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ROHINGYA CRISES IN BANGLADESH

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Introduction
1. Bangladesh sets an admirable example of solidarity with the Rohingya refugees
from Myanmar by hosting more than a million Rohingyas despite its resource
constraints. However, there is a perceptible shift from this rather unconditional
solidarity to an anti-refugee sentiment. In evaluating the factors that contributed to
these changing dynamics, we analysed how the host communities’ solidarity with
the plight of Rohingya refugees evolved.
2. Broadly, it identifies three key factors that influence the approaches of the locals
towards the refugees: economic instability as a result of the wage fall and price
hike, unequal access to humanitarian aid and uneven distribution of resource
opportunities created through substantial humanitarian operations and finally,
political uncertainty about the future of the Rohingya crisis.
3. In so doing, we argue that addressing the adverse impacts of a refugee crisis on
the poorer hosts, particularly within the context of a protracted refugee situation,
needs a more systematic evaluation, and it cannot be dealt with isolation from the
broader socio-economic context of the refugee-hosting regions.
4. Restricted mobility, denied citizenship, forced displacements and enduring
persecution for decades—the plight of the Rohingya community in Myanmar has
been one of the most violent and protracted humanitarian crises of recent time.
Since 2017, more than half a million Rohingya refugees have sought refuge in
Cox’s Bazar district of Bangladesh, in a bid to escape, joining almost an equal
number who had already been stranded there since 1978.

Research Design and Methodology

5. This paper’s narratives and findings derive from quantitative and qualitative tools
to gather data and information on host communities’ perceptions. A total of 300
respondents participated in this study in three phases between June to December
2019, with a diverse representation of age, occupations, gender and economic
conditions. At the same time, all efforts were made to choose respondents from
relatively lower-income households based on the hypothesis that the poorer
among the local communities are most severely affected, and the opposition
towards the refugees will be higher among them. Respondents, both living within

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the vicinity of the refugee camps and far from the camps, were purposively
selected for the interviews.
6. The survey was conducted in three sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar: Ukhiya, Teknaf
and Cox’s Bazar town. Whilst Teknaf and Ukhiya host the vast majority of the
refugees, the significant businesses managing the relief operations and NGO
activities are installed in Cox’s Bazar town, which has experienced a thriving
economic boom since 2017 following the arrival of the refugees and the
subsequent activities different aid agencies and their workers.
7. Qualitative instruments, including semi-structured informal interviews and
researchers’ observation, have been employed to gauge the host population’s
different perspectives. Lines of enquiry broadly focused on gaining insight into the
stories and challenges the locals have been experiencing throughout this massive
refugee situation and how their life and livelihood have been impacted amid these
ongoing challenges.

The forced displacement of the Rohingya people from

Myanmar to Bangladesh
8. The latest refugee outbreak manifests an ongoing and deep-seated ethnic and
political fault line in Myanmar, growing for decades. Although the situation has
escalated since 2017, the Rohingya had been subjected to persecution since 1978
when the Burmese army started its operation Nagamin (Dragon King), an attempt
to clear out what the Burmese military government referred to as ‘illegal migrants’
from neighbouring South Asian countries to the Rakhine province.

9. Since the late 1970s, the Rohingya refugees have sought refuge in Bangladesh
and other countries due to persecution in Myanmar. After decades of human rights
violation and forcible expulsions, a fresh military crackdown on the Rohingya
community in August 2017 resulted in another mass arrival of refugees in
neighbouring Bangladesh. More than a million Rohingya refugees have taken
shelter in Bangladesh, whom the government of Bangladesh refers to as ‘Forcibly
Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs)’.

10. According to the UN statistics, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees reside in Ukhiya
and Teknaf sub-districts bordering Myanmar. The Bangladesh government put the
figure around 1.1 million, although the local population claims the actual figure is
much higher than the official estimation. At present, Rohingya people constitute
more than a third of the local population in Southeast Cox’s Bazar region.

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: from solidarity to

resistance
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11. Whilst observing how local hosts’ approach to refugees evolved in Cox’s Bazar,
we identified three discrete phases based on the responses we gathered from the
fieldwork. The first phase of the crisis saw an unprecedented arrival of Rohingya
refugees, making it the ‘world’s fastest-growing refugee crisis and a major
humanitarian emergency’. The second phase began when the local and
international organisations took over the management of the situation. The second
phase of the crisis roughly spans from the beginning of December 2017 until the
first attempt to repatriate Rohingya refugees, which were supposed to commence
on November 15, 2018.Finally, with no solution in sight, the third phase or the
protracted phase began in mid-November 2018.In this phase, solidarity gradually
burnt out, and strong resentment became widespread. They became critical to
national and international humanitarian agencies over the allocation of
humanitarian aid and implementation of refugee relief projects.

Solidarity with the refugees

12. Almost all the refugees fleeing persecution sought refuge around the Ukhiya and
Teknaf sub-districts of Cox’s Bazar. However, the host population in Cox’s Bazar
showed solidarity and provided vital support to the refugees on humanitarian
grounds. Our study identified four potential causes, which are (a) religious
similarities between the refugees and the hosts; (b) historical linkage with the
Rohingya refugees; (c) solidarity from the major political parties and lastly (d)
Bangladesh’s historical experience as a refugee-producing country during the
liberation war.

13. Solidarity with the plight of Rohingya refugees is partly embedded in the shared
memory of refugee experiences of the Bangladeshi people. During the 1971
liberation war of Bangladesh, almost 10 million Bangladeshi refugees escaped to
bordering India in a military crackdown by the Pakistani armed forces. For
Bangladeshi, especially for the political and urban elites, the Rohingya situation is
a painful reminder of Bangladesh’s bloody liberation war. The war and the
subsequent refugee situation remain a defining feature of Bangladesh’s national
psyche. The Bangladeshi Prime Minister lately referred to the 1971 refugee crisis
after visiting the Rohingya refugee camp and said, ‘We, too, were forced to seek
refuge in India in the face of Pakistan’s attack’. This narrative and historical
experience significantly contributed to the solidarity approach from the
Bangladeshi political establishments and urban elites.

The growing concerns on the host communities

14. The immediate adverse consequences of refugee settlement were hardest on the
hosts depending on natural resources, daily wage earners, small business owners
and farmers. Furthermore, the deterioration of public services caused resentment
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against the overall refugee response. Rising prices of essential commodities,

falling wages for low-skilled workers, competition over limited natural resources,
loss of livelihood and tensions related to security are the critical factors in
developing an understanding of the changing dynamics of the refugee-hosts
relationship.

Humanitarian support for the Rohingyas

15. Bangladesh's Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief is giving humanitarian
assistance to Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar's Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas. A
number of national and international organizations have also stepped up to assist.
At a summit in Geneva convened by the UN, IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, and co-hosted
by Kuwait and the European Union, a total of USD $434 million was requested as
humanitarian assistance for Rohingya refugees . At the summit, thirty-five sources
pledged a total of USD $344 million. The total incoming fund is equivalent to USD
one hundred forty three pint one nine million as of 10 November 2017, which is 33
per cent of the UN (UNOCHA) information appeal fund.

Diplomatic initiatives
16. The atrocities against the Rohingyas in Myanmar by the Myanmar government
have been defined as “ethnic cleansing” by the UNHCR. The Prime Minister of
Bangladesh has proposed a five-point proposal for resolving the Rohingya crisis:
Myanmar has to stop the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing against
the Rohingyas; the UN Secretary-General should send a fact-finding mission to
Myanmar immediately; the civilian population in Myanmar must be safeguarded
irrespective of religion and ethnicity; to ensure the sustainable return to Myanmar
for all forcibly displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh, the Myanmar government has
been requested to end excessive military force and inter-communal violence in
Rakhine state by the UN Security Council . The Myanmar government has also
been requested to resolve the Rohingya crisis in Rakhine by the Kofi Annan
Commission . The European Union imposed an embargo on the supply of arms
and commodities to Myanmar on this matter. The US has also proclaimed
Myanmar’s withdrawal of military assistance.

