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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 65673. January 30, 1992.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ABELARDO PENILLOS y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO

"BILLY" PENILLOS, MARIANO MARAÑO y MENDEZ, JOSE NUYDA y MARMEDA and ROMEO
NUYDA y PEDROSA, Accused. ABELARDO PENILLOS y LUCINDO @ GUILLERMO "BILLY"
PENILLOS, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellant.

 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ILLUMINATION PRODUCED BY

KEROSENE LAMP SUFFICIENT FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS. — This Court has held in the
past that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera) lamps is sufficient for the identification of
persons. Where conditions of visibility are favorable, the ability of a witness to identify the malefactor
should be upheld.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSUMPTION THAT WEARING OF MASKS TO HIDE ONE’S IDENTITY IS A UNIVERSAL
PRACTICE, WITHOUT EMPIRICAL BASIS AND SPECULATIVE. — This Court cannot yield to the
postulations of the appellant that Penillos would have worn a mask during the incident knowing as he
did that Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter
was impelled by evil motives in implicating him in the commission of the offense. The first theory
assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one’s identity is a universal practice resorted to by
criminals who are known to their prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence and care in
ensuring that no witness would be able to identify them while committing a crime. These assumptions
are, of course, without any empirical basis and are, at best, speculative.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VERBAL AGREEMENT OVER USE OF YARD, NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ONE TO ACCUSE
ANOTHER OF CRIME. — On the other hand, the evil motive ascribed to Epifania by reason of an
alleged prior verbal exchange between Penillos and her is a mere figment of the former’s imagination.
Such verbal disagreement allegedly arising from the refusal by Epifania to allow Penillos to use her
yard as a pathway, even if true, is inconsequential, trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse
another of committing robbery with homicide. With his positive identification, appellant’s defense of
alibi must fail.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION MADE BY A WITNESS. —
Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the
crime was committed but that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A POLICE LINE UP NOT ESSENTIAL TO A PROPER IDENTIFICATION. — Appellant also
questions the manner in which he was initially identified by Epifania Lladones in the hospital while the
latter was recuperating from her injury. The former contends that the procedure for conducting a
police line-up should have been strictly followed. In People v. Espiritu, We ruled that there is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification.

6. ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL COURT CARRY GREAT WEIGHT. — A trial court’s findings of
fact carry great weight for it has the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of
witnesses and, therefore, can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. 33 In the light of
the evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do not see any reason to disturb the lower
court’s factual conclusions.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; CONFESSION AND WAIVER OF

RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS INADMISSIBLE. — Even if the confession
of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The same
would necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not made in the presence of counsel. We
wish to underscore that Section 12(1) of Article III of the present Constitution has gone further to
protect, promote and enhance the right to counsel of any person under investigation by expressly
providing that such is a right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice" and that it "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." cralaw virtua1aw library

8. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; CRIME DENOMINATED AS SUCH
REGARDLESS OF THE NUMBER OF HOMICIDE OR INJURIES COMMITTED. — We, however, modify the
designation of the offense the appellant was convicted for on the basis of the information prepared by
the then assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the appellant simply with the
special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. This
Court has consistently held that this offense is denominated as such regardless of the number of the
homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely serve as generic aggravating
circumstances which can be offset by other mitigating circumstances. There is no crime of robbery
with homicide and frustrated homicide or robbery with homicide and attempted homicide. The term
"homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in its generic
sense; it includes murder and slight physical injuries committed during the robbery which crimes are
merged in the crime of robbery with homicide.

9. ID.; ID.; DWELLING IS AGGRAVATING EVEN IF HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF THE
HOUSE IF THE PRINCIPAL OFFENSE OF ROBBERY WAS PERPETRATED INSIDE. — Dwelling is
aggravating in robbery with homicide because this type of robbery could be committed without the
necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. It is indisputably clear from the pleadings and the
decision of the trial court that although the homicide was committed outside the house of the
deceased, the principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the killing thus occurred as a result
of the initial evil design to steal.

10. ID.; PENALTY; RECLUSION PERPETUA IS NOT THE SAME AS LIFE IMPRISONMENT. — As noted
from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty
of" reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English
translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent
case of People v. Baguio, this Court held: "The Code does not prescribe the penalty of ‘life
imprisonment’ for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious
offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also
carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as
‘life imprisonment’ which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another,
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration." As early as 1948, in People v. Mobe,
reiterated in People v. Pilones and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People v.
Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for
life or life imprisonment. Every judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that,
henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City in
Criminal Case No. 2144 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Abelardo Penillos, Et. Al.", promulgated
on 28 September 1983, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Attempted Homicide pursuant to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of" reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." cralaw virtua1aw library

The information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal charges the above-named accused with the
crime of "Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Homicide" committed as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"That on or about the 31st day of July, 1981, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another for a common purpose, with intent of gain (sic) and by means of violence against or
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the horse of the spouses
APRONIANO LLADONES and EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES and once inside, forcibly take the amount of
P1,000.00 from the said spouses and by reason of or on occasion of the robbery and with intent to kill,
attacked, assaulted, hogtied and stabbed APRONIANO LLADONES inflicting injuries upon the latter
which directly caused his untimely death; while EPIFANIA LOPEZ LLADONES was hacked on her
shoulder, thus accused commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which could produce the crime of Homicide upon said EPIFANIA
LOPEZ LLADONES by reason of causes other than their spontaneous desistance." 2

x          x          x

Only accused-appellant Abelardo Penillos was apprehended. The others remain at large. 3

Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and was giver a separate trial.

The court a quo summarized the evidence for the prosecution, upon which it based its conviction of
appellant, as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"Four defendants are charged with the offense of ‘Robbery with Homicide and Attempted Homicide.’
Among them, only one was apprehended and a separate trial was held. On June 18, 1902, defendant
Abelardo Penillos pleaded ‘Not Guilty.’

The following facts are not disputed. On July 31, 1981, in the early hours of the evening or
thereabouts (sic), at Sitio Naontogan, Bariis, Legazpi (sic) City, Aproniano Lladones and spouse
Epifania Lopez were awakened as four (4) persons suddenly entered their house. The intruders
demanded money from the couple and when Aproniano Lladones refused to accede he was carried
outside his dwelling by the four persons. He was later on found hogtied and lifeless suffering (sic) from
multiple stab wounds. His wife, Epifania Lladones Lopez was also hacked with a bolo by one of the
entrants (sic) as she tried to follow to find out where her husband was being taken. The following
morning Abelardo Penillos was apprehended and after giving an extra-judicial confession, the present
complaint was filed against him and his co-conspirators, Mariano Maraño, Romeo Nuyda and Jose
Nuyda. The last three defendants remained at large hence Abelardo Penillos was afforded a separate
trial.

Testifying for the prosecution, Epifania Lopez Lladones narrated that on the night in question while she
and her husband were asleep inside their house they were awakened by the entry of four persons who
demanded money from them; that one of the intruders even sat on the belly of her husband who was
caught still lying down and at that moment she was able to recognize one of them as Abelardo Penillos
because of the illumination coming from a kerosene lamp in the kitchen adjoining the sala; that
Abelardo Penillos was one of the four persons who brought her husband outside the house and as she
tried to follow she was hacked by one of them whose identity she cannot tell; that she suffered a hack
wound and later on she came to know that her husband, hogtied, was found dead from stab wounds;
that she crawled in the dark to the house of her neighbor Celerino Nudo who reported the incident to
the barangay captain who in turn lost no time in notifying the police authorities; that recollecting the
robbery she discovered the 1099 of P1,000.00 kept in a bamboo basket and during the time she was
confined at the hospital she recognized Abelardo Penillos as one of the perpetrators when brought to
her for confrontation.

Celerino Nudo also testifying recalls that in the evening of July 31, 1981 Epifania Lopez then seriously
injured from a hack wound arrived at his house to seek his help regarding an incident in their house;
that she mentioned a certain Billy Penillos as one of the men who forcibly entered their dwelling while
they were asleep; that he at once reported the matter to the barangay captain and rushed Epifania
Lladones to the hospital." 4

x          x          x
Upon the other hand, appellant relied on alibi as his defense, which is summarized by the trial court as
follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Penillos testified that on July 31, 1981, he was in the house of his grandmother at Barangay
Esperanza, Putiao, Sorsogon, in the morning until six o’clock in the evening; that he left Barangay
Esperanza thereafter riding on a carabao sledge loaded with coconuts and arrived at Barangay
Imalnod, Legaspi City, a distance of about 4 kilometers at past eight o’clock in the evening; that he
proceeded to the house of his father-in-law where he spent the night because he was already tired;
that he was able to surmise the time of his arrival because he overheard from the radio that the
drama serial Zimatar had just been concluded." 5

After trial, the lower court rendered the challenged decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"All the foregoing and EVIDENCE considered, and finding the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable
doubt, Abelardo `Billy’ Penillos @ Guillermo Penillos is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua or life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Aproniano Lladones in the amount of
P20,000; further, defendant to pay Epifania Lopez Lladones the amount of P1,000.00, cash stolen, in
both instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Credit the defendant the full time of any preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in
accordance with law." 6

x          x          x

Appellant immediately filed a Notice of Appeal 7 wherein he manifested that he is appealing the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal should have
been made to this Court. The records of the case were erroneously transmitted to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) which properly forwarded the same to this Court
on 24 November 1983. 8 On 20 December 1983, We required the appellant to file his Brief, 9 which he
complied with on 16 July 1984 10 after being granted several extensions. The appellee, on the other
hand, submitted its Brief on 15 November 1984. 11

Appellant submits the following assignment of errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I

THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT BY
THE COMPLAINANT.

