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 BOOK REVIEWS

Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and
the Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. 263 pp. Cloth,
$39.95.

Susan H. Whiting, University of Washington

From Reform to Revolution adapts the framework developed by Samuel Hunt-

ington in The Third Wave to provide insights into the dynamics of regime change
experienced by both China and the Soviet Union during the 1980s and early 1990s.
According to Minxin Pei, both countries experienced some form of societal revolution
during this period. His analysis of the dynamics driving these changes takes as its
point of departure "the Tocqueville paradox." As Tocqueville notes, "the most
perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways"
(p. 45). This establishes a connection between reform and revolution that is central
to Pei's analysis. States fail to control the reform processes they initiate for two main
reasons: first, the process of reform shifts control over key economic and political
resources from state to society; and second, the reform process both produces and
accelerates the decay of state institutions.
Pei elaborates on these basic analytical claims by examining five factors that
potentially lead to societal revolution. The first factor is the nature of the initial reform
(or initial opening) by the state-most important, whether it takes place in the political
or economic realm. Second, Pei focuses on the activation of major social groups, the
strength and influence of which reflect their autonomy from the state, their access to
political and economic resources, and their value orientations. Third, these autono-
mous social groups must be able to unite in societal takeover coalitions, often
encompassing old elites who have defected from the old regime, to wrest control from
the state. Fourth, the presence of favorable external factors contributes to the auton-
omy of societal groups and their independent control over resources. Finally, the
extent of institutional decay reflects the lack of institutional adaptability, the loss of
ideological cohesion, the high degree of politicization, and the prevalence of corrup-
tion in state agencies, all of which undermine the state's ability to hold societal forces
in check. Together, these factors putatively explain how reform leads to societal
revolution.
This study is a truly comparative effort based on detailed case studies of reforms
in the private sector and the mass media in China and the Soviet Union. The analysis
provides important insights into the dramatic changes experienced by the two coun-
tries: In both cases, reforms have resulted in fundamental shifts in the locus of control

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 29 No. 3, June 1996 357-369

@ 1996 Sage Publications, Inc.
357

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

358 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / June 1996

over resources and in the nature of the state apparatus. However, a number of problems
undermine the potential contribution of this comparative effort. First, it is unclear
exactly where transitions from communism lead and hence exactly what Pei is trying
to explain. The implicit assumption underlying the study is that the outcome of reform
in both China and the former Soviet Union will be market-oriented polyarchy (p. 19).
Where market-oriented economic reforms develop faster than political reforms, as in
the Chinese case, economic change "will inevitably create, as its spillover effects,
favorable preconditions for the emergence of a polyarchy" (p. 150). In the Soviet
case, "a revolutionary program of instantly transforming the planned economy into
a market economy was immediately launched following the democratic break-
through" (p. 24). However, Pei notes that neither China nor the former Soviet Union
had actually completed the dual transition to market-oriented polyarchy. Both coun-
tries, nevertheless, had experienced societal revolutions, albeit in different arenas.
Thus, according to Pei, China experienced a societal revolution in the economy but
not in the political system, whereas the Soviet Union experienced a societal revolution
in the political system but not in the economy. It remains unclear throughout the study
whether the dependent variable is presence or absence of societal revolution or type
of societal revolution. Either way, the five factors discussed above do not vary in such
a way as to offer a consistent or systematic explanation of the outcomes. As a result,
part of the value of a comparative case study-the use of variation and control to gain
theoretical leverage over the subject matter-is lost.
In addition, there is a real disjuncture between the nuanced accounts offered in the
case studies and the theoretical framework in which they are presented. Two issues
stand out in this regard. The first is the author's treatment of state-society relations as
dichotomous and zero-sum. Even in the specific arenas examined by the author, the
locus of control over resources has not shifted unambiguously into societal or private
hands, and in many cases the state itself has been a key agent of reform. The second
is the failure to analyze institutional adaptability. The state apparatus, particularly in
the Chinese case, has not simply decayed but rather has experienced notable instances
of both institutional decay and institution building. Although Pei notes many of these
empirical nuances in his case studies, he does not adequately incorporate them into
his theoretical treatment. Moreover, he overlooks important debates surrounding
these issues in the scholarly literature. Because the nature of the state apparatus and
the relationship between state and society critically affect both the pace and the
direction of reform, the author's problematic theoretical treatment of these issues
forces him to offer conclusions quite at odds with the rest of his analysis.
The problematic characterization of state-society relations is most apparent in the
analysis of economic reform in China. Pei's interpretation of China's capitalist
revolution is based on the assertion that it was "carried out by societal forces through
the market, and not by the state" (p. 43). This interpretation deemphasizes the
importance of actions by the party-state (starting at the center and reaching down
through every administrative level) that decisively shaped the emergence of the
nonstate sector in China. In doing so, it suggests a very narrow conceptualization of
the state that focuses on the state as the central administration and locates subnational
 BOOK REVIEWS 359

