CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

SEPARATION OF POWERS

1. G.R. No. 196231               January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, 

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ,
AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner, 
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY.
CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR
CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG
LEGAL AFFAIRS,Respondents.

FACTS:

On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police
Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila
Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.
On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative
charge for grave misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO
against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement
Officers (MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his
office. The Office of the Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24,
2008.6 Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with his Order.7

Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to
substantiate his allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the
dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure
to prosecute.

On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales
forwarded the entire records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her
review.10In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’
recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration12 on
November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records
to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December
14, 2009, the case was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis
Garcia for review and recommendation.

GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for
appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to
Gonzales’ office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together
with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman.
On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case,
Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour
assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully
resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several
others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the
incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales
accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against
Mendoza."17 The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve
Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx
"precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended the referral of its
findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross
Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in
Office.

b. The OP ruling

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the
service.21According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of
[Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx
amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the
Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure."

c. The Petition
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on
April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and
transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on
Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and
approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted
on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action of the President is valid or not?

RULING:

Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a motion for
reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a
serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity
or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority
to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling
on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words,
since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on
the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the
constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.

Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be
consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers.
Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket
authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and
cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be consistent with
constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due
process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers;
and the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress
to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does
not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution.
2. G.R. No. 47065 June 26, 1940

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain extent, in the Province of
Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its
favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36830, 32014 and
53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service Commission an
application for authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on
the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing
certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of
September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the Public
Service Commission ordered:

Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del
Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la
presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados de convenciencia publica
expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el
expediente No. 53090, asi que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos
siguientes condiciones:
 Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba mencionados
seran validos y subsistentes solamente durante de veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde
la fecha de la promulgacion de esta decision.

Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de

Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo
pago del precio d costo de su equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha
fijar por la Comision al tiempo de su adquisicion.

Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing
certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20,
1939, the present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order
be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this
court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that this court, after hearing, render a
decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if
this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to
valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in the language of the
petitioner, it is contended:

1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the unfettered discretion
and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature
of its functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are
concerned, is unconstitutional and void.

2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is valid delegation of
legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The
Act applies only to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to
June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
454, invoked by the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision complained of in the
present proceedings, reads as follows:

With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no public service shall operate
in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and
public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the
preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or
by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of
time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation
of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.

In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age
of the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into
consideration.

The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually force
and to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time schedules
of public services and to authorization to renew and increase equipment and properties.

ISSUE:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:- is unconstitutional and
void because it is without limitation- constitutes undue delegation of powers
RULING:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional
because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a
valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative
function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in
view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The
Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights
and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public.
PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any
certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years
was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court
ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be
juris privati or private use only.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

3. [G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN

PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO,
DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution
to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on
Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing
and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin
petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to
amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law
has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power
of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention

ISSUES:

Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s
initiative.

Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative

Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution
RULING:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means
that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No.
6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith
dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

4. Lambino Vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153 Oct. 25 2006

FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million
individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-
7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC
indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago
binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the
"will of the sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent
COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition
despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an
opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor
General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises
to implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent.
The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition;
(2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative
petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed
changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section
10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After
receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.

RULINGS:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. The petitioners
failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of
the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which rendersthe initiative
void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives.The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between
“amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it
will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid
initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735Petition is
dismissed.

5. ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

FACTS:

As taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA

No.7675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the
statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district. Hon Congressional
representative Hon. Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos
becoming RA No. 7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population: 18, 621 voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus,
RA7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Issue:

1)

RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional for being violative of three
specific provisions of the Constitution. First objection is that it contravenes the “one-subject-one
bill” rule as enunciated in Art VI section 26(1) of the Constitution (everybill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.) this
section embraces two principal subjects 1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC and 2)
the division of the congressional district of SanJuan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.2)Second and third objection involve Art VI, Sec 5 (1) and (4) of the COnsti. Petitioners
argue that division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts has
resulted in increase in the composition of the House of representatives and that it preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislatives districts pursuant to Sec 5(4).

RULING:

Contentions are devoid of merit. The petition is DISMISED for lack of merit.

Ratio:

1)The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a HUC. A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule, it should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement is the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions germane to that
general subject

2) Statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into HUC with a population of not less than
250thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the one city, one representative proviso in the
constitution—the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts.

3) The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The phrase “unless otherwise provided by
law” indicates that composition of Congress may be increased if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment—therefore increase is not unconstitutional
4) Congress drafted and deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law- Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself (reapportioning of legislativedistricts5)The
principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city—the inhabitants of san juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of mandaluyong6)On the issue of
GERRYMANDERING: (practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate
or party)—rep Ronald Zamora, author of the law is the incumbent representative of the former
San Juan/mandaluyong district-by dividing the district his constituency has in fact been
diminished and not favorable to him.
6. G.R. No. L-18684 September 14, 1961

LAMBERTO MACIAS, LORENZO TEVES, FAUSTO DUGENIO, ROGACIANO

MERCADO and MARIANO PERDICES, petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE GELLA in his Capacity as

National Treasurer,respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners are 4 members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental and Bulacan & the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the
respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative
districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because
they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional
and void because:

1. It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the
HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage

2. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population

3. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they

1. were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be
constitutional

2. petitioners have no personality to bring such action

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

RULING:

Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than
those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional
representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is “arbitrary and capricious and against
the vital principle of equality.”

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a
resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52
years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also
a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.

7. Mariano v COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual,
Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional.
 Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as
unconstitutional. Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the
legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of
every census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of
the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of anew city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not
more than 250 members,unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or
province a particle of their sovereignty. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of
the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a
city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
8. BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009

FACTS:

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall
implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-
list seats

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.

BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC
to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution.

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of
each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC formula.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation
and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUES:

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?

RULING:

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of
Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2)
No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes
it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when
the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We
therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution and prevents the

attainment of “the

-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the

House of Representatives.”

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However,
by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

9. VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY vs COMELEC

FACTS:

May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the COMELEC a "Petition
to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It
alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed
that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on
August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care,
Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up
by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list
representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up”.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory

RULING:

No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy
to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in

the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to
be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have “additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight
(38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat,
because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the COMELEC

effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the
legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the
system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond
judicial review.

The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,
cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a
mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its
recourse is to draft an amendment to the law find lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.

In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC

First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society
to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the
broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system."
(Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should
have at least one representative."

In view of to whom should the seats be given

In the suits, made respondents together with the COMELEC were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-
list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained
at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the COMELEC "to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January
1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations
and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7
January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."

In view of the 20% being mandatory

 The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust
or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should have been the
COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of
clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.

In view of the 2% threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress.

In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent

"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes.

Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are
about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean
500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that
there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have
memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal.

Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a

multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:

"MR. MONSOD: …but we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in
the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the
sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of
representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. . . ."

In view of the method of allocating additional seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having
upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to.

In view of the Niemeyer Formula

Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total
number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes
garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the
number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements —
two percent for us and five for them.

One half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there
are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In
contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion
of the multiparty system.

In view of the legal and logical formula for the Philippines

Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is
computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only
these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the
highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on
proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly
exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect; deprive another
party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled
to . . ."

In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first party

The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of
votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.
 However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say, twenty
percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory
mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper
solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six
percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

In view of the formula for additional seats of other qualified parties

Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

In view of the 2% threshold rationale

The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:

1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;

2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are
very low, from participating in the elections;

3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within
the system;

5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of
the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system; 16 and
 7. To ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major
disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through
an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral
representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to earn their seats through participation in
the party-list system.

In view of the 3-seat limit rationale

The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as many party
groups as possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate,
then the idea of giving as much as possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated. The
purpose is to allow as many as possible of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to
representation to have a seat in Congress, and to have enough seats left for those who are way
below the list.

The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer formula,

embodied in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining
the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the
number of votes obtained by each party and then the product should be divided by the sum total
of the second votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes.
First, each party receives one seat for each whole number resulting from the calculation. The
remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal fractions. The
Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, §11.

Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives, which at
present are 52. The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district representatives to 20 percent
party-list representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-list representatives are not filled,
that is due to the fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats
each. To maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting
the number of seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.
10. Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013

Facts:

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 20 SDHCac

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21
and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13
May 2013 party-list elections.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled

summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
The 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

Ruling:

No, the comelec did not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.