Bilateral agreement
17. Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, the Home Minister of Bangladesh, visited Myanmar
on October 24–27, 2017 and talked with the Minister of Home Affairs of Myanmar
over the repatriation of the Rohingyas. During this period, Bangladesh and
Myanmar signed two security and border co-operation agreements. They
concluded after the discussion that they should coordinate efforts and adopt
measures to send the Rohingyas back to Myanmar in a secure, dignified and
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transparent way . They planned to take all feasible policies to restore normalcy in
the Rakhine State in order to facilitate the dispossessed Myanmar citizens to return
to their homeland soon.

Legal status of Rohingyas

18. The most painful plight is losing identity. The Rohingyas have been suffering from
an identity crisis for a long time. Though as citizens of the country they contributed
to Myanmar’s society and economy, their origin, ethnicity and identity were
questioned repeatedly. Instead, they were identified by the Myanmar government
as “Illegal Bengali Immigrants to Myanmar”. The Bangladesh government, on the
contrary, identifies them as “Forcefully Displaced Myanmar Citizens”. Bangladesh
signed several international human rights treaties. Some of these treaties’
provisions indirectly promote refugee rights that are not enforceable in courts of
law. Bangladesh issued identity cards to the Rohingyas as “Myanmar Nationals”
to handle the crisis. All these Myanmar nationals, the Rohingyas, were
biometrically registered by the Department of Immigration and Passport,
Bangladesh. They receive three types of humanitarian aid: material relief, medical
assistance and shelter in Bangladesh .

Budgetary implications

19. The funding requirement was estimated to be 434 USD million for 1.2 million
Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh for the last six months (September
2017 to February 2018). UNHCR requested an additional 83.7 USD million
in funds. In September 2017 to February 2018, the estimated costs of
providing for the Rohingya refugees was 517.78 USD million (source: UN
website).

20. Based on the estimation of UNHCR, many NGOs have tried to estimate the
fund requirement for the Fiscal Year 2018–19. They anticipated that they
would require an amount of 882 USD million for ten months. Expenditure
per day per Rohingya refugee was found to be 2.45. USD

21. Many international organizations and NGOs are presently providing

humanitarian support to Rohingya refugees. But it can be easily said that it
will not continue for long. Then Bangladesh has to carry the burden of the
Rohingya refugees (Joehnk, 2017). The extent of the Bangladesh
government’s expenditure will depend on the duration of the Rohingya
refugees’ stay. In the present budgetary framework, there is no scope for
additional public spending. The Bangladesh government is thinking about
taking a loan from the World Bank.

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22. Although various organizations have anticipated the estimated requirement,

it is only indicative. These are direct costs for the Rohingya refugees to be
incurred. But, if they need rehabilitation in the proposed area of
Bhashanchar of Bangladesh, there will be a need for additional costs such
as land and infrastructure development costs.

Conclusion
23. There is a growing consensus that the unprecedented arrival of refugees has
strained limited resources, necessary infrastructure, public services and the local
economy. Nevertheless, it would be imprecise to attribute refugees to the
development of negative attitudes towards the Rohingya refugees. Instead, we
argue that declining state capacity to deliver service, inadequate attention to
institution building, broadly refugee centric policies of the humanitarian aid
agencies, unequal access to humanitarian assistance and uncertainty about the
future collectively contributed to the shift in public attitudes towards the Rohingya
refugees.

24. From a policy perspective, the findings of our study suggest that the refugee-host
interaction is placed in jeopardy when host communities’ needs are overlooked or
inadequately addressed by the local state entities and humanitarian aid agencies.
In this circumstance, an understanding of the causes and the consequences of the
adverse impact on the hosts is necessary to ensure proper distribution of
humanitarian relief and the implementation of refugee and host community support
projects, mainly in the protracted phase of the crisis. Furthermore, recognising
local constraints is critical to the comprehensive management of the refugee
situation, something that many current policy efforts, both by aid organisations and
the Bangladeshi government, lack.

25. Thus, a humanitarian response that is mostly refugee centric may only risk the
further deterioration of social cohesion and host-refugee relationship dynamics.
Therefore, considering the protracted nature of the crisis, this study suggests an
all-inclusive and comprehensive humanitarian engagement by focusing on service
delivery and capacity development of the state and by ensuring a shift from the
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refugee centric humanitarian assistance programme to integrated refugees-hosts

humanitarian support programmes in Bangladesh.

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