Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 258±274

Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

BRUCE HADDOCK
University of Wales, Swansea

AND OVIDIU CARAIANI

University Politehnica, Bucharest

We explore the theoretical underpinnings of a political debate initiated in 1989 by the

Grupul pentru Dialog Social about identity, legitimacy and civil society in Romania.
Commentators have often focused on the resurgence of nationalism as a response to
the politics of transition. We concentrate, instead, on the normative engagement
which distinguishes practical argument in general. We o€er a theoretical bridge which
sets the sharply di€erentiated positions of protagonists contributing to the Romanian
debate in a broader theoretical perspective. Our central claim is that attempts
to defend a revised version of `civic nationalism' fail to resolve tensions between
individualist and collectivist notions. By focusing on what is `civic' about civic
nationalism, the terms of reference of the debate are signi®cantly shifted.

Our concern in this paper is to analyse the theoretical assumptions which have
informed attempts to modernize the Romanian state in the period since the fall
of CeausË escu. The broad terms of reference will be familiar. Modernizers have
sought to adopt (something like) the western conception of civil society, with a
stress on human rights, the rule of law, economic liberalism and association
with pan-European institutions. They have found themselves confronted not
only by hard-line nationalists, for whom cosmopolitan language is a betrayal of
Romanian national identity, but by traditionalists intent upon reconciling a
distinctive Romanian inheritance with a wider Europe des patries. The political
attractions of the latter position are evident. The nationalism which was such a
marked feature of Romanian public culture under CeausË escu has not simply
disappeared, nor in fact was it created by CeausË escu and his ideologues.1
Reconstructions of the intellectual pedigree and institutional entrenchment of
nationalist discourse in successive Romanian regimes tell us a great deal about
the building blocks of the contemporary debate. What they leave out of
account, however, is the normative engagement which distinguishes practical
argument in general. We focus on arguments (well or ill conceived) which have
sought to exploit and extend the terms of public discourse in contemporary
Romania. We treat them as more or less defensible theoretical statements, not as

1 See Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in

CeausËescu's Romania (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991); and Dennis Deletant, `The
Debate between Tradition and Modernity in the Shaping of a Romanian Identity', in Robert
P. Pynsent (ed.), The Literature of Nationalism: Essays on East European Identity (London,
Macmillan, 1996), pp. 14±26.
# Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 259

types of argument. Our reconstruction of the debate is thus a contribution to the

debate itself.
Conventional discussions of nationalism have been largely concerned with
the elaboration of typologies. Distinctions within the European context vary
from broad (and imprecise) contrasts between the nationalisms of east and west,
to more technical characterizations of civic/ethnic or reform/integral national-
ism.2 These typologies are helpful up to a point. Yet they do little to clarify the
conceptual distinctions at the margin of contrasting types. Examples of
discourse can be placed on a spectrum; but the considerations which might
persuade protagonists to change their views are left unexplored. It is one thing
to show how di€erent conceptions of the nation have been appropriated in
Romanian public debate, and quite another to consider the cogency of the
arguments advanced. Clearly little can be achieved if plausible terms of
reference are not ®rst established. In the Romanian tradition, a contrast might
be drawn between western/Roman/modernizing/individualist conceptions
and eastern/Dacian/traditionalist/anti-European/collectivist conceptions, each
exploiting familiar notions in an on-going debate. Our interest here, however, is
with what it means to hold a particular view in the face of possible objections.
There is nothing methodologically odd about this approach; it is simply to treat
a sophisticated Romanian debate as a species of political theory.
A marked feature of the contemporary debate is the reluctance to break with
established terms of discourse. Marxism, of course, has been a spectacular
casualty. In one sense, however, Marxism had already been relegated to a sub-
ordinate role through CeausË escu's exploitation of entrenched nationalist
assumptions. The preoccupation with national identity, readily intelligible in
an earlier context of state formation and expansion, has survived, fostering
discussions which marginalize signi®cant groups within Romanian society. It is
bitterly ironic that the politics of identity, which did so much to undermine even
the beginnings of an autonomous civil society under CeausË escu, should
continue to be the obsession of politicians anxious to set Romania on a new
path.3 This is a problem which, in one form or another, has beset all the
emerging post-communist states. There is no typical case. Each state ®nds itself
breaking new ground in its adaptation of received understandings to unprece-
dented political and economic conditions.4 The point to stress is that these
traditions are never ®nally closed. Within Romania the politics of identity
has been challenged at the intellectual level, albeit ine€ectively. Our aim is to set
this vital argument in a wider context of theoretical debate which may go some

2 See, for example, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford

University Press, 1994); John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (London, Fontana Press, 1994);
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: the Quest for Understanding (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1994); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983); Peter Alter,
Nationalism (London, Edward Arnold, 1985); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re¯ec-
tions on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1983); Sukumar Periwal (ed.), Notions
of Nationalism (Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995); Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism:
Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992); James G. Kellas, The
Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (London, Macmillan, 1991); and Montserrat Guibernau,
Nationalisms: the Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Polity, 1996).
3
See Tom Gallagher, Romania after CeausËescu (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995).
4
See the collection of essays in Richard Caplan and John Fe€er (eds), Europe's New Nationalism:
States and Minorities in Con¯ict (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996).
# Political Studies Association, 1999
260 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

way towards breaking down the exclusive terms of reference of contending

groups.
It is not surprising that national identity should be a pervasive concern.5
Emerging as it did from the collapse of three empires, the Romanian state has
never enjoyed a clear identity or settled boundaries. The nation clearly
antedated the state, though both were constructed identities. Contrasting
constitutionalist and authoritarian strands were already evident in 1848. Con-
stitutionalists such as KogaÆlniceanu, Russo and BaÆlcescu, in¯uenced by French
revolutionary ideas, were always on the defensive in the face of more assertive
characterizations of the essence of the nation. Francophiles were portrayed as
bonjurisËti, advocates of foreign (speci®cally French) customs without roots in
Romanian tradition. Maiorescu and his followers rejected cosmopolitanism as
`shape without substance' and argued instead for an `organic' literature that
would express the unique qualities of Romanian culture.6 The argument came
to a head in the 1920s with the publication of Lovinescu's History of Modern
Romanian Civilization (1924±6) which self-consciously defended a modernist
position that saw the adoption of advanced European institutional and cultural
models as a functional necessity for Romania.7 By challenging the basic
assumptions of indigenous traditionalism in all its guises, Lovinescu served as a
catalyst for the polarization of the national debate.
The emergence of a Romanian version of the Eastern Orthodox religion as a
politically signi®cant movement was decisive for the consolidation of a
Romanian identity with strong anti-western and anti-individualist accents.
Ethnic and religious identity were now equated. Rationalism, positivism and
toleration were seen as decadent manifestations of a declining civilization. In the
inter-war period, the quest for a cultural rebirth of the Romanian nation gave a
pronounced authoritarian tone to political rhetoric, especially in the legionary
movement. This ®rst taste of a mass-based populism was decisive in the
marginalization of liberal individualism.
Stress on the unique qualities of the Romanian tradition became the domin-
ant motif of a philosophical movement (TraÆirism) that served as a signi®cant
bolster to the legionary movement and, through Noica, has continued to exert
philosophical in¯uence.8 One of the more remarkable features of the history of
ideas in Romania in the twentieth century is the resilience of an essentially
irrationalist philosophy in the face of a state which, after 1948, embraced a
formal rationalist ideology, with matching bureaucratic apparatus.

