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SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014
SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners,

vs.
RAMON ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the June 28,
1
2012 decision and the December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119270 be reversed and set
2 3
aside. The assailed June 28, 2012 decision dismissed for lack of merit the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure filed by petitioners Benedict and Sandra Manuel (the Spouses Manuel) and sustained the November 30, 2010
and February 16, 2011 orders of the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet. The assailed December 19, 2012 resolution of
4
the Court of Appeals denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion for reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court’s November 30, 2010
order denied their motion to lift order of default, while its February 16, 2011 order denied their motion for reconsideration.
5
On December 21, 2009, respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a complaint for
accion reivindicatoria. Ong charged the Spouses Manuel with having constructed improvements — through force, intimidation,
6
strategy, threats, and stealth — on a property he supposedly owned. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582.
7 8
On January 19, 2010, Ong filed an "amended complaint." On February 3, 2010, summons was issued directed to the Spouses
9
Manuel. 10
On April 23, 2010, Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. Per the sheriff’s
11
return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along with Ong’s counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a
certain Federico Laureano, attempted to personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong,
Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another time considering that
12
petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. The sheriff’s return further indicates that on March 16, 2010, another
13
attempt at personal service was made. After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the
content of the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. Sheriff
Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to
file their answer within fifteen (15) days. As the Spouses Manuel failed to file their answer within this period, Ong asked that they
14
be declared in default. 15
On June 28, 2010, the Regional Trial Court issued an order granting Ong's motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default.
Following this, Ong moved for the ex parte presentation ofevidence, which the Regional Trial Court granted. 16
On September 13, 2010, the Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default. They alleged thatit is the siblings of
petitioner Sandra Manuel who resided in Lower Bacong, Itogon, Benguet, while they resided in Ambiong, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Thus, summons could not have been properly served on them in the former address. They surmised that Ong and his
companions mistook petitioner Sandra Manuel’s siblings as the defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582.They further claimed
that they only subsequently received via registered mail copies of (1) a compliance and manifestation filed by Ong and (2) the
Regional Trial Court’s order scheduling the ex parte presentation of evidence. Attachedto the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift
order of default was their answer. 17
In its order dated November 30, 2010,the Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default. It
noted that, first, their motion was not sworn to, as required by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and, second, they did not
showthat their failure to timely file an answer "was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." In its order dated
18
February16, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuel’s motion for reconsideration. 19
Aggrieved, the Spouses Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. 20
As mentioned, the assailed June 28, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals dismissed the Spouses Manuel’s Rule 65 petition for
lack of merit. The assailed December 19, 2012 resolution of the Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
For resolution is the sole issue ofwhether the Spouses Manuel may be granted relief from the Regional Trial Court’s June 28,
2010 order of default.
Jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel acquired
As a preliminary matter, we ruleon whether jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel, as defendants in Civil Case No.
09-CV-2582, was validly acquired. This preliminary matter is determinative of whether the fifteen-day period within which they
must file their answer started to run, thereby facilitating the context in which they could have validly been declared to be in
default.
We hold that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582 — the Spouses Benedict and Sandra
Manuel — was validly acquired. This is so because personal service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was
made by Sheriff Joselito Sales on March 16, 2010.
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section 6. Personal service, as provided
by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative — substituted service — as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the sheriff’s returnon summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to personallyhand the summons
and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2) separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first
occasion in deference to the medical condition of petitioner Sandra Manuel’s mother. On the second occasion, he was
constrained to tender the summons and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept them.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriff’s return but claimed that no valid service of
summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of
summons was made. From this, they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriff’s return was
someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service of summons has nothing to do
with the location where summons is served. A defendant’saddress is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is clear in what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient should
the defendant refuseto receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the
defendant, not the locus of service.
In any case, the Court of Appeals iscorrect in pointing out that the Spouses Manuel’s self-serving assertion must crumble in the
face of the clear declarations in the sheriff’s return. Pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
21 22
acts of Sheriff Joselito Sales and the events relating to the attempt to personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint
to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriff’s return, enjoy the presumption of regularity. Moreover, Sheriff Joselito Sales
23
must be presumed to have taken ordinary care and diligence in carrying out his duty to make service upon the proper person(s)
and not upon an impostor. 24
A sheriff’s return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and, hence, taken to be an accurate
and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have
harped on their (self-serving) claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything irregular
about the sheriff’sreturn or that it was otherwise incomplete.
Having alleged irregularities in the service of summons, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel to adduce proof of their
claims. All they mustered was their self-serving allegation of an alternative address. If at all, this claim of maintaining residence
elsewhere should not even be lent an iota of credibility considering that, as respondent Ramon Ong pointed out, the barangay
clearances, which the Spouses Manuel themselves attached to one of their pleadings (as proof of their identities), actually
indicated that they were residents of Bacong Loacan, Itogon, Benguet. Their lie is, thus, revealed by their own pleading.
25
As the Spouses Manuel not only failed in discharging the burden of proving their allegation but even succeeded in contradicting
themselves, Sheriff Joselito Sales’ recollection of events must be taken tobe true. Thus, valid personal service of summons, via
tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made. From this, it follows that jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners Benedict and
Sandra Manuel was acquired by the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582.
The Spouses Manuel are not entitled to relief from the order of default
As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel, pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to file their answer withinfifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they
26
wererightly declared to be in default.
Rule 9, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for when a party to an action may be declared in default. Further,
Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of relief from orders of default:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.— If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon
motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the
court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of
court.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedingsbut not to take part in the
trial. (b)
Relief from order of default.— A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion
under oathto set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms
and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as the pleading may warrant should a defendant fail to
timely file his or her answer. However, a court may decline from immediately rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff
to present evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be indefault shall nevertheless be "entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings," although he or she may no longer take part in the trial.
As explained in Spouses Delos Santos v. Carpio, "there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming
27
party before the court may declare the defending party in default:
(1) the claiming party must filea motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default;
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default;
(3) the claiming party must provethat the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the
Rule."28
All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon Ong.
It is not disputed that Ong filed a motion to declare the Spouses Manuel in default. It is also not disputed that the latter filed their
answer after the fifteen-day period, counted from March 16, 2010, had lapsed. The Spouses Manuel only filed their answer along
with their motion to lift order of default on September 13, 2010.
It is similarly settled that the Spouses Manuel were notified that a motion to declare them in default had been filed. They
acknowledged in the present petition for certiorari that on June 23, 2010, Ong filed a compliance to the Regional Trial Court’s
April 30, 2010 order that required the submission of the registry return card evidencing the mailing to the Spouses Manuel of a
copy of the motion to have them declared in default.
Not only were the requisites for declaring a party in default satisfied, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was also
shown to be procedurally infirm.
Consistent with Rule 9, Section 3(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "the remedy against an order of default is a motion to
set it aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence." However, it is not only the motion to lift order of
29
default which a defendant must file. As this court emphasized in Agravante v. Patriarca, to the motion to lift order of default must
30
"be appended an affidavit showing the invoked ground, and another, denominated affidavit of merit, setting forth facts constituting
the party's meritorious defense or defenses." 31
The need for an affidavit of merit isconsistent with Rule 8, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
32
"[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be statedwith particularity."
In Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, this court noted that the three (3) requisites that must be satisfied by a motion in
33
order "to warrant the setting aside of an order of default for failure to file answer, are:
(1) it must be made by motion under oath by one that has knowledge of the facts;
(2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence;
and
(3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of a meritorious defense." (Citations omitted)
34
Consistent with Agravante, it is through an affidavit of merit that a defendant seeking relief from an order of default shows that
"the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence." 35
In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of default was not made under oath. We
add that this motion was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit specifying the facts which would show that their non-filing of an
answer within fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2010 was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Failing both in making their motion under oath and in attaching an affidavit of merits, the Spouses Manuel’s motion to lift order of
default must be deemed pro-forma. It is not even worthy of consideration.
Certainly, there is jurisprudence to the effect that an affidavit of merit is not necessary "where a motion to lift an order of default is
grounded on the very root of the proceedings [such as] where the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
defendants." Similarly, there is jurisprudence stating that "when a motion to lift an order ofdefault contains the reasons for the
36
failure to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant and it is sworn to by said defendant,
neither a formal verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary." 37
However, in this case, the Spouses Manuel failed not only in attaching an affidavit of merit but alsoin making their motion under
oath. They are, therefore, left without any alternative on which to rest. Their motion is utterly ineffectual.
Apart from their failure to make their motion to lift order of default under oath and to attach to it an affidavit of merit, the Court of
Appeals also noted that the Spouses Manuel set their motion to lift order of default for hearing on the same date that they filed
it(i.e., September 13, 2010). Thus, they also violated Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
38
that service of a motion upon an adverse party must be made in such a manner that ensures receipt by the latter "at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing. . . ."
We do not lose sight of the admonitions that have been made in jurisprudence that, as a rule, courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default and that default judgments are frowned upon. Indeed, apart from a motion to lift order of default,other
39
remedies are available to a defaulted defendant evenafter judgment has been rendered. Thus, if judgment had already been
rendered but has not yet become final and executory, an appeal asserting that the judgment was contrary to the law or to the
evidence, or a motion for new trial under Rule 37, may be filed. In the case of the latter, the same affidavits as are required in a
40 41
motion to lift order of default must be attached. If judgment has become final and executory, a defaulted defendant may file a
42
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38. Still, should the defaulted defendant fail tofile a petition for relief, a petition for
43
annulment ofjudgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud remains available. 44
However, jurisprudence, too, has qualified the intent that animates this liberality. As this court stated in Acance v. Court of
1âwphi1
Appeals: 45
The issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate
refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. (Emphasis supplied)
46
Moreover, this liberality must be tempered with a recognition that, in the first place, it is a defendant who is at fault in failing to
timely file an answer.
Rule 9, Section 3(b) gives an exclusive list of only four (4) grounds that allow for relief from orders of default. Moreover, these
grounds — extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable negligence — relate to factors that are extraneous to a defendant,
that is, grounds that show that a defendant was prevented, by reasons beyond his or her influence, from timely filing an answer.
The recognition that it is the defendant who is at fault and must suffer the consequences of his or her own failure is analogous to
the dismissal of an action due to the fault of a plaintiff, as provided by Rule 17, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 17, Section 3 reads:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.— If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of
his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion,
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Rule 17, Section 3 is qualified by the phrase "for no justifiable cause." Thus, in cases covered by Rule 17, Section 3, should the
failure to comply with court processes be the result of the plaintiff’s own fault, it is but logical that a plaintiff must suffer the
consequences of his own heedlessness. Rule 9, Section 3 — on default — applies the same logic to a culpable defendant. In this
case, the Spouses Manuel only have themselves to blame in not properly receiving the summons and copyof the complaint
served on them. It has been shown that their claim that service of summons was made on persons other than them deserves no
credence. Quite the contrary, it is quite apparent that Sheriff Joselito Sales notonly explained the contents of the summons and
the complaint but actually told them that they must file their answer in fifteen (15) days. It was petitioner Sandra Manuel who
refused to sign and receive the summons and the complaint. This is evidently an act of obstinate refusal to submit to and to
comply with court processes. Thus, the Spouses Manuel are not deserving of any leniency.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The June 28, 2012 decision and the December 19, 2012
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119270 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES*
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursµant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October 14, 2014.
1
Rollo, pp. 3-44.
2
Id. at 49-59.
3
Id. at 62-63.
4
Id. at 49 and 59.
5
Id. at 49–50.
6
Id. at 50.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 79.
9
Id. at 7 and 55.
Id. at 7.
10
Id. at 51.
11
Id. at 8.
12
Id. at 8 and 51.

13
Id.
14
Id. at 51 and 81.

15
Id. at 51.
16
Id. at 12, 51–52.

17
Id. at 53.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 49 and 53.

20
Id. at 54.
21
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 131, sec. 3(m):

22
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
....
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

....
Rollo, pp. 54–55.

