1.

AGRARIAN DISPUTE (SECTION 3[D])

ISIDRO v. CA
FACTS;

 Isidro Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an
area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
 In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter,
allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned
land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to
meet his family's needs.
 The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner
would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any
rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
 In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner the return
of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming
that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
 A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner set up the
following defenses: 3
 After ocular inspection MTC found out that the disputed land is a fishpond and dismissed
the complaint arguing that the dispute is in the jurisdiction of DARAB.
 The same finding was issued by the RTC as the case was appealed but the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the lower courts arguing that the subject land is
agrarian in nature but there exists no tenancy relationship between the petitioner and
herein private respondent.

ISSUE: "WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE
AND WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COULD LEGALLY EJECT THE PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THE FOLLOWING:

1. THAT THE SUBJECT IS A FISHPOND AND UNDER THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
FISHPONDS ARE CLASSIFIED AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS;
2. THAT UNDER THE RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON WORKING ON
A FISHPOND IS A TENANT OR NOT IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB."

HELD:
The Supreme Court holds for the private respondent. The first thing to find out is
whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent.
If such relationship cannot be proved, the court can out rightly dismiss the case and DARAB has
the jurisdiction.
In the case at hand, the occupancy of the petitioner is because of the tolerance of the
owner (private respondents) to him so they let the petitioner to occupy the said portion of their
property on the condition that he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because of
petitioner's refusal to vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was
to file an action for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioner alleges of an
implied tenancy on which the reason the private respondents wants him to vacate the land is to
increase his land rental hence this petition.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural
is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a
tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned, such
arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when
the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are
not contrary to law, are even more important. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship
are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;

(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and

(6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle,
swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this case. The fact remains that the existence of
all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. And in the absence
of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Court. Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner
of the land in question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had the legal right to demand
upon petitioner to vacate the land

Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to use the land subject to the
condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. The evidence in this case, on the other
hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was an agricultural tenant or lessee.

There was no contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private respondent nor
with the overseer of the private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain
or to share his harvests.

petition is DENIED
DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 2011 (Revised Rules and Regulations
Implementing Sec. 19 of RA 9700 – Jurisdiction on and referral of Cases that are
Agrarian in Nature)

When a certain complaint is being lodged in the regular courts wherein fact it is
Agrarian in Nature, it is the DAR who has the jurisdiction over the said dispute. We can say that
it is Agrarian in nature if: there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian
in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant (Sec. 50-A of RA 6657). In
this Administrative Order, it has been laid out the guidelines in proving the case is Agrarian in
nature:

1. Existence of a tenancy relationship;

2. The land subject of the case is agricultural;
3. Cause of action involves ejectment or removal of a farmer, farmworker, or tenant;
4. The crime alleged arose out of or is in connection with an agrarian dispute (i.e., theft or
qualified theft of farm produce, estafa, malicious mischief, illegal trespass, etc.),
Provided, that the prosecution of criminal offenses penalized by R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, shall be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian
Courts;
5. The land subject of the case is covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA),
Emancipation Patent (EP), or other title issued under the agrarian reform program, and
that the case involves the right of possession, use, and ownership thereof; or

6. The civil case filed before the court of origin concerns the ejectment of
farmers/tenants/farmworkers, enforcement or rescission of contracts arising from,
connected with, or pertaining to an Agribusiness Ventures Agreement (AVA), and the
like.

The existence of one or more of the foregoing circumstances may be sufficient to justify a
conclusion that the case is agrarian in nature. The Chief of the Legal Division, or the DAR
lawyer or legal officer assigned, shall accordingly conclude that the case is agrarian in nature
cognizable by the DAR, and thus recommend that the referred case is not proper for trial.

Hence, it will be the DAR who will certify if the referred case is Agrarian in nature or not.
DOJ MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 40 – GUIDELINES ON THE INVESTIGATION AND
REFERRAL OF CASES TO DAR PURSUANT TO SEC 19 OF RA 9700

SECTION 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended by
adding Section 50-A to read as follows:

“SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. — No court or prosecutor’s office shall
take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided
under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of
the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or
tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR
which shall determine and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian
dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have
judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor’s office, the
appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial
court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.

“In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have competent jurisdiction, agrarian
reform beneficiaries or identified beneficiaries and/or their associations shall have legal standing
and interest to intervene concerning their individual or collective rights and/or interests under
the CARP.

“The fact of non-registration of such associations with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
or Cooperative Development Authority, or any concerned government agency shall not be used
against them to deny the existence of their legal standing and interest in a case filed before
such courts and quasi-judicial bodies.”

IN SUMMARY, DOJ MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 40 ADOPTS SECTION 19. Section 50 of

Republic Act No. 6657
 4 SUPLICO et al vs CA
Facts:
 Isabel Tupas was the registered owner of a parcel of rice land with an area of 120,000
square meters (12 hectares), in Taloc, Bago City.
 On 24 February 1977, she leased her landholding, excluding the 33,438-square-meter
portion already tenanted by one Jose Jacinto, for the amount of P10,000.00 to petitioner
Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that was set to expire on 31 May
1982.
 Sometime in 1979, Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meters of the farmland
under an agreement with Enrique Suplico. Armada undertook to till the land while Suplico
agreed to provide the farm implements and work animals. Suplico was to receive from
Armada 62 cavans from the palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not
only of the land but also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private respondent resided
with his family in a farmhouse on the land.
 Years later, Suplico threatened to eject Armada from the property, Armada initiated, on 03
May 1982, an action for damages and injunction against Suplico in the Court of Agrarian
Relations ("CAR") in Bacolod City. The complaint averred that Armada was the tenant-
farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas having been instituted as
such tenant in 1979 by her administrator, herein petitioner Enrique Suplico, to whom he
religiously paid the fixed rental of 62 cavans of palay per crop yield.
 An order was issued by the CAR meanwhile restraining Suplico, his agents and
representatives, from harassing, molesting, threatening, and committing acts of
dispossession against, Armada.
 In his answer with counterclaim, Suplico interposed the special defense that Armada was
not a tenant-farmer but a seasonal hired farm laborer with a fixed compensation, and that
his services could be terminated any time before or, at the worst case, upon the expiration
of their contract in May 1982. Suplico added that Armada unlawfully appropriated for
himself the whole produce of the first yield for the crop year 1982-83.
 On 14 February 1983, Isabel Tupas, represented by her attorney-in- fact Lolita T. Suplico
(sister of Isabel and the wife of Enrique P. Suplico), intervened in the case. She alleged that
she had no contractual relationship with Armada nor did she impliedly tolerate his continued
possession of the land. She prayed that Armada be ejected from her landholding. 10 On
even date, Isabel Tupas filed a complaint for ejectment against Armada and his wife,
Leticia, in the Municipal Trial Court ("MTC") of Bago City. The complaint, however, was
dismissed on 15 May 1985 for lack of jurisdiction, following the certification issued by the
Regional Director of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Region VI, Iloilo City, that the
case was not proper for trial and hearing by the MTC on account of the existence of tenancy
over the land involved.
 On 28 March 1987, Isabel Tupas donated the whole property to her sister, Lolita T. Suplico,
and her nephews, Enrique Suplico, Jr., and David Suplico. On 17 May 1988, she moved to
be dropped as intervenor and asked that her Donees of the property be instead named as
substitutes.
 Finally, on 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision declaring private
respondent a bona fide agricultural lessee.
 The contending parties all appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 29 November 1991, affirmed the decision of the court a quo and
considered Armada to be a share tenant. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Armada should be held a tenant farmer entitled to security of
tenure or a mere hired farm laborer.

HELD:
 The Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of both courts below. The facts found
by the appellate court, sustaining the court a quo, readily converge towards one conclusion,
and it is that tenancy relationship did exist between the parties.
Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there resided,
with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly, private
respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing, planting, weeding and
harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring of persons outside of the immediate
household, so long as the tenant himself had control in the farm work, was not essentially
opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the management of the farm was left entirely to
private respondent who defrayed the cultivation expenses. Fourthly, private respondent shared
the harvest of the land, depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62
cavans of palay per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed ricemiller of Taloc, attested to
Suplico’s having received from private respondent the cash value of the rental payments from
the first crop of 1979 and each crop thereafter up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive. The rental
payments made thereafter were received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, court appointed police
officers, or the barangay captain.

NB: A Disputed agricultural land will be considered an AGRARIAN DISPUTE if the TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP of the Parties is established which will be instituted in DARAB. Absence of which
can be lodged in proper courts.
 5. BEJASA v. CA

FACTS;
 Isabel Candelaria is the indisputable owner of two parcel of land measuring 16 hectares
and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. 
 On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the
land with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract,
Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to
purchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and
care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits,
etc."
 Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. The
Bejasas claim that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the
land and shouldered all expenses of production.
 On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land,
modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no
obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria. Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.
 On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her
attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land.
 On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with
Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife. The contract had a term of one year.
 On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in
consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"  agreement, with a term of one
year. 
 During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed.
The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00 was paid on
January 11, 1985. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the
land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its
use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.
 On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease
agreement over the land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also
renewed by Candelaria on the same date. On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint
before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the Bejasas but was subsequently dismissed.
 Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan
Oriental, Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages." The case was referred to the Department of
Agrarian Reform but DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil
courts.
 The trial court dismissed Jaime's complaint, including the Bejasas' counterclaim for
leasehold, home lot and damages.
 On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery
of damages." against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. On February 20, 1991,
after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. First, they reasoned that a
tenancy relationship was established. This relationship can be created by and between a
 "person who furnishes the landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor and the person who personally cultivates the same." Second, as bona-
fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure.
 Respondents appealed to the CA and the decision of the lower courts were duly
reversed on the following grounds: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold
tenancy relationship were met. There was no consent given by the landowner. The
consent of former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy
relationship Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only
constituted them as mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants".
Verily, even Malabanan knew that his contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease.
Third, the contract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms,
expired after one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of harvests, means of
production, personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing of harvest was not proven.
The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the element of
personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted that he hired
laborers to clear and cultivate the land.

ISSUE: WON there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.

HELD:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no
tenancy relationship between the parties. While it is true that Malabanan was given the
usufructuary by the land owner and Malabanan allowed petitioners to cultivate the land, we
cannot find the relation between the real landowner and the petitioners – consent and harvest
sharing was not duly proved. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent, and the
testimony of Renaldo Bejasa with regards to harvest sharing is inconsistent which raises
suspicion.
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They
acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement
with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during
Malabanan's lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured
when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when
Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in
the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the
Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere
civil law lease.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil
law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.
Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.

Principles:
tenancy relationship was established. This relationship can be created by and between a
"person who furnishes the... landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor and the person who personally cultivates the same."
In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing.
 6. VALENCIA v. CA

FACTS;
 Victor Valencia is the owner of 2 parcel of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon
City, Negros Oriental, covered by TCT No. H-T-137 with an area of 23.7279 hectares, and
by Homestead Application No. HA-231601 with Final Proof and Tax Declaration No. 0515
with an area of 6.4397 hectares.
  The only tenant of the property at that time was a certain Digoy Besario who was
succeeded by his son Jesus Besario. On 2 July 1961 Valencia and Jesus Besario terminated
their landlord-tenant relationship through a public instrument voluntarily executed by them,
thus reverting the actual physical possession of the property to petitioner Valencia.
 On 22 October 1962 Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease agreement over his
two (2) parcels of land with a certain Glicerio Henson. Before the ten (10)-year lease
expired, apparently without objection from Henson, Valencia leased the property for five (5)
years to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law lease concept beginning 21 August 1970 or until
30 June 1975 after which the lease was cancelled. The lease agreement between Valencia
and Fr. Flores was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land
without Valencias written consent. The prohibition against subleasing or encumbering of the
land apparently included the prohibition against installing a leasehold tenant thereon.
 During the lease of Fr. Andres Flores, he designated Francisco Obang (as overseer), Rogelio
Tamayo, Federico Jare, Feliciano Lobresco, Melchor Moncada, Rosendo Lobresco, Victoriano
Montefalcon, Santos Gargaya, Catalino Mantac, Herodita Semillano, Ernesto Lobresco,
Natividad Lobresco and Alfredo Demerin, along with Crescenciano and Marciano Frias
(herein private respondents), to cultivate the land. These farmhands shared their produce
with Fr. Flores who later on became recipients of CLTs and are collectively referred to
herein as private respondents.
 When the lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores expired on 30 June 1975,
Valencia demanded that private respondents vacate the premises. Instead of complying
with the demand, they refused and continued cultivating the land despite the demand for
them to vacate. Valencia wanted to regain possession of his property so he could work it by
administration, having in fact appointed Bernie Bautista as overseer until petitioner could
retire from the government service.
 Valencia filed a letter of protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual
possession of his property that was subject of the civil law lease agreement. On 20 March
1976 his letter was referred to the DAR Regional Office in Cebu City.
 Meanwhile, without the knowledge much less consent of Valencia, private respondents
applied for Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 claiming they were bona fide tenants of the
property which were later on granted with their respective CLTs.
 In view of the issuance of CLTs to private respondents, petitioner Valencia filed a second
letter of protest and requested an investigation and subsequent cancellation of the CLTs. In
February 1988 petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac, one of private respondents, entered
into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing agreement. No other
respondent entered into any agreement or tenancy contract, whether written or verbal, with
Valencia, Henson or Fr. Flores.
ISSUE: Can a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on
the land subject matter of the lease agreement?

HELD:
Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as
amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the
consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a
tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner , except as may be provided by law. But
certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically
authorized to install a tenant thereon.
A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person
who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a
third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would
technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant would
then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This
is most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease
agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his
property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already
an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the
land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations ,
which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not until then.
The purpose is merely to limit the tenancy to the person who furnishes the land, either
as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Once the
tenancy relation is established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein
stated. Obviously, inherent in the right of landholders to install a tenant is their  authority to do
so; otherwise, without such authority, civil law lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on
the landholding. Neither Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844 nor Sec. 8 of R. A. No. 1199 automatically
authorizes the persons named therein to employ a tenant on the landholding .
The civil lease agreement may be restrictive. Even the owner himself may not be free to
install a tenant, as when his ownership or possession is encumbered or is subject to a lien or
condition that he should not employ a tenant thereon. This contemplates a situation where the
property may be intended for some other specific purpose allowed by law, such as, its
conversion into an industrial estate or a residential subdivision.
In the case at bar, no such relationship was ever created between the civil law lessees
and private respondents, and subsequently, between Valencia and private respondents except
Catalino Mantac. With respect to the lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores, the
lessee did not have any authority to sublease Valencias property due to the prohibition in their
lease agreement. It is likewise in clear and unambiguous terms that the lease agreement was
only for a limited duration with no extension.
The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy
relationship: (a) the parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural
land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there
is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties.
 The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important.

Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 690-691:
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere
scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of
sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be
presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.

7. Almuete, et al. v. Andres, et al., G.R. No. 122276, Nov. 20, 2001
FACTS:

Way back on March 25, 1957, this parcel was awarded by the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete. Since then, Rodrigo
Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and planting thereon
narra, fruit trees, rice corn and legumes. For some twenty-two (22) years, Rodrigo Almuete and
his family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively.

However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist
by the name Leticia Gragasin filed a field investigation and inspection report stating, among
others, that the whereabouts of the original awardee of the subject property, Rodrigo Almuete,
was unknown and that he had "waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health
beyond his control and financial hardship." Gragasin also stated therein that "the actual
occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date." She recommended to the
Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform in Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor of
Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo Andres.
Consequently, Marcelo Andres was allowed to file his homestead application. To further
support his application, Marcelo Andres represented to the MAR (now DAR) officials that
sometime in 1965, Rodrigo Almuete sold the subject property to one Victor Masiglat, who gave
the former a radiophono set as consideration therefor. Since Victor Masiglat was disqualified
from acquiring the subject property owing to his also being a NARRA awardee, he transferred
the said property to Marcelo Andres in exchange for one carabao and the sum of Six Hundred
Pesos (P600.00). These successive transfers were not covered by written contracts between the
parties. Marcelo Andres was granted and issued a homestead patent.

