It is too early to speculate about where the Russian

invasion of Ukraine will stop. But it is already important

to look beyond the horizon and analyze the role that
Russia will be able to play in the regions to its south.
At the time of writing, Russia is facing an unprecedented
reaction from Western countries over its invasion of
Ukraine and the massive destruction of life and property
that has ensued. This has included financial, military,
and humanitarian support to Ukraine; moves to
diversify energy supplies away from Russia; the
exclusion of Russian banks from the international
financial system; the interruption of most air and sea
transport to and from Russia; the decision of major
companies to suspend their activities in Russia, or with
Russia; and a reinforcement of NATO and European
Union mechanisms and policies. Yet, none of these will
lead to a rapid resolution of the underlying issues tied to
Ukraine.
Let’s consider a scenario in which Russia’s current
posture would remain as it is in the long term—with its
autocratic power structure engaged in a permanent
adversarial relationship with Western countries and
NATO, without being part of East-West agreements. The
consequences would be momentous. Not only would the
Western world have to rethink many of its policies, but
countries to Russia’s south would have to factor in the
changes and realignments resulting from its invasion of
Ukraine. Five main consequences come to mind.
First, Russia’s political “brand” or “model” would
probably remain attractive for a number of leaders in the
Middle Eastern states of the Mediterranean—notably
Syria, as well as Sub-Saharan African countries,
including the Central African Republic and Mali, and to
a certain extent Turkey as well. That is not to mention
the geopolitical interests of larger players—such as
China, the leading states in the Persian Gulf, and India—
to accommodate Russian stances, if not actively
support them. A Russia embodying anti-Western
attitudes could well remain a political anchor, or at least
an uneasy but valued partner. After all, to remain in
power, a number of regimes resort to muzzling their
political opponents, harassing media outlets and civil
society activists, controlling their judiciary, and waging
information battles based on false narratives. That is
Russia’s brand.
A second consequence is the considerable reinforcement
of European Union unity, triggered by Russia’s
imprudent invasion of Ukraine. In just two weeks, the
EU has managed to leap forward on a policy of energy
diversification away from Russia and on foreign arms
sales. More importantly, EU member states, including
those governments closer to Moscow, have remained
unified in their reaction to Russia’s invasion. In a matter
of days, for instance, Germany concluded a decades-long
internal debate on increased military funding. In
addition, Russia’s political influence over European
political parties has fallen drastically.
These evolutions will reshape relations around the
Mediterranean, in the Western Balkans, and in Sub-
Saharan Africa. They will have an influence on Europe’s
counterterrorism operations in the Middle East and
Africa, on its network of values-based agreements,
possibly even on its future enlargement. The EU and the
United Kingdom could enhance their military
cooperation, be it through joint exercises, basing rights,
counterterrorism cooperation, or the joint production of
equipment.
Third, Russia and the West would now be expected to
argue with more virulence at the United Nations, with
countries outside the Western orbit being challenged to
choose sides. Many questions will become more acute
and information wars will escalate. Already, the NATO-
Russia dialogue has been stopped and Moscow has
withdrawn from Council of Europe meetings. Will its
narrative about a morally corrupt, declining Europe still
hold currency around the world once the horrors of the
Ukraine invasion are fully documented?
Fourth, countries in the Middle East, Mediterranean,
and Africa will face important consequences. The cost of
their imports of cereals will rise. Negotiations in the
United Nations framework over, say, the Syria or Libya
peace settlements will involve a harsher competition for
support from third countries. And Moscow will likely
increase the promotion of its interests through the
deployment of private military companies, military
sales, and air and naval basing rights.
Fifth, Turkey will face its own issues at a time when it
has started an extensive campaign to repair its
diplomatic relationships and is conducting high-level
talks to that effect with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi
Arabia, Armenia, Israel, and Greece. In the short term,
there is little doubt that Turkey will try as much as
possible to maintain a balance in its ties with Russia and
Ukraine, and to promote its potential “mediation” role
(so far only a facilitation role).
However, given the deliberate violence against
Ukrainian civilians and civil infrastructure,
preserving warm relations with Moscow will inevitably
become problematic. In a scenario where today’s
Ukraine is erased from the map, Turkey will be faced
with a new Russia totally dominating the northern shore
of the Black Sea, reinforcing its naval base in Sevastopol,
controlling one-third of global cereal exports, and more
than ever exerting power through its supply of oil and
gas.
In the defense domain, and unless a drastic reversal
occurs, Turkey’s S400 missile defense system delivered
in 2019 will remain entirely dependent on Russia for
training, maintenance, and resupplies. This will be a
core liability in a lasting confrontation between Russia
and NATO in the years to come. The modernization of
Turkey’s air force will also become a challenge, as
Ankara will need to find an alternative to its exclusion
from the U.S. F-35 stealth fighter program.
Similarly, regarding the implementation of the
Montreux Convention of 1936 regulating maritime
traffic through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits,
Russia may seek to modify the treaty. In addition,
Turkey could face increasing difficulties in its dealings
with Russia over Syria, unless it plainly agrees to deal
with the Assad regime.
Overall, faced with the scenario of a permanently
adversarial Russia, a number of countries to Russia’s
south would be confronted with difficult choices in a
vast array of domains—food security, trade, energy
supplies, arms procurement, and military alliances.
Ultimately, they could be pushed to choose between
political alignment with Russia (which would imply
autocracy) and good relations with the West (which
would imply democracy).