state officials on the societal side of a state-society dichotomy. Moreover, it unneces-

sarily (and perhaps inaccurately) portrays state-society relations as zero-sum.
The initial opening in China's economic reform process began in the agricultural
sector. Pei correctly highlights the importance of decollectivization in freeing the
factors of production that fueled the growth of nonstate industry and commerce.
However, he describes decollectivization as "principally due to the spontaneous, and
initially unauthorized, efforts of peasants, first in Anhui Province .. . then across the
nation as other peasants followed suit" (p. 95). This characterization notwithstanding,
there is substantial debate in the field surrounding the origins of decollectivization.
Joseph Fewsmith (1994), for example, focuses attention on the role of political
leadership at various levels of the political system, whereas Kelliher (1992) high-
lightes the spontaneous role of peasants. More importantly, there was significant
variation in support for decollectivization among local communities in the ecologi-
cally and organizationally diverse Chinese countryside. Finally, as even Kelliher
acknowledges, it was forceful state implementation that ultimately led to national
adoption of household farming and imposition of unfavorable grain and cotton
contracts on rural households.
Whatever the role of state officials in the decollectivization of agriculture, they
played a central role in the promotion of local entrepreneurship. As Pei acknowledges
in his empirical description of reform, it was state policy that created and maintained
the incentives for local state officials to actively promote local investment, particularly
in industry. Decentralizing fiscal reforms made local officials responsible for their
own revenue and expenditures at the same time as they increased the responsibility
of local officials for financing public goods and social welfare (Wong, 1991). In
addition, state policy sought to discipline the actions of local officials through a
vertically controlled personnel appointment system that selected and rewarded cadres
on the basis of their ability to promote industrialization, maintain public order, and
provide basic public goods. The behavior of local officials cannot be conceived of
simply as corrupt self-enrichment (p. 23) or selfless public service. State-structured
incentives encouraged local officials to undertake entrepreneurial functions as part of
their official role (Oi, 1992; Whiting, 1995).
In promoting local entrepreneurship, local officials exercised tremendous discre-
tion over the forms of enterprise ownership that would receive political support within
their jurisdictions. Indeed, scholars have identified significant diversity in the forms
local entrepreneurship found in the Chinese countryside (Nee & Su, in press; Solinger,
1992; Walder, 1995; Wank, 1995; Whiting, 1995). As Pei acknowledges, in practice
neither the passage of a constitutional amendment legitimizing private ownership nor
the promulgation of regulations governing private enterprise guaranteed the rights of
private firms to exist or to act with full autonomy. Where private enterprises flour-
ished, it was with the active political support of local officials. Numerically, small
private firms accounted for the majority of nonstate enterprises as of the early 1990s;
however, township- and village-run collectives, essentially public enterprises admin-
istered at the local level, still accounted for three quarters of total industrial output in
the rural, nonstate sector-the focus of Pei's analysis. In most townships and villages,
360 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / June 1996

