September 5 2021 Group A

GROUP A
LAW 405
Remedial Law Review 1
(First Semester, AY 2021-2022)
Compilation of Case Digests

Week 1 – September 5, 2021 deadline
Contributors:
Amer, Abjuhary H.
Castillo, Claudenne Steffanie D.
Claudio, Francis C.
Coritana, Jade C.
Go, Dawn Jessa M.
Imlani, Nafiesa V.
Mandalo, Tesia Amor S.
Millado, Dan R.
Rubin, Jannie Louise
Polo, Mary Jane G.
Sandoval, Dareilone Trystenne S.
STUDENT: AMER, ABJUHARY H.
Topic: A. Concept of Remedial or Procedural Law
Case No. 1
ALFONSO SINGSON CORTAL, Petitioner,
vs.
INAKI A. LARRAZABAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
FACTS:
Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned three (3)
parcels of land. These three (3) parcels were placed under the Compulsory
Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27. Pursuant to the Scheme,
Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of title were issued to farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioners included. In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action
for Recovery of these parcels against the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).[9] It assailed the cancellation of its transfer
certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new titles to petitioners for no
just compensation were paid for the expropriation of its properties. In their Answer,
petitioners denied non-payment of just compensation.
Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy ruled in favor of Larrazabal
Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots and petitioners
appealed to the DARAB. DARAB reversed the Decision of Regional Adjudicator
Diloy. Upon motion by the respondent the DARAB reversed its own decision and
granted Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a
Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals.
The assailed Court of Appeals September 30, 2010 Resolution dismissed
petitioners' appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on account
of several technical defects. First was an inconsistency between the listing of
petitioners' names in their prior Motion for Extension of Time and subsequent
Petition for Review, in which the accompanying verification and certification of
non-forum shopping were laden with this same inconsistency and other defects.
Second was the non-inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party,
now private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, before the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. And last was
petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the official receipt of his
payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors
noted by the Court of Appeals.
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RULING:
No, the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was not justified by the errors noted
by the Court of Appeals.
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases [so]
[c]ourts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They
provide a system for forestalling arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality
in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be ignored to suit the interests of a
party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance on a "policy of
liberal construction."
The Court has stressed that every party litigant must be afforded the fullest
opportunity to properly ventilate and argue his or her case, "free from the constraints
of technicalities." Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates their
liberal construction to the extent that justice is better served:
“Section 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”
Here, the Court has noted that a strict application of the rules should not
amount to straight-jacketing the administration of justice and that the principles of
justice and equity must not be sacrificed for a stern application of the rules of
procedure.
The Court entertains no doubt that petitioners' Petition for Review, which the
Court of Appeals discarded, falls within the exceptions to the customary strict
application of procedural rules. This Court has previously overlooked more
compelling procedural lapse, such as the period for filing pleadings and appeals. The
Court of Appeals was harsh in denying petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively
ventilate and argue their case.
Hence, rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of Appeals
should have been impelled by the greater interest of justice. It should have enabled
a better consideration of the intricate issues of the application of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and just compensation. The
reversals of ruling at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an indication
that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on
mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance
towards petitioners.
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STUDENT: CASTILLO, CLAUDENNE STEFFANIE D.
Case No. 2
Vivencio, Eugenio, Joji and Myrna, All Surnamed Mateo
vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform, Land Bank of the Philippines and Mariano T.
Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 186339, February 15, 2017
FACTS:
The Mateos were the registered owners of coconut and rice land] with a total
area of 1,323,112 square meters situated at Fabrica, Bacon, Sorsogon and were
covered by TCT No. T-22822. A portion of the lands was brought under the coverage
of the CARP of the government and for this reason, the DAR entered the premises
sometime in June 1994. LBP valued [the Mateos' land at fifty-two thousand pesos
(₱52,000.00) per [ha]. The Mateos, however, rejected the LBP's valuation.
On April 30, 1997, the Mateos filed a complaint against LBP, DAR, and the
farmer beneficiaries of the land for just compensation.
The LBP and DAR filed their respective answers arguing that since no
summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation
had been conducted yet, the complaint of the Mateos was premature. Pre-trial ensued
and was terminated. The SAC granted the request of the parties for the appointment
of two commissioners.
On August 4, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision setting aside
the SAC's judgment and dismissing without prejudice the complaint of the Mateos.
The CA explained that:
Since the DARAB is clothed with quasi-judicial authority to make a
preliminary determination of just compensation of lands acquired under R.A. No.
6657, and it appearing from the records and the Mateos' own admission that the said
administrative agency had not yet taken cognizance of, and passed upon the issue of
just compensation when the Mateos prematurely filed with the court a quo the
complaint for determination of just compensation, thus failing to exhaust the
prescribed administrative remedy and, in the process, preventing the DARAB from
complying with the said administrative process which is mandatory, We resolve to
grant the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC,
to determine in the first instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior
administrative proceedings, questions of just compensation to be paid to landowners.
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RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in negating the jurisdiction of the RTC, as a SAC, to
determine in the first instance and in the absence of the conduct of prior
administrative proceedings, questions of just compensation to be paid to landowners.
While the Court recognizes the primacy of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in our judicial system, it bears emphasizing that the
principle admits of exceptions, among which is when there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that irretrievably prejudices a complainant.
In this case, the LBP and the DAR entered the property of the Mateos
sometime in 1994, but deposited cash and Agrarian Reform Bonds as payment
therefor only on December 13, 1996 and February 11, 1997. The LBP and the DAR
were indisputably aware that the Mateos rejected the price offered as just
compensation for the subject property. Still, at the time the Mateos filed their suit
before the SAC, no summary administrative proceeding was yet initiated by the
DAR to make further valuation. The SAC even had to issue no less than three orders
dated November 12, 1997, January 7, 1998 and March 18, 1998 for the DAR to
conduct the necessary proceedings. DAR's delay and inaction had unjustly
prejudiced the Mateos and precluding them from filing a complaint before the SAC
shall result in an injustice, which the law never intends. Thus, the CA erred in
ordering the dismissal of the Mateos' complaint before the SAC. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application in the instant case where
the DAR took no initiative and inordinately delayed the conduct of summary
administrative proceedings, and where during the pendency of the case before the
SAC, the DARAB rendered decisions affirming the LBP's prior valuations of the
subject property.
5
STUDENT: CLAUDIO, FRANCIS C.
Case No. 3
Priscilla Alma Jose, Petitioner
vs.
Ramon C. Javellana, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012
FACTS:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of
₱160,000.00 to respondent Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land.
They agreed that Javellana would pay ₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed
and the balance of ₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the
Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable
period of time); After Margarita died the vendor’s undertaking fell on the shoulders
of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials
therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or
industrial subdivision. Faced with Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana
commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her
in the RTC.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The
RTC initially denied the motion. However, upon Priscilla’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied the motion for
lack of any reason to disturb the order. Accordingly, he filed a notice of appeal and
the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA promulgated its decision in reversing and setting aside the dismissal
of Civil Case and remanding the records to the RTC “for further proceedings in
accordance with law.” CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action; The CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give
due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention
to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an extension of time to file
his appellant’s brief; that current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest
opportunity to present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that
even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the discretion
to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; that the
appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was made on time considering the fact that it was
filed three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
RULING:
Yes, the notice of appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA.
In Neypes vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 141524), the Supreme Court stated
that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Being procedural in nature, Neypes Rule is deemed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. Therefore, petitioners’ notice of appeal filed on July 19,
2000 was well-within the fresh period of fifteen days from the date of their date of
receipt of order.
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STUDENT: CORITANA, JADE C.
Topic: A1. Remedial Law distinguished from Substantive Law
Case No. 4
Rodante Guyamin, et.al., petitioners,
vs.
Jacinto Flores, et.al., respondents.
G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017
FACTS:
The respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
petitioners. They alleged that they were the registered owners of a 984 sq.m. property
in Gen. Trias, Cavite, which they allowed Petitioners to occupy as their relatives.
After demand to vacate, Petitioners however, refused to do so and conciliation in the
barangay only proved to be futile. Thus, compelling them to file an action. Summons
were served upon the Petitioners, however they refused to sign the receipt.
Respondent filed a motion to declare petitioners in default contending that despite
service of summons they still failed to appear. The RTC granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly declared Petitioners in default.
RULING:
YES. The court process server's Return of Summons dated September 26,
2006 exists, and must be presumed regular. The mere fact that the RTC, and even
the respondents, requested at different stages in the proceedings that summons be
served once more upon petitioners does not prove that the service thereof made on
September 25, 2006 was invalid; it only means that the court and parties desire the
service of summons anew which was clearly unnecessary. The claim that Lucinia
was then abroad is of no moment either; there is no evidence to support this self-
serving claim.
The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them

in default, and the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners'
answer is late. Respondents' reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer a mere
scrap of paper, as it proceeds from the said answer.
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STUDENT: GO, DAWN JESSA M.
Topic: A1. Remedial Law distinguished from Substantive Law
Case No. 5
Dominador B. Bustos, petitioner,
vs.
Antonio G. Lucero, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
G.R. No. L-2086, March 8, 1949
FACTS:
Petitioner, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying
that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which
warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation.

In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and asked
him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty.
Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and
her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11
of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of
the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights.
RULING:
NO. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what
acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished
from the procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and
essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. Furthermore,
as a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence, which is
the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings, is identified with
and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
9
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure
refers to pleading, evidence and practice.
In this case, the Supreme Court does not believe that the curtailment of the
right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses
who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the
constitutional inhibition. Preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due
process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere
restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within
the constitutional prohibition.
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STUDENT: IMLANI, NAFIESA V.
Topic: A2. Procedural laws applicable to actions pending at the time of
the promulgation
Case No. 6
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HEVA MANAGEMENT and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, and SPOUSES CANDELARIA
DAYOT and EDMUNDO DAYOT, Respondents.
G. R. No. 154061 January 25, 2012
FACTS:
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc. (PRI), a GOCC, executed a
REM contract in favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure a 20M worth of loan.
Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co.
PRI failed to pay obligation, thus, TRB was able to foreclosed the property and later
on, buy it. In 1990, when TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession, PRI through
its duly authorized manager filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion
for Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of Writ of Possession. It was only in
1994, however, that PRI realized that the extrajudicial foreclosure included some
excluded properties in the mortgage contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a
Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale. TRI
filed their respective Motion to Dismiss based on several grounds.
On July 18, 1997, the RTC granted the TRB’s Motion to Dismiss. On 11
August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary
docket fees. Thereafter, TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of
nonpayment of docket fees. PRI, contended in its Opposition that their lawyer is not
yet familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective on July 1
1997. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules
on appeals. RTC ordered dismissal of the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court. PRI moved for reconsideration alleging that the court lost
jurisdiction over the case after the former filed the Notice of Appeal. RTC still
denied the motion.
In the CA, PRI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65
alleging that RTC had no jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed the
Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing to relax
procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice. CA decided in favor of PRI. TRB
filed an MR. It appears that prior to the promulgation of CA’s decision, there were
circulars issued stating that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss
an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful
11
fees within the reglementary period, as in this case. CA then reversed its initial ruling
granting PRI’s appeal, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in reversing its initial ruling granting PRI their appeal by
applying new procedural rules retroactively on pending cases.
RULING:
The Petition has no merit.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable
to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and
rules are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes
and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person
adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules.
In this case, CA was correct in retroactively applying the new procedural rules
brought about by AM 00-2-10-SC providing that trial courts may, motu proprio or
upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period to pending cases in court
– this is because no vested rights were injured. Vested rights cannot attach nor arise
from procedural laws and rules.
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STUDENT: MANDALO, TESIA AMOR S.
Topic: A3. Force and prospective effect of the Rules of Court
Case No. 7
PEDRO M. BERMEJO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23614 February 27, 1970
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe” (her identity at the time was
unknown) were charged of the crime of falsification of public or official document
in an information filed by the city fiscal. It was alleged in the information that on or
about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being private
individuals, conspired and confederated together and mutually helped each other,
and willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a document consisting of an
amended petition for habeas corpus”.
The two accused stated and made it appear in the amended petition that the
same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of the petitioners when in
truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it
was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed and swore to that petition as Julia
Carmorin. Relying on the certification of the city fiscal, the City Judge, Hon. Isidro
O. Barrios, issued an order for the arrest of accused Bermejo. To prevent his
incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond. Upon arraignment, Bermejo
filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance:(1) that the information
did not charge an offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus ,allegedly
falsified, is not a document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code (2) that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person
because the warrant issued for his arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the
same without first examining the witnesses under oath and in the form of searching
questions and answers as required under Republic Act 3828. The city fiscal filed his
opposition to the motion to quash, contending that the petition for habeas corpus is
a public document; that the provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to
municipal judges and not to city judges. Respondent City Judge issued an order
denying the motion to quash. Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration but was
denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Capiz contending
that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion in filing an information
against him without conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and that the
City Judge Isidro Barrios committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to quash.
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ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the CFI of Capiz has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
(2) Whether or not Fiscal Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in
conducting the preliminary investigation.
RULING:
(1) No.
Sec. 6, RA 3828, amending Sec. 87, paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 provides in part as follows:
Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and
subprovinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction
as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalty
provided by law does not exceed prision correctional or imprisonment
for more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both,
and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction
within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications
for bail. All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with justices
of the peace of capitals and municipal court judges shall be tried and
decided on the merits by the respective justices of the peace or
municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions
therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be.
In this case, it was an error of the petitioners in filing their petitions for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz and the error of the latter court in taking cognizance of those
petitions. Appeal must be taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
and such cognizance by the Court of First Instance of Capiz was beyond their
jurisdiction.
(2) No.
While the City Fiscal failed to notify Bermejo, that his request for
postponement was granted, which should have been done, it can also be said
that Bermejo was not entirely blameless if the preliminary investigation was
conducted in his absence. It was he himself who set the date of the
investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not bother to come
on the date he fixed.Even assuming that the City Fiscal did not notify
petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary investigation ex parte, their
rights to due process could not have been violated for they are not entitled as
of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous authorities supporting this
14
view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Sec. 14,
Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has no application in
their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1,
1964 while the preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal were
conducted in 1963. The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot
be given retroactive effect.
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STUDENT: MILLADO, DAN R.
Topic: A4. Applicability to pending actions; retroactivity.
Case No. 8
In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong,
G.R. No. 150274 August 4, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN of DPWH-CAR was charged
administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman for dishonesty, falsification of
public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Consequently, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman (AAB) found him and four others guilty as charged and ordered their
dismissal from service. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, he filed a
petition before the Supreme Court but it was referred to the Court of Appeals in light
of the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787, 808 (1998)1. The Court of
Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the AAB finding petitioner and
two co-accused guilty as charged and ordered their dismissal from service but
exonerated the two other respondents for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision of
the Court of Appeals which was docketed as G.R. No. 144694. Meanwhile, while
appeal was still pending, Secretary Simeon Datumanong of DPWH issued the
Memorandum Order dropping/ dismissing the petitioner from service. Hence, this
petition to cite Datumanong in contempt of court for issuing said Memorandum
Order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper to cite Sec. Datumanong in contempt of court.
RULING:
No, Datumanong cannot be cited in contempt of court.
In Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, it was held that
“Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive
in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because
no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.”
1where appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be referred to the
appellate court under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
16
Here, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support
the dismissal of petitioner. First, In G.R. No. 144694, Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals; and second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order
No. 17, which reads in part:
“An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. x
x x x A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly

procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered
preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event
he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is
no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office.
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STUDENT: RUBIN, JANNIE LOUISE
Case No. 9
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
Emily Rose Go Ko, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148641, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. for Annulment/Reformation of Chattel Mortgage, Annulment of Restructuring
Agreement, Fixing Correct Principal, Injunction with Prayer of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with RTC Cebu. The trial court granted
respondent’s prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioner, who received a copy of
the Order on February 18, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000.
The motion was denied by Order of May 22, 2000. Notice of the Order dated May
22, 2000 was received by counsel for petitioner on June 2, 2000.
On July 31, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
By resolution of Aug. 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. In this case, petitioner
received a copy of the assailed February 16, 2000 order on February 18, 2000. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 2, 2000 (13 days after) and
receipt by the petitioner of denial of the MR was on June 2, 2000. Petitioner had a
remaining period of 47 days or specifically until July 19, 2000 to file for a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Having been filed on July 31, 2000, or twelve days
beyond reglementary period, the petition was dismissed.
On Sept. 7, 2000, petitioner received the Aug. 23, 2000 Resolution dismissing
its petition, and thereafter petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on Sept. 21,
2000. By Resolution of June 6, 2001, appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner now, in this case, questions the Aug. 23, 2000 and June 6, 2001
resolutions of the Court of Appeals on the ground that on September 1, 2000, the
amendment of Section 1, Rule 65 which states that the 60-day period of filing a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 is to be reckoned
from the receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the assailed order
18
or motion for new trial, should have been retroactively applied to its petition, it not
having been finally disposed of at the time the amendment became effective.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the September 1, 2000 amendment should be applied
retroactively to this case?
RULING:
Yes. The amendment should be applied retroactively in this case.
In 2005, the Court resolved in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, to further amend Section
4, Rule 65 which mandated that the 60-day period shall be counted from the receipt
of denial of motion for reconsideration or new trial. In view of its purpose, the said
Resolution can only be described as curative in nature. Curative statute, by its very
essence being retroactive, should be applied in this case.
In this case, the petitioner received the denial of the motion for reconsideration
on June 2, 2000 and thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on July
31, 2000, which is to be deemed timely, the same having been made within the 60-
day period provided under the curative Resolution. The Supreme Court remanded
the case for appropriate action.
19
STUDENT: POLO, MARY JANE G.
Case No. 10
AURORA B. GO, Petitioner,
vs.
ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and
RICHARD SUNBANUN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011
Facts:
In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against Go, her
husband Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire
insurance policies that the respondents made involving the property rented by Go.
On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding only Go liable and
ordering her to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Go filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. The
court in its April 27, 2004 Order denied the said motion.
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his
client a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that Go has been busy campaigning
for the local elections as she was running for the position of town mayor in Calubian,
Leyte and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing
the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an
extension of 15 days to file Go’s notice of appeal.
Atty. Ycong thereafter filed the Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2004. The RTC
denied the notice of appeal for it was filed out of time.
Go then appealed to the CA, but it was dismissed for being procedurally
flawed.
Issue:
Whether or not the amended procedural rules shall retroactively apply.
Ruling:
Yes, the amended procedural rules shall retroactively apply.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules
of procedure.
The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the "Fresh Period Rule," states that
"a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration."
20
Neypes, which the Court rendered in September 2005, has been applied
retroactively to a number of cases wherein the original period to appeal had already
lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Go’s situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the
amendment of the procedural rules. The denial of Go’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the trial court's January 26, 2004 decision was received by her former counsel on
May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh
period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal
and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.
21
STUDENT: SANDOVAL, DAREILONE TRYSTENNE S.
Case No. 11
First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. and CBN International (HK) Corporation,
petitioners,
vs.
Bank of the Philippine Islands, respondent.
G.R. No. 154034, February 5, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 99-930 filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 57, while Respondent BPI was the defendant in that
case.
On October 16, 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of therein
petitioners. Said petitioners received a copy of the judgment on October 27, 2000.
Ten days after, or on November 6, 2000, they filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in the order dated January 30, 2001.
Petitioners claim they received a copy of the January 30, 2001 order on
February 16, 2001 and that they filed a notice of appeal on the same day. The appeal
was granted by the trial court.
On the other hand, respondent filed a motion to declare the October 16, 2000
judgment final alleging that the petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed out of time. It
averred that the January 30, 2001 order was received by Quilatan (allegedly
petitioners’ counsel) on February 9, 2001. Hence, the petitioners only had five days
left to file the notice of appeal, or until February 14, 2001. Thus, the February 16,
2001 filing was out of time.
The trial court ruled for the respondents. This ruling was sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the instant recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the notice of appeal was filed on time.
RULING:
Yes, the notice of appeal was filed on time.
In Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, the
Supreme Court stated that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
22
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal
in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Being procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed to be applicable to actions

pending and undetermined at the time of its effectivity and is thus retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. Therefore, petitioners’ notice of appeal filed on February
16, 2001 was well-within the fresh period of fifteen days from the date of their
receipt of the January 30, 2001 order on February 9, 2001.
23
Topic: A9. Liberal construction of procedural rules; purposes
(Sec. 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court)
Case No. 12
FELIX MARTOS, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 192650, October 24, 2012
FACTS:
New San Jose Builders, Inc. (hereafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the construction of road, bridges, buildings, and low cost houses
primarily for the government. One of the projects of petitioner is the San Jose Plains
Project also known as the "Erap City." Petitioners alleged that, on various dates,
respondent hired them on different positions.
Sometime in 2000, Respondent was constrained to slow down and suspend

most of the works on the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the National Housing
Authority. Thus, the workers were informed that many of them [would] be laid off
and the rest would be reassigned to other projects. On different dates, three (3)
Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed before the NLRC
against respondent and Jose Acuzar, by petitioners who claimed to be the former
employees of petitioner. Subsequently, the three Complaints were consolidated and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Facundo Leda.
The LA handed down a decision declaring, among others, that petitioner Felix
Martos (Martos) was illegally dismissed and entitled to separation pay, backwages
and other monetary benefits; and dismissing, without prejudice, the
complaints/claims of the other complainants (petitioners).
Both parties appealed the LA decision to the NLRC. Petitioners appealed that
part which dismissed all the complaints, without prejudice, except that of Martos.
On the other hand, New San Jose Builders, Inc. (respondent) appealed that part
which held that Martos was its regular employee and that he was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC resolved the appeal by dismissing the one filed by respondent and
partially granting that of the other petitioners.
Respondent filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA rendered a decision reversing and setting
aside the Decision and the Resolution of the NLRC and reinstating the May 23, 2003
Decision of the LA. The CA explained that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
24
discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their failure to verify the
same. Out of the 102 complainants, only Martos verified the position paper and his
counsel never offered any explanation for his failure to secure the verification of the
others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the complaints filed by those
petitioners who failed to verify their position papers.
RULING:
YES, the CA was correct.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied
by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and
belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing.
25
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product
of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct. The absence of a proper verification is
cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible. The lone signature of Martos
would have been sufficient if he was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for
them. Unfortunately, petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was so authorized.
The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there
may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the
same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept
that rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of
justice; hence, their rigid application may, for deserving reasons, be subordinated by
the need for an apt dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They
ought to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial compliance,
consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule 1, Section 6. Not being
inflexible, the rule on verification allows for such liberality.
Considering that the dismissal of the other complaints by the LA was without
prejudice, the other complainants should have taken the necessary steps to rectify
their procedural mistake after the decision of the LA was rendered. They should have
corrected this procedural flaw by immediately filing another complaint with the
correct verification this time. Surprisingly, they did not even attempt to correct this
technical blunder. Worse, they committed the same procedural error when they filed
their appeal with the NLRC.
Here, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the other complaints
were brought about by the own negligence and passive attitude of the complainants
themselves.
26
STUDENT: CASTILLO, CLAUDENNE STEFFANIE D.
Case No. 13
Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual, petitioner,
vs.
Sps. Marilyn Lim, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 191837, September 19, 2012
FACTS:
Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area
of 4.4 hectares and located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is registered in
the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim). On September 8, 2004, Maria
Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized
as a tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato
(Deato). At that time, the property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares,
was covered by TCT No. 24759 under Deato’s name. During the pendency of the
petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale was registered on
December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of Spouses
Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005
to implead Spouses Lim as respondents.
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and
the Registrar of Deeds of Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order
directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of ₱ 10,000,000.00 which she undertook
to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property redeemed, and cancelling
TCT No. V-73892. Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount of ₱
10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008.
The petition was given due course by the RA, the dispositive portion of the
decision stating that the property is lawfully redeemed, ordering the private
respondents to accept the amount consigned with the DARAB, execute a deed of
redemption in favor of the petitioner and directing the RD to cancel the TCT
registered in the name of the private respondents and issue a new one in favor of the
petitioner. The decision of RARAD was reversed. Consolacion moved for
reconsideration which the DARAB denied. Consolacion filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA did not give due course to the petition
due to the following technical grounds: a) failure of counsel to indicate in the petition
his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number and b) the jurat of
Consolacion’s verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to
27
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart from her
community tax certificate. She moved for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be denied due to the failure to comply with
basic procedural requirements of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes, the petition should be denied.
Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and negligence but they
did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be
an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting
the relaxation of the rules. Neither did the Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally
construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the
presence of a satisfactory and persuasive explanation. The parties therein who
prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving
that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s intent “to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.”
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is
the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at
liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their
omission by harking on liberal construction.
While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate

result, she is bound by such.
28
Case No. 14
F.A.T. Key Computer System, Inc., petitioner
vs.
Online Networks International, Inc., respondent
G.R. No. 171238; February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Herein Respondent Online filed a complaint against Petitioner F.A.T. Kee
Computer Systems, Inc. for sum of money. It alleged that Petitioner failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price of the computers it bought from the Respondent.
Allegedly there was a disagreement in the Peso and US Dollar exchange rate used
in computing for the amount involved. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Online.
The latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was dismissed by RTC for lack of
Merit. Online appealed to CA which find it meritorious. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied, hence this petition. Petitioner answered the
complaint and denied all the allegations against it. It contests the argument of
ONLINE that the instant petition is fatally defective for the failure of the former to
attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings. FAT KEE
counters that there is no need to annex the said TSN given that ONLINE does not
dispute the accuracy of the quoted portions of the transcripts and the petition does
not request for a reevaluation of the evidence of the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN render the
petition fatally defective.
RULING:
No, The SC ruled that non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN
does not render fatally defective.
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the
petition for review on certiorari "such material portions of the record as would
support the petition." However, such a requirement was not meant to be an ironclad
rule such that the failure to follow the same would merit the outright dismissal of the
petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, "the Supreme Court may require
or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may
deem necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider
appropriate." More importantly, Section 8 of Rule 45 declares that "if the petition is
29
given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete
record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice."
Given that the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms part of the
records of the instant case, the failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant portions of
the TSN was already cured by the subsequent elevation of the case records to the
Court. This pronouncement is likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural
rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.
30
Case No. 15
City of Dumaguete, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices,
vs.
Philippine Ports Authority.
G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner, through Mayor Remollo filed before the RTC an Application for
Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements under the
Property Registration Decree. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions 6 to the application for registration of
petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner may not register
the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains
to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion
to Dismiss to the respondent. In its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner contended that the dismissal of its application
was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to
present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application, such as the
subject property already being alienable and disposable at the time it was occupied
and possessed by petitioner.
Respondent opposed the MR. Respondent based its Opposition on technical

and substantive grounds. According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration
of petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6
(Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not set its
Motion for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be
considered as non-litigable. The RTC could not hear the motion for reconsideration
ex parte as they are prejudicial to the rights of respondent. Petitioner also failed to
comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the
Motion for Reconsideration a written explanation why it did not resort to personal
service of the said Motion. Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for
31
Reconsideration of the petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap of paper with no
legal effect.
RTC:
Initially agreed with respondent that the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court. However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the petitioner, the RTC issued another Order setting aside its
Order in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to
determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201.
CA:
Set aside the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in setting aside the orders promulgated by the RTC.
RULING:
YES.
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent

application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed
a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a
proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal
service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the
light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable, to begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of
the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
In this case, counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, in the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the offices of
these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other
32
was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was
not done would only be superfluous.43 In addition, we refer once more to the merits
of the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, filed by petitioner, which justify the liberal
interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court in this case.
Moreover, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the
respective counsels of the private respondents and they were duly furnished with
copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff or agents.
Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially complied with the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the
requirements of motions and pleadings.
33
Case No. 16
Leandro M. Alcantara, Petitioner,
vs.
Philippine Commercial and International Bank, Respondent.
G.R. No. 151349, October 20, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner was dismissed from employment because it was allegedly
determined that the he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in his
position as branch manager and "falsified Bank records in order to facilitate a
transaction amounting toP538,360,000.00 that was prejudicial to the welfare and
interest of the Bank". Petitioner filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
Petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit in a Decision wherein it
was held that there was substantial evidence that Petitioner manipulated the records
of respondent to facilitate the anomalous transactions of the members of the alleged
criminal syndicate.
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. However, the NLRC

affirmed the same and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit in a Resolution.
Undaunted, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied
by the NLRC in a Resolution. Thus, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This petition was dismissed by the Court of on account
of petitioners failure to attach the material portions of the records of the NLRC case,
and various relevant or pertinent documents, in accordance with paragraph 3,
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner
subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in labor cases, the relaxation of procedural rules is allowed
since what is at stake is the livelihood and survival of a dismissed employee.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court had previously sustained that failure to attach all
pleadings and documents, by itself, is not a sufficient ground to dismiss a petition.
In appropriate cases, the courts may liberally construe procedural rules in order to
meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. Lapses in the literal observation
34
of a procedural rule will be overlooked when they do not involve public policy, when
they arose from an honest mistake or unforeseen accident, and when they have not
prejudiced the adverse party or deprived the court of its authority.
In this case, the aforementioned conditions are present. Furthermore, 14 days

after petitioner’s receipt of the Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing his petition,
he filed a Motion for Reconsideration along with the documents deemed by the
Court of Appeals as lacking in his originally filed petition. Contrary to the
pronouncement made in the Court of Appeals Resolution which denied the aforesaid
Motion, petitioner’s subsequent submission should be deemed substantial
compliance with paragraph 3, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
35
Topic: A9a.1. Extent and Scope of the Rule on Liberal Construction.
Case No. 17
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION (formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY
QUEZON, INC.), respondent.
G.R. No. 159593 October 12, 2006
FACTS:
MPC is a domestic corporation licensed by SEC to principally engage in the
business of power generation and subsequent sale thereof.
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, MPC seasonably filed its
Quarterly VAT Returns reflecting an accumulated input taxes in the amount of
P39,330,500.85. These input taxes were allegedly for the suppliers of capital goods
and services for the construction and development of the plant.
MPC filed on June 30, 1998, an application for tax credit or refund of the
aforementioned unutilized VAT paid on capital goods. Without waiting for an
answer from the BIR Commissioner, MPC filed the instant petition for review, in
order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund
under the law.
In answer to the Petition, the BIR Commissioner advanced as special and
affirmative defenses that "MPC's claim for refund is still pending investigation and
consideration before the office of the BIR Commissioner accordingly, the filing of
the present petition is premature. … it is incumbent upon MPC to show that the claim
for tax credit has been filed within the prescriptive period under the Tax Code; and
the taxes allegedly paid by MPC are presumed to have been collected and received
in accordance with law and revenue regulations.”
The CTA ruled in favor of MPC, and declared that MPC had overwhelmingly
proved that its purchases of goods and services were necessary in the construction
of power plant facilities which it used in its business of power generation and sale.
The tax court, however, reduced the amount of refund to which MPC was entitled.
The CTA subsequently denied the BIR Commissioner's MR.
BIR Commissioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review. Notably, the BIR
Commissioner identified and discussed as grounds for its Petition arguments that
were totally new and were never raised. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the
BIR Commissioner's Petition, pronouncing that the BIR Commissioner cannot
validly change his theory of the case on appeal.
Refusing to give up his cause, the BIR Commissioner filed the present Petition
before this Court.
36
ISSUE:
WON the petition has merit.
RULING:
This Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
A party may not change his theory of the case on appeal. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals correctly refused to consider the issues raised by the BIR Commissioner
for the first time on appeal. Its discussion on whether the MPC is a public utility and
whether it is subject to VAT or franchise tax is nothing more than obiter dictum. It
is best not at all to discuss these issues for they do not simply involve questions of
law, but also closely-related questions of fact which neither the Court of Appeals
nor this Court could presume or garner from the evidence on record.
The courts have the power to relax or suspend technical or procedural rules or
to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant or when
the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that
would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts. In his Petition
and Memorandum before this Court, the BIR Commissioner made no attempt to
provide reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before the CTA the issue of
MPC being a public utility subject to franchise tax rather than VAT.
37
Topic: A9a.1. Extent and Scope of the Rule on Liberal Construction.
Case No. 18
Atty. Erlando Abrenica
vs.
Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayang
G.R. No. 169420, September 22, 2006, 502 SCRA 614
FACTS:
Petitioner Abrenica (Atty Abrenica) was a partner of individual respondents
in the Law Firm of Abrenica,Tungol and Tibayan. Respondents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner regarding
an alleged refusal of petitioner to return and transfer partnership funds representing
profits from the sale of the parcel of land and retainer fees. The SEC initially heard
the cases but they were later transferred to the RTC of Quezon City pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies from the SEC to the courts. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents, causing petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave
of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The CA, however, denied said motion as well as the subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration. Petitioner invokes liberal construction of the rules in seeking
reversal of the above resolutions. He alleges that his appeal was not filed late but
that he only resorted to the wrong mode of appeal; that realizing his error, he
immediately filed the Motion For Leave to Admit Petition for Review; that his notice
of appeal had the effect of tolling the period of perfecting his appeal under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court; that although unaware of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, he appealed
four days after receiving the consolidated decision through a notice of appeal, thus
showing his "sincerity" in appealing the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the non-application of a liberal
construction of the rules resulting in the refusal to admit petitioner’s petition for
review.
RULING:
No.
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal

construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
38
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own
rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural
rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights
of the litigants. Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure
to abide by the rules.
In the present case, petitioner failed to show any compelling reason for not
resorting to the proper remedy. Petitioner had known about the new rules on the
second week of January, 2005 when he received a copy of respondent’s Opposition
(To Defendant’s Notice of Appeal) on Jan 6, 2005. However, petitioner originally
insisted in his Reply with Manifestation that the correct mode of appeal was a
“Notice of Appeal”. Petitioned just filed his Motion to Admit Attached Petition for
Review only on June 10, 2005, or almost eight months from the effectivity on
October 15, 2004, after he received the trial court’s Order of May 11, 2005.
Oversight" and "excusable negligence" have become an all too familiar and ready
excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with
established rules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence
thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when rigidity
would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice.
39
Topic: A9b. General Rule on Liberal Constuctions; exception.
Case No. 19
Erlinda Pilapil, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
Heirs of Briones, et. al. Respondents,
514 SCRA 197, 211 G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007
FACTS:
The petition emanates from the CFI Order dated January 15, 1960 declaring
Donata G. Ortiz the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased
Maximino Suico Briones, and was hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of said
estate. However, respondents alleged that while Donata and Maximino had no
children but Maximino has surviving siblings, which are entitled to ½ of Maximino’s
estate. Thus, Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and
misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino. Upon a complaint by respondents, said CFI Order was annulled
and set aside by RTC Cebu and affirmed by the CA. But when petitioners assailed
the CA ruling, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the said CA ruling, and
dismissed the petition for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by
respondent Heirs of Maximino.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI Order shall be annulled for failure of the court to notify
Maximino’s siblings of the intestate proceeding.
RULING:
No, the CFI Order shall not be annulled as the proceeding of said court enjoys
the presumption of regularity, which was not contradicted.
In De Dios v. CA, G.R. No. 80491, 12 August 1992, it was held that,
“Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration
of justice by providing for a practical system by which the parties to a litigation may
be accorded a full and fair opportunity to present their respective positions and refute
each other's submissions under the prescribed requirements, conditions and
limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact, there is a
symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of
Court, the bench and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and understand
substantive rights and duties and consequently to more effectively protect and
enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.”
40
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and
abandonment thereof should only be done in the most exceptional
circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by the Supreme Court in this case are
disputable presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by
evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents failed to
overcome the given presumptions.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for
the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers
is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the
deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who
were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the
CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate
proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can
this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximino’s siblings could have
missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
41
Topic: A9b. General Rule on Liberal Constuctions; exception.
Case No. 20
Barangay Dasmariñas thru Brgy. Captain Ma. Encarnacion R. Legaspi
vs.
Creative Play Corner School, et. al.
G.R. No. 169942, January 24, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of Prosecutor of
Makati charging respondent and its alleged owners with Falsification and Use of
Falsified Documents.
On November 4, 2004, City Prosecutor Aspi released a Resolution dismissing
the case for failure to establish probable cause. Petitioner thus brought the case
before the Department of Justice(DoJ) through a petition for review. DOJ
subsequently dismissed the petition for review finding no error which would justify
the reversal of the assailed resolution and also because the petition was filed late.
Petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but was also denied.
Still unsatisfied, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals. But before the petitioner was able to file its petition, it first sought for an
extension of time of 15 days from within which to file the same due to counsel’s
heavy workload, which motion was granted. Subsequently, petitioner asked for
another extension of 5 days for the same reason given in the first motion for
extension.
The CA denied the second motion for extension of time and dismissed the
petition for review filed by the petitioner, finding that the petitioner’s reason was not
compelling to grant another extension and that the petition for review was also filed
five days late from the extension sought from the said court.
Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration explaining that aside from the
first and second motions for extension it also filed an Final Motion for Additional
Time to File Petition For Review asking for another five days within which to file
the petition on account of a sudden death in the family of the handling lawyer.
Petitioner prayed that CA set aside rules of technicalities alleging that the merits of
the case justify the relaxation of technical rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not liberal application of the Rules of Court should be applied in
this case?
42
RULING:
No. Liberal application of the Rules of Court should not be applied in this
case.
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Curt provides that the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of 15 days to file a petition for review and that no
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case shall exceed 15 days.
Here, the present case is not attended by such an imperative that justifies the
relaxation of the rules. It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that
the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial
justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will.
43
Topic: A10. In what cases Rules of Court are not applicable.
Case No. 21
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
Facts:
Romeo Sioson filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence
before the Board of Medicine (BOM) against the doctors including Atienza who
allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation of his wife, Editha Sioson
wherein the said doctors removed Editha’s fully functional right kidney instead of
the left non-functional and non-visualizing kidney. During the presentation of
evidence, the Sioson’s filed a formal offer of documentary evidence consisting of
certified copies of the x-ray request forms with different dates. Atienza objected and
alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible since the same are photocopies, not
properly identified, authenticated and intended to establish matters which are
hearsay. The BOM admitted the formal offer of documentary exhibits filed by Sison.
Atienza moved to reconsider, but the BOM denied the same. Atienza appealed via a
petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
No, the exhibits are not inadmissible in evidence.
In Bantolino vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839, it was held that
the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative
bodies such as the BOM.
In People vs. Jaca, et al.106 Phil. 572 the Court firther held that the safest
policy is to be liberal, not rejecting the evidence on doubtful/technical grounds, but
admitting them unless they are plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent. This is
because rejection places them beyond consideration of the court, if they later are
found to be relevant or competent, on the other hand, if they are admitted but later
turn out to be irrelevant or incompetent, they can simply be ignored or discarded.
In view of the above rulings, the exhibits offered by Editha in this case cannot
be considered inadmissible.
44
Topic: A10. In what cases Rules of Court is not applicable.
Case No. 22
Prudencio Bantolino, et. al., petitioners,
vs.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., respondent.
G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Herein petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor
practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the
perpetuation of the “Cabo System.”
On May 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter De Vera decided in favor of the petitioners
in finding that there was an employer-employee relationship between the parties. On
appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals, although affirming the finding of the
NLRC, nonetheless agreed with the respondents that the affidavits of some of the
complainants (petitioners) should not have been given probative value for their
failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a
consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient
evidence.
Thus, the instant recourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing herein
petitioners’ complaints.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is not correct.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121582,
October 16, 1997 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC. The Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence
may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character
and effect.
Therefore, considering that administrative bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts
of law, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners’ complaints by
strictly applying the Rules of Court in not giving probative value to the affidavits for
failure to cross-examine the affiants.
45
Case No. 23
Milagros Panuncillo, Petitioner,
vs.
CAP Philippines, Inc., Respondent.
G.R. No. 161305, February 9, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired on August 28, 1980 as Office Senior Clerk by respondent.
In order to secure the education of her son, petitioner procured an educational plan
(the plan) from respondent which she had fully paid but which she later sold to
Josefina Pernes. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be effected, however,
petitioner pledged it to John Chua who, however, sold it to Benito Bonghanoy.
Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to Gaudioso R. Uy.
Josefina, by letter of February 10, 1999, informed respondent that petitioner
had "swindled" her but that she was willing to settle the case amicably. Acting on
Josefina’s letter, the Integrated Internal Audit Operations (IIAO) of respondent
required petitioner to explain in writing why the plan had not been transferred to
Josefina and was instead sold to another which was admitted by the latter in writing.
IIAO recommended that, among other things, administrative action should be
taken against petitioner for violating Section 8.4 of respondent’s Code of Discipline.
Respondent thereupon terminated the services of petitioner by Memorandum.
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, damages and attorney’s fees against respondent.
The Labor Arbiter, while finding that the dismissal was for a valid cause,
found the same too harsh. He thus ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to a
position one rank lower than her previous position. On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed that of the Labor Arbiter, it finding that
petitioner’s dismissal was illegal and accordingly ordering her reinstatement to her
former position.
Respondent challenged the NLRC Decision before the appellate court via
Petition for Certiorari. The appellate court reversed the NLRC Decision and held
that the dismissal was valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to her full backwages from the date
her compensation was withheld from her pursuant to the decision of NLRC
reinstating her to her previous position.
46
RULING:
YES.
Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under
RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, provide that an order of reinstatement by
the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The rationale of
the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC:
"In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement
aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate
policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the
1987 Constitution on labor and the working man.
xxxx
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so
much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force,
which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity.
Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation’s progress and stability.
xxxx
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The
unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee
entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the
employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial
upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the
case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory
on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll.
Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled
to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of
the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.
Here, the Court reiterated the rule that technicalities have no room in
labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner
and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them.
Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,
it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and
such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he
actually rendered services during the period.
47
STUDENT: CASTILLO, CLAUDENNE STEFANNIE D.
Case No. 24
Ong Chia, Petitioner,
vs.
Republic of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals, Respondents.
G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-
year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since
then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino
citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended.
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented

three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac
Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him.
On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner
to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state
all his former place of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, Section 7; (3) failed
to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in
the Philippines, in violation of Section 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of Section 2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and denied petitioner's
application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases,
the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and
brought up for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that in naturalization cases, the appellate court can deny an application for Philippine
48
citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial court and not
forming part of the records of the case.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
in naturalization cases, the appellate court can deny an application for Philippine
citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial court and not
forming part of the records of the case.
Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that these rules shall not apply
to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
In this case, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, Section34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletory in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That
is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the
first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course
of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by
the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude
the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the
basis of the same documents.
49
Topic: B. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court
Case No. 25
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner
vs.
Migrant Pagbilao Corporation, respondent
G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006
FACTS:
MPC is a domestic company engaged in the business of power generation and
subsequent sale thereof.
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996, MPC seasonably filed its
Quarterly VAT Returns. It filed on June 30, 1998, an application for tax credit or
refund of the aforementioned unutilized VAT paid on capital goods .
Without waiting for an answer from the BIR Commissioner, MPC filed the
instant petition for review, in order to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive
period for claiming a refund under the law. The CTA ruled in favor of MPC, and
declared that MPC had overwhelmingly proved that its purchases of goods and
services were necessary in the construction of power plant facilities which it used in
its business of power generation and sale. The tax court, however, reduced the
amount of refund to which MPC was entitled. The CTA subsequently denied the
BIR Commissioner's Motion for Reconsideration. BIR Commissioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Review. Notably, the BIR Commissioner identified
and discussed as grounds for its Petition arguments that were totally new and were
never raised. He filed his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals on 4
October 2000, averring, for the very first time, that MPC was a public utility, subject
to franchise tax and not VAT; and since it was not paying VAT, it could not claim
the refund of input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and services.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR Commissioner's Petition,
pronouncing that the BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his theory of the case
on appeal. Hence, the present Petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition has merit considering the fact that the petitioner
changed his theory of the case on appeal.
RULING:
No, The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
The general rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case on appeal.
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a party may not change his theory of
the case on appeal. Such a rule has been expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides –
50
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the
appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his
assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
The BIR Commissioner raised for the first time on appeal questions of both
fact and law not taken up before the tax court, an actuality which the BIR
Commissioner himself does not deny, but he argues that he should be allowed to do
so as an exception to the technical rules of procedure and in the interest of substantial
justice. The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to apply the foregoing
rule to the instant case, for a rule on technicality should not defeat substantive justice.
The BIR Commissioner apparently forgets that there are specific reasons why
technical or procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and that compliance with
these rules, should still be the general course of action. The Court stated that
“Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice”. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights
inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to
the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies."
51
Case No. 26
Salvador Estipona, Jr. y Asuela, Petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo, and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality
of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, " which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any
provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail
of the provision on plea-bargaining.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous
Drugs).
Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of
guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs)
with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph
3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule- making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition dated, the prosecution moved for the denial of
the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016, it manifested
that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life
to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165,
however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, it is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused.
Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court Legazpi City, Albay,
denied Estipona’s motion. Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied, hence, this petition.
52
ISSUE:
Whether Section 23 of Republic Act no. 9165 is unconstitutional as it
encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly
subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of
Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a stronger and more
independent judiciary.
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
53
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the Court has rejected previous attempts on the
part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of
Court.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to
the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate,
the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of its institutional independence.
54
Case No. 27
SM Land, Inc., et al., Petitioners,
vs.
City of Manila, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 197151, October 22, 2012
FACTS:
On the strength of the provisions of tax ordinances, Respondent City of
Manila assessed Petitioner, together with their sister companies, increased rates of
business taxes for the year 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. Petitioner paid the
additional taxes under protest. Aggrieved Petitioners and their sister companies filed
with the RTC a complaint for refund and/or Issuance of Tax credit of Taxes Illegally
collected.
The RTC held that tax ordinances had already been declared null of void. On
this ground, it ruled that Respondents cannot use the assailed ordinances in imposing
additional taxes on petitioner and their co-plaintiffs. Reconsideration was then
denied by RTC. The CTA Second Division partially granted the petition for review.
Accordingly, with the exception of Shoemart Inc and WATSONS, it is hereby
ordered to refund the rest of the Respondents for their erroneously paid local
business taxes. CTA sustained the ruling of RTC that such ordinances are null and
void. The CTA, nonetheless, held Petitioners’ claims for tax refund should be denied
because of their failure to comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court requiring
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. A motion for partial
consideration was filed, however it was denied. CTA Enbanc rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the CTA Second Division.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there were still compelling reasons to justify relaxation of the
rules requiring verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court has held that rules of procedures are established to
secure substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, they must be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. In
particular, when a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping
and verification will result in a patent denial of substantial justice, these may be
liberally construed.
55
In this case, Watsons’ procedural lapse was its belated submission of a
Secretary’s Certificate authorizing Atty. Cruz as its representative. On the other
hand, SM Land, Inc’s infraction was not only its late submission of its Secretary’s
Certificate but also its failure to timely submit its verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the tax ordinances have
already been declared null and void by the Supreme Court. Thus, to the mind of the
Supreme Court, the unquestioned nullity of the above assailed tax ordinances, makes
Petitioners’ claim for tax refund clearly meritorious. On this basis, Petitioners’
meritorious claims are compelling reasons to relax the rule on the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
56
Case No. 28
EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF GERMAN, SANTIAGO represented by FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, Respondents
G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction
filed by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago.
The Complaint alleged that petitioner and his co-defendant had been unlawfully
entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting
the fruits of the coconut trees.
Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents' ownership of the
properties in question, asserting that petitioner's father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom
defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof
since the 1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already been
ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by
the heirs of Edmundo Pinga.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence and failed to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. On that ground, the complaint
was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their
evidence ex-parte."
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that the entire
action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte.
Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present
evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They cited
cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and Domingo v. Santos, which noted
those instances in which a counterclaim could not remain pending for independent
adjudication.
ISSUE:
WON the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the
compulsory counterclaim.
RULING:
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of
remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable
57
changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that
if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is "without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence
holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the
dismissal as well of the compulsory counterclaim.
In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential
rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal
of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the
dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the
counterclaim.
The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the counterclaim
cannot be independently adjudicated is not available to, and was not intended for the
benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.
58
Case No. 29
In the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in Favor of
Lilibeth O. Ladaga, vs. Maj. Gen. Reynaldo Mapagu
G.R. No. 189689-91, November 13, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in
what is alleged to be a JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation
Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10thID). They perceive that
by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become
easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings–are a threat to their
life, liberty and security. Atty. Lilibeth O. Ladaga (Atty.Ladaga),first came to know
of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the
OB List, it was reflected that the ultimate goal is to try to oust PGMA on 30 nov
2007.
On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-
Trinidad), delivered a privileged speech before the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB List. The Commission
on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into
the matter. According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of
her duties and functions, she has not committed any act against national security that
would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB List. She said that sometime
in May2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23, 2008
three men tried to barge into their house Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T.
Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his petition,
he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his
advocacies as a public interest or human rights lawyer. The Petitioners assert that
the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have
already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked
directly to the OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo. The RTC subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing
the respondents to file a verified written return. In the return of the respondents, they
denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners failed to show that they
were responsible for the alleged threats. After submission of the parties’ respective
Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no substantial evidence to show that
the perceived threat to petitioners ‘life, liberty and security was attributable to
the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ
was therefore denied.
59
ISSUE:
WON the evidence satisfies the degree of proof required for the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo.
RULING:
No.
The Writ of Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-
making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases
of and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy intended to address
violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a
remedy of extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain
grounds but only upon reasonable certainty. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence, and if the allegations
in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege
of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.
In the present case, petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their
names in the OB List presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent
deaths of the other known activists to the inclusion of their names or the names of
their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the existence of the OB
List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men
or the violent deaths of certain personalities. The Petitioners cannot assert that the
inclusion of their names in the OB List is a real threat as that which brought
ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from which
it can be presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on
account of their militant affiliations. The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove
by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their rights to life, liberty
and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient
enough evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
60
Topic: B1. Nature of Philippine Courts
Case No. 30
BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., Respondents,
G.R. No. 214406, February 6, 2017
FACTS:
A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against
respondent Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc. (TDLSI) before the RTC
Makati City. In its decision, RTC ruled in favor of petitioner BP Oil. However,
upon appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC, and ruled in favor of
respondent TDLSI. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court relying purely on
the basis of question of facts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Supreme Court may entertain the petition.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court may entertain the petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court require that only questions of law
should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. However, this rule admits
exceptions.
There are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor
Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990), to wit:(1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.
61
Here, a close reading of the present petition shows that what this Court is
being asked to resolve is, what should prevail - the findings of facts of the RTC or
the findings of facts of the CA on the alleged misapprehension of facts of the RTC.
The findings of facts of both Courts are obviously conflicting, hence, the need for
this Court to rule on the present petition.
62
Topic: B(f). Quasi-judicial bodies (CSC)
Case No. 30
Benigno V. Magpale, petitioner,
vs.
Civil Service Commission and Rogelio A. Dayan, respondents.
GR. No. 97381, November 5, 1992
FACTS:
On July 23, 1984, a formal charge for Dishonesty, Pursuit of Private Business
without permission (as required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations), Frequent
and Unauthorized Absences and Neglect of Duty was filed against petitioner. Based
on the said charges he was ordered preventively suspended and has been out of
service since then.
For almost 4 years, the case remained unacted upon. The formal investigation
and hearing resumed on September 18, 1987.
On January 18, 1989, a Decision was rendered by the Secretary of Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) finding petitioner guilty of Gross
Negligence on two counts. Accordingly, he was meted a penalty of dismissal from
service with corresponding accessory penalties. When petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in the DOTC’s Order of February 20, 1989, he appealed
to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of CSC.
On February 5, 1990, MSPB rendered a decision reversing the Decision of
DOTC and ordered petitioner to be immediately reinstated in the service.
On March 1, 1990, Philippine Port’s Authority (petitioner’s employer),
through its General Manager, filed an appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-
PPA, and the latter office indorsed the appeal to respondent CSC in a letter dated
March 5, 1990.
On May 1990, MSPB issued an Order for immediate implementation of its
February 5, 1990 Decision. Subsequently, on June 28, 1990 petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss the appeal of PPA alleging that CSC has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MSPB Decision was a proper subject of appeal to the CSC?
RULING:
No.
Under Section 47 of EO 292, it is stated that the CSC shall decide on appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving imposition of: a) a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or b) fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
63
salary, or c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or d) removal or dismissal from
office.
In this case, the February 5, 1990 decision of the MSPB did not involve
dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and
ordered him reinstated to his former position. Therefore, the MSPB decision was not
a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.
64
Topic: B(f). Quasi-judicial bodies (HLURB)
Case No. 31
JIN-JIN DELOS SANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES REYNATO D. SARMIENTO and LENI C. SARMIENTO and IA-
JAN SARMIENTO REALTY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 154877, March 27, 2007
FACTS:
In a Contract to Buy and Sell dated March 17, 1995, Spouses Sarmiento
agreed to sell to Santos an 82-square meter residential lot identified as Lot 18, Block
2, located at IA-JAN Homes and registered under TCT. No. 95442. The purchase
price was set at ₱824,000.00, ₱300,000.00 of which was paid by Santos to Spouses
Sarmiento at the time of the execution of the contract, with the remaining balance to
be paid within 5 years at a monthly amortization rate of ₱15,074.43.
Before the purchase price could be paid in full, Santos and Spouses Sarmiento
entered into a Cancellation of Contract to Buy and Sell dated April 19, 1997, by
virtue of which Spouses Sarmiento agreed to refund Santos ₱584,355.10 while the
latter agreed to surrender possession of the residential lot to the former.
When Spouses Sarmiento failed to refund Santos, the latter filed with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board–Expanded National Capital Region Field
Office (HLURB) a Complaint, to enforce the cancellation of contract and demand
payment of the refund plus interest and damages.
Santos was able to get a favorable judgment in the HLURB, but it was set
aside by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HLURB has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING:
No, HLURB has no jurisdiction.
In Lacson Hermanas, Inc. vs. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, June
29, 2005, it was held that the regular courts, not the HLURB, have jurisdiction over
actions to enforce a contract to sell involving real property which is not alleged nor
established to be a subdivision or condominium property.
In this case, it was never alleged that the property involved is a subdivision or
condominium and that the parties are subdivision or condominium buyer and
developer/owner. Thus, the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case.
65
Topic: B(h). Principle of judicial hierarchy
Case No. 32
Senator Leila M. De Lima, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Juanita Guerrero, et. al., respondents.
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017
FACTS:
Three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-
accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. One Information charging the petitioner
for violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. (jj), Sec. 26(b), and Sec. 28 of R.A. 9165,
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-165 and raffled off to Branch 204, presided
by respondent judge.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. However, on February
23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused.
On February 27, 2017, the petitioner repaired to the Supreme Court praying
for the annulment of the Order granting the Warrant of Arrest; the issuance of a writ
of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality; the
issuance of an order granting the application for the issuance of TRO and a writ of
preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and the issuance of a Status Quo Ante
Order.
On behalf of the respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
interposed its Comment and argued, among others, that De Lima’s petition should
be dismissed as she did not observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
No, the petitioner is not excused from compliance with said doctrine.
In The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 328-
330 (2015), the Supreme Court enjoined the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without
serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
66
courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
Here, petitioner’s allegation that her case has sparked national and
international interest is not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of
courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for the
Court’s decisions.
67
Case No. 33
Audi AG, Petitioner, vs.
HON. JULES A. MEJIA, in his capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Alaminos City; AUTO PROMINENCE CORPORATION; and
PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007
FACTS:
Audi AG, petitioner, is a non-resident foreign company engaged in the
manufacture of "Audi" brand cars. On the other hand, Auto Prominence Corporation
and Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton), respondents, are corporations duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the business of assembling,
buying, selling, distributing, importing, marketing, and servicing of motor vehicles.
On March 21, 2005, respondents filed with the RTC, Alaminos City a
complaint for specific performance and injunction (with application for a temporary
restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction) against petitioner Audi AG. The
complaint alleges that petitioner appointed respondent Proton as its sole assembler
and distributor of Audi cars in the Philippines under an Assembly Agreement and a
Distributorship Agreement, and that that respondent Proton was induced to open,
promote, develop and sell Audi brand cars in the Philippines upon petitioner’s
representations that it (respondent Proton) will be the exclusive assembler and
distributor of Audi cars and local parts manufacturer for export purposes, for a period
of 12 months and, thereafter, for an indefinite period upon the establishment of the
assembly and distributorship network.
After conducting a hearing, respondent Executive Judge issued the Order in
question directing the issuance of a TRO effective for twenty (20) days, enjoining
petitioner from terminating the contracts executed by the parties, and directing it or
any person claiming rights under it, to maintain the status quo ante. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for ignoring to observe the
established rule on hierarchy of courts.
RULING:
YES. The petition should be dismissed.
The Petitioner, by filing directly with this Court its petition, has ignored the
established rule on hierarchy of courts. It must be stressed that the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction over petitions
68
for certiorari. The rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of appeals. Such
rule is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s precious time and
attention which are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. Thus, petitioner should have
filed with the Court of Appeals its petition, not directly with this Court. While such
rule may be relaxed for special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out
in the petition, however, in the instant case, petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
Here, the Court stressed that the rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose,
and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat
such purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They
may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be
heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our
system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the
procedural rules.
69
STUDENT: CASTILLO, CLAUDENNE STEFANNIE D.
Case No. 34
Desiderio Delos Reyes, et. al., petitioners,
vs.
People of the Philippines and Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., respondents.
G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Calauan, Laguna by the Philippine Coconut Authority against
Desiderio De los Reyes and Myrna Villanueva, petitioners, and several others for
violation of Republic Act No. 8048, otherwise known as The Coconut Preservation
Act of 1995 for the cutting down and processing more or less FOUR HUNDRED
and FORTY (440) coconut trees without the required permit to cut from the
Philippine Coconut Authority.
On January 31, 1997, the MTC ordered the accused, including petitioners, to
file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from notice. On March 4, 1997,
petitioners, instead of submitting their counter-affidavits, filed a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation. On May 13, 1997, the MTC denied the motion on the
ground that in cases cognizable by the MTCs, an accused is not entitled to a
preliminary investigation. On June 4, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion To Quash the
complaint on the ground that the allegations therein do not constitute an offense. On
October 15, 1997, the MTC issued an Order denying the motion and requiring anew
all the accused to file their counter-affidavits within five (5) days from notice.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with
the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 2494-97-C. They alleged that the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it denied their Motion To Quash.
The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that the MTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion considering that the allegations in the complaint, if hypothetically
admitted, are sufficient to constitute the elements of the offense.
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied
by the RTC. Petitioners then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
Appellate Court rendered its decision holding that since petitioners are raising a
question of law, they should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for
certiorari.
70
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition is proper.
RULING:
Yes, it is proper.
Petitioners failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. They should
have filed their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the Court of Appeals has original
jurisdiction to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari.
There was no procedural lapse when petitioners initially appealed the RTC
Orders to the Court of Appeals. But what they should have done after the Appellate
Court rendered its Decision affirming the RTC Orders was to seasonably file with
this Court an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Instead, as earlier mentioned, what they
filed with this Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules.
The Court have ruled that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
71
Case No. 35
COMELEC, petitioners
vs.
Quijano-Padilla, respondents
G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
FACTS:
The COMELEC issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for the supply and
installation of information technology equipment and ancillary services for its VRIS
Project.
Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation pre-qualified and was
allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted,
PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total
weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252 approving the Notice of Award to
PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same. However, under R.A.
No. 8760 the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC’s modernization
project was only One Billion Pesos. PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote
several letters to the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of the contract, but
to no avail.
Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public
statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been "scrapped, dropped, junked,
or set aside."
PHOTOKINA filed with the RTC, a petition for mandamus, prohibition and
damages against the COMELEC and all its Commissioners. It alleged three causes
of action: first, the deliberate refusal of the COMELEC and its Commissioners to
formalize the contract rendered nugatory the perfected contract between them;
second, in announcing that the VRIS Project has been junked and that COMELEC
Chairman Benipayo committed grave abuse of discretion; and third, the
COMELEC’s failure to perform its duty under the contract has caused
PHOTOKINA to incur damages since it has spent substantial time and resources in
the preparation of the bid and the draft contract.
Respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed
Resolution granting PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction. Both parties filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. PHOTOKINA reiterated its plea for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. COMELEC and its Commissioners, through the Solicitor
General, prayed that the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be set aside and
that the petition for mandamus, prohibition and damages be dismissed. COMELEC’s
72
Omnibus Motion was denied while PHOTOKINA’s application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was granted.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General. PHOTOKINA filed a Comment with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
RULING:
No. It does not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
The Court stated that it is suffice it to say that the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts it is not an ironclad dictum. On several instances where this Court was
confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the case.
The case at bar is of similar import. It is in the interest of the State that
questions relating to government contracts be settled without delay. This is more so
when the contract, as in this case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the
modernization of our country’s election process, a project that has long been
overdue. PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present
petition since its legal position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the
COMELEC Commissioners. This is a leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The Court
stated that the OSG is an independent office. Its hands are not shackled to the cause
of its client agency. In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG
is to see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld.
73
Case No. 36
United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN), et. al., petitioners,
vs.
National Electrification Administration, et. al., respondents.
G.R 187107, January 31, 2012
FACTS:
The case is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September
3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board). Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions. Respondent essentially argues that petitioners violated the principle of
hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed
with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with the Supreme Court directly.
ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
YES.
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However,
as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift
stroke.
74
Case No. 37
Emmanuel De Castro, petitioner,
vs.
Emerson Carlos, respondent.
G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
FACTS:
Then president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed De Castro as of assistant
general manager for operations (AGMO) of the MMDA. His appointment was then
concurred by the members of the MMDA through a resolution and he took oath
before then Chairperson Bayani Fernando. After a year, De Castro was reassigned
to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office. Subsequently, Chairperson Francis
Tolentino designated Respondent as OIC of the Office of AGMO based on a
Memorandum.
Petitioner filed petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto seeking to
oust Respondent from the position of AGMO. De Castro filed the petition directly
with the Supreme Court citing urgent demands of public interest, particularly the
veritable need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights of civil
servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the President of the Philippines
is the appointing authority, De Castro doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate
court justice, with a prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go
against a presidential appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether a presidential appointee can file a petition for quo warranto under
Rule 66 directly with the Supreme Court.
RULING:
NO. Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals
and regional trial court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed. Furthermore,
settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain
if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter
and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
75
In this case, De Castro’s excuses are not special and important circumstances
that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt
to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and cannot be valid
justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
76
STUDENT: IMALNI, NAFIESA V.
Topic: B(i). Exceptions to Observance of Hierarchy of Courts
Case No. 38
HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF QUEZON CITY AND HON. KAGAWAD
ARNALDO A. CANDO, Respondents
G.R. No. 218463, March 01, 2017
FACTS:
Giron, together with Marcelo B. Macasinag, Eliseo M. Cruz, Benjamin Q. Osi
and Crisanto A. Canciller, filed before the Ombudsman a complaint for Dishonesty,
Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Section 389 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7160 against Cando, then the Barangay Chairman of Capri, for illegally using
electricity in three (3) of his computer shops.
The case was referred to the Office of the Vice Mayor of Quezon City and
was calendared for session of the City Council. The case was later endorsed to the
Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against Elective
Barangay Officials (Committee) for a hearing, only Giron appeared.
The investigation, however, was suspended because of the coming October
2013 Barangay Elections. During the said elections, Cando vied for the position of
Barangay Kagawad and won. He assumed office on December 1, 2013.
On March 13, 2014, the City Council adopted the Resolution of the
Committee, dated January 24, 2014, recommending the dismissal of the case against
Cando for being moot and academic. It cited as basis the doctrine first enunciated in
Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (Pascual) and reiterated in Aguinaldo v.
Santos (Aguinaldo), where the Court stated that "a public official cannot be removed
for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”
Giron moved for reconsideration, arguing that the doctrine of condonation
was only applicable when the re-election of the public official was to the same
position. On October 27, 2014, the City Council adopted the recommendation of the
Committee to deny Giron's motion for reconsideration.
On November 18, 2014, Giron appealed to the OP. On May 13, 2015, the OP,
through respondent Executive Secretary Pacquito N. Ochoa, Jr., dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. The OP opined that the "condonation rule applied even if
[Cando] runs for a different position as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to his
culpability was committed prior to the date of election."
77
Giron did not move for reconsideration. Instead, he directly filed this petition
before this Court. His justification for his disregard of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies was that the issues being raised in this petition were purely
questions of law or of public interest.
ISSUE:
WON Giron could directly resort to the Supreme Court directly disregarding
the rule on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and the Doctrine of the
Hierarchy of Courts.
RULING:
Plain is the rule that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts,
exhaustion of available administrative remedies, like filing a motion for
reconsideration, is a pre-condition. The courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. This
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies.
As a rule, direct resort to this Court is frowned upon in line with the principle
that the Court is the court of last resort, and must remain to be so if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions conferred to it by the Constitution. The rule,
however, admits of exceptions, namely: "(a) where there is estoppel on the part of
the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g)
where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is
involved; and (1) in quo warranto proceedings.”
In this case, petitioner Giron raises the issue of whether the condonation
doctrine still applies if the public official is elected to a new position. As he has
raised a pure question of law, his failure to seek further administrative remedy may
be excused. It has been held that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with in the following instances: (1) when the issue raised is one
purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in cases of urgency; and (4)
where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action.
78
Topic: B(j). Transcendental importance
Case No. 39
United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN), et. al., petitioners,
vs.
National Electrification Administration, et. al., respondents.
G.R 187107, January 31, 2012
FACTS:
The case is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September
3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board). Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were
terminated from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions.
Respondent essentially argues that petitioners violated the principle of

hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed
with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with the Supreme Court directly. One
of the procedural issues alleged by respondent is that the remedy of injunction is no
longer available to petitioners inasmuch as the assailed NEA Board resolutions have
long been implemented. Respondent ground their argument on the untenability of
the petition on the ground of mootness.
Petitioners contend that the principle of mootness is subject to exceptions,

such as when the case is of transcendental importance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for being moot.
RULING:
No.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be
of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, supervening events, whether intended
or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the
79
cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However,
as an exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift
stroke. Thus, the Court has the jurisdiction over the case.
80
Topic: B(k). Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
Case No. 40
Philippine Sinter Corporation and Phividec Industrial Authority, petitioners,
vs.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., respondent.
G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002
FACTS:
President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform

Policy for the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which
provides in part: "Continue direct connection for industries authorized under the
BOI-NPC Memorandum of Understanding of 12 January 1981, until such time as
the appropriate regulatory board determines that direct connection of industry to
NPC is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or
cooperative.”
Pursuant thereof, respondent CEPALCO, a grantee of legislative franchise to

distribute electric power to the municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan,
and the city of Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis Oriental, filed with
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition seeking the discontinuation of all
existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NPC, now
NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. Consequently, ERB granted the
petition. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. CA and
Supreme Court likewise affirmed the decision of ERB.
To implement the ERB decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter

Corporation (PSC), and advised the latter of its desire "to have the power supply of
PSC, directly taken from NPC (NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred" to
CEPALCO. To restrain the execution of said ERB decision, PSC and PIA filed a
complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City
alleging that there is no legal basis to cut-off PSC’s power supply with NAPOCOR.
RTC granted the injunction but was reversed and set aside by the CA on appeal.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the
ERB.
81
RULING:
No, the injunction does not lie against the final and executory judgment of the
ERB.
In Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 487, 495 (1998),
it was held that, “The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a
judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain
such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when
facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or
unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent
its enforcement. So, also, a change in the situation of the parties can warrant an
injunctive relief.”
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing

except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render
execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties
occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To
disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to
brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.
Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides
that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. (Now
transferred to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) Also, in Olaguer vs.
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Br. 48, 170 SCRA 478, 487 (1989), “Settled is the
rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative
bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are
co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically,
beyond the control of the latter.”
Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the
decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of
trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial
stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.
82

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GROUP A

Compilation of Case Digests

The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them

The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly

Being procedural in nature, Neypes is deemed to be applicable to actions

Sometime in 2000, Respondent was constrained to slow down and suspend

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate

Respondent opposed the MR. Respondent based its Opposition on technical

Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent

Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. However, the NLRC

In this case, the aforementioned conditions are present. Furthermore, 14 days

Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented

Respondent essentially argues that petitioners violated the principle of

Petitioners contend that the principle of mootness is subject to exceptions,

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

President Corazon C. Aquino and her Cabinet approved a Cabinet Reform

Pursuant thereof, respondent CEPALCO, a grantee of legislative franchise to

To implement the ERB decision, CEPALCO wrote Philippine Sinter

Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing

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