Asian Journal of Economics, Finance and Management

3(4): 18-33, 2021; Article no.AJEFM.403

Assessment of Telecom Industry in India – From

2007 to 2020
Aakash Agarwal1*, Kritika Sharma1 and Vignesh Ramanan1
1
Doon University, Mothrowala Road, Kedarpur, P.O. Ajabpur, Dehradun, Uttarakhand - 248001,
India.

Authors’ contributions

This work was carried out in collaboration among all authors. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.

Received 01 March 2021

Original Research Article Accepted 06 May 2021
Published 10 May 2021

ABSTRACT

The telecom industry in India underwent drastic changes over the past 13 years. It has gone from
being the darling of investors in 2007 to being among the most heavily indebted industries
in the country. This is a descriptive study that aims to analyse the past decade’s events to
understand the reasons behind the indebtedness of telecom operators and stress in the
industry. The study showed that the government regulations facilitated high levels of competition,
with over 16 operators in the industry at its height, which put pressure on the pricing power and
profitability of the operators. High reserve prices in spectrum auctions caused overbidding,
contributing significantly to the industry’s debt. Taxes and levies eroded the operators’ profit
margins. Coupled with the obligations of servicing the debt, it is no surprise that the industry was
under tremendous stress. The services of Reliance Jio offered at near free prices led to a wave of
consolidation in the industry. From over sixteen operators, the industry currently has four. The
current stability in the sector is fragile and any regulation or policy must be carefully measured
before implementation.

Keywords: Telecom; India; regulation; competition; telecom policy; Jio; debt; spectrum auctions.

1. INTRODUCTION substantially. However, the operating expenses

1.1 Overview
The nature of the telecom industry is such that
there are heavy sunk costs involved to build a
network, with further costs required to be
incurred only when the user base increases
are negligible. This implies that the marginal cost
of serving customers reduce with each additional
subscriber, subject to the limit of network
capacity. Thus, for operators to serve a
geographic region, they require a minimum
number of densities [1]. This is probably why the
opportunities in the rural market have not been

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

*Corresponding author: Email: aakashagrawal778@gmail.com;