5 For an historical overview see Iordan Chimet (ed.), Dreptul la memorie (Cluj, Dacia, 1992,

4 vols.).
6
See Titu Maiorescu, `IÃn contra directË iei de astaÆzi õÃ n cultura romaÃnaÆ' (1868), in his Critice
(Bucharest, Minerva, 1984), pp. 127±35.
7
See Eugen Lovinescu, Istoria civilizatËiei romaÃne moderne (Bucharest, SËtiintË i®caÆ, 1972); and for
discussion see Z. Ornea, TraditËionalism sËi modernitate in deceniul al treilea (Bucharest, Eminescu,
1980).
8 For discussion see Z. Ornea, Anii treizeci: Extrema dreaptaÆ romaÃneascaÆ (Bucharest, FundatË iei

Culturale RomaÃne, 1996); Constantin Noica, Pagini despre su¯etul romaÃnesc (Bucharest, Human-
itas, 1991); Constantin Noica, Sentimentul romaÃnesc al ®intËei (Bucharest, Eminescu, 1978);
Constantin Noica, CuvaÃnt õÃmpreunaÆ despre rostirea romaÃneascaÆ (Bucharest, Eminescu, 1987); and
Constantin Noica, Istoricitate sËi eternitate (Bucharest, Capricorn, 1989).
# Political Studies Association, 1999
 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 261

In one sense the Communist regime must be seen as an extreme version of a

collectivist politics which had been implicit in Romanian nationalist discourse
since 1848. What was new was the fusion of a thoroughly rationalist conception
of the `new man' (homo collectivus) with a traditional conception of the moral
signi®cance of the peasant in idealizations of indigenous rural culture. In
philosophical terms, TraÆirism and Marxism make uneasy bedfellows. What they
share, however, at least in these versions, is contempt for the values of liberal
individualism. The two positions were paradoxically brought together in the
doctrine of Protochronism (defended particularly by Papu and BaÆdescu) which
sought the pristine originals of scienti®c and philosophical innovations within
the structure of Romanian language and culture.9
1989 represented a challenge and an opportunity. The facile assumption that
`civil society' could simply be incorporated, that the only obstacle to civic
modernization had been an oppressive government, was now exposed.
Communism had collapsed but not collectivism.10 Elites which had previously
sheltered under the communist umbrella now sought protection under the
mantle of nationalism. In the process they may well have strengthened their
positions. Nationalism as an ideology had proved to be almost endlessly
¯exible. Indeed the Communist regime itself had endured largely by adopting
nationalist terms of discourse. What had initially seemed to be a wholly new
situation turned out, on closer inspection, to be a revised version of a very old
argument. Attitudes to Europe or minority rights were still formed within the
terms of reference of the proclaimed uniqueness of the national culture.
Collectivism, like a chameleon, had adapted to a new set of circumstances. Civic
nationalism, however, had been a casualty. In the ®nal analysis, the language of
civic engagement had been swamped by the pervasive obsession with national
identity which had informed nationalist discourse from the outset.11
These obsessions were confronted by the eclectic group of intellectuals who
came together in the immediate aftermath of the `revolution' in order to
challenge the tacit acceptance of nationalist terms of discourse. The Grupul
pentru Dialog Social (Group for Social Dialogue) initially embraced dissidents
who had served (at least in a tenuous sense) as leaders of an underground
opposition to the CeausË escu regime. It would be misleading to equate the work
of these intellectuals with the more developed opposition networks in Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But at least as far as the Romanian intelligentsia
were concerned, these were public ®gures with declared positions. Among the
leaders, Gabriel Liiceanu and Andrei PlesË u had been deprived of important
academic positions, Dan Petrescu had written an important letter to CeausË escu
condemning the human rights abuses of the regime and had given interviews
with Radio Free Europe, and Alexandru Paleologu, Octavian Paler, Stelian

9
See Edgar Papu, `Protocronismul romaÃnesc', Secolul XX, 5/6 (1974), pp. 8±11; Edgar Papu,
`Protocronism, sË i sintezÆa', Secolul XX, 6 (1976), pp. 7±9; Edgar Papu, Din clasicii nosËtri: ContributËii
la ideea unui protocronism romaÃnesc (Bucharest, Eminescu, 1977); Ilie BaÆdescu, Sincronism european
si cultura criticaÆ romaÃneascaÆ (Bucharest, SËtiintË i®caÆ sË i EnciclopedicaÆ, 1984); and the discussion in
Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, pp. 169±214.
10 Adam Michnik has described nationalism as `the last word of communism'. See Adam

Michnik, `Nationalism', Social Research, 58 (1991), p. 759.

11
See Katherine Verdery, `Nationalism and National Sentiment in Postsocialist Romania', in
her What was Socialism, and What comes Next? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996),
pp. 83±103.
# Political Studies Association, 1999
262 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

TaÆnase and others had been among the signatories of the last public letters
protesting against the treatment of Romanian writers in spring and autumn of
1989.12 Their political activity before 1989 had been fragmentary, but they
shared a commitment to create something like a western-style civil society in
dicult circumstances. In so far as the group became a formative in¯uence after
1989, it was through the journal 22.13 The journal represented a style rather than
party-political position, championing an inclusive conception of citizenship
which rendered established distinctions irrelevant. From this point of view,
there is no necessary incompatibility between Hungarian (Romany, Serb,
German) cultural identity and Romanian citizenship. The casual linkage
between identity and legitimacy was thus undermined.
To articulate a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship was itself an innova-
tion in the Romanian context. What makes 22 instructive, however, is not the
commitment to rights that informs it, but the attempt to expose the false
foundational myths which had been used to legitimize di€erent forms of the
Romanian state.14 A principal innovation here was to insist that the nation is a
discursive construct and not a `natural' fact. Essentialist views of the nation
were treated (by Patapievici for example) as a species of `ethnic Platonism',
rendering individuals accidental in relation to the nation as substance.15 This
essentialism endorses no speci®c conception of the nation, but individuals
would not be ®nally intelligible outside a national context. Within these terms of
reference one cannot ask `What makes a good man?', only `What makes a good
Romanian?'16 Individuals exist as instances of a collective essence, the people as
a whole enjoying the status of a `super-personality'.17
Attempts to characterize this `super-personality' are necessarily contentious.
Once the `people' are accorded pride of place as the embodiment of the nation,
we are still left with the problem of specifying the distinct identity of a particular
people. This, for Patapievici, is analogous to the diculties generations of
readers have encountered in elaborating the detailed implications of Rousseau's
notion of the General Will. Within the Romanian context, Patapievici cites
Blaga's in¯uential portrayal of an original pastoral idyll (spatËiul mioritic) as the

