TEAM CODE: TC-12

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF LA LA LAND

[EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION]

IN THE MATTERS OF:-

THE STATE OF ARGO

(...Petitioner/Appellant)

Versus

UNION OF LA LA LAND & STRANGER THINGS PRIVATE LIMITED

(...Respondents)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. _______ OF 2018.

(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of La La Land)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER/ APPELLANT

 SCHOOL OF LAW, NORTHCAP UNIVERSITY 5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2018.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED...................................................................4

 STATUTES INVOLVED..............................................................................................4
 LEGAL DATABASES..................................................................................................7
 TABLE OF CASES........................................................................................................7

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................................................10

STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................11

STATEMENT OF ISSUES......................................................................................................14

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................15

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE HON‟BLE

SUPREME COURT OF LA LA LAND IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?......................16

II. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 THREATENS THE QUASI-
FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF LA LA LAND?.................................................................23

III. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE STRANGER THINGS PVT. LTD?.....................................................30

PRAYER..................................................................................................................................35

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COMPETITION, 2018.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION DEFINITION

¶ Para

& And

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article

Co-Op Co-Operative

Dy. Deputy

Hon‟ble Honorable

i.e. That is

Ltd. Limited

Ors. Others

p. Page

pp. Pages

Pvt. Private

r/w Read with

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Sec. Section

u/a Under Article

vs. Versus

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COMPETITION, 2018.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 BOOKS AND GUIDELINES REFERRED:

S. No. DESCRIPTION

Basu, D.D., “Commentary on the Constitution of India”, (Vol. 9) Lexis Nexis

1.
Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th Edition 2011.
Singh, M.P., “V.N. Shukla‟s Constitution of India”, Eastern Book Company
2.
Lucknow, 12th Edition 2013.
Jain, M.P., “Indian Constitutional Law”, (6th Ed, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa,
3.
2010).
Environmental Impact Assessment Guidance Manual for Offshore and Onshore Oil
4.
and Gas Exploration, Development and Production.

 STATUTE INVOLVED:

S. No. STATUTE/LEGISLATION

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.

2. Mines and Minerals Development Act, 1957

3. Nagaland (Ownership and Transfer of Land and its Resources) Act, 1990

 LEGAL DATABASES:
S. No. LEGAL DATABASES

1. Westlaw

2. Manupatra

3. SCC Online

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COMPETITION, 2018.

 TABLE OF CASES:

CITATION OF
S. NO. NAME OF CASES PAGE NO.
CASE

1. Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Its Employees AIR 1950 SC 188 16

Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of

2. AIR 2004 SC 1815. 17
Trustees

Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development AIR 2002 SC 2036.

3. 17
Authority

A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of

4. AIR 2007 SC 1546. 17
Andhra Pradesh

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of

5. AIR 2004 SC 3467 17
Gujarat

6. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss (2007) 9 SCC 196. 17

7. Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar AIR 2005 SC 3123 17

8. Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2005 SC 3120. 18

Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara

9. AIR 2006 SC 387 18
Singh

Haryana State Industrial Corpn. v Cork (2007) 8 SCC 359

10. Mfg. Co. 18
(SC).

11. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (2003)11 SCC 241. 18

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12. C.C.E v Standard Motor Products (1989) AIR 1298 (SC). 18

Janshed Hormusji Wadia v Board of (2004)3 SCC 214

13. 18
Trustees, Port of Mumbai (SC).

14. N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss & Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 196 19

15. Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel AIR 2010 SC 1099 19

Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2351
16. 19
v. State of Bihar & Ors

State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji AIR 1981 SC 1675

17. 19
Shah

18. Gopal & Ors. v. State of T.N AIR 1986 SC 702 20

K. Ramanujan Nair v. S. Sarojini Amma

19. 1971 CriLJ 565. 20
and Anr

20. State of Punjab v. Union of India 1971 80 ITR 248 P H 21

State of Karnataka v. Union of India 1978 AIR 68, 1978

21. 21
SCR (2)1.

Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P.

22. AIR 2004 SC 1503 22
Lakshmoji Rao

23. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 112 22

Kunhayammed and Others v. State of

24. (2000) 6 SCC 359 22
Kerala and Another

Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v.

25. 2009) 7 SCC 561. 23
Union of India
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State of Kerala and Ors. v. MarAppraem

26. AIR 2012 SC 2375 24
Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr

Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra

27. and Ors AIR 2005 SC 862 25

Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and others v.

28. AIR 1947 PC 60 25
Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna

State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal

29. (2008)13 SCC 5 25
Shah and Ors

Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh and Ors v.

30. (1996) 3 SCC 105 26
State of Rajasthan and Ors.

31. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628 26

Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore

32. (2011) 3 SCC 139 26
Development Authority and Ors.

33. A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 297 26

34. State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla AIR 1959 SC 544 26

Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union

35. AIR 1990 SC 2114 26
of India(UOI) and Anr.

36. West Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1241 26

37. Orissa Cement Ltd. (M/s) v. State of Orissa AIR 1991 SC 1676 27

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38. Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi AIR 1970 SC 228 27

Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali

39. Federation and Ors. v. Kerala Trawlnet (1994) 5 SCC 28 27

Boat Operators Association and Ors.

Rakesh Wadhawan v Jagdamba Industrial

40. Corpn. [2002] 5 SCC 440 22. 28

State of Nagaland & Anr. v Rosemary

41. Dzuvichu & Ors. [2012] 4 GLT 744. 29

42. K. Parasuramaiah v Pokurl Lakshamma AIR 1965 AP 220 29

International Tourist Corp. v. State of 1981 AIR 774 : 1981

43. Haryana 29
SCR (2) 364

44. Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon AIR 1972 SC 1061 30

Jaora Sugar Mills v. State of Madhya

45. Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 416 30

State Trading Corporation of India v.