In the meantime, unaware that the NARRA award in his favor had been cancelled and that a
homestead patent had been issued to Marcelo Andres, Rodrigo Almuete and his family,
particularly his daughter Ana Almuete, continued to cultivate and farm the subject property.
From time to time, he would visit the farm to deliver supplies and pay wages to the laborers
who worked therein.

The DAR Regional Director recommended the transfer of ownership over the subject property
to Marcelo Andres. The DAR issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name
of Marcelo Andres. Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons
armed with bolos and other bladed implements, entered the subject property, claiming
exclusive right of ownership and possession. They felled the Narra trees, converting the same to
lumber, and destroyed the mongos planted by the Almuetes.

Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo Andres'
encroachment into and occupation of the subject property. It was only then that he learned
that the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo Andres and that the award in
his favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly abandoned the subject property.
Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for
reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional Trial Court
of Cauayan, Isabela.

ISSUE:
WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH OF THEM
ARE AWARDEES OF THE SAME PROPERTY?
RULING:

The court rendered a judgment in favour of Rodrigo Almuete.

The trial court found that Marcelo Andres did not acquire any right over the subject property
when he supposedly bought it from Victor Masiglat because the latter never acquired
ownership from the original owner, Rodrigo Almuete. Besides, defendant Marcelo Andres could
not present any valid document to prove his acquisition of the said property. It also found that
Rodrigo Almuete did not abandon the subject property. Rather, Leticia Gragasin of the MAR
made obviously false assertions in her report, knowingly misleading the Regional Director into
cancelling the name of Rodrigo Almuete as an awardee and issuing the homestead patent in
the name of Marcelo Andres. Hence, the cancellation of Rodrigo Almuete's award and the
issuance of the homestead patent in favor of Marcelo Andres were perpetrated through fraud.

8. BCDA v. PARO, et al., G.R. Nos. 155322-29, June 27, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) is a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created under Republic Act No. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992, as amended by Republic Act No. 7917.

The respondents are the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Pampanga, as the government
official responsible for approving and issuing the Certificates of Land Ownership Awards involved in this
case; the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, as the government official who has custody of all the original
copies of the Certificates of Title subject of this petition; and Benjamin Poy Lorenzo, Lavernie Poy
Lorenzo, Diosdado de Guzman, Rosemary Eng Tay Tan, Leandro de Guzman, Benjamin G. Lorenzo,
Antonio Manalo, and Socorro de Guzman (private respondents) as the private individuals who were
awarded the CLOAs.

On April 3, 1993, Executive Order No. 809 was issued, authorizing the establishment of the Clark
Development Corporation (CDC) to act as the operating and implementing arm of the BCDA with regard
to the management of the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Under Section 2 of Proclamation No.
163, these lands were transferred to the BCDA, which shall determine how to utilize and dispose of such
lands. As such, the BCDA became the owner of these lands, as registered in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 18247-R and 18257-R.

The CSEZ Technical Research Committee discovered that titles over parcels of land within the CSEZ,
which had just been transferred to the BCDA, had already been issued in the names of private
individuals. A property within CSEZ Main Zone near the Friendship Gate, covered by a title in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, was later partially cancelled due to the issuance of Nine Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) from the Department of Agrarian Reform dated June 19, 1998.

In view of the findings, the BCDA filed separate Complaints for Cancellation of Title against the private
respondents, the PARO, and the Register of Deeds of Angeles City, Pampanga. In its complaints, the
BCDA alleged that since the subject properties were outside those allocated to DAR, and were already
titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines then transferred to the BCDA, they could not be the
subject of an award by the PARO. The BCDA added that the subject properties, which had already been
transferred to it, were reserved by the Philippine government as part of the Clark military reservations in
accordance with the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America. Moreover, the BCDA claimed that the approval and issuance of CLOAs by the PARO, which
became the bases for the TCTs issued to private respondents, were null and void in view of the fact that
these subject properties were already titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
Nos. 18247-R and 18257-R, issued on February 11, 1958, and were derivative titles of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) issued earlier.

The respondents argued that since the subject properties, which were part of the landholdings of the
National Housing Authority, were awarded to the private respondents as the bona fide and de jure
farmer-beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
jurisdiction over the cancellation of their titles fall under the DAR through its Adjudication Board known
as the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The BCDA, commenting on the Motions to Dismiss, averred that it was erroneous to state that the
DARAB had jurisdiction over the cases as they do not involve an agrarian reform issue.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE OR THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

RULING:
This case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides:

Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. ---The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall
have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations

Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 an "agrarian dispute" is defined as follows:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

This Court agrees with the BCDA for this case to fall within the ambit of DARAB’s jurisdiction, the issue
must be one that involves an agrarian dispute, which is not attendant in the instant case.

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The BCDA’s
complaints did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that the issue to be
resolved in this case involved an agrarian dispute.1âwphi1 In the action filed by the BCDA, the issue to
be resolved was who between the BCDA and the private respondents and their purported predecessors-
in-interest, have a valid title over the subject properties in light of the relevant facts and applicable laws.
The case thus involves a controversy relating to the ownership of the subject properties, which is
beyond the scope of the phrase "agrarian dispute."

The RTC, therefore, gravely erred when it dismissed the complaints on the grounds that they were
prematurely filed. The action filed by the BCDA was cognizable by regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order/Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58 of Angeles City dated September 24, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

9. Monsanto v. Zerna, 371 SCRA 664 (2001)

FACTS:
Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents) were charged with qualified
theft in Criminal Case No. 5896, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte,
Branch 6. This case was later re-raffled and transferred to Branch 4 of the same judicial region.
The Information against private respondents was amended on June 8, 1995. That on or about
February 25, 1995, up to the following month of March, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, being then the overseers of some
banana plants on the land owned by one Leonarda Monsanto and principally devoted to
coconut trees, and having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of confidence reposed
in them by the said owner, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry away coconuts from the premises of the said
plantation, which the said accused then processed into copra with a total value of P6,162.50,
belonging to said Leonarda Monsanto, without her consent and against her will, to the damage
and prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum of P6,162.50, Philippine
Currency. After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge on July 24, 1996. The
total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information was P6,262.50. However, the
awarded amount was only P5,162.50 which was deposited by private respondents with the
barangay secretary of Buru-un on March 2, 1995, after deducting P340 (harvesting cost) and
P760 (labor cost). Thus, petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration praying that the
remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to her.

In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the Motion and ordered private
respondents to return the amount of P1,100.

After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties, the CA, on appeal, ruled that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of
P1,100. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship, the matter fell within
the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTC had no jurisdiction to rule on
the civil aspect of the case ergo, it had no appellate authority over the matter under a writ of
error.

The appellate court thus "recalled, set aside and declared null and void" the September 6, 1996
RTC Order requiring the return of the P1,100 to petitioner.

ISSUE:
IS THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AUTOMATICALLY DIVESTED OF JURISDICTION OVER A CRIMINAL
CASE WHERE AN AGRARIAN ISSUE IS ARGUED AS A DEFENSE?

RULING:

Civil liability is the liability that may arise from (1) crime, (2) breach of contract or (3) tortious
act. The first is governed by the Revised Penal Code; the second and the third, by the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the RTC had criminal jurisdiction to try private
respondents for the crime of qualified theft. In the normal course, it had authority to determine
whether they had committed the crime charged and to adjudge the corresponding penalty and
civil liability arising therefrom.

On September 4, 1996, the RTC issued an Order requiring private respondents to return the
P1,100 to petitioner on the ground that petitioner had not consented to the harvesting of the
coconuts or to their conversion into copra. Such order appears inconsistent with the trial
court's finding that private respondents had not committed the crime of qualified theft. In
People v. Pantig, the Court held that where there is no crime committed, there can be no civil
liability that can arise from the criminal action or as a consequence thereof.

The foregoing ruling has been modified by the current Rules. Thus, paragraph 2 of Section 2,
Rule 120 of the present Rules of Court provides that "in case the judgment is of acquittal, it
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist."

In the present set of facts, however, the RTC did not have jurisdiction to make a finding on the
civil liability of the accused who were acquitted.

Specifically, we believe that the resolution of the issue of who is entitled to the P1,100 falls
squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. EO 22918 vested the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters,
as well as to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of
Agriculture (DA).

Section 13 of EO 129-A,19 on the other hand, created the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), which was specifically tasked with the power and the function to
decide agrarian reform cases. The DARAB, under Section 1, paragraph (a), Rule II of the Revised
Rules of Procedure, exercises primary jurisdiction -- both original and appellate -- to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. The provision
reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not [be] limited to the following:

'a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws.'"

A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. In

the present case, undisputed by petitioner is the existence of the Kasabutan, which contradicts
her contention that private respondents were mere overseers. In any event, their "being
overseers does not foreclose their being also tenants," as held in Rupa v. Court of Appeals.
Evidently, the resolution of the agrarian dispute between the parties is a matter beyond the
legal competence of regular courts.
 10 .Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 142359, May 25, 2004

FACTS:
In 1964, Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite
with a size of 753,610 square meters. It was later issued to Credito Asiatic Incorporated (CAI).
The property was subsequently subdivided into two parcels of land, one of which was covered
by TCT No. 116658 with an area of 365,753 square meters, and the other covered by TCT No.
116659 with an area of 387,853 square meters.

On a 75-hectare land, the LDC/CAI undertook developments for a housing and industrial
project. The LDC also applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance
approving the zoning and the subdivision of the property. The Commission approved the plan
and issued a resolution affirming the project.

After the approval, the CAI filed an application under Republic Act No. 3844 with the Office of
the Minister of Agrarian Reform for the conversion of a portion of the 75-hectare property. On
July 3, 1979, Minister of Agrarian Reform Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order granting the
petition and approved the conversion of the 35.80 hectare portion of TCT-62972 into a
residential subdivision, citing the resolution of the Municipal Council of Carmona. The CAI went
on with the developments and bulldozed the property.

Farmer-tenants of the land filed a complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against CAI. They allege that while CAI was the
owner of the land, they were actual tillers who weren’t aware that the land was converted into
residential/industrial.

The plaintiffs, together with other tillers of the land, reached an agreement with CAI that they
would remain in the peaceful possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding such
agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the property, by reason of which the plaintiffs
suffered actual damages. Later, the farmer tenants in this case entered into settlements with
CAI through quitclaims and waivers.

With the settlement of the civil case, the CAI continued with its development by causing a
survey of the property. However, a Petition for Compulsory Coverage was filed before the DAR
by seventeen (17) individuals (who formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association,
Inc. or PBFAI).
The petitioners claimed that since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of public agricultural
land originally owned by General Dionisio Ojeda with an area of twenty-seven hectares, more
or less, adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River. They planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root
crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily survival.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE SUIT IS COVERED BY R.A. No. 6657.

RULING:

The contention of the petitioners has no merit.

Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as
conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands
which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.72
Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took
effect only on June 15, 1988. But long before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had
already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land by the
administrative agencies.

In Natalia Realty Inc. and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, et
al., we held, thus:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that
the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land" it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural
lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot
in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at
a snail’s pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action
to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed
for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact
that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.

Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies
other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus –

x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.

11. Escariz v. Revilleza, G.R. No. 155544, August 24, 2007

FACTS:
This controversy involves a fruit orchard situated in San Isidro, Calauan, Laguna with an area of
6,967 square meters. Genaro D. Revilleza, respondent herein, is a retired employee of the
University of the Philippines in Los Baños, Laguna. With his retirement money, he bought the
orchard from Jose Velasco. Respondent had the property registered in his name under Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-98856 and T-98857.

On December 17, 1993, Marino Escariz, petitioner, filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, Region IV a complaint for "Recognition of Security of Tenure with Damages
and Prayer for Accounting and Depositing of Tenant’s Share Pending Litigation" against
respondent, docketed as DARAB Case No. LA-0336-93. Petitioner alleged that he has been a
long time tenant on the property, planting and tending rambutan and citrus trees thereon; that
he shared the harvests with respondent on a 9:10 basis; and that respondent asked him to
vacate the property after he demanded his share from the harvests. He then prayed that he be
recognized as a tenant and be awarded damages.

In his answer, respondent denied any tenancy relationship with petitioner, claiming that the
latter is actually a tenant of the owner of a neighboring riceland. He would occasionally hire
petitioner to work on his orchard on a piecework basis. Petitioner illegally entered the property
by erecting a shack where he lives. Respondent then prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A BONA FIDE TENANT.

RULING:

A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to support and prove the
allegation that a tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and respondent. In Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals we held that the elements of a tenancy
relationship are:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

In Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, we ruled that all the above elements must
concur for a tenancy relationship to exist. Differently stated, the absence of a single requisite
does not make an occupant or a cultivator of an agricultural land a de jure tenant. Absent such
status as a de jure tenant, a person is neither entitled to security of tenure nor to coverage
under the agrarian reform programs of the government.

In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no evidence on record to
prove the existence of the following elements: (a) the consent of the parties and (b) the sharing
of harvests.

It bears emphasis that tenancy is a legal relationship. The principal factor in determining its
existence is the intent of the parties. Courts give prime importance to the intent of the parties,
the understanding when the tenant is installed and the written agreements of the parties. Here,
other than the self-serving statement of petitioner that he is a tenant, there is no concrete
evidence to show that the parties agreed to establish such a relationship.
Anent the sharing of harvests, again there is no evidence to prove this element. In Bejasa v.
Court of Appeals, we laid the rule that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
similar evidence must be presented, self-serving statements are inadequate.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

12. Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, rep. by Leonila B. Jugalbot v. Court of

Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007

FACTS:
On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on
the latter’s claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision plan (LRC) TSD-10465,
subject property of the case at bar, with an area of 6,229 square meters, located at Barangay
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. The subject property was registered in the name of Virginia A.
Roa under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1, 1970
in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property was originally registered
in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in
1966.

Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s. On
a Certification dated January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team
Leader Eduardo Maandig, the subject property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21,
1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn. On March 1, 1988, the Emancipation Patent was
registered with the Register of Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-103.

On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the
DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-
103), Recovery of Possession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot, docketed as DARAB Case
No. X (06-1358).

On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissing
private respondents’ complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent. Private
respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on the sole
ground that private respondents’ right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot’s title was
barred by prescription. It held that an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of
fraud prescribes after the expiration of one year from the decree of registration.

On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents’ motion for reconsideration,
hence they filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The
appellate court reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on four
grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR;
(3) the area of the property which was less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and
kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification of the subject property as residential, which is
outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE DE JURE TENANTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
RULING:

As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals and subsequently in Benavidez v. Court of
Appeals, the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land
in question does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first
establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. The following
essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent;
(d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f)
there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.

Valencia v. Court of Appeals further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The
elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.
There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in
question. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist
between petitioner and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land. It is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided
these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under Presidential
Decree No. 27. Private respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given
a notice of coverage of the property subject matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the
private respondents did not have any tenant on the same property; that the property allegedly
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal
property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27
due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between
them.

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The
Court of Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process
because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper
party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of
Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The
ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa.
Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or
the petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of
harvests, except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas
Jugalbot or any of his farm household cultivated the land in question. No proof was presented
except for their self-serving statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent
evidence, aside from their self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation,
sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner, and establish a tenancy relationship.

Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes
v. Department of Agrarian Reform, we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or
more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from
a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy
laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.
Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property
and not agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084 issued on September 3, 1998
clearly shows that the subject property Lot 2180-C covered by TCT No. T-11543 with an area of
6,229 square meters and owned by Virginia A. Roa is located within the Residential 2 District in
accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979
issued by the City Planning and Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City. To bolster the
residential nature of the property, it must also be noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform
Council was organized or appointed by the DAR existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, as all lands have been classified as residential or commercial, as certified by Barangay
Captain of Lapasan.

13. NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVT CORP. vs. LEONIDA DE LEON

G.R. No. 176942 August 28, 2008

FACTS:
August 2004, de Leon filed a complaint before Office of Provincial Afrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD)- Region 4 that Lim and NICORP be ordered to respect her
tenancy rights over a parcel of land in Cavite, in the name of Leoncia de Leon and
Susana de Leon (sisters of Leonida).

de Leon prayed that Lim and NICORP to respect her tenancy rights, as well as to
restore the land to its original condition and not to convert it to non-agricultural use.

Lim denied de Leon was a tenant, alleging that de Leon is a septuagenarian who is no
longer physically capable of tilling the land, and that the MARO certified that the land
had no registered tenant, and that de Leon cannot be considered landless tiller under
CARP because she owns and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which
she acquired from inheritance.

NICORP asserted that it was not a proper party because it is still negotiating with the
owners as to acquire ownership of the land, however, NICORP joins that de Leon was
not a tenant.

PARAD referred the case to RARAD. RARAD dismissed the complaint for failure to
prove substantial evidence of the agricultural tenancy relationship. DARAB affirmed
the decision of the RARAD. On appeal, CA reversed the findings of RARAD/DARAB,
saying that the letter of Susana to Dolores clearly acknowledged Rolando as tenant, and
the sharing of produce was established by the affidavits of neighboring farmers.

CA also held that the reclassification of the land by Sangguniang Panlalawigan as

residential cannot be given weight because it is only DAR that can reclassify or convert
agricultural land to other classifications, and that the sale of the land to Lim was void
because it was violative of CARP.

Issue: Whether or NOT de Leon was a tenant.

Ruling:
There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur: 1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the
foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial evidence and the absence of one will
not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate court’s
conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent
failed to prove the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not shown that the De
Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship with respondent who was their sister-
in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received any share in the harvests of the land from
respondent or that the latter delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to the
landowners pursuant to a tenancy relationship.

As to the letter, de Leon was not mentioned at all in Susana's letter. de Leon will not
necessarily be conferred the same status as tenant upon her son's death. There is no
evidence that de Leon sisters consented to constitute respondent as their tenant on the
subject land.

As to the affidavits, the affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters
received a portion of the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her sisters-
in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or details of the alleged
harvest sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known respondent to be the
cultivator of the land since time immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence
of harvest sharing.

As to the sale, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 65 and
73(c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65
applies only to lands which were covered by the CARP, i.e. those lands beyond the five-
hectare retention limit allowed to landowners under the law, which were distributed to
farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown that the subject land was
covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was made to circumvent the
application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.

14. SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO vs. ANITA R. FLORES,
assisted by her husband, BIENVENIDO FLORES
G.R. No. 167891 January 15, 2010

FACTS:

Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-
D), with an area of 25,513 square meters (sq m), located in Barangay Sumandig in
Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus
Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the two
until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order from
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo
religiously complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed
by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land,
which is the subject of controversy.

On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein
respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and
Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement (Kasunduan). This was followed by another
agreement executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No.
2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner.

On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent Anita
Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she alleged that,
as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land
consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to
agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; that, sometime in
the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the
former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted to agriculture;
that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house on the stony part of the land, and
that the use and occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance only;
and that the land, which was divided equally between the two parties, excluded the
stony portion. In February 1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally
informed them of her intention to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused to
heed the request.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, with an area of 25,513
sq m, was agricultural land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and
personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding
the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of
jurisdiction over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore precluded the
MTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.

Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court did
not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that petitioner was
allowed to cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan, however, revealed that
what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By contrast, the subject matter of
the complaint was the stony portion where petitioners’ house was erected. Thus, the
court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or NOT the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

This is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.

The controversy involves an agricultural land, which petitioners have continuously and
personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus
Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, petitioners have a right to a
home lot and a right to exclusive possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No.
3844 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code.12 Logically, therefore, the case involves an
agrarian dispute, which falls within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any
controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.

Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements.

The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy
relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of
R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the
controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-
tenant relationship.

In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated
by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the
legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such
relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of
the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian
dispute.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
15. VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO, GERALDINE TANCO, RONALD
TANCO, and PATRICK TANCO
G.R. No. 168164 July 5, 2010

FACTS:
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco purchased a parcel of land consisting of
28.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango
plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice and her three
children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each receiving 7 hectares, except
Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.

Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter dated January 16, 1995 informing
him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible.
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which
might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of
DARAB in Region III a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred
that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco (Arsenio), the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-
caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases
of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees.
The fruits were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was
allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes
located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and
continues to cultivate the land.

In their Answer, respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property.
They stressed that Vicente never worked and has no employer-employee relationship
with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted
that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker. They claimed that in April
1994 and April 1995, upon the intercession of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), Alice agreed to avail the services of Vicente for the specific purpose of
spraying the mango trees. In consideration thereof, Alice also agreed to pay Vicente an
amount equivalent to 50% of the produce, which was then the prevailing practice in
Bulacan. Respondents maintained that Alice agreed to this setup since the MARO made
it clear to both parties that the contract was for the specific purpose of spraying the
mango trees only and that the same will not ripen into tenancy relationship.

ISSUE:
Whether the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that Vicente is a bona fide tenant?

RULING
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant
once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land
belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the
right to continue working on and cultivating the land.

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a
tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to
exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent
between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship,
and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal. After a thorough evaluation of the
records of this case, we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of
consent and sharing are lacking.

The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the
landowners recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant. And,
although Vicente claims that he is a tenant of respondents’ agricultural lot in
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and openly occupied it,
no evidence was presented to establish the presence of consent other than his self-
serving statements. These cannot suffice because independent and concrete evidence is
needed to prove consent of the landowner.

Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent evidence,

such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was sharing of the harvest
between the landowner and the tenant. Self-serving statements are not sufficient. Here,
there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context of a tenancy
relationship between Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence submitted to
establish the purported sharing of harvests were the allegations of Vicente which, as
discussed above, were self-serving and have no evidentiary value. Moreover,
petitioner’s allegations of continued possession and cultivation do not support his
cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized
under agrarian laws. It is essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he transmitted the landowner’s
share of the harvest.

Neither can we agree with the DARAB’s theory of implied tenancy because the
landowner never acquiesced to Vicente’s cultivating the land. Besides, for implied
tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
present.

16. ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON, represented by his heir ROLANDO B.

SAMSON, vs. MERCEDES R. SUSANO and NORBERTO R. SUSANO
G.R. No. 179024 May 30, 2011

FACTS:
Pastor M. Samson owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land known as Lot 1108 of the Tala
Estate Subdivision located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 65174. In 1959, Pastor was approached by his friend
Macario Susano who asked for permission to occupy a portion of Lot 1108 to build a
house for his family. Since Pastor was godfather to one of Macario’s children, Pastor
acceded to Macario’s request. Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of Lot
1108 and devoted the rest of the land to palay cultivation. Herein respondents,
Macario’s wife Mercedes R. Susano and their son Norberto R. Susano, insist that while
no agricultural leasehold contract was executed by Pastor and Macario, Macario
religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was
reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of palay per agricultural year.5

In 1973, Pastor subdivided Lot 1108 into three portions. The first and last parcels,
namely Lots 1108-A and 1108-C, remained registered in Pastor’s name while Lot 1108-B
was sold to Jimena Novera in 1973 without Macario’s knowledge.
In 1979, Pastor sold 2,552 square meters of Lot 1108-A to spouses Felix Pacheco and
Juanita Clamor, allegedly also without Macario’s knowledge and consent. As a result of
the sale, Lot 1108-A was further subdivided into three portions. The last two parcels are
registered in the name of spouses Felix Pacheco and Juanita Clamor.7

Lots 1108-A-1 and 1108-C comprising a total area of 7,316 square meters remained
occupied and cultivated by Macario and his family.

On February 28, 1989, Pastor sold Lot 1108-C to petitioner Julian Chan. Consequently,
TCT No. 52638 was cancelled and TCT No. 176758 was issued in Chan’s name.

According to respondents, no written notice was sent by Pastor to Macario prior to the
sale to Chan of Lot 1108-C comprising an area of 6,696 square meters. They aver that
Macario came to know of the transaction only after Chan visited the property sometime
in October 1990 accompanied by an employee from the city government.

Chan, on the other hand, claims that prior to buying Lot 1108-C from Pastor, he
ascertained the location and condition of the property. He maintains that he knew the
property to be a residential lot.

On November 1990, Macario received a letter from Pastor’s lawyer demanding that he
vacate the property within twenty (20) days. Aggrieved, Macario filed a complaint
against Pastor before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Valenzuela.

Thereafter, on August 17, 1993 respondents filed an action for maintenance of peaceful
possession with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction
and for the redemption of the subject landholding against Pastor and Chan before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Region IV.
Specifically, the complaint prayed for the inclusion of the 7,316-square meter portion of
said landholding, or Lots 1108-A-1 and 1108-C, within the Coverage of the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2718 or The Tenant
Emancipation Decree. They also asked that an emancipation patent be issued in their
favor. They tendered ₱12,052.80 in cash representing the reasonable redemption price
over the subject landholding based on the highest land valuation prescribed by the
DAR on unirrigated rice land.19 Said amount was accepted by the DAR Regional
Cashier per Order20 of DARAB Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang.

In his Answer,21 Chan maintained that he is a buyer in good faith and that he relied on
the tax declaration which stated that the subject property is residential in character. He
also averred that agreements were made between him and Macario recognizing his
ownership over the said land in exchange for ₱25,000 paid by him to Macario, ₱10,000
of which was duly acknowledged by Macario in writing.22 Chan insisted that Macario
also promised to surrender possession of the property to him on or before November
30, 1992.
Pastor, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the pendency of the
complaint filed against him before the MARO of Valenzuela and alleging that the
property is not agricultural land but a residential lot as indicated in Tax Declaration No.
10081, dated August 29, 1986, issued by the Caloocan City Assessor’s Office. Pastor also
argued that the land involved, Lot 1108-A-1 covered by TCT No. 137744, is only 620
square meters, too small to be considered a viable family-size farm or economic family-
size farm under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) and P.D. No. 27.23

Pastor likewise filed his Position Paper31 as directed. He insisted that the land is not
covered by R.A. No. 6657 or by P.D. No. 27 as the land is not agricultural land and no
tenancy relationship existed between him and herein respondents, who occupied his
land by mere tolerance. He also reiterated that even assuming that the land is
agricultural land, respondents are not entitled to the benefits of said land reform laws
as they are not landless tenants to begin with and the subject land is too small to be a
viable family-size farm.

Chan for his part argued in his Position Paper32 that the subject parcel of land cannot
be considered as agricultural land due to the enactment in 1981 of Metro Manila Zoning
Ordinance No. 81-01 classifying the lands within the Metropolitan Manila area as
residential and/or commercial. Chan pointed that the said zoning ordinance preceded
R.A. No. 6657, which became effective only on June 15, 1988.

Meanwhile, herein respondents maintained in their Position Paper34 that their

predecessor-in-interest, Macario, was a bona fide agricultural tenant; hence, they are
entitled to the rights of pre-emption and redemption. And having validly exercised
their right of redemption through the deposit of the redemption price with the DAR,
they are allegedly now the owners of the subject land. That they have such right of
redemption is likewise due to the fact that the subject land is covered by the OLT
Program, respondents added.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents are entitled to the benefits of the OLT Program under P.D. No. 27.
RULING:

Applying our pronouncement in Levardo v. Yatco,we rule that the subject land cannot
be subject to the OLT program of P.D. No. 27 for two reasons: first, the subject land is
less than seven hectares; and second, respondents failed to show that Pastor owned
other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban land from which he
derived adequate income, as required by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474.52

Moreover, the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small

Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is explicit:
5. Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered by Operation
Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas shall be
leasehold x x
However, while the disputed landholding which had an original aggregate area of only
1.0138 hectares is not covered by the OLT program, the same may still be covered by
P.D. No. 27, albeit under its Operation Land Leasehold (OLL) program. The OLL
program placed landowners and tenants of agricultural land devoted to rice and corn
into a leasehold relationship as of October 21, 1972.54 But the fact that Macario,
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, was a de jure tenant must be established.

So was Macario a de jure tenant in the subject landholding entitled to security of

tenure?

R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines,
defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another,
with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system.

For a tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the following essential elements
must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter
is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is
sharing of the harvests between the parties.60 The presence of all of these elements
must be proved by substantial evidence.61

The sale of the land to Chan likewise did not violate R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural
Tenancy Act. Considering that respondents have failed to establish their status as de
jure tenants, they have no right of pre-emption or redemption under Sections 11 and 12
of the said law.
17. JUAN GALOPE vs. CRESENCIA BUGARIN, Represented by CELSO RABANG
G.R. No. 185669 February 1, 2012

FACTS:
Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-229582.3 Petitioner farms the land.

In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner
in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is
insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own. Petitioner
countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a
long time and that he pays rent ranging from ₱4,000 to ₱6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per
harvest. The case was not settled.

Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession,

ejectment and payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang claimed that
respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return
as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. Rabang also
claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the
land.

ISSUE:
Whether or NOT tenancy relationship between exist between parties.

RULING:
The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.

The CA and DARAB ruling that there is no sharing of harvest is based on the absence of
receipts to show petitioner’s payment of rentals. We are constrained to reverse them on
this point.

The matter of rental receipts is not an issue given respondent’s admission that she
receives rentals from petitioner. To recall, respondent’s complaint in Barangay Case No.
99-6 was that the rental or the amount she receives from petitioner is not much. This
fact is evident on the record of said case which is signed by respondent and was even
attached as Annex "D" of her DARAB petition. Consequently, we are thus unable to
agree with DARAB’s ruling that the affidavits of witnesses that petitioner pays 15
cavans of palay or the equivalent thereof in pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut
the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. Indeed, respondent’s admission confirms their
statement that rentals are in fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim of
respondent’s representative, Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid nothing for the use of
the land.

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent’s act of allowing the
petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her
consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not
determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 518 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is
the landowner; petitioner is her tenant.

Petitioner’s status as a de jure tenant having been established, we now address the issue
of whether there is a valid ground to eject petitioner from the land.

Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of

a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee.22 This rule
proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the
tenant to a security of tenure.23 The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural
landholding on grounds provided by law.

Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 enumerates these grounds, to wit:

SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.– Notwithstanding any agreement as to the
period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in
a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate
the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections [25] and [34], except when the land owned
and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That
should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry
out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed
that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land
and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossession;

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of
the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event
or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what
had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3
of Section [29];

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the
non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as
a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although
the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of
Section [27].

Through Rabang, respondent alleged (1) nonpayment of any consideration, (2) lack of
tenancy relationship, (3) petitioner mortgaged the land to Allingag who allegedly
possesses the land, and (4) she will manage/cultivate the land. None of these grounds
were proven by the respondent.
As aforesaid, respondent herself admitted petitioner’s payment of rentals. We also
found that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.

That Allingag possesses the land is also based on Andres’s hearsay statement. On the
contrary, Allingag stated in his affidavit that he is merely petitioner’s farm helper.28 We
have held that the employment of farm laborers to perform some aspects of work does
not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an
agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired
helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his
immediate family to work on the land, we have nevertheless declared that the hiring of
farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not
negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essential in a tenancy or
agricultural leasehold relationship.29 There is no showing that petitioner has left the
entire process of cultivating the land to Allingag. In fact, respondent has admitted that
petitioner still farms the land.30

SEC. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban
purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five
preceding calendar years.

