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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164150             April 14, 2008

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, represented by the Royal Embassy of Belgium, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, UNIFIED FIELD CORPORATION, MARILYN G. ONG, VICTORIA O. ANG, EDNA C.
ALFUERTE, MARK DENNIS O. ANG and ALVIN O. ANG, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of Court assailing the (1) Resolution 2 dated 27 November 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77701 granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed in said case by herein respondent
Unified Field Corporation (UFC), thus, allowing the latter to file its appellant’s brief; and (2) Resolution 3 dated 5 May 2004 of the
appellate court in the same case denying reconsideration of its 27 November 2003 Resolution sought by herein petitioner
Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, represented by the Royal Embassy of Belgium. 4

The facts of the case are as follows:

A Complaint5 for specific performance of contract with damages was filed by petitioner against respondents UFC, Marilyn G.
Ong, Victoria O. Ang, Edna C. Alfuerte, Mark Dennis O. Ang, and Alvin O. Ang, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-976.

In its Complaint, petitioner avers that it entered into a Contract of Lease dated 30 July 1997 with respondent UFC, represented
by its President and co-respondent, Marilyn G. Ong. By virtue of the said contract, petitioner leased from UFC Units "B" and "D,"
with a gross area of 377 square meters, more or less, and six parking lots, at the Chatham House Condominium, located at the
corner of Valero and Herrera Streets, Salcedo Village, Makati City (leased premises), for a maximum term of four (4) years
beginning 1 October 1997. For the use of the leased premises, petitioner agreed to pay the sum of P5,430,240.00, as rentals for
the first two years, from 1 October 1997 to 30 September 1999, payable in full upon the official turn-over of the leased premises;
and the sum of P678,780.00, as security deposit, for a total amount of P6,109,020.00.6 The Contract provided for the pre-
termination option that may be exercised by the lessee. 7

On or about 23 June 2000, three months prior to the expiration of the third year of the lease, petitioner, through counsel, served
by personal service upon respondent UFC, through its President and co-respondent, Marilyn G. Ong, a letter dated 23 June
20008 informing the corporation that petitioner was pre-terminating the Lease Contract effective 31 July 2000. Considering that
under the Contract of Lease, it could pre-terminate the lease after the expiry of the second-year term without having to pay pre-
termination penalties, petitioner also requested the return or delivery of the total sum of P1,093,600.00, representing its unused
two months advance rentals for August and September 2000, in the sum of P414,820.00, and the security deposit in the sum
of P678,780.00, within forty-five days after the pre-termination of the lease contract, or on 15 September 2000.

On 31 July 2000, petitioner vacated and surrendered the leased premises to respondent UFC through the latter’s President and
co-respondent Marilyn G. Ong free of any outstanding bills for water, electricity, telephone and other utility charges or damages
to said leased premises. However, respondents UFC and Marilyn G. Ong, in her capacity as UFC President, totally ignored the
demands made by petitioner in its letter of 23 June 2000 and, consequently, failed to return or deliver the P1,093,600.00 sought
by petitioner.

Petitioner claims that respondent UFC plainly committed fraud in the performance of its clear duty under paragraph 22 of the
Contract of Lease by not returning petitioner’s unused two months advance rentals and security deposit despite repeated
demands therefor. Hence, the individual respondents as directors of respondent UFC should be deemed to have willfully and
knowingly assented to a patently unlawful act or are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith, as the case may be, in directing the
affairs of respondent UFC. Under Section 31 of the Corporation Code 9 of the Philippines, the respondent directors must be jointly
and severally held liable together with respondent UFC.

Petitioner thus prayed to the RTC:

x x x that, after due notice and trial, to render a judgment in favor of [herein petitioner} and against [herein
respondents] by ordering [respondents] jointly and severally to pay [petitioner] the following sums of money, to
wit:

a) the principal amount of P1,093,600.00, representing the return or delivery of the unused two (2) months rentals
and the security deposit, plus interest at the rate of twelve per centum (12%) per annum from 15 September 2000
until the principal amount due is fully paid, plus six per centum (6%) per annum on the aforesaid interest due from
the filing of this complaint until the principal amount is fully paid;

b) the sum of P400,000.00, as and for actual damages by way of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

c) the sum of P100,000.00, as and for moral damages;

d) the sum of P100,000.00, as and for exemplary damages;

e) the costs of suit.10

Respondents filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim on 2 August 2001. 11 Thereafter, pre-trial was set. However,
respondents failed to appear and, worse, failed to file their pre-trial brief, as required by the Rules of Court. They were therefore
declared to have waived their right to adduce evidence on their behalf. Respondents did not seek for a reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order; hence, petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte on 19 June 2002 and 19 August 2002.

On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the [herein petitioner] has established its claim against the [herein
respondents].

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and against the [respondents], ordering
the latter, jointly and severally, to pay [petitioner]:

1. the principal amount of Php1,093,600.00 representing two (2) months rentals and security deposit, plus
 interest of 12% per annum from September 15, 2000, until the principal amount due is fully paid, plus 6%
per annum on the interest due from the filing of this complaint until the principal amount is fully paid;

2. the sum of Php400,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;

3. the sum of Php100,000.00, as moral damages;

4. the sum of Php100,000.00, as exemplary damages; and

5. costs of suit.12

Respondents elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. They received a Notice to File Brief 13 from the Court of
Appeals. Respondents were unable to comply with this directive. Petitioner thus filed on 17 September 2003 with the Court of
Appeals a Motion to Dismiss Appeal of the respondents on the ground that respondents’ counsel received the Notice to File Brief
on 16 July 2003 as shown by the Registry Return Receipt and had forty-five (45) days or until 1 September 2003 to file their
appellants’ brief, but failed to do so. No opposition to the said Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by respondents. Neither did
they file a motion for extension of time to file appellants’ brief.

On 30 September 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which reads:

For failure of the [herein respondents] to file their brief within the reglementary period, this appeal is hereby
considered ABANDONED and accordingly DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, as amended.14

On 27 October 2003, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 15 of the foregoing Resolution stating that their failure to file
their appellants’ brief was due to their counsel’s inadvertence, attaching their brief thereto and praying for its admission.
Respondents’ counsel had used his residence as his mailing address and the domestic helper might have misplaced the notice
to file brief; hence, respondents’ counsel failed to monitor the running of the reglementary period for the filing of the appellants’
brief.

On 27 November 2003, the Court of Appeals resolved respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration as follows:

For consideration is [herein respondents’] Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s resolution dated September
30, 2003 dismissing their appeal for failure to file the [appellants’] brief within the reglementary period.
[Respondents] contend that their failure to file the same was due to inadvertence and not for the purpose of
 delay.

WHEREFORE, finding the motion to be meritorious and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves to
GRANT the motion.

Accordingly, this Court’s resolution dated September 30, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered allowing the filing of the [appellants’] brief. The appellants’ brief attached to the motion for
reconsideration is ADMITTED.

[Herein petitioner] may file its appellee’s brief within the period prescribed by the rules upon receipt hereof. 16

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-quoted Resolution which the Court of Appeals denied in another
Resolution dated 5 May 2004. According to the appellate court:

The failure of the [herein respondents] to file their brief within the prescribed period does not have the effect of
automatically dismissing the appeal. The Court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal, fully
aware of its primary duty to render or dispense justice, if possible, with dispatch. However, every party must be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the game of
technicalities. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. Courts in real justice have always been guided by the norm that when
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.

Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical
sense.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioner’s] motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 17

Hence, the present Petition raising the sole issue:

Whether or not Public Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the resolutions of November 27, 2003 and May 5, 2004. 18

In brief, petitioner submits that the inadvertence of respondents’ counsel to timely file their appellants’ brief is not a persuasive
reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure.19
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the substantive merit of their appeal to the Court of Appeals outweigh the procedural
infirmity they committed by their omission to file appellants’ brief within the prescribed period, and that the decision of the RTC
has no basis in fact and law.

The pertinent rules of procedure can be found in Section 7, Rule 44, and Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which read:

Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Rule 44

Ordinary Appealed Cases

Section 7. Appellant’s brief.- It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days
from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record,
seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies
thereof upon the appellee.

RULE 50

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
time provided by these Rules.

The issue in this case is not a novel one. It has already been the subject of cases previously decided by this
Court.

It is a good time to revisit the cases we have decided, delving on the issue of non-filing of appellants’ brief to the Court of
Appeals and its consequence.
Early in Pongasi v. Court of Appeals,20 involving the failure to file the appellant’s brief within the prescribed period, this Court
ruled:

[P]etitioner’s counsel filed a timely motion for special extension of time on February 19, 1975, two days before the
expiration date on February 21, 1975, and that petitioners’ counsel filed defendants- appellants’ brief on March 3,
1975, well within the 15 days special extension prayed for by him in his motion.

xxxx

This litigation is one for partition and the conflicting assertions of the parties herein over property rights deserve to
be passed upon by the appellate court if only to assure itself that the properties in question are awarded to those
who rightfully deserve them.

Gregorio v. Court of Appeals21 followed suit as this Court again gave due course to the appeal despite the filing of the appellant’s
brief beyond the reglementary period, considering the subject matter of the appeal:

What is before the court is a question of forgery in the supposed conveyance of a 57,491-square meter land
located in the residential area of a 57,491-square meter land located in the residential area of Las Piñas, Rizal.
Petitioner claims that the sale of the land to the Spouses Corpuz Parami and Luciana Parami is an absolute
falsity. He stubbornly asserts that he never sold the land to them. Such charges are doubtless not devoid of
significance. Respondent Appellate Court, therefore, grievously erred in dismissing the appeal.

This Court expounded on its decision thus:

The expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on
appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. It is sufficient ground for extending the time
where the delay in filing the brief was caused in part by a misunderstanding of counsel, and in part by appellant’s
inability, because of his poverty, to obtain the money necessary to pay the expenses of the appeal. Similarly,
where the question raised is of sufficient importance to require an examination of the record, the late filing of the
brief may be forgone. This is especially true, like in the case before Us, where there is no showing or assertion
whatsoever of any intent to delay on the part of the appellant. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 took its bearings from the above case, thus:

[t]he need x x x to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner’s reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and
fourth motions for extension x x x" and constituted an "exceptional circumstance" which impressed petitioner’s
appeal with public interest. Thus, petitioner’s appeal was given due course despite the late filing of its appellant’s
brief.

Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner’s appeal is denied due course, a
government institution could lose a great deal of money over a mere technicality.

Though not deviating from the basic principle set in the above cases earlier mentioned, Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals23 became more succinct and this Court emphasized that sufficient cause must exist for the relaxation of
procedural rules:

As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary
and not merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such discretion must be a sound one, to
be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in
each case.

In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient proof that any inadvertence was caused by the Post Office. Moreover, no conclusive proof could
be shown that a motion for extension was indeed filed at any time. All these create a doubt that petitioner’s
counsel has been candid in his dealings with the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical
principles in the conduct of cases before the courts at all times.

As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of substantial justice would be served by giving due
course to the appeal. However, we must state that the liberality with which we exercise our equity jurisdiction is
always anchored on the basic consideration that the same must be warranted by the circumstances obtaining in
each case. Having found petitioner’s explanation less than worthy of credence, and without evidentiary support,
we are constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural rules on the timeliness of submission before the court.

Bago v. People24 followed the lead of Philippine Merchant, and ruled as follows:

On March 9, 1998, petitioner’s counsel filed a manifestation stating the Appellant’s Brief was filed seasonably by
his secretary with the Court of Appeals. However, the original of the same was inadvertently filed with the copies
 intended for the Brief Section because there were Christmas parties going on. Petitioner’s counsel likewise
admitted that the Office of the Solicitor General had just been furnished with a copy of the Appellant’s Brief due to
the failure of her secretary to send it on December 22, 1997.

xxxx

[I]t is axiomatic that Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law. More
importantly, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity,
which are wanting in this case, will lead us to allow an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of
substantial justice.

Consequently, the instant petition must perforce be denied. Petitioner has failed to show compelling reasons to
relax the rules in his favor. His failure to comply strictly with the procedural requirements of the Rules of Court
and observe the reglementary periods prescribed therein will not warrant the application of equity and the liberal
construction of the Rules.

Of the same tenor is De la Cruz v. Ramiscal,25 where we again explained at length that:

Petitioner’s justification that their former counsel belatedly transmitted said order to them only on 20 March 1998
is not a good reason for departing from the established rule. It was the responsibility of petitioners and their
counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them. Rules on procedure cannot be made to
depend on the singular convenience of a party.

Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista26 stayed on course with the more recent jurisprudence by
refusing to allow the late filing of the appellant’s brief on the ground of the mistake or inadvertence of the counsel’s secretary:

Blaming its counsel’s unidentified secretary for its abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for negligent
lawyers to cover up for their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. Such excuse is the most
hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a
system that insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly served within the period therefor and, if he fails to
do so, the negligence of his secretary or clerk to file such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.

In Uy v. Baloja, 27 counsel of therein petitioner attributed his failure to file the appellant’s brief on time to his inability to locate the
transcript of stenographic notes in the case. Unmoved, this Court dismissed the appeal and pronounced:

Truly, petitioner’s conduct in the premises can never be a case of excusable neglect. Quite the contrary, it
smacks of a lack of honest concern on his part and a blatant disregard of the lawful directive of the appellate
court. Giving in to petitioner’s maneuverings is tantamount to putting premium on a litigant’s naked indolence and
imparting imprimatur to a scheme of prolonging litigation.

This Court reiterated its stance on the strict adherence to the rules of procedure when in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Goimco, Sr.,28 it rejected therein petitioner’s excuse for the late filing of his appellant’s brief:

We note that petitioner’s previous counsel is a large law firm with several lawyers in its roster. Yet it took said
counsel four (4) months, from the expiration of the reglementary period, within which to file the appellant’s brief. It
is settled that failure to file brief for a client constitutes inexcusable negligence. Petitioner’s flimsy excuse that it’s
counsel’s log-book containing the schedules for the filing of pleadings and hearings was lost is, to say the least,
most unpersuasive. Said counsel should have examined consistently the records of its cases to find out what
appropriate actions have to be taken thereon. The notice to file the appellant’s brief was in the records of the
instant cases all along. Had counsel been efficient in the handling of its cases, the required appellant’s brief could
have been filed on time. Its failure to do so is an inexcusable negligence.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court likewise refused to relax its procedural rules:

Petitioner does not deny the procedural infraction on his part, but he asks for the relaxation of the rules. Granting
his plea, however, would be to fault the appellate court for acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure
which the court has been mandated to observe.

The Rules of Court are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the appellate court. We
cannot just turn a blind eye and tolerate its contravention. Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides that it
shall be the duty of the appellant to file his brief within 45 days from receipt of notice. His failure to comply with
this mandate is a ground for the dismissal of his appeal as provided under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner actually had 135 days to prepare his brief which is a considerable period of time.

In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure, so that the ends of justice may
be better served. However, such liberality may not be invoked if it would result in the wanton disregard of the
rules, and cause needless delay. Save for the most persuasive of reason, strict compliance with the rules is
enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Negligence of petitioner’s counsel and his own failure to
enter the appearance of his collaborating counsel are, to our mind, unacceptable reasons for relaxing the
 observance of the period set for filing briefs.

The same principle was highlighted in Moneytrend Lending v. Court of Appeals,30 where we again repeated that the general rule
is that failure to file the appellant’s brief within the prescribed period would result in the dismissal of the appeal, and any
exemption from the rule must be for the most compelling reasons and the delay must be for a reasonable period:

It may be that mere lapse of the period to file an appellant’s brief does not automatically result in the dismissal of
the appeal and loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court. It ought to be stressed, however, the relaxation of the
rules on pleadings and practice to relieve a party-litigant of an injustice must be for most persuasive reasons. And
in case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period.

In Delos Santos v. Elizalde,31 this Court reminded litigants of their responsibility to monitor the status of their case and the
inexcusability of the inability to file appellant’s brief on account of non-monitoring:

Petitioners’ failure to apprise themselves of the status of their case during its pendency before the CA is
inexcusable. Moreover, their former counsel’s failure or neglect to file the required appellant’s brief shall bind
them.

Then in Redena v. Court of Appeals,32 we repeated that negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the
appellant’s brief within the reglementary period, and explained at length that:

In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without due
process of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former
counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression
that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellant’s brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand
the main case to the court of origin for new trial.

Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant
another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require. None of these exceptions obtains here.

For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause
must be shown. Here, petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief. While this omission can plausibly
qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceeding
below.
In Natonton v. Magaway,33 this Court deemed it proper to underscore once more that the dismissal of an appeal for the late filing
of the appellant’s brief is discretionary upon the court, depending on the circumstances surrounding the same:

In Carco Motor Sales v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-44609, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 526), this Court held:

"As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), ‘(T)he expiration of the
time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a
jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration of the time fixed
for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no
motion to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused where no
material injury has been suffered by the appellee be reason of the delay or where there is no
contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced."

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief on time.
However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the
appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing
the appeal automatically. The court has discretion to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the
court, not a duty. The discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. (Emphases supplied.)

It is thus daylight clear from all these cases that:

(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is filed within the
reglementary period prescribed by the rules;

(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not
ministerial or mandatory;

(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing
the automatic dismissal of the appeal;

(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper
exercise of the court’s leniency it is imperative that:
 (a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;

(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of
substantial justice;

(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;

(d) there is no contention that the appellees’ cause was prejudiced;

(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.