46. 1963 AIR 1811 32
Commercial Tax Officer

Tata Engineering and Locomotive

47. 1965 AIR 40 32
Company v. State of Bihar

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COMPETITION, 2018.

 IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS:

(1) „Petitioner(s)/Appellant‟ for the purposes of this memorandum, stands for „The State of
Argo‟
(2) „Respondent(s)‟ for the purposes of this memorandum stands for „The Union of La La
Land‟ and „The Stranger Things Pvt. Ltd.‟

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

***************
***************

***************
***************

THE HON‟BLE SUPREME COURT OF LA LA LAND HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY,

ENTERTAIN AND DISPOSE THE PRESENT CASE BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 1361 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF LA LA LAND.

***************
***************

***************
***************

1
Art. 136 – Special Leave to Appeal:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave
to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by
any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

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COMPETITION, 2018.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Part A: The Democratic Republic of “La La Land”, commonly referred as L3, is the third
largest consumer of energy in the world with an 8% of global energy consumption share. L3
is a constitutional republic having quasi-federal structure and a union of 28 states. Presently,
L3‟s energy policy aims to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels, increase in-house gas
production, and empower vulnerable communities through sustainable localised energy
projects. During the 2017 financial year, L3 spent 130 billion dollars on annual Oil and Gas
imports leading to a significant cut in its various poverty alleviation programs.

Part B:In May 2010 the Directorate General of Hydrocarbon (DGH) operating under L3‟s
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas expressed its interest to explore unconventional gas
through hydraulic fracturing process and finalised 44 contract areas including 28 on-land
fields and 16 offshores. In May 2011, the DGH opened competitive bidding for getting
„exploration and production‟ licenses for these contract areas. The bidding process was then
finalised in February 2012 under its Hydrocarbon Exploration Licensing Policy (HELP).
Among the 28 on-land fields, 2 contract areas were located in the “Moonlight” district of
State of “Argo”- one explore unconventional gas through hydraulic fracturing process and
finalised 44 contract areas including 28 on-land fields and 16 off-shores of the eastern states
of the union of “La La Land.” The site of Moonlight project was 10 square kilometer and
have a potential to produce 20,000 barrels of oil per day generating worth one-million USD
per day. On May 8, 2012, Government of L3 officially awarded the Moonlight project to an
Argo based company “Stranger Things Private Limited” and then signed a contract for the
Discovered Small Fields (DSF) Bid 2012 for extracting hydrocarbons at Moonlight site.

Part C: After getting various clearances, including environment clearance, the Stranger
Things Private Limited (project proponent) began finalising its production phase operations
and decided to commercially produce “Shale Gas” through a traditional fracking process in
the region. The company decided to begin multi-well pad drilling in the area that required 7
million gallons of water per well. With the support of local farmers a state level non
government organization began protesting. The NGO was concern about drenching the
ground water from land of farmers and various seismic activities. On February 8, 2016

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 SCHOOL OF LAW, NORTHCAP UNIVERSITY 5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2018.

Considering the concerns and protest the state govt. Asked “BLACK MIRROR” to formulate
a draft bill to regulate shale gas fracking in the region.

Part D: DRAFT BILL BY BLACK MIRROR

On May 8, 2016, Black Mirror submitted a draft bill and related comments to the Chief
Minister‟s office. The draft bill was titled as „Argo Regulation and Development of
PreProduction phase of Fracking process, 2016‟ and primarily proposed to legislate as
following

1.1.Establishing a state-level water committee: Every project related to shale gas fracking
or any hydraulic fracturing must take consent from the committee established under this Act.
The consent will be additional to any such consent/clearance required under any central
legislation.

1.2.Defining ‘Aquifers’: There shall be a difference of 600 meters between the drinking
water sources/ aquifers and shale gas wells in order to preserve natural resources from
contamination. Further, since aquifers were not defined under any of the central legislation,
the bill defined it as “a porous deposit of rock, such as a sandstone, containing water that can
be used to supply wells.”

1.3.Centre-State Relationship Clarification: Since Shale Gas, before production is just a

“rock” it is well within the domain of state and accordingly the state can regulate these rocks.
It is only after the hydraulic fracture the water meets the rock tapping the gas. Therefore, this
bill does not regulate the „hydrocarbon‟ sector. It only attempts to preserve land and water.

1.4.Special Status of Argo under 371 A of L3’s Constitution: The draft bill further clarifies
that going forward; it will regulate the bidding process of such hydrocarbon processes as the
state has a special status under „La La Land‟s Constitution.‟ Such power will only be used to
protect the local communities‟ interest.

1.5.Waste Water/ ‘Flow-Back Water’: Since while doing hydraulic fracture, around 2-3%
shale fluid (prepared by mixing a million gallons of water and chemicals) flows back, the
state needs specific laws addressing “flow-back water.” The bill proposed to define flow back
water as “any mixture of water with chemicals used for the purpose of Hydraulic fracturing.”
Further, the bill stated that such shale fluid cannot fit in the definition of „waste water‟ due to

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its chemical and physical property. The draft bill further stated that usually „shale gas fluid‟
are protected for commercial confidentiality but the composition and its perspective affects
should be made public.

1.6.Private Mineral Ownership: Lastly, the draft bill proposes to incorporate the concept of
„Rule of Capture‟ with respect to mineral rights of the private individuals.

Part E: The bill was then introduced in the state legislature and was passed, subsequently
was effectuated on March 8, 2017. The Act was titled as „„The Argo (Regulation and
Development of Pre-Production phase of Shale Gas) Fracking Act, 2017‟ and was commonly
referred as „The Argo Fracking Act, 2017‟.