 Agarwal et al.; AJEFM, 3(4): 18-33, 2021; Article no.AJEFM.403
adequately utilised [2]. Investments in telecom
infrastructure have positively affected economic
productivity and growth [3,4]. Considering its
strategic importance in national development and
security, the telecommunications is among the
handful of regulated sectors in India. The raw
material for wireless services, airwaves
(spectrum), is owned by the Government of India
and is managed by the Department of Telecom
(DoT). DoT is tasked with granting licences to
telecom operators and providing them with
spectrum usage rights.
1.2 Trajectory
In February 2007, telecom stocks provided
investors with the maximum returns, indicatingan
optimistic outlook of the industry as a whole [5],
with Vodafone entering the market by acquiring
Hutchison’s 67% stake in Hutchison Essar for $
11.72 billion [6]. The market was dominated
mainly by voice and SMS services. Almost all
major real estate companies had applied for a
telecom licence in 2007.
However, from being the darling of investors, the
industry’s trajectory over the next 13 years was
in stark contrast to the optimism shown by the
market. The sector was mired by controversial
political and regulatory actions such as the
spectrum allocation scandal, dubbed as the “2G
Scam,” which led to the cancellation of 122
licenses issued in 2008 [7]. A significant increase
in the industry debt levels and the erosion of
pricing power due to excessive competition led to
firms being under severe stress, with a wave of
consolidation hitting the industry by 2019.
This paper analyses the impact of government
policy and competition on the telecom industry
since 2007.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The initial licences (1995 to 2003) were bundled
with startup spectrum of two blocks of 4.4MHz
and 6.2 MHz, which could be increased to up to
two blocks of 12.5MHz based on the subscriber
base of the operators. Between 2003 and 2006,
the policy was tweaked such that the licences
would be issued for a fixed fee and spectrum
would be allotted on payment of the amount as
determined by the fourth-highest bid. There was
an operator holding limit of two blocks of 10MHz
for GSM and two blocks of 5MHz for CDMA
services. The global average of spectrum holding
per operator was two blocks of 20MHz for GSM
19
and two blocks of 15 MHz for CDMA services [1].
There are about three or four operators in most
countries [8]. Spectrum allocation policy is to be
well thought out keeping in mind the
characteristics and conditions of the industry and
nation. No spectrum auction design fits all
markets [9].
The opportunity cost of spectrum in the 2010
auctions was higher in the metro circles than in
other circles, indicating fierce competition to
obtain spectrum in strategically important
markets. Due to the allocation of only two blocks
of 5MHz each, mobile broadband has not taken
off in the country [10]. The reserve price set for
the 2010 3G auctions were significantly higher at
Rs. 3,540 crores ($ 0.48 billion) per MHz than
what should have been at Rs. 850 crores ($ 0.12
billion) [1]. When a government has undue
control over aspects of an industry, regulations
imposed directly impact the industry [11,12]. In
developing countries, operators are required to
serve large sections of the society who have a
lower propensity to pay than their developed-
nation peers. With a lack of wired infrastructure,
institutions and mechanisms must facilitate
spectrum sharing and trading [13].
According to Investopedia, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) is a market concentration
measure, which is the sum of squares of the
individual market shares of the firms in an
industry. The formula for the HHI is as follows:
2
HHI = ∑ si
th
where: si is the market share of the i firm
The determinants of profitability were noticed to
be using internal funds for future expansions and
the growth of operations [14].
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This is a descriptive study in which we have
adopted an explanatory approach to describe the
changes over the study period. The data
collected is longitudinal and is from secondary
sources. We have referred to data published by
TRAI and DoT, annual reports, published
literature, and news articles from reputed
sources. The missing values identified in the data
have been filled by using simple averages. INR
figures have been translated to USD using the
exchange rate as on January 3 2021, Rs. 73.14
per USD. The statistics of minutes of usage per
month per subscriber, outgo per subscriber per
 Agarwal et al.; AJEFM, 3(4): 18-33, 2021; Article no.AJEFM.403

month, and average revenue per user have been
averaged using the subscriber base of GSM and
CDMA users as the base. The figures have been
standardised to represent a percentage of the
total of individual items.
4. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.1 Government Regulation
Intervention
service using any technology over liberalised
spectrum purchased at an auction. This was a
positive step ahead of the previously restrictive
licences [19].
From the 2012 auction onwards, the government
provided the option of deferring the payment for
spectrum rights won, along with interest. This
and increased the borrowing costs of the operators
and negatively impacted their profitability.

4.1.1 Licencing and spectrum allocation
As mentioned before, DoT is the government
authority with the power to grant licences to
telecom operators and provide them with the
rights to use airwaves. In 2007, the government
decided to completely open up the telecom
sector and allow for as much competition as
possible. They had removed the previously
imposed cap on the number of operators
permitted per circle [15]. This generated
widespread interest, and in 2008, 120 licenses
were granted to sixteen operators [16]. Until
2007, spectrum was allotted based on licences
and specific technologies. Post-2010, all
airwaves were allotted by way of auctions. The
large number of operators coupled with a scarcity
of airwaves led to overbidding in the 3G auctions
held in 2010, garnering bids for over Rs. 1.06
trillion ($ 14.52 billion). This led to a considerable
increase in industry debt levels. The sustained
competition and scarcity of airwaves
underpinned the success of further airwave
auctions held by the Department of
Telecommunications [17]. The auction
mechanism ensured that India had the cheapest
call rates, and the airwaves are among the most
expensive in the world [18]. The government also
introduced a Unified Licence for which a one-
time fee of Rs. 1,650 crores ($ 0.23 billion) were
required to be paid. With these licences,
operators could provide any telecommunication
In 2014, trading of the liberalised spectrum was
permitted, and this opened up the opportunity for
operators to sell their underutilised spectrum with
other operators who faced a lack of spectrum,
thereby ensuring efficient utilisation of the
airwaves [20].
4.1.2 Revenue Share and other levies
The New Telecom Policy, 1999 provided for
operators to pay a proportion of their adjusted
gross revenues as license and spectrum usage
charges. The definition of AGR was a matter of
dispute between the operators and the
government. Adjusted gross revenues are the
gross revenue net of service taxes and
interconnection expenses. The point of conflict
was that telecom operators held that the gross
revenues should only include income from
telecommunications services for which the
license was granted, however, the government
contended that it should consist of all company
revenues, including non-core telecom revenues.
These levies in addition to service tax and
interconnection charges, ate up 17% to 45.58%
over the period from 2006 to 2020.
The 14-year legal battle over this was settled by
the Supreme Court, whose verdict required the
telecom companies to pay Rs. 1.20 lakh crores
($ 16.41 billion) in annual dues, penalty and
interest [21].