(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and

(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court’s
indulgence except:

(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;

(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or

(c) where the interests of justice so require.

In this case, the Court cannot say that the issues being raised by respondents are of such importance that would justify the
appellate court to exempt them from the general rule and give due course to their appeal despite the late filing of their appellant’s
brief. It is starkly clear that respondents do not deny that they owe petitioner the amount it is demanding, as borne out in the
Answer they filed before the RTC, save to say that petitioner refused and failed to accept the payment thereof. Respondents’
Answer before the RTC confirms this observation. Their Answer reads:

5. [Herein petitioner] has no valid cause of action as against the [herein respondents] considering that
[respondent UFC] has already prepared the check as early as October 3, 2000 as its payment in the amount
of P1,025,590.00 but the [petitioner] refused and failed to accept such payment. For reference, we attached
herewith copy of the check voucher and check as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively. 34

Even the claim of refusal by petitioner to accept the check payment is contrary to ordinary human character and cannot be given
even half a life. For, why would the petitioner go to this length in collecting the amount due him after allegedly refusing and failing
to accept the respondents’ payment?

Our attention is riveted to respondents’ repeated laxity and indolence as regards this case even when it was still pending before
the RTC. As shown by the records and contained in the RTC Order dated 22 April 2002:

When called for pre-trial, there was no appearance on the part of the [herein respondents]. Records show that
this is the 4th time this case is set for pre-trial. In fact, up to the present time despite the requirements of the Rules
of Court the [respondents] have failed to file their Pre-trial Brief. When called for the third time at 10:00 a.m., there
was still no appearance on the part of the [respondents], prompting the [herein petitioner] thru counsel to pray for
an Order of default.

Premises considered, and as prayed for, the [respondents] are now declared to have waived their right to adduce
evidence on Pre-trial, and the [petitioner] may present evidence ex-parte on May 24, 2002, at 2:00 p.m. 35

Respondents did not file any motion to set aside the above order.

Respondents evidently continued with their lack of care even when they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals as shown by
their not having filed an appellants’ brief under the reglementary period. The purported inadvertence of their counsel cannot
justify a relaxation of the rules. It is the counsel’s responsibility to see to it that he has established an efficient system to monitor
the receipt of important notices and orders from the courts. While the omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does
not amount to gross negligence to call for the exception to the oft-repeated rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Respondents are, thus, bound by their counsel’s negligence.

Finally, it appears that respondents finally "attached" their Brief only in their Motion for Reconsideration filed on 27 October 2003
in the Court of Appeals seeking a reconsideration of the appellate court’s Resolution of 30 September 2003, dismissing their
appeal. The delay in the filing thereof, 57 days after the expiration of the period to file the same on 1 September 2003, 36 was,
indeed, unreasonably long.

ALL TOLD, the Court finds no sufficient and compelling reasons to justify the exercise of the Court’s leniency and sound
discretion. Under the facts of the case, the Court is constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural rules.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ Resolutions dated 27
November 2003 and 5 May 2004 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Resolution dated 30 September 2003 dismissing the
appeal of respondents Unified Field Corporation, Marilyn G. Ong, Victoria O. Ang, Edna C. Alfuerte, Mark Dennis O. Ang and
Alvin Ang, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Mario L. Guarina III and
1

Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-29.

2
 Rollo, p. 25.

3
 Id. at 27-29.

4
 Through its Ambassador to the Philippines, His Excellency, R. Schellinck.

5
 Rollo, p. 30.

6
 Id. at 31-32.

7
 22. PRETERMINATION CLAUSE. Should the LESSEE, during the term of the lease be disinterested to continue
the lease for no reason whatsoever, the LESSEE shall pay the LESSOR according to the schedule heretofore as
enumerated, and the LESSOR shall thereafter refund all unused advance rental payments to the LESSEE, if so
required under this lease agreement, within FORTY –FIVE (45) days following receipt of full pre-termination
payment.

Total sum due LESSOR in the event of pre-termination:

· pre-termination before end of first year of lease, or prior to 01 October 1998: SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P678,780.00), Philippine Currency, including
any and all unused advance rental payments applicable for the first year of the lease. The unused
advanced rental payments applicable for the second year of the lease shall be refunded to the LESSEE
within FORTY FIVE (45) days following receipt of full pre-termination payment;
 · pre-termination after first year of lease and before end of second year of lease, or after 01 October 1998
and before 30 September 1999: SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY PESOS ONLY (P678,780.00) Philippine currency;

· pre-termination after second year of lease and before end of lease period, or after 30 September 1999
and before 30 September 2001: (Please refer to paragraph 1 of this contract of lease). (Rollo, 43-43-A.)

8
 Records, p. 66.

9
 Section 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.- Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as directors,
or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.

10
 Records, pp. 9-10.

11
 Id. at 38.

12
 Rollo, p. 52.

13
 Id. at 10.

14
 Id. at 62.

15
 Id. at 64.

16
 Id. at 25-26.

17
 Id. at 28-29.

18
 Id. at 180.

19
 Id.
20
 163 Phil. 638, 643-644 (1976).

21
 164 Phil. 129, 136 (1976).

22
 411 Phil. 121, 135-136 (2001).

23
 432 Phil. 733, 741-742 (2002).

24
 443 Phil. 503, 505-506 (2003).

25
 G.R. No. 137882, 4 February 2005, 450 SCRA 456-457.

26
 G.R. No. 164668, 14 February 2005, 451 SCRA 294, 300.

27
 G.R. No. 134155, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 55, 60-61.

28
 G.R. No. 135507, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 361, 367.

29
 G.R. No. 156894, 2 December 2005, 476 SCRA 581, 585-586.

30
 G.R. No. 165580, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 705, 713-714.

31
 G.R. No. 141810 & 141812, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 14, 34.

32
 G.R. No. 146611, 6 February 2007. 514 SCRA 389, 402.

33
 G.R. No. 147011, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 199, 203-204.

34
 Id. at 46.

35
 Rollo, p. 49.

36
 Rollo, p. 60.
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 151084               July 2, 2010

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF AGUSTIN PATO, ADOLFO DEL VALLE BRUSAS and ZENAIDA BRUSAS; TRIFONA FEDERIS, MAURICIO
MEDIALDEA and NELSON TONGCO; MARIANO DE LOS ANGELES; HEIRS OF MIGUEL PATO, ARACELI BARRAMEDA
ACLAN and PONCIANO IRAOLA; HEIRS OF CRESENCIA VDA. DE SAN JOAQUIN,* Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 20012 and November 19, 20013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 69735.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Expropriation proceedings were initiated by petitioner Province of Camarines Sur against respondents Heirs of Agustin Pato,
Adolfo del Valle Brusas & Zenaida Brusas, Trifona Federis, Mauricio Medialdea & Nelson Tongco, Mariano de los Angeles, Heirs
of Miguel Pato, Araceli Barrameda Aclan and Ponciano Iraola sometime in 1989 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,
Camarines, Sur, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 32. In the proceedings which was docketed as Special Civil Action No. P-2-’89,
petitioner proposed to pay respondents P20,000.00 per hectare, or P2.00 per square meter, as just compensation for their lands.
Respondents resisted the attempt of petitioner to expropriate their properties arguing, among others, that there was no public
necessity. Motions to Dismiss filed by respondents were, however, denied by the RTC. After a protracted litigation that led to the
appointment of Commissioners to determine the proper value of the properties, the RTC rendered a Decision, 4 the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Expropriating, in favor of plaintiff Province, for the public use detailed in its complaint, and in Res. No. 129, S.
of 1998, the lands described in its pars. 1 and 4, consolidated complaint, as further described its sketch plan, p.
361 records;

2. Condemning plaintiff to pay defendants as just compensation for the land, owned by defendants named in the
consolidated complaint and enumerated in Annex A as well as the improvements standing thereon, at the time
this decision is executed, and set forth in Annex C hereof, which is made an integral part of this decision, with 6%
interest per annum from the date cases were individually filed until paid; and

3. Condemning plaintiff to pay Financial Assistance per E.O. 1035, Sec. 18 to the tenants mentioned in the
summary of the commissioner’s report and enumerated in Annex A; and to pay Commissioners Co, Altar and
 Malali, P5,000.00 each, immediately.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC ruled that the reasonable value of the lands to be expropriated were as follows:

Irrigated riceland – P9.00 per sq. m.

Unirrigated riceland, coconut land, orchard – P8.00 per sq. m.

Residential land – P120.00 per sq. m.6

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 7 to the RTC Decision, specifically arguing that the value of just compensation should
only be P20,000.00 per hectare, or P2.00 per square meter. Petitioner argued that such value was the amount awarded by other
RTCs in the area, which involved landholdings of the same condition as that of the subject properties.

On June 9, 2000, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 8 denying petitioner’s motion to reduce the valuations it made.

On June 15, 2000, petitioner filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. 9

On May 31, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution10 dismissing the appeal of petitioner for failure to pay the docket fees, thus:

xxxx

The Court RESOLVES to:

xxxx

(d) DISMISS the appeal of plaintiff-appellant Province of Camarines Sur for failure to pay the jurisdictional requirement of
payment of the docket fee pursuant to Sec. 1 (c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 11

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 12 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution13 dated
November 19, 2001.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following errors committed by the CA, to wit:

i.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF
HEREIN PETITIONER PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR AND IN DENYING ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SUCH
DISMISSAL AND DENIAL BEING ENTIRELY NOT IN ACCORD AND DIRECTLY IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE, CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT
CIRCUMSTANCES HEREIN WHICH JUSTIFY THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

ii.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER PROVINCE OF
CAMARINES SUR SINCE SAID APPEAL IS EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS AS THE APPEALED DECISION COMPLETELY
DEPARTED FROM THE APPLICABLE RULES AND DULY ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN THE DETERMINATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION IN EXPROPRIATION CASES AND INSTEAD THE JUDGE IN THE LOWER COURT USED HIS OWN
PERSONAL VIEW AND BELIEF IN COMING UP WITH THE VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY AS TO URGENTLY REQUIRE
THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND SUPERVISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

iii.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER AND AFFIRMED ITS RESOLUTION DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER
PROVINCE BY CITING ONE CASE WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS INSTANT CASE AND CITING ANOTHER WHICH
IS, IN FACT, SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL OF HEREIN PETITIONER.14

At the crux of the controversy is a determination of the propriety of the CA’s resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to
pay the docket fees. In its Motion for Reconsideration15 before the CA, petitioner argued that its failure to pay the docket fees was
due to the honest inadvertence and excusable negligence of its former counsel, Atty. Victor D.R. Catangui, to wit:

xxxx
 1. The failure of the former counsel of herein Plaintiff-Appellant Province of Camarines Sur (the late Atty. Victor
D.R. Catangui) to pay or caused to be paid the appellate court docket fees was committed through honest
inadvertence and excusable negligence, since during the time that the notice of appeal was filed, said counsel
was already having health problems affecting his heart that substantially distracted him from faithfully performing
his duties and functions as Provincial Legal Officer, including that as counsel of herein Plaintiff-Appellant Province
of Camarines Sur in the above-entitled case;

2. That it was the same physical condition that forced him to resign as Provincial Legal Officer effective January
2, 2001 as the distance between his office in Provincial Capitol Complex, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur and that of
his residence in San Roque, Iriga City, which is, more or less than 27 kilometers is too much for him to physically
endure;

3. That, notwithstanding his resignation from the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur and subsequent
transfer to a much nearer office in Iriga City, he nevertheless, sad to tell, unexpectedly succumbed on March 2,
2001 at the age of 47. x x x16

This Court is not convinced. Time and time again, this Court has consistently held that the payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. 17

Records disclose that petitioner’s former counsel Atty. Catangui filed a Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2000. On January 15, 2001,
Atty. Catangui filed a Motion with the CA notifying the same that he was withdrawing as counsel for petitioner. On May 31, 2001,
the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, which noted the motion of Atty. Catangui to withdraw as counsel and which also
dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the docket fees. Said resolution was sent to petitioner via registered mail and was
received by petitioner’s agent, a certain Loningning Noora-Papa, as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt. 18 It was only on
August 2, 2001 that the CA received the Entry of Appearance 19 of petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Elias A. Torallo, Jr. With the
appearance of Atty. Torallo, the CA resent the May 31, 2001 Resolution informing him of the dismissal of the petition. On
September 11, 2001, a day after receiving said Resolution, Atty. Torallo paid the corresponding docket fees.

From the time Atty. Torallo paid the corresponding docket fees, approximately 15 months had already lapsed from the time the
notice of appeal was filed by petitioner’s former counsel Atty. Catangui. This is to this Court’s mind, already too late in the day.

While the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under
exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of justice, 20 such circumstances are not present in the case at bar.

Petitioner’s attempt to pass the buck on the sickness of its former counsel, Atty. Catangui, is not a compelling reason for this
Court to relax the strict requirement for the timely payment of appellate docket fees. While this Court expresses grief over the
death of Atty. Catangui, his sickness21 was not of such a nature which would have impaired his mental faculties and one which
would have prevented him from filing the docket fees. From the time he filed a notice of appeal assailing the RTC Decision, Atty.
Catangui was still the Provincial Legal Officer for 6 months prior to his transfer to his new post at the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples. Even if the corresponding docket fees were not paid upon the filing of the notice of appeal, still, Atty.
Catangui could have rectified the situation by paying the fees within the 15-day reglementary period to file an appeal. As
manifested by petitioner, Atty. Catangui was in the practice of law for 10 years, he should have, therefore, seen to it that the
stringent requirements for an appeal were complied with.

M. A. Santander Construction Inc. v. Villanueva 22 is instructive, thus:

In the instant case, petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the trial court on March 3, 1998. Accordingly, it had, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 41, until March 18, 1998 within which to perfect its appeal by filing within that period the Notice of Appeal and
paying the appellate docket and other legal fees. While petitioner filed the Notice of Appeal on March 9, 1998, or within the
reglementary period, however, it paid the required docket fees only on November 13, 1998, or late by 7 months and 25 days.

The mere filing of the Notice of Appeal is not enough, for it must be accompanied by the payment of the correct appellate docket
fees. Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory.  It is an essential requirement without which the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal had been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal within the
prescribed period is not a mere technicality but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and
executory.

In Guevarra vs. Court of Appeals, where the docket fees were not paid in full within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days but
were paid forty-one (41) days late due to "inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work," we held that the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the appeal. In Lee vs. Republic of the Philippines, where half of the appellate docket fee was paid within the
prescribed period, while the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made, we ruled that
no appeal was perfected. Clearly, where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of
the trial court becomes final and no longer susceptible to an appeal.  For once a decision becomes final, the appellate court is
without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 23

Withal, it bears to stress that Appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. It must be exercised strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and rules. Specifically, the payment of docket fees within the period for perfecting an
appeal is mandatory. In the present case, petitioner has not given sufficient reason why it should be exempt from this stringent
rule.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2001 and
November 19, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69735, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* The Court approved the Extra-Judicial Settlement with Compromise Sale executed by the Heirs of San Joaquin
per Resolution dated December 12, 2007.

1
 Rollo, pp. 10-43.

2
 Id. at 45-46.

 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Presiding Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (retired
3

member of this Court) and Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring; id. at 49-50.

4
 Rollo, pp. 63-68.

5
 Id. at 67-68.

6
 Id. at 66.

7
 Records, vol. 3, pp. 1493-1519.

8
 Id. at 1583-1585.

9
 Id. at 1586-1587.

10
 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

11
 Id. at 45.

12
 Id. at 52-58.
 13
 Id. at 49-50.

14
 Id. at 20-21.

15
 Id. at 52-58.

16
 Id. at 52-53.

17
 Yambao v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 712, 717-718 (2000).

18
 CA rollo, p. 64. (Dorsal side.)

19
 Id. at 66.

20
 Ayala Land, Inc. v. Spouses Carpo, 399 Phil. 327, 335 (2000).

 The medical history of Atty. Catangui reveals that he was suffering from diabetes mellitus type 2 and
21

hypertensive cardiovascular disease; rollo, pp. 70-71.

22
 484 Phil. 500 (2004).

23
 Id. at 504-505. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
 [G.R. No. L-40934. April 30, 1976.]

MELENCIO CANTURNA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO CABERO AND LEONARDA

CORBILLA, SPOUSES, Respondents.

Greta-Diosa B. Quitorio for Petitioner.

Simplicio M. Sevilleja for Private Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

From an adverse judgment by the Court of Agrarian Relations, petitioner through his public counsel, a trial attorney of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance, appealed to the Court of Appeals, without the required statement of material dates to show its timeliness.
When required to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed "for failure to include in the notice of appeal such data as will
show that the appeal was filed on time," counsel duly filed a verified manifestation explaining the inadvertent omission and supplying
the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. The Court of Appeals, while apparently satisfied with the explanations, but
likewise ignoring the material dates supplied by counsel, dismissed the appeal "for failure to include in the notice of appeal such data
as will show that the appeal was filed on time."
cralaw virtua1aw library

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed the Court of Appeals to give due course to petitioner’s appeal.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; MATERIAL DATA; FAILURE TO INCLUDE MATERIAL DATA TO SHOW TIMELINESS OF APPEAL;
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. — The omission to incorporate in the notice of appeal the material dates showing the timeliness of the
appeal as required by law owing to counsel’s mistake, inadvertence and negligence considering the given circumstances of "confusion
caused by heavy pressure of work aggravated by lack of personnel and equipment in the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance field
office" could not be deemed inexcusable and meted the capital penalty of dismissal of the appeal; especially, since the innocent party
who would thus be penalized and deprived of the right to appeal would be the very agricultural tenant whom the law has sought to
extend all legal protection because of his disadvantaged position in our society, to the extent of extending him free legal assistance
through the BALA and all the rights and privileges of a pauper and indigent litigant without need of further proof.
 2. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH MATERIAL DATA RULE. — Where the undisputed material dates as
subsequently submitted under oath show the fact of timeliness of the appeal, it would subserve the ends of substantial justice and be in
consonance with a sound and just exercise of judicial discretion to admit such supplemental data and give due course to the appeal
rather than to apply the strict letter of the law and punish with dismissal of appeal the petitioner for they fault or mistake of his
counsel.

3. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF THE MATERIAL DATA RULE. — The whole purpose of the statutory and reglementary requirements on
material dates is to established the timeliness of the appeal or petition for review, since otherwise the appealed decision would already
be final and executory and the appellate or reviewing court would be rendered without jurisdiction, where there exist no valid grounds
to seek relief from final judgment .

4. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT COMPLIANCE WITH MATERIAL DATA RULE. — While the Supreme Court, in the
application of similar rules requiring a statement of the material dates to show the timeliness of the filing of appeals by petition for
review on certiorari of judgments of inferior courts under Republic Act. 5440 has initially denied the petitions for non-compliance
with the Rule (Rule 45, Sec. 1), it has consistently and variably granted in the interest of substantial justice motions for reconsideration
upon petitioner’s subsequent compliance and submittal therewith of the material dates showing the timeliness of filing of the petition
(without prejudice to meting the proper penalty in appropriate cases to offending counsel) and has proceeded to consider and act on
the merits of the petitioner, granting or denying due course thereto as the case warranted.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

The Court sets aside respondent court’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for failure to include in the notice of appeal from the agrarian
court’s decision the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. Since the undisputed material dates as subsequently submitted
under oath show the fact of timeliness of the appeal, it would subserve the ends of substantial justice and be in consonance with a
sound and just exercise of judicial discretion to admit the supplemental data and give due course to the appeal rather than to apply the
law literally and inflict upon petitioner the capital penalty of dismissal of the appeal for the fault and excusable neglect of his public
counsel.
From an adverse judgment for ejectment and lease rentals rendered under date of October 7, 1974 by the Court of Agrarian Relations
of Pangasinan at Tayug in favor of the private respondents-landowners as plaintiffs against petitioner-agricultural share tenant (lessee)
as defendant, petitioner through his public counsel, the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform represented by Aurora A. Gayapa, the trial attorney stationed at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed on December 18, 1975 a sworn
notice of appeal interposing an appeal to the Court of Appeals without the required statement of material dates to show its timeliness.
1

On March 25, 1975 respondent appellate court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Gayapa as petitioner’s counsel to show cause why
she should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with an earlier resolution of January 24, 1975 which required her to
show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed "for failure to include in the notice of appeal such data as will show that the
appeal was filed on time." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner’s counsel duly filed on April 11, 1975 her verified Manifestation and Motion expressing her regrets at not having complied
with the earlier resolution since she did not receive the copy thereof because their standard office procedure after the taking of an
appeal is to forward the pertinent records and subsequent pleadings and processes to the control office at the DAR, Quezon City (and
no longer to the field trial attorney who handled the trial, such as herself) which then takes full charge of the case through the Judicial
Cases Division until termination of the appeal.

Counsel further stated the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The lower court’s decision was received on October 30, 1974;

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on November 14, 1974 (within the 15-day period);

Counsel had not received a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration but on December 17, 1975 when she appeared in
court for another case "she happened to glance at the order denying the motion for reconsideration" ; and

"The Notice of Appeal was filed on December 18, 1975 which is within the reglementary period provided by law" (10 days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration).

Counsel finally pleaded that her failure to include the above material dates in the Notice of Appeal was "never intentional and was
merely due to inadvertence and mistake on account of lack of personnel, that aside from the numerous cases she attends to and the
pleadings she prepares everyday, she had to do the typing job as what happened in the preparation of the notice of appeal, that after
having typed the same, she immediately put the copies inside the envelope for mailing and that immediately thereafter the records
were forwarded to the Judicial Cases Division in Quezon City." 2

Counsel therefore prayed, as joined by the Judicial Cases Division of the BALA (which had taken over the appeal) in another
Manifestation dated May 6, 1975 that respondent court’s resolution of March 25, 1975 be deemed to have been satisfactorily complied
with and that petitioner’s appeal be given due course.

In its resolution of May 8, 1975, respondent court, while apparently satisfied with the explanations (for it made no further mention of
its contempt citation) but likewise ignoring the material dates supplied by petitioner’s counsel, dismissed the appeal "for failure to
include in the Notice of Appeal such data as will show that the appeal was filed on time." cralaw virtua1aw library

Reconsideration having been denied, the present petition was filed which the Court, after receiving respondents’ comment, treated as a
special civil action and declared submitted for decision in its resolution of October 13, 1975.

The petition is granted and respondent court is directed to give due course to petitioner’s appeal.

While it is true that the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal were not incorporated in the notice of appeal as required by
law, 3 such omission owing to counsel’s mistake, inadvertence and negligence considering the given circumstances of "confusion
caused by heavy pressure of work aggravated by lack of personnel and equipment in the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, field office" 4 could not be deemed inexcusable and meted the capital penalty of dismissal of the appeal.

The innocent party who would thus be penalized in this case and deprived of the right to appeal what he believes to be a just cause
would be the very agricultural tenant, tiller or lessee to whom the law has sought to extend all legal protection and assistance because
of his disadvantaged position in our society, to the extent of extending him free legal assistance and representation through the BALA
and all the rights and privileges of a pauper and indigent litigant without need of further proof. 5

The very procedure for filing of appeals from decisions of the Court of Agrarian Relations has thus been simplified by just requiring
the filing of a notice of appeal with a statement under oath of the material dates to show that it was filed within the statutory period.
Since the undisputed material dates as subsequently submitted under oath show the fact of timeliness of petitioner’s appeal, it would
subserve the ends of substantial justice and be in consonance with a sound and just exercise of judicial discretion to admit such
supplemental data and give due course to the appeal rather than to apply the strict letter of the law and punish with dismissal of appeal
the petitioner for the fault or mistake of his counsel.
The whole purpose of such statutory and reglementary requirements is to establish the timeliness of the appeal or petition for review,
since otherwise the appealed decision would already be final and executory and the appellate or reviewing court would be rendered
without jurisdiction, where there exist no valid grounds to seek relief from the final judgment.

Accordingly, while the Court, in the application of similar rules requiring a statement of the material dates to show the timeliness of
the filing of appeals by petition for review on certiorari of judgments of inferior courts under Republic Act 5440, 6 has initially
denied the petitions for non-compliance with the Rule, it has consistently and invariably granted in the interest of substantial justice
motions for reconsideration upon petitioner’s subsequent compliance and submittal therewith of the material dates showing the
timeliness of filing of the petition (without prejudice to meting the proper penalty in appropriate cases to offending counsel) and has
proceeded to consider and act on the merits of the petition, granting or denying due course thereto as the case warranted.

As already indicated, there is no dispute that the material dates as submitted show that petitioner’s appeal was timely filed (on the first
day after petitioner’s counsel learned of the denial of his motion for reconsideration, although counsel had not received a formal copy
of the denial order — which is well within the 10-day reglementary period).

Respondents, aside from technically invoking the "fatal defect" of the notice of appeal for not stating therein the material dates, make
no claim or pretense against the correctness of the dates and the timeliness in fact of the appeal. Their claim that by petitioner’s filing
of a notice of appeal "without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration dated November 14, 1974, he was deemed to
have abandoned his motion for reconsideration," and that the decision therefore retroactively became final on the day after November
14, 1974 is manifestly untenable - since the motion was actually acted upon and denied by the lower court and petitioner simply
considered having received his notice thereof on the day his counsel actually learned in court of the denial order and chose not to wait
to be formally served with the same.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent court’s resolution of May 8, 1975 is set aside and the case is remanded back to it for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal. With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, *, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1. R.A. 5434 governing such appeals provides in sec. 3 that "Sec. 3. How appeals taken — Appeals shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and with the court, officer, board, commission or agency that made or
rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment appealed from, serving a copy thereof on all other interested
parties. The notice of appeal shall state, under oath, the material dates to show that it was filed within the period fixed in
this Act. (R.A. 5434)."

Sec. 2 of the same Act provides for a period of 15 days from notice of the order, decision or judgment or in case a motion
for reconsideration is filed within the said period, for another period of 10 days from notice of denial of the motion, within
which to file the appeal.