After release of statements by both ruling and opposing party the Stranger Things Pvt. Ltd.
realised the complexity of the matter the „Stranger Things Private Limited‟ and the „Union of
La La Land‟ both filed separate cases in the High Court of Argo against the State of Argo
stating that the „The Argo Fracking Act, 2017‟ is unconstitutional. The High Court of Argo
combined both the case into a single matter and commenced the hearing. The „Stranger
Things‟ argued that the Environmental Impact Assessment sector specific manual sufficiently
and comprehensively deals with all the issues addressed in the „The Argo Fracking Act,
2017.‟ Further, the Stranger Things stated that the 2017 Act not only threaten the quasi-
federal structure of the nation but also breaches the company‟s fundamental rights. On
November 17, 2017. The High Court of Argo, by a ratio of 3:2, gave the decision in favor of
Stranger Things Private Limited. The State of Argo appealed against the decision of the High
Court in the Supreme Court of La La Land.

Pari Materia:

1. Laws of Union of La La Land in pari materia with Union of India.

2. HELP 2012 and DSC 2012 in pari materia with Indian HELP 2017, and DSC 2017.

3. Laws of State of Argo in pari materia with State of Nagaland in Union of India.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE I:

WHETHER THE PRESENT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IS MAINTAINABLE?

ISSUE II:

WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 THREATENS THE

QUASI-FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF UNION OF LA LA LAND?

ISSUE III:

WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 INFRINGES THE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF STRANGER THINGS PVT. LTD.?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF LA LA LAND IS
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Court that in the present special leave
petition filed by the State of Argo is maintainable under Art.136 of constitution of La
La Land. The petition satisfies all the grounds required for an appeal and there are no
grounds for rejection.

II. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT,2017 THREATENS

THE QUASI-FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF UNION OF LA LA
LAND?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Court that the Argo Fracking Act, 2017
enacted by the state of Argo is well within the legislative competence of the state.
The State List under Seventh Schedule of the Constitution empowers State to legislate
this act and the State of Argo also have been given special status under Art. 371(A) of
the Constitution of La La Land.

III. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT,2017 INFRINGES THE

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF STRANGER THINGS PVT. LTD.?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the Fundamental rights
of the company is not violated as the company or the corporation is not a citizen of
India and so cannot claim fundamental right because fundamental right are only
conferred upon the citizens. Even in the case of citizen the state can impose
reasonable restrictions on the right in general public interest.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF LA LA LAND IS
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?
A. The present Special Leave Petition is filed by the State of Argo before the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of La La Land u/a 136 r/w Order XXI of Supreme Court Rules, 2013 of
the Constitution of La La Land.2

B. Art. 136 of the Constitution of La La Land reads as:

a. Art. 136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in
its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India.
b. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law
relating to the Armed Forces.

C. Art. 136 of the Constitution of La La Land empowers the Supreme Court to grant special
permission or leave to an aggrieved party to appeal against an order passed in any of the
lower courts or tribunals in La La Land.

I. SCOPE OF POWERS OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE

136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF LA LA LAND.

1. In Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Its Employees, it was held that the power conferred by this Article
was not controlled by the limitations contained in other articles on the Court‟s powers to
entertain an appeal. The Court further observed that it had powers to grant the leave, not
only in respect of final orders, but also in respect of interlocutory orders.3

2
Laws of Union of La La Land is pari materia with the Laws of Union of India.
3
AIR 1950 SC 188.
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2. In the case of Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees4, the Supreme Court
commented on the developing trend of settling private disputes under Art. 136 and it said
that it would become necessary for the Hon‟ble Supreme Court to intervene in private
controversies if such matters have not received sufficient attention from the lower courts
or if a decision has lead to grave injustice. It is submitted that Art. 136 is an over-riding
power where under the Court may generally step in to impart justice to remedy injustice5.

3. The power of the Supreme Court u/a 136 has been held to be plenary, limitless6,
adjunctive and unassailable7. The Supreme Court can use the powers under Art. 136 to
impart justice and remedy any injustice. The Supreme Court with regard to scope of Art.
136 held that it is a residual power which enables the Supreme Court to interfere with the
judgement or order of any court or tribunal in India in its discretion8.

4. In Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar9, the Supreme Court has held that it is open to the
Supreme Court to interfere with the findings fact by the High Court if the High Court has
acted perversely or otherwise improperly. Hence, it is humbly submitted to this Hon‟ble
Court to hear the instant matter because the High Court has erroneously exercised its
jurisdiction in the instant matter.

II. THE INSTANT PETITION SATISFIES ALL GROUNDS REQUIRED FOR AN

APPEAL UNDER ARTICLE 136.

1. It is humbly submitted that if special leave is granted and the same is restricted to a
particular question, the Court is not constrained in any manner to restrict itself to hearing
only those matters10, insofar as an opportunity of being heard is giving to the opposite
party also11. Hence, it is submitted that this Hon‟ble Court can dwell into all matters,
including question of fact and decide this matter on merits grant justice.

4
AIR 2004 SC 1815.
5
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036.
6
A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546.
7
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467.
8
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196.
9
Ganga Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3123.
10
Suresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 3120.
11
Punjab State Electricity Board v. Darbbara Singh, AIR 2006 SC 387.
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2. Also the jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136 on the Supreme Court are corrective one
and not a restrictive one.12 A duty is enjoined upon the Supreme Court to exercise its
power by setting right the illegality in the judgments is well-settled that illegality must not
be allowed to be perpetrated and failure by the Supreme Court to interfere with the same
would amount to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated.13

3. It has been held in plethora of cases that when the question of law of general public
importance arises, the jurisdiction of Hon‟ble Supreme Court can be invoked by filing
special leave petition.

