second component of her
anti-poverty plan. In her words, “Bawat taon, mamamahagi ang gobyerno ng dalawan-
daanglibong ektarya para sa reporma sa lupa: 100,000 of private land and 100,000 of pub-
lic land, including 100 ancestral domain titles for indigenous people” (Hamada 2001, p. 5).
Apparently, for Arroyo, it seems that the issuance of CADTs and CALTs is a benevolent
gift from the state, falling under the category of land reform, rather than recognition of
time-immemorial land ownership and natural resources utilization rights of indigenous
peoples (Hamada 2001, p. 5).
Socio-cultural Perspective
Once the masters of their own land, the majority of IPs today are poor and landless
(Rodil 1994, p. 16). Many used to live in plains. However, due to population pressures and
resettlement programs from among the majority, several have moved to forest areas.
Unfortunately, at present, even their forests are devastated and their cultures are threat-
ened.
The Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) are peoples who have their own par-
ticular socio-cultural and economic institutions that distinguish them from the rest of the
society. This distinct way of life or culture developed within the context of their original
associations with or use and occupation of a specific, defined territory. They have a unique
relationship to the land for it shapes their culture thus; its loss gravely threatens the very
essence of their existence. For them, land is sacred. No single person owns the lands but
everybody owns the land (Rodil 1994, p. 16).
However, their struggles for recognition of ancestral domains remain to be the cen-
terpiece of their agenda. It includes the recognition of their rights to the ancestral domains
and their traditional socio-political structures and practices. It also includes development
activities that truly cater to their needs and aspirations and give due respect to their way
of life.
Nevertheless, the State strongly asserts its right over all lands by virtue of the
Regalian Doctrine, which is alien to the IPs. To quote Macli-ing Dulag, an elder from
Kalinga, in his protest to the construction of the Chico River Dam Project in 1970s:
You ask if we own the land. And mock us. “Where is your title?” When we
query the meaning of your words, you answer with taunting arrogance. “Where
are the documents to prove that you own the land?” Title. Documents. Proof of
ownership. Such arrogance to speak of owning the land. When you shall be
owned by it. How can you own that which will outlive you. Only the race owns
the land because only the race lives forever (PANLIPI 1999, p. 55).
82
Such strong resistance was due to their universal concept of land as a gift from God
the Creator. To the IPs, the land is life because it is the source of food and shelter. It is also
the basis of their culture, the core of their existence as distinct peoples (Penafiel 1996, p.
10). Land to them means domains, which belong to the tribe, a heritage to be passed on
from their ancestors to generations unto perpetuity. Indigenous Filipinos believe that they
are stewards of the land given to them by their God and entrusted to them by their ances-
tors. They convinced that their role is to ensure that the generations to come will have the
same or better quality of lifer that they now enjoy (Penafiel 1996, pp. 10-11).
Having presented the long-standing struggle of the IPs over their ancestral domains
and encompassing rights as individuals, one could ask whether the promotion of the right
to self-determination of indigenous people is a threat or a blessing to a nation-state
(Penafiel 1996, pp. 10-11). The interest of the state for economic development contradicts
the very essence of existence of the IPs – the preservation and recognition of their rights
over the ancestral domains.
In this process, it is vital that IPs should stand up, organize themselves, form collec-
tive strategies, and fight for what is rightfully theirs without discriminating against, manip-
ulating or marginalizing other communities (Penafiel 1996, p. 13). Development can only
be achieved if it addressed the fundamental reason behind prevailing poverty in most
indigenous communities – the absence of legal recognition of their right to ownership and
control of their ancestral domain. The recognition of the rights of the IPs to their ancestral
domains is not only a demand of social justice, but also an imperative for the survival or
the life support system that underlie national prosperity and development (National
Secretariat 1998, p. 6).
The very survival of ICCs depends on obtaining respect and legal recognition of their
rights. They have only one basic agenda: to be able to own, manage, develop and reap
the fruits of their ancestral domain (National Secretariat 1998, p. 6).
Laws Protecting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Philippine history attests to the struggle of the IPs in defending their rights to their
lands. Legislation provides a glimpse of this struggle through varying laws and policies
adopted by the government regarding the IP rights. The issue on ancestral land and
ancestral domain ownership form the bones of contention whenever IP rights are dis-
cussed.
From the American occupation, the Commonwealth Period, and up to 1957, the official
policy with respect to IPs in the Philippines was one of patronage (First Peoples 2001). It
was founded on the view that the mission of the State was to “civilize” peoples with a “low
level of civilization” (First Peoples 2001). Thereafter, the policy of “integration” was adopt-
ed from 1957 to 1986 (First Peoples 2001). Within 1986 to 1997, several laws included pro-
visions on identifying ancestral land and domains without providing processes for its even-
tual recognition and the rights and obligations that should ensue (First Peoples 2001).