Since respondent failed to prove nonpayment of rentals, petitioner may not be ejected
from the landholding. We emphasize, however, that as long as the tenancy relationship
subsists, petitioner must continue paying rentals. For the law provides that
nonpayment of lease rental, if proven, is a valid ground to dispossess him of
respondent’s land. Henceforth, petitioner should see to it that his rental payments are
properly covered by receipts.
18. DELIA T. SUTTON vs. ROMANITO P. LIM, EFREN C. LIM AND ALLAN C.
LIM, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFROM OFFICER OF AROROY, MASBATE,
PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF MASBATE, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF MASBATE
G.R. No. 191660 December 3, 2012

FACTS:
On December 7, 1993, private respondents applied for the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over a parcel of land with an area of 73,105 square
meters located in Barangay Amotag, Aroroy, Masbate. Upon the recommendation of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Aroroy, Masbate, the application was
granted and they were issued CLOA No. 00122354. Subsequently, on January 31, 1994,
the Register of Deeds of Masbate issued the corresponding OCT No. CLOA 0-1615.

On November 23, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of the said CLOA
and title before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD),
docketed as DARAB Case No. 05-077, assailing the validity of the said issuances on the
ground that the subject parcel of land is a private land devoted to cattle raising which
she inherited from her deceased father, Samuel Sutton, who, in turn, previously bought
the subject parcel of land from Romanito P. Lim and his wife, Lolita L. Cedillo, on
August 7, 1958. Petitioner also claimed to have been denied due process for not
receiving any notice of private respondents’ application proceedings for CLOA

In their answer, private respondents averred that, being the actual occupants and
qualified beneficiaries of the subject lot which formed part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain, the DAR Secretary correctly issued the CLOA
in their favor. While admitting having sold a lot in favor of Samuel Sutton from whom
petitioner purportedly inherited the subject parcel of land, they asserted that the lot
sold was different from Lot No. 1493. Moreover, they interposed the defense of
prescription since the petition for cancellation was filed after the subject title became
indefeasible.
On the other hand, the MARO and PARO, in their Answer with Motion to Dismiss,
invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official functions in
issuing the CLOA, which according to them was issued in accordance with the
implementing rules and regulations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.10 They also
clarified that the subject parcel of land has been classified as Government Owned Land
(GOL) or Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) areas pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 2282,11 hence, subject to the Comprehensive
ISSUE:
Is there existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties?
RULING:
As defined in Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657, an agrarian dispute relates to" any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

Verily, an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement

over lands devoted to agriculture. Tenurial arrangements pertain to agreements which
set out the rights between a landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm worker or other
agrarian reform beneficiary involving agricultural land. Traditionally, tenurial
arrangements are in the form of tenancy or leasehold arrangements. However, other
forms such as a joint production agreement to effect the implementation of CARP have
been recognized as a valid tenurial arrangement.

Accordingly, paragraph 2 of Section 3(d), by its explicit reference to controversies

between landowners and farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries
with respect to the compensation of lands acquired under R.A. No. 6657 or other terms
and conditions relating to the transfer of such lands, undoubtedly implies the existence
of a tenurial arrangement. Also, the phrase "whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee" in paragraph 2 lists certain forms of tenurial arrangements consistent with
the phrase "whether leasehold, tenancy or stewardship, or otherwise" stated in
paragraph 1 of the same section.

Therefore, in line with the purpose of recognizing the right of farmers, farmworkers and
landowners under the agrarian reform program, both paragraphs 1 and 2of Section 3(d)
of R.A. No. 6657 should be understood within the context of tenurial arrangements, else
the intent of the law be subverted.

In this case, a punctilious examination reveals that petitioner’s allegations are solely
hinged on the erroneous grant by the DAR Secretary of CLOA No. 00122354 to private
respondents on the grounds that she is the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot
and that it is exempt from the CARP coverage. In this regard, petitioner has not alleged
any tenurial arrangement between the parties, negating the existence of any agrarian
dispute and consequently, the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Indisputably, the controversy
between the parties is not agrarian in nature and merely involves the administrative
implementation of the agrarian reform program which is cognizable by the DAR
Secretary.

Furthermore, it bears to emphasize that under the new law, R.A. No. 9700, which took
effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.

Consequently, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the herein controversy,

rendering its decision null and void. Jurisdiction lies with the Office of the DAR
Secretary to resolve the issues of classification of landholdings for coverage (whether
the subject property is a private or government owned land), and identification of
qualified beneficiaries. Hence, no error can be attributed to the CA in dismissing the
case without prejudice to its re-filing, in accordance to DAR Administrative Order No.
6, Series of 2000.
 19. Ladano vs. Neri et al G.R. No. 178622
Digested by: Gil C. Lendio Jr.

Facts: Petitioner Luciano Ladano filed a complaint against the herein respondents
Felino Neri, Edwin Soto, Adan Espanola and Ernesto Blanco before the office of
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator. Ladano alleged that on May 7, 20003, the
respondents forcibly entered the two-hectare land located in Manalite 1, Brgy.
Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City which he and his family have been peaceably occupying
and cultivating since 1970. The said respondents informed him that the property
belongs to Neri and that he should vacate the same immediately. Ladano prayed
that he be declared rightful “occupant /tiller” of the property with the right of
security of tenure.
Respondents countered that Ladanos Complaint should be dismissed for
lack of merit. He is not entitled to the reliefs he sought because he does not have,
as he did not even allege having, a leasehold arrangement with Neri, the
supposed owner of the land he is occupying.
Instead of arguing that he has a right to remain on the property as its bona
fide tenant, Ladano maintained that he has been its possessor in good faith for
more than 30 years. He believed then that the property was part of the "public
land and was open to anybody." As a possessor and builder in good faith, he
cannot be removed from the subject property without being compensated for the
improvements that he had introduced. He prayed for an award of P100,000.00 as
disturbance compensation.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a tenant in a tenancy relationship entitled to
reliefs prayed for.
Held: No. A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a
tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
of a land belonging to the landholder, as a result of which relationship the
tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land.”  For a
tenancy relationship, express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must be
present:
(1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent by the landowner;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and
(6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant.  
Independent and concrete evidence of the foregoing elements must
be presented by the party asserting the existence of such a relationship. 
They cannot be arrived at by mere conjectures or by presumptions. “Unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure [nor is he] covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws.
The DARAB failed to consider that one’s occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make him a de jure
tenant. It should not have considered such occupation as a basis for assuming the
landowner’s consent, especially when the occupant himself never alleged that he
obtained the landowner’s consent. Petitioner did not even allege in his Complaint
that he is a tenant of the landowner. Neither did he allege that he shared his
harvests with the landowner. Without such factual assertions from Ladano, the
DARAB arrived at a conclusion that is utterly bereft of factual bases. Petitioner is
not a tenant on the land and is not entitled to security of tenure nor to
disturbance compensation. His Complaint was properly dismissed for lack of
merit.
19 LADANO VS NERI (GR NO. 178622 NOVEMBER 12, 2012)
Ladano vs Neri
GR No. 178622 November 12, 2012

Facts: 

This case originated from a Complaint filed by petitioner Luciano Ladano (Ladano) before the DARAB
Provincial  Adjudicator  against  respondents  Felino Neri  (Neri),  Edwin Soto,  Adan  Espanola  and
Ernesto Blanco.   Ladano  alleged  that on May 7,  2003,  the  respondents  forcibly  entered  the two-
hectare  land,  located  in Manalite I,  Barangay  Sta.  Cruz,  Antipolo  City,  which he  and  his  family 
have  been peaceably occupying and cultivating  since 1970.   The  said  respondents  informed him  that 
the  property belongs  to Neri  and  that  he should vacate  the  same immediately.   Not  too  long
afterwards,  the  respondents  fenced the  property  and destroyed some  of the  trees  and  kawayan 
planted thereon.   Ladano  prayed  that  he be  declared  the  rightful  “occupant/tiller”  of the  property, 
with the  right  to security of tenure  thereon. 
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a tenant in a tenancy relationship entitled to reliefs prayed for.
Held: No. A  tenancy  relationship  arises  between  a  landholder  and  a tenant  once  they agree, 
expressly  or impliedly,  to undertake  jointly the  cultivation of a land belonging to the  landholder,  as  a 
result  of  which  relationship  the tenant  acquires the  right  to continue working  on and cultivating the 
land.”  For  a tenancy relationship,  express  or  implied,  to  exist,  the  following  requisites  must be 
present:
(1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(3) there  is  consent  by the  landowner;
(4)  the  purpose is agricultural  production;
(5)  there  is  personal  cultivation  by  the  tenant;  and
(6)  there is  sharing  of harvests  between the  landowner  and the tenant.  
Independent  and concrete evidence  of  the  foregoing elements  must  be  presented by the  party
asserting  the  existence  of  such  a  relationship.  They  cannot  be  arrived at  by  mere conjectures  or 
by  presumptions.    “Unless  a  person  has  established  his status  as  a de  jure  tenant,  he  is  not 
entitled  to security  of tenure  [nor  is he]  covered by  the Land  Reform  Program  of  the  Government 
under  existing  tenancy laws.
The  DARAB  failed  to consider  that  one’s  occupancy  and cultivation of an  agricultural  land,  no 
matter how  long,  will  not  ipso  facto  make  him  a  de  jure  tenant.    It  should  not  have considered 
such  occupation  as  a basis  for assuming the landowner’s  consent, especially  when  the  occupant 
himself  never  alleged  that  he  obtained  the landowner’s  consent.   Petitioner  did not  even  allege  in
his  Complaint  that he  is a tenant  of the  landowner.    Neither  did he  allege  that  he shared  his 
harvests  with  the landowner.   Without such  factual  assertions  from  Ladano,  the  DARAB  arrived at
a  conclusion  that  is  utterly  bereft  of  factual  bases.    Petitioner  is  not  a  tenant  on  the land  and  is 
not  entitled  to security  of tenure  nor to disturbance  compensation.    His Complaint  was  properly
dismissed  for lack  of  merit.  
20. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by FRITZI
C. PANTOJA, in her capacity as the PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICE, DAR-LAGUNA, Petitioner v. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS
EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM,
SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C. LIM, Respondents
REYES, J.:
G.R. No. 176838: June 13, 2013
Digested by: Gil C. Lendio Jr.

Facts: The case stems from the petition docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0403-0009-02, filed
with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the
respondents of several parcels of land.
The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was affected
without DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657(R.A. No. 6657), otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Allegedly, the PARO came to know
of the transactions only after he had received a directive from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
to investigate the matter, following the latter's receipt of a letter-request from persons who
claimed to be the tenant-farmers of the properties' previous owners.
The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the matter involves an
administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB. They also sought the petition's dismissal on the grounds of
prescription, litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.
On October 16, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Virgilio M. Sorita (PA Sorita) issued a
Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
The DAR's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the filing of an appeal with
the DARAB. The DARAB granted the appeal.
Contrary to the findings of PA Sorita, the DARAB ruled that: first, the failure of the
parties to the sale to obtain the required clearance indicates that their transactions were
fraudulent; second, the PARO had the personality to file the petition even in the absence of the
Solicitor General's assistance, citing Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2001 (Circular No. 2),
and the policy of DAR to "acquire and distribute all lands covered by RA 6657[,] including those
subject of illegal transfers . . .";and third, the DARAB has the jurisdiction over the case, since its
jurisdiction under Circular No. 2 covers the cancellation of deeds of conveyance and
corresponding transfer certificates of title over agricultural lands.
The denial of the respondents' motion for reconsideration led to the filing of a petition
with the CA. The CA rendered the assailed Decision. The CA emphasized that the DARAB's
jurisdiction over the dispute should be determined by the allegations made in the petition.
Since the action was essentially for the nullification of the subject properties' sale, it did not
involve an agrarian suit that is within the DARAB's jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction.
Held: The Court of Appeals decision is Affirmed.
POLITICAL LAW: DARABs jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the
adjudication of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229and E.O. No. 129-A. Significantly, it was
organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority
of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only consistent with the extent of DAR's quasi-judicial
powers under R.A. No. 6657andE.O. No. 229.
Not every sale or transfer of agricultural land would warrant DARAB's exercise of its
jurisdiction. The law is specific that the property must be shown to be under the coverage of
agrarian reform laws. As the CA correctly ruled:
It is easily discernable . . . that the cause of action of the [DAR] sufficiently established a
suit for the declaration of the sale of the subject landholdings null and void (in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1989). Obviously, it does not involve an agrarian suit,
hence, does not fall under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. It must be emphasized that, "(t)here
must be a tenancy relationship between the party litigants for the DARAB to validly take
cognizance of a controversy.
Our finding on the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction over the PARO's petition renders it
needless for the Court to discuss the other issues that are raised in the petition. In any case, the
Court finds it worthy to discuss that the original petition remains dismissible on the merits.
Even during the proceedings before the PARAD, the respondents have raised the
pendency with the Regional Trial Court of Bin, Laguna of Civil Case No. B-5862, an appeal from
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Santa Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No. 2478.
The records indicate that when the matter was elevated to the CA via the petition
docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 68110, the appellate court declared the subject properties to have
long been reclassified from "agricultural" to "industrial".
The court ruled that there is no record of tenancy or written agricultural leasehold
contract with respect to the subject lands, nor are the same covered by Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27. Thus, for being industrial in nature, the subject lands are outside
the ambit of existing agricultural tenancy laws.
The Housing Land Use Regulatory Board has affirmed through a Certification dated May
22, 1991 that the zoning ordinance referred to was approved on December 2, 1981. Thus, the
respondents correctly argued that since the subject properties were already classified as
"industrial" long before the effectivity of the CARL, their sale could not have been covered by
the CARP and the requirement for a clearance. The petition is DISMISSED.
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
21. Heirs of Florentino Quilo, namely; Benjamin V. Quilo, et al. vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines-Dagupan Branch, et al.
Digested by: Gil C. Lendio Jr.

Facts: The spouses Emilio Oliveros and Erlinda de Guzman (spouses Oliveros) owned four
parcels of land. In 1966, Florentino Quilo started planting vegetables thereon. Sometime in
1975, Quilo filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a Complaint against the
spouses Oliveros regarding unspecified issues in their alleged agrarian relations. Hence, on 12
September 1975, a Notice of Conference was sent to the spouses by a DAR Team Leader.
However, the Complaint did not prosper.
The spouses Oliveros later on mortgaged the parcels of land to the Development Bank
of the Philippines, Dagupan City Branch (respondent bank) to secure a loan, for which they
executed an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy. Since they were unable to pay the loan, the mortgage
was foreclosed, and the title to the landholding consolidated with respondent bank.
On 15 April 1983, respondent bank sold the parcels of land to the spouses Roberto and
Carlina del Mindo (respondent spouses) for P34,000. Respondent spouses began to fence the
subject landholding shortly after.
Upon learning about the sale, Quilo filed a Complaint for Redemption with Damages
against respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan (RTC). He
alleged that as an agricultural tenant of the land, he had the preference and the priority to buy
it. He further said that he was ready to repurchase it, and that he had deposited with the Clerk
of Court the amount of P34,000 and other necessary expenses as redemption price.
However, on 6 May 1991, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in view of
the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, which created the DARAB and gave the latter jurisdiction
over agrarian disputes. The RTC further directed the parties to litigate their case before the
DARAB through the RARAB. On 22 August 1992, Quilo died. Hence, his heirs (petitioners)
substituted for him in the pending case before the RARAB. The RARAB dismissed the case "for
lack of interest of the parties to proceed with the case," after which Quilo’s heirs filed an appeal
with the DARAB.
On 29 April 1996, the DARAB promulgated a Decision granting the appeal and
remanding the records of the case to the RARAB for its resolution on the merits.
Issue: Whether or not a tenancy relationship existed between Quilo and the spouses Oliveros.
Held: We now rule on the main issue.
Failure to Establish the Tenancy Relationship
A tenancy relationship is a juridical tie that arises between a landowner and a tenant
once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging
to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue
working on and cultivating the land. The relationship cannot be presumed. All the requisite
conditions for its existence must be proven, to wit:
 (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant.
(2) The subject is agricultural land.
(3) There is consent by the landowner.
(4) The purpose is agricultural production.
(5) There is personal cultivation.
(6) There is a sharing of harvests.
We stress that petitioners have the burden of proving their affirmative allegation of
tenancy. Indeed, it is elementary that one who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof. Petitioners in the instant case failed to prove the elements of consent and
sharing of harvests.
There is no evidence that the spouses Oliveros consented to a tenancy relationship with
Quilo.
There is no evidence that the spouses Oliveros agreed to enter into a tenancy
relationship with Quilo. His self-serving statement that he was a tenant was not sufficient to
prove consent. Precisely, proof of consent is needed to establish tenancy.
Independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove consent of the landowner.
Although petitioners presented the Affidavits of Obillo and Bulatao, as well as the DAR Notice of
Conference dated 12 September 1975, these documents merely established that Quilo
occupied and cultivated the land. Specifically, the Notice of Conference and the affidavits only
showed that first, Quilo filed a Complaint against the spouses Oliveros regarding the land he
was cultivating; and second, the affidavits confirmed merely that Quilo had been planting on
the land. These documents in no way confirm that his presence on the land was based on a
tenancy relationship that the spouses Oliveros had agreed to.
Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert
the tiller into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. Despite this jurisprudential
rule, the DARAB chose to uphold the finding of the RARAB that there was a tenancy relationship
between Quilo and the spouses Oliveros. Hence, the CA committed no error in reversing the
DARAB Decision.
WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, we AFFIRM in toto the Decision dated 17 June
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100542.