4. It has been held by this Hon‟ble Court that when a question of law of general public
importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its jurisdiction can
always be invoked. Article 136 is the residuary power of SC to do justice where the court
is satisfied that there is injustice.14 The principle is that this court would never do injustice
nor allow injustice being perpetrated for the sake of upholding technicalities.15

5. Further, the present petition involves the substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution. The Petitioner has an alternative option to approach the
Hon‟ble Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution of La La Land but as the facts of the
case remains silent as to the certificate of fitness to appeal u/a 134-A which is to be given
by the Hon‟ble High Court of Argo, the Petitioner have approached the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court u/a 136 of Constitution of La La Land.

6. The scope of Art. 136 has been well explained in the case of N. Suriyakala v. A.
Mohandoss & Ors.,16 wherein the court held that “Article 136 was never meant to be an
ordinary forum of appeal at all like Section 96 or even Section 100 CPC. Under the
constitutional scheme, ordinarily the last court in the country in ordinary cases was
meant to be the High Court. The Supreme Court as the Apex Court in the country was

12
Haryana State Industrial Corpn. v Cork Mfg. Co. (2007) 8 SCC 359 (SC).
13
Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana (2003)11 SCC 241 (SC).
14
C.C.E v Standard Motor Products (1989) AIR 1298 (SC).
15
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai (2004)3 SCC 214 (SC).
16
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss & Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 196; Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 1099.
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meant to deal with important issues like constitutional questions, questions of law of
general importance, question relating to erroneous exercise of jurisdiction or where
grave injustice had been done. If the Supreme Court entertains all and sundry kinds of
cases it will soon be flooded with a huge amount of backlog and will not be able to deal
with important questions relating to the Constitution or the law or where grave injustice
has been done, for which it was really meant under the constitutional scheme. After all,
the Supreme Court has limited time at its disposal and it cannot be expected to hear every
kind of dispute.”

7. The court in Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.,17 held
that Art. 136 which is worded in the widest-possible terms. A plenary jurisdiction
exercisable on assuming appellate jurisdiction subject to grant of special leave against any
kind of judgment or order made by any court or tribunal and in any cause or matter has
been embodied and vested in the Supreme Court. It is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested
by the Constitution in the Court with implicit trust and faith and extraordinary care and
caution has to be observed in the exercise of this jurisdiction. Art. 136 does not confer a
right of appeal on a party but vests a vast discretion in the Supreme Court meant to be
exercised by the considerations of justice, call of duty and eradicating injustice. In State
of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah,18 the court held that the Supreme Court
should not hesitate to interfere in cases where the decision of the lower court will lead to
miscarriage of justice.

8. In Gopal & Ors. v. State of T.N.,19 the court held that unless there is any infirmity or any
illegality in the order of the lower court or that it would lead to failure of justice, the court
should not interfere by exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 136.

9. In the present case the „Stranger Things Private Limited‟ and the „Union of La La Land‟
both filed separate cases in the High Court of Argo against the „State of Argo‟ stating that
the „The Argo Fracking Act, 2017‟ is unconstitutional. The High Court of Argo without
deciding the issues relating to the jurisdiction erroneously exercised its jurisdiction and

17
AIR 2004 SC 2351.
18
AIR 1981 SC 1675.
19
AIR 1986 SC 702.
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combined both the case into a single matter and commenced the hearing. It is humbly
submitted before the Hon‟ble Court the High Court of Argo lacks the jurisdiction to
entertain the present matter but it had erroneously assumed the jurisdiction. Lack of the
Jurisdiction is said to be when a court renders a decision in a suit of which the subject
matter is outside of its purview either due to an explicit or implied bar in a statue or a
principle of law. For there to exist an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the subject matter to
be decided in the suit should be outside of the jurisdiction with respect to subject matter
of the court.20

10. Further, Art. 131 in The Constitution of La La Land reads as:

131. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, the Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have
original jurisdiction in any dispute:
(a). between the Government of India and one or more States; or
(b). between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one
or more other States on the other; or
(c). between two or more States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any
question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal
right depends:
Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any
treaty, agreement, covenant, engagements, and or other similar instrument which,
having been entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution,
continues in operation after such commencement, or which provides that the said
jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute.

11. The use of the phrase „to the exclusion of any other court‟ under Art. 131 itself suggests
that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court enjoys an exclusive original jurisdiction relating to the
disputes relating to the quasi-federal structure. Therefore, must only be decided by the
Hon‟ble Court alone.

20
K. Ramanujan Nair v. S. Sarojini Amma and Anr 1971 CriLJ 565.
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12. Also in the case of State of Punjab v. Union of India21, in which a full bench of five
judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court had held that u/a 131 of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide a dispute between a state
government and the Union of India.

13. The Supreme Court in another judgement of State of Karnataka v. Union of India,22 held
that disputes of the nature described in Art. 131 are usually urgent and their decision can
brook no delay. It is, therefore, expedient in the interest of justice that they should, as far
as possible, be brought before and decided by the Supreme Court so as to obviate the
dilatoriness of a possible appeal.

14. Since the instant matter involves the issues relating to the quasi-federal structure of the
nation23 and the Supreme Court u/a 131 of the Constitution is the only forum that
can adjudicate quasi-federal disputes, therefore the High Court of Argo has erroneously
exercised its jurisdiction.

15. Hence, it is submitted that on account of the facts, relevant judicial pronouncements the
present matter involves the substantial question of law which needs to be decided by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court.

III. RELIEFS THAT COULD ONLY BE GRANTED BY THIS HON’BLE COURT.

1. Under Art. 136, Hon‟ble Supreme Court is the lone forum which can give whatever relief
that might be necessary and proper in the facts and circumstances. 24 The Supreme Court
may even invoke its power under Art. 142 for this purpose.25 Hence, it is submitted that
this Hon‟ble Court grant orders that could remedy the injustice that is being caused to the
Petitioner.