Table 1. Spectrum auction proceeds

Year Bid (in cr) Upfront (in cr) Deferred (in cr)
2010 1 06 262.26 1 06 262.26 .00
2012 9 407.64 5 572.22 3 835.42
2013 3 639.48 1 626.32 2 013.16
2014 60 677.36 18 267.19 42 410.17
2015 1 09 227.78 32 377.85 76 849.93
2016 65 789.12 32 434.10 33 355.02
Cumulative 3 55 003.64 1 96 539.94 1 58 463.70
Source: Department of Telecommunications

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Table 2. Licence Fee and Spectrum Usage Charges as percentage of Gross Revenues

Year Service tax and interconnection Licence Spectrum usage Total

charges Fees charges Charges
2006-07 6.99% 7.76% 2.25% 17.00%
2007-08 21.42% 6.48% 2.09% 29.99%
2008-09 25.83% 6.30% 2.09% 34.21%
2009-10 24.72% 6.30% 2.26% 33.28%
2010-11 29.21% 5.84% 2.24% 37.29%
2011-12 31.14% 5.71% 2.48% 39.33%
2012-13 33.49% 5.45% 2.45% 41.39%
2013-14 32.40% 5.41% 2.62% 40.43%
2014-15 30.90% 5.53% 2.72% 39.15%
2015-16 28.84% 5.70% 2.88% 37.42%
2016-17 30.67% 5.62% 2.56% 38.85%
2017-18 38.78% 4.93% 1.87% 45.58%
2018-19 38.11% 4.96% 1.79% 44.86%
2019-20 35.81% 5.14% 1.94% 42.90%
2020-21 38.05% 4.95% 1.76% 44.76%
Source: TRAI Data

4.1.3 Cash flow pressure and insolvency
proceedings
The method of spectrum allocation followed by
the Indian government has been criticised by
industry leaders and analysts several times over
the year. They contended that the government
focused on maximising revenues by setting
astronomical base prices for spectrum auctions
[10,22,1]. Bharti Airtel’s Sunil Mittal commented
that the practice of auctioning spectrum and then
charging a spectrum usage fee was like selling
an asset and then collecting rent on it [23].
Through auctions alone, conducted between
2012 to 2016, telecom operators racked up a
debt of Rs. 1.58 lakh crores ($ 21.67 billion) as
deferred dues on which operators had to pay
interest to the government. The amount of
upfront payment of Rs. 1.97 lakh crores ($ 26.87
billion) made to the government for spectrum
rights in auctions from 2010 to 2016 made a
significant contribution to the Rs. 4.6 lakh crores
($ 62.89 billion) of debt on the books of the
telecom operators in 2018 [24].
dues led to concerns over the viability of
Vodafone Idea, which abated only when further
fusion of funds was announced [27]. The industry
has now stabilised with four operators serving
the populace. However, this is only fragile
because there is no evidence that the future
auction reserve prices will be similar to those of
2016 [28].
The bankruptcy proceedings of Aircel and
Reliance Communications had reached a
conclusion when the National Company Law
Tribunal approved bids of reconstruction
company UVARC. However, the proceedings
were halted due to bickering among the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs and the Ministry of
Telecommunications over the sale of spectrum
rights of the companies. This has stopped the
recoveries of $5.7 billion [29], ultimately
defetingthe purpose of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which aims to resolve
corporate insolvencies in a time-bound manner
to boost the confidence of creditors and increase
the availability of credit.

In a price-sensitive market, indirect taxes serve 4.2 Competition

as a drag on the profits of companies. Telecom
in India, although an essential service for the
development of a nation, is heavily taxed. The
revenues are subjected to GST (previously
service tax), licence fees, and spectrum usage
charges, in addition to customs and income tax.
Airtel’s Sunil Mittal in 2018, and Vodafone Idea
CEO Balesh Sharma in 2019, mentioned that the
telecom sector is taxed as heavily as the tobacco
or liquor industries [25,26]. The demand for AGR
4.2.1 2008 to 2016
This period saw seventeen players providing
services in cellular services using either GSM or
CDMA technology, with the maximum number of
licensed cellular operators reaching 15 between
financial years 2009-10 and 2011-12. The
dominant technology in the industry was GSM
which commanded a market share of over 70%

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throughout the entire period, as per data from
TRAI. Fig. 1 shows the market share by GSM
and CDMA users.
It is to be noted that the level of concentration in
the industry was not straight forward. Market
share of each company was measured based on
Subscriber share and AGR. AGR reported is the
amount of revenue earned by operators from
telecommunications operations net of indirect
taxes and interconnection charges. Thus, it can
be said that it is the pure topline made from
telecommunication operations. We observed a
considerable difference in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index during the period. The average
HHI based on AGR was 0.3387, which indicates
high concentration; the same based on
subscriber count, was 0.1445, depicting a
reasonably competitive market.

GSM CDMA
Market Share

Period

Fig. 1. Market Share of GSM and CDMA based on Number of Subscribers

Source: TRAI Data (Refer to Appendix 1)

0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
HHI

0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0

Quarter

Revenue Subscriber Count

Fig. 2. Market Concentration between Q4 08-09 and Q2 16-17

Source: TRAI Data (Refer to Appendix 2)

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The average HHI of 0.1445 was because the
subscriber base was divided relatively equal
among the industry. The large players throughout
the period were Airtel and Vodafone,
commanding a consistent subscriber base of
19% to 24% and 15% to 19%, respectively.
Reliance Communications had a market share of
17% during the fourth quarter of 2008-09 and lost
ground to end up at 9.57% by the first quarter of
2016-17. Similarly, BSNL lost, and Idea gained
ground during the same period with their
subscriber base from 19.01% to 9.73% and
9.05% to 16.59%, respectively. Aircel, Tata
Communications and the Indian arm of Telenor
were medium-sized players consistently
throughout the period.
The average HHI of 0.3387 was because, unlike
the subscriber base, the AGR was not divided
fairly equal among the industry. As opposed to
four or five large players based on subscriber
base, there were three large players each of
whom had over 16% of the market size by
revenue. Airtel and Vodafone were consistently
large, with Vodafone increasing their market
share from 16.43% to 20.06% during the period,
while Airtel held its own with a fairly consistent
average market share of 28.79%. BSNL lost out
on its market share from a dominant 23.58% in
the fourth quarter of 2008-09 to a middling 6.98%
in the first quarter of 2016-17. Idea Cellular
gained market share during the period from
09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13
Aircel Airtel
BSNL Etisalat DB
Idea MTNL
S Tel Spice
TATA Unitech/Telewings/Telenor
Vodafone
Fig. 3. Market share of operators based on subscriber count
Source: TRAI Data
23
8.92% to 17.38%. The changes to AGR during
the period are shown in Fig. 3.
The major players based on AGR – Airtel, Idea,
and Vodafone, had a significant share of the
subscriber base. This indicates a situation where
the smaller players were charging lower prices to
gain a higher subscriber share. Several
executives and experts in the media had
addressed this situation as a “price war”. The
price war led to erosion of earnings for the
overall industry, as is evident by the trend of
ARPU. Although the number of subscribers
increased, the average revenue earned declined
during the period. This was due to a decline in
the price charged to the customers per minute
(average outgo per minute).
As can be seen in Fig. 5, despite an increase in
the overall subscriber base and relative stability
in the minutes of usage per subscriber, the
ARPU and average outgo per minute fell from
Rs. 272.82 ($3.73) per user and Rs. 1.04
($0.0146) per minute in the first quarter of 2007-
08 to Rs. 124.10 ($1.70) per user and Rs. 0.48
($0.0066) per minute in the last quarter of 2015-
16. Due to capital input, the declining
fundamentals of the industry, coupled with high
debt service costs, put cash flow pressures on
the companies. The intense competition to gain a
higher share of the subscriber base and all the
players’ delicate cash flow situation meant that
13-14 14-15 15-16
BPL/Loop
HFCL/Quadrant
RCOM
SSTL
Videocon
 Agarwal et al.; AJEFM, 3(4): 18-33, 2021; Article no.AJEFM.403

09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16

Aircel Airtel BPL/Loop

BSNL Etisalat DB HFCL/Quadrant
Idea MTNL RCOM
S Tel Spice SSTL
TATA Unitech/Telewings/Telenor Videocon
Vodafone

Fig. 4. Market share of operators based on AGR

Source: TRAI Data

Subscriber Base ARPU MoU Outgo PM

Fig. 5. Per User Trends between 2007-08 to 2015-16

Source: TRAI Data (Refer to Appendix 3)

the industry was ripe for consolidation. However,
only four operators exited the industry during this
period – operations of Spice Telecom were
merged with Idea Cellular. Etisalat DB and S-Tel
called it quits after the Honourable Supreme
Court cancelled all the telecom licenses issued to
it on the grounds of graft, and Loop’s assets and
operations were acquired by Airtel [30,31].
Further consolidation in the industry came after
the resilient mid-sized and small-sized operators
caved under the pressure of a behemoth of an
upstart, Jio Infocomm (Previously Reliance Jio
Infocomm).
4.2.2 2016 to 2020
In February 2016, Reliance Industries Ltd (RIL)
was India’s most profitable country and was
th
ranked 215 on the Fortune Global 500 list [32].
RIL, in 2013, controlled Infotel Broadband

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Services Ltd paid Rs. 1,658 crores towards
obtaining a unified licence to enable them to
provide cellular services on any liberalised
spectrum [33]. This marked the beginning of the
disruptive behemoth, Jio Infocomm (Jio). In the
financial years 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17
(till September 2016), Jio spent Rs. 1.12 lakh
crores ($ 15.37 billion) on developing and
deploying Fourth Generation cellular services
technology, and committed to pay Rs. 65,553
crores ($8.96 billion) for acquiring spectrum
rights. Extract from the balance sheets of Jio is
as follows Table 3.
On December 27 2015, Jio’s 4G services were
officially unveiled to the world. The company
opted to provide voice calls over IP, which would
drastically bring down the cost of providing
services. As mentioned before, the nature of the
telecom industry is such that even a previously
net-debt free entity like RIL had a total debt of
Rs. 1.6 lakh crores ($21.88 billion) against cash
and cash equivalents of Rs. 84,472 crores
($11.55 billion) [34]. On September 2, 2016, the
pricing of services was revealed to the public. It
was revealed that Jio would offer 1GB of 4G data
at Rs. 50 ($0.68) and voice calls will be free for a
lifetime [35]. Not only were the significant
investments in technology and spectrum rights
backed by the cash-rich RIL, but the launch
pricing was also fueled by the cash generated by
the refining operations of RIL. The competitors of