2. Rollo, page 28.

3. Rep. Act 5434, supra, fn. 1.

4. Rollo, page 34.

5. Rep. Act 6389, section 30.

6. Rule 45, sec. 1 provides that the petition should contain "a verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and
denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received." Rule 43, sec. 2 (prior to its being superseded pro tanto
by Rep. Act 5434) likewise provides that "The petition shall be under oath and shall show, by mention of the specific
material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this rule."
cralaw virtua1aw library

* Designated vice Justice Ruperto G. Martin, who took no part.

15 OG No. 47, 13152 (November 25, 2019)

FIRST DIVISION
 [ G.R. No. 233135, December 05, 2018 ]

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., PETITIONER, V. MANUEL A.S. BERNARDO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by B.E. San Diego Inc. (petitioner), seeks to reverse and set aside the

Decision[2] dated April 3, 2017 and the Resolution[3] dated July 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142759, which affirmed the

Decision[4] dated October 20, 2014 and the Order[5] dated July 30, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, in Civil Case No. 19-V-12,

that denied petitioner's petition for relief and motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Antecedents Fact

Sometime in December 1992, petitioner sold an 8,773-square meter parcel of land (subject property) located in Arkong Bato, Valenzuela City, on installment to

Manuel A.S. Bernardo (respondent) for a total purchase price of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P9,650,300.00).[6]

Pursuant to their agreement, respondent paid an initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to petitioner, and the remaining balance of Six Million Six

Hundred Fifty Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P6,650,300.00) to be paid in 36 monthly installments of One Hundred Eighty-Four Thousand Seven Hundred

Thirty Pesos and Fifty-Six Centavos (P184,730.56).[7]

Respondent paid an aggregate amount of Two Million Fifty-Four Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,054,500.00) but failed to pay the remainder of the purchase

price balance as they become due. Hence, on March 29, 1996, petitioner advised respondent of its intent to cancel their agreement of sale and demanded

respondent to vacate the subject property.[8]

Petitioner's demand remained unheeded, it then filed an action for Cancellation of Contract and Restitution of the Premises before the RTC docketed as Civil Case

No. 5088-V-96.[9]
The RTC in a Decision[10] dated August 13, 2010, dismissed the complaint and ratiocinated that petitioner failed to provide respondent a grace period of sixty (60)

days to pay the installments due as governed by sales on installment of the Maceda Law.

The said RTC Decision was received by petitioner's counsel on record on September 30, 2010.

On October 4, 2010, petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel - Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law Office filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the RTC

Decision dated August 13, 2010 without a Notice of Hearing. On October 15, 2010 or eleven (11) days thereafter, petitioner's new collaborating counsel sent via

registered mail a Notice of Hearing,[12] which stated that the date of hearing was set on October 29, 2010 at 8:30a.m.

On December 10, 2010 Order[13] of the RTC, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner's new collaborating counsel and considered the same as a

mere scrap of paper. The RTC found that there was antedating in the Notice of Hearing filed to make it appear that the same was filed within the fifteen (15) day

reglementary period, and that there was dishonesty and scheme employed on the part of the petitioner's new collaborating counsel in the separate filing of the

Notice of Hearing.[14]

Consequently, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[15] but the RTC in an Order[16] dated February 11, 2011 denied the same for having been filed beyond the

reglementary period.

Meanwhile, the RTC Decision[17] dated August 13, 2010 lapsed into finality.

Accordingly, on September 6, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief[18] from the Order dated February 11, 2011 before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 19-

V-12 and asseverated that the gross and palpable negligence of its new collaborating counsel should not bind and prejudice the petitioner.

Trial on the merits ensued and thereafter, on October 20, 2014, the RTC in Civil Case No. 19-V-12 issued a Decision[19] denying the Petition for Relief, to wit:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for relief from judgment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[20]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[21] was denied for lack of merit by the RTC in an Order[22] dated July 30, 2015.

Then, petitioner duly filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.[23]

On April 3, 2017, the CA rendered a Decision[24] which affirmed the RTC's denial of petitioner's petition for relief, the dispositive portion of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 20 October 2015 and Order dated 30 July 2015 of the

[RTC], Branch 75, Valenzuela City, are SUSTAINED.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[26] was likewise denied in a CA Resolution[27] dated July 17, 2017.

Hence, the instant petition.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even mistakes in the application of procedural rules, an exception to this doctrine is when the

negligence of counsel is so gross that the due process rights of the client were violated.[28]

In this case, the manner with which the Law Office of Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law handled the case of petitioner, as a collaborating counsel shows gross

negligence and utter incompetence, when it failed to attach a Notice of Hearing when it filed the motion for reconsideration before the RTC on October 4, 2010,

and antedated the filing thereof to make it appear that it was filed on time. As a result thereof, the RTC in an Order dated December 10, 2010, denied the motion

for reconsideration and considered the same as a mere scrap of paper. Worst, the August 13, 2010 Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. Thus, petitioner lost its

right to appeal the Decision and petitioner's petition for relief was denied. Clearly, the rights of petitioner were deprived due to its collaborating counsel's palpable

negligence and thereof is not bound by it.

Also, contrary to findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner exercised due diligence in monitoring the case it filed. Petitioner even inquired with the Law Office of

Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law and informed it that the motion for reconsideration was duly filed. As far as petitioner is concerned and in respect of its interest,

its duty to be vigilant to the status of the case was complied with by being updated on the progress of the case.

While the Court applauds the RTC's and CA's zealousness in upholding procedural rules, it cannot simply allow petitioner to be deprived of its property due to the

gross negligence of its collaborating counsel.

It is settled in Our jurisprudence that procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the procedural rules would hinder

rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.

We allowed liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the

subject matter of the controversy, as illustrated in the cases of City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority,[29] to wit:

The liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. CA:

Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of the period of appeal because of the absence of a notice of

hearing required in Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere

scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to disregard it.

Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, the reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should have

filed an appeal expired on 23 November 1989.

But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully

shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may

thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as much as

possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.

Hence, this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over a party worth P4,000,000.00 for a measly P650,000.00 without affording him

ample opportunity to prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not in fact an absolute sale but one of mortgage. Such grave injustice must not be

permitted to prevail on the anvil of technicalities.

Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:

But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used

only to help secure not override substantial justice (National Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138 [ 1980]; Gregorio v.
Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1976]). The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially

where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal (Siguenza v. Court of

Appeals, 137 SCRA 570 [1985]; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 76595, May 6, 1998).
[30]
 (Emphasis in the original)

"[T]he rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of

the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires."[31] Simply put, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to prevent injustice to a litigant.

In sum, the Court deems it appropriate to relax the technical rules of procedure in order to afford petitioner the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of its

appeal, rather than to deprive it of such right and make it lose his property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April3, 2017 and the Resolution dated July 17, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

142759 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75, for proper resolution

of the case on its merits.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and  Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 9-27.
[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Renato C. Francisco; id. at 30-37.
[3]
 Id. at 61-62.
[4]
 Rendered by Presiding Judge Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion A. Gepty; id. at 132-138.
[5]
 Id. at 145-146.
[6]
 Id. at 31.
[7]
 Id.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id.
[10]
 Id. at 64-73.
[11]
 Id. at 74-88.
[12]
 Id. at 89-90.
[13]
 Id. at 92-94.
[14]
 Id. at 93.
[15]
 Id. at 95.
[16]
 Id. at 97-98.
[17]
 Id. at 64-73.
[18]
 Id. at 110-127.
[19]
 Id. at 132-138.
[20]
 Id. at 138.
[21]
 Id. at 139-144.
[22]
 Id. at 145-146.
[23]
 Id. at 147-164.
[24]
 Id. at 30-37.
[25]
 Id. at 36-37.
[26]
 Id. at 38-44.
[27]
 Id. at 61-62.
[28]
 Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., 752 Phil. 15, 25 (2015).
[29]
 671 Phil. 610 (2011).
[30]
 Id. at 627-628, citing Basco v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 251, 266-267 (2000).
[31]
 Curammeng v. People, 199 Phil. 575, 582-583 (2016).

© Supreme Court E-Library 2019

This website was designed and developed, and is maintained, by the E-Library Technical Staff in collaboration with the Management Information
Systems Office.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be afforded
another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to
condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his
innocence to his previous lawyers.

Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status of their case with the trial court since a client has the right to
expect that his lawyer will protect his interest during the hearing of his case.

A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his
lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or
defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts
necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendants attorney,
the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant. 21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for relief. Considering the
circumstances obtaining here, petitioners should not be made to suffer the consequences of their counsels negligence.
Hence, the period within which to file their petition for relief should be reckoned from their actual receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration, which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly, the petition for relief filed on
December 16, 1998 was well within the sixty-day period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

Both lower courts actually sacrificed justice for technicality. This Court has consistently ruled that it is a far better and
more prudent course of action for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
merits to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.22 Hence, it would be more in accord with justice and equity to allow the appeal by petitioners to enable the Court
of Appeals to review the trial courts decision.
The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their
behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities.23 cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have relaxed the stringent application of procedural rules in order
to allow a party the chance to be heard. This policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has been consistently
held that the dismissal of appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. 24

x x x, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very aims. Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the dismissal of appeals
grounded merely on technicalities, especially in this case where petitioners appeal appears prima facie worthy of the CAs
full consideration on the merits.25 cräläwvirtualibräry

1.
2. Simply put, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to prevent injustice to a litigant.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made suffer for the lawyers mistakes and should be afforded
another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on their behalf. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to
condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his
innocence to his previous lawyers.

Petitioners cannot be faulted for failing to verify the status of their case with the trial court since a client has the right to
expect that his lawyer will protect his interest during the hearing of his case.

A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his
lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or
defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts
necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendants attorney,
the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant. 21 cräläwvirtualibräry

Undoubtedly, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for relief. Considering the
circumstances obtaining here, petitioners should not be made to suffer the consequences of their counsels negligence.
Hence, the period within which to file their petition for relief should be reckoned from their actual receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration, which is December 7, 1998. Accordingly, the petition for relief filed on
December 16, 1998 was well within the sixty-day period prescribed in Section 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

Both lower courts actually sacrificed justice for technicality. This Court has consistently ruled that it is a far better and
more prudent course of action for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the
merits to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.22 Hence, it would be more in accord with justice and equity to allow the appeal by petitioners to enable the Court
of Appeals to review the trial courts decision.

The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their
behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities.23
cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have relaxed the stringent application of procedural rules in order
to allow a party the chance to be heard. This policy applies with equal force in case of appeals. It has been consistently
held that the dismissal of appeal on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. 24

x x x, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby
defeat their very aims. Verily, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may even stay the dismissal of appeals
grounded merely on technicalities, especially in this case where petitioners appeal appears prima facie worthy of the CAs
full consideration on the merits.25cräläwvirtualibräry
ARTICLE III

Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

A default judgment is frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every litigated case on the merits. But the default judgment will
not be vacated unless the defendant satisfactorily explains the failure to file the answer, and shows that it has a meritorious defense.

JUDGMENT; SUITS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON
TECHNICALITIES. — We note that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Hence, in Genite v. Court of Appeals, we stressed that: "The Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technicalities rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts, rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be
conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and
not the other way around. As applied to [the] instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities
"should give way to the realities of the situation." Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and
not on technicalities.
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE FROWNED UPON AND NOT LOOKED UPON WITH FAVOR. — In this regard, we
have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned
upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the
defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the grounds
upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a
particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the
ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency of the instant petition, the trial court
has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the court of last resort, we deem it in the best
interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default
issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if
petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.  cAaDCE

This notwithstanding, we note that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Hence, in Genite v. Court of Appeals,   we stressed that:
35

The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering justice have always been, as they in fact ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights,
and not the other way around. As applied to [the] instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal, technicalities
"should give way to the realities of the situation." 36
 Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.   In this regard, 37

we have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are
frowned upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to
the defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the
grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside.   Since rules of procedure are mere tools
38

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend
its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to
frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.   We are not unmindful of the fact that during the pendency
39

of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being the court of
last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be extended to petitioners
by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent default judgment; otherwise,
great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to prove their claims.

it would toil through the ends of substantial justice and be in consonance with a sound and just exercise of judicial discretion to admit
such supplemental data and give due course to the appeal rather than to apply the strict letter of the law and punish with dismissal of
appeal the petitioner for they fault or mistake of his counsel.

it would subserve the ends of substantial justice and be in consonance with a sound and just exercise of judicial discretion to admit
such supplemental data and give due course to the appeal rather than to apply the strict letter of the law and punish with dismissal of
appeal the petitioner for they fault or mistake of his counsel.
PURPOSE OF THE MATERIAL DATA RULE. — The whole purpose of the statutory and reglementary requirements on material
dates is to established the timeliness of the appeal or petition for review, since otherwise the appealed decision would already be final
and executory and the appellate or reviewing court would be rendered without jurisdiction, where there exist no valid grounds to seek
relief from final judgment .

meritorious and in the interest of substantial justice

The failure of the [herein respondents] to file their brief within the prescribed period does not have the effect of automatically
dismissing the appeal. The Court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal, fully aware of its primary duty to
render or dispense justice, if possible, with dispatch. However, every party must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the game of technicalities. If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Courts in real justice have
always been guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around.

Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of
appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

not a persuasive reason or a compelling justification to forego the Rules of Procedure

Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the substantive merit of their appeal to the Court of Appeals outweigh the procedural infirmity
they committed by their omission to file appellants’ brief within the prescribed period, and that the decision of the RTC has no basis in fact
and law.

The pertinent rules of procedure can be found in Section 7, Rule 44, and Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which read:

Procedure in the Court of Appeals

Rule 44

Ordinary Appealed Cases

 Section 7. Appellant’s brief.- It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt
of the notice of the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his
legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellee.

RULE 50

DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or
on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time
provided by these Rules.

The issue in this case is not a novel one. It has already been the subject of cases previously decided by this Court.

It is a good time to revisit the cases we have decided, delving on the issue of non-filing of appellants’ brief to the Court of Appeals and its
consequence.

The expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a
jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. It is sufficient ground for extending the time where the delay in filing
the brief was caused in part by a misunderstanding of counsel, and in part by appellant’s inability, because of his poverty, to
obtain the money necessary to pay the expenses of the appeal. Similarly, where the question raised is of sufficient
importance to require an examination of the record, the late filing of the brief may be forgone. This is especially true, like in
the case before Us, where there is no showing or assertion whatsoever of any intent to delay on the part of the appellant.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 took its bearings from the above case, thus:

[t]he need x x x to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner’s reversion efforts are foreshore lands
constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension x
 x x" and constituted an "exceptional circumstance" which impressed petitioner’s appeal with public interest. Thus,
petitioner’s appeal was given due course despite the late filing of its appellant’s brief.

Similarly, the case at bar is impressed with public interest. If petitioner’s appeal is denied due course, a government
institution could lose a great deal of money over a mere technicality.

Though not deviating from the basic principle set in the above cases earlier mentioned, Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals23 became more succinct and this Court emphasized that sufficient cause must exist for the relaxation of procedural rules:

As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and not
merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.

In the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb the conclusions of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof that any inadvertence was caused by the Post Office. Moreover, no conclusive proof could be shown that a motion for
extension was indeed filed at any time. All these create a doubt that petitioner’s counsel has been candid in his dealings
with the courts. Needless to stress, a lawyer is bound by ethical principles in the conduct of cases before the courts at all
times.

As a last recourse, petitioner contends that the interest of substantial justice would be served by giving due course to the
appeal. However, we must state that the liberality with which we exercise our equity jurisdiction is always anchored on the
basic consideration that the same must be warranted by the circumstances obtaining in each case. Having found
petitioner’s explanation less than worthy of credence, and without evidentiary support, we are constrained to adhere strictly
to the procedural rules on the timeliness of submission before the court.

Bago v. People24 followed the lead of Philippine Merchant, and ruled as follows:

On March 9, 1998, petitioner’s counsel filed a manifestation stating the Appellant’s Brief was filed seasonably by his
secretary with the Court of Appeals. However, the original of the same was inadvertently filed with the copies intended for
the Brief Section because there were Christmas parties going on. Petitioner’s counsel likewise admitted that the Office of
the Solicitor General had just been furnished with a copy of the Appellant’s Brief due to the failure of her secretary to send it
on December 22, 1997.

xxxx

[I]t is axiomatic that Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law. More importantly,
rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely
 indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict
compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity, which are wanting in this
case, will lead us to allow an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.

Consequently, the instant petition must perforce be denied. Petitioner has failed to show compelling reasons to relax the
rules in his favor. His failure to comply strictly with the procedural requirements of the Rules of Court and observe the
reglementary periods prescribed therein will not warrant the application of equity and the liberal construction of the Rules.

Of the same tenor is De la Cruz v. Ramiscal,25 where we again explained at length that:

Petitioner’s justification that their former counsel belatedly transmitted said order to them only on 20 March 1998 is not a
good reason for departing from the established rule. It was the responsibility of petitioners and their counsel to devise a
system for the receipt of mail intended for them. Rules on procedure cannot be made to depend on the singular
convenience of a party.

Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista26 stayed on course with the more recent jurisprudence by refusing to allow
the late filing of the appellant’s brief on the ground of the mistake or inadvertence of the counsel’s secretary:

Blaming its counsel’s unidentified secretary for its abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to
cover up for their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. Such excuse is the most hackneyed and
habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court.
It bears stressing that it is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that insures that all pleadings should
be filed and duly served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the negligence of his secretary or clerk to file
such pleading is imputable to the said counsel.

