EVIDENCE

April 2, 2022
CASE DIGESTS

4. Examination of a witness
Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution),
[July 25, 1973], 152 PHIL 129-139
FACTS: In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there
were commenced, all dated January 16, 1968 eight criminal actions respondents
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Lorenzana. The trial for the cases
was jointly held on 14 trial dates. All the fourteen trial dates fell on a Saturday. This was
arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the
same to be terminated as soon as possible as, Saturday as agreed upon as the
invariable trial day for said 8 criminal cases. The trial of the cases in question was held
with the conformity of the accused and their counsel in the chambers of Judge Garcia. It
is worthy to note that said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to any
supposed irregularity of the proceedings thus far; Then Carbonnel thru their counsel,
filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional
defects. The respondent judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order causing the deferment of the promulgation of judgment. There was an order from
him declaring that ‘the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been
violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial of
these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the
court room open to the public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in
stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other
respondents2 inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the
petitioner
HELD: No. The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public
was thereby excluded. It is to admit that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative
of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are
smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver
opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
“have his friends, relatives and counsel present, not matter with what offense he may be
charged.” Then too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the
part of respondent policemen should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded.
Thus, in one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The
Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused
offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is
deemed waived.

People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019]

FACTS: Cristina and Julius recruited Mary Jan Veloso as house help in Malaysia,
however, upon arriving it was found out that there was no available job and was offered
a vacation to Indonesia. They provided her a luggage that was found out to have heroin
in the airport. Mary Jane Veloso was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to
death by the Indonesian Government. Pending fire execution, the illegal recruiters and
traffickers namely, Cristina and Julius who recruited her were apprehended and placed
under police custody. On her basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government
requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary
Jane and that her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Jane Veloso, who was convicted of drug trafficking and
sentenced to death by the indonesian government and presently confined thereat,
testify by way of deposition by written interrogatories.
HELD: Yes. The OSG asserts that the presence of extraordinary circumstances, i.e.,
Mary Jane’s conviction by final judgment and her detention in a prison facility in
Indonesia, while awaiting execution by firing squad; the grant by the Indonesian
President of an indefinite reprieve in view of the ongoing legal proceedings against
Cristina and Julius in the Philippines; and the conditions attached to the reprieve
particularly that Mary Jane should remain in confinement in Indonesia, and any question
propounded to her must only be in writing, are more than enough grounds to have
allowed the suppletory application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order for the
testimony of the prosecution witness be taken before the court where the case is being
heard, it must be shown that the said prosecution witness is either: (a) too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court, or; (b) has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning. The case of Mary Jane does not fall under
either category.
The extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant the
resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal
Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same
time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign
jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in
particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in
open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said
Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long
as there is compelling reason. The Court finds no reason to depart from its practice to
liberally construe procedural rules for the orderly administration of substantial justice.

a) Rights and obligations of a witness

b) Order in the examination of an individual witness
(i) Direct examination
People v. Calixtro, G.R. No. 92355, [January 24, 1991], 271 PHIL 317-332
FACTS: At night of April 24, 1989, Edeliza heard the barking of dogs; she peeped thru
the hole of their window and she saw three male persons. She went to her husband on
the bed and awakened him. Both peeped through the hole of the window where they
saw three men calling from outside to open the door. One of the three persons
threatened her that if she would not open the door, they would blast the house with a
hand grenade. She was about to open the door but they continued kicking the door to
open the same. She was afraid that her family would be killed, so she decided to open
the door. As she was opening the door, Celso Ferrer pulled her outside of the house
and threatened her not to ask for help. Then they dragged her out to the middle of the
fields.
In the middle of the field, Celso Ferrer and Louie Ferrer took hold of her arms and
pointed a bladed weapon at her neck. At that very moment, accused Pedring Calixtro
told her that if she would not give her womanhood she would be killed. Pedring Calixtro
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the victim, while Celso Ferrer took off her
ring and earrings. Celso Ferrer and Louie Ferrer took turns in abusing her. After the
heinous acts, the three accused debated whether to kill Edeliza Astelero or not. Edeliza
took the opportunity to flee while the three were discussing. She ran as fast as she
could until she saw a jeep, which she later found to be carrying her husband.
The testimony of complainant witness is corroborated by Rogelio de la Cruz, a
barangay tanod and neighbor of the Asteleros. He testified that he followed them
secretly towards the house of complainant after they left his house. He saw them
kicking the house and ordering the occupants to open the door. Moments later, he saw
them dragging the complainant away from her house towards the field. He reported the
incident to the Barangay Captain.
Pedro Calixtro testified on his behalf that on that same night he only heard of the shouts
and saw a naked woman being forced and brought away by Celso Ferrer and Louie
Ferrer. Then he heard from Celso Ferrer the words "papatayin kita", being addressed to
Edeliza. Witness gave to Edeliza the dress which he noticed behind her. A fist fight
ensued between him and Celso. After the fight, he noticed that Edeliza ran away,
whereas, he went to the watering pump.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies of Edeliza Astelero during the trial of the case
clearly established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: Yes. In rape, the prosecution need not, present testimonies of people other than
the offended party herself if the same is accurate and credible. In the case at bar, the
defense depended heavily on supposed inconsistencies pervading complainant's
testimony at the trial court below. Appellant pointed out alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimony of the rape victim Edeliza Astelero which allegedly cast
reasonable doubt on his guilt. The most notable of these were: (a) although she testified
on direct that she was alone when she peeped through the hole of their window and
saw three (3) male persons, on cross, she claimed that it was she and her husband who
peeped through the hole of their window (b) while, on direct, she testified that she heard
the barking of the dogs at around 10:00 p.m., on cross, she stated that she heard the
barking of the dogs at around 7:00 p.m.; (c) on direct, she did not state that her
assailants wore masks and that she herself was blindfolded which she mentioned only
on cross; (d) she could not have recognized her assaillants because they wore masks
and she was blindfolded.
SC finds the alleged inconsistencies as too trivial, insignificant and inconsequential to
merit the reversal of the trial court's decision. The inconsistencies pointed out by
appellant can hardly affect the complainant's credibility. They refer to minor details or to
the precise sequence of events that do not detract from the central fact of rape, on
which complainant had consistently and candidly testified. A witness who is in a state of
flight cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity matters connected with
the main overt act (People v. Ramilo, supra). The testimonial discrepancies could have
also been caused by the natural fickleness of memory, which tend to strengthen, rather
than weaken, credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony (People v.
Cayago; 158 SCRA 586). These discrepancies on minor details serve to add credence
and veracity to her categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous testimony (People v.
Ramilo, supra).
Minor discrepancies indicate that the witness was not previously rehearsed, and
consequently strengthen her credibility. It would, perhaps, have been more suspicious if
complainant had been able to pinpoint with clarity or described with precision the exact
sequence of events (People v. Cayago, supra; People v. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 487). The
rape victim should not be expected to keep an accurate account of the traumatic and
horrifying experience she went through.
Needless to say, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
court are generally accorded a high degree of respect, the court having observed the
demeanor and deportment of witness. We find no compelling reason to deviate from this
settled rule.
(ii) Cross examination
Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118509 (Resolution),
[March 29, 1996], 325 PHIL 967-1013
FACTS: The bottom-line issue is whether or not a contract of sale of the subject parcel
of land existed between the petitioner and respondent BPI. Philippine Remnants Co.
constituted BPI as its trustee and ordered it to sell its land (Barrio Bagong Ilog, Pasig).
BPI engaged the services of Pedro Revilla as its broker to be the one to sell the land.
Revilla formally informed BPI when he finally found a buyer. Negotiations between
Limketkai and BPI officials were made and they agreed that the lot would be sold at
1K/sqm. Lim asked if it was possible to pay initial 10% then 90% within 90 days, and if
disapproved, price will be paid in cash. Later, Limketkai found out that its offer to pay on
terms had been frozen, so an officer went to BPI and paid the full amount of 33M.
Payment was refused and Limketkai filed an action for specific performance and
damages, and BPI issued a deed of sale to NBS. It was rejected because allegedly,
authority to sell the land had been withdrawn from that unit of BPI and the land was then
sold to National Bookstore.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred to have admitted evidence testimony to
prove the existence of a contract of sale of a real property between the parties.
HELD: Yes. Corrolarily, as the petitioner's exhibits failed to establish the perfection of
the contract of sale, oral testimony cannot take their place without violating the parol
evidence rule. It was therefore irregular for the trial court to have admitted in evidence
testimony to prove the existence of a contract of sale of a real property between the
parties despite the persistent objection made by private respondents' counsels as early
as the first scheduled hearing. While said counsels cross-examined the witnesses, this,
according to the Supreme Court’s view, did not constitute a waiver of the parol evidence
rule. The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, and Abrenica v. Gonda and de Gracia cases cited
by the Court in its initial decision, which ruled to the effect that an objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, i.e., ". . . at the time
question is asked", and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived,
do not apply as these two cases involved facts different from the case at bench. More
importantly, here, the direct testimonies of the witnesses were presented in "affidavit-
form" where prompt objection to inadmissible evidence is hardly possible, whereas the
direct testimonies in these cited cases were delivered orally in open court. The best that
counsels could have done, and which they did, under the circumstances was to preface
the cross-examination with objection.
Counsels should not be blamed and, worst, penalized for taking the path of prudence by
choosing to cross-examine the witnesses instead of keeping mum and letting the
inadmissible testimony in "affidavit form" pass without challenge. We thus quote with
approval the observation of public respondent Court of Appeals on this point:
As a logical consequence of the above findings, it follows that the court a quo erred in allowing
the appellee to introduce parol evidence to prove the existence of a perfected contract of sale
over and above the objection of the counsel for the defendant-appellant. The records show that
the court a quo allowed the direct testimony of the witnesses to be in affidavit form subject to
cross-examination by the opposing counsel. If the purpose thereof was to prevent the opposing
counsel from objecting timely to the direct testimony, the scheme failed for as early as the first
hearing of the case on February 28, 1989 during the presentation of the testimony in affidavit
form of Pedro Revilla, Jr., plaintiff-appellee's first witness, the presentation of such testimony
was already objected to as inadmissible.

Kim Liong v. People, G.R. No. 200630, [June 4, 2018]

FACTS: In an Information, Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return
to Equitable PCI Bank, despite demand, a total of US$ 50,955.70, which was
erroneously deposited in his dollar account, which should have been instead credited
and posted to the account of Wallen Maritime Services, Inc. Liong was arraigned
pleading not guilty to the charge. The first prosecution witness Antonio Dela Rama
(Dela Rama), was finally presented Atty. Danilo Banares (Atty. Banares) appeared as
collaborating counsel of Atty. Jovit Ponon (Atty. Ponon). The hearing was again reset on
the instance of Liong because Atty. Ponon was allegedly a fraternity brother of the
private prosecutor, Atty. Pacheco. Dela Rama had suffered a stroke. Liong
subsequently filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and, eventually, a Motion to
Dismiss.
After multiple times of resetting, the court upon motion of private prosecutor, Atty.
Maningas in conformity of Prosecutor Meneses, declared accused to have waived his
right to cross examine the witness Antonio dela Rama. The trial found that Liang’s
abuse of his right by changing his counsels repeatedly was a tactic to delay the
proceedings. Such motion was opposed by the private prosecutor.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Presiding Juge Morallos, Liong filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which denied Liang’s petition. It held
that what is essential is for an accused to be granted the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, not to actually cross-examine them. In Other
words, when an accused fails to avail himself or herself of this right, he or she is
deemed to have waived it.
Liong filed Motion for Reconsideration shich CA denied. Liong filed his petition for
Review on Certiorari to Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in declaring as
waived petitioner Liong’s right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela
Rama.
HELD: No. "To meet the witnesses face to face" is the right of confrontation. Subsumed
in this right to confront is the right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against
him or her, i.e., to propound questions on matters stated during direct examination, or
connected with it. Thus, denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the
testimony of the witness incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. "When cross-
examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the
party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent."
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It "is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination." When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-
examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived
this right. The witness' testimony given during direct examination will remain on record.
If this testimony is used against the accused, there will be no violation of the right of
confrontation.