22. Davao New Town Development Corp. v. Sps. Saliga, et al., G.R. No.
174588, December 11, 2013
FACTS;
On February 5, 1998, respondent filed before Office of the PARAD in Davao City a
complaint for injunction, cancellation of titles and damages against the petitioner.
PETITIONER;
1. The petitioner alleged in defense that it purchased the property in good faith from
the previous owners (Paz Flores and Elizabeth Nepomuceno) in 1995;
2. At that time, the alleged tenancy relationship between the respondent and Eugenio
had already expired following the expiration of their lease contract in 1986;
3. Prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the Zoning Administrator confirmed
that the property was not classified as agricultural. The affidavit of non-tenancy executed by the
vendors affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural lessees on the property;
4. The property had already been classified to be within an urban/urbanizing zone in
the 1979-2000 comprehensive Land use plan for Davao City that was duly adopted by the City
Council of Davao City an approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now the
Housing and Land use Regulatory Board/ HLURB)

RESPONDENT;
1. The respondents claimed that they and their parents, from whom they took over
the cultivation of the landholding, had been tenants of the property as early as 1965;
2. On August 12, 1981, the respondents and Atty. Mendiola, originally registered
owner of the 2 parcels of land situated in Catalunan Pequeño, Davao City, executed a five
years lease contract;
3. While they made stipulations regarding their respective rights and obligations
over the landholding the respondents claimed that the instrument was actually a device Eugenio
used to evade the land reform law;
4. Pursuant to the provisions of PD 27. They as tenants were deemed owners of the
property beginning October 21, 1972 (the PD’s effectivity date); thus, the subsequent transfer of
the property to the petitioner was not valid;
5. The petitioner could not have been a buyer in good faith as it did not verify the
status of the property-whether tenanted or not tenanted-prior to its purchase;
6. The respondents submitted among others, pertinent tax declaration showing the
property was agricultural as of 1985.
ISSUE;
Whether or not the property had been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural uses prior
to June 15, 1988 so as to remove if from the coverage of R.A .6657?
RULING:
Yes, the City Council of Davao had been authority to adopt zoning resolutions and
ordinance. Under Section 3 of R.A No. 2264 (the then LGC). Municipal and/or city officials are
specifically empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or regulation in consultation
with the National Planning Commission’, the power of the local government units to reclassify
or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of the DAR. While
DNTDC attached the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification only in its Mr. the DARAB should have
considered it, especially in the light of the various documents that DNTDC presented to support
its position that the property had already been reclassified as non-agricultural land.
Considering that the property is no longer agricultural as of June25, 1988, it is removed
from the operation of R.A.6657. only those parcels of land specifically classified as agricultural
are covered by the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise classified is beyond its ambit.
No vested rights over the property accrued to the respondents under P.D. no. 27, under
P.D. 27 tenant-farmers of rice and corn agricultural lands are deemed owners of the land that
they till as October 21, 1972. Under these terms vested right cannot simply be taken away by the
expedience of adopting zoning plans and ordinances reclassifying an agricultural land to an
urban/urbanizing area. However, this policy should not be interpreted as automatically vesting in
them absolute ownership over their respective tillage. The tenant-farmer must still first comply
with the requisite preconditions, payment of just compensation and perfection of the before
acquisition of full ownership.
 The record does not show that the respondent had been issued certificates of land
transfer (CLTS)-best evidence of the government’s recognition of their inchoate
right as “deemed owners” of the property.
 Similarly, the record does not show that the government had placed the property
under its OLT program or that the government, though the MARO, recognized the
respondents as the actual tenants of the property on the relevant date, thereby
sufficiently vesting in them such inchoate right.
No. tenancy relationship exist between DNTC and the respondents;
In a tenancy relationship the subject must be agricultural land. Here, it has already been
reclassified as non-agricultural. Accordingly, the respondents are not de jurant tenants and are,
therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural lessees under the provision of P.D
No.27, in relation to R.A No 6657.
Under Section 36 (1) of R.A. no. 3844, as amended by section 7 of R.A NO 6389,
declaration by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission,
to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purpose, terminates the
right of the agricultural lessee to continue in its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the
conversion however, is not limited to the authority of the DAR or the courts. The reclassification
and conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of R.A. no.
6657. On June 15, 1988 was a coordinated effort of several government agencies. Such as local
government units and the HSRC. in effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship between
the respondents and Eugenio had been established by virtue of the provision of R.A no. 3844 or
of the five-years lease contract executed in 1981 this leasehold relationship had been terminated
with the classification of the property as non-agricultural land in 1982. The expiration the five-
year lease contract in 1986 could not have done more than simply finally terminate any leasehold
relation that may have prevailed under the terms of the contract. Consequently, when the
DNTDC purchased the property in 1995. There was no longer any tenancy relationship that
could have subrogated the DNTDC to the rights and obligation of the previous owner.
23. G.R. No. 200713, December 11, 2013
MARIO REYES, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF PABLO FLORO, Respondent

Facts:
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land identified as Lot 5 of the Consolidated Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Pcs-25816 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 279800. The land, primarily
devoted to rice production and consisting of 62,186 square meters, is located in Longos, Malolos,
Bulacan.
On 3 May 2004, petitioner Mario Reyes filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of Malolos City, Bulacan, a Complaint for Pre-Emption and Redemption, Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession, Occupation and Cultivation with prayer for the issuance of Restraining
Order/Injunction against Zenaida Reyes Sun Industrial Corporation, the Register of Deeds of Tabang,
Guiginto, Bulacan; and respondents, heirs of Pablo Floro, namely: Elena F. Vichico, Valeriano L. Floro,
Ernesto L. Floro, Victoria Floro-Basilio, Avelina C. Floro, Elsie C. Floro, Samuel C. Floro, Josephine C.
Floro, Jerome C. Floro, and Pablito Floro.
Reyes alleged that the land was formerly owned by Carmen T. Bautista under one lot title, TCT No.
T-264134. On 16 September 1983, Bautista allegedly sold the land to Zenaida as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity. Before Bautista sold the land, Reyes was allegedly
one of her tenant-lessees.
On September 17, 1983 Bautista executed a document entitled Pagpapatunay claiming that she was
the original owner of the land and acknowledging Reyes as her tenant, even though not registered with
the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the same document, Bautista attested that Reyes did not sign
the deed of sale since he did not want to give up his tenancy rights. Thereafter, Zenaida registered the
land in her name under TCT No. 279800. On 19 December 1983, Zenaida executed an Agricultural
Leasehold Contract  with Reyes, her brother.
Reyes stated in the Complaint that as an agricultural lessee, he wanted to acquire the land according
to the approved Barangay Committee on Land Production (BCLP) in the locality, by way of pre-emption
and redemption, under Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, as amended by RA 6389, or
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code.  Reyes implored that a restraining order be
issued against defendants upon receipt of the Complaint and, after hearing, prayed for the following: (1)
to make the restraining order/injunction permanent; (2) to declare the documents on the transfer of
ownership of the land in the names of the respondent heirs and Sun Industrial null and void ab initio; (3)
to pay the amount of the redemption price based on the approved BCLP in the locality under Section 12
of RA 3844; and (4) to order the Registry of Deeds of Tabang, Guiginto, Bulacan to cancel all existing
TCTs issued in the name of the respondent heirs and Sun Industrial and to issue new TCTs in his favor by
virtue of Sections 11 and 12 of RA 3844.
 On 28 May 2004, Zenaida filed her Answer with Counterclaim. She alleged that since 1983 Reyes
was the actual occupant, cultivator and agricultural tenant-lessee over the subject land. Zenaida also
stated that: (1) she timely received Reyes’ rental payments as agricultural tenant-lessee and he complied
with the terms and conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract which they have entered into; (2) as
registered owner of the land, she had all the legal rights to dispose of the land without Reyes’ consent; (3)
she had no knowledge that Reyes wanted to acquire the land and/or exercise his rights of pre-emption
and redemption; and (4) she never tried to eject Reyes from the land; thus, the issuance of a temporary
restraining order was unnecessary. As counterclaim, Zenaida asked for moral and exemplary damages.
On 17 November 2004, Sun Industrial filed its Answer denying the material allegations in the
Complaint. Sun Industrial raised the defense that it was an innocent assignee and purchaser for value in
good faith. Sun Industrial alleged that the subject land, now covered by TCT No. T-1188 in its name, has
no tenant or agricultural lessee. Otherwise, such fact would have been annotated at the back of its title.
Sun Industrial pointed out that the two previous titles of the land showed that it was not covered by
Operation Land Transfer. Sun Industrial declared that it became the registered owner of the land on 11
September 1989 or several years before the alleged issuance of the MARO Certification dated 4 May
1995. since Zenaida ceased to be the owner of the land in 1995, she could no longer institute Reyes as
tenant.
On 6 December 2004, respondent heirs filed their Answer with special and affirmative defenses
and damages. Respondent heirs maintained that they are the lawful owners of several parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 51068, 85587, 85588, 51062, 51066, 51065 and 51069 registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Bulacan. Respondent heirs asserted that before Sections 11 and 12 of RA 3844 may be
applied, it must first be established that a tenancy or leasehold relationship existed between Reyes and
Pablo Floro and/or his heirs. They added that while Zenaida is the alleged registered owner of the land in
the Complaint, the same is not valid since she never acquired a valid and defensible title to the land. They
averred that Zenaida was convicted of falsification of public documents by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 9252-M. Since Zenaida falsified and forged the
signature of Pablo Floro to transfer the subject land under her name, she could not validly enter into any
voluntary dealings with anybody including Reyes and neither could they suffer for the misdeeds of
Zenaida since they were also victims of an illegal transfer of ownership. Further, the respondent heirs
alleged that Reyes did not cultivate the land since 1995 as certified by the  Punong Barangay of Longos,
Malolos, Bulacan nor did Reyes tender a reasonable purchase price within 180 days from the transfer of
the land. Thus, respondent heirs prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the payment of moral
and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit.
on November 29,2005, the PARAD decided the case in favor of Reyes, as a tenant-lessee entitled to
redemption. The PARAD added that Zenaida’s conviction in a criminal case will not sever
Respondent heirs filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 16 May 2007, the
DARAB reconsidered and set aside its Decision dated 11 December 2006. The resolution declared that
Reyes was not a tenant and ordered him to vacate the property.
On June 1, 2001 decision of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22 in Criminal Case No. 9252-
M entitled “People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Reyes” for falsification of public documents, in view of
all the foregoing, it can be deduced that the 62,000 square meters or the nine (9) titles originally belong to
Pablo Floro and the accused somehow got hold of the four (4) land titles from Pablo Floro and transferred
it to her name by signing the signature of Pablo Floro in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1985.
Later on, in the Deed of Reconveyance of four (4) Parcels of Land she executed, she admitted having
forged and falsified the signature, Reyes is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
on September 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 68557 entitled
“Victoria Floro-Basilio v. Zenaida Reyes and Sun Industrial Corporation” for annulment of title, where
the CA found that there is no dispute on Pablo Floro’s ownership over the land and declared the titles of
Zenaida and Sun Industrial as void.
Issue:
Whether or not Reyes is a de jure tenant or lessee who is entitled to redemption, pre-emption,
peaceful possession, occupation and cultivation of the subject land.
The Court’s Ruling:
No, petitioner was not a tenant and not entitled to redemption and pre-emption. Reyes is
not an agricultural lessee because: (1) there was no valid contract between Reyes and Zenaida
nor between Reyes and Bautista; (2) Reyes has not personally cultivated the parcel of land; (3)
Reyes did not share any harvest with any landowner; and (4) the claim of Reyes is not supported
by substantial evidence.
In determining tenancy relations between petitioner and the respondent, the essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites are
necessary to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant, cultivator, or a planter, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.
The MARO certification is merely preliminary and does not bind the courts as conclusive
evidence that Reyes is a lessee who cultivates the land for purposes of agricultural production.
In Bautista v. Araneta, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers
that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. Here, the
certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value, without any corroborative evidence. The
certification was not notarized and Bautista was not even presented as a witness. Similarly,
Reyes was not included as a legitimate and properly registered agricultural tenant in the
supposed Deed of Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity which Bautista
executed in favor of Zenaida. the genuineness of the agricultural leasehold contract that
Zenaida entered into with Reyes is doubtful.
There was no document presented to prove the claim of the accused that she was the lawful
owner of the properties subject matter of this case, particularly the original title of the 62,186
square meters agricultural land in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan before it was subdivided into nine
(9) residential lots. Since all the records of the Register of Deeds from 1987 [onwards] were
destroyed because of a fire that hit the said office in 1987. Only a certification dated July 8, 1987
which was signed by Register of Deeds Elenita Corpuz certifying that the office of the Register
of Deeds, Malolos, Bulacan together with all the titles, documents, office equipment and supplies
have been totally burned during the fire conflagration on March 7, 1987 was presented.

This Court however is of the belief that there are in fact strong reasons not to believe its
faithfulness since there are other copies of the same which were not burned that should be
presented to prove that there was in fact such a sale from Carmen T. Bautista to Zenaida
Reyes to wit: 1) the Notary Public’s copy; 2) the copy of the Court (Notary Publics are
supposed to furnish copies of their notarized document to the Court that approved their
application for Notary Public); 3) BIR copy for the payment of the Capital Gains Tax; 4)
the copy of the Archives (National Library). These copies were never presented in this
Court or in the RTC, Branch 12 nor explained as why they were not presented. This is
therefore clearly suppression of evidence which would therefore be adverse if produced.
Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period,
etc. - The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
this provision assumes that a tenancy relationship exists. In this case, no such relationship was
ever created between Reyes and respondent heirs nor between Reyes and Zenaida because
Zenaida is not the true and lawful owner of the agricultural land. Since Reyes’ claim on his
supposed tenancy rights is based on the leasehold contract, as well as the certifications from
Bautista and the MARO, which were found to be inadequate to prove that an agricultural tenancy
relationship exists, then Reyes’ assertions must fail.
the certifications from Bautista and the MARO declaring Reyes to be a tenant are not enough
evidence to prove that there is a tenancy relationship. One claiming to be a de jure tenant has the
burden to show, by substantial evidence, that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship
are present. Since Reyes is not a de jure tenant or lessee, he is not entitled to the benefits of
redemption, pre-emption, peaceful possession, occupation and cultivation of the subject land, as
provided under existing tenancy laws.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 21 December 2010

and Resolution dated 13 February 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
100857.chanRoblesvirtualLawl

24. G.R. No. 191538               December 11, 2013

WELLER JOPSON, Petitioner, 
vs.
FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
The facts:
Spouses Laura S. Pascual and Jose H. Mendoza owned a parcel of land situated at Naga City,
Camarines Sur. The property had an aggregate area of one hundred one thousand forty-five
(101,045) square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 687. On 26
December 1961, the said property was subdivided into sixty-three (63) lots through a judicially
approved subdivision and became part of Laura Subdivision. Thus, TCT No. 687 was cancelled
and, in its stead, TCT No. 986 (covering 31 lots), TCT No. 987 (covering 31 lots) and TCT No.
988 (covering 1 lot) were issued.
On 4 January 1992, spouses Laura and Jose conveyed to respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines by way of dacion en pago, the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 986 (subject
landholding) which has an area of eight thousand nine hundred forty-six (8,946) square meters.
The transfer was evidenced by a Deed of Conveyance of Real Estate Property in Payment of
Debt. As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of Naga City cancelled TCT No. 986 and issued
TCT No. 1149 in favor of respondent DBP.
in 1990, respondent DBP published an Invitation to Bid for the conveyance of the subject
landholding covered by TCT No. 1149. On 28 December 1990, the said property was sold for
₱1.2M to petitioner Fabian O. Mendez, Jr. as the highest bidder. Thus, TCT No. 1149 was
cancelled and, in lieu of it, TCT No. 21190 was issued to [respondent Mendez].
in 1991, a Complaint was filed by Weller Jopson with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur. It was directed against respondent DBP, [respondent
Mendez] and Leonardo Tominio for annulment of sale, preemption/redemption and
reinstatement with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order with
damages.
petitioner alleged that he is a bona fide tenant-farmer of the parcel of land subject of the sale
between respondent DBP and [respondent Mendez]; his father Melchor Jopson, was the original
tenant of subject landholding appointed as such by the spouses Laura and Jose in 1947; in 1967,
he succeeded his father in cultivating the subject landholding now covered by the present TCT
No. 21190 when his father became ill; from 1967 up to December 1990, he laboriously tilled and
cultivated the parcel of land and religiously shared the harvest with respondent DBP through its
representatives or employees; on 20 December 1990, a certain Leonardo, acting upon the
instructions of [respondent Mendez], unlawfully entered the subject landholding and ejected him
from the same; the sale of the subject landholding by respondent DBP to petitioner is void
because the latter is not qualified to acquire the same under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657; the
sale of the parcel of land is also violative of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 360, series of 1989, in
relation to Section 1 of E.O. No. 407 dated 14 June 1990; he was deprived of his preferential
right to buy the parcel of land he tenanted under reasonable terms and conditions as provided for
by Section 11, R.A. No. 3844; in the alternative, he also has the right to redeem the parcel of
land from petitioner at a reasonable price pursuant to Section 12, R.A. No. 3844; the forcible
entry by Leonardo upon the instructions of [respondent Mendez] desecrated his right to security
of tenure and deprivation of his livelihood;
In 5 November 1991, Mendez denied petitioner allegations and asseverated that the latter has no
cause of action against him;[petitioner is guilty of laches (or estoppel) for not having questioned
the auction sale of the parcel of land;
20 December 1990, long before he knew respondent Mendez, it was petitioner, claiming to be
respondent DBP’s caretaker, who placed him in the subject landholding;
On 15 June 1992, respondent DBP alleged that respondent Mendez accepted the sale will full
knowledge of the extent and nature of the right, title and interest of the former, thus, he should be
the one to assume the risk of any liability, or the extent thereof, when he purchased the subject
landholding.
On 8 October 1993, Mendez filed a Motion to Maintain Status Quo Ante Litem and to Cite
Complainant in Contempt as petitioner forcibly entered the parcel of land in the company of
armed men. The motion was resolved by granting [respondent Mendez’s] request and ordering
[petitioner] to vacate the parcel of land.
On August 25, 1995, the PARAD declared the sale of the subject property between respondents
as a nullity and ordered respondent DBP to execute the necessary Deed of Transfer of the parcel
of land in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
In a Decision dated January 25, 2000, the DARAB reversed the PARAD’s ruling and held that
there is a tenancy relationship between respondent DBP and petitioner as evidenced by the
sharing of harvest between them.

The petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the

DARAB, dated 25 January 2000 and 26 April 2002, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. 
ISSUES;
Whether or not the petitioner is a bona fide tenant of the subject property,
RULING;
NO, the petitioner is not a bonafide tenant. In order to recognized as a de jurant tenancy must be
stablish the indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.

In this case, however, the facts substantiating a de jure tenancy are missing. the petitioner’s bare
assertion that a tenancy relationship exists between him and respondent DBP, no other concrete
proof was presented by petitioner to demonstrate the relationship of petitioner and respondent
DBP as tenant and landowner. the subject matter of the relationship is not an agricultural land
but a commercial land. Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), states that "an agricultural land refers to land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined therein and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."

As per Certification by the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Naga City, the subject
landholding covered by TCT No. 21190 is classified as secondary commercial zone based on
Zoning Ordinance No. 603 adopted on December 20, 1978 by the City Council and approved by
the National Coordinating Council for Town Planning and Zoning, Human Settlements
Commission on September 24, 1980. the subject landholding is no longer an agricultural land
despite its being planted with palay. It had long been reclassified as a commercial land and it
even forms part of Laura Subdivision. Whatever the landowner does to the subject landholding,
like plant it with palay, does not convert it to an agricultural land nor divest it of its actual
classification.
the essential element of consent is absent. In the present case, no proof was presented that
respondent DBP recognized or hired petitioner as its legitimate tenant. Besides petitioner’s self-
serving assertions that he succeeded his father in tilling the subject landholding, no other
concrete evidence was presented to prove consent of the landowner.

As aptly held by the CA, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties. Perforce, the ruling of the PARAD, as well as the
decision and resolution of the DARAB which were rendered without jurisdiction, are without
force and effect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July
9, 2009 and Resolution dated February 12, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
70781, are hereby AFFIRMED.
 25. Quintos V. Darab G.R no. 185838

Facts;
Subject of the instant case is a 604.3258 hectares of land in Tayamaaon, Mamburao Occidental Mindoro
covered by TCT of title No. T-11639 in the name of Golden Country Farms Incorporated (GCFI), which
consist of, 249 hectares of mango orchard and 399 hectares rice land. Petetioner Ricardo V. Quintos was
the majority stock holders of GCFI who manage the properties until 1975 when properties was taken
over by Armando Rumualdez.

Under Romualdez management, GCFI contracted several loans with PNB and DBP banks which were
secured several real estate mortgage over GCFI properties including the subject property. In 1981
Romualdez then abandoned the subject property and then DBP take over and on the same year a
certain people started to plant palay on the subject property.

After the Edsa revolution the possession and the management of the GCFI properties were returned to
GCFI. On July 1987 the properties were sequestered by PCGG albeit eventually cleared. PNP and DPB
transfer their financial claims against GCFI to Asset Privatization Trust (ATP). PNB and DBP
initiated extra judicial foreclosure against the GCFI properties.

In 1989 Cesar Lacuesta OIC of the APT enetered into a verbal agreement with 53 members of private
respondent of Kanlurang Mindoro Farmer’s Cooperative Inc. (KMFCI) and allow the latter to tend the
standing mango trees, induce their flowering and gather the fruits at 300 pesos per tree, the payments
of which was to remitted to Quintos.

Quintos was inform by APT of the notice from DAR placing the subject property under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to CARP of the government. Quintos filed a petition for exemption under the office
of the DAR secretary. He claimed that GCFI was organize for the primary purpose of buying, selling,
importing, exporting, improving preparing, processing, producing, dealing and trading in cattle, swine
poultry, stock, meat, dairy products, etc., warranting the exemption of its properties, including the
subject properties from CARP coverage.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA correctly sustained the tenancy agreement purported in this case.

RULLING

The petition is meritorious

For a tenancy relationship to exist between the parties, the following essential elements must be shown,
the parties are the land owners and the tenant, the subject matter is agricultural land, there is consent
between the parties, the purpose is agricultural production, there is personal cultivation by the tenant,
there is sharing of the harvest by the parties. Thus, the absent of one does not make an occupant of a
parcel of land, a cultivator or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure under the
existing tenancy laws.

The burden of proof rests on the claiming tenant to prove his affirmative allegation by substantial
evidence. His failure to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he basis his claims would put
the opposite party under no obligation to prove his exemption or defense.
In this relation, in bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a land
owner, except as may be provided by law. Hence, the consent of the landowners must secure prior to
the installation of tenants. In this case the PARAB, DARAB and the CA all held between GCFI and the 53
KMFCI members who were allegedly installed as tenants by APT. However, there were no records
showing that APT was authorized by GCFI the landowners to install tenants thereon. APT only assume
the rights of the original mortgagees DPB and PNB who have yet to exercise their rights to foreclosed
and mortgage properties. It is settled that a mortgagee does not become the owner of the mortgaged
property until he have foreclosed the mortgaged and ,thereafter , foreclosed the property for
foreclosure sale. APT could not have been regarded as the landowner of the subject property because of
the enjoyment of the foreclosed proceedings.

Section 6 of RA 3844 provides that agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the persons who
furnishes the land holdings, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the
person who personally cultivates the same, it assumed that there is already an existing existing
agricultural leasehold relation, i,e …a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The epigraph
of section 6 merely states who are parties of “agricultural leasehold relations” which assumes that there
is already tenant on the land.

Since the law establishes a special relationship in tenancy with important consequences, it properly
pinpoints the persons to whom said relationship shall apply. The spirit of the law is to prevent both
landholder absenteeism and tenant absenteeism. Thus, it would seem that the discretionary powers and
important duties of the land holder like the choice of crop or seed, cannot be left to the will or capacity
of an agent or overseer, just as the cultivation of the land cannot be entrusted by the tenant to some
other people. Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character.

Wherefore the petition is granted. The decision dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution dated December 17,
2008 of the court of appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 44430 are reversed and set aside since no valid tenancy
agreement exist over the mango orchard subject of this case.
 26. Automat Realty Devt Corp V. Sps Cruz
Facts;

Automat Realty is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Barangay Malitlit, Sta Rosa Laguna. It
acquired one parcel from El Sol Realty and Development Corporation and the other from Ofelia Carpo.
The land was not occupied in 1990 when Automat purchased it.

Leonor Lim was the real estate broker behind Automat’s purchase of the property. Sps. De la Cruz
sometimes refer to her some Sta. Rosa real estate properties available for sale. Ofelia dela Cruz
volunteered her services to Lim as its authorized administrator, on the condition that the caretaker
would voluntarily vacate upon Automat’s demand.

Dela Cruz’s family stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants. They cultivated and improve the land.
They shared the produced palay with automat through its authorized agent Lito Cecilia , who remitted
the rentals to Lim and Lim to Automat.

Sometimes in August 2000, Automat asked the respondent spouses to vacate the premises as it was
preparing the ground work for developing the property. Respondent spouses refuse to vacate unless
they were paid compensation and claimed that they were “agricultural tenants who enjoyed security of
tenure under the law”.

On August 19, 2000, respondent spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful possession with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against Automat before
the PARAD of Laguna.

On August 28, 2001, the PARAD dismissed the complaint. It declared, among other things, that “no
agricultural tenancy can be established between the parties under the attending factual circumstances”

On February 8, 2005, the DARAB reverse and set aside the PARAD’S decision. It declared respondent
spouses as de jure tenants of the land holdings.

Automat, petioner Lim, petitioner Cecilia appealed with the court of appeals arguing that the DARAB has
no jurisdiction since the subject property is not agricultural lands, the boards finding that the
respondent spouse are de jure tenant was not supported by evidence and the essential requisites for a
valid agricultural tenancy relationship are not present.

On August 29, 2009 the CA affirmed the DARAB without prejudice to the petetioner’s right to seek
recourse from the DAR secretary on the other issues. Meanwhile, DAR region IV-A issued two orders
both dated March 30, 2010 exempting the subject property in the coverage of CARP.

On April 16, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between Automat and respondent
spouses.
2. Whether or not the DAR exemption orders had an effect on the DARAB’S earlier exercise of
jurisdiction,

RULLING
No agricultural tenancy relationship in this case. The elements to constitute tenancy relationship are the
ff; the parties are the land owner and the tenant or the agricultural lessee, the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land, there is consent between parties to the relationship, the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production, there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee and the harvest is shared by the land owners and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

There must be substantial evidence on the presence of all these requisites otherwise there is no de jure
tenants. Only those who have established de jure tenant status are entitled to security of tenure and
coverage under tenancy laws.

Well settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove. Respondent spouses filed the petition before the
PARAD praying to be maintained possession to the property. They are the one claiming they have a
tenancy relationship with automat. Thus, they have the burden of proof that such relationship existed.

On the issue on whether or not the DAR exemption orders had an effect on the DARAB’S earlier exercise
of jurisdiction, the court rules that Jurisdiction and adjudication board section 1 states that the board
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the CARP under RA 665, executive orders nos. 228,
229 and 129-A, RA 3844 as amended by RA 6389 , PD 27 and other agrarian laws and their IRR.
Specifically such jurisdiction is involved but not limited to cases involving;

a. The rights and obligation of person whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management
cultivation and use of agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws

b. The valuation of land and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing
and collection of lease rentals, disturbance collection, amortization paymentsand similar
disputes concerning the functions of the LBP.

c. The annulment of contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under the
administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP.

d. Those cases arising from or connected with membership or representation in compact farms,
farmers’ cooperatives and other registered farmers association or organization, related to lands
covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws

e. Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, re-emption and redemption of
agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP and other agrarian laws.

f. Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificate of Land Ownership
Award and Emancipation Patents which are registered with LRA.

g. Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the defunct Court
of Agrarian Relations under sec 12 of PD 94, except sub-paragraph (q) thereof and PD 815.

h. And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matter of concerns referred to it by Secretary of the
DAR.

Section 2- Jurisdiction of Regional and Provincial Adjudicators- The RARAD and the PARAD shall
have concurrent original jurisdiction with the board to hear, determine and adjudicate all
agrarian cases and disputes.
Agrarian dispute define in Sec. 3(d) of RA 6557 refers to “any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, leasehold or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture.

The court held that “jurisdiction of a tribunal including quasi-judicial office or government
agency over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material obligations therein and the character relief prayed for irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to such reliefs.

However, jurisdiction is conferred by law and “an order or decision renderedby a tribunal or
agency without jurisdiction is a total nullity.

The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainty that the lands were re-classified as
non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988. Consequently, the petition filed by respondent spouses
in 2000 before the PARAD did not involve “land devoted to agriculture” and, necessarily, it
could not have involved any controversy relating to such land. Absent of such “agrarian dispute”
cannot fall under the jurisdiction of the DARAB which is a quasi-judicial body.

THEREFORE, the petition is granted. The court of appeals’ August 19, 2009 decision and April 14,
2010 are reversed and set aside. The PARAD decision dated August 28, 2001 and DARAD’S
decision dated Feb. 8, 2005 are declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice
of the filing of civil case to the proper court.

27 Caluzor v. Llanillo G.R No. 155580

Facts;

Petetioner Romeo Caluzor alleges that Respondent Lorenzo Llanillo took him tenant, giving him
(Caluzor) a sketch of the land he will be cultivating. Even after the death of Lorenzo, Caluzor continued
giving Lorenzo’s share to his overseer, Martin Ricardo. In 1990, Diogracias Llanillo, son of Lorenzo
offered to pay Caluzor 17,000 per hectare of the cultivated land in exchange for turning his (Caluzor)
over to Diogracias. However, no payment was made instead , Caluzor was ejected from the land. Efforts
before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council proved futile which gave authority to Caluzor to file
instant case.

In September 9, 1994 the petitioner instituted the case against Deogracias in the office of the PARAD
and demanded the payment of disturbance compensation. He also implead Moldex Realty Corporation
as an additional defendant upon discovering that the latter had entered the land to develop it into a
residential subdivision.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between Caluzor and Llanillo.

RULING

The petition for certiorari is bereft of merit

The court ruled that under sec. 5 subparagraph of RA 1199 which provides that a tenant shall mean a
person who , himself and with aid available from within his immediate farm households cultivates the
land belonging to , or possessed by another , with the latter’s consent for purposes of production ,
sharing the produce with land holder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system.

For tenancy relationship to exist, therefore, the ff. elements must be shown to concur to wit; the parties
are the land owner and the tenant, the subject matter is agricultural land, there is consent between
parties to the relationship, the purpose is of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production,
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee, the harvest must be shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all of these elements must be
proved by substantial evidence. This means that the absence of one will not take an allege tenant a de
jure tenant. Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security
of tenure or to be covered of the land reform program of the government under existing laws. Being the
party alleging the existence of tenancy relationship, the petitioner has the burden of proving the
allegation of his tenancy.

In the instant case, the third and sixth elements of tenancy relationship were not shown. The sketch did
not establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the petitioner in as agricultural tenant. This element is
demanded that the land owner and the tenant should have agreed to the relationship freely and
voluntarily, with neither of them unduly imposing his will on the other.
The sixth element was not also established. Even assuming that Lorenzo had verbally permitted the
petitioner to cultivate his land, no tenancy relationship between them thereby set in because they have
not admittedly discussed any fruit sharing scheme, with Lorenzo telling him simply that he would just
asked his share from him. Although petitioner asserted that he continued sharing the fruits of his
cultivation through Ricardo Lorenzo’s caretaker after the latter’s death, producing the list of produce to
support his claim, the list did not indicate Ricardo’s receiving the fruits listed therein. The petitioner did
not also contain Ricardo’s authority to received Ricardo’s share.
In short, the de jure tenant should allege and prove, firstly, the cost and expenses incurred in the
cultivation, planting or harvesting and other expenses incidental to the improvement off his crop ; and
secondly, the necessary and useful improvements made in cultivating the land . Without the allegation
and proof, the demand for indemnity be denied.

Wherefore, the court dismiss the petition for certiorari for lack of merit; and orders the petitioner to pay
the cost of suit.

28 G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

 MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
Facts:
Monico Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
due to an incident that happened on June 29, 2000 at Sitio Lamak, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte
when allegedly he harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo,
without the consent of the owner, Anecita Pacate.

Monico Ligtas pleaded not guilty and denied that he was harvesting abaca fibers during that
date. According to him, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband since 1993 when
the late Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the criminal
case.
While the case was on trial, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on
November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a
bona fide tenant of the land.
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence
before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court
and Court of Appeals and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of theft and Ligtas' defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and
substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate duly
corroborated by any witness. His defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it, the burden to prove
the existence of the tenancy relationship belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the
essential elements of tenancy agreement.
The Court of Appeals also declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision declaring him as
a bonafide tenant of the land is irrelevant in the case at bar.
Issues:
Whether or not the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land
owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a
criminal case for theft.
Held:
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a
question of fact. To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion
based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the
essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having
been pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole. A review of the records
of the case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
The SC holds that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and
binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. The SC has
ruled in a number of cases that, it is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa.
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of
facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and
administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of... whether there
exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were... proven by the prosecution.
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are
entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence.[85] This court is not tasked to weigh again "the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and... to substitute its own judgment [as to] the
sufficiency of evidence."
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.[87] This court has held that "judicial
determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as... judgments and orders of a regular
judicial body."
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a
tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner. It found that there was substantial evidence to support
petitioner's claim as tenant of the land. In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which
consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres
Pacate sometime in 1993. Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
harvest. However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.
Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to private complainant, and had done so every
harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.
The SC emphasized that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to
heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled hearings.
In declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and
private complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Rollo, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.
in Rollo, the SC did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional and,
thus, not binding on courts.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's
consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and
the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by
way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

29. G.R. No. 190482, December 09, 2015

 DAR, Petitioner, v. IGMIDIO D. ROBLES, RANDY V. ROBLES, MARY KRIST B.
MALIMBAN, ANNE JAMAICA G. ROBLES, JOHN CARLO S. ROBLES AND
CHRISTINE ANN V. ROBLES, Respondents.

FACTS:
On April 17, 1997, Eduardo Reyes, married to Nenita P. Reyes sold his subdivided properties
located at in Barangay Ambiling, Magdalena, Laguna to the six respondents, namely: Igmidio D. Robles,
Randy V. Robles, Mary Krist B. Malimban, Anne Jamaca G. Robles, John Carlo S. Robles, Christine Anne V.
Robles. On May 3, 2005, the deeds of absolute sale covering the properties were duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Laguna.
On May 26, 2006, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region IV-A Laguna
Provincial Office, represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja in her capacity as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II
(PARO), filed Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Absolute Sale and Cancellation of Transfer Certificates
of Titles. It alleged that the deeds of absolute sale were executed by Eduardo without prior DAR
clearance under Administrative Order No. 01-89, series of 1989, in violation of Section 6, paragraph 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as
amended (CARL).
On September 9, 2006, respondents received a Summons and Notice of Hearing, together with a
copy of the said petition from the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, requiring them to answer the petition and appear for the initial
preliminary conference set on October 10, 2006. Thus, they filed their Answer and Supplemental Answer
to the petition.
On October 10 and 23, 2006, Julieta R. Gonzales and Nenita Reyes, the surviving spouse and the
daughter of Eduardo, respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action and the subject matter of the case, and that the DAR has no
cause of action against them.
On November 2, 2006, respondents filed a Manifestation adopting the motion to dismiss filed by
Julieta and Nenita.
On November 30, 2006, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator issued a Resolution denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Julieta and Nenita filed a motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on January 24, 2008, respondents, through counsel, manifested that they are
joining the motion for reconsideration filed by Julieta and Nenita.
On February 7, 2008, the Provincial Adjudicator issued another Resolution dismissing the case
against Julieta and Nenita for lack of cause of action, but not against respondents.
Respondents then filed their motion to reconsider the Resolution dated February 7, 2008 and to defer
the preliminary conference set on March 13, 2008.
On June 26, 2008, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a Resolution denying respondents' motion
for reconsideration, and setting the preliminary conference anew on August 28, 2008.
Aggrieved by the Provincial Adjudicator's Resolutions, respondents filed with the CA a petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On May 29, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
granted the petition. The three (3) questioned Resolutions of the PARAD dated 30 November 2006, 7
February 2008 and 26 June 2008 are all reversed and set aside. The DAR's petition before the PARAD
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DAR Adjudication Board has Jurisdiction over annulment of Deeds of
Absolute Sale and the subsequent cancellation of Titles involving lands under the administration and
disposition of the DAR.
HELD:
Citing the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz: It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of
a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of
a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or
omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does
not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.
There is also no merit in respondents' contention that the TCTs issued in their favor have
become incontrovertible and indefeasible, and can no longer be altered, cancelled or modified or
subject to any collateral attack after the expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree
of registration, pursuant to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529.
While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes
incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The
acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the
real owners.
Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust
for another person by the registered owner.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by
that document. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both, are interchangeably used.
In this case, what is being assailed in the DAR's petition for annulment of deeds of sale and
cancellation of titles is the legality of the transfer of title over the subject properties in favor of
respondents, and not their corresponding TCTs, due to the absence of DAR clearance and for possible
violation of Section 6, paragraph 4 of R.A. No. 6657.
All told, the CA erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the DAR's petition for annulment of
deeds of sale and cancellation of titles before the PARAD, and in holding that it is the regular courts that
should determine if indeed there were violations of the agrarian laws which would justify the grant of
such petition. As can be determined from the allegations of the petition, the DARAB has jurisdiction over
such case which involves agrarian reform matters under Section 1 (1.5) and (1.13), Rule II of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 29, 2009 and its
Resolution dated December 2, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104896, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Resolutions dated February 7, 2008 and June 26, 2008 of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region IV-A, are REINSTATED. The said Adjudicator
is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the resolution of the Petition for Annulment of Deeds of SALE

(30.) G.R. No. 185312, December 01, 2016

MALABANAN et al., Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ALFREDO RESTRIVERA, Respondents.

FACTS:
The disputed property is an 8.839-hectare agricultural land situated in Potrero, Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite. It used to be registered under the name of Alfredo Restrivera, as shown by his
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-13. In 1968, OCT No. 0-13 was cancelled by TCT No.
T-28631 under the name of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC). After the ouster of the
Marcos administration, the IRC voluntarily surrendered the land to the Philippine Commission
on Good Government (PCGG).
The PCGG then transferred the above property to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) by virtue of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Sequestered
Agricultural Lands between the PCGG and the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), as
well as Executive Order (E.O.) No. 407, Series of 1990.
In February 2002, DAR awarded the land to petitioners. Two collective CLOAs were
generated and the RD eventually issued to them derivative TCT Nos. CLOA-2838 and CLOA-
2839. Invoking their preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries under Section 22 of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 6657, respondents filed before the Adjudication Board for Region IV a Petition for
Cancellation of CLOA, Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Repossession and Reconveyance against
petitioners, Charmaine Uy, the PARO of Cavite, and the RD of Cavite in February 2003.
Respondents alleged that (1) Alfredo never transferred his title to the subject land to any
entity; (2) petitioners were perpetually disqualified from benefitting from CARP because they
had sold the subject land to Charmaine Uy in violation of Section 73(f) of R.A. 6657 and DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1996; (3) prior to the award, petitioners also executed a
waiver of their rights to the subject land in favor of other potential farmer-beneficiaries; and (4)
the land had a slope of 18% as shown in the DAR regional director's Investigation Report and
was, therefore, exempt from CARP coverage.
The Malabanans, the DAR-Legal Assistance Division, and Charmaine Uy filed separate
Answers15 raising these substantially similar defenses: (1) no waiver of rights or sale of the
subject land had ever occurred; (2) respondents had no legal standing to file the petition, because
Restrivera was not the registered owner of the property; and (3) the petition was premature
because whether or not the land was exempt from CARP was an Agrarian Law Implementation
(ALI) issue that needed to be resolved first by the DAR Secretary.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal personality to assail the distribution of the
subject land under the agrarian reform program; and
2. Whether or not the agrarian adjudicator has jurisdiction over a petition for cancellation of
title and reconveyance of agricultural land sequestered by or surrendered to the PCGG.
HELD:
Respondents have no legal standing to assail the award of the subject land to
petitioners.
In this case, respondents trace their alleged ownership of the disputed property to OCT
No. 0-13. Their claim that the property was illegally acquired by the IRC is unsubstantiated. The
CA correctly noted that the issue of whether the acquisition of the property by IRC was lawful or
not was still undetermined by the proper tribunal. Without question, however, the last known
owner of the land before it was surrendered to the PCGG was the IRC. In fact, the derivative
titles under question cancelled the latter's title under TCT No. 28631, instead of OCT NO. 0-13.
All things considered, there is yet no sufficient basis to say that Alfredo Restrivera was the
previous owner of the land prior to its award to petitioners.
 Respondents cannot rely solely on their father's title to assert ownership over the subject
land. A title is merely evidence of ownership of the particular property described therein.
Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title.
On the other hand, the SC did not disregard the existence of TCT No. 28631, which is
under the name of the IRC. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered
land and serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person in
whose name it was issued. In the absence of a definitive ruling that TCT No. 28631 was illegally
procured, the SC did not only take the titles presented in evidence at their face value. At this
point, respondents cannot claim ownership of the land, or any interest therein that could have
been the subject of succession. Concomitantly, they have no legal standing to challenge the
propriety of its distribution under CARP by virtue of their interest as Alfredo's compulsory heirs.
Neither can respondents claim to have any present substantive interest in the disputed
property as preferred beneficiaries under paragraph 2 of the MOA between DAR and the PCGG
on sequestered lands.
The law, therefore, does not automatically vest preferential rights upon
the children of landowners. 47 To avail themselves of this right, claimants must
show that: (1) their parents owned the subject land; and (2) it has been
determined in the proper proceeding that the claimants are qualified
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. Proof of these circumstances,
however, are utterly wanting in this case

DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents.

It is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA already
registered with the Land Registration Authority as in this case. For purposes of determining
whether DARAB has jurisdiction, the central consideration is the existence of an agrarian
dispute.
Section 3 (d) of R.A. 6657 defines agrarian dispute as follows: 
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.
In this case, respondents have not alleged any tenurial relationship with petitioners.
Rather, their petition is centered on their supposed preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries and
the suitability of the land for CARP coverage. These are matters falling under the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction of DAR, which is supposed to determine and adjudicate all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
The question of whether the TCTs issued to petitioners should be cancelled hinges
on whether the landholding is exempt from CARP coverage, which remains undetermined
up this point. As DARAB correctly pointed out in its Decision dated 28 April 2006, the
investigation conducted by the regional director does not measure up to the proceedings and
outcome described. Hence, RARAD should not have acted on the petition. Under Section 5, Rule
II of the procedural rules on ALI cases, the petition should have been referred to the office of the
DAR Secretary for the determination of pending ALI issues; specifically, whether the subject
land was exempt from CARP coverage, and whether respondents were qualified and preferred
farmer-beneficiaries.
DAR Administrative Order No. 09-97 as amended, sets the guidelines for the recovery of
lands turned over to DAR pursuant to E.O. 407, but those lands were later found to be outside
the coverage of CARP. Under these guidelines, the petition for reconveyance should be filed
with the provincial, regional or national offices of DAR. Moreover, the Order of Reconveyance
should be issued by the regional director, which can only be appealed to the DAR Secretary.
 Based on the above, the SC found that the Decision of RARAD was rendered without
authority and jurisdiction; hence, it is void.

31. ROMEO M. LANDICHO, v. WILLIAM C. LIMQUECO,

G.R. No. 194554, December 07, 2016

EDGAR PEÑALOSA, DARWIN P. LANDICHO, JURIS P. LANDICHO, IVY P.

LANDICHO, and FELIPE PEÑALOSA, Petitioners, v. WILLIAM C. LIMQUECO,

Facts:
Sometime in the year 2000, petitioners Felipe Peñalosa, represented by Joel Peñalosa and
Edgar Peñalosa, Darwin P. Landicho, Juris P. Landicho, and Ivy P. Landicho each filed
petitions before the PARAD against respondent and Yang Chin Hai (Hai), his Taiwanese
investor-partner. Petitioner Romeo Landicho (Romeo Landicho) was impleaded via third-
party complaint in the said cases. The petitions sought the nullification of the contracts of
sale in favor of respondent and the return to the petitioners of their respective owner's
duplicate copies of the CLOAs issued by the DAR back in 1992 or, in the alternative, the
cancellation of the CLOAs and the issuance of the RD of new certificates in petitioners'
names.
The CLOAs and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covered five (5) parcels of land located
in Mabang Parang, Lucban, Quezon, which originally formed part of a bigger landholding
with an area of 177,763 square meters, previously covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-29365 or Free Patent No. 593794 and registered in the name of spouses Romeo
and Evangeline Landicho (Spouses Landicho). By virtue of a Voluntary Land Transfer, the
land covered by OCT No. P-29365 was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1992. As a consequence, Spouses Landicho were able
to retain five (5) hectares of said landholding, while the remaining portion was subdivided
among the petitioners, to wit:

Petitioner Felipe Peñalosa averred that respondent was able to obtain physical possession of
his CLOA as well as his TCT to the property and that he came to know that respondent and
Romeo Landicho entered into a contract of sale of his property and as a result thereof,
respondent was able to take hold of the copy of the TCT to his land.

Petitioners Edgar Peñalosa, Darwin P. Landicho, Juris P. Landicho, and Ivy P. Landicho, on
the other hand, contended that sometime in June 1994, they were asked by respondent and
Romeo Landicho to sign certain documents which turned out to be contracts of sale and
lease involving their properties covered by the CLOAs; that by reason of such sale, the
owner's duplicate copies of their TCTs were delivered to respondent; and that in affixing
their signatures, they did not receive any consideration and the legal implications of the
said contracts were not explained to them.

Petitioners Darwin Landicho, Juris Landicho and Ivy Landicho further stated that they had
entrusted their owner's duplicate copies of their TCTs and the CLOAs to their father,
Romeo Landicho. In June 1994, however, they came to know that respondent and their
father entered into a contract of sale and/or lease involving their properties and by virtue
thereof, the TCTs were given to respondent.

Hence, the petitioners claimed that the transfers of lands covered by their individual
CLOAs by Romeo Landicho to respondent were made in violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), which prohibited
the sale, transfer or conveyance of land for a period of ten (10) years;7 and that their consent
to such transactions was vitiated by fraud, undue influence and mistake. For said reason,
they filed the cases before the PARAD to recover their lands.

Respondent opposed the petitions. He asserted that he was a purchaser in good faith and
for value and that the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the subject petitions because no
agrarian dispute was involved.

Issue
Whether or not the case at bench is an agrarian dispute and within the jurisdiction of
DARAB and PARAD.

Ruling
Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an agrarian dispute as:
xxx, any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers'
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
In this case, the petitions filed before the PARAD asking for the nullification of the contracts
of sale and recovery of the CLOAs did not contain any allegation of tenurial relations
constitutive of an agrarian dispute as the parties were not subjects of a landowner and
tenant relationship, or an allegation that they were lessors and lessees of each other as
reinforced by the categorical admission of the parties in their pleadings that no such
contract exists.35 These circumstances, however, do not mean that the controversy is no
longer agrarian in nature.

The second sentence of Section 3(d) of the CARL clearly provides that an agrarian dispute
also includes "any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under the CARP
law and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lessor and lessee."

Here, the controversy pertains to respondent's act of selling to a third person the lands
acquired by the petitioners under the CARP. Hence, the case is still an agrarian dispute and
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB and PARAD.
III.PD No. 27 A. (32) Beneficiaries Cabral v. Heirs of Adolfo, et al., G.R. No.
191615, Aug. 2, 2017 (OLT)
Facts:
Petitioner claims that she is the registered owner of several parcels of land situated, at Barangay
Purok, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally covered by OCT No. 0-1670. The property subject of
the instant case are portions of Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390 covered by OCT No. 0-1670.In July
1973, sought to convert her landholdings, including the subject property to no-agricultural
purposes. In her 2ndendorsementletter to DAR Secretary dated October 1, 1973, DAR District
Officer Fernando Ortega, stated that per reports of the Agrarian Reform Team, subject property
was not included in the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)program under PD 27, nor has any
portion thereof been transferred to a tenant. Thus, District Officer Ortega recommended the
conversion of the same into residential, commercial, industrial, or other purposes. On April 25,
1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to respondents pursuant to the OLT program
covering the subject property. Petitioner filed for cancellation of the EPs of the respondents.
Petitioner argues that the subject EPs were issued without compliance with the requirements for
its issuance under PD 27, such as the prior issuance of corresponding Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT).On the other hand, respondents argued that since the reclassification of the
property was made after the effectivity of PD No. 27, tenant-farmers enjoy a vested right and
should be deemed full owners of the property.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are the famer-beneficiaries of the subject land.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the respondents are not the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject lands. Farmer-
beneficiaries cannot be deemed full owners when there is no compliance with the procedure of
an EP under PD 27 and related rules. Indeed, under PD no. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn
lands were deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21,1972 or the effectivity of the
said law. This policy was intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the
soil. However, the provision declaring tenant farmers as owners as of October 21, 1972, should
not be construed as automatically vesting upon them absolute ownership over the land they are
tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with before full ownership is vested
upon the tenant-farmers. One of the important steps to be undertaken before an EP can be
issued to effectively transfer the land tenant-farmers with respect in the case at hand, is
identification of the tenants, and the land covered by the OLT. In this case, the records are bereft
of evidence to show that the respondents complied with the requirements and procedures to
prove that the said provisional title was perfected, from the time that the entitlement to such right
started pursuant to PD No. 27 and before claimed land was reclassified.

Furthermore, the court found that there were no issuance of CLT in favor of the respondents
before the issuance of subject EPs. A CLT is issued to a tenant-farmer to serve as provisional
title of owner of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of
just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is amortizing the owner. The issuance of a
CLT is also proof that the property was previously covered by the OLT program and proof of the
governments ‘recognition of the farmer-beneficiary’s inchoate rights over the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitiOn is GRANTED.

 (33) J.V. Lagon Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Vda. De Terre, et al., G.R.
No. 219670, June 27, 2018
THE FACTS

On 1952, It was alleged in the complaint that, Antonio Pedral (original owner) instituted
Leocadia and her spouse, Delfin Terre to work as share tenants over his 5-hectare
agricultural landholding known as Lot 587 located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.

1958, Three (3) years later, Pedral sold the land to Jose Abis who, in turn, sold the
same to Augusto Gonzales (Gonzales) in 1958.

During the said transfers of ownership, the spouses Terre were allegedly retained as
tenants of the entire 5-hectare landholding. In the 1960s, Gonzales reduced their tillage
to 2.5 hectares, and the other half of the land was given to Landislao Bedua and
Antonillo Silla to till. On their 2.5 hectares, the Spouses Terre constructed a house and
that of their daughter's.

In 1988, the spouses Terre were surprised when they were informed that J.V. Lagon
had already bought the entire 5-hectare land from the heirs of Gonzales. Later on, J.V.
Lagon constructed a scale house within the 2.5 hectare land tilled by the spouses Terre.
In 1989, J.V. Lagon warned the spouses to stop cultivating the land because the whole
lot was to be developed for commercial or industrial use. In that same year, Delfin died,
purportedly due to mental anguish over the turn of events. In 1990, J.V. Lagon filled
the eastern portion of the land with earth and boulders.

On 7 May 1991, Leocadia filed a complaint before the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC). The following day, on 8 May 1991, a complaint was also lodged
before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). No appropriate action, however,
was taken on the said complaints until the dispute was eventually brought before the
PARAD on 19 June 1997.

Leocadia claimed that the works done by J.V. Lagon were tantamount to conversion of
the land for non-agricultural purposes. Also, Leocadia averred that she was not duly
notified in writing about the sale between Gonzales and J.V. Lagon. Thus, her 180-day
right of redemption pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as
amended by R.A. No. 6389, did not commence. Accordingly, it was prayed that she be
allowed to exercise her right of redemption over the land, the expenses thereof to be
shouldered by the Land Bank of the Philippines.

In her bid to prove the existence of tenancy, Leocadia relied, inter alia, on the following
documents: (a) 23 April 1997 Certification issued by Geronimo P. Arzagon, Municipal
Mayor of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, certifying that the spouses Terre were actual
tenants of the land; 8 (b) Pedral's affidavit dated 4 July 1987, confirming his consent for
the spouses Terre to be his agricultural tenants at a 70-30 sharing of harvest in their
favor;9 (c) affidavit dated 28 July 1997, executed by MARO Perfecto Bergonia, Jr.
stating that Terre, a tenant, filed a complaint on 7 July 1991, concerning her illegal
ejectment.10

On the other hand, J.V. Lagon countered that Leocadia had no cause of action simply
because there was no tenancy to speak of. J.V. Lagon asseverated that Lot 587 had
ceased to be agricultural and was already classified as commercial, the same having
been utilized as the site of the Rural Bank of Tacurong. Also, at the time the
landholding was purchased from Gonzales in 1988, no tenant was found cultivating the
land.

The PARAD Ruling

In its 3 April 2002 decision, the PARAD ruled in favor of J.V. Lagon. It opined that
Leocadia's complaint was already barred by prescription and laches, as the cause of
action accrued in 1988 when J.V. Lagon constructed a scale house in the allegedly
tenanted area. Also, the PARAD ruled that the filing of the complaint with the MARO in
1991 did not toll the running of the prescriptive period because it was the DARAB that
had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes.

With respect to the issue on redemption, the PARAD observed that as vendee, J.V.
Lagon failed to give Leocadia a written notice of the sale. Nevertheless, it resolved to
deny the claim for redemption on the finding that Leocadia had actual knowledge of the
sale as early as 1988 when she confronted J.V. Lagon about the scale house.

Anent the question of whether there was tenancy, the PARAD held that Leocadia failed
to establish her status as a de jure tenant. It found scant evidentiary value on the
documents she presented. In so ruling, the PARAD pointed out that Pedral, as former
owner, could attest to the condition of the land only from 1947 to 1955 when he was
still the owner thereof, and not after he had already sold the property. Moreover, the
PARAD was of the view that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers
as regards tenancy relations are merely provisional in nature.

Finally, the PARAD was convinced that the disputed real property was not an
agricultural land. It noted that the Rural Bank of Tacurong was situated at the heart of
the subject landholding; and that per photocopy of the Urban Land Use Plan as certified
by the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator, the said land was
already classified as commercial.12 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgement is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the herein complaint filed on June 17, 1991 barred by

prescription;
2. Complainant's claim for disturbance compensation is denied for lack of
merit;
3. Complainant's right to redeem the property is also denied for lack of
merit; and,
4. Other claims are likewise denied for lack of merit.

The DARAB Ruling

In its 13 April 2012 decision, the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's ruling. It
held that Leocadia's action was not barred by prescription because the filing of the
complaint with the BARC on 7 May 1991 tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Similarly, the DARAB opined that Pedral's affidavit declaring that he installed the
Spouses Terre as share tenants sufficiently proved the existence of tenancy
relationship. Citing Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844, it held that tenancy is attached to the
land regardless of whoever may have become the owner thereof. Thus, Leocadia's
status as a tenant was not extinguished by the successive transfers of ownership from
Pedral to Abis, and then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V. Lagon, as the latter
assumed the rights and obligations of the preceding transferors.

The CA Ruling

On March 23, 2015 decision, the CA affirmed in toto the DARAB's ruling. It held that
Leocadia was able to establish that she was the tenant of the subject landholding. Such
tenancy commenced in 1952 when Pedral, the original owner, installed her and Delfin
as share tenants. The appellate court espoused a similar view that the documents
Leocadia presented substantiated her claim of tenancy.

Considering that there was tenancy between Pedral and Leocadia, the CA decreed that
there was subrogation of rights to Abis, then to Gonzales, and finally to J.V. Lagon, as
landowners. The tenancy relationship was not terminated by changes of
ownership pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844.Likewise, the CA sustained the
DARAB's finding that, as a tenant, Leocadia was entitled to redeem the land consequent
to the lack of written notice of the sale.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 13, 2012 and the
Resolution dated September 13, 2012 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 14553 declaring Leocadia V da. De Terre
as bona fide tenant under Republic Act No. 3844 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

The Present Petition

In their comment, the heirs of Leocadia contend that there is no need to adduce
evidence to prove Leocadia's status as a bona fide tenant because tenancy is attached
to the land irrespective of whoever becomes its subsequent owner. Taking cue from the
DARAB's findings, they maintain that the filing of the complaint with the BARC on 7 May
1991 tolled the running of the prescriptive period. As a final point, the heirs of Leocadia
assert that she is entitled to redeem the landholding because the law speaks of written
notice of the sale and not actual or personal knowledge thereof.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN J.V. LAGON REALTY

AND LEOCADIA.

THE COURT'S RULING

There is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur: 1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner
and tenant or agricultural lessee.

All of the above requisites are indispensable in order to create or establish tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of at least one requisite does not make
the alleged tenant a de facto one, for the simple reason that unless an individual has
established one's status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
guaranteed by agricultural tenancy laws.

the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

Pedral's affidavit does not prove that there is tenancy between Leocadia and
J.V. Lagon.

Leocadia anchors her claim against J.V. Lagon on Section 10 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code which, in essence, states that the existence of an agricultural leasehold
relationship is not terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale or transfer of
legal possession.26 The fundamental theory of her case parlays the notion that she was
an agricultural lessee during the period of Abis' and Gonzales' respective ownership of
the land spanning from 1955-1988; such that at the time J.V. Lagon came into
possession, there was a subsisting tenancy which the latter assumed by operation of
law.

The evidence on record, however, is bereft of any affirmative and positive showing that
tenancy was maintained on the land throughout the three decades leading to J.V.
Lagon's acquisition in 1988.

Absence of harvest sharing belies claim of tenancy relationship.

In Landicho v. Sia,29 the Court declared that independent evidence, such as receipts,

must be presented to show that there was a sharing of the harvest between the
landowner and the tenant. Bejasa v. CA30 similarly held that to prove sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, as self-serving statements
are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be adduced. 31 In another case, the Court
ruled against the existence of tenancy for failure of the alleged tenant to substantiate
the element of sharing of harvest, viz:

Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context of a
tenancy relationship between Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence
submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests were the allegations of Vicente
which, as discussed above, were self-serving and have no evidentiary value. Moreover,
petitioner's allegations of continued possession and cultivation do not support his
cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized
under agrarian laws. It is essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he transmitted the landowner's
share of the harvest.32

The DARAB and the CA committed reversible error when they failed to notice that not a
single receipt or any other credible evidence was adduced to show sharing of harvest in
the context of tenancy. The record only contains the allegation that there is a 1/3-2/3
system of harvest sharing with Pedral, and 70-30 for Abis and Gonzales. 33 Substantial
evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere
scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the
element of sharing.34 As reiterated in VHJ Construction v. CA,35

Further to the lack of receipts, the record is likewise devoid of testimony from either
Pedral, Abis or Gonzales acknowledging the fact that they received a share in the
harvest of a tenant. In the absence of receipts or any concrete evidence from which it
can be inferred that Leocadia transmitted the landowner's share of her produce, the
Court is constrained to declare that not all elements of tenancy relationship are present.

The MARO's affidavit and the municipal mayor's certification do not prove
tenancy.

The Court's pronouncement in the foregoing cases applies with equal force to the
certification issued by the municipal mayor of Tacurong. Like the MARO's affidavit, the
municipal mayor's certification deserves scant consideration simply because the mayor
is not the proper authority 39 vested with the power to determine the existence of
tenancy. Besides, the MARO and the mayor merely affirmed the fact that Leocadia lived
in a hut erected on the subject landholding. 40 If we subscribe to the DARAB's fallacy,
then anyone who squats on an agricultural land or constructs a hut with the consent of
the owner becomes a tenant. It bears to stress that mere occupation or cultivation of
an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farmworker into an
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws.41

While tenancy presupposes physical presence of a tiller on the land, the MARO's
affidavit and the mayor's certification fall short in proving that Leocadia's presence
served the purpose of agricultural production and harvest sharing. Again, it cannot be
overemphasized that in order for a tenancy to arise, it is essential that all its
indispensable elements must be present.42

All told, the evidence on record is inadequate to arrive at a conclusion that Leocadia
was a de jure tenant entitled to security of tenure. The requisites for the existence of a
tenancy relationship are explicit in the law, and these elements cannot be done
away with by conjectures.

As a final word, the Court sees no more reason to belabor the other points raised by the
parties, particularly on the right of redemption and entitlement to disturbance
compensation. It is the juridical tie of tenancy relationship that breathes life to these
kindred rights provided for by our agricultural laws. There being no tenancy
relationship, the issues raised on these points have thus become moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed 23 March 2015 Decision and 29
July 2015 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 05331-MIN are
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DISMISSING the
complaint against petitioner J.V. Lagon Realty Corporation.