II

THAT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING THE STATEMENT OF APPELLANT GREAT WEIGHT WHEN
SAID STATEMENT WAS TAKEN IN DEROGATION OF APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND IN
CONTRAVENTION OF PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE." cralaw virtua1aw library

In support of the first assigned error, appellant insists that Epifania Lladones could not have made a
proper identification of the offenders because: (1) The only illumination at the scene of the incident
was a gas lamp which was placed in the kitchen. There were partitions between both the kitchen and
the sala and the sala and the bedroom where she and her deceased husband were sleeping. There
could not have been enough light for her to properly recognize the accused. (2) Having just been
roused from sleep by one of the perpetrators who sat on the deceased’s belly, she was most probably
"in a state of shock or terror" and thus positive identification of the accused is highly improbable.
Besides, she testified that the very reason for her rushing to the kitchen upon waking up was to get
the gas lamp in order to see who her husband’s attacker was. (3) Even when Epifania was overtaken
by the accused and pinned under a table, visibility was still not sufficient as both were still some
distance from the kitchen, the only source of illumination. (4) Finally, her claim that she had known
the accused prior to the incident should have compelled the latter to have at least worn a mask so he
would not be recognized.

Appellant also takes exception to the procedure undertaken by the police authorities on the day after
the incident when he was brought to the hospital to be identified by Epifania Lladones. He laments
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The evidence for the prosecution also pointed out that on the following morning of the incident
(August 1, 1981), Abelardo was made to face Epifania while the latter was still confined at the Albay
Provincial Hospital for medical treatment of the hack wound she sustained and that Epifania pointed to
Abelardo as one of the perpetrators of the offense charged. The defense submits that this particular
procedure undertaken by the Police in showing the victim, Epifania, a single person and asking her
whether or not that man is one of those who perpetrated the offense, is most unfair and violative of
the constitutional rights of the accused. The proper procedure should have been an identification in a
line-up, whereby the suspect is made to line up with other persons who are not suspects at all, and
then the victim is asked to point to whoever he or she recognizes as the perpetrator of the offense."
12

Anent the second assigned error, appellant claims that his constitutional rights to remain silent, to be
entitled to counsel and to be informed of such rights "had no longer any meaning or purpose." This is
because before giving his confession to the police investigator, he was interviewed by other
policemen. The prosecution failed to show that in the said interview, the accused was apprised of his
constitutional rights. He further avers that he initially disclaimed any responsibility for the crime but
when manhandled, boxed and struck with a piece of wood on the head, he was forced to confess.
Thus, the confession he prepared on 1 August 1981 (Exh. "B") is a mere formality in spite of his
having been informed by the police investigator during the formal investigation of his constitutional
rights.

And even conceding the absence of coercion during the initial interview, the signed confession would
still be inadmissible as it does not appear that a valid waiver of the right to counsel was made by the
accused.

In the People’s Brief, the Solicitor General asserts the view that the principal issue to be resolved is
whether or not the appellant was sufficiently identified as one of the culprits responsible for the
offense.

Appellee avers, and We agree, that Epifania was able to sufficiently identify Abelardo Penillos as the
person who sat on her husband’s belly and demanded money from her. She testified that she was able
to recognize Penillos when the latter pinned her down under the table; such identification was aided
by her having known Penillos long before the incident, when the latter would go to the Lladones’
house. 13 She was even able to declare that Penillos was wearing short pants at the time of the
commission of the crime. 14

Furthermore, the illumination provided by the kerosene lamp was enough for Epifania to have
recognized Penillos. This Court has held in the past that illumination produced by kerosene (gasera)
lamps is sufficient for the identification of persons. 15 Where conditions of visibility are favorable, the
ability of a witness to identify the malefactor should be upheld. 16

The frenetic efforts of the appellant’s counsel to cast doubt on the positive identification by Epifania,
characterized by attempts to mislead the latter, proved to be a bad gamble for it only provided the
prosecution a rare opportunity to elicit the details for the positive identification, to wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q How were you able to say that it was Billy Penillos who sat on the stomach of your husband and
pointed the knife when you said there were two persons present inside your bedroom?
A I recognized him; he was then wearing short-pant while his other companions was (sic) wearing
long pants.

Q And according to you after you ran away to get the lamp in the kitchen — before you reached the
kitchen, Billy Penillos twisted your arm and pinned you under a table. Is that correct?

FISCAL: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

No. It is misleading, Your Honor please, because she was already in the kitchen. Before she could get
hold of the lamp, that was the time when Abelardo Penillos twisted her right arm, she was already in
the kitchen.

COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Witness may answer. She is under cross-examination.

A He placed me under the table.

BENDAÑA: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q And it was under the table that you recognized the face of Billy Penillos?

A While inside, I already recognized him inside. Before I have (sic) already recognized him.

Q Did you not testify a while ago that you ran towards the kitchen to get a lamp, so that, you can
recognize the persons inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you want to impress the (sic) Court that before you could get the lamp from the kitchen,
you were already able to recognize Billy Penillos?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you were able to recognize Billy Penillos although at that time you were running towards the
kitchen and Billy Penillos was behind inasmuch as he was sitting on the stomach of your husband?

A Yes. I already recognized him.

Q So, your statement a while ago that you prefer (sic) in giving to the kitchen to get a lamp was to
recognize who the persons were inside your house is not correct?

A He was the very first one to get inside the house while his companions who were wearing long pants
followed him. So I tried to recognize them.

Q Is there a partition between the kitchen and your room?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you said the lamp is (sic) situated inside the kitchen?

A Yes, sir, because there was (sic) a door leading to that place.

Q How far is the kitchen to your bed?

A Very near.

Q But the direct light of the lamp is (sic) being obstructed by the partition separating the bedroom and
the kitchen?
A The gas lamp was situated near the door.

Q Is it the door of the room or near the door of the kitchen?

A Near the door of the sala.

Q So, you are now telling the Court that the lamp is (sic) near the sala and not in the kitchen?

A It is (sic) inside the kitchen but near the door leading to the sala.

Q But your bedroom is inside a room which has a partition separating it from the sala. Is there a
partition?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, you were not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo Penillos?

A No, sir. I was not able to recognize the companions of Abelardo Penillos because when Abelardo
Penillos ran to hold my husband and then suddenly his companions entered. 17

x          x          x

Q So, the only moment that you were able to recognize Billy Penillos was while you were inside the
room, and while Abelardo Penillos was demanding from you some money while you were being pinned
under the table?

A Yes, sir.

Q And in these two instances where (sic) according to you, you recognized the face of Abelardo
Penillos, first, when you were in the room, the room was still dark because the lamp was in the
kitchen. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the second time that you recognized Billy Penillos was while you were being pinned under the
table; and under the table it was also dark at that time. Is that correct?

A No not dark, because the light from the kitchen was illuminating the place wherein I was being
pinned under the table. It was not dark.

Q The table where you said you were pinned by Abelardo Penillos, how far was it from the kitchen?

A About two meters.

Q How big is this table?

A It is small, we use it for our eating purposes." 18

This Court cannot yield to the postulations of the appellant that Penillos would have worn a mask
during the incident knowing as he did that Epifania was familiar with him and that the latter was
impelled by evil motives in implicating him in the commission of the offense.

The first theory assumes that the wearing of masks to hide one’s identity is a universal practice
resorted to by criminals who are known to their prospective victims and who exercise utmost prudence
and care in ensuring that no witness would be able to identify them while committing a crime. These
assumptions are, of course, without any empirical basis and are, at best, speculative. On the other
hand, the evil motive ascribed to Epifania by reason of an alleged prior verbal exchange between
Penillos and her is a mere figment of the former’s imagination. Such verbal disagreement allegedly
arising from the refusal by Epifania to allow Penillos to use her yard as a pathway, even if true, is
inconsequential, trivial and insufficient to move one to accuse another of committing robbery with
homicide.

With his positive identification, appellant’s defense of alibi must fail.

We defer to the conclusion by the court a quo that the protestations of the appellant "held in contrast
with the positive identification made by Epifania Lopez on his complicity in the commission of the
offense could not provide a justifiable ground to extricate him." 19

Appellant testified that between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on 31 July 1981, the day of the incident, he
was travelling by carabao from Sitio Esperanza to Nauntogan, the place of the incident, a distance of
about four (4) kilometers. He was allegedly accompanied by one Victor Maraño. Arriving at his
destination at around 8:00 p.m., he proceeded to the house of his father-in-law, co-accused Mariano
Maraño, which is about thirty (30) meters away from the residence of the victims. At the house of
Mariano, appellant also encountered his other co-accused, Jose Nuyda and Romeo Nuyda. While
having supper therein, appellant overheard Mariano and the Nuydas talking about something that they
would divide among themselves. 20

Appellee easily demolishes this defense by alleging that: Penillos’ alleged travel from Esperanza to
Nauntogan was not even corroborated by his supposed companion, Victor Maraño, who was not
presented as a witness; Penillos’ presence at the house of his co-accused, a mere thirty (30) meters
away from the scene of the crime, militates against his defense in view of the positive identification by
Epifania; and that it was not physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the place of the
incident during the commission of the crime.

Settled is the rule that alibi cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. 21 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the
crime was committed but that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime. 22

Appellant also questions the manner in which he was initially identified by Epifania Lladones in the
hospital while the latter was recuperating from her injury. The former contends that the procedure for
conducting a police line-up should have been strictly followed. In People v. Espiritu, 23 We ruled that
there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Clearly then, this
argument must also fail.

And now on the second assigned error. In respect to the allegation that the signed confession (Exh.
"B") was defective and should not have been admitted in evidence, the appellee practically concedes
the irregularity when it avers thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"From the record, it appears that appellant’s sworn statement was executed in a manner not in full
accord with his right to the assistance of counsel. This may be seen in the preliminary portion of the
sworn statement, in which appellant was: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . reminded that under the new rules of the Constitution you have the right to remain silent and the
right to have counsel of your own choice. You are also reminded that whatever you say here might be
used for or against you in any court proceedings. Is this clearly understood by you?

Answer: Yes sir.

Question: After having been informed of your constitutional rights do you wish to proceed with this
investigation?

Answer: Yes sir.

Question: Are you ready to give a free voluntary statement?

Answer: Yes sir. (Folder of Exhibits, p. 2).’

Neither the preliminary portion aforecited nor the testimony of the investigating officer showed an
affirmative offer to provide appellant with counsel de oficio if he could not retain counsel of his choice.
Consequently, the sworn statement may very well be inadmissible and may not be utilized against
appellant." 24

Indeed it does not appear that constitutional safeguards afforded an accused under investigation for
the commission of an offense were complied with. Aside from the Solicitor General’s observations, it is
clear that waiver of the right to counsel was not made in the presence of counsel. On cross-
examination, police investigator Demosthenes Martillano testified: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Why did you not place in the investigation that the witness is waiving, his right to a (sic) counsel?

A That is my error.

BENDAÑA: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q Why? What do you mean by that answer of yours that it was your error? Will you please explain to
us that answer of yours?

A All I know is that if the suspect does not need a counsel, I think, it was (sic) also suffice.

Q Tell the court whether or not during the investigation Billy Penillos did not waive his right to a (sic)
counsel?

FISCAL: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is already stated, Your Honor please, in his statement that when the affiant chose to proceed with
the investigation, to answer all questions, he in effect is waiving his right to a (sic) counsel after
having been informed of all his rights.

x          x          x

COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The witness had already admitted that he did not place specifically that portion of waiver. But it does
not mean that he did not asks the suspect. It is a matter of interpretation how you are going to
interpret that portion of your question. The court under that respect will sustain the objection of the
Fiscal."25 cralaw:red

x          x          x

Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel,
it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given. 26 The same would necessarily apply to a waiver of the right to counsel not made in the
presence of counsel.
In Morales v. Enrile, Et Al., 27 this Court, applying and interpreting Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which provides as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library

laid down the duties of an investigator during custodial interrogation and ruled that the waiver of the
right to counsel shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible — or by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accompanied.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library

We reiterated the above ruling in People v. Galit, 28 People v. Lumayok, 29 People v. Albofera 30 and
People v. Marquez. 31 In view therefore of the law and jurisprudence, the sworn statement of
appellant, Exhibit "B", is hereby declared inadmissible in evidence and should have been rejected by
the trial court even if it is not in fact a confession for, as correctly observed by the People, it is
exculpatory in nature. Just the same, since it was taken in violation of appellant’s constitutional right
to counsel, its exculpatory character did not cure the fatal defect.

We wish to underscore that Section 12(1) of Article III of the present Constitution has gone further to
protect, promote and enhance the right to counsel of any person under investigation by expressly
providing that such is a right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice" and that it "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." cralaw virtua1aw library

Be that as it may, We affirm the judgment of conviction by the trial court on the basis of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Concluded the lower court: "The truth and
as clearly borne by the evidence is: the defendant was among the perpetrators of the heinous offense.
The robbery, left in its wake the death of Aproniano Lladones and the wounding of his wife Epifania
Lopez Lladones." 32

A trial court’s findings of fact carry great weight for it has the privilege of examining the deportment
and demeanor of witnesses and, therefore, can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not.
33 In the light of the evidence presented in the proceedings below, We do not see any reason to
disturb the lower court’s factual conclusions.

We, however, modify the designation of the offense the appellant was convicted for on the basis of the
information prepared by the then assistant city fiscal. The information should have charged the
appellant simply with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. This Court has consistently held that this offense is denominated as such
regardless of the number of the homicides or injuries committed. These other circumstances merely
serve as generic aggravating circumstances which can be offset by other mitigating circumstances. 34
There is no crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide 35 or robbery with homicide and
attempted homicide. 36 The term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is
to be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and slight physical injuries committed during
the robbery which crimes are merged in the crime of robbery with homicide. 37
The trial court, however, should have taken into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with homicide because this type of robbery could be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. 38 It is indisputably clear
from the pleadings and the decision of the trial court that although the homicide was committed
outside the house of the deceased, the principal offense of robbery was perpetrated inside; the killing
thus occurred as a result of the initial evil design to steal.

The penalty for robbery with homicide and physical injuries defined under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, the greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 39 However, in view of the abolition
of the death penalty, the appellant is entitled to the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty
of" reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Evidently, it considered the latter as the English
translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the recent
case of People v. Baguio, 40 this Court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Code 41 does not prescribe the penalty of ‘life imprisonment’ for any of the felonies therein
defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal
Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely:
perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as ‘life imprisonment’ which, for one thing,
does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite
extent or duration." cralaw virtua1aw library

As early as 1948, in People v. Mobe, 42 reiterated in People v. Pilones 43 and in the concurring
opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People v. Sumadic, 44 this Court already made it clear
that reclusion perpetua is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge
should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should
mistake one for the other.

Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P20,000.00 is increased to P50,000.00. 45

WHEREFORE, except as modified in its dispositive portion to specify that appellant Abelardo Penillo’s
penalty is to be reclusion perpetua, to remove the alternative reference therein to "life imprisonment"
and to increase the indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones to be paid by him to the heirs of
said deceased, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 2144 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects. The attempted homicide aspect of the charge is likewise deemed absorbed in one special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, and the civil indemnity for the death of Aproniano Lladones is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. Original Records, 124-129; Rollo, 8-13. The decision is dated 15 September 1983.

2. Original Records, 1-2, Rollo, 6-7.

3. Id., 124.

4. Decision of trial court, 1-3; Original Records, 124-126.

5. Rollo, 10-11.

6. Rollo, 129.

7. Id., 132.

8. Id., 3.

9. Id., 26.

10. Id., 39.

11. Id., 68.

12. Rollo, 46.

13. TSN, 6 October 1982, 8.

14. Id., 17.

15. People v. Almenario, 172 SCRA 268; People v. Reana, 120 SCRA 583.

16. People v. Espejo, 186 SCRA 627.

17. TSN, 6 October 1982, 17-20.

18. Id., 23-24.

19. Rollo, 12.

20. TSN, 23 June 1983, 3-6.

21. People v. Clores, 184 SCRA 638; People v. Arceo, 187 SCRA 265; People v. Esparcia, 187 SCRA 282; People v. Ampo-
an, 187 SCRA 173; People v. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313; People v. Marapao, 188 SCRA 243; People v. Mandal, 188 SCRA
526; People v. Tenebro, 191 SCRA 363; People v. Tasarra, 192 SCRA 266.

22. People v. Arceo, supra.; People v. Paringit, 189 SCRA 478; People v. Gupo, 190 SCRA 7; People v. Yeban, 190 SCRA
409; People v. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754; People v. Mañago, 191 SCRA 552.

23. 191 SCRA 503.

24. Appellee’s Brief, 12-13.

25. TSN, 17 December 1982, 21-23.

26. People v. Repe, 75 SCRA 422.

27. 121 SCRA 538 (1983).

28. 135 SCRA 465 (1985).

29. 139 SCRA 1 (1985).

30. 152 SCRA 123 (1987).

31. 153 SCRA 700.

32. Rollo, 12.

33. People v. Renejane, 158 SCRA 258; People v. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533; People v.
Caboverde, 160 SCRA 550; People v. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623.

34. People v. Nunag, 196 SCRA 206. See also People v. Pedroso, 115 SCRA 599; People v. Mateo, Jr., 179 SCRA 303;
People v. Repuela, 183 SCRA 244.

35. People v. Ga y Esplanada, 186 SCRA 790.

36. GREGORIO, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminals Law Review, 1988 ed., 523.

37. People v. Ga y Esplanada, supra.

38. People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178, citing People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232; People v. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98; People v.
Dajaresco, 129 SCRA 576.

39. Article 63(1), Revised Penal Code.

40. 196 SCRA 459 (1991).

41. The Revised Penal Code.

42. 81 Phil. 58.

43. 84 SCRA 167.

44. 113 SCRA 689.

45. People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643; People v. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700; People v. Baguio, supra.

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G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020

♦ Decision, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J]

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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
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EN BANC

G.R. No. 134815             May 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO DE JESUS y ENRILE, appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, convicting the appellant
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.

The Case for the Prosecution

SPO3 Eugenio Ybasco was a policeman assigned to the Makati Police Station, Substation Block No. 6 since March 1
1973.3 After his tour of duty, he worked on the sly for a money changer in the vicinity of the Intercontinental Hotel and
Rustan’s Supermarket in Makati City. He delivered money for his employer every afternoon. The money was placed i
bag3 and he used a bicycle for this extra job.4 Everytime Ybasco delivered money to his employer, he passed by Yola
Rapa who was selling cigarettes in the vicinity of the Rustan’s Supermarket and the Kimpura Restaurant, Ayala Cent
City.5 Ybasco was a familiar face among the other cigarette vendors in the area, namely, Lydia, Gina, Jing and Romy
called him "Sir Ybasco."7

Sometime in February 1994, Dante Manansala, a native of Barangay Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna, 8 appellant Edua
Jesus, a native of Barangay Tabuyok, Apalit, Pampanga, 9 and Crispin Del Rosario, the appellant’s brother-in-law 10 an
Barangay Tadloc, Los Baños, Laguna, 11 agreed to stage a robbery in the afternoon of March 7, 1994. On February 15
appellant told Del Rosario of the planned robbery. 12 Del Rosario was told that the financier for the heist was Christoph
British national residing in the Philippines.13 The appellant knew that Ybasco was to deposit US$250,000 in the bank
afternoon for his employer. They decided to waylay Ybasco on his way to the bank.

At 8:00 a.m. on March 7, 1994, upon Nash’s instructions, Del Rosario and the appellant took a Toyota Corolla car wit
TAX 732 from Rolando Fajardo in Tanauan, Batangas. The car was owned by Nash. 14 While the appellant, Del Rosar
Manansala were on board the car, their confederate, Tonton, had lunch somewhere in Batangas. The group arrived i
of the parking lot at the Ayala Center near the Rustan’s Supermarket and the Kimpura Restaurant on board the same
appellant was armed with a caliber .45 handgun. 16 Manansala, the appellant and Del Rosario alighted, and conducted
surveillance of the area. Tonton remained in the car. Manansala instructed Del Rosario to position himself as a looko
corner of the Rustan’s Supermarket, and for the appellant to position himself within the vicinity. 17 Manansala waited Y
the office of the money changer. Dela Rapa, who was then vending cigarettes, was about five arm’s length away from

At around 6:30 p.m., Ybasco emerged from the office of his employer holding a plastic bag. Manansala contacted De
and told him that Ybasco was on his way out. He reminded Del Rosario to be on the lookout for anybody who might r
succor of Ybasco, while the appellant would take care of Ybasco. Momentarily, Manansala and the appellant confron
and told him, "May warrant of arrest ka." They grabbed Ybasco, handcuffed him and dragged him to the car. 19 Manan
appellant had a scuffle with Ybasco when they grabbed the plastic bag from him. 20 Roberto Acosta, a roving security
the incident and pulled out his .38 caliber gun with Serial No. 172410. On board his motorbike, he sped towards the s
investigate the incident. Del Rosario confronted Acosta and grappled with him for the possession of the gun. 21 As Del
managed to wrest possession of the gun from Acosta, Manansala ordered Del Rosario to shoot. Del Rosario did as h
and shot Acosta in the mouth. They boarded the car, and sped towards EDSA. 22 Dela Rapa was shocked at the sudd
events.23 So was Juanito Mendoza, who had just stepped out from the Rustan’s Supermarket and saw the shooting in

Wilfredo Delia, another security guard at the Ayala Center, rushed to Acosta’s aid and brought him to the Makati Med
Acosta expired at about 10:10 p.m.25

Meanwhile, the Toyota Corolla sped towards the direction of Cabuyao, Laguna. Manansala said that they would have
because the mayor was his ninong.26 However, when he looked inside Ybasco’s bag and found that it only contained
instead of the expected US$250,000, he was enraged. Manansala hit Ybasco on the nape and uttered invectives at t
Ybasco explained, "Eh wala naman akong idinedeliber mga anak na ganyan kalaking pera." Manansala took the ₱5,0
Ybasco.27

Ybasco was transported to a sugar farm at Barangay Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna. Manansala and the appellant took him
car and told him that he would be allowed to board a tricycle. The appellant warned Ybasco not to follow them, as he
appellant) was a member of the New People’s Army. Believing that Ybasco would be freed, Del Rosario took ₱80 fro
latter’s wallet, but returned ₱50 to him for his fare. 28

The appellant suddenly shot Ybasco on the head. The latter fell to the ground with his hands still handcuffed. 29 Manan
appellant and Del Rosario proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, where Del Rosario alighted after receiving ₱100 from the
for his fare.30 The appellant explained that the remaining ₱4,900 would be used for the repair of the car.

In the meantime, police operatives from the Makati Police Station, including SPO4 Tomas Sipin and SPO1 Ramoncito
arrived at the Ayala Center to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the killing of Acosta and Ybasco’s abduction. 31 W
Rapa informed the policemen that she witnessed the incident, she was brought to the police station where she gave a
statement.32 At 8:10 p.m., Juanito Mendoza arrived at the Makati Police Station and gave a sworn statement where h
that he witnessed the shooting incident and saw the get-away car, a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TAX 732. He also
physical description of Acosta’s assailant.33

At 6:20 a.m. of March 8, 1994, Sofronio Entridicho was at his sugar field and saw the cadaver of Ybasco whose hand
handcuffed.34 Entridicho reported what he saw to the Cabuyao Police Station. 35 SPO2 Reynaldo Arcibal of the Cabuya
Station reported the finding to the Makati Police Station which dispatched a team of police investigators to Barangay
Cabuyao, Laguna. The policemen found Ybasco’s body and an empty shell from a .45 caliber pistol. 36

In the meantime, the policemen were able to ascertain that the Toyota Corolla car with Plate No. TAX 732 belonged t
Tan and her husband Christopher Nash, and that the latter gave the car keys to Rolando Fajardo for car repairs, with
to turn it over later to Del Rosario and the appellant. 37 On March 9 and 10, 1994, Rolando Fajardo gave sworn statem
Makati Police Operatives where he stated that at 8:00 a.m. of March 7, 1994, he turned over the car to the appellant
latter’s brother-in-law, Del Rosario. Fajardo also stated that at 9:00 a.m. of March 8, 1994, Manansala told him how Y
abducted and brought to Cabuyao, Laguna, where he was shot by the appellant.

On March 9, 1994, police operatives arrested Del Rosario at his residence in Barangay Tadloc, Los Baños, Laguna. 3
Rosario tried to shoot it out with the policemen using Acosta’s service pistol, a .38 caliber revolver which had six live
ammunitions, bearing serial number 172410. 40 The gun was turned over to SPO2 Marlon Binotapa at the homicide se
Makati police department.41 On the same day, Manansala was arrested at his residence in Barangay Canlubang, Lag

On March 12, 1994, Manansala, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Sofronio Untalan, Jr., executed an extrajudic
confession in which he narrated how he, the appellant, Del Rosario and Nash, planned to rob Ybasco of the cash he
carrying, including the details of the abduction and the killing. 42 The policemen attempted to arrest the appellant at his
but the latter was nowhere to be found. The appellant remained at large. 43

Tanauan Police Operatives found the white Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TAX 732 in Tanauan, Batangas. 44 The car w
over to SPO2 Romeo Urbino of the Makati Police Station, who discovered that the said plate number was tampered w
renumbered PTT 134.

From a police line-up of ten persons formed by the Makati Police Station, which included Del Rosario, Dela Rapa was
identify Acosta’s killer and Ybasco’s abductors. Dela Rapa pointed to and positively identified Del Rosario as Acosta’
Dela Rapa gave a supplemental statement45 pointing to and identifying Del Rosario as the person whom she saw boa
white car.46

In the meantime, PNP Medico-Legal Officer Joselito Rodrigo performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Ybasco and iss
Medico-Legal Certificate No. M-006-94 which contained the following findings:

Well-nourished, well-developed male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the depend
of the body. Pale conjunctivae, cyanotic lips and nailbeds. Both upper extremities were handcuffed.
 HEAD AND EXTREMITIES

1. Gunshot wound thru and thru point of entry right zygomatic region measuring 0.9 x 1.2 cms
from its anterior midline with area of smugging and tattoing measuring 4 x 7 cms. directed pos
slightly downwards and to the left fracturing the right zygomatic bone, maxillary bone, and occ
making a point of exit at the posterior neck region measuring 1 x 1.2 cms., 2.5 cms. from its p
midline.

CONCLUSION:

Cause of death is hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wound of the head. 47

The doctor also issued the victim’s Certificate of Death. 48

On May 19, 1995, Del Rosario and Manansala were charged with robbery with homicide in an Information, the accus
of which reads:

That on or about March 7, 1994, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within th
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with Edu
Jesus y Enrile alias "Eddie," Christopher John Nash and one alias "Ton Ton" whose real name and pr
whereabout are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of g
means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: dragging, shoving and pushing inside a Toyota Coro
colored white with Plate No. TAX-732 one SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco, did then and there willfully, unlawfu
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following:

1) One (1) Cal. 38 revolver Smith & Wesson, with

Serial No. AUB-1015;

2) Identification Cards;

3) One (1) wallet containing ₱5,000.00 cash.

belonging to the said SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco, against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Eugenio Ybasco and/or his heirs and thereafter, the above-named accused, after handcuffing both ha
said SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, s
fire at him with a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter a mortal wound which was the direct and i
cause of his death; that on the occasion of the aforesaid robbery committed on SPO2 Eugenio Ybasc
above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot and fire at, with a
one Roberto Acosta y Capirao, a roving security guard detailed at the Ayala Center, who came to the
SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco, thereby inflicting upon him a serious mortal wound which directly caused his

CONTRARY TO LAW.49

Del Rosario was arraigned on April 5, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded guilty to the charge. 50 On April 15, 199
Manansala, assisted by counsel, was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 51 On April 21, 1994, Del Rosario appeared be
court and stated that he wanted to testify and elucidate on how the crime charged was committed by him and his coh
court granted Del Rosario’s request. With the assistance of counsel de parte, he forthwith testified on how he, Manan
appellant perpetrated the crime.52 The court, thereafter, rendered judgment convicting Del Rosario of robbery with hom
sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua.53

On motion of the public prosecutor, the court admitted the Amended Information filed by public prosecutor. The amen
consisted of the inclusion of Christopher John Nash and the appellant as additional accused. 54 Consequently, the cou
warrants for their arrest. Christopher Nash filed a petition for review of the resolution of the public prosecutor finding p
cause against him for the crime charged. On January 25, 1995, the Secretary of Justice granted the petition and orde
public prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of the Amended Information as against Christopher Nash only. The publ
prosecutor filed the motion55 which the court granted on March 29, 1994. 56 Manansala, through counsel, prayed for th
of the Presiding Judge on the ground of partiality. The court granted the motion. The case was re-raffled to Branch 65
court. In the meantime, the prosecution began presenting its evidence against Manansala.

