ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI

“HISTORICAL FACTS & CIRCUMSTANCES AS EXTERNAL

AID TO INTERPRETATION”

Project Submission in the Partial Fulfilment of BA LLB

Submission To: Submitted By:

Dr KP Singh Ankit Malik

Asst. Professor of Law Roll No: 1648

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher. Dr KP Singh who gave
me opportunity to do the project on the topic “Historical Facts & Circumstances as External
Aid to Interpretation” which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know
about so many new things. I am really thankful to her.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who always support me mentally,
emotionally and financially in every little effort of mine and in achieving it.

Thanking you
ANKIT MALIK
INTRODUCTION

“By interpretation or construction is meant”, says Salmond, “the process by which the courts
seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed”.1 A statute is an edict of the Legislature 2 and the conventional way of
interpreting and construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. A statute is to be
construed according “to the intent of them that make it” and “the duty of judicature is to act
upon the true intention of the legislature- the mens or sentential legis.”3

There are two types of aids to interpretation- The internal and the external aids. The
following are considered internal aids to interpretation: long title, preamble, headings,
marginal notes, punctuations, illustrations, interpretation clause, proviso, explanation and
schedule.

External aids to interpretation of statutes include Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and
Surrounding Circumstances, Later Scientific Inventions, Reference to Other Statutes (pari
materia) & Use of Foreign Decisions.

CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH EXTERNAL AID IS SOUGHT

Mostly, recourse to external aid is taken in the following circumstances :-

 Where the legislature has not chose to define a particular expression, then the
court of law has to fall upon external aids of interpretation for determining the
intention of the legislation; For example, by referring to the context and object
and purpose of the legislative measure in question.
 If the internal aids fail to resolve any ambiguity,then external aids are looked
for, since methods of external aid are not as satisfactory as precise and clear
legislative definitions in the statute itself are.

In B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the apex court held that :-

 Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to
external aids to discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not
ruled out. This is now a well settled principle of modern statutory
construction.
1
Salmond, Salmond on Jurisprudence, p.152 (Sweet and Maxwell,11th edition).
2
Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works Ltd. V. Chief Inspector of Stamp, UP, AIR 1968 SC 102.
3
Supra note 1.
  Committee reports, Parliamentary debates, Policy statements and public
utterances of official spokesmen are of relevance in statutory interpretation.
But the comity, the courtesy and respect that ought to prevail between the two
prime organs of the State, the legislature and the judiciary, require the courts
to make skilled evaluation of the extra textual material placed before it and
exclude the essentially unreliable.
 Nevertheless the court, as master of its own procedure, retains a residuary
right to admit them where, in rare cases, the need to carry out the legislature's
intention appears to the court so to require.

HISTORICAL FACTS AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES

Historical facts are very essential to understand the subject matter of the statute or to have
regard to the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the statute.

In order to arrive at the intention of the legislature, the state of law and judicial decisions
antecedent to and at the time the statute was passed are material matters to be considered.
Evidence of matters relating to such surrounding circumstances and historical investigation of
which judicial note can be taken by court, including reports of select committees and
statements of objects and reasons, can be resorted to for ascertaining such antecedent law and
for determining the intention of the legislature. But the bill and reports of select committee
are not legitimate material for arriving at the construction of a statute, that is, for finding the
meaning of words. Parliamentary debates on the floor legislature are also inadmissible,
because, the court is concerned only with what the legislature actually said in the statute.
Moreover, plain words in the statute cannot be limited by any considerations of policy. An
erroneous assumption by the legislature as to the state of the law has no effect and would not
become a substantive enactment. In the construction of a statute the worst person to construe
it is the person who is responsible for its drafting. Courts sometimes make a distinction
between legislative debates and reports of committees and treat the latter as a more reliable or
satisfactory source of assistance. The speeches made by the members of the House in the
course of the debate are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory
provisions. It cannot be said that the acceptance or rejection of amendments to a Bill in the
course of Parliamentary proceedings forms part of the pre-enactment history of a statute and
as such might throw valuable light on the intention of the Legislature when the language used
in the statute admitted of more than one interpretation. The reason why a particular
amendment was proposed or accepted or rejected is often a matter of controversy and without
the speeches bearing upon the motion, it cannot be ascertained with any reasonable degree of
certainty. And where the 4 Legislature happens to be bicameral, the second Chamber may or
may not have known of such reason when it dealt with the measure.

In Keats v. Lewis Merthbyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd. (1911) it was held that the external
aid in the form of historical facts and circumstances surrounding the legislation is necessary
and quite useful in understanding the subject matter of the statute and thereby to arrive at the
legislative intent.

In Auckland Jute Co; Ltd. Vs. Tulsichandra Goswamy (1949), the Federal Court held- “For
the purpose of appreciating the scope and object of an old statute and for explaining its
language which may be susceptible to different meaning, it is useful to remember the well
known historical facts that led to the enactment.”

In Doypacte Systems Pvt. Ltd. Vs UOI (1988 SC), it was held that the meaning of certain
words and terms used in an ancient document or a statute can be properly explained only by
reference to the circumstances existing at the time when the enactment was written.

In Bridge and Roofs Co. Ltd Vs. UOI (AIR 1963 SC), the question before the court was
whether or not ‘Production Bonus’ was excluded in the definition of basic wages’ as defined
in section 2(b) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952. In Section 2(b) of the Act
‘Bonus’ was excluded from the definition of the basic wages. The word bonus was not
qualified in the definition. The Supreme Court held that production bonus is excluded in the
definition of ‘basic wages’. The Supreme Court referred to the fact that production bonus was
prevalent in industrial field long before 1952, so bonus included ‘production bonus.

In the case of Thomson v. Lord Clanmorris, it was held that while construing a statute,
regard must be had not only to the words used but also to the history of the Act and the
reasons for which it had been passed. It must be seen the mischief which had to be cured as
well as to the cure provided.

In B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it was held that the enacting history of
an Act is the surrounding corpus of public knowledge relative to its introduction into
Parliament as a Bill, and subsequent progress through, and ultimate passing by, Parliament.
In Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the apex court clearly stated that
history of the legislation may be looked into by a court in case of an ambiguity.