New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147

Eight good questions for developmental

epistemology and psychology
Leslie Smith*
Department of Educational Research, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YL, UK

Abstract

My reply to eight good questions arising from commentary is an elaboration of my main

argument that there are parallels in the epistemologies of Frege and Piaget and that these
parallels have distinctive implications for developmental psychology. The eight questions are:
(i) was Piaget really an epistemologist? (ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or
epistemological? (iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity?
(iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism? (v) what is the relation between thinking and
thought? (vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow? (vii) how are cause and reason related in
the interpretation of thought? (viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation
of thought? These questions are productive, and can be developed.  1999 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.

It was a delight to read the stimulating commentaries of Harry Beilin, Michael

Glassman, and Ulrich MuK ller. Each has set out a range of penetrating and important
questions. It is for this reason that I thank them warmly for the opportunity to say
something by way of a reply to eight good questions which they raised, even though
I am mindful of the fact that their questions deserve very much more attention than
I can give them here. These questions are:
(i) was Piaget really an epistemologist?
(ii) is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological?
(iii) is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity?
(iv) does Piaget's constructivism entail realism?

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: L.Smith@lancaster.ac.uk (L. Smith)

0732-118X/99/$ - see front matter  1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 7 3 2 - 1 1 8 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 6 - 1
138 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147

(v) what is the relation between thinking and thought?

(vi) is Frege's concept of mind too narrow?
(vii) how are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought?
(viii) what is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought?

In reply, I plan to elaborate my main argument that there are parallels in the
epistemologies of Frege and Piaget, and that these parallels have distinctive implica-
tions for developmental psychology. It strikes me that these questions are productive
and can be developed, which is a welcome property of any perspective.
(i) Was Piaget really an epistemologist?
Beilin gave two reasons for his negative answer. Firstly, Piaget's non-empirical
work would not be counted as a contribution to mainstream analytic epistemology.
Secondly, Piaget's empirical work included theoretical psychological which does not
amount to, even if it has implications for, epistemology.
The "rst reason is well taken since it is literally wrong and fundamentally right!
There is an entry to Piaget in philosophical encyclopedias over two generations
(Gopnik, 1998; Mays, 1967), and Piaget's work is explicitly discussed by major
philosophers (e.g. Quine, 1960). What's more, the American problem-shift away from
analytic philosophy has the consequence that cognitive science and genetic epistemol-
ogy are one the same thing (Leiser & GillieH ron, 1990). Although in this literal sense,
Beilin's point is wrong, there is real sense in which he is right. Quine's (1969) famous
paper on naturalised epistemology ignored Piaget's epistemology, which is a signi"-
cant omission in view of his own participation at Piaget's (1963, p. 11) Centre. But
what was left implicit in Quine's paper is explicit in Hamlyn's (1978) argument that
Piaget's epistemology is fundamentally misconceived.
That's because of Frege's in#uence! Frege's argument against psychologism was
interpreted as anti-psychologism by his famous student (Carnap, 1928; 1967) with
a consequential impact on Logical Positivism. This led to Reichenbach's (1938, 1961)
celebrated distinction between the context of discovery, which is non-logical, and the
context of justi"cation, which is logical. This distinction is central to Popper's (1979)
`three worldsa with due reference to Frege. In general, most philosophers accept as
a received truth the view that the causal origin of a reason (psychology) and its
normative validity (logic) are not the same thing (Sainsbury, 1991). The main implica-
tion of anti-psychologism is that there can be no mediating link between empirical
psychology and normative logic. So yes: Beilin is quite right. Piaget's work has not
been in#uential in analytic philosophy.
My counter-argument is that Frege's argument can be interpreted as non-psychol-
ogism, which is quite another matter. According to non-psychologism, there can be
a linking science between normative logic and empirical psychology, namely, epi-
stemology. The crucial point, it seems to me, is this. If non-psychologism is valid, the
question to ask is not whether there can be a linking science in epistemology, but
rather what sort of linking science this could be. Evidently, there are alternatives to
hand in mainstream epistemology (Haack, 1978, p. 238), empirical (Goldman, 1986)
evolutionary (Kornblith, 1985), and naturalised (Quine, 1969) epistemology, and to
make an obvious point, there is genetic (developmental) epistemology to which Piaget
 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147 139

has made some contribution (Kitchener, 1986). If Piaget has not been regarded as
a Picasso by his contemporary epistemologists, that does not rule out that their
successors will regard him as a van Gogh.
Beilin's second reason is that `top downa psychology is psychology, not epistemol-
ogy. This strikes me as open to challenge. It runs counter to the citation in the
American Psychological Association's award of Distinguished Scientist: (Piaget's)
&revolutionary perspective on the nature of human knowledge and biological intelli-
gence (has lead to the study of ) questions up to now exclusively philosophical in
a resolutely empirical manner, and has made epistemology into a science separate
from philosophy, but related to all the human sciences' (quoted in Evans, 1981, p. 143).
Evidently, the APA regarded Piaget's psychology as epistemology in line with Piaget
(1977) own practice in his book titles where the words psychology and epistemology
appear inter-dependently. This amounts to verbalism, you might say. Well, let us be
speci"c: the classic study of the psychology of number conservation (Piaget, 1952) had
its basis in a logic text (Piaget, 1942) with a speci"c focus on the epistemology of
logicism in mathematics (Piaget, 1967). How else would you explain Piaget's (1952,
p. 42) use of the waiter example in the design of his famous task with its precursor in
Frege's (1884/1980 Sect. 70) seminal argument for logicism in mathematics (for
commentary, see Smith, 1999b)?
(ii) Is Piaget's epistemic subject psychological or epistemological?
Consistent with his general argument that Piaget's work is a contribution to
psychology, Beilin's answer is negative. This amounts to the claim that the study of an
epistemological (epistemic) subject lies in psychology. As I see it, such an argument
con#ates two distinctions due to Frege and discussed in my paper, one between
thinking and thought and the other between cause and reason (my paper, pp. 54}56).
At issue is the concept of truth, whose instances are such that any truth can be
known and such that, if it is known, can be known on the basis of good reason.
Representational thinking which results in a correct response is one thing; grasping
a thought which is realised to be true (or false) is something else again. Neither truth
nor its realisation is a `merelya psychological matter. Thus when Piaget (1995, p. 184)
asked how truth is formed in the mind at all, his question should be understood as
a matter for psycho-logic, not psychology. According to non-psychologism, there may
be continuity between thinking and thought without the reduction of the latter to the
former. It is for this reason that Piaget's epistemic subject is an epistemological
subject.
Examples may be useful. When Carraher, Carraher and Schliemann (1985) reported
that a street vendor says that 35;4"140 in one context (on the streets), but that
35;4"200 in another context (in the classroom), the natural interpretation is that
one of these responses is wrong. There are fascinating issues for psychology here,
namely, that di!erential responses are made by psychological subjects in di!erent
contexts, and that what seems to be the `worsta context has generated the `besta
response. But there are also fascinating issues for epistemology since the thought
35;4"140 may be known autonomously as a mathematical truth rather than
a heteronomously accepted procedure; necessarily as an equality rather than as a local
contingency; intersubjectively as the self-same thought in both contexts rather than as
140 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147

an element in a social interaction; objectively as `this is how things area rather than as
`this is how it turned outa; universally as binding across all of its instances rather than
as what is the case in this case hic et nunc. As I see it, the former set of realisations are
accomplishments of the epistemic subject, unlike the latter set which are accom-
plishments of the psychological subject (Smith, 1993, p. 50; 1995, p. 15). Under this
interpretation, Piaget (1967, p. 380) was not so much addressing `causal factsa about
the origins of knowledge in children's minds, but rather `normative factsa about the
legitimacy of children's reasoning in this development.
(iii) Is Frege's non-modal logic consistent with Piaget's account of necessity?
One of the parallels in my argument concerned necessary knowledge. Beilin points
out, following Rotman (1977), that necessary knowledge is central to the work of both
Kant and Piaget, but o$cially excluded from Frege's logic. This is, of course, a good
challenge. Even so, it can itself be challenged.
Firstly, Rotman (1977, p. 156) saw a sharp distinction in Piaget's account between
mathematical knowledge and formal proof; for my part, I see continuity. According
to Piaget (1942,1952), any knowledge acquired in mathematics is dependent on the
mathematical reasoning*which in the best cases amounts to proof*used by the
subject. Piaget's (1949) structures are less the source of this knowledge; rather, they
formally inventory the properties of the relations linking knowledge-to-reasoning.
Some of these relations are due to logic the laws of which Frege set out to chart.
Rotman has evidently disregarded a major claim made by Mays (1967) that all logical
behaviour, including the behaviour in which proof-construction is instantiated, can be
studied in line with Piagetian constructivism. Secondly, although Piaget and Garcia
(1991) did invoke an intensional logic as a way to `clean upa Piaget's structures, this is
an admission that an extensional characterisation of cognitive structures was inad-
equate. This invites an explanation as to why Piaget (1949) did o!er an extensional
characterisation of his structures in the "rst place. The natural answer is by reference
to Frege, since it was his revolution in logic which had its consequential impact on
Piaget (1949; for discussion, see Smith, 1999b). This looks as if Piaget appropriated
available intellectual tools (Frege's extensional logic) in a research-programme which
actually required augmented tools (modal logic). Thirdly, Frege is committed to at
least two cases of necessity (my paper, pp. 24}25). Agreed: this account could not be
Frege's logic. But this very exclusion of (alethic) modality requires its incorporation as
(epistemic) modality in an account of epistemology which Frege sketched but left
under-elaborated. Epistemology is concerned with the grounds of true judgment
and so with justi"cation in line with logical laws (see the passage quoted from Frege in
my paper p. 3). Even if Frege's logic is non-modal, a Fregean epistemology is
another matter. Fourthly, extensionalist logicians are not sceptical*even if they are
reductionists*about necessity. Rather, it is their argument that logical necessity is
interpretable as that which is `always truea whatever the combination of values in
a truth-table. Following Frege, Quine (1974) refers to the `eternala truths of logic.
Some psychologists have followed suit in their preference for an extensional model of
psychological processes (Bell & Johnson-Laird, 1998; Kargopulos & Demetriou,
1998). Necessity is interpreted di!erently in intensionalist logic (Sainsbury, 1991), and
this di!erence can be exploited in two ways. One is by way of counter-arguments
 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147 141

against extensionalist accounts (Smith, 1994,1998). Another is by way of new perspect-

ives in an intensionalist account (Piaget & Garcia, 1991; PieH raut-Le Bonniec, 1980).
Systems of modal logic subsume most of the axioms and inference-rules of exten-
sionalist systems. Of course most is not all, and intensional systems include further
axioms and rules as well, resulting in fundamental di!erences. Evident similarities
should not be regarded as negligible (cf. Sainsbury, 1991).
The upshot is that, either way, necessity is eliminated neither in extensional nor in
intensional systems What is unresolved is a more speci"c interpretation in epistemol-
ogy qua linking science. To say the least, there is a considerable amount of further
work to be done here.
(iv) Does Piaget's constructivism entail realism?
Some version of this complex question appears in each commentary and it deserves
more attention that I can give it here where I want to make three points. At issue is the
status of objects of knowledge.
Firstly, it is accepted that realism and constructivism are contraries, for example by
Dummett (1981, p. xxxviii), and by Piaget (1967, p. 556; 1995, p. 196). I have followed
suit (Smith, 1997). This leads to a second point in that I have attributed to Frege and
Piaget the contrary positions which each is standardly assigned, namely realism
(Popper, 1979) and constructivism (Kitchener, 1986), respectively. But there is a major
ambiguity here since the former is an attribution of ontological realism to Frege, but of
epistemological constructivism to Piaget. Citing Kitchener (1986) who is well aware of
this ambiguity, Beilin asks how realism (Frege) and constructivism (Piaget) can be
combined (his p. 17). Yes: there is a real problem here, since there is no available
account which is jointly acceptable in both ontology and epistemology, as I noted. It
follows that the question as to whether ontological realism entails, and is entailed by,
epistemological realism is open. And mutatis mutandis for constructivism. I take this to
mean that all the bets are o!. That is, even if Frege was committed to ontological
realism, then it is not impossible for his epistemology to be constructivist. Similarly,
even if Piaget is committed to epistemological constructivism, his ontology is another
matter. Indeed, Glassman seems to be inclined to accept just this combination in his
remark about the good mechanic whose expertise is based on `things that are
objectively true about combustible enginesa (p. 8). MuK ller states that Piaget's assimila-
tory acts are `directed towards objectsa, but makes it clear that object should be
interpreted epistemologically, not ontologically (see his pp. 5, 8).
This leads to the third point. Piaget invoked the S}O relation to mark the relation
between subject and object. There is a convergence between Piaget's (1950, p. 26)
self-styled `relativisma in his epistemology and what I shall call Piaget's (1995, p. 136)
`relationalisma in his sociology. It seems to me that relativism is misleading, even
a misnomer. What he means is that his epistemological account assigns priority to the
relation linking a subject S and an object O, rather than to either term of the relation.
Thus the question `Which objects?a and `Which subject?a requires an answer by
reference to the relation(s) which bind them together. This is crystal clear in his
sociological account where he rejects both the individualism of Comte and the holism
of Durkheim in favour of a priority for relational interactions, which may be indi-
vidual in both psycho-genesis and collective in socio-genesis (Piaget, 1995, p. 94). This
142 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147

position has two consequences. One is that realism is not so much false as derivative
since both subjects and objects are the (derivative) terms constructed in virtue of the
relations which are a subject's-actions-on-objects. As Piaget and Garcia (1991, p. 165)
put this, &an object of knowledge (is) `what can be done with ita '. The other con-
sequence concerns the subject, whose task is the &creation of new objects (eL tres) such
as classes, numbers, morphisms, etc.' (Inhelder & Piaget, 1980, p. 21; my amended
translation). In this passage, object is meant to cover both actual objects (such as trees
and tables) and abstract objects (such as classes and numbers). In turn, constructivism
about the status of `mathematical objects (eL tres)a is not so much the view that &they
do not consist in `objectsa like others; rather they do not constitute `objectsa at all'
(Piaget, 1967, p. 556).
In general, epistemological constructivism with a primary emphasis on objective
knowledge and ontological realism with its main focus on objects as such are not the
same thing. It seems to me that philosophical epistemologists have extensively
discussed issues relevant to the Kantian question `How could knowledge develop?a
In the best cases, this amounts to rational speculation as to what developmental
sequences and mechanisms could be like. In so doing, they have missed Piaget's main
point in his adaptation of Kant's famous question. When Piaget asked `How do the
di!erent types of knowledge become possible?a (quoted in Smith, 1993, p. 36), his
question amounted to an empirical characterisation of what developmental sequences
and mechanism are in fact like. This is quite another matter.
(v) What is the relation between thinking and thought?
Frege did not completely characterise the relation between thinking and thought.
This is a major omission since Frege also contended that*for humans*it is a natural
necessity that a thought can be grasped only on the basis of thinking (my paper p. 15).
MuK ller's (his paper p. 6) reminder of this oversight is telling, notably his claim that
Frege referred to `a special mental capacitya, which was then characterised meta-
phorically. In this regard, Kant (1787/1933, A141-2) made a comparable remark
about the schematism of the understanding, which he regarded as &an art concealed
in the depths of the human soul whose real modes of activity nature is hardly ever to
allow us to discover'. Both accounts read like a counsel of despair. It is tempting to
draw Wittgenstein's (1958, Sect. 149) conclusion that human understanding never
should have been regarded as a psychological process in the mind in the "rst place.
One way forward is identi"ed by Glassman in his discussion of non-rational
thinking, which he regards as falling on one pole of a continuum whose other pole is
rational thought. He makes further claims as well. One is that even if Frege set out
important premises for the empirical study of thinking and its conversion into rational
thought, these premises alone are not enough (his paper p. 5). Another is that Piaget
did set up parallels which could fare better (his paper p. 7). A third claim is that Piaget
translated the term non-logical as pre-logical in view of the directionality of develop-
mental change in industrialised societies. These claims are welcome, but could be
augmented as follows.
Firstly, a continuum hypothesis entails symmetry as to sequences, since there is
nothing in a continuum as such to require change to be uni-directional. Thus
non-rational thinking can change into rational thought (development), just as rational
 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147 143

thought can change into non-rational thinking (regression). Is it acceptable, however,

to refer to regression as a change from logical to pre-logical thinking? Secondly, since
(mental) activity can fall at any point on such a continuum, di!erences in degree,
rather than in kind, predominate. Such di!erences are relative (more}less), rather than
absolute (all}none). It may be for this reason that Piaget (quoted in Smith, 1993,
pp. 38}39) regarded intellectual development as two-termed, and so as a change from
knowledge at a lower level to knowledge at a higher level. This is, of course, very
di!erent from a one-termed change whereby an incorrect response (ignorance) is
converted into a correct response (knowledge). In turn, any level can be interpreted by
analogy with a contour line on a map. This analogy could make clear that although all
heights at the same contour are at the same height, there is no implication that other
individuals should remain at this height. You can walk up and down a mountain.
Intellectual change can be similarly variable. If this metaphor in which levels are
interpreted as contours contributes to the re-instatement of stage-theories, so much
the better (Smith, Dockrell & Tomlinson, 1997, p. 5). Thirdly, any (mental) action
instantiated on such a continuum includes dual contributions from a psycho-social
subject, on the one hand, and an epistemic subject, on the other. What varies is the
relative contributions made by both subjects in speci"c contexts (Glassman's `local
historya*see p. 9). According to Piaget (1926)/1959, p. 36; 1995, p. 308) there are no
stable measures of egocentric and rational thought. Sociocentric thought would be
similar in this respect. Fourthly, global distinctions such as &the children either have or
have not met the criteria' exclude mediators, which is another reason for demarcating
di!erences in comparative rather than in absolute terms, as Glassman remarks (p. 8).
What is required is the speci"cation of potential mediators in comparative terms, and
he mentions intersubjectivity and objectivity as being especially fruitful in this regard.
As I see it, all "ve epistemological values in the AEIOU mnemonic could play
exactly this role in two ways. One is by indicating a category about the respects in
which mental acts are alike. The other is by identifying the extent to which they diwer.
Ensuring that this dual role is discharged could dispel some of the mystery about how
human thinking actually does develop into rational thought. One example of how
such a research-programme could be implemented was given under (ii) above, and
another will follow in (viii) below.
(vi) Is Frege's concept of mind too narrow?
In one way, MuK ller's argument that Frege's concept of mind is both too passive and
too narrow is quite right. It provides a further reason why Frege's epistemology could
be complemented in Piaget's. But just as Frege, rightly, observed that his own work
was ignored by his contemporaries, Frege did the same to Brentano (1874/1995) who
argued that intentionality, not Cartesian consciousness, was the criterial property of
the mind. There are two relevant points here in line with MuK ller's argument. One is
that Frege's own critique of mental representation evidently did presuppose a Car-
tesian criterion, whilst Piaget's account presupposed a criterion of the mind based on
intentionality. The other point is that if intentionality is the criterion of the mental,
two of Frege's own claims are secured. Firstly, a mental act can have causes whose
empirical investigation is the task of psychology. Secondly, an intentional object of
a mental act is implicatory in line with logical laws. Implicatory relations cannot be
144 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147

investigated merely as causal facts, even if they are instantiated as `normative factsa,
since empirical causality and logical implication are not the same thing. Arguments
for both claims are set out in my paper. They nicely "t an insistence on the importance
of the &transition from the causal to the logical' (Piaget, 1995 p. 51).
In another way, MuK ller's argument leads to problems. Mental activity has recently
been interpreted so as to exclude psycho-genetic perspectives, based on internaliz-
ation, in favour of socio-genetic perspectives, based on participation (Matusov, 1998;
Winegar, 1997). The argument for an inclusive interpretation, or for the superiority of
a psycho-genetic perspective, merits further elaboration.
(vii) How are cause and reason related in the interpretation of thought?
MuK ller (his paper p. 10) points out that my third conclusion about the relation
between causes and criteria (reasons) is incomplete, o!ering some suggestions as to its
development in terms of intentionality. He is of course quite right. Yet the reason
behind his suggestion causes something of a problem.
Although von Wright (1971), whom MuK ller cites, has contributed good ideas about
the di!erence between causal and teleological questions, the implied research-pro-
gramme remains under-elaborated. According to von Wright, causal explanation and
teleological understanding are distinct. Very well: but that leaves normativity un-
touched, notably, how knowledge due to epistemological criteria is acquired at all, as
well as how better knowledge develops from available knowledge. Thus in the schema
of teleological interpretation set out by von Wright (1971, p. 107), the second premise
refers to an agent's &considered capacities', i.e., to the capacities which an agent
A believes to be under A's control. This looks like a commitment to some form of
modal knowledge whose normative properties are well known to von Wright (1951).
Much less clear is how agent A acquired those `considered capacitiesa in the "rst
place, and also how A may contribute to their development. For example, how does
a traditional dogma, such as &we observe our old customs in the conservation of the
universe' (Piaget, 1998, p. 111), become a mathematical necessity, such as the invari-
ance in the Pythagorean theorem (Piaget, 1995, p. 243)? Following Piaget, Vygotsky
(1994, p. 229)*who was also arguably aware of Frege's work (Smith et al., 1997,
pp. 6}10)*saw a real problem for ontogenesis in that factual connections masquerade
for logical relations. These facts of socio- and psycho-genesis cry out for attention.
(viii) What is the status of an act of judgment in the interpretation of thought?
MuK ller (his paper p. 10) endorses the "rst conclusion in my paper about acts of
judgment as the unit of analysis (see my paper p. 53). This is a congenial suggestion.
Here is an example of how this could be done.
In a study of mathematical induction funded by The Leverhulme Trust, children
(n"100) aged 5}7 years repeatedly added equal numbers of counters to two boxes,
A and B. At the outset, the children knew that A already contained one counter but
that B was empty. The children were eventually asked whether the addition of `a great
numbera to A and to B would result in the same number in each or not. J's judgment
was `Noa with his justi"cation as follows:

that (box A) would be right up to the cover in the sky and that (box B) would be right up
to God, so then there would still have to be more.
 L. Smith / New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) 137}147 145

This reasoning has "ve remarkable properties:

E autonomous. J's reasoning was his own. It was a free mental act which could not in
principle have speci"able conditions amenable to quanti"cation, even
though it does have an individual characterisation amenable to quali-
tative methods.
E analogical. After confessing my ignorance, J explained his analogy. God is in
Heaven and the number in B is so big that it reaches God. But the
number in A is bigger, so it would go up to the cover over Heaven. No
other child in fact used this beautiful example of cultural knowledge
applied to mathematics.
E modal. J's justi"cation is modal, concerning `what has to bea in that all
mathematical truths are necessities (Smith, 1999a). Modal justi"cation
to this question was rare but can be quanti"ed. J's justi"cation
contains a qualitatively identixable realisation which is missed by
many adolescents (Morris & Sloutsky, 1998).
E valid. J knew that there was more in A than B at the outset, and that if the
same number is added both to A and to B, then A still has more than
B the same. This amounts to his version of Euclid's axiom (if equals are
added to unequals, the wholes are unequal).
E correct. J's correct judgment is quanti"able. The di!erence in correct judg-
ments between the children in School Year 1 and Year 2 was statist-
ically signi"cant (s"28.657, df. (1), p(0.000).
Such a unit of analysis is productive by its inter-dependent use of qualitative and
quantitative evidence as well as by its concern for both `causal factsa and `normative
factsa. Psychologists (e.g., Siegal, 1999), who studiously ignore the reasons children
give for their judgments make the fundamental mistake of being incapable of demar-
cating reasoning based on reasons from reasoning based on reason (Moshman, 1994;
Smith, 1999a). Their practice in experimental psychology is no doubt common. All
that I can say is: common practice is not thereby good practice. Can't a practice be
changed*for the better!

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