83
In the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the State asserted ownership over the lands
of the public domain and all the minerals and other natural resources found therein.11
However, with the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the supremacy of the Regalian
Doctrine over certain portions of the public domain has been seriously challenged by
“constitutional innovations geared for the recognition of the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral domain” (Abelardo 1996, p. 29).
In the 1935 Constitution, there was no state policy on tribal Filipinos. It has been noted
that the raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for Filipinos,
which impelled the framers of the organic law to entrench the Regalian Doctrine in the
1935 Constitution (Cristobal 1990, p. 48).
In the 1973 Constitution the tribal Filipinos who were previously called as dociles,
feroces or infieles by the Spaniards (Ugnayan 1983, p. 56) and as non-Christian tribes by
the North Americans (Ugnayan 1983, p. 22), were officially addressed as “communities”
by the highest law of the land. However, the implementation of this provision under the
Martial Rule is another matter.
Thereafter, Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 410 or the Ancestral Lands
Decree in 1974, in order to address the ancestral domain issue. The decree provided for
the issuance of land occupancy certificates to the members of national cultural communi-
ties who were given until 1984 to register their claims. Nonetheless, no land occupancy
certificate was ever issued.
After the historic February Revolution, the need to address the inequities in Philippine
society was emphasized. The 1987 Constitution provides at least six provisions that
ensure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.12
Section 5 of Article XII13 of the Constitution alone fairly addresses the issues of devel-
opment aggression, conflict between the national law and customary law, and land classi-
fication connected with the ancestral domain issue (Abelardo 1996, p. 32).
As regards conflict between national law and customary law on land ownership and
use, 1986 Constitutional Commissioner Bennagen stated that on matters concerning
ancestral lands and codification of laws, “…when there is a conflict between this (ances-
tral lands) and national law, the general principle is that the national law shall prevail, but
there should always be the effort to balance the interest as provided for in the national law
and the interest as provided for in the customary law” (Record 1986, p. 34).
Thus, the Regalian Doctrine will still be in place, but this time, in its proper place
(Abelardo 1996, p. 34). The harsh and confiscatory effects of this constitutionally adopted
feudal theory are now counteracted by Art. XII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution in con-
11 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, art. XIV, § 1 (1935); art. XIV, § 8 (1973); art. XII, § 2 (1987).
12 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, art. II §22; art. VI, §5, cl.2; art. XII, §5; art. XIII, §6; art. XIV, §17; art. XVII, §12.
13 The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
84
junction with the other constitutional doctrines like balancing of interest, due process,
compensation, and social justice (Abelardo 1996, p. 34). The Regalian Doctrine must be
viewed alongside the rights of the indigenous peoples. Consistent with the spirit of Section
5, the first view calling for automatic exclusion of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
from the operation of the Regalian Doctrine must be upheld (Abelardo 1996, p. 36).
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) is the
present law protecting the rights of the indigenous peoples. This law primarily guarantees
the IPs rights to ancestral lands and domains, political and human rights, and rights to cul-
tural integrity (Manzano 1998, p. 7). It grants the ownership and possession of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains (Cruz
2000, pp. 128, 174).
The important features of the IPRA are the following (Manzano 1998, pp.
8-9):
1) Grants the total recognition of the right of the indigenous peoples to own
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, including the right to control, manage
and utilize natural resources found in the lands/domains. This includes the right
to formulate and implement ancestral domains management plans.
2) Repeals all laws prejudicial to the recognition of the right to ownership of
ancestral domains.
3) Respects and recognizes indigenous political structures and systems,
culture, resource management practices and conflict resolution mechanisms.
4) Provides for the issuance of tenure instruments, which are equivalent to
Torrens title. This is the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and the
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT), which will be issued by the National
Indigenous Peoples Commission (NCIP).
5) Recognizes socio-cultural differences among the various indigenous
groups.
6) Provides for the establishment of an office/structure with clearly defined
functions, with adequate funding and where indigenous peoples are adequately
represented. It provides for the creation, composition, qualifications, appoint-
ment and removal processes of the NCIP to carry out the policies of the IPRA.
7) Mandates the delivery of basic services to indigenous communities and
provides for their holistic and integral development.
8) Simplifies the requirements for the recognition of ancestral domain own-
ership and provides for the conversion of ancestral domain claims under DAO2
to complete ownership.
85
9) Recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination and

autonomy.
10) Provides for the indigenous peoples’ self-delineation of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.
Some sectors consider the IPRA as a landmark legislation spawned by deliberate,

sustained and collective action of IPs, IP support groups, and some individuals (Manzano
1998, pp. 7-8). Others regard the IPRA to be far from revolutionary. Like all laws, the IPRA
represents, even before enactment, a simple compromise in form and in substance
(Leonen 1998, p. 7). Apparently, the passage of the law elicited varying views from differ-
ent sectors of society.
An examination of IP history would reveal that it was not so much the case of a law
waiting for the IPs to be prepared to comply with it. On the contrary, it was the IPs who
were struggling and waiting for the law to help the government understand their needs
and demands (Leonen 2001, p. 2). It embodies the much-awaited recognition that the IPs
had long-struggled for.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (Cruz 2000, p. 128), this
law was challenged by former Justice Isagani Cruz and Davao-based attorney Cesar
Europa. They allege that certain IPRA provisions contravene the constitution. The
Supreme Court decided:
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation,
the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED (Cruz 2000, p. 162).
Hence, by virtue of the votes provided by members of the Supreme Court, the peti-
tion to declare the IPRA as unconstitutional was not granted. The dismissal of the petition
only means “the challenge to the constitutionality of the IPRA is defeated, not because the
Supreme Court decided that the questioned provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution but because those who believe that the questioned provisions of the IPRA are
unconstitutional do not form a majority” (Leonen 2001, p. 9).
Implications of Law and Jurisprudence

The passage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on October 29, 1997, and the decision of the Supreme Court
upholding its validity on December 6, 2000 necessarily spawn the following ramifications:
(1) The Jura Regalia doctrine enshrined in Art. XII, Sec. 2 & 3 of the 1987 Constitution,
as well as in the previous 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, no longer holds an absolute rule.
The Court unanimously view an exception, actually recognized way back in Cariño v.
86
Insular Government (Cariño 1909) and Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (Oh Cho 1946). The
Cariño ruling, on the one hand, held that lands held under the concept of owner since time
immemorial are presumed never to have been public land (Cariño 1909, p. 941). The Oh
Cho ruling, on the other hand, defined lands of the public domain as
…all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by pur-
chase or by grant…An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessor-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest (Oh Cho 1946).
While all lands of public domain and natural resources belong to the State, lands held
under the concept of ownership since time immemorial have never been part of the pub-
lic domain and can therefore be appropriated to the indigenous peoples without contra-
vening Article XII, Sections 2 and 3 and Article XII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides for such possession by virtue of time immemorial possession.
The presumption now lies against the State. The declaration of ownership by the State
of all lands of the public domain and all natural resources, from the 1935 to the 1987
Constitution, does not mean absolute ownership by operation of law. The Constitution sets
parameters to guarantee due process, thus limiting the State’s confiscatory power
(Leonen 2001, p. 2).
Therefore, IPRA should be understood as conferring OWNERSHIP from a different
concept, as stated in Sec. 5 thereof, as “private but community property, which belongs
to all generations, and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed.”
(2) The IPRA is valid until held otherwise by the Supreme Court. The Cruz v. NCIP
decision (Cruz 2000) is indecisive, petition therein having been granted with a 7-7 deci-
sion. The petition was dismissed in accordance with the Rules of Court14, the Constitution15,
and jurisprudence (Salas 1972). The Motion for Reconsideration, filed on December 22,
2000, remains pending in the Court chambers.
Only 14 Justices deliberated on the issues of the case and voted thereon due to Justice
Fidel Purisima’s retirement prior to the votation. However, Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez has been appointed to fill the vacant post. The new and complete 15-member
chamber can now decide the matter with more conclusiveness (Leonen 2001, pp. 28-30;
Cruz 2001, p. 6). However, following a line of cases previously decided and subsequent-
ly overruled by a same set of Supreme Court justices16, the present ruling on the IPRA
stands floating on thin air until the next Court decision. Should the Court declare IPRA or
some of its provisions unconstitutional, the NCIP will be abolished, if not deprived of much
power and capacity.
14 Rule 56, Sec. 7, Rules on Civil Procedure.

15 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, art. VIII, §4 (3).
16 Protection Developer’s Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 142 & 201 SCRA; Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. 139465,
Jan. 18, 2000 and Oct. 17, 2000; Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 & 246 SCRA 540.
87
(3) Until declared unconstitutional, IPRA is a valid law capable of vesting property
rights to IPs over ancestral lands and domains. However, the threat posed by IPs’ claim
over Philippine territory cannot be overemphasized. As early as June of 1998, IPs have
claimed over 2.5 million hectares as ancestral domains. Based on ethnographic surveys,
ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources, and 8-10 million of the 30
million hectares of land in the country. Therefore, four-fifths of the country’s natural
resources and one third of land in the country will be concentrated among 12 million
Filipinos constituting the IPs, while over 60 million non-IPs share what remains. Obviously,
this would run contrary to the constitutional principle of a “more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth” among Filipinos (Cruz 2000, p. 27).
(4) The provisions of IPRA necessarily encourage litigation by inciting more legal
questions requiring judicial determination. Will national law or customary law apply to a
given situation (Sec. 65)? Is the punishment cruel, degrading and inhuman (Sec. 72)? Is
there a need for NCIP to issue a certification as a precondition for a financial or technical
assistance agreement (Sec. 59)? Is prior free & informed consent of the IPs necessary
before eminent domain is exercised (Sec. 7, RA 7942)? Is prior free & informed consent
of the IPs necessary for the proclamation of watersheds and protected areas? Does the full
participation of IPs include free and informed consent (Sec. 58)? Why should Baguio City
be excluded from the operation of IPRA (Sec. 78)? (Leonen 1998, pp. 40-41)
(5) Absent any protective measure by the State, the exercise by the IPs of their rights
under the IPRA will be threatened by external factors. The apparent economic equality
will tend to influence the IPs in giving their “free and informed consent” to other parties,
especially mining companies, to the end that the latter will be allowed to exploit the ances-
tral domains for their own commercial interests.
(6) Implementation of the IPRA does not necessarily reflect the interests of the IPs. The
appointment of officials and employees of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the agency tasked to implement the IPRA, may be marred by political
interests, which may pollute the direction towards addressing genuine IP concerns
(Manzano 1998, pp. 65-68).
(7) Being a government agency created by law, the NCIP has to depend on the year-
ly budget appropriation of Congress, which is relatively low to speed up their administra-
tive and judicial machineries (Varanal 2002). The yearly NCIP budget for the management
and development of ancestral lands in support of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) is a
mere trickle compared to the Department of Environment & Natural Resource (DENR)
budget for the establishment, maintenance, and protection of tree plantations. Also, the
NCIP budget pales in comparison to the Mining & Geosciences Bureau (MGB) for the
exploitation of mineral resources. Should this trend of discrepancy continue, mineral and
forestlands continue to be subject to environmental risks (Malanes 2000, p. 8).
(8) Debated upon by various sectors, the IPRA will possibly be subject of possible
modifications and amendments by Congress. The members of the Congress, humans
themselves, may well entertain commercial interests in the guise of IP protection. In fact,
88
in 1999, House Rep. Harry Angping submitted House Resolution No. 310 during the 1st
Regular Session of the 11th Congress. This Bill seeks to “harmonize” the provisions of the
IPRA and the National Integrated Protected Areas System Law (NIPAS) to the Mining Act
of 1995 (Republic Act No. 7492) (Pasimio 1999, p. 1). Like any other statute, the rigors of
the law can be tilted by Congress to favor certain class of private interests, by sort of a
compromise agreement.
Critical Analysis
The Philippine society has long been confronted with the struggles of the indigenous
Filipino peoples. These are continuously heightened by the widening gap of differences
between the lowlanders and the IPs. Several legislations have been passed to reconcile it
but most proved to be unrewarding. Some even contradict the very nature of IP existence.
IPRA vs. Philippine Politics

The unsettled constitutional issue of the IPRA caused the spawning of other related
issues. Politics, to be exact, corrupted the ideal letter of the said law in which, for most part
of its implementation, the programs were stalled and the imperfections, magnified. To
start with, the law is not self-executory. The implementation of the law is the most impor-
tant component in order to mobilize the system. One must also understand that it is in the
implementation aspect that external factors, both seen and unforeseen, not to mention
those deliberately created, could affect the efficiency of the law. One clear instance of this,
and perhaps manifesting how politics blemishes the image of the law, is during the
appointment of the chairperson of the NCIP.
President Ramos appointed Atty. David Daoas, a Kankanaey from the Cordilleras as
chair of the NCIP in early 1998 (Ballesteros 2001, p. 39). A few months old in the position
and with the near take off of operations of the agency, then President-elect Joseph Estrada
appointed Cesar Sulong, a Subanen in Zamboanga (Castro 2000, p. 38). Other members
were also appointed.
An organizational crisis immediately ensued prompting several protests from the
Daoas group, saying that their tenures were not respected and the balance of represen-
tation of the said different IP groups inside the agency was seriously disrupted by the
appointments. As a result of this, and to pacify or silence protesting groups, the then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora released a memorandum17 creating the Presidential
Task Force on Ancestral Domains (PTFAD) to be chaired by PA Gasgonia. The
Department of Justice was also ordered to investigate certain complaints against NCIP offi-
cials. The President, on the other hand, had ordered the Department of Budget and
Management to withhold the release of funds to the NCIP except for payments of salaries
of the rank and file employees of two agencies formerly tasked with managing govern-
17 Memorandum No. 31.
89
ment’s programs to “cultural communities” (Ballesteros 2001, p. 37), pending the study
being conducted by the Task Force. “The resulting confusion due to overlapping jurisdic-
tions, plus the fact that the legally constituted agency had no money and were facing graft
charges, led to a virtual administrative standstill” (Ballesteros 2001, p. 37).
Consequently, with no operational funds to speak of and with a narrow, if not the
absence of, vision and program for the Indigenous Communities, the whole implementa-
tion system of the IPRA bogged down. Not a single CADT was released. Further, IPs were
now isolated because local government units and the DENR ceased to extend aid after the
IPRA. These are other government agencies, which are used to giving assistance to IP
groups before the passing of IPRA. Truly, it has amounted to an administrative mess.
Another interesting aspect is the kind of framework the government adopts in formu-
lating its programs and implementing its policies. The current development tenets that the
government so hold are profit-driven and not people-centered. “The national govern-
ment’s development framework remains hinged on the pursuit of national development,
national security, increased gross national product or national wealth and becoming an
economic tiger cub” (Manzano 1998, p. 10). As long as the government continues to treat
ancestral domain as a resource basin of wealth, IP rights, culture and history shall forever
be threatened. This framework of mind cannot be denied. As the IPRA is worded, the con-
cessions represent the leeway of the government to give opportunities for exploiting the
natural resources therein.
Until now, real efforts to implementing the rules have yet to be seen. The present gov-
ernment under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo promises a new hope. Amid the con-
stitutional and legal issues that come with the IPRA, the purpose of the law must not be
undermined and a sound governmental policy and program would be a good ground to
start with. One problem with the Estrada Administration is that clearly, at the beginning of
his term, he already had no clear program for the IPs, that is to include the “actor style” of
speeches he used to deliver during conferences. This administration is prayed for doing
more than uttering hollow words.
IPRA vs. Indigenous Peoples’ Culture

The land of the IPs shapes their unique identity and culture that are inextricably linked
to the environment. The environment, more often than not, assumes a spirituality of its own.
Thus, the rituals of appeasing spirits when a tree is cut down and of thanksgiving for a
bountiful harvest (Macli-ing 1999, p. 49), to cite an example, characterize their culture. In
other words, the land is the Indigenous People. Without the land, there are no distinction
between highlanders and lowlanders – no indigenous peoples. “When one takes away the
land, to the dispossession of the IPs, he therefore kills them” (Manuel 2002). The indige-
nous peoples, being one with the environment, understand the ecology of the natural
resources. This allows them to manage and utilize the environment responsibly, not mere-
ly to their exclusion and benefit, but also to avoid the disruption of ecological balance in
90
the environment (Macli-ing 1998, p. 49). According to most scholars, this outlook has usu-
ally ignored and misunderstood. Thus, this makes them more vulnerable to dispossession
of their lands.
Examining the outlook on land, Datu Betil spoke of the issue yet to be addressed,
“Our current issue is with regard to not only the recognition of the indigenous peoples but
concerns (of) our tribe, the Bagobo-Clata Tribe. We want our tribe to be strengthened
because now it looks like it is vanishing… with the entry of western culture and religion…
as well as the establishment of the government of the lowlanders… They entered using
legal matters, owning properties by virtue of having a title. The title is nothing to us
because we believe that since time immemorial the land has been ours. That is govern-
ment’s way to establish rights… papers. We do not have rights and are not really very
interested, so we did not attend to them… And because of this we were displaced from
our lands” (Macli-ing 1998, p. 51). It is interesting to note that to some extent, the IPRA
gave them hope that a historical justification of the years of non-recognition of ancestral
domain as a historical fact would be achieved. “… Government recognition of the rights
of the indigenous peoples to their ancestral domain, laws and IPRA… gave us renewed
hope that we could revive our tribal heritage… As I’ve said to my companions, we should
begin from that point” (Macli-ing 1998, p. 52). Datu Betil puts it.
However, not all IP groups have the same belief, at least at the time when the task to
implement came in. The concessions promoted disunity and the culture of corruption
among them. Among these concessions are the Mining Concessions where the mining
firms were allowed to enter into the lands of the indigenous peoples to exploit the miner-
als underneath the land. NCIP Administrative Order No. 3 specifically grants right of entry
to mining groups subject to the Free and Prior Informed Consent of the Indigenous
Peoples (FPIC) provisions of the IPRA (Manuel 2002). The order clarified that the firms
with approved contracts, licenses, agreements and other concessions prior to the effec-
tivity of the IPRA are exempted from the FPIC requirement (Castro 2000, p. 42).
Nonetheless, mining firms manipulated this by organizing IP groups to give their FPIC, but
then in reality, these IPs were employees of the mining firm. The process of getting the
FPIC already undermines its very concept as enshrined in the IPRA. The “palakasan” sys-
tem never left the scenario, as NCIP members made corrupt deals to allow the issuance
of the FPIC. Several instances in the process of securing FPICs have encouraged a culture
of bribery among these communities. In extreme cases, partisan differences relative to
IPRA have created tensions and conflict in multi-ethnic communities. The initial euphoria
by indigenous communities led to disillusionment because of the failed promises of the
law (Castro 2000, p. 50).
The concessions made by law prompted the alteration of the IP culture. One of them
is the employment of IPs in mining firms. The entrance of economic development slowly
changes the face of Indigenous culture. Sad to say, the IPRA legitimizes these changes.
Conclusively, the law’s impact on local communities is two-fold. On the one hand,
IPRA has brought about heightened public awareness on IP rights and welfare and
91
encouraged the organization of several IP organizations. On the other hand, differing atti-
tudes toward the law brought about disunity among IP groups and within communities
(Castro 2000, p. 50). However, to totally disregard the IPRA would definitely be a step
backwards. What are needed are an improvement of the existing law through amend-
ments and the passage of new implementing rules and regulations. More concretely, cul-
ture-specific ordinances should be adopted. There should be different guidelines for
more acculturated groups distinct from those who have relatively maintained their tradi-
tional practices. A different approach should be applied for nomadic groups compared to
those of “sedentary agriculturists” (Castro 2000, p. 51). Moreover, there must be a rein-
forced provision, with stricter policy as regards the Free and Prior Informed Consent
(FPIC) provisions to avoid corruption and disunity among the IP groups.
92
Recommendation
Having presented the IP situation, this paper recommends different courses of action
for the government, the indigenous peoples, and mainstream Philippine society to appro-
priately address the problems regarding the issue.
The government is bound to protect its people, as parens patriae. The IPs need this
governmental protection for their ancestral domain and thus, must be afforded with it.
Their demands are legitimate, realistic and within constitutional bounds, and can therefore
be easily addressed by the government.
Since the IPRA is already effective, the government must activate its implementation
by providing sufficient funds for IP programs and projects. Government policies for the
IPs must be made clear and distinct from its general anti-poverty and environment agen-
da.
The government should acknowledge the IPs’ intricate relationship with nature. The
IPs preserve and sustain their habitat in their unique way. Environmental laws desecrat-
ing their cultural integrity must not be imposed. The IP connection with nature must always
be respected. The government should provide the IPs with opportunities to modernize at
their own pace and rhythm. Assimilation is not always the solution. Basic human rights,
including the use of resources, should be respected.
The IPs should vigilantly and assertively exercise their rights. They should not allow
themselves to be corrupted by the system that is alien to them. They should fight corrup-
tion of any kind from any sector.
The mainstream Philippine society must be re-educated on the nature of IP existence.
Beyond IP history and culture, a deeper understanding of the distinctions and conditions
behind the IPs’ alienation from modern civilization must be made. The Filipino people
should vigorously and conscientiously eliminate all forms of discrimination. A profound
understanding of IP and non-IP differences should lead to cultural reconciliation, social
reintegration, and national unity.
93
REFERENCES
Articles
Austria, Joey (2000) “The Indigenous Peoples and Ancestral Domains.” Energy
Forum.
Ballesteros, Andre Gerard (2001) “Ancestral Domain Recognition and Community
based Forest Management: Two Sides of Different Coins.” Philippine Natural Resources
Law Journal, November.
Castro, Nestor T. (2000) “Three Years of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act: Its
Impact on Indigenous Communities.” Kasarinlan.
Corpus, Rina Angela (1999) “One Hundred Years of Servitude.” Tan-awan, January.
Cristobal, Adrian (1990) “The Constitutional Policy on Natural Resources: An
Overview.” Phil. Natural Resources Law Journal, December.
Cruz, Isagani (2001) “An Indecisive Decision.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10
February.
Hamada, Maxine Tanya (2001) “Between the State and Indigenous Communities:
Civil Society as Political Arbitrators.” Tan-awan, September.
Hamada-Pawid, Zenaida (2001) “RA 8371 (IPRA) and the Cordillera.” TAN-AWAN,
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Leonen, Marvic and Ballesteros, Andre Gerard (2001) “A Divided Court: A
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94
Pasimio, J (1999) “HB 310 ni Angping: Hirit na Naman ng Mining Industry.” 2 Tan-
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95
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Abelardo, Cerilo Rico (1996) Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues, Responses and
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Philippines. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
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96
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Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
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Cariño v. Insular Government, No. 72, February 23, 1909, 41 Phil. 935, 212 US 449,
53 L. Ed. 594.
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Secretary of Budget & Management, and the Chair & Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, G.R. 135385, December 6, 2000.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 & 246 SCRA 540.
Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890,1946.
Protection Developer’s Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 142.
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Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 1972.
97
Electronic Sources
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2007).
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December 8, 2007).
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Interview with Ms. Gilda Q. Varanal of PANLIPI-Legal Assistance Center for
Indigenous Filipinos, in Quezon City (January 28, 2002).
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Republic Act No. 8371, The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
Rules on Civil Procedure (1997).
98