23
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 131, sec. 3(d):

24
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
....
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
....
Rollo, p. 82.
25
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 11, sec. 1:

26
SEC. 1. Answer to the complaint.— The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15)
days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
533 Phil. 42 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

27
Id. at 51.
28
Agravante v. Patriarca, 262 Phil. 127, 133 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].
29
262 Phil. 127 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

30
Id. at 133–134.
31
32
SEC. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other condition
of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
244 Phil. 49 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

33
Id. at 56.
34
Id.
35
Ponio v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 218 Phil. 548, 550 (1984) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].
36
Tanhu v. Judge Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101, 1115 (1975) [Per J. Barredo, Second Division].
37

38
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Acance v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 689 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division];
39
Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 244 Phil. 49, 58 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
Tanhu v. Judge Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101, 1126 (1975) [Per J. Barredo, Second Division]:
40
[A] defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by
defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him
must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, of course, presented in
his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the
defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should
be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the
plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot
exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.

41
SEC. 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration.— Within the period for
taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said
party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the
damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or
that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Ortiz, 234 Phil. 376, 385–386 (1987) [Per J. Narvasa, First
42
Division].

43
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. — When a judgment or final order is
entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that
the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, secs. 1 and 2:
44
SEC. 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment.— The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion
for new trial or petition for relief.
493 Phil. 676 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

45
Id. at 689, citing Samartino v. Raon, 433 Phil. 173, 187 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
46
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 135885

Home Back
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135885. April 28, 2000.]
SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, petitioners, vs. JOSE DIAZ and COURT OF

APPEALS, respondents.
Raul Ma. Oracion and Miguel Romualdo T. Sanidad for petitioners.

Yolando T. Busmente for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent Jose Diaz filed an action for sum of money against petitioners spouses Juan J. Diaz and Elizabeth L. Diaz before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, but it was denied by the trial court. The petitioners then
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the private respondent filed with the trial court a motion
to declare petitioners in default for failure to file an answer on the last day for filing the same. Petitioners filed their Opposition thereto, but
the trial court declared petitioners in default and set the ex-parte presentation of evidence on March 30, 1998. Again, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but before the trial court could act upon the said motion, the petitioners filed another Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order thereby enjoining the trial
court from proceeding with the scheduled hearing. Later, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioners' second Petition for Certiorari.
Thereafter, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion praying that he be allowed to proceed with the ex parte presentation of
evidence, which was granted by the trial court. After the private respondent presented evidence ex-parte, the trial court rendered
judgment in his favor. Private respondent then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted by the appellate court.
However, petitioners posted a supersedeas bond. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution reversing its prior
decision and thereby ordering the petitioners to comply with the writ of execution of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that petitioners received on January 22, 1998 a copy of the trial court's Order dated October 8, 1997, denying
reconsideration of its ruling on their Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners had only five (5) days from receipt of said Order, or until January 27,
1998, within which to file an answer. When petitioners filed their first Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on February 6, 1998,
they were already in default. Hence, the filing of said Petition for Certiorari cannot be considered as having interrupted the reglementary
period for filing an answer.
IDAEHT
However, suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. The Court has often admonished courts to
be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to
a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when
the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. The Court is not unmindful of the fact that during the
pendency of the petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the Court of Last Resort, it deemed it
in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the
trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to
prove their claims.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; ELEMENTS. — It has been our consistent ruling that a complaint states
a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN READILY BE FOUND BY EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In
the case at bar, the connection which petitioners seek can readily be found by an examination of the Complaint in its entirety. In his
Complaint, private respondent alleged that he was entitled to receive P15,000.00 as his share in the sales proceeds of the Mandaluyong
property. He thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection the same P15,000.00 was used by his brother in paying
for the Greenhills property. Having allowed his brother to use his money, private respondent demanded the return of the present
equivalent of his contribution following the sale of the Greenhills property but said demand was rejected. Hypothetically admitting these
allegations, private respondent's Complaint satisfies all the elements of a cause of action.
3. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; STATEMENTS OF LAW MADE BY PARTIES TO A CASE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS. — We agree
with petitioners that private respondent's invocation of Article 1452 is a conclusion of law. However, the inclusion thereof does not render
the Complaint infirm since statements of law made by parties to a case are not binding on the courts.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; DOUBTFUL VERACITY OF ALLEGATIONS THEREIN IS NOT A GROUND FOR GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS. — Similarly, doubtful veracity of the allegations in the Complaint is not a ground for granting a motion to dismiss. The existence
or non-existence of an agreement between petitioners and private respondent is a matter that should be threshed out during the trial of
the case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY STATEMENTS STATED THEREIN MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF A CAUSE OF ACTION. — Petitioners correctly pointed out that in determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements
in a complaint may properly be considered, and that it is error for the courts to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary
hearings to determine its existence. Petitioners will, however, concede that private respondent's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and
Comment are extraneous matters which we are proscribed from considering for purposes of determining the sufficiency of private
respondent's Complaint. Whether or not the provision of law cited by private respondent is applicable to the case at bar is immaterial.
Under the rules of pleading, a party is not required to specify the provisions of law or contract relied upon by the pleader. If he does so,
and is mistaken, this will not preclude him from obtaining relief under a different conception of the case, provided always that the facts
stated and proved justify such relief.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DESIGNED TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JURISDICTION. — It need not be gainsaid that
a special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the
grant of such extraordinary remedy, the abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHALL NOT INTERRUPT COURSE OF PRINCIPAL CASE UNLESS A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAS BEEN ISSUED. — More importantly, Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules provides that: SEC.
7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it
may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. In Santiago v.Vasquez, we
explained that: The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its
supervisory powers over lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the
case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The
inevitable conclusion is that for so long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no
impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DID NOT INTERRUPT REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR FILING AN ANSWER; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners
received on January 22, 1998 a copy of the trial court's Order dated October 8, 1997, denying reconsideration of its ruling on their Motion
to Dismiss. Petitioners had only five (5) days from receipt of said Order, or until January 27, 1988, within which to file an answer. When
petitioners filed their first Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on February 6, 1998, they were already in default. Hence, the
filing of said Petition for Certiorari cannot be considered as having interrupted the reglementary period for filing an answer. . . . In United
States of America v. Reyes, we held that although petitioner Maxine Bradford questioned the denial of her motion to dismiss before this
Court, she was nonetheless properly declared in default for failure to file her answer within the reglementary period. In that case, we
issued a temporary restraining order against the trial court three (3) months after rendering a default judgment against petitioner. It is
clear from the foregoing that proceedings in the court of origin are not automatically suspended by filing of a petition for certiorari, much
less by a mere intent to file the same. It will be noted in the case at bar that the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order
against the trial court two (2) months after the latter denied petitioners' motion seeking reconsideration of its Order dated October 18,
1998. We need not stress that petitioners cannot assume that the Court of Appeals or this Court will readily grant prayers for a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC BY CONTINUATION OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN. — As
early as Palomares v. Jimenez, we stated that an application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of
the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Impliedly, a petition for certiorari pending before a higher court
does not necessarily become moot and academic by a continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin.
10. ID.; ID.; SECTION 7 OF RULE 65; EXCEPTION TO THE OBSERVANCE OF HIERARCHICAL COURTESY AMONG COURTS. —
Our pronouncements in Santiago, United States of America, Reyes and Yasay, Jr. sufficiently explain the import of the term "notice of
denial" and indicate that Section 7 is intended as an exception to the observance of hierarchical courtesy among courts.
11. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY DEFENDANTS IN MOTION TO DISMISS MAY VALIDLY BE
RAISED IN THEIR ANSWER. — We also find that petitioners' fear of taking inconsistent positions is more apparent than real. The
grounds relied upon by petitioners in their Motion to Dismiss may validly be raised in their Answer and invoked in moving for the dismissal
of the action should said grounds become evident during the trial.
12. ID.; ID.; DECLARATION OF DEFAULT; MATUTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners
overlook the fact that in Matute, petitioners were prematurely declared in default because the period for filling their answer had not
commenced to run anew as counsel for petitioners had not yet received a copy of the order denying their motion to dismiss. This is our
rationale for setting aside the order of default. In this case, notwithstanding receipt of the Orders denying their Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Reconsideration thereof, petitioners did not file an answer within the reglementary period.
13. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; SUITS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON TECHNICALITIES.
— We note that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Hence, in Genite v. Court of Appeals, we stressed that: "The
Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand
that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technicalities rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely
why courts, rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to [the] instant case, in the language of
Justice Makalintal, technicalities "should give way to the realities of the situation." Suits should as much as possible be decided on the
merits and not on technicalities.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE FROWNED UPON AND NOT LOOKED UPON WITH FAVOR. — In this regard, we have
often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with
favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences
necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except
a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are
not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners.
However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners
by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if
petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims. cAaDCE
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J: p:
This case stems from the action for a sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214 by private 1
respondent Jose Diaz against petitioners Juan and Elizabeth Diaz. In the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners assail the
Decision dated July 14, 1998 and Resolution dated October 8, 1998 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court’s denial of their
2 3 4
Motion to Dismiss. In their Supplemental Petition, petitioners question the trial court’s Order dated January 8, 1999, denying their Motion
5
to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, and the Order dated January 12, 1999, correcting certain paragraphs of the
6
Order dated January 8, 1999. prcd
The relevant facts are:

In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that:
3
Plaintiff and defendant Juan J. Diaz are brothers, and together with their recently widowed sister, Marita D. Papa, owned in common,
as co-heirs (sic), a parcel of land, with improvements thereon, situated in the Municipality of Mandaluyong (now Mandaluyong City),
hereinafter referred to as the Mandaluyong property, in the following proportions:
Defendant Juan J. Diaz 6/8
Plaintiff Jose Diaz 1/8
Marita D. Papa 1/8
4
On May 17, 1968, the above-mentioned co-owners sold their Mandaluyong property to PHILAMGEN for P125,000.00. Thus, the
corresponding amounts pertaining to each co-owner from the sale were as follows:
Juan J. Diaz P90,000.00
Jose Diaz 15,000.00
Marita D. Papa 15,000.00
xxx xxx xxx
Immediately after the sale of the Mandaluyong property, defendant Juan J. Diaz, purchased a 1,000 sq. meter lot in Greenhills
Subdivision, San Juan, for P140,000.00 (hereinafter referred to as the Greenhills lot), using as part of the purchase price plaintiff’s
P15,000.00 share of the sale of the Mandaluyong property, and thereafter caused title thereto to be issued in his name, all with the
knowledge and without objection of the plaintiff;
xxx xxx xxx
11
Defendant spouses have recently sold the Greenhills lot, together with their Greenhills home, for P54,000,000.00.
12
Considering that defendant Juan J. Diaz, in buying the Greenhills lot, used as part of the purchase price plaintiff’s afore-mentioned
P15,000.00 share of the sale of the Mandaluyong property, and caused the title to said lot to be issued in his name, all with the
knowledge and without the objection on the part of the plaintiff, an implied trust was created by force of law, between plaintiff and
defendants, in favor of the former, in proportion to his interest in said Greenhills lot, pursuant to Article 1452 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;
13
On June 18, 1997, plaintiff wrote defendant spouses a letter demanding from them an amount of at least P2 million as his share of the
actual value of the Greenhills lot which can reasonably be placed at P30 million but defendant spouses, however, refused to honor
plaintiff’s demand in a letter to him dated August 28, 1997 . . . 7
On September 19, 1997, private respondent filed an action for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. On
October 7, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent's Complaint failed to state a cause of action,
8
and assuming that private respondent had a cause of action against them, it was already barred by prescription and laches. Private
respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, to which petitioners responded by filing a Reply.
In its Order dated November 27, 1997, the trial court denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss as the "points invoked and the arguments
advanced were contentious and evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings but must be
proved during the trial on the merits." The trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners in its Order dated January 14,
9
1998.
On February 6, 1998, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its Resolution dated February
10
12, 1998, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to comply with Section 11 Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rules"). 11
On February 23, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On July 14, 1998, the
appellate court denied the petition. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on October 8, 1998.
Dissatisfied, on October 29, 1998, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with this Court. In our Resolution dated
12
November 25, 1998, we treated said petition as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
In the meantime, during the pendency of petitioners’ first Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, private respondent filed with
the trial court a motion dated February 16, 1998 to declare petitioners in default for failure to file an answer on or before January 27,
1998, allegedly the last day for filing the same. Petitioners filed their Opposition thereto on February 25, 1998. In its Order dated March 2,
1998, the trial court granted the motion of private respondent and set the date for the ex-parte presentation of evidence on March 30,
1998. On March 20, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order of default. Before the trial court could act upon said motion,
on March 27, 1998, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners' March 17, 1998 motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order thereby
enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the scheduled hearing on March 30, 1998 or on any future date until ordered by the
appellate court.
13
With the denial by the Court of Appeals of petitioners' second Petition for Certiorari, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion
dated July 27, 1998, praying that he be allowed to proceed with the ex-parte presentation of evidence. The trial court granted said motion
in its Order dated August 7, 1998.
On August 13, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 1998, contending that their Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 20, 1998 had not yet been resolved. In the interim, petitioners filed their Answer on October 21, 1998.
In its Order dated October 28, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners' Motions for Reconsideration dated March 20, 1998 and August 13,
1998 and expunged their Answer from the records. Subsequently, in its Order dated November 6, 1998, the trial court allowed private
respondent to present his evidence ex-parte.
On November 9, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. Petitioners filed a
supplement thereto on November 17, 1998. On January 8, 1999, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that:
It is clear from the records that after the denial of defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, they failed to file any
answer or pleading within the remaining period provided under Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules and opted instead to file a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was only upon receipt of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals that defendants
partially sought to set things right.
The foregoing simply demonstrate defendants’ obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect of the rules of procedure which deserves no
compassion from the court. Therefore, the default order should be maintained. 14
In an Order dated January 12, 1999, the trial court corrected certain paragraphs 15 in its Order dated January 8, 1998 which "had been

inadvertently and/or erroneously typed and/or omitted." 16
On February 3, 1999, petitioners filed, with leave from this Court, a Supplemental Petition, 17 assailing the trial court's Orders dated