21
1971 80 ITR 248 P H.
22
1978 AIR 68, 1978 SCR (2)1.
23
Moot Proposition.
24
Divisional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, AIR 2004 SC 1503.
25
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 112.
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IV. ABSENCE OF ANY GROUND FOR THE REJECTION.

1. The limitation on exercise of the discretionary powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution
has been laid down by the Supreme Court itself. In Kunhayammed and Others v. State of
Kerala and Another26, it was held that a petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal
may be rejected for several reasons, some of which are as follows: (i) If the Petition is
barred by time; (ii) If the Petition is presented in a defective manner; (iii) The petitioner
has no locus standi to file the petition; (iv) The conduct of the petitioner disentitling him
to any indulgence by the court; (v) The question raised by the petitioner for consideration
by this Court being not fit for consideration or deserving being dealt with by the Apex
Court.

2. In the instant case, it is obvious on a prima-facie level that there is no ground on which
the instant petition for special leave could be rejected. The questions raised by the
Petitioner involve substantial questions of law as it relates to the question of quasi-federal
structure of the nation, as would be shown in the aforementioned submissions, and the
same requires to be adjudicated by this Hon‟ble Court.

V. ARGUENDO, IF IT IS ASSUMED THE PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE,

THIS HON’BLE COURT CAN STILL HEAR THE MATTER.

1. For the purposes of arguments, if it assumed that the current petition is not maintainable,
it is humbly submitted that the width of the discretion of this Hon‟ble Court may extend
to a situation where although the appeals are found not to be maintainable, yet, the
Supreme Court may decide on the merit of the appeals.27. Hence, it is humbly submitted
to this Hon‟ble Court that the situation requires immediate intervention by this Hon‟ble
Court to avoid any further injustice to the Petitioner.

Therefore in the light of aforementioned observations related to the facts of the case,
arguments and various and judicial pronouncements, the present petition filed before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court of La La Land is maintainable.

26
Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2000) 6 SCC 359.
27
Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561.
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ISSUE II. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 THREATENS THE
QUASI-FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF LA LA LAND?

A. As a component of the Federal Structure of the Constitution of La La Land, legislative

powers have been divided between the Union Parliament and State Legislatures. The
competing legislatures may not infringe upon the each other‟s legislative domain.28 The
constitutional vires of the “The Argo (Regulation and Development of Pre-Production
phase of Shale Gas) Fracking Act, 2017” has been challenged on the grounds of
legislative competence.29 It is submitted that the said the impugned Act is intravires to the
Constitution as the „pith and substance‟ of the impugned Act lies within the bounds of
List II of the Seventh Schedule.

B. It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of La La Land that “The Argo
(Regulation and Development of Pre-Production phase of Shale Gas) Fracking Act,
2017” as enacted by the Appellant i.e., State of Argo is well within its legislative
competence and thus does not leads to the violation of the quasi-federal structure as
alleged by the Respondents. Also, the State of Argo has been given a special status under
Art. 371 A of the Constitution of La La Land owing to which it can regulate the
ownership and transfer of land and its resources in order to protect the interest of local
communities.

C. Further, in the instant case „Union of La La Land‟ has no legislative competence to enact
any law on the subject matter as the State of Argo has exclusive right to protect the land,
water, air, and the living resources of the State as the same falls within the List II of
Seventh Schedule i.e., State List. Also, the Union of La La Land cannot resort to the
residuary powers under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule r/w Art. 248 of the
Constitution of La La Land. Also the centre cannot legislate in the State field as no
special circumstances exist.

D. In the instant case though the State Government has asked the „Black Mirror‟ a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) to formulate the draft bill to regulate the process of

28
State of Kerala and Ors. v. MarAppraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2375,¶12.
29
Moot Proposition.
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fracking as the NGO was well acquainted with the impact and aspect of the process but it
wasn‟t the delegation of any legislative power as such rather just the process of giving the
structure to the bill which further undergoes the legislative scrutiny when placed before
the legislature.

I. THE STATE OF ARGO HAS AN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE TO LEGISLATE ON

THE SUBJECT MATTER.

1. As a component of the Federal Structure of the Constitution of La La Land, legislative

powers have been divided between the Union Parliament and State Legislatures. The
competing legislatures may not infringe upon the each other‟s legislative domain.30 The
constitutional vires of the “The Argo (Regulation and Development of Pre-Production
phase of Shale Gas) Fracking Act, 2017” (hereinafter,) has been challenged on the
grounds of legislative competence.31 It is submitted that the said the impugned Act is
intravires to the Constitution as the „pith and substance‟ of the Act lies within the bounds
of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

2. The doctrine of „pith and substance‟ is one of the key principles of interpretation used to
construe entries classified under the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. In order to determine whether a particular statute comes within the purview
of one legislature or the other, the pith and substance of the enactment is to be looked
into.32 If the „true nature and character‟ of a legislation falls outside the permissible limits
assigned to the respective legislature then such law is ultravires the Constitution.33 Only
the offending part of the Act may be declared invalid in case it is sufficiently separable
from the rest of the Act.34 The relevant factors which must be considered to ascertain the
pith and substance of a statute are: (i). the object and purpose; (ii). the scope and; (iii).the
effect of the provisions.35

30
State of Kerala and Ors. v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. and Anr., AIR 2012 SC 2375,¶12.
31
Moot Proposition.
32
Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 862 at ¶ 88; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee
and others v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, AIR 1947 PC 60 at ¶¶35-38.
33
State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors.,(2008)13 SCC 5 at ¶30.
34
Lt. Col. Sawai Bhawani Singh and Ors v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 105 at ¶8., R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India , AIR 1957 SC 628 at ¶ 5.
35
Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 139 at ¶ 64; A.S.
Krishna v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 297 at ¶16.
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3. In the instant case, if we refer to the objective of the draft bill it clearly indicates that the
purpose of the bill is to „preserve the land and water‟. Since, Shale Gas before production
is just a “rock” it is well within the domain of the State of Argo under Entry 18, List II of
the Seventh Schedule and accordingly the State can regulate these rocks. It is only after
the hydraulic fracture the water meets the rock tapping the gas. Therefore, this bill does
not regulate the „hydrocarbon‟ sector. Further, the draft bill also clarifies that in order to
protect the interest of local communities the bill also regulates the bidding process of such
hydrocarbon as the State of Argo has a special status under Art. 371 of the Constitution of
La La Land.

