Can judges determine their own impartiality?

By Jennifer K. Robbennolt, JD, PhD, and Matthew Taksin, JD, University of Illinois College of Law

February 2010, Vol 41, No. 2

For justice to be truly blind, litigants must have access to unbiased legal proceedings. Accordingly,
legal decision-makers, whether jurors or judges, are expected to evaluate cases on their merits,
without prejudice or preconception. To this end, individual jurors may be excused from service if
they are unable or unwilling to keep an open mind. Similarly, judges may recuse themselves on
their own initiative or in response to a motion by a party.

It can be difficult, however, for a judge to assess his or her own impartiality. In June 2009, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc. (129 S.Ct. 2252), addressing the
issue of whether a judge must recuse himself or herself from a case when one party has donated a
significant sum in support of that judge’s election. In Caperton, a West Virginia trial court found
that the A.T. Massey Coal Co. was liable for $50 million in damages arising out of a business
dispute. After the verdict but before the case was appealed, West Virginia held its judicial
elections. Massey’s chairman and chief executive officer, Don Blankenship, expended $3 million to
support Brent Benjamin’s candidacy for a judicial seat on the West Virginia Court of Appeals — the
court that would hear the appeal in Massey’s case. Benjamin was elected.

The plaintiffs in the case moved three times to disqualify Benjamin from hearing the case.
Benjamin denied each motion, reasoning that he was not biased. With Benjamin casting the
deciding vote, the court reversed the $50 million judgment against Massey.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself
violated the due process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and found that due process required that
he be recused. Considering “a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness,” the court found that the circumstances of the case — in particular the timing and
“significant and disproportionate influence” of Blankenship’s financial support — presented a risk
of bias sufficient to interfere with due process.

Caperton raises a number of interesting questions for psychologists. First, it highlights the
limitations inherent in judging one’s own biases. Psychologists have shown that individuals
experience an illusion of objectivity: People believe they are objective (Pyszczynski and Greenberg,
1987), see themselves as more ethical and fair than others (Messick et al., 1985), and experience a
“bias blind spot,” the tendency to see bias in others but not in themselves (Pronin et al., 2004). As
noted by Judge Richard A. Posner in his book “How Judges Think” (Harvard University Press, 2008),
“We use introspection to acquit ourselves of accusations of bias, while using realistic notions of
human behavior to identify bias in others.” These tendencies make it difficult for judges to identify
their own biases. Similar problems arise when judges rely on jurors to evaluate whether they can
set aside their biases and judge a case on its merits (Rose and Diamond, 2008).
Second, the Supreme Court in Caperton did not inquire into whether Benjamin was biased. The
court said, “Due process ‘may sometimes bar trial judges who have no actual bias and who would
do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties.’” Instead, it is
the appearance of justice that matters.

Finally, research in psychology can inform the development of rules and procedures for recusal, as
well as the questions judges should ask themselves when faced with a motion requesting recusal.
Most judicial recusal situations are governed by state law and state codes of judicial ethics. In
Caperton, the Supreme Court made it clear that states are free to have more demanding
requirements than those imposed by the Constitution. As states contemplate revisions to their
judicial codes, they might consider using objective triggers for recusal and avoid leaving the
recusal decision solely to the discretion of the challenged judge. States might also consider rules
that make it easier for judges to recuse themselves by framing the recusal decision in terms of the
appearance of impropriety, rather than asking a challenged judge to evaluate his or her actual
biases.

Para que la justicia sea verdaderamente ciega, los litigantes deben tener acceso a procedimientos
legales imparciales. En consecuencia, se espera que quienes toman las decisiones legales, ya sean
jurados o jueces, evalúen los casos según sus méritos, sin prejuicios ni ideas preconcebidas. Con
este fin, los jurados individuales pueden ser excusados del servicio si no pueden o no quieren
mantener una mente abierta. Asimismo, los jueces pueden recusarse de oficio o a petición de
parte.

Sin embargo, puede ser difícil para un juez evaluar su propia imparcialidad. En junio de 2009, la
Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos decidió Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc. (129 S.Ct.
2252), que aborda la cuestión de si un juez debe recusarse de un caso cuando una de las partes ha
donado una suma significativa para apoyar la elección de ese juez. En Caperton, un tribunal de
primera instancia de West Virginia encontró que el A.T. Massey Coal Co. fue responsable de $50
millones en daños derivados de una disputa comercial. Después del veredicto, pero antes de que
se apelara el caso, Virginia Occidental celebró sus elecciones judiciales. El presidente y director
ejecutivo de Massey, Don Blankenship, gastó $3 millones para apoyar la candidatura de Brent
Benjamin para un asiento judicial en la Corte de Apelaciones de Virginia Occidental, la corte que
escucharía la apelación en el caso de Massey. Benjamín fue elegido.

Caperton plantea una serie de preguntas interesantes para los psicólogos. Primero, destaca las
limitaciones inherentes a juzgar los propios sesgos. Los psicólogos han demostrado que las
personas experimentan una ilusión de objetividad: las personas creen que son objetivas
(Pyszczynski y Greenberg, 1987), se ven a sí mismas como más éticas y justas que los demás
(Messick et al., 1985) y experimentan un "punto ciego de prejuicios". ” la tendencia a ver
prejuicios en los demás pero no en ellos mismos (Pronin et al., 2004). Como señaló el juez Richard
A. Posner en su libro "Cómo piensan los jueces" (Harvard University Press, 2008), "Usamos la
introspección para absolvernos de las acusaciones de parcialidad, mientras usamos nociones
realistas del comportamiento humano para identificar la parcialidad en los demás". Estas
tendencias dificultan que los jueces identifiquen sus propios sesgos. Problemas similares surgen
cuando los jueces confían en los miembros del jurado para evaluar si pueden dejar de lado sus
prejuicios y juzgar un caso según sus méritos (Rose y Diamond, 2008).
Judicial Notebook” is a project of APA Div. 9 (Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues).