There are no sufficient conditions, no non-aesthetic features

such that the presence of some set or number of them will beyond
question justify or warrant the application of an aesthetic term. (426)

Accordingly, when a word or expression is such that taste or

Description/ perceptiveness is required in order to apply it, I shall call it an aesthetic
Features term or expression, and I shall, correspondingly, speak of aesthetic
concepts or taste concepts (421)

In short, aesthetic words apply ultimately because of, and aesthetic

qualities ultimately depend upon, the presence of features which,
like curving or angular lines, color contrasts, placing of masses,
or speed of movement, are visible, audible, or otherwise discernible
without any exercise of taste or sensibility. (424)

unified
balanced
integrated
lifeless
serene
somber
dynamic
powerful
vivid
moving
trite
sentimental
tragic
telling contrast
sets up a tension
Sibley (1959) Expressions/ attributions conveys a sense of
Aesthetic Concepts Non-classified holds it together
violent
grand
fiery
massive
flaccid
weakly
washed out
lanky
anaemic
wan
insipid
joyous
fiery
robust
strident

graceful
delicate
handsome
comely
function only or predominantly elegant
as aesthetic terms garish
lovely
pretty
beautiful,
dainty

dynamic
melancholy
metaphorical transference:
balanced
Terms except in artistic and critical writings,
tightly-knit
are not normally aesthetic terms
taut
gay

red
noisy
brackish
clammy
square
docile
seldom used as
curved
aesthetic terms at all
evanescent
intelligent
faithful
derelict
tardy
freakish
 judgments about the shape, color, sound, wording,
subject matter, or composition of things, including works of art, are
such that it would be ludicrous to suggest that aesthetic sensitivity,
perceptiveness, or taste had been exhibited in making them.
Similarly, it would be ridiculous to suggest that aesthetic sensitivity
was required to see or notice or otherwise perceive that something
is, say, large, circular, green, slow, or monosyllabic.
Description/Features
relationships between aesthetic
and nonaesthetic properties
Exactly what these
general relationships are
often remains clouded;
certainly a common assumption,
sometimes explicit, is that
they are empirical and contingent
(46)
Sibley (1965)
Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic
non-aesthetic
Judgments aesthetic
verdicts
purely evaluative judgments
Accordingly, I speak of
nonaesthetic judgments, qualities,
descriptions, and concepts.
'aesthetic judgement' := "Where there is no question of aesthetic perception,
judgment where it is used a I shall use some other expression like 'attribution of
aesthetic perception (non quote) aesthetic quality' or 'aesthetic statement'. (35)
Although a thing's aesthetic character is dependent
(i) Aesthetic qualities are dependent upon non-aesthetic ones for their existence. (35) on and results from its non-aesthetic features, in
general there are no sets of non-aesthetic features
that are logically sufficient for it to have a certain
(ii) The non-aesthetic qualities of a thing determine its aesthetic qualities. aesthetic quality. (46)
Aesthetic qualities are 'emergent'.
(iii) In addition to being able to state the general truth that aesthetic qualities
depend on and result from non-aesthetic characteristics, we can state
particular truths about individual objects—for example, that these particular
non-aesthetic qualities of this object (described as fully as one wishes) give it
some aesthetic property rather than none, and that what they give it is, say,
grace or balance.
The particular aesthetic character of something may be said to result
from the totality of its relevant non-aesthetic characteristics. explanation The person to whom the reasons are offered may,
This third relationship might therefore appropriately critics activities after reviewing them, conclude or infer or decide that
be called the relation of total specific dependence. support of an aesthetic judgement the judgement is indeed correct or justified.
helping people to see and judge for themselves that
(iv) what the critic is doing is selecting from a work those features which are things have those qualities
notably or especially responsible for its character. For often in a work there are
some features that strike us as making the most outstanding contribution, usually
those in which a small alteration would work a remarkable aesthetic change. This
fourth relationship might therefore be called that of notable specific dependence;
statements of such relationships bulk large in criticism
it's not pale enough
there are too many characters
a concentration of blues and greys as responsible
wavy lines
change in key
quietness
slowness
speed
bright colours
curving lines
low pitch
pauses
tailing
intervals
minor key
rapid sequences of short notes
squarish
grinning
Aesthetic terms
graceful
dainty
garlish
balanced
moving
powerful
serene
Aesthetic qualities
grace (of a work)
unity (of a work)
plaintiveness (in the music)
frenzy (in the music)
gaudiness (of colour scheme)
power (of a novel)
mood (of a novel)
uncertainty of tone (of a novel)
restless
sombre or indecisive character
See, notice, hear, feel...
sadness
solemnity
gaiety
excitement
garishness
gaudiness
sprightliness
majesty
pensiveness
serenity
aesthetcally good/bad
excellent
mediocre
superior
inferior
 the question of what distinguishes aesthetic from, e.g.,
moral, predicates is a question of what constitutes the
goodness of a work of art, that is, what predicates are
relevant to a judgment of the value of a work of art, what
they are: they are predicates that describe are the aesthetic virtues. (54)
Description
the perceptual qualities of an entity in a
/Features necessarily value-tending way. (54)
Value-tending. That is, it is impossible to use these
predicates to describe a thing without the description counting for
or against praise or dispraise of the thing described (except by an
explicit disclaimer). Their primary function in the language, in other
words, is to have both descriptive and emotive meaning of equal
import. (53)