January 8, 1999 and January 12, 1999 for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Parenthetically, on March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. On March 30, 1999, petitioners filed
a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was given due course by the trial court in its Order dated March 31, 1999. Sometime
thereafter, the appellate court granted private respondent's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Petitioners posted a supersedeas bond
with the trial court. Petitioners manifested that while they were preparing their Appellants’ Brief, they also filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion for Deferment of Any Proceeding Relative to the Appeal in light of this Court’s Resolution dated October 4, 1999, giving due
course to their petition. On December 6, 1999, the appellate court promulgated a Resolution: (1) reversing its prior decision allowing
petitioners to file a supersedeas bond and thereby ordering them to comply with the writ of execution of the trial court, (b) declaring
petitioners guilty of forum-shopping, and (c) denying petitioners' second motion for an extension of forty-five (45) days within which to file
their Appellant’s Brief. Claiming that they would suffer grave injustice from the enforcement of said Resolution, petitioners filed an urgent
motion with this Court on December 10, 1999, praying for issuance of a status quo or temporary restraining order. On December 13, 18
1999, we granted petitioners' prayer.

In their petition for review, petitioners assign the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, ON ITS FACE, THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DUE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
VACILLATING CAUSE OF ACTION, WHICH SHOWS HIS INABILITY TO ALLEGE AN ACTIONABLE CAUSE IN HIS
COMPLAINT.
III. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT DID STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, THE COURT OF
APPEALS STILL ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD NOT SET IN WHEN THE CASE WAS FILED ON
SEPTEMBER 19, 1997.
IV. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD NOT SET IN WHEN THIS CASE WAS FILED, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT ON LACHES IS UNSUSTAINABLE.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IS NOT THE
APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR THE PETITIONERS.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE
OF THE ALLEGED LACK OF COMPELLING REASON TO MODIFY, REVERSE OR RECONSIDER THE DECISION, AND
THE ARGUMENTS RAISED THEREIN WERE PURPORTEDLY ALREADY CONSIDERED AND PASSED UPON IN THE
DECISION.
On the other hand, petitioners' Supplemental Petition hinges upon the resolution of the following issues:
cdasia
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING PETITIONERS IN DEFAULT AND
ORDERING THEIR ANSWER EXPUGNED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. ASSUMING THAT PETITIONERS WERE PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT, WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE STILL
ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT AND ADMITTING
PETITIONERS’ ANSWER.
III. IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDERS AND CATEGORICALLY DECLARING THAT HE WOULD PROCEED TO RESOLVE THE
MAIN CASE "UNLESS ENJOINED BY [THE] SUPREME COURT," THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
I. Denial of Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss
Petitioners maintain that private respondent's Complaint failed to state a cause of action as it contained mere averments of facts and
conclusions of law that neither establish any right or claim on the part of private respondent nor constitute wrongful acts or omissions
violative of his right. Petitioners specifically draw this Court’s attention to paragraphs 5 and 12 upon which private respondent allegedly
anchors his cause of action. Citing Remitere v. Vda. de Yulo as the case in point, petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 5
19
failed to state private respondent’s claim to the P15,000.00, the Greenhills property, or the manner by which his rights or interests were
prejudiced by the alleged use of his P15,000.00 by petitioners while paragraph 12 is a mere reiteration of paragraph 5.
We disagree with petitioners. It has been our consistent ruling that a complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following
elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right. Accordingly, in Remitere, we found that the complaint failed to allege any connection between the plaintiffs
20
and the deceased Gregorio Remitere, their claim to the properties, the manner by which their rights or interests were affected by the sale
of said properties as well as facts and circumstances upon which the nullity of the public auction was predicated. In the case at bar, the
connection which petitioners seek can readily be found by an examination of the Complaint in its entirety. In his Complaint, private
respondent alleged that he was entitled to receive P15,000.00 as his share in the sales proceeds of the Mandaluyong property. He
thereafter claimed that, with his knowledge and without his objection, the same P15,000.00 was used by his brother in paying for the
Greenhills property. Having allowed his brother to use his money, private respondent demanded the return of the present equivalent of
his contribution following the sale of the Greenhills property but said demand was rejected. Hypothetically admitting these allegations,
private respondent's Complaint satisfies all the elements of a cause of action.
Petitioners argue that private respondent's invocation of Article 1452 of the Civil Code is a mere conclusion of law which is not allowed to
be alleged in the Complaint. Petitioners also dispute the applicability of Article 1452 as there was never any agreement between the
parties for the purchase of the Greenhills property and for registration of the title in their name. We agree with petitioners that private
respondent’s invocation of Article 1452 is a conclusion of law. However, the inclusion thereof does not render the Complaint infirm since
statements of law made by parties to a case are not binding on the courts. Similarly, doubtful veracity of the allegations in the Complaint
is not a ground for granting a motion to dismiss. The existence or non-existence of an agreement between petitioners and private
respondent is a matter that should be threshed out during the trial of the case.
Petitioners further contend that private respondent’s vacillating cause of action indicated an inability to allege an actionable cause which
should have impelled the Court of Appeals to grant their Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners ask this Court to take notice of the fact that private
respondent first cited the implied trust provisions of Article 1452 of the Civil Code in his Complaint then shifted to implied trust under
Article 1455 in his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and finally, co-ownership in his Comment before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
correctly pointed out that in determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in a complaint may properly be
considered, and that it is error for the courts to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine its
existence. Petitioners will, however, concede that private respondent’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Comment are
21
extraneous matters which we are proscribed from considering for purposes of determining the sufficiency of private respondent’s
Complaint. Whether or not the provision of law cited by private respondent is applicable to the case at bar is immaterial. Under the rules
of pleading, a party is not required to specify the provisions of law or contract relied upon by the pleader. If he does so, and is mistaken,
22
this will not preclude him from obtaining relief under a different conception of the case, provided always that the facts stated and proved
justify such relief.
23
Assuming that the Complaint did state a cause of action, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that private
respondent’s cause of action accrued in 1968 with the sale of the Mandaluyong property. Thus, when private respondent filed his
Complaint twenty-nine (29) year later, prescription and laches had already set in. The points raised by petitioners are contentious in
nature and should be resolved after considering evidence other than mere allegations in pleadings.
As to petitioners' argument that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a special civil action for certiorari is not the appropriate remedy to
question the denial of their motion to dismiss, it need not be gainsaid that a special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of such extraordinary remedy, the abuse of discretion
24
must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. In this case, no such
25
circumstances attended the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss.

II. Propriety of the Order of Default
Petitioners submit that Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules, respecting the period within which a defendant is allowed to file an answer
following the denial of his motion to dismiss, must be harmoniously construed with Rule 65. Petitioners try to convince this Court that they
could not be expected to file an answer because they intended to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners further
submit that the notice of denial provided in Section 4 referred to a decision or resolution of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
denying a petition for certiorari with finality. Until resolved, petitioners contend that the period provided for in said section does not apply
to them.
We are not convinced. Petitioners received on January 22, 1998 a copy of the trial court's Order dated October 8, 1997, denying
reconsideration of its ruling on their Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners had only five (5) days from receipt of said Order, or until January 27,
1998, within which to file an answer. When petitioners filed their first Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on February 6, 1998,
they were already in default. Hence, the filing of said Petition for Certiorari cannot be considered as having interrupted the reglementary
period for filing an answer. More importantly, Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules provides that:
SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief . — The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Italics Ours)
In Santiago v. Vasquez, we explained that:
26
The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory
powers over lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case
pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. The
inevitable conclusion is that for so long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no
impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction. 27 (Italics
Ours)
This rule was reiterated in the later cases of United States of America v. Reyes, Reyes v. Commission on 28
Elections and Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto. In United States of America, therefore, we held that although petitioner Maxine Bradford
29 30
questioned the denial of her motion to dismiss before this Court, she was nonetheless properly declared in default for failure to file her
answer within the reglementary period. In that case, we issued a temporary restraining order against the trial court three (3) months
after rendering a default judgment against petitioner. It is clear from the foregoing that proceedings in the court of origin are not
automatically suspended by filing of a petition for certiorari, much less by a mere intent to file the same. It will be noted in the case at
bar that the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order against the trial court two (2) months after the latter denied
petitioners’ motion seeking reconsideration of its Order dated October 18, 1998. We need not stress that petitioners cannot assume
that the Court of Appeals or this Court will readily grant prayers for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
Petitioners also contend that to require them to file an answer before resolution of their Petition for Certiorari would render nugatory their
right to question the denial of their Motion to Dismiss and result in taking inconsistent positions by compelling them to admit the existence
of a cause of action. As early as Palomares v. Jimenez, we stated that an application for certiorari is an independent action which is not
31
part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of. Impliedly, a petition for certiorari pending
before a higher court does not necessarily become moot and academic by a continuation of the proceedings in the court of origin. We
also find that petitioners’ fear of taking inconsistent positions is more apparent than real. The grounds relied upon by petitioners in their
Motion to Dismiss may validly be raised in their Answer and invoked in moving for the dismissal of the action should said grounds
become evident during the trial.
Petitioners argue that they should not have been declared in default because the trial judge could have easily considered their Motion to
Dismiss as their Answer as in the case of Matute v. Court of Appeals. Petitioners overlook the fact that in Matute, petitioners were
32
prematurely declared in default because the period for filing their answer had not commenced to run anew as counsel for petitioners had
not yet received a copy of the order denying their motion to dismiss. This is our rationale for setting aside the order of default. In this case,
notwithstanding receipt of the Orders denying their Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration thereof, petitioners did not file an
answer within the reglementary period.
III. Propriety of the Denial of Petitioners’ Motion to Lift Order of Default
Petitioners submit that the import of Section 4 of Rule 16 involved a difficult question of law which may be considered as a mistake of fact,
excusing them from the legal consequences of their act. Moreover, they honestly and firmly believed that Section 7 of Rule 65 did not
render useless the doctrine of hierarchical courtesy among courts. If not persuaded, petitioners argue that their actuation and that of their
counsel should at least be considered as excusable negligence. Petitioners’ submission is without merit. Our pronouncements
in Santiago, United States of America, Reyes and Yasay, Jr. sufficiently explain the import of the term "notice of denial" and indicate that
Section 7 is intended as an exception to the observance of hierarchical courtesy among courts. Petitioners’ own admissions likewise
militate against their claim of mistake and excusable negligence. In their second Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
petitioners alleged the following in support of their prayer for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order: LLjur
6.3 Unless inhibited by the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, being presided by
Respondent Judge Edwin D. Sorongon will and should set for continuation of the proceedings of said Civil Case No. 15-MD of your
Petitioners considering that the assailed ORDERS DENIED the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration and further found
that said civil case necessitates trial on the merits and presentation of evidence. This would cause great injustice to Petitioners
considering that they are clearly entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or at least temporary restraining order and
their need for relief is extremely urgent. 33 (Italics Ours)
Similarly, in their motion dated March 12, 1998, seeking, among others, reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on their Motion
to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, petitioners stated:
3. While it is true that without a temporary restraining order from the Court of Appeals, the proceedings before this Honorable Court
may proceed, the decision of whether to proceed or not is still discretionary with the trial court. 34 (Italics Ours)
These statements show that petitioners were fully aware of the rule that a petition for certiorari does not stay the proceedings in
the court of origin in the absence of a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order.
This notwithstanding, we note that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Hence, in Genite v. Court of Appeals, we 35
stressed that:
The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the
hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts, in rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on
the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. As applied to [the] instant case, in the
language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities "should give way to the realities of the situation." 36
Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have often admonished
37
courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they
may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a
careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools
38
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a
particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are39
not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners.
However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to
petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice
would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss is AFFIRMED. The Motion to Set
Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer is hereby GRANTED; and the default judgment rendered by the trial court on March
11, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the case, and to resolve the same with dispatch. The Court
of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand the records of the case to the trial court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof. Both the trial
court and the appellate court are ordered to immediately inform this Court of their compliance with these orders.
Costs against petitioners. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
2. Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 62-72; Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos and Teodoro P. Regino.
3. Annex "B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 73-74.
4. Tenth Division.
5. Annex "A" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, pp. 324-325.
6. Annex "B" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 326.
7. Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 75-78.
8. Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 83-88.
9. Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 109.
10. A copy of this petition was not attached as an annex.
11. Annex "L" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 130.
12. Rollo, p. 236.
13. Annex "I" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, pp. 354-357.
14. Annex "A" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, pp. 324-325.
15. Paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of the Order dated January 8, 1998 were corrected to read as follows:
Paragraph 3
". . . was due to their firm belief that their period to answer has not yet expired because the validity of the order denying their motion to dismiss has
not yet attained finality since the same was brought via certiorari to the Court of Appeals . . ."
Paragraph 5
". . . It was only upon receipt of the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals that defendants frantically sought to set things right . . ."
Paragraph 6
". . . defendants’ obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect of the Rules of Procedure."
16. Annex "B" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 326.
17. Rollo, pp. 280-323.
18. Rollo, pp. 738-746.
19. 16 SCRA 251 (1966).
20. San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 115 (1998).
21. Rava Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 144 (1992).
22. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 316 (1993).
23. La Insular Cigar & Cigarette Factory, Inc. v. Jao One, 42 Phil. 366 (1921).
24. BF Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267 (1998).
25. Santiago Land Development Company v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 535 (1996), citing Palma v. Q&S, Inc., 17 SCRA 97 (1966).
26. 217 SCRA 633 (1993).
27. Ibid.
28. 219 SCRA 192 (1993).
29. 254 SCRA 514 (1996).
30. 300 SCRA 494 (1998).
31. 90 Phil. 773 (1952).
32. 26 SCRA 768 (1969).
33. Annex "M" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 156.
34. Annex "H" of the Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p. 346.
35. 296 SCRA 38 (1998)
36. Id. at 52.
37. Gerales v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 638 (1993).
38. Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, 161 SCRA 45 (1988).
39. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 34 (1997).
Today is Wednesday, March 30, 2022
Constitution
Statutes
Executive Issuances
Judicial Issuances
Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
AUSL Exclusive
FIRST DIVISION
July 27, 2016
G.R. No. 192477
MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., Petitioner

vs.
FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, Respondent
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A default judgment is frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every litigated case on the merits. But the default
judgment will not be vacated unless the defendant satisfactorily explains the failure to file the answer, and shows that it has a
meritorious defense.
The Case
Under challenge by the petitioner is the affirmance on January 14, 2010 by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the trial court's default
1
judgment rendered against it on August 23, 1999 in Civil Case No. C-18066 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126, in
Caloocan City. The defendant hereby prays that the default judgment be undone, and that the case be remanded to the RTC for
2
further proceedings, including the reception of its evidence.3

Antecedents
Civil Case No. C-18066 is an action the respondent initiated against the petitioner for the nullification of a deed of absolute sale
involving registered real property and its improvements situation in Caloocan City as well as of the transfer certificate of title
issued in favor of the latter by virtue of said deed of absolute sale on the ground of falsification.
The following factual and procedural antecedents are summarized by the CA in its assailed decision, to wit:
On September 23, 1997, plaintiff filed against defendant a complaint for "Nullification of Deed of Sale and of the Title Issued"
pursuant thereto alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of land with improvements located in Caloocan City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 204755. A letter from defendant corporation dated June 12, 1997, informed plaintiff that TCT No.
204755 over aforesaid property had been cancelled and TCT No. C-319464 was issued in lieu thereof in favor of defendant
corporation on the strength of a purported Special Power of Attorney executed by Dominador Villamena, her late husband,
appointing her, plaintiff Felicidad Villamena, as his attorney-infact and a deed of absolute sale purportedly executed by her in
favor of defendant corporation on May 21, 1997, the same date as the Special Power of Attorney. The Special Power of Attorney
dated May 21, 1997 is a forgery. Her husband Dominador died on June 22, 1991. The deed of sale in favor of defendant
corporation was falsified. What plaintiff executed in favor of Mamarco was a deed of real estate mortgage to secure a loan of
P100,000.00 and not a deed of transfer/conveyance.
xxxx
On August 19, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant corporation in default for failure of aforesaid defendant to file its
answer as of said date despite the filing of an Entry of Appearance by its counsel dated May 4, 1998.
On September 10, 1998 defendant corporation filed its Answer with Counterclaim which denied the allegations in the complaint;
alleged that plaintiff and her daughter Lolita accompanied by a real estate agent approached the President of Momarco for a loan
of Pl00,000.00; offered their house and lot as collateral; and presented a Special Power of Attorney from her husband. She was
granted said loan. Aforesaid loan was not repaid. Interests accumulated and were added to the principal. Plaintiff offered to
execute a deed of sale over the property on account of her inability to pay. Plaintiff presented to defendant corporation a deed of
sale and her husband's Special of Power Attorney already signed and notarized. 4
Under the order dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner was declared in default, and its answer was ordered stricken from the
records. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the respondent to present her evidence ex parte.
On August 23, 1999, the RTC rendered the default judgment nullifying the assailed deed of absolute sale and the transfer
certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; and ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel the petitioner's Transfer
Certificate of Title No. C-319464, and to reinstate the respondent's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 204755. It concluded that the
5
act of the petitioner's counsel of formally entering an appearance in the case had mooted the issue of defective service of
summons; and that the respondent had duly established by preponderance of evidence that the purported special power of
attorney was a forgery.6
The petitioner appealed the default judgment to the CA, arguing that the RTC had gravely erred in nullifying the questioned deed
of absolute sale and in declaring it in default.
On January 14, 2010, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the default judgment upon finding that the RTC did not
commit any error in declaring the petitioner in default and in rendering judgment in favor of the respondent who had successfully
established her claim of forgery by preponderance of evidence. 7
On May 31, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 8
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
Issue
The petitioner raises the lone issue of whether or not the CA gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in
ordering its answer stricken off the records; in allowing the respondent to adduce her evidence ex parte; and in rendering the
default judgment based on such evidence. 9
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The petitioner claims denial of its right to due process, insisting that the service of summons and copy of the complaint was
defective, as, in fact, there was no sheriff's return filed; that the service of the alias summons on January 20, 1998 was also
defective; and that, accordingly, its reglementary period to file the answer did not start to run.
The claim of the petitioner is unfounded. The filing of the formal entry of appearance on May 5, 1998 indicated that it already
became aware of the complaint filed against it on September 23, 1997. Such act of counsel, because it was not for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, constituted the petitioner's voluntary appearance in the action, which was the
equivalent of the service of summons. Jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant became thereby vested in
10
the RTC, and cured any defect in the service of summons. 11
Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the three requirements to be complied with by the claiming party before the
12
defending party can be declared in default are: (1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare the
defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming party
must prove that the defending party failed to answer the complaint within the period provided by the rule. It is plain, therefore,
13
that the default of the defending party cannot be declared motu proprio. 14
Although the respondent filed her motion to declare the petitioner in default with notice to the petitioner only on August 19, 1998,
all the requisites for properly declaring the latter in default then existed. On October 15, 1998, therefore, the RTC appropriately
directed the answer filed to be stricken from the records and declared the petitioner in default. It also received ex parte the
respondent's evidence, pursuant to the relevant rule. 15
The petitioner's logical remedy was to have moved for the lifting of the declaration of its default but despite notice it did not do the
same before the RTC rendered the default judgment on August 23, 1999. Its motion for that purpose should have been under the
oath of one who had knowledge of the facts, and should show that it had a meritorious defense, and that its failure to file the
16
answer had been due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Its urgent purpose to move in the RTC is to avert the
rendition of the default judgment. Instead, it was content to insist in its comment/opposition vis-a-vis the motion to declare it in
default that: (1) it had already filed its answer; (2) the order of default was generally frowned upon by the courts; (3) technicalities
should not be resorted to; and (4) it had a meritorious defense. It is notable that it tendered no substantiation of what was its
meritorious defense, and did not specify the circumstances of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented
the filing of the answer before the order of default issued - the crucial elements in asking the court to consider vacating its own
order.
The policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried on the merits. As a consequence, the courts have generally
looked upon a default judgment with disfavor because it is in violation of the right of a defending party to be heard. As the Court
has said in Coombs v. Santos: 17
A default judgment does not pretend to be based upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the ground that it
is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without
unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that
it be set aside.
In implementation of the policy against defaults, the courts have admitted answers filed beyond the reglementary periods but
before the declaration of default.18
Considering that the petitioner was not yet declared in default when it filed the answer on September 10, 1998, should not its
answer have been admitted?
The petitioner raised this query in its motion for reconsideration in the CA, pointing out that the RTC could no longer declare it in
default and order its answer stricken from the records after it had filed its answer before such declaration of default. However, the
CA, in denying the motion for reconsideration, negated the query, stating as follows:
Unfortunately, we find the foregoing arguments insufficient to reverse our earlier ruling. These points do little to detract from the
fact that Defendant-Appellant filed its Answer only after a period of more than four months from when it entered its voluntary
appearance in the case a quo, and only after almost a month from when Plaintiff-Appellee moved to have it declared in default.
Verily, Defendant-Appellant's temerity for delay is also betrayed (sic) by the fact that it had waited for a judgment to be rendered
by the court a quo before it challenged the order declaring it in default. If it truly believed that it had a "meritorious defense[,]
which if properly ventilated could have yielded a different conclusion [by the trial court],'' then it could very well have moved to set
aside the Order of Default immediately after notice thereof or anytime before judgment. Under the circumstances, that would
have been the most expeditious remedy. Inauspiciously, Defendant-Appellant instead elected to wager on a favorable judgment.
Defeated, Defendant-Appellant would now have us set aside the Order of Default on Appeal and remand the case for further
proceedings. These we cannot do.
While we are aware that we are vested with some discretion to condone Defendant-Appellant's procedural errors, we do not find
that doing so will serve the best interests of justice. To remand this case to the court a quo on the invocation that we must be
liberal in setting aside orders of default, would be to reward Defendant-Appellant with more delay. It bears stating that the Rules
of Procedure are liberally construed not to suit the convenience of a party, but "in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding." To this end, it has been rightly written:
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. x
x x.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.
Justice has to be administered according to the rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice and whimsicality. 19
We concur with the CA's justification. The RTC and the CA acted in accordance with the Rules of Court and the pertinent
jurisprudence. The petitioner was insincere in assailing the default judgment, and its insincerity became manifest from its failure
1âwphi1
to move for the lifting of the order of default prior to the rendition of the default judgment. The CA rightly observed that the
petitioner had apparently forsaken its "expeditious remedy" of moving soonest for the lifting of the order of default in favor of
"wager[ing]" on obtaining a favorable judgment. The petitioner would not do so unless it intended to unduly cause delay to the
detriment and prejudice of the respondent.
The sincerity of the petitioner's actions cannot be presumed. Hence, it behooves it to allege the suitable explanation for the
failure or the delay to file the answer through a motion to lift the order of default before the default judgment is rendered. This
duty to explain is called for by the philosophy underlying the doctrine of default in civil procedure, which Justice Narvasa eruditely
discoursed on in Gochangco v. CFI Negros Occidental, to wit:
20
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that the defendant's failure to answer the complaint despite receiving copy
thereof together with summons, is attributable to one of two causes: either (a) to his realization that he has no defenses to the
plaintiff's cause and hence resolves not to oppose the complaint, or, (b) having good defenses to the suit, to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence which prevented him from seasonably filing an answer setting forth those defenses. It does
make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of the specific relief prayed for in the complaint,
to forego the filing of the answer or any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result would be
the same: since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact, judgment would inevitably go against
him. And this would be an acceptable result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the judgment did not go
beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. It would moreover spare him from the embarrassment of openly
appearing to defend the indefensible. On the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be unnatural for him not to
set them up properly and timely, and if he did not in fact set them up, it must be presumed that some insuperable cause
prevented him from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. In this event, the law will grant him relief;
and the law is in truth quite liberal in the reliefs made available to him: a motion to set aside the order of default prior to
judgment, a motion for new trial to set aside the default judgment; an appeal from the judgment by default even if no
motion to set aside the order of default or motion for new trial had been previously presented; a special civil action
for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction. 21
It is true that the RTC had the discretion to permit the filing of the answer even beyond the reglementary period, or to refuse to
set aside the default order where it finds no justification for the delay in the filing of the answer. Conformably with the judicious
22
exercise of such discretion, the RTC could then have admitted the belated answer of the petitioner and lifted the order of default
instead of striking the answer from the records. However, the RTC opted not to condone the inordinate delay taken by the
petitioner, and went on to render the default judgment on August 23, 1999. Such actions were fully within its discretion. We
23
uphold the default. While the courts should avoid orders of default, and should be, as a rule, liberal in setting aside orders of
default, they could not ignore the abuse of procedural rules by litigants like the petitioner, who only had themselves to blame.
24
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on January 14, 2010; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 20-24; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok (retired), with Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.
2
CA rollo, pp. 10-12; penned by Judge Luisito C. Sardillo.
3
Rollo, p. 16.
4
Id. at 21-22.
5
CA rollo, p. 12.
6
Supra note 2.
7
Supra note 1.
Rollo, pp. 26-29; penned by Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice Baltazar-
8
Padilla and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
9
Id. at 13.
10
Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section. 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
11
Cezar v. Ricafort-Bautista, G.R. No. 136415, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 322, 334.
Section. 3. Default; declaration of - If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the
12
court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare
the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence.
Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
Delos Santos v. Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, September 11, 2006, 50 I SCRA 390, 398-399.
13
Trajano v. Cruz, No. L-47070, December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 712, 715.

14
Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court.

15
Montinola, Jr. v. Republic Planters Bank, No. L -66183, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 45, 52.
16
24 Phil. 446, 449-450 (1913).

17
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-64276, March 4, 1986, 141 SCRA 451, 455.
18
Supra note 8, at 27-29.
19
No. L-49396, January 15, 1088, 157 SCRA40.

20
Id. at 54-55 (bold underscoring added for emphasis).

21
Malipod v. Tan, No. L-27730, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA202, 213.

22
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 18.

23
Acance v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159699, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 548, 563; Montinola, Jr. v. Republic
24
Planters Bank, No. L-66183, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 45, 54.
DEATH Of COUNSEL
Today is Wednesday, March 30, 2022
Constitution
Statutes
Executive Issuances
Judicial Issuances
Other Issuances
Jurisprudence
AUSL Exclusive
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150453 February 14, 2003
RAFAEL AMATORIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition to reverse and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 9, 2001 in CA-G.R. No.
1
21247.
The pertinent facts and incidents appear from the records:
Petitioner Rafael Amatorio was charged with the crime of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, 6th Judicial Region,
Iloilo City and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35460. 2
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment against Amatorio, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAFAEL AMATORIO is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide only and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of Ten (10) years as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months as maximum.
The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the deceased Ofelia Melocoton [in] the amount of PhP63,200.00 for funeral
and burial expenses and expense[s] during the wake and further to pay the legal heirs of the deceased the amount of
PhP50,000.00 for his wrongful death and another PhP50,000.00 for moral damages and the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 3
From the foregoing decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Throughout the course of the trial, Amatorio was represented by Atty. Joelito T. Barrera of the Barrera Law Office. 4
On March 2, 2001, while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals and before the appellate court could render a
decision, Atty. Barrera died.
5
After a review of the case on the merits, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated April 18, 2001, affirmed the decision of the
6
Regional Trial Court, stating:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision dated July 18, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 35460, being in accordance with law and evidence is AFFIRMED with the
correction in the sense that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the imprisonment for a period of Ten (10) Years
of prision mayor as minimum to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED. 7
A copy of the decision was received by the Barrera Law Office on May 7, 2001. Thus, appellant had until May 22, 2001 within
8
which to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the same to us.9
Petitioner alleges that he was not informed of the decision of the Court of Appeals and that he learned of Atty. Barrera’s death
only on August 9, 2001. Thus, he was unable to file a timely motion for reconsideration of the said decision. 10
On August 17, 2001, represented by new counsel, Atty. Gerald C. Jacob, petitioner filed a "Motion for 30-day Extension to File
Motion for Reconsideration." The new counsel stated that "in the interest of justice," he was asking for "more time to thoroughly
11
study the case and prepare an intelligent Motion for Reconsideration." 1awphi1.nét
Acting upon the motion for extension, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution denying the motion for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals stated:
Considering that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed (Section 2, Rule 40 and Section 3,
Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended) and considering further that the decision promulgated on April 18, 2001 is
now final and executory that it can no longer be a subject of a motion for reconsideration, this instant motion for 30-day extension
to file a motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 filed by counsel for accused-appellant is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 12
A copy of said Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on October 17, 2001.
Hence, this petition, filed on November 9, 2001.
Upon perusal of the pleadings, there is a need to resolve a preliminary question regarding the nature of the petition filed before
us.
We note that the petition filed on behalf of Amatorio by his counsel Atty. Gerald C. Jacob was expressly denominated as a
13
"Petition for Certiorari (under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court)."14
Clearly raised therein as issues for resolution are two instances of alleged "grave abuse of discretion" committed by the Court of
Appeals. In addition, counsel alleges that the verified petition is filed, "there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
However, in a "Reply to Comment" dated June 25, 2002, petitioner, through the same counsel, now alleges that the petition he
15
filed was in fact one under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Counsel now asserts that "the proper remedy available to petitioners
was a petition for review under Rule 45, not 65." Citing Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, he avers that he has complied
16
with all the requisites under the said rule. He particularly points out that the petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule
45 and that the Court of Appeals need not be impleaded as respondent. 1awphi1.nét
As belatedly realized by the petitioner, the proper remedy for him in this case is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, said error is correctible by appeal under Rule 45.
Petitioner submits a question of law before us. We are called upon to determine what the law is for the particular undisputed
17
1a\^/phi1.net
facts of this case.
Time and again we have established the distinctions between the remedies under Rule 45 and Rule 65. We have constantly
18
reminded members of the bench and bar regarding these distinct remedies and the requisites to avail of them. An erroneous
mode of appeal can have fatal consequences to a petition.
We find occasion herein to caution Atty. Jacob as counsel for petitioner. First, he came to us using the wrong mode of appeal.
Subsequently, he attempted to correct his mistake by alleging in a subsequent pleading that he in fact filed the petition under
Rule 45. This is notwithstanding the fact that his earlier pleading clearly and unequivocally declared that the petition was filed
under Rule 65.
For the foregoing reasons, this petition could have been dismissed outright. However, in order to clarify the issue raised, we
resolve to treat this petition as one filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
We now resolve the main issue.

Petitioner submits the following assigned errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK [OR] EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED A RESOLUTION THAT NO MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS ALLOWED (SECTION 2, RULE 40
AND SECTION 3, RULE 41 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED); AND
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE DECISION IT PROMULGATED ON APRIL 18, 2001 IS FINAL AND EXECUTORY DESPITE THE DEATH
OF COUNSEL WHICH EXTINGUISHES THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 19
The sole issue for resolution is whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court of Appeals is allowed.
Petitioner seeks to convince us that he still has a right to file a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
and the motion for reconsideration itself, before the Court of Appeals. 20
Petitioner argues that when Atty. Barrera died on March 2, 1991, his death effectively cancelled the attorney-client relationship.
Thus, notice sent to the deceased counsel would no longer bind him because death extinguished the juridical tie. Petitioner adds
that although legal representation was made by the law firm of the deceased Atty. Barrera, the professional partnership was
likewise extinguished by the death of one of the partners. He also avers that immediately upon Atty. Barrera’s death, his
associates formed their own law offices. Petitioner contends that it would be a miscarriage of justice to consider the notice to the
"dissolved and inexistent" Barrera Law Office as binding on the accused.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that the Court of Appeals was correct in denying the motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration. First, such a motion is proscribed under Rules 40 and 41 of the Rules of Court. Second,
petitioner is represented by the Barrera Law Office and not by Atty. Barrera alone. Considering this, any one of Atty. Barrera’s
partners or associates in the law firm should have filed the appropriate pleading to protect the interest of petitioner who is still
their client, notwithstanding the death of the handling lawyer, Atty. Barrera. Citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Solicitor
21
General contends that the death of a particular attorney does not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship where the legal
representation is by a law firm. Service of a copy of the decision dated April 18, 2001 on petitioner’s counsel of record, the
Barrera Law Office, is service upon the petitioner. The failure of petitioner’s counsel, the Barrera Law Office, to file the necessary
motion for reconsideration, binds petitioner in this case.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that Rules 40 and 41 of the Rules of Court, cited by both the Court of Appeals and the
Solicitor General, specifically pertain to appeals from decisions of the lower courts. We note that the stage of the proceedings
before us pertains to a decision of the Court of Appeals. Thus, the cited Rules 40 and 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
are inapplicable. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals is still correct in denying the motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration but the denial should have been anchored on the then existing Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
(RIRCA), as well as on prevailing jurisprudence.
On all fours with the case at bar is the case of Heirs of Andrea Cristobal v. Court of Appeals. We stated therein:
22
We agree with private respondents. Pursuant to Sec. 12 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, the Court of
Appeals adopted and promulgated the RIRCA designed to govern the internal operating procedures of the appellate court. Under
Sec. 2, Rule 9, of the RIRCA, as amended, a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution within fifteen
(15) days from notice thereof, without any extension.
The records show that respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 31 August 1998 and copy thereof was received
by petitioner’s counsel on 9 September 1998. As such, petitioners had until 24 September 1998 within which to file their motion
for reconsideration. However, instead of filing the motion, petitioners filed on 17 September 1998, a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration, obviously in violation of the mandatory provision prohibiting the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the appellate court correctly denied petitioners’ motion.
It should be stressed that this Court advocates strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Japson that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
23
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as a court of last resort which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested. An exception therefore cannot be made despite the claim that the lapse was due to the illness
of petitioners’ counsel. It is claimed that Atty. Policarpio’s law office was closed since July 1998 due to her illness. The interval of
two (2) months before the promulgation of the Decision should have given her associates ample time to sort out her records,
delegate her responsibilities among themselves, and forewarn her clients, specifically herein petitioners, about their counsel’s
unavailability or incapacity so that they may be given the option to seek another counsel elsewhere. x x x
Even the present 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) which took effect on August 22, 2002, do not provide for the
extension of the period for filing a motion for reconsideration.24
In a long line of cases, we have continuously reiterated the Habaluyas doctrine which made two significant pronouncements: (1)
that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible; and (2) that there is a prohibition against the filing of a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration in all courts, except the Supreme Court. We pointed out that
25
neither jurisprudence nor the procedural rules provide for an exception. 26
It is also established that Atty. Barrera was part of a law firm and had other partners who could have taken over his cases or
settled his professional affairs after he died. The allegation that his partners formed their own law offices after he died, deserves
scant consideration. We reiterate that it is not the duty of the courts to inquire during the progress of a case whether the
partnership continues to exist lawfully, or whether the partners are still alive or its associates are still connected with the firm.
27
In the case of Villanueva v. People, where counsel for petitioner had actually withdrawn from the case prior to the promulgation
28
of the Court of Appeals decision, and there was some difficulty in finding a new counsel, we ruled that the motion for
reconsideration belatedly filed was correctly expunged from the records. New counsel therein had filed a "motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration" on the last day of the reglementary period to file the motion for reconsideration. We laid
down the rule that the client was bound by the acts of his counsel, including even the latter’s mistakes and negligence. It was not
shown therein that new counsel was so grossly incompetent or so grossly negligent. Moreover, we said that there was no
violation of petitioner’s right to counsel as he was represented by a member of the Bar at all stages of the proceedings. In that
case, the party himself was even faulted for negligence in belatedly hiring new counsel.
Similarly, in the case of petitioner herein, his motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was filed only on
August 17, 2001, way beyond the 15-day period for filing the motion for reconsideration and more than three months from the
receipt by the Barrera Law Office of the decision sought to be reconsidered. Consequently, the period for filing an appeal or a
motion for reconsideration has indeed lapsed. As found by the Court of Appeals, the decision dated April 18, 2001 has become
final and executory.
In addition, petitioner was also guilty of negligence. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, he failed to coordinate with his
counsel on the progress of his case, when such is his duty as a party. It is not surprising, therefore, that he came to know of Atty.
Barrera’s death only in August 2001. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. 29
For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to agree with the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. 30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Rollo, p. 11.
1
Entitled People of the Philippines v. Rafael Amatorio.

2
Rollo, pp. 3-4.

3
Id. at 5.
4
Death Certificate, Rollo, p. 29.

5
Rollo, pp. 14-26.

6
Id. at 25.
7
Id. at 5.
8
Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court.

9
10
Rollo, p. 5.
11
Id. at 27-28.
12
Rollo, p. 11.
13
Id. at 3-9.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Rollo, pp. 52-54.
Section 4. Content of petition. – The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended
16
for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as
the petitioner, and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either
as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment, or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and
when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and
the reasons and arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court
of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as
would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
When the facts are undisputed, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom by the Court of
17
Appeals is correct is a question of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. (Commissioner of Immigration v.
Garcia, 57 SCRA 603, 610 [1974]).
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts. (Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289, 292 [1967]).
Riviera Filipina v. CA, G.R. No. 117355, April 5, 2002; San Miguel Corp. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 146775, January
18
30, 2002, p. 4.
19
Rollo, p. 5.
20
Ibid.
21
275 SCRA 413 (1997).
22
331 SCRA 707, 711 (2000).
23
142 SCRA 208, 212 (1986).
24
Rule VII, Entry of Judgment and Remand of Cases.
Section 1. Entry of Judgment. – Unless a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed or an appeal taken
to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court shall be entered upon expiration of
fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
xxx
Section 5. Entry of Judgment and Final Resolution. – If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or resolution has become final and executory.
25
Argel v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 511, 518-519 (1999).
26
Ibid.
27
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 428.
28
330 SCRA 695, 702-703 (2000).
Villanueva v. People, 330 SCRA 695, 703 (2000); citing Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491, 502
29
(1997).
30
See Spouses Mesina v. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002, p.10.

9999
G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014 - LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193494, March 07, 2014
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
There should be no inexplicable delay in the filing of a motion to set aside order of default. Even when a motion is filed within the required period,
excusable negligence must be properly alleged and proven.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ decision1 dated May 24, 2010 and resolution2 dated August 13, 2010 in CA–G.R. CV
No. 88023. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court of Makati’s decision 3 dated July 4, 2006.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises, Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10–year contract of lease 4 over a parcel of land located in
Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City. The parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T–166476 and was registered under Eli L.
Lui.5
On January 10, 2003, Zuellig Pharma received a letter 6 from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new owner of the leased
property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to pay rent directly to it. Attached to the letter was a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 336962 under
the name of the Philippine Bank of Communications. 7 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 336962 was derived from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T–
166476.8
Zuellig Pharma promptly informed Lui Enterprises of the Philippine Bank of Communications’ claim. On January 28, 2003, Lui Enterprises wrote to
Zuellig Pharma and insisted on its right to collect the leased property’s rent. 9
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications over the rental payments, Zuellig Pharma filed a
complaint10 for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it already consigned in court
P604,024.35 as rental payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental payments and that Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims. 11
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer 12 to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss 13 on the
ground that Zuellig Pharma’s alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the corporation. Under
the secretary’s certificate14 dated May 6, 2003 attached to the complaint, Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only authorized to “initiate and represent
[Zuellig Pharma] in the civil proceedings for consignation of rental payments to be filed against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or [the Philippine Bank of
Communications].”15
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the
filing of the interpleader case.16 Lui Enterprises filed this nullification case against the Philippine Bank of Communications with respect to several
properties it dationed to the bank in payment of its obligations. The property leased by Zuellig Pharma was among those allegedly dationed to the
Philippine Bank of Communications.17
In the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which corporation had the better right over the rental
payments.18 Lui Enterprises argued that the same issue was involved in the interpleader case. To avoid possible conflicting decisions of the Davao
trial court and the Makati trial court on the same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed.
To support its argument, Lui Enterprises cited a writ of preliminary injunction 19 dated July 2, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao,
ordering Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications “[to maintain] status quo” 20 with respect to the rent. By virtue of the writ of
preliminary injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it should continue collecting the rental payments from its lessees until the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was resolved. The writ of preliminary injunction dated July 2, 2003 reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREAS, on June 30, 2003, the Court issued an Order, a portion of which is quoted:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue, restraining and enjoining [the Philippine Bank of Communications],
its agents or [representative], the Office of the Clerk of Court–Sheriff and all persons acting on their behalf, from conducting auction sale on the
properties of [Lui Enterprises] in EJF–REM Case No. 6272–03 scheduled on July 3, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. at the Hall of Justice, Ecoland, Davao City,
until the final termination of the case, upon plaintiff [sic] filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00 to answer for damages that the enjoined
parties may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that applicant is not entitled thereto.
WHEREAS, that plaintiff posted a bond of P1,000,000.00 duly approved by this Court.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge that, until further orders, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] and all [its] attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other persons assisting [the bank], are directed to restrain from conducting auction sale on the Properties of [Lui
Enterprises] in EJF–REM Case No. 6272–03 scheduled on July 3, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. at the Hall of Justice, Ecoland, Davao City, until the final
termination of the case.21
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition22 to the motion to dismiss. It argued that the motion to dismiss should be denied for having been filed late. Under
Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the required time given to file an answer to the
complaint, which is 15 days from service of summons on the defendant. 23 Summons was served on Lui Enterprises on July 4, 2003. It had until July
19, 2003 to file a motion to dismiss, but Lui Enterprises filed the motion only on July 23, 2003. 24
As to Lui Enterprises’ claim that the interpleader case was filed without authority, Zuellig Pharma argued that an action interpleader “is a necessary
consequence of the action for consignation.” 25 Zuellig Pharma consigned its rental payments because of “the clearly conflicting claims of [Lui
Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bank of Communications].” 26 Since Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was authorized to file a consignation case, this authority
necessarily included an authority to file the interpleader case.
Nevertheless, Zuellig Pharma filed in court the secretary’s certificate dated August 28, 2003, 27 which expressly stated that Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was
authorized to file a consignation and interpleader case on behalf of Zuellig Pharma. 28
With respect to the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Zuellig Pharma argued that its pendency did not bar the filing of the interpleader
case. It was not a party to the nullification case. 29
As to the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Zuellig Pharma argued that the writ only pertained to properties
owned by Lui Enterprises. Under the writ of preliminary injunction, the Regional Trial Court of Davao enjoined the July 3, 2003 auction sale of Lui
Enterprises’ properties, the proceeds of which were supposed to satisfy its obligations to the Philippine Bank of Communications. As early as April
21, 2001, however, the Philippine Bank of Communications already owned the leased property as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
336962. Thus, the writ of preliminary injunction did not apply to the leased property. 30
Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15–day period to file an answer, Zuellig Pharma moved that Lui Enterprises be
declared in default.31
In its compliance32 dated September 15, 2003, the Philippine Bank of Communications “[joined Zuellig Pharma] in moving to declare [Lui
Enterprises] in default, and in [moving for] the denial of [Lui Enterprises’] motion to dismiss.” 33
The Regional Trial Court of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the reglementary period. Thus, in its
order34 dated October 6, 2003, the trial court denied Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss and declared it in default. 35
Lui Enterprises did not move for the reconsideration of the order dated October 6, 2003. Thus, the Makati trial court heard the interpleader case
without Lui Enterprises’ participation.
Despite having been declared in default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation with prayer 36 dated April 15, 2004. It manifested that the Regional
Trial Court of Davao allegedly issued the order 37 dated April 1, 2004, ordering all of Lui Enterprises’ lessees to “observe status quo with regard to the
rental payments”38 and continue remitting their rental payments to Lui Enterprises while the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was
being resolved. The order dated April 1, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ORDER
Posed for Resolution is the Motion for Amendment of Order filed by [Lui Enterprises] on September 23, 2003 seeking for the preservation of status
quo on the payment/remittance of rentals to [it] and the disposal/construction of the properties subject matter of this case.
xxxx
As elsewhere stated, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] did not oppose the instant motion up to the present. In fact, during the hearing held
on March 15, 2004, [the bank’s] counsel manifested in open court that except for the rentals due from [Zuellig Pharma] which are the subject of a
consignation suit before a Makati Court, the other rental payments are continuously received by [Lui Enterprises].
There being no objection from [the Philippine Bank of Communications], and in order to protect the right of [Lui Enterprises] respecting the subject
of the action during the pendency of this case, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion hereby grants the motion.
Accordingly, consistent with the order of this Court dated June 30, 2003, the parties are hereby directed to further observe status quo with regard to
the rental payments owing or due from the lessees of the properties subject of the first set of deeds of dacion and that the defendants are enjoined
from disposing of the properties located at Green Heights Village, Davao City until the case is finally resolved.
With the order dated April 1, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao as basis, Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma must remit its
rental payments to it and prayed that the interpleader case be dismissed.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati only noted the manifestation with prayer dated April 15, 2004. 39
It was only on October 21, 2004, or one year after the issuance of the order of default, that Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of
default40 in the Makati trial court on the ground of excusable negligence. Lui Enterprises argued that its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time
“was caused by the negligence of [Lui Enterprises’] former counsel.” 41 This negligence was allegedly excusable because “[Lui Enterprises] was
prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting [its] case.” 42
For its allegedly meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises argued that the earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment case barred the filing of
the interpleader case. The two actions allegedly involved the same parties and the same issue of which corporation had the better right over the
rental payments. To prevent “the possibility of two courts x x x rendering conflicting rulings [on the same issue],” 43 Lui Enterprises argued that the
subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed.
Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition44 to the motion to set aside order of default. It argued that a counsel’s failure to file a timely answer was
inexcusable negligence which bound his client.
Further, Zuellig Pharma argued that the pending case for nullification of deed of dation in payment “[did] not preclude [Zuellig Pharma] from seeking
the relief prayed for in the [interpleader case].” 45
While the motion to set aside order of default was still pending for resolution, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation and motion to dismiss 46 dated
April 21, 2005 in the Makati trial court. It manifested that the Davao trial court issued another order 47 dated April 18, 2005 in the nullification of
deed of dation in payment case. In this order, the Davao trial court directed the Philippine Bank of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay
rent to Lui Enterprises while the Davao trial court’s order dated April 1, 2004 was subsisting. The order dated April 18, 2005 of the Davao trial court
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ORDER
Plaintiffs move for execution or implementation of the Order dated September 14, 2004. In substance, [Lui Enterprises] seek[s] to compel the
remittance in their favor of the rentals from [Zuellig Pharma], one of the lessees alluded to in the September 14, 2004 Order whose rental payments
“must be remitted to and collected by [Lui Enterprises].” [The Philippine Bank of Communications] did not submit any opposition.
It appears from the records that sometime in February 2003, after being threatened with a lawsuit coming from [the Philippine Bank of
Communications], [Zuellig Pharma] stopped remitting its rentals to [Lui Enterprises] and instead, has reportedly deposited the monthly rentals
before a Makati court for consignation.
As aptly raised by the plaintiffs, a possible impasse may insist should the Makati Court’s ruling be contrary to or in conflict with the status quo order
issued by this Court. To preclude this spectacle, Zuellig Pharma should accordingly be advised with the import of the Order dated September 14,
2004, the salient portion of which is quoted:
x x x prior to the institution of the instant case and by agreement of the parties, plaintiffs were given as they did exercise the right to collect, receive
and enjoy rental payments x x x.
Since the April 1, 2004 status quo order was a necessary implement of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 30, 2003, it follows that
plaintiff’s right to collect and receive rental payments which he enjoyed prior to the filing of this case, must be respected and protected and
maintained until the case is resolved. As such, all rentals due from the above–enumerated lessees must be remitted to and collected by the
Plaintiffs.
Status quo simply means the last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy. (Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 207 SCRA 622).
As such, the [Philippine Bank of Communications] [is] hereby directed to forthwith inform [Zuellig Pharma] of the April 1, 2004 status quo order and
the succeeding September 14, 2004 Order, and consequently, for the said lessee to remit all rentals due from February 23, 2003 and onwards to
[Lui Enterprises] in the meanwhile that the status quo order is subsisting.
In its manifestation and motion to dismiss, Lui Enterprises reiterated its prayer for the dismissal of the interpleader case to prevent “the possibility
of [the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City] and [the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City] rendering conflicting rulings [on the
same issue of which corporation has the better right to the rental payments].” 48
Without resolving the motion to set aside order of default, the Makati trial court denied the manifestation with motion to dismiss dated April 21,
2005 on the ground that Lui Enterprises already lost its standing in court. 49
Lui Enterprises did not file any motion for reconsideration of the denial of the manifestation and motion to dismiss dated April 21, 2005.
In its decision50 dated July 4, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises “[was] barred from any claim in respect of the
[rental payments]”51 since it was declared in default. Thus, according to the trial court, there was no issue as to which corporation had the better
right over the rental payments.52 The trial court awarded the total consigned amount of P6,681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of Communications
and ordered Lui Enterprises to pay Zuellig Pharma P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees. 53
Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court of Appeals.54
The Court of Appeals found Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief insufficient. Under Rule 44, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an
appellant’s brief must contain a subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of
issues, among others. However, Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief did not contain these requirements. 55
As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’ motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises
filed its motion to dismiss four days late.56
With respect to Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default, the Court of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable
negligence that prevented it from filing its motion to dismiss on time. On its allegedly meritorious defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not being a party to the nullification
case.57
On the award of attorney’s fees, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court since “Zuellig Pharma x x x was constrained to file the action for
interpleader with consignation in order to protect its interests x x x.” 58
Thus, in its decision59 promulgated on May 24, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial
Court of Makati’s decision.
Lui Enterprises filed a motion for reconsideration. 60
The Court of Appeals denied Lui Enterprises’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution promulgated on August 13, 2010. 61 Hence, this petition.
In this petition for review on certiorari ,62 Lui Enterprises argued that the Court of Appeals applied “the rules of procedure strictly” 63 and dismissed its
appeal on technicalities. According to Lui Enterprises, the Court of Appeals should have taken a liberal stance and allowed its appeal despite the lack
of subject index, page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues in its appellant’s brief. 64
Lui Enterprises also claimed that the trial court should have set aside the order of default since its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time was due
to excusable negligence.65
For its allegedly meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises argued that the pending nullification of deed of dation in payment case barred the filing of the
interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case allegedly involved the same issue of which
corporation had the better right to the rent. To avoid conflicting rulings on the same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed
interpleader case be dismissed.66
No attorney’s fees should have been awarded to Zuellig Pharma as argued by Lui Enterprises. Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case despite its
knowledge of the nullification of deed of dation in payment case filed in the Davao trial court where the same issue of which corporation had the
better right over the rental payments was being litigated. Thus, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case in bad faith for which it was not entitled to
attorney’s fees.67
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its comment 68 on the petition for review on certiorari . It argued that Lui Enterprises failed to raise any
error of law and prayed that we affirm in toto the Court of Appeals’ decision.
For Zuellig Pharma, it manifested that it was adopting the Philippine Bank of Communications’ arguments in its comment. 69
The issues for our resolution are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal for lack of subject index, page references to the record, table of cases,
textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues in Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief;
II. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order of default;
III. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the subsequent filing of the
interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati; and
IV. Whether Zuellig Pharma was entitled to attorney’s fees.
Lui Enterprises’ petition for review on certiorari is without merit. However, we delete the award of attorney’s fees.
Lui Enterprises did not comply with the

rules on the contents of the appellant’s
brief
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of the appellee,
dismiss an appeal should the appellant’s brief lack specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f): chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on
the following grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a),
(c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with
textbooks and statutes cited: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 13. Contents of the appellant’s brief. – The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged,
textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited;
xxxx
(c) Under the heading “Statement of the Case,” a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the
appealed rulings and orders of the court, the nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading “Statement of Facts,” a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in
controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references to the
record;
xxxx
(f) Under the heading “Argument,” the appellant’s arguments on each assignment of error with page references to the record. The authorities relied
upon shall be cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
xxxx
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule
50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, 70 appeal is a “purely statutory right.”71 The right to appeal “must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law”72 and requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals. 73 Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal
shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.
In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc.,74 this court sustained the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Mendoza’s appeal. Mendoza’s appellant’s
brief lacked a subject index, assignment of errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of Appeals,75 this court also sustained the
dismissal of De Liano’s appeal. De Liano’s appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases and authorities, and page references to the
record.
There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona International, Inc., 76 the Philippine Coconut Authority’s appellant’s brief
lacked a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the nature of the judgment, and page references to
the record. However, this court found that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied with the Rules. Its appellant’s brief “apprise[d]
[the Court of Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the
case].”77 This court “[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules” 78 and ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut
Authority’s appeal.
In Go v. Chaves,79 Go’s 17–page appellant’s brief lacked a subject index. However, Go subsequently filed a subject index. This court excused Go’s
procedural lapse since the appellant’s brief “[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may easily peruse to apprise it of [the case]
and of the relief sought.” 80 This court ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve Go’s appeal “in the interest of justice.” 81
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. Thus, this court
excused the appellants’ procedural lapses.
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellant’s brief. It admitted that its appellant’s brief
lacked the required subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct
its admitted “technical omissions”82 by filing an amended appellant’s brief with the required contents. 83 Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of
the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal.
Rules on appeal “are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the Court of Appeals.” 84 With respect to the appellant’s brief, its
required contents are designed “to minimize the [Court of Appeals’] labor in [examining] the record upon which the appeal is heard and
determined.”85
The subject index serves as the brief’s table of contents. 86 Instead of “[thumbing] through the [appellant’s brief]”87 every time the Court of Appeals
Justice encounters an argument or citation, the Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the argument or citation he or she
needs.88 This saves the Court of Appeals time in reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows the justices of the appellate court to substantially
attend to this case as well as other cases.
Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellant’s brief are supported by the record. 89 A statement of fact without a
page reference to the record creates the presumption that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, “may be stricken or disregarded altogether.” 90
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the Court of Appeals can easily verify the authorities cited “for
accuracy and aptness.”91
Lui Enterprises’ appellant’s brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These
requirements “were designed to assist the appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance the orderly administration of
justice.”92 This court will not disregard rules on appeal “in the guise of liberal construction.” 93 For this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party
must substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. 94 Lui Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises’ appeal. It failed to comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d),
and (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the required contents of the appellant’s brief.
II
Lui Enterprises failed to show that its

failure to answer the complaint within
the required period was due to excusable
negligence
When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint, he or she is required to answer within 15 days from the day he or she was
served with summons.95 The defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint “[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer.” 96
Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to answer with good defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. Thus, a defendant
who fails to answer within 15 days from service of summons either presents no defenses against the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint or was
prevented from filing his or her answer within the required period due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. 97
In either case, the court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiff’s motion and notice to defendant. 98 The court shall then try the case until
judgment without defendant’s participation99 and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her complaint may warrant. 100
A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. 101 He or she is “deprived of the right to take part in the trial and forfeits his [or
her] rights as a party litigant,” 102 has no right “to present evidence [supporting his or her] allegations,” 103 and has no right to “control the
proceedings [or] cross–examine witnesses.” 104 Moreover, he or she “has no right to expect that [the court] would [act] upon [his or her
pleadings]”105 or that he or she “may [oppose] motions filed against him [or her].” 106
However, the defendant declared in default “does not [waive] all of [his or her] rights.” 107 He or she still has the right to “receive notice of
subsequent proceedings.”108 Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his or her allegations “despite the default of [the defendant].” 109
Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant but to enforce the prompt filing of the answer to the complaint. For a defendant without
good defenses, default saves him or her “the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the indefensible.” 110 As this court explained
in Gochangco v. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV:111
It does make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of the specific relief prayed for in the complaint, to forego
the filing of the answer or any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result would be the same: since he would be
unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact, judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be an acceptable result, if not
being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the judgment did not go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated in the complaint. x x
x.112 (Emphasis in the original)
On the other hand, for a defendant with good defenses, “it would be unnatural for him [or her] not to set x x x up [his or her defenses] properly and
timely.”113 Thus, “it must be presumed that some insuperable cause prevented him [or her] from [answering the complaint].” 114 In which case, his or
her proper remedy depends on when he or she discovered the default and whether the default judgment was already rendered by the trial court.
After notice of the declaration of default but before the court renders the default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside
order of default. The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, 115 mistake116 or excusable
negligence.117 The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Default; declaration of. – x x x x
(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to
set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that
he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
interest of justice.
If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming final and executory, he or she may file a motion for
new trial under Rule 37, Section 1, paragraph (a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 118 If he or she discovers his or her default after the judgment
has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be filed. 119
Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the judgment for being contrary to the evidence or to the law
under Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 120 He or she may do so even if he or she did not file a petition to set aside order of
default.121
A petition for certiorari may also be filed if the trial court declared the defendant in default with grave abuse of discretion. 122
The remedies of the motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, and petition for relief from judgment are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or cumulative. This is to compel defendants to remedy their default at the earliest possible opportunity. Depending on when the default
was discovered and whether a default judgment was already rendered, a defendant declared in default may avail of only one of the three remedies.
Thus, if a defendant discovers his or her default before the trial court renders judgment, he or she shall file a motion to set aside order of default. If
this motion to set aside order of default is denied, the defendant declared in default cannot await the rendition of judgment, and he or she cannot
file a motion for new trial before the judgment becomes final and executory, or a petition for relief from judgment after the judgment becomes final
and executory.
Also, the remedies against default become narrower and narrower as the trial nears judgment. The defendant enjoys the most liberality from this
court with a motion to set aside order of default, as he or she has no default judgment to contend with, and he or she has the whole period before
judgment to remedy his or her default.
With a motion for new trial, the defendant must file the motion within the period for taking an appeal 123 or within 15 days from notice of the default
judgment. Although a default judgment has already been rendered, the filing of the motion for new trial tolls the reglementary period of appeal, and
the default judgment cannot be executed against the defendant.
A petition for relief from judgment is filed after the default judgment has become final and executory. Thus, the filing of the petition for relief from
judgment does not stay the execution of the default judgment unless a writ of preliminary injunction is issued pending the petition’s resolution. 124
Upon the grant of a motion to set aside order of default, motion for new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment, the defendant is given the
chance to present his or her evidence against that of plaintiff’s. With an appeal, however, the defendant has no right to present evidence on his or
her behalf and can only appeal the judgment for being contrary to plaintiff’s evidence or the law.
Similar to an appeal, a petition for certiorari does not allow the defendant to present evidence on his or her behalf. The defendant can only argue
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default.
Thus, should a defendant prefer to present evidence on his or her behalf, he or she must file either a motion to set aside order of default, motion for
new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment.
In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to
set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.
Excusable negligence is “one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.” 125 The circumstances should be properly
alleged and proved. In this case, we find that Lui Enterprises’ failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable.
Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take steps to remedy its default and took one year from
discovery of default to file a motion to set aside order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only “conveniently
blamed its x x x counsel [for the late filing of the answer]” 126 without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under
Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b)127 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside
the order of default.
Lui Enterprises argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati should have been liberal in setting aside its order of default. After it had been declared
in default, Lui Enterprises filed several manifestations informing the Makati trial court of the earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment
case which barred the filing of the interpleader case. Lui Enterprises’ president, Eli L. Lui, and counsel even flew in from Davao to Makati to “formally
[manifest that] a [similar] action between [Lui Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bank of Communications]” 128 was already pending in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao. However, the trial court did not recognize Lui Enterprises’ standing in court.
The general rule is that courts should proceed with deciding cases on the merits and set aside orders of default as default judgments are “frowned
upon.”129 As much as possible, cases should be decided with both parties “given every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort
to technicality.”130
However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be complied with. 131 The
defendant’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The defendant must challenge the default
order before judgment. Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As this court held in SSS v. Hon. Chaves:132
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non–observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules[,] they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x. 133
As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel failed to file the motion to dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal
in setting aside orders of default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its representative and counsel had to fly in from Davao
to Makati to personally appear and manifest in court its meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do.
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to
litigate their claims. Thus, “[d]eclaring the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.” 134 The Regional Trial Court
of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in default.
Under Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person may file a special civil action for interpleader if conflicting claims are made
against him or her over a subject matter in which he or she has no interest. The action is brought against the claimants to compel them to litigate
their conflicting claims among themselves. Rule 62, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims
no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against
the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
An interpleader complaint may be filed by a lessee against those who have conflicting claims over the rent due for the property leased. 135 This
remedy is for the lessee to protect him or her from “double vexation in respect of one liability.” 136 He or she may file the interpleader case to
extinguish his or her obligation to pay rent, remove him or her from the adverse claimants’ dispute, and compel the parties with conflicting claims to
litigate among themselves.
In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filing the interpleader case “was not
defeated”137 when the Makati trial court declared Lui Enterprises in default.
At any rate, an adverse claimant in an interpleader case may be declared in default. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
claimant who fails to answer within the required period may, on motion, be declared in default. The consequence of the default is that the court may
“render judgment barring [the defaulted claimant] from any claim in respect to the subject matter.” 138 The Rules would not have allowed claimants
in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would “ironically defeat the very purpose of the suit.” 139
The Regional Trial Court of Makati declared Lui Enterprises in default when it failed to answer the complaint within the required period. Lui
Enterprises filed a motion to set aside order of default without an acceptable excuse why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove
the excusable negligence. Thus, the Makati trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.
III
The nullification of deed in dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of
the interpleader case. Litis pendentia
is not present in this case.
Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for nullification of deed of dation in payment with the Regional Trial Court of Davao. It sought to nullify the deed of
dation in payment through which the Philippine Bank of Communications acquired title over the leased property. Lui Enterprises argued that this
pending nullification case barred the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader case. Since the interpleader case was filed
subsequently to the nullification case, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
xxxx
Litis pendentia is Latin for “a pending suit.”140 It exists when “another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action x x
x.”141 The subsequent action is “unnecessary and vexatious” 142 and is instituted to “harass the respondent [in the subsequent action].” 143
The requisites of litis pendentia are: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the other.144
All of the requisites must be present. 145 Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader
case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.
There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it
executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the rental
payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the
Philippine Bank of Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
Lui Enterprises cited Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 147 as authority to set aside the subsequently filed interpleader
case. In this cited case, petitioner Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. entered into a lease contract with Westin Seafood Market, Inc. The
latter failed to pay rent. Thus, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties
inside the leased premises, and scheduled the public sale of the inventoried properties as they agreed upon in their lease contract.
Westin Seafood Market, Inc. filed for forcible entry with damages against Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. It subsequently filed an action
for damages against Progressive Development Corporation for its “forcible takeover of the leased premises.” 148
This court ordered the subsequently filed action for damages dismissed as the pending forcible entry with damages case barred the subsequently
filed damages case.
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. does not apply in this case. The action for forcible entry with damages and the subsequent action for
damages were filed by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. There is identity of parties in both cases.
In this case, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case was filed by Lui Enterprises against the Philippine Bank of Communications. The
interpleader case was filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. A different plaintiff filed the
interpleader case against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no identity of parties, and the first requisite
of litis pendentia is absent.
As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed the nullification of deed of dation in payment to recover ownership of the leased premises. Zuellig Pharma filed the
interpleader case to extinguish its obligation to pay rent. There is no identity of reliefs prayed for, and the second requisite of litis pendentia is
absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are absent, the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
Lui Enterprises alleged that the Regional Trial Court of Davao issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The
Regional Trial Court of Davao allegedly enjoined the Regional Trial Court of Makati from taking cognizance of the interpleader case. Lui Enterprises
argued that the Regional Trial Court of Makati “should have respected the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao.” 149 Lui Enterprises
cited Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of Appeals 150 where this court allegedly held: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [T]he issuance of the said writ by the RTC of Agoo, La Union not only seeks to enjoin Branch 9 of the RTC of Manila from proceedingwith the
foreclosure case but also has the effect of pre–empting the latter’s order. x x x. 151
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas is not an authority for the claim that a court can issue a writ of preliminary injunction against a co–equal
court. The cited sentence was taken out of context. In Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, this court held that the Regional Trial Court of
Agoo had no power to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 152 A court cannot enjoin the proceedings of a
co–equal court.
Thus, when this court said that the Regional Trial Court of Agoo’s writ of preliminary injunction “not only seeks to enjoin x x x [the Regional Trial
Court of Manila] from proceeding with the foreclosure case but also has the effect of pre–empting the latter’s orders,” 153 this court followed with
“[t]his we cannot countenance.”154
At any rate, the Regional Trial Court of Davao’s order dated April 18, 2005 was not a writ of preliminary injunction. It was a mere order directing the
Philippine Bank of Communications to inform Zuellig Pharma to pay rent to Lui Enterprises while the status quo order between Lui Enterprises and
the Philippine Bank of Communications was subsisting. The Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the proceedings before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. The order dated April 18, 2005 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As such, [the Philippine Bank of Communications] [is] hereby directed to forthwith inform Zuellig Pharma Corp., of the April 1, 2004 status quo order
and the succeeding September 14, 2004 Order, and consequently, for the said lessee to remit all rentals due from February 23, 2003 and onwards
to plaintiff Lui Enterprises, Inc., in the meanwhile that the status quo order is subsisting. 155
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davao did not enjoin the Regional Trial Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader case.
All told, the trial court did not err in proceeding with the interpleader case. The nullification of deed of dation in payment case pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao did not bar the filing of the interpleader case with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
IV
The Court of Appeals erred in awarding attorney’s fees

In its ordinary sense, attorney’s fees “represent the reasonable compensation [a client pays his or her lawyer] [for legal service rendered].” 156 In its
extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees “[are] awarded x x x as indemnity for damages [the losing party pays the prevailing party].” 157
The award of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule. 158 It is not awarded to the prevailing party “as a matter of course.” 159 Under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulation, except under specific circumstances: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.160
Even if a party is “compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his [or her] rights,” 161 attorney’s fees will not be awarded if
no bad faith “could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case.” 162
To award attorney’s fees, the court must have “factual, legal, [and] equitable justification.” 163 The court must state the award’s basis in its
decision.164 These rules are based on the policy that “no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.” 165
In this case, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney’s fees as “[Zuellig Pharma] was compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect [its] interest[s].”166 This is not a compelling reason to award attorney’s fees. That Zuellig Pharma had to file an interpleader case to consign
its rental payments did not mean that Lui Enterprises was in bad faith in insisting that rental payments be paid to it. Thus, the Court of Appeals
erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Zuellig Pharma.
All told, the Court of Appeals’ award of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision and resolution in CA–G.R. CV
No. 88023 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of P50,000.00 attorney’s fees to Zuellig Pharma Corporation is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
March 28, 2014
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Please take notice that on ___March 12, 2014___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above–entitled
case, the original of which was received by this Office on March 28, 2014 at 2:00 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 28–41. This decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Florito S.
Macalino, concurring.
2
Id. at 43–44.
3
Id. at 74–79.
4
Id. at 53–66.
5
Record, p. 44.
6
Rollo, p. 68.
7
Id. at 69–70.
8
Id. at 77, decision dated July 4, 2006.
9
Id. at 71.
10
Id. at 47–52, complaint dated May 7, 2003.
11
Id. at 30.
12
Record, pp. 37–47.
13
Rollo, pp. 80–82.
14
Id. at 52.
15
Id.
16
Record, p. 405.
17
Rollo, p. 81.
18
Record, pp. 77–80.
19
Id. at 87.
20
Rollo, p. 81.
21
Record, p. 87.
22
Id. at 93–98.
23
Rules of Court, Rule 11, sec. 1.
24
Rollo, pp. 30–31.
25
Record, p. 94.
26
Id. at 95.
27
Id. at 98.
28
Id., secretary’s certificate dated August 28, 2003, states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION (the “Corporation”) hereby authorize ATTY. ANA L.A. PERALTA with
address as that of the Corporation, to initiate, represent and act on behalf of the Corporation, including the authority to execute verifications and
certificate of non–forum shopping, in the civil proceedings for consignation of rental payments and interpleader and in all other legal suits or
proceedings to be filed against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or Philippine Bank of Communications, and to be the Corporation’s true and lawful attorney–
in–fact, in its name, place and stead.
29
Record, p. 95.
30
Id. at 95–96.
31
Id. at 96.
32
Id. at 101–103.
33
Id. at 101.
34
Id. at 111–113.
35
Id. at 112.
36
Id. at 208–209.
37
Id. at 210–211.
38
Id. at 211.
39
Id. at 215, in an order dated April 29, 2004.
40
Id. at 402–409.
41
Id. at 402.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 405.
44
Id. at 393–395.
45
Id. at 394.
46
Rollo, pp. 83–88.
47
Id. at 89–90.
48
Id. at 87.
49
Record, p. 451, in an order dated May 3, 2005.
50
Rollo, pp. 74–79.
51
Id. at 77.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 78–79.
54
Court of Appeals rollo, pp. 17–38.
55
Rollo, pp. 33–35.
56
Id. at 35–36.
57
Id. at 36–37.
58
Id. at 40.
59
Id. at 28–41.
60
Court of Appeals rollo, pp. 128–137.

Jurisprudence Order of Default

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205249 October 15, 2014

SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners,

Hence, this petition.

Jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel acquired

Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

wererightly declared to be in default.

All these requisites were complied with by respondent Ramon Ong.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Id. at 8 and 51.

Id. at 51 and 81.

Id. at 12, 51–52.

Id. at 49 and 53.

REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 131, sec. 3(m):

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

Rollo, pp. 54–55.

REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 131, sec. 3(d):

(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 11, sec. 1:

533 Phil. 42 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

262 Phil. 127 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

244 Phil. 49 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 15, sec. 4:

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 37, sec. 1:

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 38, sec. 1:

493 Phil. 676 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 135885

[G.R. No. 135885. April 28, 2000.]

SPOUSES JUAN J. DIAZ and ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, petitioners, vs. JOSE DIAZ and COURT OF

Raul Ma. Oracion and Miguel Romualdo T. Sanidad for petitioners.

Order dated January 8, 1999. prcd

The relevant facts are:

inadvertently and/or erroneously typed and/or omitted." 16

1999, we granted petitioners' prayer.

circumstances attended the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss.

Today is Wednesday, March 30, 2022

July 27, 2016

G.R. No. 192477

MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., Petitioner

further proceedings, including the reception of its evidence.3

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

the RTC, and cured any defect in the service of summons. 11

that the default of the defending party cannot be declared motu proprio. 14

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Padilla and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.

Trajano v. Cruz, No. L-47070, December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 712, 715.

Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court.

24 Phil. 446, 449-450 (1913).

No. L-49396, January 15, 1088, 157 SCRA40.

Id. at 54-55 (bold underscoring added for emphasis).

Malipod v. Tan, No. L-27730, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA202, 213.

Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 18.

Planters Bank, No. L-66183, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 45, 54.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 150453 February 14, 2003

The pertinent facts and incidents appear from the records:

From the foregoing decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.