Garcia, Zacarias E.

BS Criminology
3rd Year

Research about absolute pardon and conditional pardon and cases regarding those.

Conditional Pardon
People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997 Facts: In an effort to seek their
release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the
Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with
the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-
appellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that
the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been
extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC
favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.  
Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid    
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.   Pardon is granted by the
Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty
by the Proclamationof the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and
it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted
to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it
in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.   While the pardon in this case
was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before
conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-
appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid.
This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

People of the Philippines vs Benedicto Jose

FACTS:
Jose was charged for violating Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the Nat’l
Assembly of RP while the Japanese were still occupying the country. After serving
6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a conditional pardon – the simple
condition was for him not to violate any other Penal Laws of RP. Later he
committed a crime of qualified theft. The Fiscal then went on to file an additional
charge against Jose for violating the conditions of the pardon granted him. Jose
argued that he did not violate the pardon conditions at all because there is no
pardon at all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the law he violated
before was a political law which was abrogated when the US army took over the
country as proclaimed by MacArthur in Oct 1944.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly
violated the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic
of the Philippines.
HELD: The SC held that Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a violation of
the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called RP (during the Jap
Occupation), for the following reasons: Because, without necessity of discussing
and determining the intrinsic validity of the conditional pardon, as an act done by
the President of the so-called RP, after the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, no elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a
conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant
the punishment inflicted by the sentence ceases to be of any effect in so far as the
individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the latter cannot be required
to serve a void sentence of penalty imposed on him, even without such pardon.

Absolute Pardon
 
 
Pelobello v. Palatino
Facts:
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo
warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office
because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of
such conviction and imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatino is already
barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of
the Election Code which supports his contention. It is also admitted that the
respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon
back in 1915; and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency,
the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon
and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
Issue:WoN absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification
incident to criminal conviction
Held:
YES. The pardoning power is only subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative action. After the
pardon was granted, Palatino had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected
municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931);
and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in
December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in
granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in
deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code
for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a
restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.
Barrioquinto v Fernandez
Facts:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they
made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because
Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the
defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in
favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war
efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced
in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th
Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused
because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto
in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being
charged to them.
Issue:WoN an admission of guilt is necessary before an amnesty could be granted.
Held:
NO. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation,
it is not necessary that he should, as a condition, admit having committed the
criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a
defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.” Although the
accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For,
whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he
is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested
party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or
hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance
with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a
public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein
to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed
by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows
that the accused is entitled to said benefits.