On November 20, 1995, the police operatives arrested the appellant in Cabuyao, Laguna. 57 The appellant was arraign
assistance of counsel on February 13, 1996, and entered a plea of not guilty. 58 On November 6, 1996, Manansala die
under detention due to a mauling incident.59 The case against him was dismissed,60 while trial against the appellant co
Considering that Del Rosario was detained at the national penitentiary, the court conducted a trial thereat on May 20,
where Del Rosario testified for the prosecution and was cross-examined by the appellant’s counsel. 61

The appellant, through counsel, admitted the due execution of the sworn statement of Rolando Fajardo, 62 Juanito
Mendoza,63 Marcelina Acosta64 and Dolores Ybasco,65 and waived his right to cross-examine the said witnesses.66 The
prosecution no longer presented the affiants as witnesses.

The Evidence for the Appellant

The appellant denied any involvement whatsoever in the crime charged. He did not know of any person named John
denied being in the company of Manansala, Del Rosario and a certain Tonton in the evening of March 7, 1994. 67

The appellant testified that in February 1994, he purchased a tricycle for ₱46,705 in Calamba, Laguna. He borrowed
from his sister. He had the tricycle registered in his name. 68 He drove the tricycle everyday to eke out a living, plying t
Barangay Tabuyoc, Apalit, Pampanga, from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. 69

On March 7, 1994, the appellant took out his tricycle to ply his usual route. At around 5:00 p.m. that day, he dropped
passenger, Mrs. Silvina Lumba, at the market. They had agreed that he would pick her up from the market, then drop
her house. The distance from the market to the Lumba residence was about 2-l/2 kilometers. The trip took him about
hour.70 On March 10 or 11, 1994, policemen raided his house, but failed to arrest him. 71

The appellant admitted that he had known Manansala in Pampanga

since he was a boy. He alleged that Del Rosario was the brother of his wife, Cecille; hence, his brother-in-law. 72 After
Cecille were married, they resided in the house of his in-laws where Del Rosario was also staying. 73 There was a time
and Del Rosario had a violent altercation. As he was also a sewing machine mechanic by profession, Del Rosario as
alter a pair of pants, but the appellant refused to do so. Del Rosario then smashed the sewing machine 74 and the two
exchanged fist blows.75 Since then, Del Rosario harbored a grudge against him. Later, he and Cecille parted ways. Sh
Swedish national and resided in Sweden,76 bringing their daughter Diane Joyce along with her. The appellant had five
with his new partner. Del Rosario was also mad at him because he had planned on filing a case against his sister for
foreigner.

The appellant was in the house of his aunt on March 11, 1994 when he learned that he had been implicated in the ca
of policemen, together with Manansala and Del Rosario, raided his house. He saw his co-accused in a "bugbog-
sarado condition."77 He also received information that Del Rosario and Manansala were tied to a bridge and dipped in
while under the custody of policemen. 78 Upon the advice of his brother, the appellant decided not to surrender, as he
that he might also be mauled and hurt by the police. 79 The appellant, thereafter, worked in Binangonan, Rizal. 80 He wa
on November 20, 199581 and was brought to Camp Vicente Lim,82 where he was treated well and subjected to physica
examination.

While in prison, Del Rosario told the appellant that he would be impleaded and jailed as he had abandoned his sister
Del Rosario was intending to file a case against him. 83 The appellant received a letter with a Christmas card from his
Sweden.84 He also received a letter from Del Rosario dated December 4, 1997 through Pinky Dizon, the wife of one o
inmates at the penitentiary.85 In the said letter, Del Rosario stated that the appellant was not involved in the case and
for implicating him. The appellant also received a letter from Del Rosario sometime in Easter, suggesting that he ask
hearing so that Del Rosario could testify and clear him of the crime charged. The appellant also alleged that before M
died, the latter disclosed that he executed a statement implicating the appellant because he (Manansala) was torture
policemen.86

Silvina Lumba corroborated the testimony of De Jesus. She testified that at 5:00 p.m. on March 7, 1994, she contract
services of the appellant to transport her in his tricycle, going to and from the market. They arrived at her house at aro
p.m.87 The appellant asked her to appear in court and to testify.88

Rosario Dizon Lopez testified that sometime in November or December 1997, she visited her husband Jerry Lopez a
City Jail where she met Del Rosario. She again met Del Rosario in Muntinlupa where he would ask her to deliver lette
appellant, who was then detained at the Makati City Jail. 90 The jail warden never knew that the said letters were hand
neither were her things inspected when she left the national penitentiary. Lopez did not course the letters through the
but would simply go directly to the jail guards who would inspect the letters and read them. She was then allowed to b
letters in. Furthermore, the visits in the Makati City Jail were not recorded in the logbook; nor was she required to sign
times, her forearms were stamped to indicate that she was a visitor. 91 She also recounted that sometime in 1997, the
asked for money from Del Rosario, but the latter did not send any.92

Jennifer Obina, the appellant’s live-in partner, testified that the latter worked as a sewing machine mechanic in a garm
in Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati, when they started living together. In 1988, she was engaged in the business of s
and tinapa. Sometime in February 1994, the appellant bought a tricycle and drove it as a means of livelihood. He wou
plying his route, usually around the market and the municipal hall, at 6:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. everyday of the week.

On March 10, 1994, Obina was surprised to learn that the appellant was implicated in a kidnapping and killing inciden
aired over the television and radio. 93 Also on the said date, policemen in civilian clothes who were looking for her "hus
raided their house.94 The appellant, however, was not there, but was within the vicinity of his aunt’s house. The police
showed any warrant of arrest or search warrant. They just went inside the house and poked a gun at her head. They
to reveal where the appellant was, but she refused to do so.95 Neither was she informed why they were looking for him
policemen merely told her that the appellant was a criminal and a killer. Although the appellant knew that he was "wa
kidnapping and killing incidents, he just ignored the matter. 96 Obina later learned from the appellant’s cousin that the l
already left for Manila.97 The appellant did not return for about a week, and thereafter, stayed with his aunt in Taguig. 9

After trial, the court rendered judgment finding De Jesus guilty of the crime charged, the decretal portion of which rea

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding the accused EDUARDO DE JES
ENRILE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him
the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco and Roberto Ac
sum of ₱50,000.00 each family; and to pay the heirs of SPO2 Eugenio Ybasco the sum of ₱500,000.0
moral damages.99

The trial court relied principally on the testimony of Dela Rapa and Del Rosario, corroborated by the other evidence o
convicting the appellant of the crime charged. It considered the testimony of Del Rosario on April 21, 1994 as a judici
confession, admissible in evidence not only against the confessant (Del Rosario) but also against the appellant.

The appellant now assails the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOU

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED CRISP
ROSARIO AND IN USING THE SAME AGAINST THE OTHER ACCUSED, INCLUDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT EDUARDO DE JESUS, IMPLICATING THEM TO THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE T
THAT THE SAME IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. MOREOVER, THE AFFIDAVIT OF ACCUSED
MANANSALA POINTING TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT IS LIKEWISE INADMISS
EVIDENCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSPIRED WITH
OTHER ACCUSED IN COMMITTING THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OUTRIGHTLY DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEF

ALIBI AND DENIAL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS CREDIBLE AND WAS CORROBOR
ANOTHER WITNESS.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE W
COMMITTED DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO ROBBERY ACTUALLY TOOK PLACE.

VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND IN IMPOSING
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH, AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGED
THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FAILED TO
THE CRUCIBLE TEST OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
GUARANTEED PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.100

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the commission of the crime charged beyond reasonable
While the prosecution may have proved the killing of Acosta and Ybasco, it, however, failed to prove that the appellan
Ybasco of ₱5,000.

The appellant also avers that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the malefactors, and his precise parti
the commission of the crime charged. He asserts that absent proof of conspiracy, Del Rosario’s judicial confession is
in evidence only against the confessant but not against him. Moreover, the appellant asserts, the said judicial confess
from a "polluted source," as Del Rosario himself admitted to being one of the malefactors. Thus, his testimony must b
scrutinized with care and subjected to grave suspicion. The appellant further avers that Del Rosario even stated that
was Ybasco’s assailant. He argues that Del Rosario himself could also have been the assailant, as it was he who sho
when the latter tried to rescue Ybasco.

According to the appellant, Del Rosario implicated him, his own brother-in-law, because they often quarreled with eac
The appellant had made life miserable and unbearable for Del Rosario, and the latter’s sister, who was later impelled
Swedish national. As shown by Del Rosario’s letters to the appellant, the former himself apologized to the latter for ha
implicated him in the crime charged.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Del Rosario’s letters to the appellant were not hearsay. The prosecution could
have presented Del Rosario anew to refute his allegations, but the prosecution failed to do so. The appellant further a
Manansala’s extrajudicial confession is hearsay, because the latter died before he could testify and later be cross-exa
the appellant thereon. Moreover, the affidavits and testimony of Dela Rapa, as well as Del Rosario’s judicial confessio
utterly insufficient on which to anchor a finding that the appellant was one of the malefactors and that he conspired w
perpetrators of the crime, namely, Manansala and Del Rosario. Finally, the appellant concludes that Dela Rapa failed
him as one of the malefactors.

We have meticulously reviewed the records and we are convinced beyond cavil that the prosecution adduced proof b
reasonable doubt that the appellant, Del Rosario and Manansala, conspired to rob Ybasco of US$250,000 through vi
intimidation and that the appellant was one of the perpetrators thereof; hence, criminally liable therefor as a principal
participation.

The Felony of Robbery

With Homicide

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of r
the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by ra
intentional mutilation or arson.

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the followin

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. 101

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrate
occasion or by reason of the robbery.102 The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. 103 The ho
take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into cons

There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpa
authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of hom
one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasi
robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of
are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sen
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the
asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property
the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and de
the robber or recovered by the owner. 105 The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property sto
amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no mo
because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved. 106

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the rob
also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actu
part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. 107

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robber
robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime,
not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his c
conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. 108

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to preven
of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a
between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbe

The Prosecution Adduced Proof

Beyond Reasonable Doubt That

The Appellant Conspired With Del

Rosario And Manansala To Commit

Robbery With Violence Against Or

Intimidation Of Persons

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when ten or more offenders agree to commit a felony
to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy must be shown
and conclusively as the crime itself.109 It may be declared from the acts of the suspect before, during and after the com
the felony which are indicative of a joint purpose, concocted action and concurrence of sentiments. 110

To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be
separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effo
their common criminal objective.111 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The pre
or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, 112 since all the conspirators are principals. To exemp
from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspir
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.113

In this case, the appellant, Del Rosario and Manansala, intended to abduct Ybasco and divest him of money in the am
US$250,000, which they thought Ybasco was about to deposit in the bank. Each of them had specific tasks to perform
appellant and Manansala were tasked to abduct Ybasco, handcuff him and board him in their car, while Del Rosario a
lookout who would prevent anyone from interfering with Ybasco’s abduction and the consummation of the robbery. Th
performed their tasks with precision. In the process, Del Rosario shot and killed Acosta who was on patrol within the
had rushed to the scene to investigate the incident. The appellant and Manansala abducted Ybasco, handcuffed him
boarded him in the car. Del Rosario took Acosta’s service gun bearing serial number 172410 after killing the victim. T
gleaned from the Del Rosario’s testimony, viz:

FISCAL BACULI

Q Isinusumpa mo ba na ang lahat ng sinasabi mo ay pawang katotohanan lamang?

A Oho, sir, siya rin ho ang nagsabi niyan sa akin narinig ko sa kanyang bunganga, ngayon pagdating
ng mga menus kinse bago magalas-sais dito sa may kotse doon piplano (sic) ni Dante kung paanong
ang gagawin dinala niya ako sa may kanto ng Rustan’s si Eddie doon niya ipinuwesto sa may banda
aking puwesto tapos ho si Dante dito naman siya sa may malapit sa money changer siya ang tumiting
umaagap dito kay sir Ybasco, ngayon ho nong dumating ang oras ng labas ni sir Ybasco nauna si Da
kasunod si sir Ybasco ngayon ho pagdating sa akin sa may kanto sabi sa akin ni Dante "nandiyan na
diyan" sabi sa aking ganon kung meron mang humarang ikaw ang bahala upakan mo sabi sa aking g
naman ang bahala dito kay tanda kay tatang sabing ganon tutulungan ko si Eddie dito sa pagipit, nga
nong lumampas sa akin si sir Ybasco dalawa na sila doon si Dante at si Eddie ngayon ho nakita ko di
sir Ybasco pinosasan nila tapos pilit nilang isinakay sa kotse siya naming dating nong guwardiya at tin
akin "bakit anong ibig sabihin niyan" at nakahawak sa pulohan ng baril ngayon ho natakot naman ako
nakahawak sa pulo ng baril baka ako barilin ngayon ho sa lito ko hindi ko maintindihan kung anong ga
ang ginawa ko ho pagbunot niya ng baril yon pinilit agawan ng baril habang inaagaw ko ang baril siga
ng mga ito pilitin mong maagaw tapos iputok mo sa kanya.

COURT

Sino ang nag-utos sa iyo non?

A Si Dante po, sir, tapos po di hindi ko naman inintindi yon dahil alam ko naman ang gagawin ko dahi
naman talaga ang mamamatay kung bibitawan ko eh yon ho pagkaagaw ko ng baril kaysa ako ang m
na ho ang pinutukan ko.114

Del Rosario’s testimony is corroborated by the fact that Acosta’s firearm was found in his possession when he was ar
the police,115 and by Dela Rapa’s sworn statements to the Makati police office as well as her testimony:

Q While selling cigarette at that date and time, do you still remember or recall of any unusual incident
happened on that date and time?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please inform the Court what was that unusual incident that happened on that date and time?

A Mr. Ybasco was forcefully dragged into the white car, sir.

Q Who is this Mr. Ybasco, if you know?

A I called him "Sir Ybasco," sir.

Q Why do you addressed him "Sir Ybasco?"

A Because I know him for a long time and I’m selling cigarette for a long time, sir.

Q Do you know where he was connected?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A Money Changer, Sir.

Q Do you know also if he is [a] member of [the] Makati Police Headquarters?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long have you know[n] him as [a] member of the Makati Police Headquarters?

A As far as I know I am selling for thirteen years and he is also working at the Makati Police Headqua
thirteen years.

Q Do you know what was his position or nature of his work at the Makati Police Headquarters?

A I do not know, sir.

Q A while ago, you said that with the same date and time, you saw some persons shoving, dragging a
Eugenio Ybasco inside a white car, do you know the identities of these some (sic) persons?

A I cannot remember the persons who dragged, shoved and pushed Eusebio Ybasco inside the car b
was a little bit dark, sir.

Q But, were there lights that (sic) date and time?

A Yes, sir.

Q How many lights were there at that place and time?

A There were several lights at that date and time, because it is a parking lot and there were lights in th
sir.

Q Do you still recall how many persons were pushing, shoving and dragging Eugenio Ybasco inside a
colored car?

A Around three (3) persons, sir.

 Q Are these three (3) persons male or female?

A Male, sir.

Q Now, what happened then when these three male persons pushed, dragged or shoved Eugenio Yb
the white car?

A After Eusebio Ybasco was pushed inside the car he (witness is referring to Crispin Del Rosario) sho
Acosta, a certain Security Guard.

Q Are you sure that he was the one who shot a certain Security Guard Roberto Acosta?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see him actually shoot a certain Roberto Acosta?

A Yes, sir.116

Juanito Mendoza, likewise, corroborated in part the testimonies of Del Rosario and Dela Rapa. 117 The barefaced fact
Rapa and Mendoza did not see the face of the appellant and could not identify him as one of Ybasco’s abductors doe
negate the fact that they witnessed the abduction and the killing of Acosta.

The Prosecution Adduced Proof

Beyond Reasonable Doubt that

the Appellant and his Cohorts

Divested Ybasco of P5,030.00 And

That The Appellant Shot Ybasco And

Acosta To Death On The Occasion

Or By Reason Of Robbery

We reject the appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant and his cohorts divested Yb
₱5,030.00, and his argument that Ybasco was shot by either Manansala or Del Rosario. The prosecutor adduced pro
reasonable doubt that Del Rosario shot Acosta in Makati, that the appellant divested Ybasco of ₱5,000.00, and that D
divested the victim of ₱30.00. This is gleaned from the testimony of Del Rosario, viz:

FISCAL BACULI

Ikaw ba ay handang tumestigo laban kay Dante Manansala kung bibistahan uli ang kaso niya?

A Opo, sir, tapos po nakita ko pong naisakay na si sir Ybasco na hindi ko naman alam na pulis pala a
ko pong nakasakay na sila ako nama’y takbo tapos may bumaril pa ho sa loob ng kotse kaya nagkaro
yung likuran ng kotse hindi ko ho matiyak kung ako ang binaril nila o yong guwardiya dahil ang alam k
ako ang nakabaril sa guwardiya wala naman silang babarilin kundi ako lang talaga dahil ako nama’y b
ngayon po pagdating naming sa kotse umandar na kami papunta kami ng expressway sa madalit sab
expressway na kami nong malapit na kami sa Cabuyao ang sabi ni Dante "nandito na tayo sa Cabuya
ang mayor diyan wala tayong problema dito na lang natin itumba yan" hindi naman ho ako makapags
marami naman ho sila eh di pagdating ho ng Cabuyao doon sa may tubohan tumigil ho ang kotse at b
Dante, pagbaba ni Dante ang sabi narinig ko "teka muna titingnan ko muna baka may tao" dahil madi
lugar tapos ho nong makita niyang walang tao sabi niya kay Eddie "sige Ed ibaba mo na yan si tatang
bago niya ibinaba si tatang akala ko pasasakayin niya ng tricycle dahil ang sabi ni Eddie sa loob ng tr
pakakawalan na naming kayo basta huwag lang kayong hahabol kami’y eh mga NPA sabing ganon p
hindi naman kami NPA si Eddie lang ang NPA yon ang panakot sabi naman ni sir Ybasco "sige wala
problema mga anak sabi niyang ganon" ngayon ho ibinaba nila si sir Ybasco, si Eddie at si Dante din
banda roon, akala ko naman talagang pasasakayin nila ng tricycle dahil yong pera ho sa bulsa ni s
na baryang otsenta pesos ako pa ho ang kumuha non at ako pa ho ang nagbigay ng singkuwe
kay sir Ybasco ngayon ho nong pagkababang yon nakita ko hong tinututukan ni Eddie kasama si Da
ipinagmamalaki niya na ninong nga daw niya yong meyor doon at malakas siya sa Cabuyao. Ngayon
yong tao nakita ko tagilid siyang bumagsak tapos eh tumihayang ganon tapos eh uulitin ng baril kaya
na naulit dahil bumatangal daw yong baril kaya hindi na ho pumutok.

COURT

Sino ang bumaril?

A Si Eddie po ang nakita kong bumaril pero ang nagbaba ho ng tao ay silang dalawa, si Eddie at si D
ngayon ho pagdating naming sa Calamba yon ibinaba na nila ako sa Calamba binigyan niya ako ng p
isangdaang piso.

FISCAL BACULI

Sino ang nagbigay ng pera sa iyo?

A Si Eddie po dahil nasa kanya yong pera eh, ngayon ho di binigyan na ako ng perang isandaang pis
pamasahe at marami pa raw hong papartihan … (interrupted).

COURT

Magkano bang nakuha n’yo?

A ₱5,000.00 lang, sir, at ipapaayos pa raw ang salamin sa likod dahil sira dahil habang kami’y n
eh nalaglag na yong salamin ngayon ho hindi ko na alam kung saan nila dinala yong kotse at s
ho sobra ho galit niya kay sir Ybasco hinahanap niyang maigi ang pera na $250,000 daw.

FISCAL BACULI

Sino?

A Si Dante ho, sir, nong kami’y nasa expressway galit na galit yan kay sir Ybasco minumura niyang m
yong matanda at binabatukan pa ho ng patunog hinahanap yong perang $250,000 bakit daw hindi siy
nagdeliber ngayon hinahanap niyang magaling sabi naman ho ni sir Ybasco "eh wala naman akong id
mga anak na ganyang kalaking pera" ang akala ko meron ng pera sabi pa niyang ganon eh pagtingin
ho sa bag sa loob ng bag eh wala naman ho ang nakita ko lang ay baunan nong mga oras na yon. 118
It is true that when Del Rosario continued with his testimony during the trial on May 20, 1997, he admitted to having p
guilty to robbery with homicide, but declared that no robbery took place:

PROS. BAGAOISAN

Mr. Witness, do you recall that you pleaded guilty to the offense Robbery with Homicide before Branc
Regional Trial Court, Makati City?

WITNESS

Yes, sir, but there was no robbery that took place on that day. 119

Del Rosario even declared on re-direct examination that no money was found in the possession of Ybasco and that w
testified on April 21, 1994, his mind was confused:

PROS. BAGAOISAN

Yes, Your Honor.

Q Mr. Witness, you testified on cross-examination that there was (sic) no robbery that (sic) was comm
correct?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN

But in the hearing of April 21, 1994, particularly on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes, the
asked you [a] question and I repeat: Magkano ba ang nakuha ninyo? Five thousand lang, sir. How do
reconcile now your testimony that there was no robbery to your answer to that question that you were
the amount of five thousand pesos?

WITNESS

Well sir, what I know is that their target was the money changer because the money changer where S
has a part time job but they were thinking that the old man takes the money to the bank…. and Sir Yb
the money to the bank. They are planning to holdup Sir Ybasco but they were not able to find money
sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN

Now, where did you get then this amount of five thousand pesos?

WITNESS

Well, sir, at that time my mind was confused, I have said that amount five thousand pesos, but the tru
was no money found from Sir Ybasco, sir.120
Indeed, Del Rosario’s testimony during the trial on May 20, 1997 is inconsistent with his testimony during the trial of A
1994. But the trial court rejected the aforequoted testimony of Del Rosario on May 20, 1997, and gave credence to hi
on April 21, 1994.

We agree with the trial court.

First. When the public prosecutor asked Del Rosario to affirm and confirm the truth of his answers to the questions pr
on him during the trial of April 21, 1994,121 Del Rosario unequivocably declared that his answers to the said questions
and that he was not coerced, forced or intimidated into answering:

PROS. BAGAOISAN

After you pleaded guilty before Branch 65 Regional Trial Court, Makati City, do you recall that the Pre
Judge and the Fiscal propounded questions to you regarding that incident?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN

In other words, there was a hearing conducted after you pleaded guilty to the offense charged?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN

Now, Mr. Witness, I am showing to you an official transcript of stenographic notes of Branch 65 Regio
Court, Makati City, certified true and correct by Court Stenographic Reporter Ms. Concepcion Padua,
please go over the same and tell us if these are the same questions that were propounded to you and
the same answers that you have given to the questions?

WITNESS

Yes, sir, these are the questions that were asked and these are my answers.

PROS. BAGAOISAN

Mr. Witness, under your present oath, do you still affirm and confirm the truthfulness and veracity by (
answers to the questions propounded to you by the Presiding Judge and the prosecutor?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

PROS. BAGAOISAN
 Were you forced, coerced or intimidated when you made these answers, Mr. Witness?

WITNESS

No, sir.122

Second. We have carefully reviewed the testimonies of Del Rosario on April 21, 1994 and May 20, 1997, and conclud
Del Rosario’s testimony during the hearing of April 21, 1994 which represents the truth. The transcript of stenographi
taken during that day is replete with important details, logical and positive in character, and consistent even in light of
clarificatory questions of the trial court. Del Rosario, who was then assisted by counsel, could not have contrived his
1994 testimony where he implicated not only the appellant and Manansala but also confirmed his criminal participatio
crime charged, including his killing of Acosta. His testimony on April 21, 1994 was not made by one who had a confus
but by one who had a clear recollection of what he, the appellant and Manansala, had done with precision to consum
crime they had planned so meticulously to accomplish. In contrast, the testimony of Del Rosario on May 20, 1997, ma
than three years after his initial testimony, is frontally inconsistent. He claimed that his mind was confused when he te
April 21, 1994, but in the same breath, affirmed and confirmed the truth of his answers to the questions propounded o
during the said trial.

Del Rosario claimed in his testimony during the hearing of May 20, 1997 that when he pleaded guilty to robbery with
was not assisted by counsel. However, the records show that he was, in fact, assisted by his counsel, Atty. Sofronio U
Jr.123 We find it incredible that Del Rosario would plead guilty to robbery with homicide and accept the penalty of reclu
perpetua imposed on him by the trial court if, after all, Ybasco was not robbed of ₱5,000. For the court to acquit the a
robbery with homicide simply and merely because Del Rosario made a volte face and disavowed his judicial confessi
bare claim that his mind was confused when he testified on April 21, 1994 is unacceptable. In People v. Ubiña, et al.,
that it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solely taken before the courts of justice simply becau
witnesses who had given them later on change their minds for one reason or another. Such a rule would make some
mockery and place the investigation of truths at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. All the expedients devised by m
determine the credibility of witnesses should be utilized to determine which of the contradictory testimonies represent
truth.125 The trial court and this Court reviewed the records and have come to the same conclusion – it is Del Rosario
1994 testimony which represents the truth.

It is true that Del Rosario was a co-conspirator and that he implicated the appellant and Manansala in the killing of Yb
the taking of ₱5,000 from the latter. However, we have ruled that the testimony of a co-conspirator may be given full p
weight if it is shown to be candid and straightforward, and is full of details which by its nature could not have been con
besides being corroborated by independent evidence. In People v. Sia,126 we had the occasion to state:

… [I]n this regard, it must be borne in mind that the fact that a witness may have been a co-conspirato
commission of the offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of or, much less, be a ground
disregard altogether his testimony. Indeed:

By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be suffici

it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manne
of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. 127

The April 21, 1994 testimony of Del Rosario is not only replete with details; it is also corroborated by independent evi
including the medico-legal report of Dr. Joselito A. Rodrigo and his testimony that Ybasco was shot once on the right
sworn statement of Mendoza, the sworn statements and testimony of Dela Rapa, as well as the results of the investig
police operatives.

Del Rosario’s letters to the appellant dated October 8, 1997 and December 4, 1997, 129 did not weaken his testimony a
the case for the prosecution. Neither did they bolster the appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi. The appellant’s con
his own brother-in-law, Del Rosario, bore a grudge against him on account of their personal differences, deserves sca
consideration.

First. On cross-examination by the defense counsel on May 20, 1997, Del Rosario was asked if he bore a grudge aga
appellant on account of the latter’s separation from his wife, Cecille, Del Rosario’s sister. Del Rosario categorically de
nurturing any grudge against the appellant:

ATTY. DE LEON

Do you know this person Ed de Jesus?

WITNESS

Yes, sir.

Q Why do you know him?

A He was a former husband of my sister, sir.

Q Is it correct to say that Ed de Jesus and your sister were already separated?

A Yes, sir, almost 17 years.

Q And because they were already separated, you took grudge against Ed de Jesus, is that correct?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any grudge against Ed de Jesus?

A None, sir.130

Second. In his October 8, 1997 letter, Del Rosario claimed that the appellant was even intending to send money to hi
he, Del Rosario, was expecting some money from the appellant. Del Rosario even expressed hope that the appellant
him first:

O cege (sic) Ed hanggang dito nalang at sana lagi kang mag-iingat diyan at ako’y umaasa na magpap
dito sa akin. At siyempre alam mo na walang Bigas. walang ulam. walang gas. At walang pera. Siguro
mas higit mo akong dapat na matulungan. Kaysa sa ibang kakosa natin dito. 131

If, as claimed by the appellant, his brother-in-law Del Rosario falsely implicated him in the heinous crime, Del Rosario
have manifested remorse and sought forgiveness from the appellant for his perfidy. Del Rosario did not do so, and w
expecting financial help from the appellant, the very person he falsely implicated.

Third. In the Letter dated December 4, 1997, Del Rosario stated that he implicated the appellant in the robbery becau
fear that the appellant would sue his ex-wife. This was but an afterthought on the part of Del Rosario to inveigle the a
send money to him. The appellant did not adduce evidence to prove that animosity existed between him and his ex-w
between him and Del Rosario, on account of the appellant’s separation from Cecille. The appellant and his ex-wife ha
agreed to separate more than two decades ago. In the interim, the appellant and his ex-wife had separate partners a
The only proof the appellant offered was his bare testimony, which does not deserve credence.

The appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged and his alibi are intrinsically weak defenses and cannot prevail over
and straightforward identification made by Del Rosario, that the appellant was one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged.132 Alibi is so easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. 133 Furthermore, the appellant’s defenses of denial and
debilitated by his flight after learning that he was wanted by police authorities for robbery with homicide, and his hidin
Cabuyao, Laguna on November 20, 1994, where he was arrested. The appellant managed to evade the police autho
March 10 or 11, 1994134 by working in Cabuyao, Laguna, and in Binangonan, Rizal, 135 while his family remained in Pam
agree with the following disquisitions of the trial court:

Additionally, working against the accused Eduardo de Jesus is his "flight" from justice. After knowing t
police authorities were after him in connection with this case, he went into hiding. He was brought to C
after he was arrested by the PNP Regional Directorate Intelligence, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Lag
November 20, 1995. (Records, p. 195). "Flight" according to the Supreme Court, is an indication of gu
reason that he feared for his life has no basis.136

The trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty on its finding that Ybasco was shot to death with tre
The appellant contends that (a) the prosecution failed to prove that he shot the victim; and, (b) even if he did shoot th
prosecution failed to prove that he adopted a particular means or method to do so. The Office of the Solicitor Genera
that treachery was attendant because when Ybasco was shot, he was handcuffed; hence, unable to defend himself.

We agree with the trial court and the Office of the Solicitor General. The evidence on record shows that when the app
Manansala abducted Ybasco in Makati, they handcuffed the victim and transported him to a sugar field in Cabuyao, L
appellant and Manansala brought Ybasco out of the car. Still handcuffed, Ybasco was shot by the appellant on the rig
The appellant insists that it was Del Rosario who shot Ybasco. However, the identity of the conspirator who shot Yba
Acosta is of no moment.

In People v. Escote, Jr.,137 the trial court ruled that treachery is aggravating in robbery with homicide. The aggravating
circumstance of the use of a vehicle in committing robbery with homicide is also attendant in this case. The appellant
cohorts used a vehicle when they abducted Ybasco and transported him to Cabuyao, Laguna. However, the Informat
allege that the appellant and his cohorts used a vehicle in committing the crime charged as mandated by Section 8, R
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule must be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the
appellant.138 However, the additional killing is not an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. This is in acc
with the ruling of this Court in People v. Regala139 which is the prevailing doctrine.

The imposable penalty for robbery with homicide as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. C
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, and that no mitigating circumstance attended the commis
crime, the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty, conformably to Article 63, paragrap
Revised Penal Code.

The trial court ordered the appellant to pay ₱50,000 to the heirs of Ybasco and ₱50,000 to the heirs of Acosta as civi
It also ordered the appellant to pay to the heirs of Ybasco ₱500,000 as moral damages. The trial court, however, faile
exemplary damages. We shall, thus, modify the decision of the trial court.

The heirs of Ybasco are entitled to ₱75,000 as civil indemnity. Although the killing of Acosta was integrated into the s
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, the two crimes having no separate juridical existence, nonetheless, the he
are entitled to civil indemnity.140

The heirs of Ybasco are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000. 141 The heirs of Acosta are, likewise
₱25,000 as exemplary damages. Since Dolores Ybasco, the widow of the victim, testified for the prosecution on the f
for moral damages, the heirs of Ybasco are entitled to, moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000. However, the heirs
are not entitled thereto, for failure of the prosecution to present any of the heirs of the victim to testify on the factual b
said damages. The appellant is obliged to return to the heirs of Ybasco the ₱30.00 which Del Rosario took from Ybas
he was shot.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of the

Trial Court of Makati, Branch 4. The appellant Eduardo de Jesus is found GUILTY of robbery with homicide under Ar
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and sentenced to suffer the death penal
appellant is hereby ORDERED to pay to the heirs of the victim SPO3 Eugenio Ybasco the amount of ₱5,030.00 as ac
damages; ₱75,000 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000 as moral damages, and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. The appella
likewise, ORDERED to pay to the heirs of Roberto Acosta ₱75,000 as civil indemnity and ₱25,000 as exemplary dam
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr.*, Puno*, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* On official leave.

* On official leave.

1
 Penned by Judge Delia H. Panganiban.

2
 Exhibit "O," Records, Vol. II, p. 37.

3
 TSN, 15 April 1994, p. 14.

4
 Id. at 13-14.

5
 Id.

6
 Id.

7
 Id. at 5.

8
 Exhibits "M" and "C."

9
 TSN, 2 December 1994, p. 4.

10
 Id. at 8-9.

11
 Exhibit "7."

12
 Exhibit "U-7."
13
 Exhibits "U" to "U-22."

14
 Exhibit "D."

15
 Ibid.

16
 Records, pp. 116-117.

17
 Ibid.

18
 Exhibits "A" and "B;" TSN, 15 April 1994, p. 15.

19
 Exhibit "G."

20
 Exhibit "15."

21
 Exhibits "U" to "U-22."

22
 Exhibit "U-15."

23
 Exhibits "A" and "B."

24
 Exhibit "G."

25
 Exhibit "F-1."

26
 Exhibit "U-15."

27
 Exhibits "U-17" to "U-18."

28
 Exhibit "U-16."

29
 Exhibit "M."

30
 Exhibit "U-17."

31
 TSN, 22 August 1995, pp. 9-10.

32
 Exhibit "A."

33
 Exhibit "G."

34
 Exhibit "F-1."

35
 Exhibit "M."

36
 Exhibit "F-2."
37
 Exhibits "F" to "F-4."

38
 Exhibit "C."

39
 Exhibit "M-1."

40
 Exhibits "F" to "F-4."

41
 Exhibit "M-1."

42
 Exhibits "C" to "C-5B."

43
 Exhibits "I" to "I-4."

44
 Records, pp. 233-234.

45
 Exhibit "B."

46
 Ibid.

47
 Exhibit "K."

48
 Exhibit "N."

49
 Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

50
 Id. at 48.

51
 Id. at 49.

52
 Exhibits "U-19" to "U-22."

53
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 60-61.

54
 Id. at 69-70.

55
 Id. at 174-175.

56
 Id. at 177.

57
 Id. at 273.

58
 Id. at 289.

59
 Id. at 351.

60
 Id.
61
 Exhibits "U" to "U-22."

62
 Exhibit "E."

63
 Exhibit "G."

64
 Exhibit "H."

65
 Exhibit "I."

66
 Records, p. 432.

67
 TSN, 2 December 1994, pp. 7-8.

68
 Exhibits "1" and "2."

69
 TSN, 2 December 1994, pp. 55-56.

70
 Id. at 57-58.

71
 Id. at 5.

72
 Id. at 8-9.

73
 Id. at 10-11.

74
 Id. at 12-13.

75
 TSN, 11 December 1997, p. 21.

76
 TSN, 2 December 1994, pp. 48-49.

77
 Id. at 37-39.

78
 Id. at 39-40.

79
 Id. at 37.

80
 TSN, 11 December 1994.

81
 Records, p. 273.

82
 TSN, 2 December 1997, p. 41.

83
 Id. at 46-47.

84
 Exhibit "7" and submarkings.
85
 Exhibit "8."

86
 TSN, 11 December 1997, p. 17.

87
 TSN, 15 January 1998, pp. 17-22.

88
 Id. at 54.

89
 Exhibits "8" and "9."

90
 TSN, 12 February 1998, pp. 5-8.

91
 Id. at 23-25.

92
 Id at 19-20.

93
 Id. at 39-40.

94
 Id. at 34.

95
 Id. at 38.

96
 Id. at 41.

97
 Id. at 42.

98
 Id. at 42-43.

99
 Rollo, p. 189.

100
 Id. at 51-53.

101 
People v. Pedroso, 336 SCRA 163 (2000).

102
 People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67 (1997); People v. Abuyan, 213 SCRA 569 (1992).

103
 People v. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627 (1991).

104
 People v. Mangulabnan, 99 Phil. 992 (1956).

105
 See People v. Puloc, 202 SCRA 179 (1991).

106
 People v. Corre, Jr., 363 SCRA 165 (2001).

 People v. Carrozo, 342 SCRA 600 (2000); People v. Pedroso, supra; People v. Verzosa, 294 SCR
107

(1998).
108
 People v. Palijon, 343 SCRA 486 (2000).

109
 People v. Reapor, 366 SCRA 604 (2001).

110
 People v. Arapok, 347 SCRA 479 (2000).

111
 People v. Tulin, 364 SCRA 11 (2001).

112
 People v. Quinicio, 365 SCRA 252 (2001).

113
 People v. Morial, 363 SCRA 96 (2001).

114
 Exhibit "U-13."

115
 Exhibit "M."

116
 TSN, 15 April 1994, pp. 5-7.

117
 Exhibit "G."

118
 TSN, 21 April 1994, pp. 16-18 (emphasis ours).

119
 TSN, 20 May 1997, p. 5.

120
 Id. at 11-12.

121
 Exhibits "U" to "U-22."

122
 TSN, 20 May 1997, pp. 5-6.

123
 Records, p. 44.

124
 97 Phil. 515 (1955).

125
 Cited in Reano v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525 (1988).

126
 370 SCRA 123 (2001).

127
 Id. at 133.

128
 Exhibit "K."

129
 Exhibits "9" and "9-B."

130
 TSN, 20 May 1997, pp. 7-8.

131
 Exhibit "9."
 132
 People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495 (1999).

133
 Ibid.

134
 TSN, 11 December 1997, p. 3.

135
 Id. at 6-7.

136
 Records, p. 138.

 400 SCRA 603 (2003). Associate Justices Jose C. Vitug, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Angelina
137

Gutierrez maintain their dissenting opinion.

138
 People v. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003).

139
 329 SCRA 707 (2000).

140
 People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001).

141
 Ibid.

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Davide, Jr.: First Division

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