The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: national parties or organizations,
regional parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations.

National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.

Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking

in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

11. Sema vs Comelec, G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008

Facts:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054). Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanao's first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having
voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. SDECAI

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, 5 enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

Later, three new municipalities 6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was
left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato
City, although part of Maguindanao's first legislative district, is not part of the Province of
Maguindanao.

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District
of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201. CHIEDS

In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March
2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao". Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the
recommendation of the COMELEC's Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007.

The COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanao's first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act 201.

Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema
contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao's first legislative district
despite the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanao's reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further
claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress' power to create
or reapportion legislative districts.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional

Ruling:

No, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is unconstitutional.

The creation of any of the four local government units; province, city, municipality or barangay
must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the
criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, 25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only an Act of Congress" can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create
local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to
regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to
the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of
Representatives.

Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative
district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative

Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
12. Bagabuyo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 176970. December 8, 2008.

Facts:

Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act
Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan de
Oro." This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's
legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters
would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place
of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress
as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27,
2007. On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as
respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without
providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the
issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No.
9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No.
7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.

Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A.
No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.

The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,
argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only
apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371
did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit

Ruling:

No, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the
authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5 (4) of the Constitution.

Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided
along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition
of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City
into two districts.

Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional
apportionment made.

Neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate
entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and
greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its
population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the city's population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000 he used to represent.

The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16
since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer
constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress
and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each councilor represents both a smaller area and
fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The City,
for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of
Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of
doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city
cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de
Oro City in Congress.
13. Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995.On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent
contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates to the House of representative on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that an
order be issued declaring petitioner disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,

changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the

COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private
respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day.
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation"which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte
held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471
votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995 elections

Ruling:

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in

jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement.
The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence
in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District
of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24, 1995
maintains that "except for the time when studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts
as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last
few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following
the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where
she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
14. Aquino vs Comelec, G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995

Facts:

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,
Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections.

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner
stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be
elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.

On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit
dated May 2, 1995, lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,
Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28, 1995 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April
28, 1995.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied
for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five
hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained
thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes. 10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to
Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he
manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of
the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency
requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.

Ruling:

No, the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency requirement of one
year against the petitioner is not contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should
be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year
prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.

Clearly, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. There is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a
given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive
to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify.

That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice.
Clearly it indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but
that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time,
his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times
during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that hisdomicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled
with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and
the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire a new residence or domicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence
of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions
stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.

Finally, it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a
newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not
created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this
case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be
allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed
resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the
constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public
office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.
15. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008

Facts:

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
 Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-
election in the May 10, 2004 elections, 1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2)
to enjoin the COMELEC from implementingResolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says
that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds
that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand
the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the
equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable.

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36 (c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional

Ruling:

No, Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are not constitutional.

Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative

rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications.
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
16. Dimapora vs.Mitra Jr. G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9
January 1987 and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining
thereto.

On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of

Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The election was scheduled for 17 February 1990.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents

Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll
of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990
and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties
and functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was
taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat
in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments
due his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by
other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and
from exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his
district.

Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor
of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as
congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present
Constitution, Being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of
Congress.

On the other hand, respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary
act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term 'voluntary renunciation"
of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided
in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds
mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure
of office of Members of Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime
which carries a penalty of disqualification to hold public office.

Issue:

Whether or not Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he
has filed for another government position

Ruling:

No, Dimaporo cannot be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position.
 As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not
necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture
in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of
office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled
out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by
respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of
Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As
administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by
the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their
ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty.

17. Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732. June 22, 1993

Facts:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon
of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SMBA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and
unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses
attached to the office.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or

designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic,

Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S.
Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted
in italics infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure," 3
because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public
offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the
questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; 5 and,
(c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.

Ruling:

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in
one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job.

While Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the
first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only
one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion
to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of
choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

As long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to

another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding
his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his
elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution

Term vs. Tenure

18) Dimaporo v. Mitra 202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner
filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon
being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of
the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which
states:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent
Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House
of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that
"the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states:
"The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which
shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for
the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.

Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of
candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,

'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

RULING:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily
because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both
in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public
Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must
serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that
rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision
(Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire
term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back
to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective
office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term.
Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy
for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the
ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies,
unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not
preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
… All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds
found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened
are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about
a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of

legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-
founded, does not suffice.

2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial
functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated
to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional
governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse
to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the
law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for
the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public
policy may dictate on his office.

19) Flores vs. Drilon 223 SCRA 77

FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of
Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of
its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman
and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo
City and thus an excepted circumstance.

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

RULING

(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible
for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is
precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect
his constitutents.

(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.

(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman
of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he
must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to
prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
elective official for appointmentremains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is
an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office.

(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointmentthereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA officialare not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to
such benefits.

20. Liban vs. Gordon, GR No. 175352 (2009)

Facts:

In 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise known as the Philippine National Red Cross
(“PNRC”) Charter. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions,
established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Red Cross Convention.

The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission

is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.

Liban et al. are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. In
2006, during Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors.

Liban et al.’s position: In Camporedondo v. NLRC, it was held that the PNRC is a GOCC. In
accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. Incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts upon their appointment to another government office.

Gordon’s position:

(1) He has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. He was already
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having
been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.

(2) PNRC is not a GOCC

(3) The prohibition under Art. 6, §13 of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since
volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment

Issue:

Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC.

RULING

NO. PNRC is a private organization performing public functions.

The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (“Movement”). The Fundamental Principles of the Movement provide a universal
standard of reference for all its members. The PNRC, as a member, has the duty to uphold the
Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National
Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous. The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be
accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed
conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict.
The PNRC cannot be seen as a GOCC, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must
also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent.
The following are proof that the PNRC is not a GOCC:

(1) The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by private contributions.

(2) The PNRC is not controlled by the government. Under its Charter, only 6 of the 30 members
of the Board of Governors are appointed by the President (of the 24 remaining, 18 are elected by
the chapter delegates of the PNRC and the other 6 are elected by the 24 members already
chosen). The PNRC Board of Governors elects the Chairman and all its other officers. Gordon
was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board

(3) The PNRC Chairman is neither appointed by the President nor by the head of any
department, agency, commission or board of the Executive, Judicial or Legislative
branches.Hence, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine
Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does
not hold a government office or employment.

(4) The PNRC board’s decisions or actions are not reviewable by the President. Neither can the
President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman, it is the Board that can
review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman. This proves again that the
office of the Chairman is a private office, not a government office.

In the Camporedondo ruling, the test used was whether the corporation was created by its own
special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general
corporation law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it
is a government corporation. However, it failed to consider the definition of a GOCC in the
Administrative Code.

A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a
majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding
such membership by appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as
discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.

Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.

Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such
legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If
the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Under existing laws, the
general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation
of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters.
Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.

Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a GOCC in the
absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the
PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the
constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides
no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the provisions of the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates a private corporation and grants it corporate powers is void
for being unconstitutional.
21. Tolentino, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 148334

FACTS:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines,

the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May
14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The
resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of
votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which
ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates
as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the
13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio
Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition
for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that
COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the
electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA
6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under
Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet
the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly
required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646.

Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes
cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
“there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for
thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order during the pendency of their petition.

Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on
the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition
as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public
funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-
005 and 01-006.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not the petition was moot.

3. Whether or not petioners had locus standi.

4. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held
on 14 May 2001

RULING:

On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning
was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to
determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the
issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again

On the VAlidity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as
required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill
such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to
give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate
it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be
Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT
could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible
information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless there had been a patent showing of
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the
Comelec.

22. Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 /GR L-2821, 4 March 1949

FACTS:

In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.

On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator
Tañada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution
enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.

Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall
at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner
delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the
rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a
copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the
public he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his
colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.

Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting
to order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in
the United States, all the Senator were present.

Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed
with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of
petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.

Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.

Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner,
then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator
Tañada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order
the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all
the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting
at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator
Tañada.

At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-
arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's
followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently,
again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.

Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote. Another commotion ensued.

Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to
a vote.

Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while
the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-
tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the
Chair.

Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing
Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.

With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring
vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously
approved.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

RULING:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. In
view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of ten
senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution
that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution
been approved only by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for
the transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because
at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators
Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does
not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House". Thus, the
Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since
the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

22. Arroyo vs. de Venecia, GR No. 127255

Facts:

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed
to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to
a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

23. Osmeña vs. Pendaton, 109 Phil 833

Facts:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.

He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined
from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he
must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have
been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been selling “free things” at premium
prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.

The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in
truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would
expose it to contempt and disrepute.

The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was authorized to
summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance
of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would
be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee
shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the present special
session of the Congress of the Philippines.

In support of his request, Osmeña alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took
up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has
intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer,
without issuing any preliminary injunction.

The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a
chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such
report, the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension
and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had
thereby ceased to exist.

After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.

Issue:

Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?

RULING:
Yes. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in
any other place." The provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."

It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member.

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured,

committed to prison, and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,
suspended a senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him,
because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No.
59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the
House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous
consent.

Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect
past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the required
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within
the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure,
adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Certain
American cases)

In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the
House, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes
disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation
to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine
whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch
of the Government. This was due to the theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what
are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to
example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair
decision.

Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for
having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate
had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.

In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is
necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety
of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be
the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of
the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the
legislature, or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our
special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions.

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino
precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for
12 months because he had assaulted another member of that Body. The Senator challenged the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it
had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the
Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to
removal, and the Jones Law gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its
members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an
elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators.
Alejandrino was one.

The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark
should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party.

Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except
as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that
the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of suspension for
one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the
Constitution did not impair.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
weighty, becuase deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their
members to jail.

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the
latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having
become moot or academic.

Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable
outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.
24. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 126055

Facts:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization for the stay of the aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said
aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and
the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively,
No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed
on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for
the implementation of the suspension order.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to petitioner.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

In view of suspension NOT as a penalty

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to
be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter
of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could
have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures
to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

In view of multiple petitions

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion
to quash the information (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in
the information(People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.'

In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks.
 Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a
Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be
quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but
a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed
on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."

In view of the power of the Court

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.
25. Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 118364

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, seeking to set aside the resolution
dated December 9, 1992 of the Office of the Ombudsman, denying petitioners motion for the
reinvestigation of three cases of falsification of public documents which had been filed against
petitioners and to restrain the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan from hearing the cases.

In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a
case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty.
Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification
from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained
that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of
Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
congress.

Petitioners argue that the certifications made by the clerk of court with respect to an arraignment
allegedly held on July 9, 1985 in Criminal Case No. 1393 is conclusive and cannot be altered by
Atty. Sansaets claim to the contrary. They cite what is now Rule 132, 23 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which provides that public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. First of all, that the filing of the charges is
politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise
evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint against petitioners
was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well as that of private
respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of GIO II Violan. Violans
resolution was reviewed by Special Prosecutor Erdulfo Querubin who made his own detailed
resolution concurring in the finding of Violn. We cannot say that, in approving the resolutions of
two investigators, the respondent Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor committed an abuse of
their discretion.
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused. As explained in Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman:

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped
if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.

26. G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

 ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL.,
respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in
the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators
and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order
to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of
the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise
were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes
in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of
the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:

As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and
an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the
basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the
due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act
No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the
law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had
been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of
the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court
did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater
weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal
of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of
irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.

27. G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ,
in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in
his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95.
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications
for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several
times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. —
which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer
by plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made
another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the
last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of
P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary
Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the
provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by
petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank.
Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General. Urea formaldehyde is distinct
comparing to the terms Urea and Formaldehyde. The latter being the two separate chemicals
while the latter is formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and
formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction.
Individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, it is well settled that the
enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" —
is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any
mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
28. G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together and plotting
among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently, bring
from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import
and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court,
520 tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and
that, then and there, the said accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves,
did receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that said
drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands
from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had
not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced accordingly,
the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of
one-half of the costs. The same penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the
judgment as to him has become final.

The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five assignments of error) and are greatly
multiplied by their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the many
propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when correctly
understood, are these: The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record establishes
the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No.
2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on the
28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the special
session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of
adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed order.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court can look to legislative journals as proof of when the adjournment of
Legislature happened

2. Whether or not the court can go behind the legislative journals to determine the date of
adjournment

RULING:

Yes. Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts
of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction of proof…”
Official documents may be proved through: The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or
of any legislative body that may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the
journals of those bodies or of either house thereof

2. The court did not go behind the legislative journals when such journals are already clear and
explicit (about when Act No. 2381 was adjourned). “…to inquiry into the veracity (accuracy) of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to … interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.” The
journals already say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.

29. G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J.

VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in
his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer
of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN
ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO,
APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO
LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR.,
AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES,
JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the
Municipal Board, respondents.
FACTS:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21,
1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M.
Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by
Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal
Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives
that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the
Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as
sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill
thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City Mayor drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964
issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the
President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor.
As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter
dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers
thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further
clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on
which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that
he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers
of both Houses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially
withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the
previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law
what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law

Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers,
to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts
may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was
the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether
the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress
ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity
of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled
bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly
enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This
Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court
to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.

30. G.R. No. L-29658 February 27, 1969

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil

Service, respondent.

FACTS:

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951 was
referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes
its present form and substance. The provision of the substitute bill reads:

“No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department
of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain or higher.”

The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951 and according
to the Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted what is now
section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be

appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served as chief of police with exemplary record or has served in
the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
least eight years with the rank of captain and/higher.

Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that the omission of the phrase “who
served the police department of a city” was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings
but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and
that the change was not made by Congress but only by an employee.

It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchingly into the matter.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for mandamus be granted due to a different interpretation of the respondent
and the petitioner of Sec 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

RULING:

No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service to
include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present state of the law, he
is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there may be a possibility of
ommision of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress to the Senate, that may permit
the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in possession of the legislative secretary of
the President, is signed by the Presidents of both the Lower and Upper Houses together with
their respective secretaries and the President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to
the Court. No inclusion of other enlargements, no matter how sound they are, should be used in
the interpretation of an already enrolled bill.

The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.

The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress. After all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants thereof.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree."
31. [G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E.

TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

Facts: The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing “Sin Taxes”) by filing a petition for certiorari
and/or prohibition. They claim that respondents violated the rules of the House which are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution
when the Chair of the Committee(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza ) allegedly ignored a privileged
question raised by Rep.Arroyo during the committee report for the approval of R.A.
8420.Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this
portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation:(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21,1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21,
1996(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,1996 as
certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996(4) the published
version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason
they are judicially enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its
business free from interference by courts. In this case, petitioners cite the provision for the
opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretionin enacting
R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?

RULING:

Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.

To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due
the other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission
to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so.
The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything
to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due
the judgment of that body.

In view of what is essential

Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural,
and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.

In view of the Courts jurisdiction

This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government
has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".

In view of House Rules

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases
such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar
as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years
ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows
and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time
a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a
bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of
the President.

In view of grave abuse

Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to
lack of power.

In view of the enrolled bill doctrine

Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
32. G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs. MARIANO JESUS

CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and
disbursing officer, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the
Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the
Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns,
Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto,
Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of
this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by
petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique
Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias,
on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano
Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator
Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member
of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on
Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate
choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the
same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz
and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator
Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said
respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and
upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted
the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and
Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956,
as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party,
and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that
the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the
Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had “acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11
of the Constitution”; that “in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking
the corresponding oath of office therefor”, said respondents had “acted absolutely without color
of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping,
intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal”; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical
assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments
to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that
Senators Cuenco and Delgado “are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral
Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the
rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their
election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3)
senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second
largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to
the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5)
Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.”.

ISSUES:

Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners

RULING:

1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction. RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate
compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as members of Electoral Tribunal. The
Electoral Tribunal is part of neither House, even if the Senate elects its members. The issue is not
the power of the Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner by which power was
exercised (constitutionality).The Court is concerned with the existence and extent of said
discretionary powers.

2. No. RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional mandate of 6 Senate
members in the ET must be followed, this cannot be done without violating the spirit &
philosophy of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan decisions. The respondents'
practical interpretation of the law (modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted;
although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed mandate on procedure. The
contention that petitioner Tañada waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When interests
of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to waive is inexistent. Tañada never led
Primicias to believe that his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid. WHEREFORE: The
Senate cannot elect members of the Electoral Tribunal not nominated by the proper party, nor
can the majority party elect more than 3 members of the Electoral Tribunal. Furthermore, the
CRS has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents Cuenco & Delgado void ab
initio. The appointment of the staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a matter
under the discretion of the Chairman.

33. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO

YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for
filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a
grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even
if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable
and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that
said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole
judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost
against the petitioner.
34. G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988

FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS,

ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P.
GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW,
WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U.
MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M.
PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and
FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
respondent.

FACTS:

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest
docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the Commission on
Elections. On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but
including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal
replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and resigned as the
Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution
of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents therein. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself
from participating in the hearings and deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case
No. 00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez
against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his personal
involvement as a party in the two cases .The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of
public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable
and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules
of procedure so as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five
(5)members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is aproviso that where more than
four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1)Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit thes ituation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

Issue:

Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the
tribunal?

RULING:

The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of
the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that
the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to
must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the
petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
35. Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal

GR 141489 29 November 2002

FACTS:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with
the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the
election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13
organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action
Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was
able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political
parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From
available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing
of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman
of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause
the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January
2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter
to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary
Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed
with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and
against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,
and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On
11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead
then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the
amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to
protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of
the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN
and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the
HRET.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the
authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12
seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of
each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in
Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House
of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties
as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are
bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list
groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative
for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies
with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners
at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response
to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.

36. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs.

HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as

Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA.
VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. A registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification
against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that
the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to
extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for
the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district
representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.

As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results
showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin’s 53,447 votes.

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray
even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was
proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte.

Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the “election,
returns, and qualification” of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET);

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proclamation of Locsin was valid.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction on this case and not the HRET.

RULING:

The proclamation was invalid because the petitioner was denied due process.

The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not
contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of
service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioner’s repeated assertion that he
was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received
summons. Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC
Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his
proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the order of the COMELEC
Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001.
Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its power when it
suspended petitioner’s proclamation.

In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that “the Second Division’s
directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and executory.” Clearly, the validity of
respondent Locsin’s proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to
rule on the issue.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en
banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the
nullity of respondent’s proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review,
on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

“Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.”
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second
Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not
divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The
said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the
basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction
in the instant case.

Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be
brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[109]

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in
his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

37. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN

DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners, vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO
ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents.
FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement
that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The
results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.

Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in his behalf of the
LDP, eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on Appointments.

Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to
prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission on Appointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as
the eight senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto E. Tañada, as the lone member representing
the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation, and
that it is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution,
to combine their fractional representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one
seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally
nominated and elected thereto.

Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation of the various political

parties with elected senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these political parties is
entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments as stated. Each political
party has a claim to an extra half seat, and the election of respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority is precisely
questioned by the petitioners because, according to them, it unduly increased the membership of
LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the commission and reduced the membership of the LAKAS-
NUCD and NPC correspondingly. In view of the conflicting claims of each of the political
parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a fractional membership in the Commission on
Appointments, the election of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada has become
controversial and its validity questionable. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as
members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

No, the election was violative of the provisions provided by Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In
so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation
to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party — either the LAKAS-NUCD or
the NPC.

A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in
order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.

In this case, the election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP majority by sheer
force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting was done in grave abuse
of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the
Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said
exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly
found to exist.

The Supreme Court declared the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto
Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation
of the rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines.
38. ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG
BAYAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of
Representatives of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng
Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa,
Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique
M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the
CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced
Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the
revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal
Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the
election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the
theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and
elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the
support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence
outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation”
clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since
KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties.

RULING:

Yes, the members were chosen in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman
of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission.
The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the
LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to
80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal
9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two
seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in
the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even
if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one
of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional
membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4%
of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.

The endorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and
they signed identical endorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-
Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The
petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House.
They were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution.
39. REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner, vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V.
VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

FACTS:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the
several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-
Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a
representative of the Liberal Party.

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in

the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from
that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing
their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this
to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

Petitioner challenged his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent. He contended that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine
announced in Cunanan v. Tan. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in
the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition
of the Commission on Appointments.

RULING:

Yes, the composition of the Commission of Appointments is validly changed due to the
political realignment.
 The petitioner based his argument on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims
has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. He
insisted that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered
political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See.
160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining
the required proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. The
clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the
right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly
registered with the COMELEC.

That argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on
Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28,
1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to
prove its permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to
representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and
has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created
in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support
Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23,
1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was
raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral
Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the
House of Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the
President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over
recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some
internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political
organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist
Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments
and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the
petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be
represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal
Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House
Electoral Tribunal.
40. JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local
Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Pertinent provisions
of the said Act read:

Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP Chief. – xxx The Chief of the PNP
shall be appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of the chief
superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments: Provided, That the
Chief of the PNP shall serve a term of office not to exceed four (4) years: Provided, further, That
in times of war or other national emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend
such term of office.

Sec. 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members. - The appointment of the officers and
members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:

(a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV - Appointed by the PNP regional director for
regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for the national headquarters personnel and
attested by the Civil Service Commission;

(b) Inspector to Superintendent - Appointed by the Chief of the PNP, as recommended by their
immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission;

(c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General - Appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Chief of the PNP, with the proper endorsement by the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission and subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

(d) Director General - Appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the
rank of chief superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; Provided, That the Chief of the PNP shall serve a tour of duty not to exceed four
(4) years; Provided, further, That, in times of war or other national emergency declared by
Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.

Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said
police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions.

On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original petition for
prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements
made therefor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of officers lower in rank needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.

RULING:

No, officers who are not within the first category need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.

The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive by Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, which provides:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers
who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the
power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
41. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS,
accused-appellant.

FACTS:

The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve (12) years of age, who herself
narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her virtue. The victim was peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because the
complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of
lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused was then Congressman Romeo
Jalosjos who, in spite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory
rape, was still re-elected to his congressional office. On December 16, 1996, two (2) information
for the crime of statutory rape and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against
accused-appellant.

Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-fledged member of Congress who was confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant is immune from arrest being a member of the

Congress.

RULING:

No, he is not immune from arrest because his offense is punishable for more than six
years.

There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher
the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.

Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same . . .

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to
civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending
appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions
and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

. . . But the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law
within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be
attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses,
it is enough that Congress is in session.

The Supreme Court, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

42. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148,
MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I.
CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA,
respondents.

FACTS:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led
by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the
impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio
F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Close to four years
later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a
seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator.

RULING:

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos
that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
Reclusion Perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by Reclusion
Perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and
coup d’état cases, both being punishable by Reclusion Perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless
of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation,
or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not
apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to
govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
43. ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,
Respondent.

FACTS:

After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the position of Chief
Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate floor and was
quoted as saying:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . .

In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero J. Pobre asked the
Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary action against Senator
Santiago on the ground that her statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and
constituted direct contempt of court.

In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the statements.
However, she explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Miriam Defensor-Santiago can be charged for her comments on the
Judiciary.

RULING:

The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago. In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, it ruled:

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining
the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun,
said: Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and
mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.
The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.
While the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, it felt that such should not be the last word on
the matter. It added:

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at
once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance.
To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme
Court of idiots”. . .

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards
the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the
Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to
re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal,
and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made
responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to
protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing
the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter
to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under
such circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.”

44. NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME

CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
FACTS:

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of

its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of
an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly
three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president.
The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.
The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because
he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.

RULING:

No, Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides:

“The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It
is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

The immunity of speech and debate of members in the Congress includes a vote or
passage of a resolution, all the utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
functions such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes casts in the halls of Congress. It
also includes bills introduced in Congress (whether or not it is in session) and all the other
utterances (made outside or inside the premises of Congress) provided they are made in
accordance with a legislative function.

The purpose of the privilege is to insure the effective discharge of functions of Congress. The
privilege may be abused but it is said that such is not so damaging or detrimental as compared to
the denial or withdrawal of such privilege.

Publication is not always protected by the immunity. The same shall be made while Congress is
in session and not during its recess. However, if publication is made when Congress is not in
session, it is not privileged because Congressman is said to be not acting as congressman.