Freedman (1968)
The Myth of the Aesthetic Predicate
A-Predicates:
square
descriptive
large
condition-governed
dominated by the color mid-night blue
more cognitive content
is a landscape
can support descriptions in terms of B-predicates

clumsy
graceful
B-predicates:
gloomy
descriptive
serene
Predicates not condition-governed
eerie,
less cognitive content
garish
can support descriptions in terms of C-predicates
balanced
tightly-organized

beautiful
ugly
C-predicates:
good
evaluative
poor
even less cognitive content (51)
excellent
fair
 A[esthetic]-qualities are not only dependent, but
infra-dependent, qualities — i.e., that an A-quality
depends on qualities that occupy a spatial or temporal
region lying within its own region, rather than
being coextensive with it. (339)

Every A-quality has a set of sufficient conditions

(and many of them have several, partly overlapping,
sets of sufficient conditions), such that if one condition infra-dependent A-qualities necessarily belong to different
is removed, and others preserved, the set will no longer regions from the NA-qualities with which they are
be sufficient. (341) "associated", and it seems to me at least prima facie
Description implausible to suppose a conceptual connection between two
/Features qualities that have different locations. (345)
Sibley has qualified his thesis by admitting certain "conceptual relationships"
between A-predicates and NA-predicates, whereas I believe there are none. (343)
The NA-qualities within the region of an A-quality are either irrelevant or
relevant (i.e., have an influence, pro or con, upon the presence of the
my position is that unless A-predicates are primarily presence of the A-quality). The irrelevant ones certainly are not
descriptive (however much they may lend themselves to conceptually connected with the A-quality. And the relevant ones are
normative uses), A-attributions could not fulfill their causally related to it, since they are qualities on which it depends — or on
function of serving as verifiable reasons in support of whose suppression it depends. And the causal relation must be contingent:
aesthetic evaluations no NA-quality on which an A-quality depends can be conceptually
connected with it. (346)
Beardsley (1974)
The Descriptivist Account of Aesthetic Attributions It is absurd to say that the reason why the refrigerator is
so cold is that we have built a fire under it, or that the reason
why a plant grows so well is that is is never watered — but
legato surely it is not conceptual analysis, but experience, that shows
portentousness us the absurdity. (346)
angularity
sarcasm
engagingness
ramshackle grace
coffeehouse simplicity
waywardness
grace
Qualities
swaggering
dynamic visual
vital
engaging
sadness
ominous
lively
melancholy
triumphant
 We cannot make a list of aesthetic terms because aesthetic terms are not a
distinct subgroup of the terms in ordinary language; rather, they are
terms in ordinary language which at times and in certain contexts
we call "aesthetic." (At least many of them are, although there may
be some terms in ordinary language that are always and
only "aesthetic" terms.) (198)

Description
/Features Aesthetic terms, then, are those that, characteristically, occur in
descriptions which seem to be ends rather than beginnings. They are
not, as many seem to think, terms that we call supply no logically
compelling criteria for applying. But they are terms that do not
provide the reasons for anything else. And the fact that aesthetic
descriptions are "terminal," that they lead nowhere, distinguishes
them sharply from moral descriptions, which often are preludes to
Kivy (1975) action. To conclude that a course of action is right is to provide some
reason for pursuing that course of action in the future. (221)
What Makes ‘Aesthetic’ Terms Aesthetic?
"unified"
Aesthetic terms "vibrant"
"sublime"

"great"
"terrific"
Terms Evaluative terms
"lousy"
"marvelous"

"short"
"paint-on-canvas"
Nonaesthetic terms
"yellow"
"heavy"
 To say that an object is beautiful or ugly is seemingly to refer
to a property of the object. But it is also to express a positive
or negative response to it, a set of aesthetic values, and to
suggest that others ought to respond in the same way. Such judgments
are descriptive, expressive, and normative or prescriptive at
once. (23)
If certain relations add value to the elements in artworks that they connect,
why can these value creating transformations themselves not be lawlike,
hence expressed in aesthetic principles? The answer here lies in
irreconcilable differences in taste. (34) [ANTI-REALISM]

Description/Features Beauty is a relatively nonspecific or broadly evaluative relational

property, in that its ascription leaves unspecified how the object is
such as to elicit this positive response in suitable observers. This,
together with the requirement that critics not base their judgments
on aesthetically irrelevant properties, implies that beauty must supervene
on other properties.(23)

The fact that evaluative properties are always supervenient on others, however, Those qualities on which beauty and artistic merit most immediately
implies that there must be some nonevaluative properties on which they ultimately supervene are themselves aesthetic and, at least in part, evaluative.
supervene, and hence some fact/value distinction that can be recognized. Its
recognition generates a [minimal] constraint on rational evaluators- that the presence of all
the same nonevaluative properties on different occasions must elicit the same The middle-level evaluative aesthetic qualities that I have been
aesthetic evaluations. (26) describing provide reasons for judgments of artistic merit or beauty. (25)
Goldman (1990)
Aesthetic Qualities and Aesthetic Value
phenomenal properties, those which appear in tones (in musical pieces)
perceptual experiences, and relations among colored patches (in paintings)
phenomenal properties. elements lines (in paintings)
surfaces (of sculptures)
Basic chunks (of sculptures)
(non-evaluative aesthetic qualities)

contrasts
variations
repetitions
structural,
similarities
Aesthetic expressive,
blendings
Qualities and historical
attractions
relations
repulsions
elements are transformed by the relations tensions
into which they enter, and so do not resolutions
themselves always count in the same
(lawlike) way toward the value of works in
which they are found. (34)
graceful refers to
balanced
dynamic
relational tightly knit
balanced
harmonious

powerful
soaring
sad
Evaluative expressive
tense
somber
cheerful

original
relations of properties in
innovative
artworks to earlier artworks
conservative
that define a tradition.
daring
 substantive descriptions have no evaluative content whatsoever; but
when we use substantive descriptions —such as 'graceful', 'delicate', 'garish'
or 'awkward' —we conversationally imply an evaluation. So evaluation is not
part of the content or sense of the judgement. Instead, we infer that the person
making the judgement also makes the evaluative judgement from the use of
Description the language in a context. (322)
/Features

Aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic properties. But also, within the

aesthetic, verdictive properties depend on substantive aesthetic properties. [...]
Something which is beautiful, cannotbe barely beautiful. It must be beautiful
because it has various substantive properties. (325)

Zangwill (1995)
The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the Dumpy

verdictive to the effect that things are beautiful

beauty (1st sense)
or ugly, or that they have or lack terms
(evaluative) ugly
aesthetic merit or value

Judgments
delicate
metaphorical balanced
metaphorically use
aesthetic descriptions warm
passionate
substantive

beautiful (2nd sense)

dainty
distinctly dumpy
Non-metaphorically use
aesthetic terms graceful
elegant
garish

brooding
awkward
sad
Non-classified evocative
robust
vibrant
exquisitely designed
 Aesthetic attributions to works of art, and the terms used to effect such attributions,
are largely descriptive; that is to say, they are based on, and obliquely
testify to the occurrence of, certain looks, impressions, or appearances which
emerge out of lower-order perceptual properties. Insofar as an aesthetic attribution
Description/Features is intended as objective, that is, as the attribution of a property of intersubjective
import, such looks or impressions or appearances are relativized to
a perceiver who views a work correctly, and thus approaches the condition
of what has been called, following Hume, a true critic or ideal judge.

‘striking’
‘splendid’
Levinson (2006) Solely evaluative terms
‘excellent’
‘mediocre’
Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force, ‘miserable’
and Differences of Sensibility ‘execrable’

‘balanced’
formal ‘chaotic’
‘unified’

‘melancholy’
‘anguished’
expressive
‘cheerful’
‘sorrowful’*
Evaluative + descriptive
Terms (substantive aesthetic terms)
‘delicate’
‘steely’
Metaphorical but
‘brittle’
non-psychological
‘serene’*
‘passionate’*

‘graceful’
Natively aesthetic ‘gaudy’
‘garish’

‘gaudy’
descriptive terms (merit-terms)
‘maudlin’
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