public enterprises also accounted for the lion's share of local fiscal revenue. Thus the
emergence of the nonstate sector in China's rural economy cannot simply be charac-
terized as a societal takeover.
Similar criticisms can be raised in the case of Soviet political reforms. Theoreti-
cally, Pei characterizes the former Soviet mass media as the locus of a successful
societal takeover in the political realm. Empirically, however, he pays careful attention
to important constraints on the development of truly independent mass media.
Through the early 1990s, state officials at different levels of the state apparatus
wielded their political power, their institutional positions, and their influence over the
allocation of economic resources to hinder the emergence of a free press. Clearly,
important shifts in control over both political and economic resources occurred, but
such shifts reflected complex interactions between state officials and societal
activists.
This leads to a second major problem with the study's interpretative framework-
namely, its failure to offer any systematic analysis of institutional adaptability. Pei
interprets his case studies to suggest that China experienced greater institutional decay
in the economic realm than did the Soviet Union, but the evidence also supports an
alternative interpretation. Although economic changes in China were indeed accom-
panied by signs of institutional decay, most notably the increase in official corruption,
they were also indicative of significant institutional adaptability and capacity. (For
early debates over this issue, see Shue, 1988, and Siu, 1989.) Local state officials,
responding to state-structured incentives, sought innovative ways to promote local
investment, to extract revenue from rapidly evolving local economies, and to channel
revenue into new investments, public goods, and social welfare, as well as their own
pockets. In 1994, central state officials launched several new reform initiatives
(centered on the tax, fiscal, and banking systems) to bring the regulatory structure in
line with the changing economy. These characteristics of economic reform in China
suggest that it was as much a state-led revolution as a societal revolution. As economist
Barry Naughton (1995) notes, "For better and for worse, government kept trying
throughout the reform era to develop investment policy, restructure enterprise incen-
tives, and devise new and appropriate institutions. There was never a period of
hands-off policy making in the Chinese reform. Activist government persisted
through the 1990s" (p. 95). Moreover, early reform measures in the economic realm
were accompanied by political reforms that led to the retirement of a large portion
of the revolutionary generation of party-state bureaucrats and the advancement
of cadres with greater education and skills more relevant to economic reform
(Lee, 1991; Manion, 1993). These political changes contributed to the overall
success of economic reform in China during the 1980s and early 1990s.
By contrast, Gorbachev, as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, was unable to implement reforms effectively through the Soviet bureaucracy.
Soviet reformers were less successful in bringing about personnel change within the
Soviet bureaucracy and in shaping institutional incentives to change the ways
party-state bureaucrats intervened in the economy (Aslund, 1989). As Pei notes,
"unlike the decentralized Chinese fiscal system in the 1980s, which made local
 BOOK REVIEWS 361

governments dependent on local revenues . . . the Soviet fiscal system remained

highly centralized duringperestroika,a factor that did not force local governments to
open up local revenue bases by [promoting the growth of the nonstate sector]"
(p. 144). Indeed, the combination of new state-structured incentives for both state
officials and enterprise managers and the gradual introduction of competition that
underpinned Chinese economic reform efforts was absent in early Soviet reform
efforts. Nevertheless, in Pei's theoretical treatment, institutional decay (by which he
means the lack of institutional adaptability, the high degree of politicization, etc.) was
more severe in the Chinese than in the Soviet economy. For Pei, state institutions
apparently contribute to the failure but not to the success of reforms. An explanation
more consistent with the evidence presented in the case studies might focus on the
nature of state institutions and the way the state intervenes in the economy as factors
potentially contributing to success as well as to failure.
The course of political reform in the Soviet Union reflected Gorbachev's inability
to change the economic behavior of state bureaucrats or to remove them from their
positions. As Pei points out in his empirical description of Soviet reforms, glasnost
was initially intended to serve perestroika. However, in his theoretical overview, he
portrays political reform as preceding economic reform, thereby deemphasizing the
institutional obstacles to economic reform that led Gorbachev to emphasize political
reform in the first place. Clearly, fundamental obstacles to economic reform remain
even today in the former Soviet Union. A comparison of the Chinese and Soviet
experiences suggests that strong state institutions may be a necessary concomitant of
the successful development of markets and private enterprise and, moreover, that
state-society relations need not be regarded as zero-sum (Chaudhry, 1993; Migdal,
Kohli, & Shue, 1994). In policy terms, perhaps the emphasis should not be on
"get[ting] the state out of the marketplace" (p. 32), but rather on how to shape and
discipline the way the state necessarily intervenes in the marketplace.
These theoretical problems raise questions about Pei's conclusions, especially
regarding the Chinese case. Did China experience regime change? The interpretation
of the rapid development of the nonstate sector as a societally driven, capitalist
revolution makes it difficult to explain the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in China,
particularly in view of the anticipated spillover effects of economic reform in the
political realm and the zero-sum approach to state-society relations (p. 21). Pei's
conclusion that the capitalist revolution actually underpinned authoritarian rule in
China (p. 208) does not follow from the interpretation of the empirical evidence
offered in the study. This conclusion would appear less of a reversal if the active role
of the state in sponsoring the capitalist revolution had received more explicit theo-
retical attention. Instead, the author appeals in part to peasant values as an explanation
for continued authoritarian rule:
Although the less educated and underprivileged peasantry has proved to be the
leading force in the development of a market economy, the same group is rarely
an active participant in the democratization process. This fact can also be
explained by the value orientations of this group as a whole. As polling data
362 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / June 1996

in China revealed, the Chinese peasantry tended to be less supportive of

democracy and more submissive to authority than other groups. (p. 57)
Other scholars, however, have pointed to peasants as active proponents of grassroots
democracy through both village elections and legal actions targeting state cadres (Li

&
O'Brien, 1996; O'Brien, 1994). At the same time, Pei ignores other factors that might
support authoritarianism, such as the prominence of blatant appeals to nationalist
sentiment by the Chinese Communist Party. Other scholars such as Guillermo
O'Donnell (1979) have highlighted the potential importance of such nationalist
appeals in underpinning authoritarian rule. Although Pei asserts that transitions from
communism are distinct from authoritarian transitions in that they entail both democ-
ratization (or least political liberalization) and marketization, perhaps the transition
from communism shares more with the transition from authoritarianism than Pei
suggests.

REFERENCES

Aslund, Anders. (1989). Gorbachev'sstrugglefor economic reform: The Soviet reformprocess,

1985-88. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. (1993, September). The myths of the market and the common history of
late developers. Politicsand Society, 21(3) 245-274.
Fewsmith, Joseph. (1994). Dilemmasofreform in China:Politicalconflict and economic debate.
New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Kelliher, Daniel. (1992). Peasantpower in China: The era of rural reform, 1979-1989. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lee, Hong Yung. (1991). From revolutionary cadres to party technocrats in Socialist China.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Li, Lianjiang, & O'Brien, Kevin. (1996, January). Villagers and popular resistance in contem-
porary China. Modem China, 22(1), 28-61.
Manion, Melanie. (1993). Retirement of revolutionaries in China: Public policies, social norms,
private interests. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Migdal, Joel, Kohli, Atul, & Shoe, Vivienne. (Eds.). (1994). State power and socialforces:
Domination and transformationin the third world. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Naughton, Barry. (1995). Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform, 1978-1993. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Nee, Victor, & Su, Sijin. (in press). Local corporatism and informal privatization in China's
market transition. In John McMillan & Barry Naughton (Eds.), Reforming Asian socialism:
The growth of market institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
O'Brien, Kevin. (1994, July). Implementing political reform in China's villages. Australian
Journalof Chinese Affairs, 32, 33-59.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. (1979). Tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and the question
of democracy. In David Collier (Ed.), The new authoritarianismin Latin America (pp. 285-
318). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pres,
 BOOK REVIEWS 363

Oi, Jean C. (1992, October). Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state
corporatism in China. World Politics,45(1), 99-126.
Shue, Vivienne. (1988). The reach of the state: Sketches of the Chinese body politic. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Siu, Helen F. (1989). Agents and victims in south China:Accomplices in ruralrevolution. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Solinger, Dorothy J. (1992). Urban entrepreneurs and the state: The merger of state and society.
In Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (Ed.), State and society in China: The consequences of reform
(pp. 121-142). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Walder, Andrew G. (1995, September). Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational
analysis of China's transitional economy. American Journalof Sociology, 101(2), 263-301.
Wank, David L. (1995, January). Private business, bureaucracy, and political alliance in a
Chinese city. Australian Journalof Chinese Affairs, 33, 55-71.
Whiting, Susan H. (1995). The micro-foundations of institutional change in reform China:
Property rights and revenue extraction in the ruralindustrialsector. Doctoral dissertation,
University of Michigan.
Wong, Christine P. W. (1991, December). Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline: The
paradox of fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China. China Quarterly, 128, 691-715.

Felipe Aguero, Soldiers, Civiliansand Democracy: Post-FrancoSpain in Compara-

tive Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 316 pp. Cloth,
$48.50.

Steven G. Snow, Western Washington University

The process of democratization has proceeded unevenly in southern Europe and

South America, and opposition from the military has proved to be one of the most
considerable obstacles civilian reformers have faced. What can explain the relative
success of Spain, as well as Portugal and Greece, in advancing civilian supremacy
over the armed forces as compared to the more problematic South American transi-
tions, such as those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay? Agiero focuses on the
assertion of civilian authority in the wake of authoritarian rule in Spain, yet he also
extends his explanatory framework to the southern European and South American
cases. His ambitious and well-informed work will for years be central to the study of
civil-military relations during democratization.
Agiero situates civilian control of the military as an essential aspect of democracy,
and argues it must be at the very center of any analysis of the democratization of an
authoritarian regime in which the military enjoyed a prominent position. Many
analyses of the Spanish transition, Aguiero argues, combine an explanation of its
striking achievements with acknowledgment of the persisting fragility of democratic
institutions after the return to democracy, yet "do not integrate this puzzle within the
schemes used to explain success" (p. 9). Aguero accomplishes this task admirably,
and also improves on previous analyses by examining transition as a process in which
the negotiation between civilians and the military is affected by their previous actions
and transactions. He moves beyond static comparative strength explanations to a