Table 3. Non-Current Assets and Liabilities of Jio (all figures in crores rupees)

Particulars 2014- 2015- 2016- 2017- 2018- 2019-

15 16 17 18 19 20
Non-Current Assets
Property, Plant and Equipment 882 937 972 95 769 74 633 1 02
864
Capital Work in Progress 33 701 64 687 1 12 61 025 30 965 21 176
424
Intangible Assets 4 3 2 59 760 59 367 60 563
Intangible Assets under Development 26 595 41 385 65 553 8 962 3 643 82
Non - Current Liabilities
Borrowings 18 691 30 067 38 436 35 192 65 613 0
Deferred Payment Liabilities towards 7 388 13 821 20 137 20 209 18 839 18 839
Spectrum
Source: Company Annual Reports

16-1716-1716-1716-1717-1817-1817-1817-1818-1918-19 18-1918-1919-2019-2019-2019-20
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Subscriber Base ARPU MoU Outgo PM

Fig. 6. Per User Trends between 2015-16 to 2019-20

Source: TRAI Data (Refer to Appendix 3)

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Jio criticised them for subsidising the prices with
oil money in a bid to capture market share.
However, the true disruption lay in the approach
of RIL. The launch of Jio was accompanied by a
push in the development of Reliance Retail and a
suite of entertainment and utility apps. The
telecom venture was, in essence, a data highway
connecting the masses to the internet, and it was
the services provided over the internet that would
be monetised [36].

35.00%

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%
16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20

Aircel Airtel BSNL

HFCL/Quadrant Idea Jio
MTNL RCOM SSTL
TATA Unitech/Telewings/Telenor VI
Videocon Vodafone

Fig. 7. Market share of operators based on subscriber count

Source: TRAI Data

45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00% 16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20
Aircel Airtel BPL/Loop
BSNL Etisalat DB HFCL/Quadrant
Idea Jio MTNL
RCOM S Tel Spice
SSTL TATA Unitech/Telewings/Telenor
VI Videocon Vodafone

Fig. 8. Market share of operators based on AGR

Source: TRAI Data

26

0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
HHI
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
16-17 16-17 17-18 17-18 17-18 17-18 18-19 18-19 18-19 18-19 19-20 19-20 19-20 19-20
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Fig. 9. Market Concentration between Q3 16-17 to Q4 19-20
Source: TRAI Data (Refer to Appendix 2)
Close to 70% of the telecom sector’s revenues
were from voice calls which were now being
offered for free. The Jio approach proved to be
the driving force behind the consolidation the
industry saw during the two years from
September 2016 [37]. The operations and
spectrum rights of Tata Communications and
Telenor were acquired by Airtel, and Idea and
Vodafone merged to form a new entity –
Vodafone Idea. Reliance Communications
attempted a 3-way merger with Sistema and
Aircel. However, could only merge the operations
of Sistema. Subsequently, Videocon, Aircel and
Reliance Communications filed for bankruptcy
and are currently in the middle of bankruptcy
proceedings [38].
After the wave of consolidation, the market in
2019-20 has four prominent players – Jio, Airtel,
Vodafone Idea, and BSNL. They serve 98.99%
of the telecom subscriber base (Fig. 7), with the
remainder 1.01% being served by MTNL, Tata
Communications and Reliance Communications
(the latter two being enterprise services). These
four players have 96.41% of the industry AGR.
The consolidation led to a change in pricing
power, as the convergence can be seen in Fig. 9.
All operators have similar levels of pricing per
subscriber. In the third quarter of 2018-19, the
HHI based on revenue was 0.2753 and based on
subscriber base was 0.2715.
Agarwal et al.; AJEFM, 3(4): 18-33, 2021; Article no.AJEFM.403
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Quarter
5. CONCLUSION
Although the final nail in the coffin was the
launch of Jio, which changed the rules of the
game, it must be understood that the government
policies contributed significantly to the inability of
the incumbents to react to the pricing strategy of
Jio. The government regulations permitted
several operators to enter the market, set high
reserve prices at spectrum auctions, and heavily
taxed the industry. The ensuing wave of
consolidation managed to bring the amount of
competition to be in line with other countries ie.
3-4 operators in a country. The introduction of
unified licences and the liberalisation of
spectrum purchased in an auction, revamped the
licence system and done away with business-
specific or technology-specific licences
previously issued.
The spectrum management policy of the
government is a lingering matter of concern. The
fragile stability in the industry can be easily
undone if the reserve prices in future auctions
are kept at expensive levels as has been the
practice till now. Considering the importance of
the industry on the development of the country, it
is advisable that the government not indulge in
the practice of selling spectrum rights at high
prices and then collecting rent on it as revenue
share.
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APPENDIX

1. Market Share of GSM and CDMA Services

Period GSM CDMA

07-08 Q1 73.43% 26.57%
07-08 Q2 73.65% 26.35%
07-08 Q3 73.72% 26.28%
07-08 Q4 73.81% 26.19%
08-09 Q1 74.08% 25.92%
08-09 Q2 74.11% 25.89%
08-09 Q3 74.44% 25.56%
08-09 Q4 75.88% 24.12%
09-10 Q1 76.96% 23.04%
09-10 Q2 78.56% 21.44%
09-10 Q3 80.29% 19.71%
09-10 Q4 81.92% 18.08%
10-11 Q1 83.02% 16.98%
10-11 Q2 84.12% 15.88%
10-11 Q3 85.31% 14.69%
10-11 Q4 86.05% 13.95%
11-12 Q1 86.57% 13.43%
11-12 Q2 87.13% 12.87%
11-12 Q3 87.93% 12.07%
11-12 Q4 88.56% 11.44%
12-13 Q1 89.05% 10.95%
12-13 Q2 89.21% 10.79%
12-13 Q3 91.01% 8.99%
12-13 Q4 91.50% 8.50%
13-14 Q1 91.84% 8.16%
13-14 Q2 92.77% 7.23%
13-14 Q3 92.98% 7.02%
13-14 Q4 93.69% 6.31%
14-15 Q1 93.93% 6.07%
14-15 Q2 94.19% 5.81%
14-15 Q3 94.37% 5.63%
14-15 Q4 94.62% 5.38%
15-16 Q1 94.91% 5.09%
15-16 Q2 95.17% 4.83%

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2. Market Concentration based on HHI

Period HHI Based on

Revenue Subscriber Count
08-09 Q4 0.3172 0.1594
09-10 Q1 0.3188 0.1585
09-10 Q2 0.3774 0.1572
09-10 Q3 0.3171 0.1536
09-10 Q4 0.3230 0.1498
10-11 Q1 0.3211 0.1469
10-11 Q2 0.3214 0.1429
10-11 Q3 0.3253 0.1387
10-11 Q4 0.3274 0.1371
11-12 Q1 0.3217 0.1359
11-12 Q2 0.3219 0.1356
11-12 Q3 0.3269 0.1344
11-12 Q4 0.3341 0.1335
12-13 Q1 0.3321 0.1347
12-13 Q2 0.3329 0.1349
12-13 Q3 0.3384 0.1359
12-13 Q4 0.3467 0.1407
13-14 Q1 0.3468 0.1429
13-14 Q2 0.3419 0.1432
13-14 Q3 0.3413 0.1436
13-14 Q4 0.3466 0.1441
14-15 Q1 0.3483 0.1443
14-15 Q2 0.3500 0.1443
14-15 Q3 0.3593 0.1454
14-15 Q4 0.3526 0.1467
15-16 Q1 0.3591 0.1478
15-16 Q2 0.3576 0.1483
15-16 Q3 0.3601 0.1501
15-16 Q4 0.3591 0.1516
16-17 Q1 0.3342 0.1539
16-17 Q2 0.3527 0.1541
16-17 Q3 0.3706 0.1451
16-17 Q4 0.3975 0.1427
17-18 Q1 0.4036 0.1448
17-18 Q2 0.3305 0.1451
17-18 Q3 0.3371 0.1548
17-18 Q4 0.3668 0.1680
18-19 Q1 0.3520 0.2040
18-19 Q2 0.2638 0.1904
18-19 Q3 0.2753 0.2715
18-19 Q4 0.2788 0.2687
19-20 Q1 0.2739 0.2689
19-20 Q2 0.2938 0.2736
19-20 Q3 0.2965 0.2729
19-20 Q4 0.2881 0.2736

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3. Per user Trends

Quarter Total Subscriber Base Average Revenue Minutes of Average Outgo Per
(mn) per User Usage Minute
07-08 Q1 184.92 272.82 472.28 1.04
07-08 Q2 209.07 248.13 449.09 0.95
07-08 Q3 233.62 238.66 440.61 0.95
07-08 Q4 261.07 236.50 462.10 0.89
08-09 Q1 286.87 213.08 465.86 0.80
08-09 Q2 315.31 195.37 455.77 0.76
08-09 Q3 346.89 192.14 463.80 0.74
08-09 Q4 391.76 179.43 453.37 0.71
09-10 Q1 427.29 163.57 428.19 0.70
09-10 Q2 471.72 147.92 398.35 0.68
09-10 Q3 525.09 131.78 392.67 0.62
09-10 Q4 584.32 121.06 391.38 0.56
10-11 Q1 635.5 113.85 383.68 0.54
10-11 Q2 687.71 104.12 354.50 0.54
10-11 Q3 752.19 99.57 346.78 0.51
10-11 Q4 811.59 95.26 337.00 0.50
11-12 Q1 851.69 93.43 329.77 0.50
11-12 Q2 873.62 90.17 318.00 0.50
11-12 Q3 893.85 93.22 319.21 0.51
11-12 Q4 919.17 94.48 332.62 0.49
12-13 Q1 934.1 92.81 333.19 0.48
12-13 Q2 906.62 93.17 329.38 0.48
12-13 Q3 864.72 96.38 347.40 0.47
12-13 Q4 867.81 104.15 373.82 0.48
13-14 Q1 873.36 109.94 379.03 0.49
13-14 Q2 870.59 108.21 366.83 0.51
13-14 Q3 886.3 111.44 371.49 0.51
13-14 Q4 904.51 113.43 381.80 0.50
14-15 Q1 914.92 118.57 383.50 0.51
14-15 Q2 930.2 115.65 369.67 0.50
14-15 Q3 943.97 117.49 369.58 0.51
14-15 Q4 969.89 119.35 376.65 0.50
15-16 Q1 980.81 125.03 381.64 0.49
15-16 Q2 996.66 121.23 368.30 0.48
15-16 Q3 1010.89 122.07 370.25 0.47
15-16 Q4 1033.63 124.10 375.84 0.48
16-17 Q1 1035.12 125.00 371.46 0.49
16-17 Q2 1049.74 121.53 364.43 0.48
16-17 Q3 1127.37 104.49 358.60 0.44
16-17 Q4 1170.18 83.52 403.32 0.31
17-18 Q1 1186.84 80.39 426.39 0.27
17-18 Q2 1183.04 84.33 435.16 0.23
17-18 Q3 1167.44 79.14 493.28 0.19
17-18 Q4 1183.41 76.01 582.10 0.16
18-19 Q1 1146.5 68.89 606.45 0.18
18-19 Q2 1169.29 67.00 627.00 0.12
18-19 Q3 1176 70.00 667.00 0.11
18-19 Q4 1161.81 71.00 692.00 0.13
19-20 Q1 1165.46 74.00 701.00 0.13
19-20 Q2 1173.75 74.00 691.00 0.13
19-20 Q3 1151.44 79.00 712.00 0.11
19-20 Q4 1157.75 91.00 750.00 0.06
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