12
Opponents of the CeausË escu regime formed two clear groups. Followers of Noica (such as
Liiceanu and PlesË u) stressed the signi®cance of salvation through culture, while a more politically
orientated group who saw themselves as dissidents (including Doina Cornea, Mircea Dinescu, Dan
Petrescu and Gabriel Andreescu) stressed principled opposition to communism in both theory and
practice.
13
The Grupul pentru Dialog Social published a declaration of principles in the ®rst issue of 22,
20 January 1990, p. 3. A selection of articles from 22 is available in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.),
RomaÃnia versus RomaÃnia (Bucharest, Clavis, 1996).
14 For discussion in relation to Romanian historiography see also Lucian Boia, Istorie sËi mit õÃn

consËtiintËa romaÃneascaÆ (Bucharest, Humanitas, 1997).

15
H.-R. Patapievici, `Criticilor mei', 22, 32, 7±13 August, 1996, p. 11. Patapievici is something of
an enfant terrible in Romanian cultural life. Trained as a physicist, he became a public celebrity after
the publication of his Politice (Bucharest, Humanitas, 1996). He contributes to a range of journals
and newspapers and is a leading editor with the publishing house Humanitas.
16 In the 1930s Nae Ionescu, the intellectual mentor of the legionary movement, proposed a

distinction between `Romanian' and `good Romanian'. A Greek Catholic could be a loyal Romanian,
but strict Romanian identity applied only to followers of the Orthodox religion. See Z. Ornea, Anii
Treizeci: Extrema DreaptaÆ RomaÃnescaÆ (Bucharest, Editura FundatË iei Culturale RomaÃne, 1995),
pp. 91±5.
17
See Patapievici, `Criticilor mei', p. 11; the phrase is taken from Karl Popper, The Open Society
and its Enemies (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1945, 2 vols).
# Political Studies Association, 1999
 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 263

archetype of a style of thought that necessarily attributes a subordinate and

derivative signi®cance to personal identity.18 Individuals are real, in this scheme
of things, only in relation to a pristine ethnic form.
Patapievici's point is not simply that Blaga is mistaken, but that collective
conceptions of identity are illusory. He describes the search for a `putative
identity' as a `national obsession'.19 The syndrome is evident in the ®rst stirrings
of a movement for political independence. In 1848, for example, both liberal
modernizers and traditional revivalists were operating with an entirely abstract
conception of Romanian identity, involving schematic and blinkered con-
ceptions of past and future. At moments of crisis, such as the War of Independ-
ence of 1877 or the peace settlement of 1918, the contrast between (what we
might call) the French and Eastern Orthodox models came to the fore, under-
mining any prospect for a settled consensus. Here was an argument that
would be endlessly repeated if political legitimacy were persistently treated as a
function of cultural identity. Communism o€ered only an illusory solution,
replacing both models with an equally myopic conception of identity (homo
collectivus). What Patapievici presents us with, then, is a choice between `the
theology of homo collectivus', `nostalgia for mystic solidarity', and the rational-
ism of `methodological individualism'.20 Whether methodological individual-
ism can be sustained without ®ctions of its own, however, is quite another
matter.
Patapievici's favoured position is a conception of a free-standing civil
society, where `e€ective identity is constructed through our daily politics', with
each individual contributing to the `collective identity of all'.21 The con-
structivist view of national identity has, of course, a very long history, going
back to Renan's celebration of the nation as a `daily plebiscite' and beyond.22
And in more recent social and political theory it has come to constitute one of
the most in¯uential currents among theories of nationalism.23 There is less
agreement, however, regarding the building blocks of this daily construction.
Individuals may contribute in a very small way to the construction of a
`collective' identity, but not (as Marx was to note in a slightly di€erent context)
`under circumstances they themselves have chosen'.24 The idea of rational
actors bargaining among themselves in the pursuit of mutual advantage, with
no regard for context or attachments, is one of the least plausible hypotheses of
modern political theory.25 One simply does not need an atomistic theory
of society in order to argue that individuals are uniquely valuable and have
rights.

18
See Lucian Blaga, SpatËiul mioritic (Bucharest, Editura Humanitas, 1994), pp. 165±6; ®rst
published 1936.
19 H.-R. Patapievici, `Meta®zica natË iunii õÃ n act este o politica', in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.),
Æ
RomaÃnia versus RomaÃnia, pp. 180±1.
20
Patapievici, `Meta®zica natË iunii õÃ n act este o politicaÆ', p. 184.
21
Patapievici, `Meta®zica natË iunii õÃ n act este o politicaÆ', p. 185.
22
See Ernest Renan, `What is a Nation?', in Stuart Woolf (ed.), Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to
the Present (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 48±60.
23 See, classically, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re¯ections on the Origin and

Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1983).

24
Karl Marx, `The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in his Surveys from Exile, David
Fernbach (ed.) (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973), p. 146.
25
See Maurice Keens-Soper, `The liberal state and nationalism in post-war Europe', History of
European Ideas, 10 (1989), 689±703.
# Political Studies Association, 1999
264 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

What outraged Patapievici's critics was precisely the claim that individual
identity is conceivable outside a collective context. Pruteanu, for example, could
ask rhetorically whether a defence of individualism necessarily made one both
`an enemy of the people' and `an enemy of the regime'.26 Orthodox communists
and nationalists (the distinction is not always clear) saw Patapievici as a
`pathological case', an `exhibitionist', a `suitable case for treatment'.27 Nearly all
critics sought to reinstate a distinction between a people in its diverse circum-
stances and an historical archetype of a people (neam) which legitimizes a polity
despite its lapses from perfection.28 This is clearly counter-assertion rather than
argument, but it illustrates the centrality of collectivist assumptions within
Romanian culture.29 More signi®cant, perhaps, is Patapievici's tacit assumption
that the people as a whole cannot properly constitute a political order of any
kind. Manolescu warned Patapievici of the danger of ¯irting with an anti-
democratic position.30 If (as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
had argued) the nation and the political order were to be identi®ed, then denial of
the nation might undermine the political space for democratic politics.
Patapievici's position might more properly be described as anti-majoritarian
or anti-populist rather than anti-democratic, endorsing as it does the priority of
rights over a passing consensus within public opinion.31 It may be that the form
of Patapievici's polemic is slightly misleading. To denigrate certain conceptions
of the Romanian nation (and Patapievici's tone is certainly sharp) is to
presuppose that there is a nation to talk about.32 Liviu Antonesei identi®ed
residual `ethno-psychological' assumptions in Patapievici's language.33 One is
reminded of the dilemma posed by Wittgenstein in his characterization of action
(`what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise
my arm?').34 When we rid ourselves of all myths, what exactly are we left with?
Few Romanians could accept the stark rationalism of Patapievici's position.
Even sympathizers such as Gabriel Andreescu (who had served as chairman of
the administrative council of the Grupul) felt the need to move beyond icono-
clasm to a modulated analysis of the pursuit of Romanian interests.35
Andreescu sees the language of collective identity as a fatal temptation which
has obscured the furtherance of concrete political objectives. To insist, for
example, that Moldavia should properly be a part of Romania is an obstacle to
the achievement of a stable working relationship with Russia and the Ukraine.
The real issue for Romania is not how to redeem lost lands but how to ensure
26
George Pruteanu, `EsË ecurile õÃ mpotrivirii', Dilema, 173±4 (1996), p. 13.
27
C. T. Popescu, `Cum saÆ ne descotorisim de poporul romaÃn, AdevaÆrul, 1869, 17 June 1996, p. 1.
28
For discussion of the translation of the term neam into English see Verdery, National Ideology
under Socialism, p. 323, fn. 3.
29 See Verdery, `Nationalism and Nationalist Sentiment in Postsocialist Romania', pp. 83±103.
30 Nicolae Manolescu, `Votul universal', RomaÃnia literaraÆ, 23, 12±18 June, 1996.
31
For a full elaboration of an anti-majoritarian democratic position see Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth, 1977).
32
Note the tone and temper of the four letters of Patapievici to Paleologu in H.-R. Patapievici,
Politice (Bucharest, Humanitas, 1996), pp. 17±69. The remaining essays in the volume are more
analytical.
33 Liviu Antonesei, `IÃn jurul ``cazului'' Patapievici', Sfera Politicii, 40 (1996), p. 59.
34 Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe (transl.), Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil

Blackwell, 1968), para. 621.

35
Andreescu, like Patapievici, was trained as a physicist. He is currently Director of the Steering
Committee of the Centre for International Studies and co-chairman of the Romanian Helsinki
Committee.
# Political Studies Association, 1999
 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 265

that ethnic rivalries do not become matters of principle. From this point of view,
good relations with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania should be the ®rst
priority of the Romanian state. A cosmopolitan Romania in a cosmopolitan
Europe is the only way forward.36 To dwell upon the collective identity of all
`true' Romanians is to face the future by looking to the past.37
Andreescu's position became the focal point of a ®erce debate. Octavian Paler
and Alexandru Paleologu, for example, both of whom had reservations about
the CeausË escu regime, were concerned at what they saw as Andreescu's blanket
rejection of the legitimacy of the language of national identity.38 Paler describes
Andreescu as `a fundamentalist pan-European', so obsessed with reactions to
Romania in western Europe and the United States that he sees the formulation of
Romanian policy as simply a matter of obeying instructions from the high
command in Brussels. He characterizes Andreescu as a `European from
nowhere', an `extreme cosmopolitan' who is allergic to the word `national'.
The xenophobia of C. V. Tudor (leader of RomaÃnia Mare) is thus replaced by a
species of `Romanophobia'. Paler can accept that Romanian national identity
might be `tragic'; but he cannot allow that domination by foreign powers and the
loss of peoples and territories should simply be forgotten. From the pure
cosmopolitan perspective, Romania becomes a `pale imitation' of itself, `a
population but not a people'.39 A ®xation with individual rights, says Paler,
equates the problem of Romanian identity with the allocation of full civic status
to `homosexuals and prostitutes'. Paler stresses, instead, the idea of a moral
order, rooted (as Blaga had insisted) in primordial village life. Where Andreescu
had rejected backward-looking nostalgia, Paler argues that the future can only
have signi®cance in relation to a determinate past. Paler does not regard himself
as anti-European. What he seeks, for Romania, is no more than western Euro-
pean nations have come to accept, an institutional and cultural context which
acknowledges the legitimacy of both national and European aspirations. This
conception of a Europe des patries echoes the thinking of the (so-called) bonjurisËti
of the nineteenth century who sought to bring Romania up to the level of the
advanced nations of Europe. The `new bonjurisËti', by contrast, `suppose that they
are championing advanced ideas when they are actually renouncing national
responsibility'. These `Europeans from nowhere treat national identity as a kind
of baggage that can be left at the reception desk'. But who checks into the hotel?
If we discount national identity, how precisely should we conceive of ourselves?40
36
See Andrei Marga, Filoso®a uni®caÆrii europene (Cluj, Apostrof, 1995); Adrian Marino, Pentru
Europa: Integrarea RomaÃniei (IasË i, Polirom, 1995); Adrian Marino (ed.), Revenirea õÃn Europa: Idei sËi
controverse romaÃnesËti, 1990±1995 (Craiova, 1996); and Iordan Chimet (ed.), Momentul adevaÆrului
(Cluj, Dacia, 1996).
37 For Andreescu's endorsement of Patapievici see his `Guernica, desenata õÃ n cuvinte', 22, 22,
Æ
29 May±4 June, 1996, p. 13. For his analysis of Romania's international priorities see his `Privirile,
õÃ ndreptate spre Republica Moldova ori spre Ungaria?', in Gabriel Andreescu (ed.), NatËionalisËti,
antinatËionalisËti: O polemicaÆ, õÃn publicistica romaÃneascaÆ (IasË i, Polirom, 1996), pp. 13±24.
38
Paler was director of Romanian National Television and editor of the in¯uential RomaÃnia
LiberaÆ in the 1980s. He is a well known novelist and essayist. After 1989 he became an important
opinion leader. Paleologu is an aristocratic ®gure from an older generation. He was imprisoned for
political reasons between 1959 and 1964 but returned to became an in¯uential ®gure among young
intellectuals before 1989. In 1990 he served as Romanian ambassador to France and currently holds
a seat in the Senate.
39
Paler is following Noica here.
40
Octavian Paler, `IÃntre natË ionalismul de grotaÆ sË i ``europenii'' de nicaÆieri', 22, 51, 22±
27 December 1995, p. 11.
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266 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

Underpinning Paler's argument is a distinction between malignant and

benign nationalisms. He can grant that nationalist discourse is open to the most
grotesque abuse; but without some appeal to national sentiment, political
community of any kind is inconceivable to him. Paleologu ( following Jacques le
Go€) frames the discussion in terms of a contrast between `legitimate' and
`hegemonic' nationalism.41 Legitimate nationalism in this construal should not
be equated with a straightforward civic conception. It alludes rather to a deeper
cultural unity which informs the manifold guises European nations have
assumed. The intellectual pedigree derives from Herder or Mazzini rather than
Bismarck and Fichte. For Paleologu the emphasis is on the diversity of cultural
expression rather than the dominance of any particular form. He sees Europe
primarily as `a culture and a civilization', and certainly not a network of
institutions and procedures.42 The two dimensions are, of course, related; but
defensible institutions cannot be fashioned in disregard of the diversity of
cultures within Europe. Paleologu speci®cally endorses historicism, despite the
appalling damage which a certain style of historicism had wrought in Romania
in his life-time. What he cannot accept is the `thin' cosmopolitanism which
denies the signi®cance of concrete forms of ¯ourishing.
The debate between Patapievici and Andreescu on the one side, and Paler and
Paleologu on the other, though couched in ideological terms and advanced with
particular political ends in view, clearly highlights points which have been central
in the dispute between liberals and communitarians in Anglo-American political
theory.43 If a rights-based regime requires a conception of the person as an ideal
rational actor (what Sandel has characterized as an `unencumbered' self), then
advocates of a cosmopolitan Romania, fully integrated in the wider network of
European institutions will ( probably) ®nd themselves confronted by insuperable
theoretical and practical obstacles.44 The point we would want to insist upon,
however, is that rights can be defended without invoking any particular
conception of the person. Identities can be rich and varied; and indeed discussion
of rights starts from the recognition that such multiple-identities are morally
irreducible. We have no need to invoke an abstract conception of human nature
(and indeed Sandel may well be mistaken in attributing such a view to the early
Rawls).45 We begin with social diversity as a datum. The problem with nationalist
discourse of any kind is that it privileges one conception of identity over others,
as if national identity is a trump which overrides other attachments and
dispositions. Given that identities are essentially contested and multi-faceted, it
follows that if we take identity seriously, we cannot invoke a conception of the
nation as a criterion of political legitimacy.46
Andreescu's point is precisely that even a commitment to `legitimate'
nationalism (which Paleologu regards as a necessary foundation for a polity)
41
Alexandru Paleologu, `Pacta sunt servanda . . .', in Andreescu, NatËionalisËti, antinatËionalisËti,
p. 27.
42
Alexandru Paleologu, `Despre irelevantË aÆ, in Andreescu, NatËionalisËti, antinatËionalisËti, p. 64.
43
For an overview of the debate see S. Mulhall and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1992).
44 See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University

Press, 1982), p. 180.

45
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 27,
fn. 29.
46
See Andrew Vincent, `Liberal nationalism: an irresponsible compound?', Political Studies,
XLV (1997), 275±95.
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 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 267

obstructs an informed pursuit of interest. Instead of focusing on `practical

objectives', so-called `legitimate' nationalists conduct their arguments in general
terms, repeating `stereotypical commonplaces'.47 Even when they appear to be
arguing from history and tradition, they adopt idealized terms, deploring the
`ingratitude of history, the decadence of modernity, and the cynicism of the
west'.48 If territorial disputes remain matters of honour, it will always be
impossible to resolve dicult issues. Con¯icts of interest are treated as if they
are necessarily questions of fundamental principle. If the charge against
Andreescu is that his cosmopolitanism is excessively abstract, then he can
respond by focusing on the idealization which passes for history in (even
moderate) nationalist discourse. Territorial disputes are problems of inter-
national law, not national redemption.
Andreescu identi®es three fundamental `vices of nationalist discourse'.49 In
the ®rst place, the legitimizing narrative is an `historical idealization', a function
of `nostalgia' rather than analysis, attributing principled signi®cance to events
which are transient and contingent.50 Secondly, specifying one's own political
identity in relation to an `other' involves an exclusive conception of citizenship
even if there is a commitment to national diversity as a value. From this
perspective, even `legitimate' nationalism becomes ( potentially) xenophobic
and, in the Romanian context, anti-western. Thirdly, and most fundamentally,
an in¯exible language prevents the kind of practical accommodation which
facilitates the resolution of con¯icts of interest. The distinction between
`Romanian tradition and identity' and European culture more generally is seen
by Andreescu as a work of ®ction, edifying perhaps in fairy-tales but an
unnecessary burden in the business of practical politics.51
Andreescu concedes to Paler and Paleologu that the past cannot be
discounted. His point is that to `worship' historical memories is `counter-
productive' in practical politics.52 That we have speci®c identities is not in
dispute. Fanciful discussions of identity, however, are entirely secondary in
relation to `the dignity of human beings in their individuality'.53 Our personal
histories tell us many things about ourselves; but they cannot be invoked simply
to validate the way of life we happen to enjoy.
Andreescu's principal point is that the will of the Romanian peoples
(Hungarians, Germans, Jews, Romanies, Armenians etc.) should not be
reduced to a homogeneous ethno-cultural identity. He is happy enough to
invoke `nationalism in the civic sense' in this context, though we should be clear
that neither Paler nor Paleologu can be simply dismissed as ethnic nationalists.54
Paleologu's objections to a certain style of European integration (the Europe of

47 Gabriel Andreescu, `Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu sË i spinoasa problema a natË iona-
Æ
lismului', in NatËionalisËti, antinatËionalisËti, p. 57.
48
Andreescu, `Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu sË i spinoasa problemaÆ a natË ionalismului',
p. 57.
49
Andreescu, `Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu sË i spinoasa problemaÆ a natË ionalismului',
p. 42.
50 Andreescu, `Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu sË i spinoasa problema a natË ionalismului',
Æ
p. 42.
51 Andreescu, `Octavian Paler, Alexandru Paleologu sË i spinoasa problema a natË ionalismului',
Æ
p. 45.
52
Andreescu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', NatËionalisËti, antinatËionalisËti, p. 142.
53
Andreescu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', p. 93.
54 Andreescu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', p. 100.

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268 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

Maastricht) actually stems from his perception of a failure at European level to

recognize the value of cultural diversity. Whether or not his strictures against
Maastricht are defensible is beside the point. He sees in the Maastricht Treaty a
denial of `national speci®city', a purely `administrative formula', which under-
mines the original cosmopolitan ideals of the founders of the European
Union.55 His sentiments on this issue are very similar to those articulated by
Mrs Thatcher in her notorious Bruges speech of 1988. Her conception of
Europe as `a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating
each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less
than our common European endeavour', combines a commitment to unity and
diversity.56 It would be misleading to portray discourse that happened to value
national diversity as necessarily nationalist. Thatcher certainly would not have
so described herself in 1988. Paleologu accepts that full civic rights within a state
are compatible with multiple identities. His opposition is not to a regime of
rights but to the bureaucratic imposition of regulations which do not re¯ect the
self-understandings of the various European cultures. He can thus defend
accommodation between Romanians and Hungarians, while deploring the
imposition of Recommendation 1,201 from the Council of Europe regarding the
self-determination of minority cultures.
For Andreescu, however, Paleologu's Europeanism is more apparent than
real. His reading of the Maastricht Treaty ignores the commitment in the
preamble to `the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental liberties and the rule of law', signi®cantly including respect for the
`traditions and culture' of the European peoples.57 A preamble, of course, is no
more than a bland commitment; and it may be that in practice European
institutions and policies have emerged to serve the interests of certain states
rather more than others. Paleologu speci®cally complains about the neglect of
the impact of `50 years of communist genocide' on Romanian life in discussions
of economic integration. Economic goals which are simply not attainable in the
short term are presented as de®nitive criteria of international acceptability.58
Andreescu insists, however, that a very thin line divides the rhetoric of diversity
from the rhetoric of political exclusion. Paleologu's misreading of Maastricht
o€ers nationalists a more secure foundation than the more stringent language of
Partidul UnitaÆtËii NatËionale a RomaÃnilor propaganda. The real contrast at work
here is between the politics of sentiment and the politics of principle. Nobody
suggests that principles operate in a cultural vacuum. Yet is not clear what our
proper response should be when sentiments (quite naturally) clash. Moderate
nationalism legitimizes a purely contingent consensus. Our narrowly political
problems arise when sentiments cease to be mutually supportive. In such a
dilemma, the (moderate) nationalist simply privileges one position over another,
the liberal seeks a principled procedure for the resolution of con¯ict.
Ideal-typical characterizations of liberalism and nationalism can only be taken
so far. Andreescu's concern is to highlight what may be implicit in moderate
nationalism. The point is not to belittle the signi®cance of local identities, rather

55
Andreescu cites from an interview with Paleologu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', p. 107.
56
Trevor Salmon and William Nicoll (eds), Building European Union (Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1997), p. 214.
57
Gabriel Andreescu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', pp. 107±8.
58 See Andreescu, `Interes natË ional, pro®l intelectual', p. 107.

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 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 269

that principled choices are being made when local identities are endorsed. Sorin
Antohi speci®cally warns against the danger of pursuing an abstract European
identity that properly belongs nowhere. The Europe of Maastricht is no more an
actual culture than the political utopias of the 1930s. The crucial point for
Antohi is to realize a local cultural identity which is a vehicle for universal values.
Neither the fantasies of uncritical westernizers (bovarismul geocultural) nor the
nostalgic illusions of autochthonists (autohtonismul) can serve as reliable guides
for the future.59 Antohi's preferred path is a synthesis of `reality and ®ction',
`history and utopia', which breaks down the conceptual opposition between
Romanian and European identities.60 The point he insists on is that public
discourse can be culturally rooted without being narrowly parochial.
It should be clear from our reconstruction of this debate on the political
signi®cance of Romanian identity that neither the liberal nor national camps are
homogeneous. Antohi distinguishes four distinct positions: (1) the `radical
institutional westernism' of Andreescu, endorsing a Euro-Atlanticist view; (2)
the `anti-modern cultural Europeanism' of Paler and Paleologu; (3) the `arma-
tive nationalism' of Zub, compatible with a wider commitment to Europe but
deeply sceptical of western motives; and (4) the `apologetic westernism' of
Patapievici, based upon an idealized reading of liberalism.61 Among these
principal thinkers, only Zub, for whom the nation is an `ethno-cultural
memory', speci®cally appeals to ethnic identity.62 The strident discourse of
populist nationalism, of course, is thoroughly imbued with ethnic language. But
the debate we are concerned with here is focused on an emerging normative
discourse within the Romanian intelligentsia. Whether that normative discourse
constitutes an e€ective challenge to widely held views of the nation is precisely
the point at issue. We are looking at the defensibility of certain ways of
speaking, not at the language that simply happens to be used. We are treating
the intellectual debate in Romania much as we would treat the debate between
liberals and communitarians in Anglo-American political theory.
We are not concerned simply to apply Anglo-American theory to the
Romanian debate. The point (as Andreescu himself has insisted) is that the
resolution of practical diculties involves principled choices. Problems arise in
all numbers of di€erent contexts irrespective of the conception of the nation one
happens to adopt. Andreescu cites the Hungarian minority problem, territorial
disputes with Moldavia and Ukraine, and the vexed question of privacy, as
occasions for the elaboration of a procedural politics which is speci®cally geared
to problem solving. The real contrast is between a politics which accommodates
contested priorities and a utopian politics which sees con¯icts of interest and
principle as somehow eradicable.
At the very least, it is clear that the conception of ethnic nationalism as
somehow typical of eastern Europe is misleading even in the context of a
nationalism which is generally regarded as profoundly anti-individualist. Even if
it is accepted that the idiom of the nation constitutes a fundamental point of
reference within Romanian public discourse, it remains the case that principles
have to be invoked as soon as we discriminate between di€erent species of the
59 Sorin Antohi, `RomaÃnii in anii '90: geogra®e simbolica sË i identitate sociala', in Andreescu,
Æ Æ
RomaÃnia versus RomaÃnia, p. 201.
60
Antohi, `RomaÃnii in anii '90: geogra®e simbolicaÆ sË i identitate socialaÆ', p. 202.
61
Antohi, `RomaÃnii in anii '90: geogra®e simbolicaÆ sË i identitate socialaÆ', p. 213.
62 Cited in Andreescu, NatËionalisËti, antinatËionalisËti, p. 99.

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270 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

genus. We have to be very careful with our language here. Conventional

attempts to distinguish between types of nationalism refer to context rather than
doctrinal implication. Plamenatz, for example, focuses on an awareness of
`inadequacy' which has somehow driven eastern European peoples `to assert
themselves as equals' in an ill-de®ned contest with their more fortunate
neighbours.63 The attribution of `backwardness' to eastern European forms of
nationalism has done lasting damage. Political theorists, in particular, have
been disinclined to take the normative argument within certain national cultures
seriously. Eastern European nationalism is regarded as a problem, even some-
thing to deplore. Hegemonic discourses within national cultures, however, are
the product of normative argument. It is undoubtedly the case that social
structural factors within cultures are likely to facilitate particular sorts of
discourse rather than others. The role of intellectuals in relation to the state has
clearly been an important feature in Romanian development. But structural
circumstances do not determine intellectual outcomes. They may make certain
arguments more readily assimilable than others, especially at popular levels. It
may indeed suce in some disciplines to focus exclusively on typologies. Yet
something important is lost if discourses are not seen as products of intellectual
and practical engagement. What counts as a good argument will doubtless
di€er from context to context. Explanation of the genesis of ideas, however,
cannot replace, and should not be confused with, the question of justi®cation.
It should be clear, then, that `ethnic nationalism' cannot be applied to
Romanian (or any other) public discourse as a descriptive term without
quali®cation. Clearly the position of C. V. Tudor and RomaÃnia Mare is ethnic in
an obvious sense. Our concern here, however, is with distinctions which have
already been introduced into the argument by thinkers who might be described
as nationalist. Paler and Paleologu have defended a sense of Romanian tradition
in their response to what they see as an excessively abstract characterization of
civil society drawn largely from Anglo-American political and social theory. To
describe Romanian tradition in speci®c terms may commit them to speaking of
the `nation', but they do not have to endorse the normative charge the term
carries in some quarters. Michael Oakeshott, for example, in his strictures
against rationalism and collectivism, attacks the abstraction at the heart of
utopian schemes.64 When he defends tradition, however, it is very speci®cally
not in abstract national terms. The `nation' itself in modern discourse has
constituted a central point of reference for rationalist projects. For manipulative
purposes, the nation has been presented as a natural fact rather than an
historical construct. Traditions (on-going practices which we are inducted into)
are essential to our ¯ourishing as human beings. They o€er us terms of reference
which enable us both to understand ourselves and to confront contingencies
that could not (in principle) have been anticipated. Recognizing ourselves as
historically situated enables us to appreciate our individuality. But our

63 John Plamenatz, `Two Types of Nationalism', in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), Nationalism: The

Nature and Evolution of an Idea (London, Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 30. Plamenatz has been sharply
criticized by Norman Davies, Europe: a History (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 21±2.
64
See Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London, Methuen, 1962).
For discussion see Bruce Haddock, `Michael Oakeshott: Rationalism in Politics', in Murray
Forsyth and Maurice Keens-Soper (eds), The Political Classics: Green to Dworkin (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 100±20.
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 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 271

traditions do not constitute a greater good which can be speci®ed in abstract

terms and used in justi®cation of arbitrary constraints on practical choices.
Paler and Paleologu can thus be described as traditionalists who set
Romanian identity in a wider context of European culture. It may be that
their hostility to the abstraction of Anglo-American rights discourse is based on
a caricature that rights-theorists themselves would not recognize. Rawls in
Political Liberalism has certainly made signi®cant concessions to his commun-
itarian critics by treating rooted pluralism as the starting point of his political
theory. When Paler, in particular, continues to extol the virtues of Romanian
village life and the honesty and generosity of the peasant, we must ask ourselves
what he is committing himself to. Precisely how the cultural life of the
Romanian peasant should best be characterized is a question for the anthro-
pologist or the sociologist; the use that is made of that understanding in
normative discourse is quite another matter.
Paler admits that his allusions to rural culture are nostalgic rather than
historical or theoretical. His point, however, is that principled positions are
always informed by culturally speci®c connotations. If he grants, as he must,
that our nostalgia may take many and varied forms, we are still left with the
problem of how to arbitrate between sentiments which clash. This is where the
language of rights is useful to us. Conceptions of rights furnish us with
procedural means of resolving disputes which threaten the status and interests of
protagonists. They do not replace our complex identities but rather facilitate our
practical dealings with one another.
It may appear that what we are dealing with here is a conception of `civic'
rather than `ethnic' nationalism, as these distinctions are conventionally under-
stood. Our contention, however, is that civic nationalism (or liberal nationalism)
is in fact a con¯ation of conceptually distinct positions. Nationalism in all its
guises exploits the language of shared identity; civic or liberal conceptions o€er
procedural means of arbitrating between the designated rights of actors. Who
rights-bearers are and how they should be designated is a dicult and sometimes
explosive question. Animals and future generations are sometimes said to have
rights. By the same token, people who seem to resemble one another in almost all
respects are sometimes denied civic status for what appear to be accidental
reasons (religion, race etc.). But the point we must insist on is that granting
diverse identities does not provide a legitimizing principle where these identities
are felt to be incompatible. Whether consciously or not, something like the
language of rights has to be invoked. Human beings, of course, are not simply
bearers of rights. When they encounter one another as strangers they are already
blessed with complex identities which are not regarded as relevant to their
practical engagements. In a real sense, then, rights and identities cannot be
regarded as alternatives because they are operating in di€erent spheres.
The point is nicely illustrated in Havel's work. In Summer Meditations he
presents the individual as the centre of `a set of concentric circles' which specify
what it means for us to feel at home.65 From our families, these circles radiate
outwards to include village or town, language, profession, country, culture etc.
All of these circles contribute to our sense of ourselves. Crucially, however, the
pattern of circles would never be identical for any two individuals. Much that

65
Vaclav Havel, (Paul Wilson, transl.), Summer Meditations on Politics, Morality and Civility in a
Time of Transition (London, Faber and Faber, 1992), p. 30.
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272 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

we need to say about ourselves depends upon social criteria and social recogni-
tion. Yet even if we share very many attitudes and sentiments with those closest
to us, we will never be able to speak in terms of a de®nitive identity which sums
us up. In this scheme of things, territorial boundaries are more or less arbitrary
legal markers, convenient no doubt for certain purposes but not ®xed in the
nature of things.
Havel clearly envisages that national boundaries will become less signi®cant
as European cultures and economies adjust to the removal of inappropriate
political constraints. His point, however, is not `to suppress the national
dimension of a person's identity, or deny it, or refuse to acknowledge its
legitimacy and its right to full self-realization', but rather to `reject the kind of
political notions that, in the name of nationality, attempt to suppress other
aspects of the human home, other aspects of humanity and human rights'.66 Far
from seeing the principles of civil society as incompatible with the national
principle, Havel argues that civil society enables human beings to ¯ourish in
diverse ways. Without the formal commitment to procedural rules which we
associate with civil society, `nations' are the caricatured consequence of the
manipulation of political elites. If we are talking in terms of validating
principles, it is civil society which legitimizes national cultures and not the other
way about. Havel is emphatic on this point. He insists that `our everyday lives
depend as much on the kind of constitution we have as they do on the kind of
country we live in'.67 And, of course, we have to make choices about
constitutional principles, whereas we simply grow up in particular cultures.
Havel has returned to precisely the same point in a recent comment on the
frustrations of European Union enlargement from an east European perspect-
ive. The dealings of west European governments with one another have always
been something of a mystery to statesmen in less fortunate circumstances
confronting an historical opportunity that could well be lost. In an address in
Aachen on 15 May 1996, Havel sought to remind the leaders of the European
Union of a wider conception of Europe which had informed the original
experiment to link the political fortunes of sovereign states to a permanent set of
institutions. The curious combination of caution, complacency and mutual
accommodation which is a feature of European Union negotiation should not
obscure the principles which motivated European statesmen in the aftermath of
the Second World War. Havel acknowledges that `European integration began
as economic integration', yet he contends that `its political points of departure
and its political objectives' were always clear.68 `The hope was to bring about a
great renaissance of the civic principle as the only possible basis for truly
peaceful cooperation among nations.'69 He reiterates that the concern `was not
to suppress national identity or national consciousness, which is one of the
dimensions of human identity, but rather to free human beings from the
bondage of ethnic collectivism'.70
The point about `ethnic collectivism' needs to be emphasized here. The threat
posed to human rights and individuality by certain styles of nationalist rhetoric

66 Havel, Summer Meditations, p. 32.

67
Havel, Summer Meditations, p. 25.
68
Vaclav Havel, `The hope for Europe', New York Review of Books, 20 June 1996, p. 40.
69
Havel, `The hope for Europe', p. 40.
70 Havel, `The hope for Europe', p. 40.
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 BRUCE HADDOCK AND OVIDIU CARAIANI 273

is too obvious to require further comment. Yet even (so called) benign forms of
nationalism (liberal, civic, reform) implicitly appeal to collectivist principles. We
must emphasize that a doctrine which endorses the rights of diverse cultures to
¯ourish (some of which may be described as national) is not itself a species of
nationalism. The addition of the `ism' here makes all the di€erence to what
would otherwise be an orthodox form of pluralism. It is the use of the nation as
a political trump (rather than a term of cultural identi®cation) that implicitly
subordinates claims about rights to questions of identity. Political claims on
behalf of the nation are necessarily couched in collective terms (the interests of
our citizens, the defence of our traditions etc.). The political culture in question
may be more or less supportive of the rights of individuals. But it is the culture
that nationalist discourse is grafted on to which secures those rights, not
nationalist principles themselves.
The denial of the possibility of a general characterization of the collective
interest of a community clearly creates problems for nationalist discourse in any
context. Our concern here, however, is not simply to endorse (what might be
regarded in Romania as) an anti-nationalist position; rather we aim to clarify
the points at issue in order to facilitate constructive political discourse. What we
o€er is a theoretical bridge which sets the problems of the various protagonists
in a di€erent perspective. The protagonists, to be sure, may not welcome this
reworking of their arguments. The tone of Paler's letter which closes the debate
in 22 suggests that he felt little would be gained from a further exchange of
views.71 We share his scepticism about the likelihood of ®nal agreement. It
would be unreasonable to expect the kind of normative discourse defended here
to reconcile fundamental disagreements of world view or conviction. Our
interest is more precisely in what follows from a recognition of deep di€erences
in attitudes and beliefs. Political discourse of the kind recommended here leaves
a great deal that matters to people entirely out of account. But it is only political
agreement that we are talking about. A reasonable outcome of a controversial
argument may be an agreement to di€er. That is not the same as refusal to
engage in argument in the ®rst place.
What is ruled out is the contention that knowledge-claims can be advanced
which somehow circumscribe the community. Civil society is essentially a
regulatory framework which enables strangers to pursue their goals in a mutually
advantageous fashion. It says nothing about the goals they should in fact pursue.
Individuals will agonize about what they should do and will generally need to
negotiate with one another in order to pursue complex projects. The state (as a
coercive apparatus) may be invoked where procedural rules have been breached.
Eciency may demand that immense public resources should be channelled into
certain projects rather than others. But the state is justi®ed in terms of procedures
rather than projects. There is no speci®c goal that the state should strive to
attain.72 Utopia is one obvious casualty of this style of argument. There is no
end-state which can be cited in justi®cation of the sacri®ces that citizens have
been persuaded to endure. Attempts to characterize real interests, the national
will, the common good (or other such abstractions) encounter the same
theoretical objections. Individuals will have their views about these matters. The

71
See 22, 31, 31 July±6 August 1996, p. 5.
72
Oakeshott's distinction between `civil association' and `enterprise association' is helpful here.
See Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford, Clarendon, 1975), pp. 108±84.
# Political Studies Association, 1999
274 Nationalism and Civil Society in Romania

point, however, is that reasonable agreement cannot be expected in essentially-

contested areas. Collectivism in its various forms depends upon the speci®cation
of ideal goals. If, in fact, such goals cannot be speci®ed, collectivism fails.
It is widely recognized that CeausË escu's Romania was a ghastly collectivist
nightmare. It is curious, then, that it should be replaced by another version of
collectivism. As Katherine Verdery has shown, the concept of the nation has
tended to marginalize rights discourse in Romanian public culture, exploiting
assumptions deeply embedded in the CeausË escu era.73 In normative terms, this
has meant that some of the principal objections to the CeausË escu regime have
simply been set aside. This is not to suggest that all `nationalists' have knowingly
argued for a replacement of one collectivism with another, rather that the
fundamental anities of collectivist modes of discourse have not been e€ectively
confronted. In theoretical terms, then, the debate within Romanian political
culture has been conducted in systematically misleading terms. We can accept
that individualism and collectivism can be cast in a variety of guises. But to
conduct the debate exclusively within collectivist terms of reference (socialism,
communism, ethnic nationalism) is to prejudice the outcome. Patapievici and
Andreescu have sought to counter nationalism with a vigorous defence of
individualism. There is no need to argue, however, that individuals are free-
standing or bereft of social identity and commitments. Part of the diculty here
is that building political institutions in the wake of the collapse of communism is
not the same as building a nation. Our theoretical concern has been to focus on
the ambiguity of `civic nationalism' as a concept. Romanian experience suggests
that the forced marriage of individualist and collectivist notions is likely to be
barren. By focusing on what is `civic' about civic nationalism, the terms of
reference of the debate are signi®cantly shifted. The concern must be to ask what
makes civil society possible, not how national consensus might best be achieved.
The political problem facing all post-communist states was in fact technical.
A whole panoply of institutions, ranging from complex arrangements for credit
and money supply to (apparently) straightforward entitlements to private
property, had to be created overnight. An adjustment of practices and proced-
ures on this scale was bound to involve casualties. What happened in the
Romanian case is that the language of national identity o€ered a convenient
pretext for the defence of interests vested in the old regime. In the light of the
initial collapse of incomes and expectations, a reaction along these lines may
well have been inevitable. The task reformist intellectuals set themselves in this
context was to defend a rights-based conception of civil society in the face of
a reassertion of collectivist values. In the course of the debate, they high-
lighted issues which are of crucial signi®cance in the developing context of
pan-European institutions.74
(Accepted : 1 February 1998)

73
See Katherine Verdery, `Civil Society or Nation? ``Europe'' in the Symbolism of Postsocialist
Politics', in her What is Socialism, and What comes Next, pp. 104±29.
74
We are grateful to Gabriel Andreescu, Robert Bideleux, Alan Monte®ore and the three
anonymous readers of Political Studies for helpful comments on a ®rst draft of this paper.
# Political Studies Association, 1999