4. In State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla,36giving significant importance to the object of

legislation in determining its pith and substance, it was held that a legislation controlling
the use of amplifiers was public health legislation under List II rather than a broadcasting
legislation under List I.37In order to determine the object and purpose of a statute, we may
refer to the circumstances which prevailed at the time and necessitated the passing of the
Act.38 In State of West Bengal v. Union of India,39 the existing dearth of coal in the
country shaped the Court‟s understanding of the object of Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.

5. We must refer to the various legislative fields under the Seventh Schedule to ascertain
which subject-matters fall under the exclusive competence of the States. Entries 17, 18,
23 and 25 of the State List empowers the State Legislature to enact laws relating to water,
land, regulation of mines and mineral development and gas and gas-works.

6. The meaning and import of the provisions of an Act have to be enquired into in order to
determine its scope.40 The scope of a parliamentary statute must not fall within the ambit
of legislative fields enumerated in List II. However, the power to legislate under Entry 17
of List II is subject to Entry 56 of List I. Thus, we must ascertain the inter-relationship
between the aforementioned entries.

36
State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544.
37
State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544 at ¶15.
38
Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr. v. Union of India(UOI) and Anr., AIR 1990 SC 2114 at ¶16, State of Orissa
and Ors. v. Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd. and Ors. at¶¶5-7.
39
West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241.
40
Orissa Cement Ltd. (M/s) v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1676 at ¶37.
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7. In the event that an entry under List II confers a general power to State Legislatures
whereas specific power relating to the same subject-matter has been conferred to the
Parliament under List I,41 then the general power would be limited to the extent of the
special power.42 In Kerala SMTF v. Kerala TBO,43 it was held that the States would have
the exclusive power to legislate with respect to fisheries within their territorial borders.44
Similarly, In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal,45 with respect to water it was
observed that the States had the exclusive power to legislate with regard to water which
was present solely within its territorial limits.46 In the present case, Thereby, it is
submitted that the scope of the Act lies within the exclusive ambit of State Legislatures.

8. Reflecting the object and purpose of the impugned Act, the ostensible effect which the
provision would have matters within the auspices of the State List which are the land,
water, air, and the living resources of the State.47 Furthermore, the proposed shale gas
project will not only drench the ground-water from the land of farmers but will also result
in various seismic activities in the region leading to a lot of crisis. 48 It is therefore
submitted that the „pith and substance‟ of the impugned section lies within the legislative
domain of the State Legislatures.

II. THE STATE OF ARGO HAS BEEN GIVEN A SPECIAL STATUS UNDER ART. 371
A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF LA LA LAND.

1. The clause (1) sub-clause (a)(iv) of the Art. 371 A inter alia states that no Act of
Parliament shall affect the ownership and transfer of land and natural resources unless the
Legislative Assembly of State of Argo decides to do so by passing a resolution.

41
For example, Entry17, 18, 23, 33 of List II is limited by Entry 56, 3, 54, 60 of List I respectively.
42
Indu Bhushan Bose v. Rama Sundari Debi, AIR 1970 SC 228 at ¶12.
43
Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali Federation and Ors. v. Kerala Trawlnet Boat Operators Association and
Ors.,(1994) 5 SCC 28 at ¶4.
44
Kerala Swathanthra Malaya Thozhilali Federation and Ors. v. Kerala Trawlnet Boat Operators Association and
Ors.,(1994) 5 SCC 28 at ¶4.
45
In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1992 SC 552.
46
In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1992 SC 552 at ¶¶47-50.
47
Moot Proposition.
48
Moot Proposition.
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2. Art. 371-A(1)(a)(iv) reads as “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, no Act of

Parliament in respect of ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to
the State of Argo unless the Legislative Assembly of State of Argo by a resolution so
decides.”

3. If a literal interpretation is done of Art. 371-A (1)(a)(iv), it can be inferred that the word
“decides” stands for only “acceptance” and not “rejection” of the applicability of Union
Acts. In other words, it means that an Act of Parliament will be applicable to the State of
Argo, only when its Legislative Assembly assents to it by passing a Resolution to its
effect. The State can indeed “reject” the applicability of a Union Act that falls in the any
of the areas mentioned in the provisions, but it does not have to pass a Resolution in order
to do so. This is because, if the word “decides” in Art. 371-A(1)(a)(iv) included a
rejection of Union Acts, then according to the Article, it would create an absurdity against
the very language of the provision.

4. It is a settled rule of construction that in cases of ambiguity, the provision should be read
as to avoid the resulting absurdity or anomaly.49 If the grammatical construction leads to
some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, it
may be departed from so as to avoid such an absurdity or inconsistency. 50 But does this
mean that every Act of Parliament to start with, is applicable in the State of Argo on its
enactment unless the State Legislative Assembly by a resolution decides otherwise? No.
The language of Art. 371-A(1)(a)(iv) does not endorse such an elucidation. In other
words, the State Legislative Assembly need not pass a resolution to explicitly “reject” an
Act of Parliament. However, the State Legislative Assembly of Argo can very well
scrutinize every Act of Parliament bearing on the fields of legislation envisaged in Clause
(1)(a)(iv) and can “accept” its applicability to the State by passing a resolution to its
effect.51

5. Furthermore, on a bare perusal of text of Art. 371A(1); specifically the word

“Notwithstanding...”, it becomes worthwhile to give due regard to the presence of the

49
Rakesh Wadhawan v Jagdamba Industrial Corpn. [2002] 5 SCC 440 22.
50
Justice G.P. Singh, „Statutory Interpretation‟ (2001 Edn.) at p. 113
51
State of Nagaland & Anr. v Rosemary Dzuvichu & Ors. [2012] 4 GLT 744.
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„non-obstante clause‟. Such clauses are usually used in provisions with the object that in
case there is any inconsistency between the non-obstante clause and another provision,
the former would prevail over the latter.52 Consequently, it may very well be urged that
the power to impose conditions by any other provisions in the Constitution is limited,
when it comes to Art. 371-A(1) because of the non-obstante clause and consequently, the
State of Argo have full autonomy and independence over exploitation and exploration of
natural resources for the State‟s development and the accompanying progress of the
society.

III. UNION OF LA LA LAND CANNOT RESORT TO RESIDUARY POWERS.

1. If a particular matter falls within the exclusive competence of the States, i.e., List II of
Seventh Schedule that represents the prohibited field for the Centre. 53 Entry 97 of List I
read with Art. 248 (1) gives the Parliament the exclusive power to make any law with
respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. However,
Union of La La Land can take recourse to the Residuary Powers only if the matter is
found to be outside the State purview. Before exclusive legislative competence can be
claimed for Parliament by resort to the residuary power, the legislative incompetence of
the State Legislature must be clearly established.54

2. Only when the subject-matter of the impugned legislation does not fall under any entry in
List II or List III the Parliament can take recourse to residuary power.55 Parliament‟s
residuary power is not to be interpreted so expansively as to whittle down the power of
the State Legislatures. To do so would be to affect the quasi-federal principles adversely.
If there is competition between an entry in List II and the residuary power of the Centre,
the former may be given a broad and plentiful interpretation.56 It is clear that the subject
matter of the impugned Act relates to the land, water, air, and the living resources which
falls squarely into various entries namely Entries 15, 17, 18, and 23 of State List and

52
K. Parasuramaiah v Pokurl Lakshamma AIR 1965 AP 220.
53
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 532.
54
International Tourist Corp. v. State of Haryana, 1981 AIR 774 : 1981 SCR (2) 364
55
Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, AIR 1972 SC 1061 : (1971) 2 SCC 779
56
Jaora Sugar Mills v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 416, 421 : (1966) 1 SCR 523
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therefore the State has legislative competence over the subject matter of the impugned
Act and thus, the Union cannot resort to Residuary Powers.

IV. CENTRE CANNOT LEGISLATE IN THE STATE FIELD AS NO SPECIAL

CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST.
1. The Union of La La Land, is empowered to legislate with respect to a matter in the State
List only under certain special circumstances which are specified in the Constitution in
Arts. 249, 250, 252 and 253. Vide Arts. 249, 250, 252 and 253 the Parliament is
empowered to legislate on a State subject in national interest by obtaining a resolution
from the Council of States to that effect, and during a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation or when two or more states consent and to enact such Legislation for the
implementation of treaties or international agreements respectively. As none of these
special circumstance are present in the instant case the Union is not justified in legislating
upon a subject which is within the exclusive domain of a State.

In light of the above mentioned reasons it is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court of La La Land that “The Argo Fracking Act, 2017” is well within the legislative
competence of the State of Argo and hence is intravires to the Constitution of La La Land.
Thus it does not threaten the quasi-federal structure of La La Land.

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ISSUE III. WHETHER THE ARGO FRACKING ACT, 2017 INFRINGES THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE COMPANY?

A. It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of La La Land that the Argo
Fracking Act, 2017 does not violates any of the Fundamental Rights of the Stranger
Things Private Limited as the Act was enacted for the specific purpose to preserve land
and water of the State of Agro.57 Also, the draft bill also clarifies that in order to protect
the interest of local communities the bill also regulates the bidding process of such
hydrocarbon as the State of Argo owing to a special status under Art. 371 of the
Constitution of La La Land is empowered to regulate.

B. As far as the issue of violation of fundamental rights is concerned; Firstly the benefits of
the fundamental rights available under Art. 19(1)(g) is only available to the citizens of La
La Land and the company i.e., the Stranger Things Private Limited is not a citizen for the
propose of Art. 19(1)(g). Secondly, no fundamental right is absolute one. Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution of La La Land puts some of the reasonable restrictions on the fundamental
right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g). Further the State is empowered to make law
imposing the reasonable restrictions as flows from the wordings of the Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution of La La Land.

I. THE STRANGER THINGS PRIVATE LIMITED IS NOT A CITIZEN UNDER

ARTICLE 19(1)(g).

1. The provisions related to the “Citizenship” as mentioned in Part II of the Constitution of

La La Land considers only the natural persons under its domain and not juristic persons
like corporations. Further, Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its various judgments clarifies the
corporate personalities are not to be bring under the domain of “Citizenship” except in
the circumstances where it is so expedient in the interest of justice.

2. In State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer 58, the Supreme Court
held that the company or corporation is not a citizen of India and cannot, therefore, claim

57
Moot Proposition.
58
1963 AIR 1811.
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such of the Fundamental Rights as have been conferred upon citizens. The citizenship
conferred on a citizen by Part II of the constitution, the court said, is conferred only with
natural persons and not juristic persons. The Supreme Court, however, held that the state
trading corporation wasn‟t the citizen and therefore could not claim the right under
Article 19 (1)(g).

3. In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company v. State of Bihar59, in a petition by the

company, some shareholders also joined. They argued that though the company was not a
citizen but its share holders were citizen and if it was shown that all its shareholders were
citizens the veil of corporate personality might be lifted to protect their fundamental
rights. The court rejected this argument and held that “if this plea is upheld, it would
really mean that what the corporations and companies cannot achieve directly can be
achieved indirectly by relying upon the Doctrine of Lifting the Corporate Veil.”
Therefore, the application of “the Doctrine of Lifting the Corporate Veil” was also
excluded in this regards.

II. REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS CAN BE IMPOSED.

1. The freedom guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) is not absolute and reasonable restrictions
can be imposed on it under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution Art. 19(6) reads that:
Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the
interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, [nothing in the said sub-clause shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from
making any law relating to, -

i. The professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any

profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or

59
1965 AIR 40.
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ii. The carrying on by the State or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State,
of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or
partial, of citizens or otherwise.

2. The Fundamental Rights of a citizen to carry on any occupation, trade or business under
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is not an absolute one. It is subject to reasonable
restrictions which may be imposed by the State in the interest of general public.

3. In the case of Ramchandra v. Union of India, Hon‟ble Supreme Court of La La Land held
that the expression “reasonable restrictions” signifies that the limitation as the right
should not be arbitrary or excessive in nature and it has to strike a proper balance between
the freedom under Art. 19(1)(g) and social control permitted by Art. 19(6).

4. Also, as has been held in the case of Commercial & Ahmadabad v. Union of India, Clause
6 of Art. 19(1)(g) authorizes the states:
i. To impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of trade, business, occupation or
profession in the interest of the general public.
ii. To prescribe the professional or technical qualification necessary for carrying on any
occupation, profession, trade or business.
iii. To carry any trade or business by itself or through a corporation owned or controlled
by the state to the exclusion of private citizen wholly or in part.

5. In the instant case the proposed fracking process basically deals with:
(a). Loss of ground water from the land of farmers, which would eventually lead to
seismic activities.
(b). Extraction of noxious things which will poison the land.

6. So, as the Agro Fracking Act, 2017 was enacted for the specific purpose to preserve land
and water of the State of Agro.60 And the draft bill also clarifies that in order to protect the
interest of local communities the bill also regulates the bidding process of such
hydrocarbon as the State of Argo owing to a special status under Art. 371 of the
Constitution of La La Land is empowered to regulate. Therefore, even in the case of

60
Moot Proposition.
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Citizens, the State of Argo has the full authority to impose reasonable restrictions and
therefore is justified.

7. The Act further prescribe professional or technical qualifications for carrying hydraulic
fracking process in the State of Argo by establishing a State-Level Water Committee,
defining Aquifers and Management of Flow-Back Water.

8. The reasonableness of the restrictions has to be tested on certain objective criteria

namely,

(a). Whether the appropriate legislature has the legislative competency to make laws.

As has already been dealt with in the earlier issue i.e., Issue II that under Art. 371 A of
the Constitution of La La Land the State of Argo has been given the special status where
clause (1) sub-clause (a)(iv) of the Art. 371 A inter alia states that no Act of Parliament
shall affect the ownership and transfer of land and natural resources unless the Legislative
Assembly of State of Argo decides to do so by passing a resolution.

Art. 371-A(1)(a)(iv) reads as “Notwithstanding anything in respect of religious or social

practices of the Argo and ownership and transfer of land and its resources shall apply to
the state of Argo unless the Legislative Assembly of Argo by resolution so decides.
In this respect the State of Argo has full Legislative competence to regulate its Land and
Resources. So, the legislature of Argo has the full competency to legislate the Argo
Fracking Act, 2017 by the State List Entry No:

i. Entry 17 deals with the subject matter of „Water‟, that is to say, water supplies,
irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water power
subject to the provisions of entry 56 of List 1.
ii. Entry 18 deals with the subject matter of „Land‟, that is to say , right in or over
land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection
of rent; transfer and alienation of agriculture land; land improvement and
agriculture loans; colonization.
iii. Entry 25 deals with the subject matter of „Gas and Gas Works‟.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT
SCHOOL OF LAW, NORTHCAP UNIVERSITY 5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2018.

(b). Whether the Agro Fracking Act, 2017 infringes the Freedom under Art. 19, whether
the infringement only amounts to reasonable restrictions on such rights in public
interest.

The Argo Fracking Act, 2017 is completely in the interest of the general public as it
favours the farmers of the state of Argo and local communities. It regulates the
fracking process of the Shale gas in a manner that it preserves land and groundwater
of the state which eventually would lead to the benefit of the general public. It also
protects the mineral rights of private individual living in the state of Argo by
introducing the “Rule of Capture”.

Therefore, in the light of aforementioned observations related to the facts of the case,
arguments advanced and various judicial pronouncements, it is humbly submitted
before the Hon‟ble Court that the fundamental rights of the company is not violated.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT
 SCHOOL OF LAW, NORTHCAP UNIVERSITY 5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION, 2018.

PRAYER
In the light of light of given facts, the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is most humbly and respectably prayed that the Hon‟ble court may be pleased to adjudge
and declare that:

1. The present Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of Argo is
maintainable.
2. The Agro Fracking Act, 2017 was under the legislative competence of the State of Argo
and thus the Act doesn‟t threaten the quasi-federal structure of the nation.
3. The fundamental right of the company i.e., the Stranger Things Private Limited is not
violated.
4. The production of the Shale Gas in the State should be regulated according to the Argo
Fracking Act, 2017.
5. The Union should be directed not to interfere with the special status of the State which is
enshrined under Art. 371 A of the Constitution of La La Land.
6. The Union of La La Land should be directed to help the State of Argo to take the
corrective measures to protect and reinstate the damages done to the environment so as
the interest of the local communities shall be protected.

. AND/OR

Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of Justice,
Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience.

For this Act of Kindness, the Respondents as in duty bound, shall forever pray.

TC- 12
...........................

(Counsels for the Petitioner/ Appellant)

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT