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A current literature review of international mediation

Article  in  International Journal of Conflict Management · February 2014

DOI: 10.1108/IJCMA-02-2012-0020

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A current
A current literature review of literature review
international mediation
Allard Duursma
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 81
Uppsala, Sweden

Abstract
Purpose – A rapidly expanding body of literature on international mediation, as well as the central
role international mediation plays in modern-day conflict resolution, make it necessary to review and
analyze this vastly evolving field of study. This study seeks to review the most significant trends and
debates in the literature on international mediation, with an emphasis on the literature of the past six
years.
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Design/methodology/approach – Reflecting Wall et al.’s staged conceptualization of the mediation

process; this review essay is divided in three sections that cover the antecedents of mediation, possible
mediation approaches, and the outcomes these approaches yield – making it possible to review and
analyze the diverse sets of theories within the field of mediation, as well the various methodological
approaches employed to test these theories.
Findings – Much research to date has focused on how international mediation in armed conflicts
affects the likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement, while other possible outcomes of mediation
have been understudied. Accordingly, research needs to be done on the effects of mediation attempts
that did not lead to a peace agreement, as well as the accumulative effect of peace agreements.
Furthermore, the relation between negative peace and mediation has been studied extensively, but
how mediation affects the degree of positive peace has received scant scholarly attention. Finally, the
interlinkages between the different phases of the mediation process need to be examined more
extensively.
Originality/value – This review identifies the state of the art knowledge concerning the
international mediation process, which allows peacemakers to make informed decisions in order to
prevent and resolve armed conflict in the twenty-first century.
Keywords Review, International mediation, Mediation occurrence, Mediation outcomes,
Mediation strategy, Mediator type
Paper type Literature review

Introduction
On 22 June 2011, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly unanimously adopted a
resolution which reaffirmed the international community’s commitment to
strengthening the role of international mediation in conflict prevention and
resolution (United Nations General Assembly, 2011). Since mediation is already
explicitly mentioned in article 33 of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, this resolution was an
acknowledgment of the central role mediation plays in modern-day conflict resolution.
Evidence supports this proposition. Mediation has occurred in 70 percent of all
conflicts since 1945 and the probability of a peace agreement being concluded is six
times more likely when third-party intermediaries are present (Bercovitch and Gartner, International Journal of Conflict
2009; Frazier and Dixon, 2009). Management
Vol. 25 No. 1, 2014
That mediation plays a central role in modern-day conflict resolution is also pp. 81-98
reflected in a rapidly expanding body of literature. Indeed, since the early 1960s, the q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1044-4068
number of studies on mediation has increased progressively, if not exponentially, as is DOI 10.1108/IJCMA-02-2012-0020
 IJCMA reflected in several seminal literature reviews on the topic (Wall, 1981; Wall and Lynn,
25,1 1993; Wall et al., 2001). Such an expansion makes it necessary to review and analyze
this vastly evolving field of study. The goal of this review essay is therefore to identify
the state of the art knowledge concerning the international mediation process, since a
better understanding of the recent trends and debates within this field will allow
scholars of mediation to advance this field. More specifically, this article aims to
82 specify and complete Wall et al.’s (2001) literature review on mediation by proffering a
review on international mediation, rather than mediation in general, with an emphasis
on the literature after 2001.
One possible way to organize the literature on international mediation reasonably
and concisely is to divide the mediation process into separate phases. For instance,
Wall et al. (2001) distinguish between four phases: the adversaries’ interactions before
mediation occurs, mediation itself, the approach a mediator pursues as the mediation
gets under way, and the outcomes these approaches yield.
This review essay is in line with Wall et al.’s (2001) staged conceptualization of
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mediation and is divided in three sections that cover the antecedents of mediation,
possible mediation approaches, and the outcomes these approaches yield:

Antecedents of Mediation ! Mediation Approaches ! Mediation Outcomes

On the basis of this conceptual framework, the first section addresses the conditions
necessary for mediation to occur, the second section refers to the various approaches a
mediator can pursue and what governs the mediator’s choice to employ a particular
mediation strategy, and the third section discusses the possible outcomes of
international mediation processes, as well as what factors influence these outcomes.
This makes it possible to review and analyze the diverse sets of theories within the
field of mediation, as well the various methodological approaches employed to test
these theories, in a comprehensive and structured manner. The list, included in
section 4, will summarize the main findings on the basis of this conceptual framework.
The review encompasses 17 studies from 2001-2012 that supplement research on
international mediation in armed conflicts. However, since these scholarly works have
not been written in a vacuum, some other works are briefly referred to if this is
necessary for a better understanding of the argument. The four primary works
reviewed in the first section focus on the conditions that explain the occurrence of
mediation (Maundi et al., 2006; Greig and Regan, 2008; Beardsley, 2011; Kelman, 2005).
These studies thus aim to answer the “when” question of mediation. It follows from
this section that the literature on mediation incidence has diversified in recent years,
both in terms of theory and methodology.
A further seven scholarly pieces, in section two, touch upon the many different
approaches a mediator can pursue, thus addressing the “how” question of mediation
(Savun, 2009; Svensson, 2007b; Rauchhaus, 2006; Kydd, 2006; Sisk, 2009; Greig and
Diehl, 2005; Kaufman, 2006). The debate concerning which strategy of mediation is more
effective can be traced back to the 1980s, but it follows from this section that the
successfulness of different methods of mediation is still contested. In addition, a new
debate has emerged from 2001 onwards regarding the effectiveness of biased mediators.
The third section addresses the different types of outcomes these mediation
approaches yield: the “what” question of mediation. Since the conclusion of peace
agreements as a outcome variable of international mediation is discussed in the
 previous section, this section discusses nine scholarly works that have gone beyond the A current
mere conclusion of peace agreements as a criterion for mediation success. Four studies literature review
are included that address the durability of peace agreements (Werner and Yuen, 2005;
Beardsley, 2008; Beardsley, 2011; Carment et al., 2009), as well as two studies that
examine the quality of the concluded peace (Svensson, 2007a, 2009). It follows from this
section that, studies extending the scope of analysis beyond the conclusion of a peace
agreement, have moved beyond the forcing versus fostering debate in recent years. 83
The final section of this review essay recapitulates the main findings, as well as
presents potential avenues for future research.

1. Antecedents of international mediation

Since mediation is consensual to all parties involved in it, scholars of mediation have
studied the motives of involved actors as a way to uncover when and where mediation
is most likely to take place.
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1.1 The conflict parties’ motives

Several factors that motivate conflict parties to accept mediation are identified in the
literature, but one of the most established ones is the mutual hurting stalemate (MHS);
which is a situation where disputants feel they are trapped in a costly conflict from
which they cannot escape through victory (Zartman, 2008). According to Zartman, a
MHS makes a conflict “ripe” for resolution since parties will seek a way out in order to
avoid the negative consequences of what they feel as a costly predicament (Zartman,
2008). In essence, ripeness thus suggest the moment where the conflict parties’ fear of
continuing the war becomes greater than the fear of peace. The proposition that
conflict parties experiencing pain and loss are ready for negotiations is confirmed in a
comparative study of six African armed conflicts by Maundi et al. (2006). Yet, the
added value of this study is not so much in confirming Zartman’s “ripeness” theory,
which he put forward as early as 1989, as it is in generating new knowledge with
regard to mediators’ entries into armed conflicts. Basing the in-depth case studies on a
rational-choice framework, the authors find that a high confidence in the mediator’s
ability to achieve preferred outcomes increases the probability of acceptance or a
request of mediation. On the other hand, it is found that high stakes will make rejection
of mediation more likely; since mediation reduces the flexibility of the adversaries in
negotiations, they are less willing to be limited to certain outcomes when much is at
stake. In addition, the authors illustrate how mediation can be used by conflict parties
to obtain political support, since it reduces perceived accountability of the leaders that
have to make compromises (Maundi et al., 2006).
Findings as those of Maundi et al. (2006) have recently also been confirmed in
quantitative studies. While studies on when international mediation is most likely to
take place emerged as early as the 1980s (e.g. Zartman, 1989), it was not until the turn
of the century that scholars started examining the conditions that promote the
occurrence of mediation between conflict parties in a more systematic manner. In this
regard, Greig (2005) points out that scholars of mediation have devoted considerable
attention to the form that mediation takes, while ignoring conditions under which
mediation is most likely to occur.
One recent quantitative study by Beardsley fills this gap and supports the
proposition that conflict parties are driven by self-interest. Mediation is found to be
 IJCMA more likely when the conflict intensity is high, when it has an ethnic dimension, when
25,1 it is between opponents of similar strength, and when the crisis is long; which are
conditions typically associated with the presence of a MHS (Beardsley, 2011). The
findings of a quantitative analysis by Greig and Regan (2008) are also in line with the
idea of conflict parties being driven by self-interest, but they neither find significant
nor substantial evidence that the number of annual battle deaths influence the
84 willingness to accept mediation[1]. Nevertheless, they do find that conflict duration
influences the likelihood of mediation being accepted (Greig and Regan, 2008). More
specifically, the results in Greig’s and Regan’s censored probit model suggest that
offers of mediation are most likely to be rejected in the earliest and latest stages of the
civil war. The authors explain this finding by pointing out that both the earliest and
the latest phases of conflicts have unique characteristics that make parties hesitant to
negotiate: in the early stages conflict parties generally believe a victory is possible,
while in the later stages the parties perceive high sunk costs making them hesitant to
accept any alternative other than victory (Greig and Regan, 2008).
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Greig and Regan (2008) also find that the reputation of the third-party influences the
decision-making calculus of the disputants. A mediator that has reached an agreement
in all of the armed conflicts in which it has previously been involved has nearly a 19
percent greater probability of being accepted as third-party than a mediator without
prior success (Greig and Regan, 2008). In short, Greig and Regan (2008), although
stressing conflict duration rather than battle deaths, find a relation between conflict
costs and the willingness of conflict parties to accept mediation. They also find that
mediators with a potential for success are more likely to be accepted. This means that
Greig and Regan (2008), just as Zartman (2008) and Maundi et al. (2006), base their
research on the idea that a necessary precondition for negotiations is a perception by
the adversaries that a negotiated outcome is preferable to continued fighting and a way
out is possible.
Beardsley (2011) has a different take on the reasons of warring parties to accept
mediation. Although he recognizes that warring parties can be motivated to accept
mediation by a desire for the conclusion of a peace agreement, Beardsley stresses that
peace is not necessarily the ultimate goal of mediation. Drawing on Richmond’s (1998)
seminal study on “devious objectives” of warring parties, Beardsley (2011) puts
forward two motives, other than a desire for a negotiated outcome, which might
explain the onset of mediation. First, mediation in intrastate conflicts might be used by
rebel parties to gain recognition. Governments indirectly legitimize the negotiation
positions of insurgents if they agree to negotiate with them. Second, mediation might
be used as a stalling tactic. Getting involved in mediation provides combatants with
time to regroup and reorganize, which may allow them to take the battlefield from a
stronger position and end up with a better agreement (Beardsley, 2011). Beardsley thus
puts forward some theoretical arguments why mediation can occur in spite of a lack of
a desire among the conflict parties to make peace.
The findings of the studies addressed above all suggest that conflict parties are
rational actors, who make cost-benefit analyses, and are primarily driven by
self-interest. Indeed, an issue that has only been scarcely addressed in recent years, in
terms of the conflict parties’ motives for mediation, is the role of psychological
dynamics that make disputants hesitant to engage in mediation. A recent study by
Kelman (2005) is an exception in this regard. On the basis of conflict resolution efforts
 related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman (2005) explains that on the one hand, A current
developing trust between opposing groups in armed conflicts is problematic, since both literature review
conflict parties believe – usually with a long history of supporting evidence – that the
adversary is bent on causing them harm (Kelman, 2005). This level of distrust makes
conflict parties hesitant to become involved in a mediation process. On the other hand,
trust cannot be built without engaging in peace talks. Kelman argues that a mediator
can play a decisive role in tackling this dilemma, since the presence of a third-party 85
allows the adversaries to interact at a relative low level of commitment, which reduces
the conflict parties’ fears of the opposing party exploiting this trust (Kelman, 2005,
p. 645). Indeed, instead of drawing on economic assumptions about the nature of
human motivation to explain why conflict parties accept mediation, Kelman thus
emphasizes factors that contribute to the persistence of violence and why initiating
mediation is so problematic. In this sense, Kelman also points out that a rationalistic
concept such as self-interest as an explanatory variable for the onset of mediation has
its limits, since it overlooks the psychological dynamics underlying armed conflicts.
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1.2 The mediators’ motives

Some of the scholarly works discussed above not only consider conflict parties’ motives,
but also focus on the diverse set of reasons underlying the mediation efforts of
third-parties. It follows from Maundi et al. (2006) that a positive impact on the mediator’s
interests make offers of mediation more likely. A slightly idiosyncratic example in this
regard is that Zairian President Mobutu tried to improve his relations with the US
through mediating the N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement between the Hutu dominated
Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in N’sele, Zaire, on 29
March 1991. It is highlighted in Maundi et al. that with the end of the Cold War, the US
was less willing to overlook human rights abuses in Zaire, which made Mobutu decide to
portray himself as a regional peacemaker as a way to improve his relations with the
Bush administration (Maundi et al., 2006). This, in turn, highlights the relative strength
of case-studies when studying mediation. In contrast to quantitative studies, case-studies
can examine the unique context in which mediation takes place.
Beardsley adds to the finding that interests explain mediation incidence by
distinguishing between public interests and private interests that a mediator may
have. The collective benefits include a more stable international system and decrease in
negative externalities of armed conflicts (Beardsley, 2011). Private benefits usually
relate to reducing spillover-effects that directly affect the third-party; for example,
through trade disruptions and refugee flows when the armed conflict takes place in a
neighboring country (Beardsley, 2011). Private benefits, according to Beardsley, can
also be humanitarian in nature. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are particularly likely to value peace as an
end in itself according to Beardsley (2011).
The private and public benefits identified by Beardsley are in line with the findings in
his quantitative analysis. Indeed, when the conflict intensity is high, third-parties are
more likely to mediate, which could be explained both by the negative spillover effects
and high humanitarian costs of the conflict (Beardsley, 2011). Similarly, Greig and Regan
(2008) find support for the proposition that a mediator is more likely to mediate when its
private interests are at stake. A state is nearly 14 times more likely to mediate in its
neighboring country than an average state 1,265 miles away (Greig and Regan, 2008).
 IJCMA Although Beardsley’s empirical findings are in line with his self-interest based
25,1 explanations of mediation incidence, one can question the added value of his broad
understanding of the concept. Since Beardsley believes self-interest also covers
value-driven interests, the concept is stressed thin. For example, the finding that high
conflict intensity is likely to lead to third-parties offering mediation can be explained
through negative spillover-effects neighboring countries experience, but also through
86 value-driven interests that are humanitarian in nature. Indeed, considering that
self-interest lies at the heart of most current explanations of the onset of mediation, it is
striking that what the concept exactly entails has received little attention. Questions
concerning how individuals and organizations decide on and conceive their interests
have remained unaddressed. Third-parties are generally treated as unitary actors in
the recent international mediation literature, but it is apparent that mediators in reality
often represent complex organizations, in which equally complex decision-making
processes take place[2].
Finally, the studies above solely focus on reasons for third-parties to mediate; but
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besides being motivated, a third-party should also have the capabilities to mediate.
This gap is addressed by Crocker et al. (2003) in an article in 2003, in which they argue,
on the basis of many illustrative examples, that scholars of mediation should also
consider whether the mediator is ready at the operational and political, strategic and
diplomatic, as well as the relational levels. However, recent scholarship has neglected
the issue of whether a mediator is ready to mediate in terms of resources.

1.3 Summary
In summary, a diverse set of explanatory variables focusing on the occurrence of
mediation is put forward in the literature. Ever since Zartman (1989) put forward his
ripeness theory, high conflict costs have generally been considered as a key factor in
determining the successful entry of mediators in conflicts. Indeed, many previous reviews
on international mediation have considered the prominence of ripeness in the literature on
international mediation (e.g. Kleiboer, 1996; Wall et al. 2001). Yet, scholarly studies after
2001 have added many other factors that seem to influence the occurrence of mediation.
For instance, confidence by the disputants that a specific mediator can help them reach
their preferred outcome, as well as the need for an excuse to make undesired
compromises, are identified as motives of conflict parties to accept or request mediation
(Maundi et al., 2006; Greig and Regan, 2008; Beardsley, 2011). Another relevant addition to
the prevailing conflict “ripeness” paradigm is that conflict parties may not always engage
in mediation with a desire to make peace (Beardsley, 2011). With regard to the supply-side
of mediation, it is found that a state is more likely to mediate when the conflict intensity is
high and when an armed conflict is taking place in its neighboring country.
Besides greater theoretical diversity, studies on mediation occurrence after 2001 have
also grown in terms of methodological diversity in recent years. The methods employed
to explain mediation incidence range from prescriptive studies (e.g. Zartman, 1989),
in-depth case studies and structured, focused comparisons (e.g. Maundi et al., 2006) to
formal modeling (e.g. Smith and Stam, 2003), but it was not until recently that scholars
have started to pay attention to the conditions under which mediation occurs in a more
systematic manner, through quantitative analyses (e.g. Greig, 2005; Greig and Regan,
2008; Beardsley, 2011). The great strides recent scholarship has made towards
identifying mediation determinants is thus also due to methodological advances.
 Although the recent literature has generated many new insights on the onset of A current
mediation, some gaps in research have been left unaddressed. As a consequence of the literature review
many new theoretical arguments, the issue of which factors matter most has received
scant scholarly attention. Zartman’s “ripeness” theory dominates the literature, but
which factors matter most when explaining the onset of mediation needs to be
examined further. Furthermore, one consequence of recent scholarship focusing on
self-interest as an explanatory variable for mediation is that third-parties are treated as 87
unitary actors. Since many studies draw on the notion of self-interest, there is a need
for conceptual clarity regarding this concept. Finally, most of the literature focuses on
whether third-parties want to mediate rather than whether they are able to. These
issues leave space for future studies.

2. International mediation approaches

Mediation is always undertaken based on the conflict parties’ consent. However,
mediators are not merely bystanders; rather, they actively take part in the conflict
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resolution process. Indeed, once mediation is accepted by the warring parties, it takes
place along a spectrum of intervention ranging from a fostering style to a forceful style
of mediation (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009). Mediation can thus take many forms.

2.1 Providing relevant information

Although not directly engaging with the issue of whether a fostering or forceful
method of mediation is more effective, Savun (2009) argues that mediators that are
capable of providing relevant information to the disputants are more effective in
preventing or resolving violent conflict than their counterparts without relevant
information. Drawing on bargaining theory, Savun (2009) argues that improving the
flow of information can reduce uncertainty among the conflict parties about each
other’s reservation points, which is the point where a party prefers fighting over a
negotiated settlement. Providing this information therefore may lead to an agreement
that is in line with the costs each of the conflict parties bear and the probability of one
of them winning, making further fighting unnecessary (Savun, 2009).
In order to test whether a mediator providing relevant information is positively
correlated with mediation success, Savun employs a quantitative analysis. In this
analysis, a mediation episode is regarded as successful when the mediator succeeds in
concluding a ceasefire, partial, or full peace agreement as successful (Savun, 2009). In
terms of the explanatory variables, Savun looks at the levels of information state
mediators and international organizations have. To determine whether a state
mediator has relevant information, three indicators are used: the strength of the
military intelligence, the diplomatic representation in the conflict area, and any highly
institutionalized alliance structure between the mediator’s state and one of the conflict
parties. For international organizations, Savun (2009) only looks at the UN, since she
expects the UN to have more information about the resolve and capabilities of conflict
parties than uninformed states.
Evidence supports the proposition that both informed states and informed
international organizations are more successful in mediation than states without
relevant information. Indeed, compared to a state with no relevant information, a state
with high levels of information is 166 times more likely to be successful (Savun, 2009).
Similarly, the UN is 38 times more likely to be successful than uninformed states
 IJCMA (Savun, 2009). Yet, the added value of Savun’s study is not so much her findings that
25,1 providing information can be an effective mediation strategy, as it is in highlighting
that the effectiveness of this strategy is dependent on the mediator having high levels
of relevant information.

2.2 Biased mediators

88 While Savun’s study on providing relevant information as a way to resolve conflict has
a long tradition, recent studies have produced a whole body of innovative knowledge
concerning how a mediator can credibly provide information. These studies examine
how the identity of a mediator influences its credibility. Kydd (2003) argues in a
seminal article, which puts forward a formal model of mediation, that since it is in the
interest of a mediator to make peace, it has strong incentives to make statements that
will induce one of the parties to make a compromise, even if these statements do not
correspond with reality. A mediator can, for example, exaggerate the resolve and
strength of the opponent. Kydd describes this costless but strategic communication as
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“cheap talk” (Kydd, 2003, p. 598). According to Kydd’s logic a mediator is therefore
more effective if it is biased when it tries to convince one side to make a concession by
providing information.
However, Kydd’s formal argument is only partly confirmed in a quantitative study by
Svensson (2007b). On the one hand, Svensson finds that non-biased mediators are more
effective than both government-biased and rebel-biased mediators with regard to the
conclusion of a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, Svensson shows that biased
mediators are effective, but that it is important to distinguish between rebel-biased and
government-biased mediators since he finds that, unlike government-biased mediators,
rebel-biased mediators have no significant effect. Svensson explains this finding by
pointing out that in the early phase of a peace process rebels have a commitment
problem since they gain opportunities that can be exploited in the future. For example,
they gain legitimacy, time to reorganize, and access to official structures. Svensson
therefore believes that mediators that are biased towards the government are more
effective, since they can mitigate the government’s fear of rebels exploiting these
opportunities. In addition, by accepting a biased mediator, rebels show their
trustworthiness (Svensson, 2007b). Although not mutually exclusive, Svensson’s and
Kydd’s findings are thus not entirely similar. While Kydd (2003) believes a mediator has
to be biased towards the side that has to make concessions, Svensson (2007b) believes a
mediator should always be on the side of the government in order to increase the
prospects for a peace agreement. In short, Svensson adds to the debate on biased
mediators by highlighting the need to differentiate between rebel-biased and
government-biased mediators in intra-state armed conflicts.

2.3 Unbiased mediators

Despite the strong evidence put forward in the studies reviewed above, the
effectiveness of biased mediation is not unchallenged. It follows from a formal model
employed by Rauchhaus (2006) that in order to share information credibly, the
mediator has to be unbiased. Additionally, it is found in a quantitative analysis
employed in the same study that impartial mediators outperform biased mediators
both substantially and significantly (Rauchhaus, 2006). However, Kydd (2006) explains
that the discrepancy between Rauchaus’s study and studies that find biased mediators
 to have positive effects is likely due to a lack of conceptual clarity. While Kydd (2003) A current
defines a mediator as biased when it shares one side’s preference ordering of the literature review
possible outcomes in a conflict, Rauchhaus sees a mediator only as neutral when its
preferred outcome is within the bargaining space, which means the outcome is an
mutual satisfactory agreement (Kydd, 2006). A mediator is thus biased, according to
Rauchhaus, when its preferred outcome is not within the bargaining space. The
findings of Kydd (2003) and Rauchhaus (2006) thus do not necessarily conflict. A 89
mediator that prefers an outcome that is on the bargaining space but is more favorable
to the side its supports, would be a biased mediator in Kydd’s (2003) study, but would
be a neutral mediator in Rauchhaus’s study. Finally, instead of focusing on the
mediator’s preferences directly, Svensson (2007b, 2009) understands a mediator to be
biased when it has given one of the warring parties’ secondary support; a definition
that fits the purpose of his quantitative analysis. Svensson thus focuses on a
third-party’s actions rather than its preferences. In short, there is a need for transparent
definitions in the debate on biased mediators.
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2.4 Bargaining with bullets

Instead of providing information, either through a biased or unbiased mediator, a
mediator can also employ a more forceful approach to put an end to armed conflict. In a
recent monograph, Sisk (2009) argues that powerful mediation is much more effective
than other methods of mediation, such as providing information or building trust. Sisk
sets out that the primary aim of a mediator is to steer the conflict parties from war to
peace through curbing potential violence of parties aiming to spoil the peace process.
According to Sisk (2009), a powerful mediator is more up to this task since it is more
effective in minimizing the potential cost and increasing the potential benefits of the
parties involved in the mediation process. To determine a mediator’s leverage, Sisk
distinguishes between non-coercive and coercive measures a mediator can take. Next, he
identifies three kinds of non-coercive measures: purchase, insurance, and legitmation; as
well as three kinds of coercive measures: pressures, sanctions, and military force.
After having put forward this theoretical framework, Sisk finds in each of the five
cases that he employs that a rewards and threats based strategy is positively
associated with success in mediation. Since forceful mediation usually is considered
more effective in making conflict parties sign a peace agreement (e.g. Bercovitch and
Gartner, 2009), the added value of Sisk’s work is mainly in identifying the causal
mechanisms that underlie this correlation.

2.5 Enforcing an agreement

Although Sisk (2009) believes enforcing and/or monitoring an agreement is part of the
non-coercive measures a mediator can take to make conflict parties commit to peace,
this specific function of a mediator deserves special attention since it has been a source
of much debate in recent years. Several recent studies on mediation have engaged with
the findings in Walter’s (2002) seminal work, in which she finds that third-party
security guarantees increase the likelihood of a peace agreement, as well as durable
peace.
For instance, Greig and Diehl (2005) examine the relation between the presence of a
peacekeeping force and the prospects of the conclusion of an agreement. Walter (2002)
only considers whether promises of peacekeeping forces increase the likelihood of the
 IJCMA conclusion of a peace agreement; yet, there are cases in which a peacekeeping force is
25,1 put in place after a ceasefire, but prior to the conclusion of a peace agreement. Greig
and Diehl therefore aim to examine how the presence of a peacekeeping force
influences the peacemaking process in these cases. In the theoretical framework of their
study, Greig and Diehl put forward two theoretical views that can explain the relation
between a peacekeeping force and the prospects of a peace agreement. The first view
90 holds that peacekeeping missions create environments in which conflict parties are
more likely to settle their differences. The level of fighting generally tends to decrease
after a peacekeeping mission has been deployed, which makes it easier for mediators to
build trust and reach a peace agreement (Greig and Diehl, 2005). The second view holds
that the deployment of a peacekeeping force may decrease the feeling among the
conflict parties that they are caught in a costly predicament, which gives them fewer
incentives to find a way out through the conclusion of a comprehensive peace
agreement (Greig and Diehl, 2005). In order to test which of these two competing logic
is the most accurate, Greig and Diehl employ a quantitative analysis. In this analysis,
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they find support for the view that peacekeeping decreases the likelihood of a
settlement being concluded. In short, Greig’s and Diehl’s findings are a significant
addition to the literature on mediation since they highlight that enforcing a mediated
ceasefire can hamper the mediation efforts aimed at concluding a peace agreement.

2.6 Changing hostile attitudes

The two mediation strategies addressed above – leveraging costs and providing
benefits and monitoring and enforcing peace agreements – both assume that a
mediator can manipulate the bargaining environment in such a way that conflict
parties will prefer a negotiated settlement over continued fighting. In a recent study,
Kaufman (2006) makes an important reservation regarding the effectives of these
capacity-based mediation approaches. At the heart of Kaufman’s critique lies the
notion that peacemaking efforts based on leverage pay insufficient attention to
ameliorating the emotional and symbolic roots of armed conflict; and instead he argues
that that resolving armed conflicts requires changing hostile attitudes towards more
moderate ones. Although Kaufman acknowledges that armed conflicts are fought over
tangible issues such as land, resources, power, and security; he finds that these issues
are not the fundamental barrier to conflict resolution, since these issues are divisible or
positive-sum in nature. Instead, Kaufman believes that what makes armed conflicts
intractable are myths and fears that lead the disputants to demand political and
military superiority. Accordingly, the logical implication of Kaufman’s argument is
that transforming the psycho-political dynamics of conflict through
confidence-building is the most effective approach of making peace. Since
Kaufman’s study deviates from most of the recent studies on mediation, in which it
is assumed that wars result from conflicts of interest among rational individuals, his
article is a significant addition to recent literature. Furthermore, Kaufman’s argument
that international mediation should be aimed at changing disputant’s hostile attitudes
points to a gap in recent research: little attention has been paid to how the behavior of
mediators, or what one could describe as personal style, influences the disputants’
attitudes. While this has been examined on the level of community dispute resolution
centers (e.g. Zubek et al., 1992), it remains the question whether these findings can be
translated to contexts in which international mediation takes place.
 2.7 Summary A current
Although the debate concerning which strategy of mediation is most effective has a literature review
long history, with Touval and Zartman outlining their seminal typology of mediation
as early as 1985, the debate is still very much alive. Compared to scholarly works
before 2001 (Wall et al. 2001), a current trend is that most scholars addressing a specific
mediation approach draw on bargaining theory to put forward their theoretical
arguments. A notable exception in this regard is Kaufman’s (2006) study on the role of 91
emotions and perceptions regarding conflict resolution.
Furthermore, the many studies on biased mediators could be classified as being part
of an emerging academic debate. Although this topic has been addressed before the
2000s (e.g. Touval and Zartman, 1985), after the turn of the century, biased mediators
gained renewed attention in studies that applied techniques such as formal modeling
(e.g. Kydd, 2003; Rauchhaus, 2006; Kydd, 2006) and statistical analysis (Svensson,
2007b, 2009).
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3. International mediation outcomes

The studies reviewed in the previous section are in line with the majority of the studies
on mediation to date, which have mainly focused on the short-term effects of mediation.
Savun (2009), Svensson (2007b), Rauchhaus (2006), Kydd (2006), Sisk (2009), Greig and
Diehl (2005), as well as Kaufman (2006), all examine how a specific mediation strategy
influences the likelihood of the conclusion of peace agreements in armed conflicts.
Nevertheless, some recent studies have gone beyond the study of short-term effects of
mediation. In essence, two alternative ways of understanding mediation outcomes
have emerged in this regard: the durability peace agreements and the quality of the
concluded peace.

3.1 Lasting peace

The influence of mediation on the prospects for lasting peace has long been ignored, but
this gap has been filled in recent years, among others due to two recent studies by
Beardsley (2008, 2011). In these studies Beardsley illustrates that taking the long-term
effects of mediation into account sheds a whole new light on the effectiveness of mediation.
In essence, Beardsley argues that all mediation strategies in international crises lead to
time-inconsistent outcomes. Providing information, as Savun (2009) examines, is
time-inconsistent since it only helps parties find an agreement that is mutually
satisfactory in the present, while the agreement may not be mutually preferable in the
future, particularly since the mediator cannot provide any information concerning the
future (Beardsley, 2008). Leveraging costs or providing benefits, as Sisk (2009) studies,
leads to time-inconsistent outcomes since a mediator will lose interest over time, which will
make the conflict parties dissatisfied with the initial agreement. Finally, monitoring and
enforcement of peace agreements, as Walter (2002) examines, is time-inconsistent since
third-parties are unable to indefinitely sustain their security guarantees (Beardsley, 2008).
In order to examine the short-term, as well as the long-term effects of mediation,
Beardsley (2008) employs a survival analysis, in which he distinguishes between the
effects of mediation on the conclusion of a formal agreement, as well as the recurrence
of a crisis. Drawing on data between 1918 and 2001 from the International Crisis
Behavior project, Beardsley predicts that the hazard rate of mediation found in his
survival analysis is not proportional over time, which indeed turns out to be the case.
 IJCMA This means that the likelihood that a mediated peace will hold decreases over time. In
25,1 short, Beardsley (2008) finds that mediation has a strong short-term impact due to
artificial incentives it produces, but that it often inhibits long-term peace.
This conclusion is examined more closely in several illustrative cases employed by
Beardsley (2011) to examine his findings in various unique contexts. The results these
case-studies produce are for the most part in line with Beardsley’s quantitative
92 findings, but depart in some ways. The most important difference is that rather than
arguing that mediation is always unsustainable, Beardsley (2011) argues, on the basis
of his illustrative cases, that mediation based on leverage is particularly
time-inconsistent. This is in line with Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that
agreements that are the result of significant third-party pressure are more likely to fail.
According to the authors, a forceful method of mediation leads to terms in agreements
that are at odds with the military reality on the ground, which will result in uncertainty
about the consequences of continued fighting. This uncertainty will, in turn, lead to
resumed fighting as soon as one or both conflict parties feel they can gain more from
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war than they have gained from the terms specified in the peace agreement (Werner
and Yuen, 2005). In order to test this argument, Werner and Yuen employ a hazard
model in which they examine the effects of ceasefires that occurred due to significant
third-party pressure. It follows from this analysis that “unnatural” ceasefires, due to
third-parties employing a threats and rewards based strategy, are less likely to hold.
Both Beardsley (2008) and Werner and Yuen (2005) thus study the long-term effects
of mediation. However, unlike Werner and Yuen, Beardsley does not distinguish
between different kinds of mediation in his quantitative analysis, since he believes
mediation in general is not sustainable, whatever the strategy may be. Indeed, to test
whether mediation is time-inconsistent, Beardsley (2008) uses mediation as an
independent variable, which he operationalizes as a third-party participating in
negotiations with both sides of the dyad during the course of the crisis. Beardsley’s
study thus may not capture the positive effects of mediation in producing “natural”
agreements, as is found by Werner and Yuen.
That mediated agreements as a result of little or no third-party pressure leads to
more stable outcomes on the long-term is also one of the findings in a quantitative
analysis by Carment et al. (2009). According to Carment et al. (2009), mediation is both
about the cessation of hostilities and addressing the underlying issues of a conflict.
They therefore argue that a mediator should act as manipulator since this type of
mediation is better equipped to cease the hostilities, but also as a formulator since this
type of mediation is more efficient in resolving the underlying issues. In other words,
Carment et al. (2009) argue that the most efficient way of resolving protracted conflict
is a strategy that involves sequenced manipulative and facilitative mediation
techniques. Indeed, the authors find that manipulation has the strongest effect on the
likelihood of reaching a formal agreement, whereas facilitation has the greatest
influence on increasing then prospects of lasting tension reduction (Carment et al.
2009). This implies that the two mediation approaches may not be as mutually
exclusive as one would assume from previous literature.

3.2 The quality of peace

In essence, armed conflicts reflect at least two sides striving to reach incompatible
goals, which often concern the control over a piece of territory or control over the
 government of a state. However, the impact of mediation on how well these underlying A current
issues of conflicts are tackled has only been sparsely examined. literature review
In a quantitative analysis, Svensson (2007a) analyzes the effectiveness of what he
describes as “power” and “pure” mediators in terms of reaching peace agreements, as
well as how effective both types of mediation are in resolving the incompatible goals of
conflict parties. A power mediator is defined by Svensson (2007a) as a third-party
effort by a great power, colonial power, or neighboring state, whereas a pure mediator 93
is understood to be a representative from international, regional, or non-governmental
organization, individuals, and small distant states. Svensson finds that power
mediators outperform pure mediators regarding reaching peace agreements, but pure
mediators are more effective in reaching territorial and political power sharing
provisions. A combination of both types of mediation is, however, most effective in
both reaching peace agreements and durable institutional arrangements within these
agreements. In other words, just as Beardsley et al. (2006) and Carment et al. (2009),
Svensson (2007a) moves beyond the fostering versus forcing debate and finds that the
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best way of achieving mediation success is combining “power mediators” with “pure
mediators” (Svensson, 2007a, p. 244). Furthermore, Svensson illustrates that there is a
need to take the content of peace agreements into account as an outcome variable of
mediation, instead of solely considering the conclusion of peace agreements.
Svensson (2009) also supplements research on the links between peacemaking and
power sharing in an article in that addresses the outcomes of mediation by biased
mediators. The central argument in this study is that biased mediators are more likely
than neutral mediators to conclude provisions in peace agreements that are generally
associated with lasting peace (Svensson, 2009). Svensson identifies two reasons why
this is the case. First, a biased mediator will try to represent its side during
negotiations, which increases the probability that stipulations in an eventual peace
agreement guarantee the interest of this side. Second, a biased mediator can also use its
leverage to persuade its side to make costly concessions which might be necessary for
the conclusion of an agreement. Indeed, Svensson (2009) finds evidence that biased
mediators increase the likelihood that a peace agreement includes power-sharing
provisions, third-party security guarantees, and justice provisions. In short, Svensson
not only shows the effectiveness of biased mediators in concluding peace agreements,
but also highlights how biased mediators can shape the content of an agreement in
terms of durability.

3.3 Summary
In summary, the literature on different types of mediation outcomes has expanded
since 2001, from solely considering the conclusion of peace agreements to also
regarding the durability and quality of these peace agreements. There is a growing
consensus that a mediator needs to employ a combination of strategies. In order for
mediated peace to be durable, mediation styles should not be too forceful; hence, the
importance of a combination of mediation techniques. The literature thus has gone
beyond the forcing versus fostering debate.
However, both Beardsley et al. (2006) and Carment et al. (2009) do not elaborate
much on whether mutual pursuing a manipulating and formulating mode of mediation
is possible, as well as how this works. Future research should therefore continue to
move beyond the forcing versus fostering debate through examining how to maximize
 IJCMA the prospects of a peace agreement, as well as lasting peace. Another neglected aspect
25,1 of mediation outcomes in recent scholarship is the influence of mediation on the
improvement of disputants’ relationships. Mediation has been linked to the power
sharing literature, but there is a need to also link the effects of mediation to studies on
reconciliation. Indeed, how relations of disputant’s improves through mediation is only
studied as a process (e.g. Kelman, 2005; Kaufman, 2006), rather than as an outcome of
94 mediation.

4. Recapitulation and suggestions for research

A rich and diverse body of literature exists on international mediation. Some
considerable trends and debates within this field can be recognized, as well as some
gaps for future research. This review essay has examined the recent international
mediation literature on the basis of the conceptual framework put forward in the
introduction. The major elements in this conceptual framework are:
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(1) Antecedents of international mediation:

.
ripeness (intensity and duration of armed conflict);
.
perception that mediation offers a way out;
.
stakes of the conflict;
. reputation of the mediator;
.
political cover;
.
insincere motives (stalling for time and international recognition);
.
ability of the mediator to build an initial degree of trust;
.
negative spillover effects (neighboring country wishing to mediate);
.
humanitarian considerations; and
. readiness at operational, political, and diplomatic levels.
(2) International mediation approaches:
.
providing relevant information;
.
biased or unbiased mediation (type of mediator);
.
leveraging costs and providing benefits; and
.
guaranteeing peace agreements.
(3) International mediation outcomes:
.
peace agreements;
.
lasting peace; and
.
quality of peace agreements.

The literature on mediation occurrence has expanded both theoretically and

methodologically in recent years, rather than engaging in a clear-cut debate on the
subject of which factors mainly account for the onset of mediation. The primary
challenge in order to move the field forward is therefore to examine which factors
matter most with regard to the onset of mediation, as well as how these different
factors interact. Additionally, since self-interest lies at the heart of many explanations
of mediation incidence, future research should further conceptualize it. This still
 underdeveloped sub field within the field of international mediation has therefore great A current
potential for future research. literature review
Mediation approaches have received far more attention than the onset of mediation.
Much of the literature addressing what affects mediation outcomes is written in the
context of debates; for instance, the forcing versus fostering debate and the biased
versus unbiased mediator debate. What these debates have in common, is that the goal
is to find a golden formula on how to meditate. It is highly unlikely that such a formula 95
will be found, but this does not mean that further research is unnecessary. The focus on
mediator traits rather than mediator styles has advanced field of mediation in recent
years, of which the academic debate on the effectiveness of biased mediators is a telling
example. Nevertheless, this area is still in need of more research and will therefore
provide avenues for future research. For example, the links between mediator traits
and style has not yet been addressed. Another potential gap that still needs to be filled
is the long-term impact of biased mediators. While Svensson (2009) expects that
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particular provisions will lead to more durable peace agreements, it has not yet been
tested whether this is case for peace agreements mediated through biased third-parties.
Furthermore, since the debate on biased mediators is ongoing, it is important that
conceptual clarity is maintained. This will keep the debate fruitful.
It also follows from this review that several outcomes of mediation are currently
considered in the recent literature, including the initiation of peace talks (e.g. Maundi
et al., 2006; Greig and Regan, 2008) and the conclusion of peace agreements between the
warring parties (e.g. Savun, 2009; Sisk, 2009; Greig and Diehl, 2005; Rauchhaus, 2006;
Kydd, 2006); but the most innovative studies, in terms of mediation outcomes, have
been on how mediation influences the content of peace agreements (Svensson, 2007a,
2009b), as well as the extent to which peace is durable (Beardsley, 2008; Beardsley,
2011; Werner and Yuen, 2005; Carment et al., 2009).
However, these studies have in common that outcomes of mediation are always
considered in relation to the effectiveness of a specific approach, which hinders the
field of mediation in developing different ways of understanding mediation outcomes.
Indeed, a mediation effort that does not lead to the conclusion of a peace agreement is
not necessarily a failure. For instance, parties could still disagree and refuse to sign an
agreement, but cease their fighting. A large body of research exists on what has been
described as impasses, frozen conflicts, or “no war, no peace” situations; but how
mediation affects these outcomes has not yet been addressed. Furthermore, keeping
mediation channels open can be regard as a success in itself. Similarly, a mediation
attempt that fails due to parties resuming the fighting can still be a stepping stone for
future third-party initiatives. Accordingly, research needs to be done on the effects of
mediation attempts that did not lead to a peace agreement, as well as the accumulative
effect of peace agreements. Finally, the long-term effects of mediation have only been
studied in the form of durable settlements or the content of the agreement. These two
efforts should be combined which would allow for the study of how mediation
influences the prospects for peace building.
Besides addressing research gaps within each stage of the mediation process, the
scholarly understanding concerning the links between the different stages in the
mediation process needs to be enhanced. At least two relevant issues can be recognized
in this regard.
 IJCMA A first issue is that scholars of international mediation have paid little attention to
25,1 how selection effects influence the choice of mediation strategy, type of mediator, and
mediation outcome. One could argue that armed conflicts in which mediation takes
place are likely to be different, in terms of ex ante likelihood of mediation success, than
armed conflicts in which no mediation takes place. For example, on the basis of
Zartman’s ripens theory, discussed in the first section of this review essay, one would
96 expect conflicts, in which the disputants feel they are trapped in costly predicament, to
be more prone to mediation success. Similarly, certain kinds of mediators may be more
likely to succeed because parties that are more committed to peace are more likely to
choose those kinds of mediators. The effects of certain types of mediation may thus be
less independent than it appears to be. Although research has been done on when and
where mediators are likely to mediate (e.g. Svensson, 2005), the question of whether
certain types of mediators are more likely to succeed in mediation since they only
mediate under specific circumstances has remained unaddressed. Future research
should therefore develop explanations for mediation success or failure, based on the
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entire mediation process.

A second factor that influences the entire mediation process is the mandate of
mediation. International mediators cannot randomly employ a particular mediation
approach, but have to consider the conditions under which they mediate. The mandate
of mediation is particularly relevant in this regard since it provides explicit
instructions concerning the nature of the assignment. A mediator can receive its
mandate either from one or both of the conflicting parties themselves or from the
decision-making authority of a third-party, which can be the mediator’s home state, an
IGO, or a NGO. The mandate of mediation thus influences the onset of mediation, the
approach that is employed, as well as the results this approach yields; but there is to
date no scholarly work that addresses this topic.
In conclusion, although much work still needs to be done in terms of deepening and
widening our knowledge about the mediation process, the recent strides made in the
international mediation literature give reason for optimism. This vast and expanding
body of knowledge on international mediation will continue to allow peacemakers to
make informed decisions in order to prevent and resolve armed conflict in the
twenty-first century.

Notes
1. See Greig (2005), as well as Svensson (2005), for quantitative studies that do find annual
battle deaths and conflict duration to influence the onset of mediation.
2. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.

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About the author

Allard Duursma earned his Master’s degree in International Relations at the University of
Groningen, The Netherlands, and is currently a second-year Master’s degree candidate in Peace
and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. He is the founder of the non-governmental
organization Dutchpeace and has published in Conflict Trends and The African Journal in
Conflict Resolution. Allard Duursma can be contacted at: duursma_allard@hotmail.com

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