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European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Vol: 1 No: 1 Summer 2008

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Vol: 1 No: 1 Summer 2008

Casting Radical Uncertainty on the Precautionary Principle:

Perspectives on Crisis Management in European Union Countries:

An Examination of Relationship between Burnout and Job

A Glance to Turkey-EU Relations from the Security Perspective:

Modernity vs. Culture:

Casting Radical Uncertainty on the Precautionary

Key Words: Precautionary Principle, Uncertainty Inherent, Decision Making

* Ph.D Candidate, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, US, e-mail: berten@econs.umass.edu

2. Uncertainty Inherent in Knowledge

2.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis

2.3 Probabilities, Risks, and Uncertainty

2.4 Crucial and Irreversible Decisions about Environment

2.5 Is there an Uncertainty Paradox in the Precautionary Principle?

3. Time in Environmental Decision-Making Process

3.2 Scientific Conservatism and the Burden of Proof

3.3 A Critique of Dorman’s Time-Consistency Model

me-consistency model. Thus, the time-inconsistency model, overall, is inconsistent with

4. Participatory Decision-Making to Challenge the Authority of Science

4.2 Truth Spoken by Science

4.3 Inclusion of People’s Voices: Participatory Decision-Making

Dorman, P. (2005) “Evolving Knowledge and the Precautionary Principle.” Ecologi-

Foucault, M. (1977) History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I. Vintage.

Jordan, A. and T. O’Riordan. (1999) “The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary

Kriebel, D. , J. Tickner, P. Epstein, J. Lemons, R. Lewins, E. L. Loechler, M. Quinn, R.

Shackle, G.L.S. (1992) Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of Economic Doctrines.

(1955) Uncertainty in Economics and Other Reflections. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

Sunstein, C. R. (2003) “Beyond the Precautionary Principle.” University of Pennsylva-

Tickner, Joel A. (1999) “A Map Toward Precautionary Decision Making.” In C. Raf-

Perspectives on Crisis Management in European

Bahadir Sahin*, Naim Kapucu**, Ali Unlu***,

Key Words: Crisis management, European Union, Organizational Learning,

Crisis Management in the European Union

Broader Introduction to Crisis Management in EU

mad-cow disease crisis in 1996 and Prestige accident in 2002.

Case Study: Elbe Flood in August 2002

Special Case: London Bombings in July 2005

Special Case: Madrid Train Bombings in March 2004

Boin R.A.; Groenleer M.L.; Sundelius B. (2007) “Managing European emergencies:

Ekengren M.; MatzAn N.; Rhinard M.; Svantesson M (2006) “Solidarity or

management.” Telecommunications Policy 3-11: 592-604.

aprueba el protocolo de intervención de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME) (BOE

AKNZ (Akademie für ENPC (Escuela Nacional

Fig. 1: BBK Organization Chart

Fig. 2: DGCPE Organization Chart

Source: Sauvagnargues-Lesage et. al, (2006)

Fig. 2: UK Resilience Organization Chart

Source: Arbuthnot, 2005.

An Examination of Relationship between Burnout and

Adem Anbar* & Melek Eker**

Key Words: Burnout, depersonalization, emotional exhaustion, job satisfaction, per-

JEL Categories: I23, J28, M12

Employees in any organization have attitudes about every aspect of an organization-

ic environment, supervision/supervisor behavior and co-workers behavior dimensions.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Burnout and job satisfaction scores of academicians

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Burnout Scores

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients

** a= 0.01 significant level (Pearson Correlation)

Results of Multi Regression Analysis

Bahadir Sahin, Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu,