Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY IN THE

PHILIPPINES
Author(s): Carolina G. Hernandez
Source: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2, DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY (WINTER
1985), pp. 243-258
Published by: Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board
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Carolina G. Hernandez
CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITARIANISM
AND THE PROSPECTS OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
When martial law was imposed in the Philippines in
September 1972, the official rationale was the resur
gence of the Communist insurgency during the late six
ties under the aegis of a newly-constituted Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the
New People's Aimy (NPA). Marcos proclaimed at this
time that he intended to use martial law to build a New
Society,1 which apparently could not be constructed
under a democratic governmental structure because of
the energy-consuming and time-wasting tendencies of
democratic decision making. Authoritarian rule exer
cised by a martial law administrator was seen as the
appropriate alternative political mechanism for bring
ing about change.
This paper examines the effects of constitutional
authoritarianism on Philippine society, particularly its
political institutions, as well as the prospects for a re
turn to democracy in light of recent events. It will begin
with a brief description of the governmental structure
before 1972 and proceed to discuss the effects of con
stitutional authoritarianism in terms of the decline of
0022-197x/85/1314-0243$01.50/0
©Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York
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democracy since 1972. Prospects for a return to de
mocracy will be evaluated by way of conclusion.
Philippine Democracy Prior to 1972
When Philippine independence was restored by the
United States on July 4, 1946, a republican system of
government headed by a powerful president was in ef
fect. From 1946 to 1969 the Filipino people were led
by a succession of presidents who served for four year
terms with only one opportunity for reelection. Until
Marcos, however, no Philippine president had been re
elected to a second term.
Governmental powers were shared by the legislature
—the Philippine Congress—composed of the House
of Representatives and the Senate, the former elected
through a system of geographic representation, the
latter by nation-wide elections. Two major parties, the
Nacionalista and Liberal parties, alternated as the ma
jority party. As in most presidential systems, the exe
cutive sometimes had to contend with a legislature
composed of a majority of opposition members, mak
ing the process of decision making time-consuming and
often frustrating.
The Supreme Court, as the highest court in the land,
functioned as the authoritative arbiter of issues of law
and legitimacy. Its independence, nurtured over time,
earned it both prestige and public esteem. When the
distinguished justices spoke, everybody listened; when
they ruled, Filipinos obeyed.
1. Proclamation 1081, September 21, 1972. The term "New
Society" refers to a reformed Philippine society rid of inefficiency,
and other practices and values considered inimical to progress and
national development.
243
 Journal of International Affairs
The Constitution of 1935 guaranteed the fundamen
tal rights of the citizens to life, liberty and property. Due
process was one of the legal procedural guarantees for
these rights. Abuse of governmental power was limited
by the operation of the principle of separation of
powers and a system of checks and balances. An ac
tive, critical and free, if often abusive, press ensured
that instances of corruption and government abuses
were brought to public attention. Nevertheless, in spite
of these constitutional and legal safeguards, Philippine
democracy did not escape the usual and persistent gov
ernment ills of graft and corruption.
Elections were usually marred by violence and fraud.
Private armies were used by politicians to ensure elec
toral success. Vote-buying was common as was "flying
voting."2 For all these corrupt electoral practices, how
ever, from 1946 to 1969, Filipinos did exercise their
sovereign right of electing their chosen representatives
into office with predictable regularity. Unpopular lead
ers were rejected in favor of more popular or at least
less unpopular candidates. Palace coups had no place
in Philippine politics perhaps because the electoral pro
cess worked, albeit imperfectly.
Philippine democracy operated within a socioeco
nomic system characterized by the control of wealth by
a few families, many of whom were also members of
the political elite. Redistribution of wealth through land
reform was therefore infeasible. Social discontent with
the system was fanned by growing activism and protest
both in urban and rural areas. By the late 1960s this
culminated in the revival of a Communist-inspired in
surgency by the newly-constituted CPP-NPA led by
Jose Ma. Sison. The Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) also posed a security problem for the gov
ernment. Outside of these groups, social unrest was
244
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exacerbated by graft and corruption in government.
Lawlessness and violence characterized the period im
mediately preceding marital law, abetted by the wide
circulation of unlicensed firearms among a broad array
of citizens, ranging from politicians and middle class
businessmen to ordinary criminals.
Peace and order had deteriorated so badly by 1972,
that many Filipinos were relieved when martial law was
imposed. However, there were also many who quietly
expressed misgiving about the consequences of martial
law, especially in terms of the future of democracy in
the Philippines.
The Decline of Democracy: 1972-84
Prompted by the presumed threat to national secu
rity posed by subversion, lawlessness and violence, and
the perceived ineffectiveness of existing political ar
rangements to meet this threat and solve other press
ing problems, in September 1972 Mr. Marcos declared
martial law. In his capacity as commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, he ordered the military:
... to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promul
gated by me or upon my direction.3
Marcos's assumption of emergency powers was based
on a constitutional provision which made the president
the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces,
and allowed him, at any time to:
2. "Flying voting" is a term used to describe the practice of regis
tering and voting in more than one electoral precinct.
3. Proclamation 1081, September 21,1972.

call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless vio
lence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend
the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Phil
ippines or any part thereof under martial law.4
Thus martial law was justified on the basis of this con
stitutional mandate and the perceived threats to na
tional security and peace and order.
Constitutional Authoritarianism and
Presidential Primacy
With the advent of martial law, Congress was dis
mantled, political parties were outlawed, mass activities
were proscribed, and civil and political rights were sus
pended. One of the very first orders under martial law
was the arrest and detention of persons named in a list
attached to General Order No. 2s to which subsequent
additions were made. Many leading politicians were ar
rested and detained under this order, including Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., who was later assassinated, Jo
vito Salonga, Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, Jose W. Diokno,
and others. Leaders and members of suspected sub
versive organizations, including the CPP-NPA and the
Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (an or
ganization of intellectuals and professionals led by a
distinguished and respected lawyer and national leader,
former Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada), were similarly on
the list.
With Congress dismantled, legislative power was as
sumed by Marcos, who, as head of the executive, was
also the executor of the laws he now made. The al
ready powerful position of the president under the
1935 Constitution was made even more powerful
through the adoption of the 1973 Constitution under
which the powers of the prime minister were also as
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Prospects in the Philippines
signed to Mr. Marcos. The 1973 Constitution was rati
fied through the unusual procedure of convening spe
cial citizens' assemblies which reportedly approved the
Constitution through a mere show of hands. Though
this procedure was not one of the methods of ratifying
constitutional amendments provided for in the 1935
Constitution, the Supreme Court ruled that there was
no judicial impediment for the 1973 Constitution to be
in full force and effect.6
Constitutional authoritarianism replaced democracy
as the effective governmental form from 1972. All of
the country's democratic political institutions have de
clined relative to the presidency since then. Marcos
fused executive and legislative powers in his person.
Appointive powers consequently became his alone;
thus all major appointments to both civilian and mili
tary posts were made under his sole authority. Over
time, all major civilian officials and top ranking military
officers became the president's men. Outside of the cab
inet, Marcos's chief partner in the management of the
country became the military.
4. Constitution of the Philippines, February 8, 1935, Article VII,
Section 10 (2).
5. Sources of the various presidential decrees (PD), general orders
(G.O.), and letters of instruction (L.O.I.) issued by Mr. Marcos since
1972 are various issues of the Official Gazette from October 2,1972
onwards. A helpful compilation of these presidential issuances is the
series compiled and edited by Myrna Feliciano and Antonio Santos,
Subject Guide to Presidential Decrees and Other Presidential Issu
ances from the Proclamation of Martial.Law to June 1975 (Quezon
City: University of the Philippines Law Center, 1975). Three supple
ments have since been published covering the period October 1976
to December 1978 and work on the fourth supplement is currently
underway to cover the period January 1979 to the present.
6. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 1973.
245
Journal of International Affairs
The primacy of the presidency under constitutional
authoritarianism can be gleaned from the fact that
Marcos has been both lawmaker and executor of laws
since 1972. Because of a set of constitutional amend
ments which was approved by the electorate two years
prior to the 1978 elections, the election of the interim
Batasang Pambansa (interim National Assembly) in
1978 did not alter his legislative position. Amendment
No. 5 authorized Marcos to continue exercising legisla
tive powers for the duration of martial law.7 This am
endment not only served to perpetuate the fusion of
executive and legislative powers under the president
until the lifting of martial law, but also obviously weak
ened and undermined the legislative powers of the in
terim assembly.
As if these constitutional provisions were not ade
quate to ensure executive primacy, Amendment No. 6
further entrenched presidential legislative powers. It
provides that:
Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister),
there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires
immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, is
sue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions,
which shall form part of the law of the land.8
The president's continued exercise of legislative
powers is not limited to the usual kinds of emergency
which would warrant their exercise, such as invasion,
insurrection or their imminent threat. He can exercise
his powers whenever, in his view, the assembly is una
ble to act adequately on any matter that he perceives
requires immediate action. The amendment does not
require that an independent body, such as the Supreme
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Court, concur with his decision. Whatever decrees
Marcos enacts do not require ratification by any other
authority, such as the assembly itself, before they come
into force as laws. Under Amendment No. 6, nothing
in the constitution or in the existing laws can prevent
the president from exercising legislative powers. Such
preemption of the lawmaking powers of the assembly
strikes at the very root of its raison d'être. Moreover, the
assembly has no organ of appeal within the context of
Amendment No. 6.
The acquisition of such unbridled powers can lead
to abuse. One of the most serious criticisms waged
against the decree-making powers of the president con
cerns the issuance of "secret decrees" that are known
only to their sponsors, the president, and a select few.
This situation creates a great deal of anxiety among
Filipinos because it means that one may be committing
a crime without even being aware of it. Decrees are
numbered seriatim, but one minister publicly stated that
there are numbered decrees the texts of which have
not yet been written and therefore remain unpublished.
These decrees carry the note "text reserved" in lieu of
the usual text.9
There has been an ongoing debate on the effective
ness of Amendment No. 6, which continues even after
the election of a regular assembly in May 1984. One
view holds that, since the regular National Assembly
mentioned in the amendment is none other than the
7. Constitution of the Philippines, January 17, 1973, as amended
on October 27, 1976.
8. 1973 Constitution of the Philippines.
9. Minister of Foreign Affairs Arturo M. Tolentino, "Amendment
No. 6 and the Batasari' (Speech at a symposium sponsored by the
Association of Political Science Majors, Asian Center Conference
Hall, University of the Philippines, September 11, 1984).

one which was elected in May 1984, presidential
decree-making powers survive the election of the reg
ular Batasang Pambansa. Another view, advocated by
Minister of Foreign Affairs Arturo M. Tolentino, holds
that because a subsequent constitutional amendment
enacted in 1981 substituted the term "regular Batas
ang Pambansa" for all constitutional references to the
"regular National Assembly" in Articles 12, 13, 14, 15
and 16 of the 1973 Constitution but not in Amend
ment No. 6, the election of the regular Batasang Pam
bansa terminates the decree making powers of the
president under Amendment No. 6. In other words,
since the legislative bodies mentioned in Amendment
No. 6 refer to the interim Batasang Pambansa, whose
term lapsed with the election of the regular Batasang
Pambansa, and the regular National Assembly, which
does not exist at all, the powers granted under that
amendment have also lapsed.
Moreover, in line with the latter view, the authority
upon which the amendment confers decree-making
powers is the president (prime minister), but such an
official no longer exists because the president and the
prime minister are now two separate officials. Finally,
it is held that the package of amendments of which
Amendment No. 6 is a part, was intended to last only
for the duration of the transition from a presidential to
a parliamentary system of government, a period which
has also now elapsed.10
Regardless of the constitutional weight of the Tolen
tino argument, the intent to make the presidential
decree-making powers survive the duration of martial
law seems clear. Amendment No. 6 guaranteed this
survival. An illustration of this intention was the sudden
announcement of two decrees, Presidential Decrees
(PD) 1934 and 1935, which increased vehicle registra
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Prospects in the Philippines
tion fees and travel tax to levels beyond the ability of
most people to pay. Public objection to these PDs was
widespread and intense, and was highlighted by a mass
strike of "jeepney"11 operators in September which
paralyzed Metro Manila for one day. Consequently,
Marcos issued an amendment to the two PDs. These
amendments were made in September while the reg
ular assembly was in session. It was a clear exercise
of presidential decree-making powers within the frame
work of Amendment No. 6. The popular perception
that Marcos would not yield to popular demands to
repeal Amendment No. 6 seemed reinforced by his
statement that the alternative to Amendment No. 6 is
martial law.12
Amendment No. 6 is objectionable on several
grounds.13 It authorizes the president to issue decrees
and orders on any subject. It can lead to abuse and
enables the president to issue the dreaded "secret de
crees." In addition, it violates the principle that all laws
are repealable. Even if the assembly issues a law re
pealing a PD, presidential approval is required for it to
become valid. Finally, the assembly is reduced to a sub
ordinate body under the primacy of the president.
The Decline of Democratic Institutions
The Parties and the Elections. The imposition of
martial law marked the decline of democratic institu
tions in the Philippines. Marcos's initial orders included
10. Tolentino.
11. The "jeepriey" is a modified four-wheel army jeep which has
become the most common means of transportation in the Philippines.
12. Popular clamor for the repeal of Amendment No. 6 has included
Jaime Cardinal Sin's appeal to Mr. Marcos. See Ang Pahayagang
Malaya, September 10,1984, pp. 1 and 8.
13. Tolentino
247
 Journal of International Affairs
the prohibition of political parties, including his own
Nacionalista party. As already noted, many leading po
litical leaders were arrested and detained. A few were
able to leave for abroad, including former Senator Raul
Manglapus. All political party activities were prohibited,
putting a stop to the processes of elite recruitment, po
litical debate, and political competition which are so
vital to the democratic spirit.
The hasty revivial of political parties prior to the 1978
parliamentary elections did not contribute much to
democratic revival. The six years of suspended party
activities had already taken their toll. The environment
of martial law tendeci not to be conducive to the growth
of competitive politics; superior power resided with the
president and his newly-founded party, the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL, or New Society Movement).
Given the state of disarray among the traditional par
ties whose leadership had been dispersed through ar
rest, detention and/or refuge, and the psychological
climate among the citizenry, freedom of choice could
not really be expected to prevail at the polls, especially
as these were guarded and watched by soldiers, police
men and civilian officials closely identified with the
Marcos regime. Election fraud continued to plague Phil
ippine elections, the only difference being that now all
the aces were held in one hand.
Elections were suspended with the advent of martial
law. It was argued that elections were inimical to nation
building and development as they were costly, divisive,
counter-productive and destablizing, particularly with re
gard to economic growth. Whatever electoral exercises
were held between 1972 and 1978 were in the form of
plebiscites and referenda, which served to legitimize the
policies of the martial law regime.
However, the five elections held since 1978 have pro
248
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vided a certain kind of participative mechanism through
which the citizenry has been able to have an input in
government. Elections were held in 1978 to elect the
interim assembly, in 1980 to elect local government of
ficials, in 1981 to elect the president, in 1982 to elect
the officials of the barangay14 government, and in 1984
to elect the regular asssembly. In general, these elec
tions were neither fair nor clean. Results predictably
dealt KBL candidates the winning hand with few ex
ceptions, the most notable one being the 1984 parlia
mentary elections which gave a surprising number of
seats to opposition candidates.
The Legislature. The interim assembly which ser
ved as the formal legislative body from mid-1978 to
mid-1984 has been viewed largely as a "rubber-stamp"
legislature—its membership dominated by the KBL. A
miniscule opposition that dwindled with time served
as a token symbol of democracy during this period.
The record of the interim assembly was consequently a
dismal one. A member of the opposition in the Phil
ippines remarked that Amendment No. 6 made a
legislative assembly superfluous15 and noted that the
interim assembly's legislative record did not endorse
the election of a regular assembly. According to him,
the interim assembly enacted a total of 1,200 laws and
resolutions during its six years in office, as against 1,935
14. The barangay is the Philippine village of pre-hispanic times.
During martial law, the smallest political subdivision, the barrio, was
replaced by the barangay, an agency which became a part of the
government delivery system of services to the people.
15. From Abraham F. Sarmiento's (Liberal Party Official) (Speech
delivered at a symposium sponsored by Women in Media Now
(WOMEN), National Heritage Art Center, Quezon City, January 21,
1984), a copy of which is in the author's possession.

presidential decrees and other executive issuances dur
ing the same period. The latter includes only those that
have been published in the Official Gazette and does
not include "secret decrees." Moreover, most of the laws
passed by the interim assembly were related to the is
sues of health, local government and education. In the
case of health care they largely dealt with the establish
ment, renaming, expansion and upgrading of hospi
tals, while in the case of local government, most were
of a temporary and local nature.
In contrast, presidential decrees were substantive,
dealing with subjects such as subversion, fundamental
rights and creation of important governmental structures
and offices. The controversial preventive detention ac
tion (PDA) which replaced the presidential commit
ment order (PCO) was enacted by decree. Like the
PCO, the PDA authorizes the arrest and detention of a
person simply on the strength of a suspicion that he
may commit a subversive act. The suspect may be de
tained to prevent him from commiting such an act. With
a PDA not even the civilian courts are authorized to
order the release of suspects from military custody.16
Based on a study of the legislative performance of
the interim assembly and the president, the above men
tioned opposition leader concluded that the election of
a regular assembly is unwarranted. The Filipino people
spent about ^517,883,000 in six years, or an average
of î>431,569.17 per resolution, to support the opera
tion of a second legislative body, something which in
his view was unnecessary.17
Be that as it may, the election of the regular assem
bly in May 1984 has been viewed as a hopeful sign for
an eventual return to democracy. The opposition par
ties fared much better than expected by winning sixty
one seats. The assembly, however, remains under the
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Prospects in the Philippines
firm control of the government party (KBL). In fact, the
initial hopes of the opposition to initiate impeachment
proceedings against Marcos were dashed by a majority
party action which made impeachment procedures ag
ainst the incumbent impossible, unless members of the
assembly voted contrary to party lines. The best that
the opposition in the assembly can do is publicize
issues, dramatize their criticisms of unpopular gov
ernment policies, debate political issues, encourage
independent-minded KBL members and try to persuade
the rest of the KBL to vote independently of the party
line for the sake of the greater majority of Filipinos.
The Media. Martial law inflicted serious damage to
freedom of the press and public information. The gov
ernment initially shut down all newspapers, television
and radio stations, and placed them under the control
of the military. When they were allowed to resume op
erations, it was under the supervision of a regulatory
body which set guidelines for print and broadcast me
dia. Tight control over the media was secured through
the enactment of various decrees which limited what
could be publicly expressed. A scholar and writer noted
that many of these decrees are vague and all-embracing,
tending to make practically every criticism of the gov
16. The Supreme Court ruled in Padilla vs. Enrile, 1983 that the
president has the legal authority to issue PCOs. Two recent victims of
the PDA are faculty members from a girls' school in Metro Manila
who were recommended to be released on bail by an appropriate
civilian court. The military refused to release them on the strength of
PDAs reportedly issued earlier than the preliminary hearing by the
civilian court, but publicly announced by the military only after the
hearing revealed them to be liable for the lesser offense of possession
of subversive documents, instead of subversion.
17. Sarmiento.
249
Journal of International Affairs
eminent a criminal act. Criticism which produces divi
sive effects among the people, promotes distrust for
duly constituted authorities, or tends to undermine the
integrity of the government is proscribed.18
The most dreadful of these decrees is PD 1834,
which prescribes the death penalty for the use of media
facilities for the purpose of mounting sustained propa
ganda attacks against the government or any duly con
stituted authority. These decrees have led to the practice
of self-censorship and the exercise of prior restraint by
members of the press. Unwritten guidelines for editors
and publishers prohibit stories which are critical of the
First Family, discuss corruption in high places, cast as
persions on the military, or are inimical to Philippine
interest, its culture and people.19
Not everyone in the media submitted to these stric
tures on press freedom. There were those who attem
pted to bypass these guidelines. But such boldness led
to forced resignation, dismissal or suspension from
work. In some instances entire newspapers were shut
down and their publishers and writers brought before
the courts on charges of subversion. Some individual
media men were also charged with libel. Until 1983,
the state of press freedom and public information was
so dismal that it led an analyst to characterize it as a
situation in which there is "[o]fficial denial of the truth,
censorship and propaganda" reflecting "distrust and
cynicism towards the people," which in turn "evoke[s]
similar feelings towards the authorities and stirfs] up
anti-government rumors and speculation."20
Since the assassination of former Senator Aquino in
August 1983, the government has been more tolerant
of the print media. Several publications critical of the
government have emerged, including Ang Pahayagang
Malaya (The Free Newspaper), and Veritas (Truth, pub
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lished by a church-controlled corporation). Collectively
these are called the "alternative press" and they have
been largely responsible for bringing to public attention
cases of abuse of power by both civilian and military
authorities, as well as for providing a forum in which
popular criticism of the government may be articulated.
Toleration of these publications has had the salutary
effect of defusing the outrage and frustration of the
people in the face of the government's repressive and
undemocratic practices, conditions which have been
exacerbated by the worst economic crisis to hit the
nation since World War II.
Broadcast media are largely controlled by the gov
ernment or by Marcos's close associates. Of the five
television channels operating in Metro Manila, one is
government-owned, and the other four are controlled
by close associates of Marcos. After the May 1984 elec
tions, three of the latter channels found themselves un
der the management of the eldest Marcos daughter.
Ownership of the remaining nongovernment-owned
channel is reportedly under negotiation for its sale to a
still undisclosed party.21 If this party turns out to be the
Marcos family, then their control over television media
will be complete.
18. Salvador R Lopez, "Free Press/Media" (A Workshop Paper pre
sented at the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference on Human Devel
opment, Makati Sports Club, Salcedo Village, Makati, December 10,
1983), 1.
19. Lopez.
20. Jose V. Abueva, "The Filipino Nation in Crises" (A paper pre
sented at the First National Social Science Congress, Philippine So
cial Science Center Auditorium, Quezon City, Novermber 17-19,
1983), 14.
21. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 3, 1984, pp. 1 and 2.

The only truly independent radio stations are Radio
Veritas, of the same church-controlled corporation pub
lishing the newspaper of the same name, and about
four others.
Fundamental Rights. The institution of constitutional
authoritarianism meant the suspension of other funda
mental rights of the citizens. As already noted, the
right to organize and engage in political party activi
ties was proscribed until 1978. Rights associated with
"due process" were similarly suspended. In many cases
suspects were detained for an indefinite period of time
without formal charges being brought against them.
Amnesty International claimed that prisoners were tor
tured and that disappearances and summary execu
tions (known as "salvaging" in local parlance) were
common.22 The Catholic bishops of the Philippines ob
served that one of the major causes of popular discon
tent is the militarization of Philippine society, including
the establishment of hamlets in Mindanao, "salvaging,"
torture in "safehouses," prolonged detention without due
process, and arbitrary arrest of suspected persons.23
Strikes, rallies and other forms of mass demonstra
tion organized by nongovernment groups were prohib
ited. When they were attempted, the military and the
police were used to break them up. This prohibition
lasted until the formal lifting of martial law in January
1981. However, strikes in industries which are critical to
the economy, such as those engaged in exports, con
tinue to be prohibited. In 1984, because of the worsen
ing economic situation, strikes have been staged in a
wide range of economic enterprises, from shoe facto
ries to banks. In a number of cases, the peace and or
der forces have used violence to disrupt the legitimate
expression of the workers' right to strike.
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Prospects in the Philippines
Since the Aquino assassination, rallies and other
forms of mass action have increased. These have not
been confined to the urban centers, but have spilled
over into the rural areas as well. Government policy
requires a permit to hold these rallies, and the civilian
political authorities have to obtain a favorable recom
mendation from the appropriate peace and order offi
cer before such a permit may be issued. During such
rallies, the official policy is one of maximum tolerance
by the peace and order forces. However, since July
1984 many of these rallies have been dispersed through
violence, with tear gas, smoke bombs, water cannons,
truncheons and guns being used against unarmed citi
zens. The most brutal dispersal took place on Septem
ber 27, 1984, when at least one bystander was fatally
shot and several others wounded by antiriot squads af
ter demonstrators refused to obey orders to disperse.
That rally had been called to protest the violent disper
sal of a demonstration held only six days before, or on
the anniversary of the declaration of martial law.
The government has argued that many of these ral
lies were held without permits. However, the process
ing of applications for such permits has usually been
deliberately delayed by the authorities. As 1984 comes
to an end, street confrontations between opposition
groups and military and police forces are bound to in
crease. The violent dispersals of rallies during the past
several months seems only to have fanned the flames
22. See Report of Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of
the Philippines, November 11-28,1981 (Amnesty International, 1982)
for an account of these human rights violations in the Philippines.
23. Cited by Bishop Federico Escobar, S J., "Militarization—An Issue
Facing Philippine Society Today" (A Workshop Paper presented at the
Bishops-Businessmen's Conference on Human Development, Makati
Sports Club, Salcedo Village, Makati, January 14,1984), 2.
251
Journal of International Affairs
of dissent. The head of the Catholic church, Jaime Car
dinal Sin, has publicly endorsed the rallies saying that
"the storm of nonviolent protest must be continued,
and it must involve all of us."24
The Judiciary. Once an independent and coordi
nate body in government, the Supreme Court, during
the period under review, was made subordinate to the
executive. Long considered the guardian of the Consti
tution and the rights of citizens, as well as the ultimate
arbiter of issues involving legitimacy, the Supreme Court
came to be perceived as the legitimizer of constitutional
authoritarianism and consequently lost public esteem.
As already noted, the Supreme Court passed the
judgment that though the 1973 Constitution was not
ratified in accordance with the amendment provisions
of the 1935 Constitution, there remained no further
judicial impediment to its full enforcement. The Su
preme Court validated and thus legitimized all the acts
of the president as the administrator of martial law and
decided many issues in favor of the government. One
analyst summarized these Supreme Court decisions
as follows:
(1) Validity of the suspension of the privilege of habeas cor
pus; (2) Power of the President to call a plebiscite for the
ratification of the Constitution; (3) Validity and effectivity of
the new Constitution; (4) Constitutionality of martial law; (5)
Constitutionality of the referendum [of 1975]; (6) Validity
of the creation and jurisdiction of military tribunals; (7) Power
of the President to propose amendments to the Constitution;
(8) Validity of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980; and
(9) Power of the President to exercise legislative power even
after Martial Law.25
After the Aquino assassination, however, the Supreme
Court began to demonstrate a certain amount of inde
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pendence in deciding some cases in favor of opposi
tion groups. One such instance concerned the petition
of opposition groups to rule on the granting of permits
for rallies by local executives.26 The Supreme Court
mied that unless a public demonstration constituted a
"clear, present and substantive evil to the state," per
mits for it must be granted. This decision formed the
basis for a subsequent Supreme Court ruling permit
ting organizers of the first anniversary of the Aquino
assassination to hold a rally on August 21, 1984. It
would be significant if two cases currently before the
Supreme Court are similarly decided in favor of the
opposition. These cases challenge the legality of the
creation of the Metro Manila Commission under the
governorship of Imelda R. Marcos through PD 824,
and the constitutionality of five PDs considered to de
prive basic rights of freedom of expression, press and
assembly, and to provide penalties which are cruel and
unusual in violation of constitutional protection.27
The Emergence of the Military as a Major
Political Force
The involvement of the military as a partner in mar
tial law began with the consultations between Marcos
and top ranking military and defense leaders in 1972
regarding the wisdom of imposing martial law in the
24. Jaime Cardinal Sin, speaking before a group of accountants, as
cited by Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 4, 1984, pp. 1 and 2.
25. Raul P. de Guzman, "The Evolution of Filipino Political Insti
tutions: Prospects for Normalization in the Philippines" (A Paper pre
sented at the Joint Seminar on U.S.-Philippine Relations, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Wash
ington, D.C., September 11, 1982), 15-16.
26. J.B.L. Reyes vs. Ramon Bagatsin, et al, 1984.
27. Cited in Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 3,1984, pp. 1 and 2.

Philippines. A dozen military leaders agreed to support
the decision to declare martial law and have hence
forth been called the president's "Twelve Disciples."
They include all the top ranking officers of the military
(with the exception of the vice-chief of staff who dissen
ted on professional grounds), the defense secretary,
and a close business associate who was recalled to ac
tive duty and given the rank of colonel.28
Expansion of the military's role under martial law led
to a situation which 1 have previously described:
... the military became the primary basis of regime support as
well as the partner of the martial law regime in implementing
governmental policies. ... In a country with no militaristic
tradition to speak of, where the military was traditionary low
keyed and had a low profile, the military became visible, per
forming an expanded security and law and order roles (sic), a
new judicial role, greater management and administrative and
development roles and a new political role.2'
The new political role acquired by the military has
made it a key actor in contemporary Philippine politics,
most significantly through its replacement of traditional
politicians as the dispensers of patronage in the politi
cal system. Sensing this change in the distribution of
political power, many petitioners have transferred their
locus of activity from traditional politicians to the officer
corps. A number of officers have also served as officials
in certain political subdivisions in which internal secu
rity is minimal. Like the military Presidential Officers for
Development (PRODs),30 which managed each of the
twelve development regions in the country, these offi
cers enjoy both executive and management powers
within their respective political subdivisions, as well as
political base.
The military's prominence in politics and society is
expected to continue in the immediate future, if only
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Prospects in the Philippines
because current political and economic conditions re
quire military involvement and support. The tide of
popular discontent is not expected to abate; the recent
series of violent dispersals of peaceful rallies by military
and police forces will only fuel popular indignation. Al
ready, such rallies attract not only students, laborers
and urban poor, who constituted the bulk of demon
strators before 1972, but also the idle rich, middle class
businessmen, professionals and clergy.
Strikes are expected to continue, with the military
being used to break them up. The increase in strikes since
1979 has been documented by an analyst as follows:
Strike notices and actual work stoppage have been on the
increase at least since 1979. By 1981, the number of strikes
and workers involved were highest since martial law declara
tion in 1972, as a matter of fact since 1957. Between 1980
and 1981 alone, strike notices increased by 117%, actual
strikes by 33%, workers involved by 38%, and manhours lost
by 65% The lifting of martial law and, perhaps even more,
the deteriorating economic position of labor appeared to have
triggered this explosive mass activity and work stoppage. The
28. The list of these twelve men may be found in Carolina G.
Hernandez, The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the
Philippines: 1946-1976 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, SUNY at
Buffalo, 1979), available at the University Microfilms, Ann Arbor,
Michigan.
29. Carolina G. Hernandez, "Political Institution-Building in the
Philippines: Past Record and Future Prospects" (A paper presented
at the Conference on Development, Stability, and Security in the
Pacific-Asian Region, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California Berkeley, March 17-21,1984), 26.
30. The Presidential Offices for Development or PRODs were at
the top of each of the twelve regions (outside Metro Manila) into
which the country was subdivided for development purposes. One
half of them were military officers until October 1978. The PRODs
enjoyed presidential powers of allocation, management, and the like
for development purposes within their regions.
253
Journal of International Affairs
worsening economic times since then and in the immediate
future hold little hope of dampening this tendency towards
labor militancy.31
Another important development requiring further
military involvement and support is the spread of the
CPP-NPA insurgency. A recent staff report of the U. S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the dra
matic worsening of the insurgency and estimated the
number of armed guerillas to be as high as 12,500.32
The National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(NDF, an umbrella organization for leftist groups of
which the CPP is a member), claims that the NPA op
erates in 1,500 towns throughout the entire country. It
further claims that the NPA controls 10,000 guns which
in turn are used by about 20,000 guerillas. The NPA is
also said to be engaged on 40 battlefronts, each com
prised of 3 to 10 guerilla zones which control"3 to 10
towns. It claims to have 6 million organized supporters
in about 60 provinces including laborers, farmers,
youths, women and others, and to have established lo
cal organs with political-military authority.33
It is possible that the NDF's claim is slightly exagger
ated for propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, there is
evidence of increased NPA activity, such as the greater
visibility of military forces in areas purportedly infested
by the NPA and almost daily newspaper reports of mili
tary encounters with the NPA throughout the country.
Moreover, Ang Bayan (The Nation), the official organ
of the CPP's central committee, claimed responsibil
ity for the assassination of Brigadier General Tomas
Karingal, superintendent of the northern police district
of Metro Manila, for his alleged direct responsibility "for
the massacre of workers at the picket line..., [and] for
the violent suppression of peaceful assemblies and
other mass actions held by the people in the exercise of
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their legitimate rights."34 The NPA even thanked mili
tary personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) for their alleged assistance in the Karingal assas
sination. If the claim is true, its objective could be to
demonstrate its ability to operate even in the heart of
Metro Manila.
In view of these recent developments requiring that
the regime secure the continued assistance and sup
port of the military, it is likely that the latter's visibility
and involvement in society and politics will continue at
least in the short run. This is especially likely given the
relative decline of formal democratic institutions since
1972, despite the limited resuscitation of freedom of
the press, speech and assembly, as well as the emplace
ment of the regular assembly.
31. Miranda, 11.
32. The contents of the staff report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Rela
tions Committee were revealed in the various newspapers in the Phil
ippines during the first week of October 1984. See for example, Ang
Pahayagang Malaya, October 1 and 4, 1984, pp. 1 and 2. See Fred
erick Z. Brown and Carl Ford, "The Situation in the Philippines" (A
Staff Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, October 1984), 25.
33. Patnubay K. Liwanag, "Ang ating mga kaalyado at ang arma
dong pakikibaka," Taliba ng Bayan (National Democratic Front of the
Philippines, June 1, 1984), 4. The article's anglicized title is "Our
Allies and the Armed Struggle." An issue of Liberation, the official
publication of the NDF, features the NPA on its 15th anniversary on
March 29, 1984. Its cover story makes a much more modest claim
about NPA strength and penetration of the country than that made
by the Talibang Bayan. Liberation claims that the NPA has opera
tions in only 530 municipalities and 53 provinces. See "Armed strug
gle scales up," Liberation 12, no. 3 (March 1984), 3-9 for information
on NPA activities throughout the Philippines.
34. As reproduced in Taliba ng Bayan, 1.

The Prospects for a Return to Democracy
In spite of the pessimistic scenario that has been de
picted about the decline of Philippine democracy since
1972, it would be presumptuous to claim that the pros
pects of a democratic revival are nil. There are impor
tant, albeit small and slow, changes currently discernible
among various groups which are working towards a
democratic restoration in the Philippines. The Aquino
assassination undoubtedly served as a catalyst in the
process of change. The massive public outpouring of
anti-authoritarian sentiment following the assassination
cannot easily be ignored, especially as these demon
strations have been immortalized in print and film.
The aftermath of the assassination continues to
plague the Philippines. With the conclusion of the fact
finding board's work in late October 1984 tension be
gan to mount as leaks of its conclusions were printed in
local and foreign newspapers and magazines which
linked the military to the assassination. As it turned out,
these leaks were rather close to the board's findings.
When the Agrava Board's work ended, two reports
were submitted a day apart to Marcos and the public.
Both the Chairman's Report and the Majority Report
implicated the military in a conspiracy to assassinate
Aquino. They only differed in the extent to which the
responsiblity was lodged in the military hierarchy. Chair
man Agrava concluded that the conspiracy was limited
to the head of the Aviation Security Command (AV
SECOM), the military unit in charge of the security plan
for Aquino, and six men who were Aquino's guards as
he was led out of the China Airlines plane through the
service stairway onto the tarmac. The Majority Report,
supported by the report of the board's legal counsel,
implicated twenty-six men only one of whom was a ci
vilian. This particular report implicated the chief of staff
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Prospects in the Philippines
of the Philippine Military, General Fabian C. Ver, and
the head of the Philippine Constabulary's (PC) Metro
politan Command (METROCOM), General Prospero
Olivas, in the conspiracy as they allegedly attempted to
cover up the military plot to assassinate Aquino.
Subsequent events only served to exacerbate popu
lar fears that in the end justice for Aquino may not be
served. Even as the seven military men implicated by
the chairman were confined to the barracks, General
Ver and General Olivas merely went on a leave of ab
sence. General Fidel V. Ramos, deputy chief of staff
and head of the PC and Integrated National Police
(1NP), was named acting chief of staff. This appoint
ment was generally regarded as a hopeful sign that
some positive change could take place within the mili
tary since General Ramos is viewed as a highly profes
sional soldier with solid personal honesty and integrity.
One of his first official statements in his new capacity
had to do with his declaration of "unwavering loyalty
and support to the Constitution and his complete faith
in the country's judicial processes and rule of law," as
he reacted to the manifesto of loyalty and support for
General Ver signed by sixty-eight generals.35 Even as
General Ramos enjoys this reputation, the extent of
what he can do by way of reforms within the military
will be limited because he is only acting chief of staff.
In the meantime, Marcos instructed the Tanodbayan
(the ombudsman that conducts preliminary investiga
tion of cases involving public officers) to determine
whether there is enough evidence to prosecute those
who are named in the two reports before the Sandig
anbayan, a court especially charged with prosecuting
culpable public officers. Unfortunately, even as he did
35. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 31,1984, p. 1.
255
 Journal of International Affairs
so, Marcos also in effect undermined the integrity of
the two reports by saying that they are "most serious
and grave ... [and]... shadowed by serious controversy
and differences of opinion," while stating that Vers
"long and distinguished record ... is not diminished by
the institution of the present charge" against him.36
Various legal and civic groups are opposed to having
the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan consider the Aquino
case. Many believe that these two bodies cannot act
independently on the grounds that (1) their members
do not enjoy security of tenure, (2) they are all Marcos
appointees, and (3) three new appointments were made
by Marcos shortly before the fact-finding board submit
ted its reports. Moreover, it is also claimed that existing
laws assign cases involving military personnel exclu
sively to court martials and that since a court martial
would be suspect in this case, a special court should be
created to deal with the same.
Amid this controversy on the appropriate court, the
government suddenly announced PD 1952 reportedly
signed on September 5, 1983 exempting the Aquino
case from court martial jurisdiction. This particular PD
was not publicly known nor publicly acknowleged by
even the Office of the Solicitor General until November
8, 1984. This led people to wonder whether this PD
was created only after the controversy on the proper
forum for the case developed and has provided an
other reason for those who advocate and demand
the repeal of Marcos's decree-making powers under
Amendment No. 6.
Amid all these controversies, the Tanodbayan de
cided late in November 1984 to adopt the Majority
Report's conclusions by including all the twenty-six sus
pects implicated by this report, led by General Ver, as
"principals" in the two counts of murder based on the
256
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board's finding.37 Filipinos in the meantime continue
to hope for a just resolution of the case although some
doubts regarding the final outcome continue to be ex
pressed by many concerned citizens.
Aquino's death seems to have opened the floodgates
of protest and spurred many Filipinos to participate in
parliamentary elections to bring about a return to de
mocracy. In spite of a strong boycott movement, millions
of voters turned out on election day and surprised even
the opposition parties by electing 61 non-KBL assem
blymen out of a total of 200. This means that there are
now more opposition voices to be heard in the assem
bly and issues can be better publicized for the benefit of
the people. The first session of the assembly was re
cently commended by the National Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL)38 for having produced significant
output, including a unanimous resolution condemning
the violent dispersal of a peaceful, if unauthorized, rally
on September 27, and calling for a full investigation of
the case.
For various reasons, many more people have joined
the protest movement, now popularly called "the par
liament of the streets," in spite of the risks of violent
dispersal, arrest, detention and even death. A wide
cross-section of the people constitutes the bulk of this
movement. Some members of the assembly have openly
36. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 25, 1984, pp. 1 and 2.
37. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, November 30,1984, p. 1.
38. NAMFREL is a civic group whose purpose is to promote and
secure free and honest elections by fielding its members on election
day to act as watchdogs of the polls. Its active participation in the
May 1984 elections has been credited as one of the reasons for the
latter's relative cleanliness leading to the election of more opposition
assemblymen. Its evaluation of the assembly's first session was reported
by Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 6, 1984, pp. 1 and 2.

supported the parliamentarians of the streets. An even
more phenomenal development is Cardinal Sin's en
dorsement of and support of the protesters, which led
Marcos to issue a public statement expressing his dis
appointment with the cardinal, requesting that he with
draw his support, and deploring his violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of church and
state.39 The cardinal responded to Marcos's allegation
regarding the violation of the separation of church and
state by saying that he would welcome being charged
in court as this would give him the opportunity to prove
his innocence.40 The definition of Cardinal Sin's official
position on the issue of the protest movement is ex
tremely important not only because he is the spiritual
leader of 85 percent of the Filipino nation, but also
because he is not identified with the progressive wing
of the Church. His open support for the protest move
ment is a potent force which the Marcos regime cannot
afford to ignore.
The Aquino assassination has also helped bring about
a relaxation of media controls. As already noted the
"alternative press" came to life in late 1983. Even tele
vision channels controlled by progovernment forces
have displayed some openness by being more objec
tive than ever before in their reporting. They have even
given coverage to opposition activities such as rallies
and have begun to encourage political debate. Be that
as it may, the recent development in television owner
ship and control already noted could arrest this trend
towards greater openness in the media. A related de
velopment is the closure in October 1984 of WHO
Magazine, one of the publications viewed as part of the
alternative press. The management has not yet dis
closed the cause of the closure.41
Another important force which provides some hope
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Prospects in the Philippines
for an eventual return to democracy is the Supreme
Court. As already noted, it has become a little more
independent than it was during the period of mid-1972
to mid-1983. Since the Aquino assassination, the Court
has decided a number of cases in favor of the opposi
tion in areas having to do with freedom of assembly. If
this tendency continues, the restoration of a coordinate
judicial body will be achieved, paving the way for possi
ble democratic gains.
The movement to have Amendment No. 6 repealed
is also important in this regard. As long as it exists, the
assembly will remain a secondary legislative organ, op
erating under the constant threat of having its primary
function usurped by an overzealous executive. Emer
gency powers, which admittedly the executive must
continue to possess in order to deal effectively with cri
sis situations, can be well-defined and appropriately lim
ited to safeguard the integrity of the assembly and
protect the people from abuses of such powers. A re
formulation of Amendment No. 6 could ensure that
these requisites are met. The return to democracy will
certainly be facilitated by a repeal of this very contro
versial amendment and by replacing it with a law which
will guarantee the ability of the government to act in
times of crisis without eroding democratic institutions
and practices.
39. Mr. Marco's public statement was aired and televised on Octo
ber 5, 1984 in response to the announced opposition rally on Octo
ber 7, 1984 to be preceded by a con-celebrated mass officiated by
Cardinal Sin at the church where Aquino's wake was held. Violence
was averted when a permit was issued to hold the rally on Mr.
Marcos's orders.
40. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, October 7,1984, p. 1.
41. This information was made available by a colleague of this author
who has requested anonymity.
257
 Journal of International Affairs

Finally, the political succession by a leader who en- range of forces, the dynamics of which have been in
joys the confidence of the military is necessary if de- constant motion for a number of years. It will depend
mocracy is to be restored. Such a leader would have to largely on the persistence of forces favorable to democ
safeguard legitimate military corporate interests includ- racy which I have identified and on the erosion of anh
ing a sphere of professional autonomy. If such a leader democratic forces. In the final analysis, it will depend
can be found, the road back to democracy will be that largely on the ability of the Filipino people to weather
much smoother and easier to negotiate. the obstacles which lie on the way towards a demo
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the cratic revival in their country. From their previous track
prospects for a return to democracy depend on a wide record on resilience the odds seem to be on their side.

258

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