(iii) Re-direct examination

(iv) Re-cross examination
(v) Recalling the witness
c) Leading and misleading questions
d) Methods of impeachment of adverse party’s witness
e) How the witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements (laying
the predicate)
People v. Buduhan y Bullan, G.R. No. 178196, [August 6, 2008], 583 PHIL 331-366
FACTS: On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations officer at the
RML Canteen. At about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups of men inside
the beerhouse. First was that of the appellants, which was composed of Robert
Buduhan, who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano, Rudy Buduhan, who was
wearing a red T-shirt, a man wearing a blue T-shirt, and another man wearing a blue T-
shirt with a black jacket. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his
companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding). At 10:40
p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached
them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise
approached Cherry Rose’s Manager Romualde Almeron, who was seated at the
counter. The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up. Larry
then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Robert’s
group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down. Abe and
Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid
below the table. SPO1 Saquing testified that he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were
detailed as duty investigators at the Maddela Police Station when Ancheta, a fireman,
reported to them a shooting incident at the RML Canteen. SPO1 Saquing and SPO4
Gumayagay then proceeded to the said place. They encountered four male individuals
who were running away therefrom. The policemen immediately halted the men and
asked them where they came from. When they could not respond properly and gave
different answers, the policemen apprehended them and brought them to the Maddela
Police Station for questioning and identification. Later that night, the witnesses of the
shooting incident went to the police station and they positively pointed to the four
persons, later identified as Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna and Boyet
Ginyang, as the assailants in the said incident. Cherry Rose testified against the
accused. The prosecution did not present the other surviving victims in the shooting
incident, namely Gilbert Cortez and Fernando Pera. The latter were fearful of reprisals
from unknown individuals. No evidence was likewise adduced on their behalf. Also, the
other employees who worked as guest relations officers in the RML Canteen and who
likewise witnessed the incident were said to have absconded already.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in giving complete credence to the testimony of the
principal witness’ Cherry Rose of the prosecution despite the presence of facts tainting
the credibility of the witness
HELD: No. Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in view of the
conflicting answers she gave in her sworn statement before the police, in the
preliminary investigation of the case and in her testimony in open court. They contend
that the trial court failed to scrutinize the entirety of the statements made by Cherry
Rose vis - à-vis the shooting incident. What the defense brought to Cherry Rose's
attention during the trial were her contradictory statements about her romantic
relationship with Larry Erese. As a result of this confrontation, Cherry Rose changed her
answer. Supreme Court rule, however, that this inconsistency relates only to an
insignificant aspect of the case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.
Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent
statements by a witness, is revealing:
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. '
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related
to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and
he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.
Inasmuch as the mandatory procedural requirements were not complied with, the
credibility of Cherry Rose as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the trial court,
the testimony of Cherry Rose was straightforward throughout. The appellants were not
able to adduce any reason or motive for her to bear false witness against them. As a
matter of fact, Cherry Rose testified during cross-examination that she did not
personally know appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only during the night
when the shooting incident took place.
f) Evidence of the good character of a witness
5. Admissions and confessions
a) Res inter alios acta rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAJOR EMILIO COMILING
G.R. No. 140405 March 4, 2004
FACTS: On September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua, the owner of Masterline Grocery and his
helper Mario were about to close the store when someone knocked on the door to buy
some cigarettes. As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men
suddenly barged into the store and announced a hold-up. SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3
Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime
scene. SPO1 Torio was standing outside the store's door, he heard three gunshots
coming from inside the store, all directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was
then on the street while Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid
behind a concrete marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police
headquarters. Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces worth P26,000 and
cash amounting to P81,000. On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience,
prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what she
knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four
meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched. On the other
hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each of them claimed to be
somewhere else at the time the crime happened on September 2, 1995. The witnesses
for the defense also tried to impugn the credibility of the lead witness for the
prosecution, Naty Panimbaan.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering Naty Panimbaan as a
credible witness for the prosecution.
2. Whether or not Naty's testimony was inadmissible to prove conspiracy
because of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
HELD: 1. No. In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court was
whimsical or capricious in the performance of its tasks. Thus, the court have no
recourse but to uphold its findings on the credibility of Naty Panimbaan and of the other
prosecution witnesses. In any event, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, Naty
Panimbaan was examined three times not only under the close scrutiny of two defense
counsels but also, in some instances, under the abrasive tirades of the trial judge who
called her a "whore." Yet, despite the trial court's apparent misgivings about her
character, it still gave full credence to her testimony. Naty's tenacious insistence on the
minute details of what happened suggested nothing else except that she was telling the
truth. The court does not doubt her credibility. The time-tested rule is that, between the
positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the mere denials of the accused, the
former undisputedly deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
value.
2. No. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court prescribes that any declaration
made by a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not
against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent
evidence. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial declarations or
admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In the present case, Naty's
admission implicating appellant Comiling was made in open court and therefore may be
taken in evidence against him.

People v. Enero, G.R. No. 242213, [September 18, 2019]

FACTS: This is an appeal filed by Roger Enero (accused-appellant) assailing the
Decision dated March 27, 2018 of the Court of Appeals which convicted him of the
crime of Murder. That on AUGUST 10, 2010 or thereabout in the Municipality of
Gattaran, province of Cagayan, the accused with intent to gain, armed with knives, with
violence against or intimidation of persons, conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the
house/residence of Mabel Ulita, once inside took, stole and carted away [P]20,000.00
cash; a gold ring and gold earring with pendant, and by reason or on occasion of the
Robbery, the same was aggravated, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack and stab said Mabel Ulita y Bumanglang, Medirose Paat y
Berbano, and Clark John Ulita y Bumanglang, a minor, eleven (11) years of age,
inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds which caused their deaths, and that the same
was further aggravated the act having been accompanied by the Rape of Mabel Ulita.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), in a Decision dated January 27, 2016, convicted
accused-appellant of the crime as charged. By circumstantial evidence, the RTC found
that the prosecution sufficiently proved that robbery with homicide was committed by
accused-appellant. The following circumstances were considered by the trial court in
ruling for accused-appellant's conviction: (a) Bernard claimed to have seen the
accused-appellant near the place of the incident at the time or near at such time; (b)
Bernard's statement was corroborated in some material points by Arnold's testimony
that he saw four to five male persons coming out of the fence of Mabel's house; (c)
Accused-appellant did not deny that on the date and time of the incident, he was at
Palagao, Norte, Gattaran, Cagayan; (d) The investigation of the police officers yielded
to the fact that money and jewelry were taken from Mabel's house; and (e) Mervin and
Ernesto executed their respective confessions, which implicated accused-appellant in
the commission of the robbery and death of the victims.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD: No. In this case, however, there is want of evidence proving that all the accused
executed concerted acts so as to achieve their common design of killing the victims. In
fact, the prosecution seemed to dispense with the theory of conspiracy as there appears
no evidence to such effect. The extrajudicial confession executed by Mervin and
Ernesto does not bind the accused-appellant as it is considered as hearsay evidence
under the res inter alios acta rule. Even the exception to such rule, i.e., an admission
made by a conspirator, does not apply here for proof other than said admission is
necessary. Here, the lone evidence of conspiracy is such confessional statement of
Mervin and Ernesto.

b) Admission by a party
Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109172, August 19, 1994
FACTS: Trans-Pacific applied for and was granted several financial accommodations
amounting to P1.3M by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and
secured by 4 promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three parcels of land
and a chattel mortgage over petitioner’s stock and inventories. Unable to settle its
obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by the bank, a restructuring
of the remaining indebtedness. To secure the restructured loan, 3 new promissory notes
were executed by Trans-Pacific. The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by
another mortgage covering 2 other parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on
petitioner’s stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and the
proceeds were turned over to the bank and applied to TIS’ restructured loan.
Subsequently, the bank returned the duplicate original copies of the 3 promissory notes
to Trans-Pacific with the word “PAID” stamped thereon. Despite the return of the notes,
Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00
representing accrued interest because the promissory notes were erroneously released.
Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by
respondent bank but later had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before
the RTC of Makati for specific performance and damages, and prayed that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and
that its obligation to the bank be declared as having been fully paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of settlement or compromise is not an admission that
anything is due and is inadmissible against the party making the offer.
HELD: No. SC held that this is not an iron-clad rule. To determine the admissibility or
non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case and the
intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and
avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the
party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.);
Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac.
(US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a
borrower's loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what petitioner did in the case before us for review.

c) Admission by a third party

People v. Tena, G.R. No. 100909, [October 21, 1992], 289 PHIL 474-484
FACTS: On June 19, 1988, 82-year-old Alfredo Altamarino, Sr. was found dead inside
the bedroom of his house located at corner Gardner and Regidor Streets, Barangay
Sadsaran, Mauban, Quezon. The deceased's bedroom was in a topsy-turvy state; his
cabinet's drawers had been opened and ransacked. Suspicion fell on the deceased's
caretakers, the spouses William Verzo and Ofelia Ritual, but investigation by the
Mauban Police Force yielded no evidence to warrant the filing of charges against them.
Emma Altamarino Ibana sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
NBI Agents arrived at Mauban, Quezon to conduct their own investigation. Mauban
Police Station Commander Lt. Gironimo de Gala informed them that suspicion as to the
authorship of the crime had shifted to a syndicate operating in Lucena City and nearby
municipalities. This syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery of a Petron Gas
Station owned by a certain Benjamin Lim and a member thereof, Adelberto Camota,
was then in detention. The NBI Agents interrogated Camota. When confronted,
Adelberto Camota executed an extrajudicial confession in the presence of Atty. Albert
Siquijor, admitting participation in the robbery-killing of Alfredo Altamirano, Sr. and
pointing to Virgilio Conde, Jose de Jesus, Solito Tena and an unidentified person as his
companions in the crime. An information for the crime of Robbery with Homicide was
subsequently filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal against Virgilio Conde, Jose de
Jesus Jr., Adelberto Camota, Solito Tena and John Doe. Virgilio Conde and Solito Tena
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on November 12, 1989 as did Adelberto Camota
when arraigned on January 17, 1990. On February 26, 1991, the Trial Court rendered a
decision finding accused Virgilio Conde, Adelberto Camota and Solito Tena are all
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime. The judgment of conviction
was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession of accused Adelberto Camota.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Camota is admissible in
evidence against Tena.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the use of Camota's extrajudicial confession is
precluded by Section 25 (now Section 28), of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. On a principle
of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts
of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. But
there is an exception, it is admissible in evidence if it is proved that a co-conspirators
relationship exists between Camota and Tena. In order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission
relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. There exists no evidence of conspiracy
between Camota and accused-appellant Tena. As stressed by the trial court, there was
no eyewitness to the commission of the crime and none of the circumstantial proofs
considered by the court a quo points to a conspiracy between Camota and accused-
appellant Tena. For another, the extrajudicial confession was executed only February 1,
1989, long after the supposed conspiracy between Camota and accused-appellant had
come to an end. The extrajudicial confession of Camota thus being inadmissible against
his co-accused, and there being no evidence independently of said confession, linking
accused-appellant Solito Tena to the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide with which he is charged.

d) Admission by a co-partner or agent

e) Admission by a conspirator
People v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9181, [November 28, 1955, 97 PHIL 940-947
FACTS: Juan Consungi, Algonso Panganiban and another whose identity is still
unknown were charged with having conspired together in the murder of one Jose
Ramos. During the progress of one of their trial, while the prosecution was questioning
one of its witnesses, in connection with the making of a certain extrajudicial confession
(allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the
other defendants Alfonso Pamganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence
on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as
against the other accused Panganiban. The court (CFI QC) ordered the exclusion of the
evidence objected to but on an altogether different ground. that the prosecution could
not be permitted to introduce the confessions of the defendants Consunji and
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them without prior proof of such conspiracy
by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The prosecution moved for
a reconsideration but was denied. Wherefore, this petition for certiorari was bought by
the Solicitor General for the review and annulment of the lower court’s order completely
excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused without prior
proof of conspiracy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in excluding the of the prosecutor’s
evidence on the alleged confessions.
HELD: Yes, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in its order. This court
held in the case of Prats&Co vs Phoenix Insurance Co that “the practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy, it is impossible for a judge
of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not and where there is no indication of bad
faith on the part of the attorney offerening the evidence, the court may as a rule safely
accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. In this case, the prosecution had not yet offered the confession to
prove the alleged conspiracy. The alleged confessions had not yet even been identified,
much less offered in evidence. It was premature for the respondent court to exclude
them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy. Therefore,
the order excluding the confessions of the accused is annulled and set aside.

People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193, [January 28, 1997], 334 PHIL 779-798
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig,
Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own house. Suarez wanted his aunt
killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victim’s adopted daughter, could
get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death.
In exchange for the job, Suarez would allow the other accused to steal what they
wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the
killing of Estrellita. Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement
detailing what transpired from the planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. While Suarez and Reyes
have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower court's
decision by challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations. He claims
that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and
without the benefit of an effective counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of each of the accused are binding
against each other and admissible in evidence
HELD: Yes. If it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of
a normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with
each other in their essential details which could have been known only to the
declarants, and corroborated by other evidence against the person or persons
implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of
the crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution.
The court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions
sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused's own incriminating
statements. This doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and
recognized in numerous decisions of this Court as an exception to the res inter alios
acta rule and the hearsay rule. Reyes' confession is thus admissible against Lara to
show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by
an accused co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against him.

Gardiner v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 48185, [August 18, 1941], 73 PHIL 114-116
FACTS: On October 30,1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, filed an information against the said Catalino Fernandez and the herein
respondents Pedro Yalung, Eugenio Villegas, Maximo Manlapid, Magno Icban, and
Rufino Maun, charging them with having conspired together to kill, and that they did kill,
one Gaudencio Vivar, with evident premeditation. Upon arraignment Catalino
Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five coaccused, not guilty. At the trial of the latter, the
former was called by the fiscal as his first witness, to testify to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon objection of counsel for the defense, the respondent judge did not permit the
witness Catalino Fernandez to testify against his coaccused, on the ground that he
being a conspirator, his act or declaration is not admissible against his coconspirators
until the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration, under
section 12, rule 123 of the Rules of Court. A written motion for reconsideration,
supported with lengthy argument, was filed by the fiscal to no avail. Hence the present
petition for mandamus. The only question raised here is the interpretation of section 12
of rule 123, which reads as follows: "Sec. 12. Admission by conspirator. The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration."
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the friend of Fernandez is admissible against
Fernandez's co-accused
HELD: No. The said provision is a re-enactment of paragraph 6, section 298 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, which provided that after proof of a conspiracy, the act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy may be given in evidence. This
rule has a well-settled meaning in jurisprudence, but apparently the respondents
completely missed it. It is one of the exceptions to the "res inter alios" rule. It refers to
an extrajudicial declaration of a conspirator not to his testimony by way of direct
evidence. For illustration, let us suppose that after the formation but before the
consummation of the alleged conspiracy between Catalino Fernandez and his five co-
accused, the former borrowed a bolo from a friend, stating that he and his co-accused
were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar. Such act and declaration of Fernandez could not be
given in evidence against his co-accused unless the conspiracy be proven first. The
testimony of Fernandez's friend to the effect that Fernandez borrowed his bolo and told
him that he (Fernandez) and his co-accused were going to kill Gaudencio Vivar would
be admissible against Fernandez, but not against his co-accused unless the conspiracy
between them be proven first. It is admissible against Fernandez because the act,
declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him (section 7, rule 123). But, without proof of conspiracy, it is not admissible
against Fernandez's co-accused because the act and declaration of Fernandez are res
inter olios as to his co-accused and, therefore, cannot affect them. But if there is
conspiracy, each conspirator is privy to the acts of the others; the act of one conspirator
is the act of all the co-conspirators.

f) Admission by privies
Alpuerto v. Pastor, G.R. No. 12794, [October 14, 1918], 38 PHIL 785-800
FACTS: Alpuerto filed a case asking the court to declare him as the rightful owner of
three parcels of land originally belonging to Juan Llenos. o He claims that he acquired it
under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, duly attested and acknowledged before a
notary public. Pastor, on the other hand, asserts that the sale was simulated or fictitious,
and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding him as
creditor of Llenos. (note: contract executed in fraud of creditors is subject to rescission)
At the time of the sale between Llenos and Alpuerto (Alpuerto is actually the son-in-law
of Llenos), there was already a judgment debt in favor of Pastor. The 3 parcels of land
were levied. They were sold to Pastor. Alpuerto alleged that under Art. 1227 of the Civil
Code, Pastor was privy to the sale between him and Llenos, and, was therefore bound
by the contract of sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pastor as the the purchaser at the public sale under an
execution directed against Juan Llenos, is considered a privy or successor in interest.
HELD: Yes. Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall
have, with regard to those who sign it and their privies (causahabientes), the same force
as a public instrument. The word "privies," as used in article 1225 of the Civil Code,
denotes not only the idea of succession in right of heirship or testamentary legacy, but
also succession by virtue of acts inter vivos, as by assignment, subrogation, or
purchase—in fact any act whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the
predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is, therefore, a privy of the
execution debtor. Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term
"privies," it is clear that Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution
directed against Juan Llenos, must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the
execution debtor. Note: The Court still ruled in favor of Pastor. The Court concluded that
the transaction was made in fraud of creditors, and must be annulled. The following
circumstances were considered familiar badges of fraud, and their combined effect
raises a presumption of fraud: (1) The grantee is the sonin-law of the grantor; (2) at the
time conveyance is made an action is pending against the grantor to recover several
thousand pesos of money; and of the pendency of this action the grantee has full
knowledge; (3) the debtor has no other property out of which the judgment, if recovered,
can be satisfied; (4) the consideration for the transfer is less than half of the value of the
property in question. Dispositive Portion: The judgment entered in this cause in the
court below must accordingly be reversed; and judgment will be here entered
dismissing the complaint of Eladio Alpuerto and requiring him to surrender the three
parcels of property described in the complaint to Eustaquio Lopez, as administrator of
the estate of Jose Perez Pastor, deceased.

City of Manila v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 1284, [November 10, 1905], 5 PHIL 227-231
FACTS: This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the
complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied
by the defendant. At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the
dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
allegations in the complaint. This motion was overruled by the court, to which ruling the
defendant duly excepted.
Plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the
testimony of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The
first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question
belonged to the city. The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel
and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central
Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs. It must be
borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and
Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the
streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are
building lots.
The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership
of the land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary
evidence introduced by the plaintiff.
Of these documents the most important of all is the petition presented by Lorenzo del
Rosario to the "mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of September, 1891, and the
letter written by him on the 9th of October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila.
Lorenzo del Rosario in his testimony, admitted the authenticity of both documents which
contain an offer to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on Calle Clavel.
Lorenzo del Rosario admitted also that he signed the first document under the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently
informed by some of the city officials that the land did not belong to the municipality, but
to Cipriano Roco y Vera. He stated that he signed the second document because the
President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to do so in order to avoid
litigation with the city. His testimony in this respect was not contradicted.
ISSUE: WON the statements of Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the
documents mentioned are binding upon the defendant
HELD: NO. SC held that whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in
the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under
section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from
another, the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title." Lorenzo del
Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the
ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he
had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of
the same and had it registered, as the plaintiff admits on the 23d of February, 1893.
From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not
prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses
presented by the plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the city of
Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the
complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments
referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the
defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the
complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded
since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893.
This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land.
According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title,
unless the contrary is shown.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
allegations in the complaint, and the court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss.

g) Admission by silence
People v. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060, [July 20, 1978], 173 PHIL 316-338
FACTS: Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol
Magallanes. The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the
Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there
they had intercourse. The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the
door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused
exiting the house when she came knocking. The victim did not reveal what happened to
her until 6 days after the incident. Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.
Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what
Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual
intercourse. Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed
sweethearts. The CFI convicted Benben. CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: WON the evidence justifies a conviction.
HELD: No. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is
weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted
the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her
house where she is surrounded by her neighbors. The victim could also have revealed
the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the
accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place
and not 3 days after. Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the
allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut
the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and
Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual
communications previously. As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained: The rule
allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth is
applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2)
that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for
an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or
the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These
requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of
Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely
construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

Yoshimura v. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 10962, [September 11, 2018]

FACTS: For their application to join Lesambah Transport Cooperative, Akira and his
partner Bernadette paid Panagsagan P29,000 for documentation, P40,000 for “under
the table” and P85,000 to include another bus. Many times they asked for a refund as
there was no result. After he convinced them to join Sta. Monica Transport while their
Lesambah papers were pending, they paid him P200,000. He notarized an “agreement”
between them and Sta. Monica’s chairman Rhoel. Later, they learned that Sta. Monica
had long closed down. He refused to return their money. Despite IBP notices, he failed
to answer or attend hearings.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Panagsagan was given several opportunities to answer the complaint
against him, yet no answer came. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an
unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature
to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Silence in such
cases is almost, always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof.
Consequently, we are left with no choice but to deduce his implicit admission of the
charges levelled against him. Qui tacet consentire videtur. Silence gives consent. This
instant disbarment case will, thus, proceed despite Atty. Panagsagan's unwillingness to
cooperate in the proceedings.

h) Confessions
i) Similar acts as evidence