In Uy v. Baloja, 27 counsel of therein petitioner attributed his failure to file the appellant’s brief on time to his inability to locate the transcript
of stenographic notes in the case. Unmoved, this Court dismissed the appeal and pronounced:

Truly, petitioner’s conduct in the premises can never be a case of excusable neglect. Quite the contrary, it smacks of a lack
of honest concern on his part and a blatant disregard of the lawful directive of the appellate court. Giving in to petitioner’s
maneuverings is tantamount to putting premium on a litigant’s naked indolence and imparting imprimatur to a scheme of
prolonging litigation.

This Court reiterated its stance on the strict adherence to the rules of procedure when in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Goimco,
Sr.,28 it rejected therein petitioner’s excuse for the late filing of his appellant’s brief:
 We note that petitioner’s previous counsel is a large law firm with several lawyers in its roster. Yet it took said counsel four
(4) months, from the expiration of the reglementary period, within which to file the appellant’s brief. It is settled that failure to
file brief for a client constitutes inexcusable negligence. Petitioner’s flimsy excuse that it’s counsel’s log-book containing the
schedules for the filing of pleadings and hearings was lost is, to say the least, most unpersuasive. Said counsel should have
examined consistently the records of its cases to find out what appropriate actions have to be taken thereon. The notice to
file the appellant’s brief was in the records of the instant cases all along. Had counsel been efficient in the handling of its
cases, the required appellant’s brief could have been filed on time. Its failure to do so is an inexcusable negligence.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court likewise refused to relax its procedural rules:

Petitioner does not deny the procedural infraction on his part, but he asks for the relaxation of the rules. Granting his plea,
however, would be to fault the appellate court for acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure which the court
has been mandated to observe.

The Rules of Court are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the appellate court. We cannot just
turn a blind eye and tolerate its contravention. Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides that it shall be the duty of
the appellant to file his brief within 45 days from receipt of notice. His failure to comply with this mandate is a ground for the
dismissal of his appeal as provided under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner actually had 135 days to
prepare his brief which is a considerable period of time.

In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure, so that the ends of justice may be better
served. However, such liberality may not be invoked if it would result in the wanton disregard of the rules, and cause
needless delay. Save for the most persuasive of reason, strict compliance with the rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice. Negligence of petitioner’s counsel and his own failure to enter the appearance of his collaborating
counsel are, to our mind, unacceptable reasons for relaxing the observance of the period set for filing briefs.

The same principle was highlighted in Moneytrend Lending v. Court of Appeals,30 where we again repeated that the general rule is that
failure to file the appellant’s brief within the prescribed period would result in the dismissal of the appeal, and any exemption from the rule
must be for the most compelling reasons and the delay must be for a reasonable period:

It may be that mere lapse of the period to file an appellant’s brief does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal
and loss of jurisdiction by the appellate court. It ought to be stressed, however, the relaxation of the rules on pleadings and
practice to relieve a party-litigant of an injustice must be for most persuasive reasons. And in case of delay, the lapse must
be for a reasonable period.

In Delos Santos v. Elizalde,31 this Court reminded litigants of their responsibility to monitor the status of their case and the inexcusability of
the inability to file appellant’s brief on account of non-monitoring:
 Petitioners’ failure to apprise themselves of the status of their case during its pendency before the CA is inexcusable.
Moreover, their former counsel’s failure or neglect to file the required appellant’s brief shall bind them.

Then in Redena v. Court of Appeals,32 we repeated that negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellant’s brief
within the reglementary period, and explained at length that:

In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process of
law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross
that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared and
filed his appellant’s brief. He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin for new
trial.

Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsel’s negligence and allowed a litigant another
chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests
of justice so require. None of these exceptions obtains here.

For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown. Here, petitioner’s counsel failed to file the appellant’s brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceeding below.

In Natonton v. Magaway,33 this Court deemed it proper to underscore once more that the dismissal of an appeal for the late filing of the
appellant’s brief is discretionary upon the court, depending on the circumstances surrounding the same:

In Carco Motor Sales v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-44609, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 526), this Court held:

"As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), ‘(T)he expiration of the time to file
brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a jurisdictional matter
and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the
reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been made. Late
filing or service of briefs may be excused where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee be
reason of the delay or where there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced."

Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief on time. However, the
dismissal is directory, not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. The failure of an
appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. The
court has discretion to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion must be
 a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case. (Emphases supplied.)

It is thus daylight clear from all these cases that:

(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is filed within the
reglementary period prescribed by the rules;

(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or
mandatory;

(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the
automatic dismissal of the appeal;

(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the
court’s leniency it is imperative that:

(a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;

(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;

(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;

(d) there is no contention that the appellees’ cause was prejudiced;

(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.

(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and

(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the appellate court’s indulgence
except:

(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;

(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or
 (c) where the interests of justice so require.

In this case, the Court cannot say that the issues being raised by respondents are of such importance that would justify the appellate court
to exempt them from the general rule and give due course to their appeal despite the late filing of their appellant’s brief. It is starkly clear
that respondents do not deny that they owe petitioner the amount it is demanding, as borne out in the Answer they filed before the RTC,
save to say that petitioner refused and failed to accept the payment thereof. Respondents’ Answer before the RTC confirms this
observation. Their Answer reads:

5. [Herein petitioner] has no valid cause of action as against the [herein respondents] considering that [respondent UFC]
has already prepared the check as early as October 3, 2000 as its payment in the amount of P1,025,590.00 but the
[petitioner] refused and failed to accept such payment. For reference, we attached herewith copy of the check voucher and
check as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively.34

Even the claim of refusal by petitioner to accept the check payment is contrary to ordinary human character and cannot be given even half
a life. For, why would the petitioner go to this length in collecting the amount due him after allegedly refusing and failing to accept the
respondents’ payment?

Our attention is riveted to respondents’ repeated laxity and indolence as regards this case even when it was still pending before the RTC.
As shown by the records and contained in the RTC Order dated 22 April 2002:

When called for pre-trial, there was no appearance on the part of the [herein respondents]. Records show that this is the
4th time this case is set for pre-trial. In fact, up to the present time despite the requirements of the Rules of Court the
[respondents] have failed to file their Pre-trial Brief. When called for the third time at 10:00 a.m., there was still no
appearance on the part of the [respondents], prompting the [herein petitioner] thru counsel to pray for an Order of default.

Premises considered, and as prayed for, the [respondents] are now declared to have waived their right to adduce evidence
on Pre-trial, and the [petitioner] may present evidence ex-parte on May 24, 2002, at 2:00 p.m. 35

Respondents did not file any motion to set aside the above order.

Respondents evidently continued with their lack of care even when they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals as shown by their not
having filed an appellants’ brief under the reglementary period. The purported inadvertence of their counsel cannot justify a relaxation of the
rules. It is the counsel’s responsibility to see to it that he has established an efficient system to monitor the receipt of important notices and
orders from the courts. While the omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to call for the
exception to the oft-repeated rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Respondents are, thus, bound by their counsel’s
negligence.
Finally, it appears that respondents finally "attached" their Brief only in their Motion for Reconsideration filed on 27 October 2003 in the
Court of Appeals seeking a reconsideration of the appellate court’s Resolution of 30 September 2003, dismissing their appeal. The delay in
the filing thereof, 57 days after the expiration of the period to file the same on 1 September 2003, 36 was, indeed, unreasonably long.

ALL TOLD, the Court finds no sufficient and compelling reasons to justify the exercise of the Court’s leniency and sound discretion. Under
the facts of the case, the Court is constrained to adhere strictly to the procedural rules.

LIBERAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF COURT.

At the crux of the controversy is a determination of the propriety of the CA’s resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the
docket fees.

1. The failure of the former counsel of herein Plaintiff-Appellant Province of Camarines Sur (the late Atty. Victor D.R.
Catangui) to pay or caused to be paid the appellate court docket fees was committed through honest inadvertence and
excusable negligence, since during the time that the notice of appeal was filed, said counsel was already having health
problems affecting his heart that substantially distracted him from faithfully performing his duties and functions as Provincial
Legal Officer, including that as counsel of herein Plaintiff-Appellant Province of Camarines Sur in the above-entitled case;

2. That it was the same physical condition that forced him to resign as Provincial Legal Officer effective January 2, 2001 as
the distance between his office in Provincial Capitol Complex, Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur and that of his residence in San
Roque, Iriga City, which is, more or less than 27 kilometers is too much for him to physically endure;

3. That, notwithstanding his resignation from the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur and subsequent transfer to a
much nearer office in Iriga City, he nevertheless, sad to tell, unexpectedly succumbed on March 2, 2001 at the age of 47. x
x x16
While the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the rule on payment of appellate docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional
circumstances to better serve the interest of justice,20 such circumstances are not present in the case at bar.

such a nature which would have impaired his mental faculties and one which would have prevented him from filing the docket fees

bears to stress that Appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege