How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming

the Legal Profession

Rachel Vanni

The legal sector has a general reputation for being conservative when it comes to technology. Not
anymore. The landscape is rapidly changing. Digital legal tools have gone beyond the days of Westlaw
and LexisNexis, the two companies that pioneered online legal research. Artificial intelligence is
revolutionizing how attorneys practice law. Keep reading to understand what artificial intelligence is and
how it’s transforming the legal profession.

One of the revolution that we have in the legal profession from written bar exams to a digital,
typewritten one.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a term used for a computer-based algorithm that can analyze, strategize, and
draw conclusions to complete tasks typically performed by humans.+

the German attorney G.W. Leibniz theorized that machines would someday use a binary logic system to
calculate numbers, and he envisioned a partnership between artificial intelligence and lawyers. Despite
never seeing anything resembling a computer, he accurately described the benefits that AI now provides
to the legal profession: “It is unworthy of excellent men to lose hours like slaves in the labor of
calculation which could safely be relegated to anyone else if machines were used.”

AI won’t spell the end of non-attorney legal careers. Instead, it will undoubtedly create new career
paths, with boundless opportunities in AI and machine learning.

AI solves two persistent problems with discovery: it typically takes too long, and it’s expensive.

it’s a time-consuming process of gathering documents, relevant data, communications, and other vital
information.

In a democracy, those tasked with making decisions should

be susceptible, reciprocally, to the impact of decisions; there ought to be a
meaningful sense in which the participants’ roles in the decisional process
could always be inverted. Role-reversibility infuses the act of judgment
with a ‘there but for the grace of god’ dynamic and, in doing so, casts
judgment as the result of self-rule. –
Opposition:

Should humans remain ‘in the loop’ of some decision-making even if it

fails to increase—and may well diminish—accuracy and consistency?
our argument is
that in a liberal democracy, there must be an aspect of ‘role-reversibility’ to
certain judgments. In some contexts, those who exercise judgment should
be vulnerable, in reverse, to its processes and effects. And those subject to
its effects should be capable, reciprocally, of exercising judgment.

Role-reversibility enables decision-makers to respect the gravity of

decision-making from the perspective of affected parties. This, in turn,
allows the act of judgment to be understood as the vindication of values
shared by a broader moral community—a community of equals that
includes both the decision-maker and the affected party, as well as many
other people who were not involved in the decision but equally might have
been, and who, in any case, share responsibility for the decision’s
consequences.

The central idea is that the act of applying a rule—the exact same
rule—is different when carried out by a party who is herself subject to the
rule as opposed to a party immune from the rule’s reach. In a democracy,
citizens do not stand outside the process of judgment, as if responding, in
awe or trepidation, to the proclamations of an oracle.

One appealing feature of our account—even putting all other benefits

to one side—is that it resists the ‘humanity-fetishism’ (or ‘speciesism’) that
often looms over conversations about humans and machines. There is
nothing special, in our view, about a human decision-maker. Rather, what
matters is whether the decision-maker could swap positions with the
affected party. In this sense, our account provides a ready-made answer for
when it could become normatively acceptable for robots to don judicial
robes, serve on juries, and occupy other democratic decision-making roles:
when they interchangeably become robo-defendants.

Assuming the technology exist, TH prefers artificial intelligence over human being as a judge in a court
of law

Interpellation:

Do you believe that human has biases, influences and others?

And this AI data’s are being installed by a human being?

Thus, this AI’s are can still have its biases, influences coming from its producers as mentioned by
our first speaker.

PROPER

Good morning your honor, before I start my constructive speech, I’ll be putting some rebuttals first
Rebuttals:

1.) This is a value judgement debate, not a policy,

2.) Setting the parametters AI to non criminal cases and such, special proceeding, imprisonment
not more than 6 years only shows that this AI cannot work in the status quo: coming from the
first speaker.
3.)

It only shows that the Government still consider that we prefer human over AI in the majority of
cases, hence it wins for the opposition your honor.

base case scenario for the gov is that ok they are able to give speedy disposition to the people, but at
THE END OF THE DAY IT IS STILL THE JUDGES, JUSTICES EVEN THE COURT OF APPEAL who are HUMANS
in the world that the government paints who makes the Excruciating decisions on cases.

4.)

1. it is not a mere technicialities, there is still needs of humanitarian

aspect
bound to glitch
human can be fix
creators are human
wider intelligence/exceed human intelligence
working overtime

might be abandoned/overturn by the judges but with AI would win over this

Case of Enrile
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not
be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

Sui generis cases

The red cross Gordon case

Enrile case

worst case-base case scenario

2. Case are unique, regardless if it has the same crime and the same
punishment.
As simple as consideration on mere error on the pleadings which was in the sound discretion
of the court.

i.e. By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. 6 "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been held to
mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the conclusion that
the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably
be punished capitally if the law is administered. 7 "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and
convinsing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conlusion.

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it
shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially bound to decide which
circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.

3. Jurisprudence changes from time to time.

i.e. serreno quo warranto cases

quo warranto cases can be used to according to rule 66 of the rules of court

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or
without lawful authority so to act.
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the
subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating
to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid.
Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment
if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.