Quality

of One-
ness

1
Basis, n:

There has to be a moment at the beginning when you wonder

whether you’re in love with the person or in love with the

feeling of love itself.

If the moment doesn’t pass, that’s it - you’re done.

And if the moment does pass, it never goes that far. It stands

in the distance, ready for whenever you want it back. Some -

times it’s even there when you thought you were searching for

something else, like an escape route, or your lover’s face.

(David Levithan, 28)

2
 In The Symposium, Plato addresses the love of a specific individual over others in

Socrates’ discussion with Diotima. If love is grounded in the possession of particular qualities,

then it does not make sense to distinguish between two individuals who are relevantly similar.

On the one hand, the very fact that one chooses to be with a particular individual seems to imply

that there must be something phenomenological at work. Socrates however, does not believe that

love should be directed at a particular individual because beauty, whether of body or mind, is not

particular. It is present in many, which means that there is nothing truly unique about the

individual in question. According to Socrates, one must attempt to climb the ladder of love in

order to make the ascent from the love of one to the love of all to the love of beauty itself. Now,

the fundamental question that arises when considering Socrates’ ladder of love is the following:

Why would one choose to remain on the lower rung by loving a particular individual?

The primary focus of this thesis is to provide an answer to this question. In order to do so,

I shall draw upon a number of different sources, both fictional and non-fictional, with the main

emphasis on Plato’s The Symposium, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, and Heidegger’s “What

is Metaphysics”1. For the sake of clarification, my analysis will be divided into three parts: The

first will address the similarities and differences between the views of love presented by

Aristophanes, Socrates/Diotima, and Alciabides in The Symposium. The second will be an

1 Although Kierkegaard does have a book titled, Works of Love, it will not be used in this paper because
the love he writes about is primarily theological.

3
analysis of Heidegger’s conception of anxiety in relation to Kierkegaard’s notion of the leap of

faith. The last part will elaborate on “quality of oneness”, a phenomenological quality that

differentiates one individual from others.

For Diotima and Socrates, the answer is immortality. Although immortality may be

sought through sexual reproduction, it is also possible through the transference and appreciation

of wisdom. The latter is preferable because the beauty of an earthly body is not only perishable

but also, indistinguishable from the beauty that can be perceived in other earthly bodies. Hence,

one must abandon the pursuit of a particular individual for the sake of recognizing beauty in and

of itself. In contrast to Socrates, both Aristophanes and Alciabides advocate the love of a

particular individual. For Aristophanes, the particularity of love is illustrated through a myth in

which human beings were once whole. After attempting to make an attack on the gods, Zeus

chose to punish human beings by separating each whole into two halves. The purpose of life

then, is for each half to find his or her missing half with the hope of becoming whole again. For

Alciabides, the particularity of love is not restricted to a single individual throughout the course

of one’s life. There may actually be many individuals who inspire feelings of love. These

individuals are different from others by virtue of their respective particularities. The experience

of love with a particular individual does not have to be reciprocal. Rather, the existence of

particular individuals implies that Socrates is not correct in his assertion that the love

experienced for one individual can be expanded to include all individuals.

The love experienced for a particular individual is a considerable source of anxiety

because it cannot be explained. The experience of anxiety is closely related to “the nothing”, a

concept advanced by Heidegger. “The nothing” can be understood as the sphere that transcends

all that is considered knowable within the earthly, or material, realm. Once “the nothing” is

4
encountered, one is reminded of one’s mortality. One is then faced with the following choice:

perform a meaningful action in the world or escape “the nothing”. To love another is a

meaningful action because it requires a leap of faith. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard writes

about the leap of faith and how it is a movement made in virtue of the absurd. Since there is no

logical reason as to why one should possess faith, it requires a leap of sorts. Although

Kierkegaard primarily writes about the leap of faith in the context of Abraham and his decision

to sacrifice his son, Isaac, it can also be understood in the context of love. When confronted by a

particular individual, one must make a leap of faith in order to be with this particular individual.

One cannot know the consequences of such a leap, which is why it is a sufficient cause of

anxiety. What’s more is that one cannot share one’s anxiety with others because, like faith, it

does not have a language.

Since love cannot be explained or elaborated upon as a result of an objectively

recognizable quality, there must be something else, something phenomenological that

distinguishes one individual from another. Hence, in the last section of this paper, I intend to

argue that “quality of oneness” is a phenomenological quality that accounts for the particularity

of an individual. “Quality of oneness” is a feeling that one experiences upon meeting an

individual who is relevantly different from everyone else that one has met throughout one’s life.

The revelation of love, which can be understood as falling in love, occurs with one who

possesses “quality of oneness”. This revelation is different from the leap of faith for love because

the leap presents itself after the revelation of love has occurred. “Quality of oneness” then, is

important because it provides an account as to why one should choose to make the leap of faith

for love.

5
 I
In Plato's “Symposium”, there is an attempt made by each man who is present to “make

the finest speech he can in praise of Love.” (Plato, 9) In this section however, I am primarily

concerned with the accounts provided by Aristophanes, Socrates, and Alciabides because they

represent the more commonly accepted ideas of love. Of the three, Aristophanes' account is the

most romanticized because he sets forth the idea that when human beings were created, they

were not separate beings but rather, two parts of a whole. After humans attempted to make a

violent attack on the gods, Zeus chose not to destroy them but rather, to cut them in two so that

each human being was separate from his or her other half. This idea is synonymous with the

popular conception of “soulmates”. For Aristophanes, each human being has an other half, which

implies that there is a particular individual who is perfect for another.

Contrary to both Aristophanes and Alciabides, Socrates advances a more metaphysical

notion of love in the sense that it is not confined to the earthly realm. He raises the important

question: does one love the qualities possessed by another or one does actually love another as a

particular individual? For Socrates, the qualities possessed by an individual do not provide a

sufficient reason for loving a particular individual because these qualities are not specific to the

individual in question. To love another because he or she possesses certain qualities implies that

anyone who possesses such qualities should inspire the same type of love. Since the possession

of qualities is not restricted to a specific individual, one should move on from the love of an

individual to the love of all individuals with the respective qualities. Socrates' view is in direct

opposition to Alciabides’ who expounds upon his love of Socrates, thereby emphasizing the

6
particularity of the individual2. By elaborating upon the similarities and differences between

these three conceptions of love, I intend to argue that the notion of particularity set forth by both

Alciabides and Aristophanes is an inextricable feature of love.

When Aristophanes begins his speech, he does so by saying that “people have wholly

failed to recognize the power of Love; if they'd grasped this, they'd have built the greatest

temples and altars for him, and made the greatest sacrifices.” (Plato, 26) In order to explain why

love is deserving of such high praise, Aristophanes recounts a myth about human nature and how

it was changed by the gods. Initially, human beings were two parts of a whole. These two parts

could each be a partnership of three possible sexes: male/male, female/female, and male/female.

(Plato, 26) When human beings were united as one, they used their strength and vigor to attack

the gods. After some deliberation, Zeus decided to weaken human beings by dividing them into

two separate parts. The important thing to note about this division is that a wound was left in the

form of the navel, a wound that is supposed to serve as a reminder of the whole that human

beings had once been.

At first, the newly separated humans would cling to their other halves, refusing to let

each other go. As a result, “they died from hunger and general inactivity, because they did not

want to do anything apart from each other.” (Plato, 28). Once Zeus realized that human beings

were dying off as a result of their refusal to let their other halves go, he decided to alter their

reproductive systems in such a way that sexual intercourse could occur in the union of any of the

pairs of sexes. When the union occurs between a man and a woman, the potential for

reproduction is present, thereby ensuring that human beings would not simply die off. When two

men or two women meet, an opportunity presents itself for the pleasure of sexual intercourse.

2 This view of Alciabides is advanced in Martha Nussbaum’s, “The Speech of Alciabides: A Reading of
Plato’s Symposium”.

7
Aristophanes then mentions that after individuals have satisfied their sexual desires, they are able

to “relax, turn to their work, and think about the other things in their life.” (Plato, 29) Given the

fact that there is a persistent sense of longing for one's other half, the pleasure of sexual

intercourse seems to serve as a distraction of sorts. Even if one is not able to become whole with

his or her other half, one is able to attain some degree of physical satisfaction and a sense of

union with the body of another. Sometimes the meeting of bodies through sexual intercourse is

enough to numb one's self against the idea that he or she is not whole. This can be recognized in

certain types of relationships, like friends with benefits. Both individuals are aware that the

relationship is not motivated by some type of romantic interest, but rather sexual gratification.

From relationships such as these, it becomes evident that sexual intercourse temporarily enables

one to replace the sense of longing with a sense of pleasure.

Although it is certainly romantic to conceive of a particular individual as one's soulmate,

it is difficult to understand how the meeting of this soulmate would ever take place. When

considering the fact that there are seven billion people on earth, there seems to be a low

probability that one could meet enough people to find one’s soulmate. Another problem that

arises with the specificity of soulmates relates to how one half is supposed to know that another

is one’s other half. In the context of Aristophanes’ example, it would seem to be the case that one

would “just know”. This knowledge would be unavoidable by virtue of the fact that each half is

aware, to some degree, of the absence of his or her other half. To encounter this other half would

be akin to “coming home” because one has met the specific other who enables the two to become

whole again. The whole conception of becoming whole can only occur when one encounters

one’s other half because the lack that is usually experienced would have to be filled by the

presence of that specific other. The amount of specificity involved however, treads the borders of

8
absurdity because there is too much room for failure even if one does encounter one’s other half.

If one meets a person whom one believes to be one’s soulmate, what would it mean if this person

were to reach an untimely death? What if this person’s death occurred during their honeymoon?

Would such an early death imply that one could never love another in the same way?

The idea of a singular soulmate implies that one can only get it “right” once. This

implication is perilous because it makes a future claim. For the sake of clarification, consider the

sentiments, “I will never love anyone the way I love you.” or “I will love you until the day I die.”

Both imply that one will continue to feel the way that one does for an indiscriminate amount of

time. Such a claim cannot be made because the future is unknowable. If one can verify that one

will feel for all of time how one feels in the moment that such a sentiment is expressed, then it is

a valid claim. But such verification is impossible because, as previously stated, the future is

unknowable. In other words, the only time in which a future claim can be made is if one

recognizes all of the impediments and conditions that have the potential to prevent such a claim

from being true.

Only if a future claim is recognized as contingent upon the potential role that

impediments and conditions can play, can a future claim be made. For instance, when a couple

stand together at an altar and profess their vows to one another, they do so with the idea that

despite what may occur in the future, the feelings that they have for each other at this moment

may also persist in the future, thereby enabling them to face the obstacles that may confront them

in the future. There seems to be an intrinsic awareness that the feelings that one has for another

are contingent upon the precise moment in time in which they are felt. The consequence is that

whatever promises or claims are made are done so with the idea that such feelings will either

continue or grow in the future. The idea of a soulmate then, seems to require the same type of

9
contingency in the sense that one must be willing to concede that one does not actually know if

there may be another who is more compatible. Perhaps compatibility is not even the main issue

but rather, there needs to be some type of awareness of the potential for failure.

To accept the idea of a singular soulmate is to remove one's self from all other

possibilities. This type of removal cannot be justified because one has not met every potential

love interest. One cannot actually say that he or she is with the “most right” person because there

could very well be another who is “more right”. There is no way to disprove that there could be

another love interest who is more compatible. Perhaps the point then, is to appeal to one's past

experiences, which is akin to expressing a sentiment like, “Given all of my experiences with love

in the past, I am quite sure that you are relevantly different.” or “Given the individuals that I

have met throughout my life, I am convinced that you are different in relation to them.” In the

context of one's own life, a specific individual can be different in the sense that he or she inspires

an unprecedented emotional response. However, the relation must always be with one's self

because that is the ultimate standard of judgment, which is to say that we are condemned to the

biases of our own experiences. This is illustrated well in John Green's novel, The Fault In Our

Stars. When Augustus Waters, the love interest of the protagonist, attempts to explain why he

feels the way that he does for Hazel, he says, “You are so busy being you that you have no idea

how utterly unprecedented you are.” (Green, 123)

By using the word, “unprecedented”, Augustus is really saying that he has never met

anyone else like Hazel. More importantly, it is safe to assume that many other guys had met

Hazel and not been struck by how different she was in relation to other girls. For Augustus,

Hazel was different from any girl he had ever met, thereby rendering her worthy of pursuing in a

romantic sense. She could not have been considered “unprecedented” without Augustus' past

10
experiences with others who served as precedents. The unprecedented nature of one's love

interest seems to be necessary because it does not make sense for one to love another who is

relevantly similar to those who have not inspired romantic interest. If “each of us is a matching

half of a human being”, then it follows that one's matching half could not be like other

individuals (Plato, 29). Even if the difference was a subtle subconscious tick, that difference

would account for why love had to be restricted to that one specific individual. Aristophanes

goes on to say that when two matching halves meet to form a whole, they “still could not say

what it is they want from each other.” (Plato, 30). Sexual desire cannot be the ultimate reason for

being together because it is not restricted to soulmates. There is something else, something

inherent and particular, to the relation between two specific individuals that renders it different

from all other types of relationships. As Aristophanes writes, “it's clear that each of them has

some wish in his mind that he can't articulate; instead, like an oracle, he half-grasps what he

wants and obscurely hints at it.” (Plato, 30-31).

In his eulogy on love, Socrates argues that the love of a particular individual needs to be

abandoned for the sake of something higher. Throughout his eulogy, he appeals to a discussion

that he once had with Diotima, a woman from Mantinea. (Plato, 45 - 63) He begins his argument

by expressing two points: “First, that Love is of something; second, that it is of something that he

currently needs.” (Plato, 44) In regards to the first point, to say that love is of something is to say

that it bears a direct relation to something else. One may be the mother of a child or the brother

of a sister or the friend of someone else. In regards to the second point, the relation between love

and something else implies a necessity for that something else, whatever it may be. For instance,

in order for one to be the mother of a child, there needs to be a child. If love is related to beauty,

then it must be the case that love needs beauty. At first, this need seems to imply a lack on the

11
part of love to the extent that love, in and of itself, must not be beautiful. Socrates goes on to ask

Diotima, “Then if Love is in need of beautiful things, and good things are beautiful, he would be

in need of good things?” (Plato, 45) From this question, it becomes clear that love bears a

relationship with that which is good and beautiful, which means that love is the lack of that

which is good and beautiful. When he sets forth the notion that love must be ugly and bad since

it lacks beauty and goodness, she is dismayed. The very idea that love lacks beauty or goodness

does not necessarily imply that love, in and of itself, is ugly or bad. Rather, it is “something in

between these two.” (Plato, 46) Since love is neither beautiful and good or ugly and bad, love is

capable of being defined in the sense that it becomes something in relation to something else.

Consider Augustus’ use of the word, “unprecedented.” To say that Hazel is unprecedented is to

say that he had not met anyone else like her. Until he met her, he was not even aware that

someone like her could exist. Love then, is not a lack until it is confronted by something that

had, until then, been unfamiliar.

When speaking about the origin of love, Diotima relays the following story:

“Because he is the son of Resource and Poverty, Love’s situation is

like this. First of all, he’s always poor; far from being sensitive and

beautiful, as is commonly supposed, he’s tough, with hardened skin,

without shoes or home. He always sleeps rough, on the ground, with

no bed, lying in doorways, and by roads in the open air; sharing his

mother’s nature, he always lives in a state of need. On the other

hand, taking after his father, he schemes to get hold of beautiful and

good things. He’s brave, impetuous and intense; a formidable hunter,

always weaving tricks; he desires knowledge and is resourceful in

12
 getting it; a lifelong lover of wisdom; clever at using magic, drugs,

and sophistry.” (Plato, 49)

The importance of relaying the nature of love is that it paves the way for understanding the

manner in which love is perceived by individuals. If love “always lives in a state of need”, then it

is capable of recognizing that which it needs. Moreover, once it recognizes what it needs,

whatever that may be, it would be capable of exercising the resourceful side of its nature in order

to satisfy this need. To live in a state of poverty then, is to live in a constant state of awareness as

to what has the potential to alleviate this poverty. This is hinted at by Diotima when she says, “...,

I think you saw Love as the object of love instead of the lover: that’s why you imagined that love

is totally beautiful. But in fact beauty, elegance, perfection and blessedness are characteristic of

the object that deserves to be loved, while the lover has a quite different character, which I have

described.” (Plato, 50) From this, it can be extrapolated that being a lover is different from being

the object of love because an object of love has to be deserving of love. In order to be deserving

of love, an object of love needs to fulfill the lack experienced by the lover. This is understandable

in light of the idea that if love is a constant state of need, then it is only able to see value in that

which satisfies the need in question.

Now, the use of the word ‘lack’ is troublesome because it implies that the lover is

deficient in regards to some quality (i.e. a lover who is not kind or compassionate wants to be

with one who is kind or compassionate). This definition of ‘lack’ is not correct because the ‘lack’

is an effect of a confrontation with a particular individual. Even though one may feel a sense of

longing to be with another, this longing is different from ‘lack’ because longing is abstract and

not really directed towards anyone in particular. The ‘lack’ however, comes after meeting an

individual. Before Augustus met Hazel, he had no idea that someone like her even existed. He

13
may have experienced a sense of longing to love and be loved but such longing was not directed

towards a particular person. Once he met Hazel, he was confronted by the lack of her presence in

his life before she entered it. He did not, and could not, realize his lack of her until he met her,

neither could he long for her because he did not know her. It is only upon meeting another that

one can conceive of the manner in which one’s life lacked this other. To lack then, is to be aware

of whom one longs for3.

According to Diotima, the idea of soulmates set forth by Aristophanes is flawed because

the object of love needs to be directed towards that which is good or beautiful. If a lover loves

that which he or she lacks, then it does not make sense for him or her to yearn for his or her other

half unless his or her other half is good or beautiful. She attempts to justify this by saying,

“...,people are even prepared to have their own feet or hands amputated if they think that those

parts of themselves are diseased. I don’t think that each of us is attached to his own

characteristics, unless you’re going to describe the good as ‘his own’ and as ‘what belongs to

him’, and the bad as ‘what does not belong to him.’ The point is that the only object of people’s

love is the good - don’t you agree?” (Plato, 52-53) One objection that can be made in response to

Diotima’s argument is that it seems to ignore an essential component of Aristophanes’ argument;

namely, when two halves search for one another, they are actually searching for that which is

good and beautiful. Human beings were originally whole, which means that two halves who

search for one another are in pursuit of their original nature. Although each half may feel a sense

of longing for some abstract other, this longing does not represent a lack until confronted by the

presence of his or her other half. If love is a lack, and one can only become aware of this lack

when confronted by one’s other half, then one must pursue one’s other half in order to love. The
3 Recall that, in the myth presented by Aristophanes, the navel is supposed to serve as a reminder of the
whole that human beings had once. To be reminded of the whole invokes a sense of longing, not a lack,
because one is not yet aware of who one longs for. Once one encounters one’s other half, the sense of
longing is replaced with a lack because one is aware of exactly who one longs for.

14
purpose of longing then, is to ensure that each half pursues the other half in order to return to his

or her original nature, which is good and beautiful because the lack can only be experienced

between two specific halves.

The faltering aspect of Aristophanes’ argument that works in favor of Diotima seems to

be that the lack is due to the split between the two halves. That is, good is being defined as “his

own” and “what belongs to him” in the sense that each half longs to be reunited with his or her

other half. These halves are particular to each other in the sense that they form a particular

whole. However, it is also worth mentioning that all human beings were divided into halves,

which is to say that the desire to become whole is a universally shared desire. It is not a personal

good or a personal lack in the strictest sense of the word ‘personal’ because separation is the

human condition. To go even further, the constant desire to become whole as the human

condition translates into feelings of longing and displacement until the point of union, if it does

occur. If the height of human existence was when human beings were whole, then the most

meaningful life would be the constant striving to become whole again. After all, it was only by

being whole that human beings were a significant threat to the gods.

The discussion between Socrates and Diotima then turns to the question: “Why is Love of

beautiful things?” (Plato, 50) Socrates’ response is to say “that they become his own,” which

leads Diotima to ask what it is that love will gain once those beautiful things become his own.

(Plato, 50) The purpose of this line of questioning is to acquire some type of understanding as to

how love will benefit by entering into a relation with something else. Does love hope to become

beautiful by loving that which is beautiful? Does love hope to become good by loving that which

is good? According to Socrates and Diotima, the answer to both questions is “yes”. The lover of

beauty hopes to acquire that which is beautiful. Since “wisdom is one of the most beautiful

15
things,” it logically follows that a lover of beauty is a lover of wisdom. (Plato, 50) The

acquisition of beauty, or wisdom, is not desired for a particular increment of time but rather, for

an indiscriminate amount of time; namely, forever. While it is certainly simple enough to make

the claim that a lover hopes to acquire that which he or she loves eternally, the important

question remains: “What function does love really have?” (Plato, 53) It is all well good to claim

that love is desired for all of time but that does not answer the question as to why love should be

desired for eternity.

For Diotima, “love’s function is giving birth in beauty both in body and in mind.” (Plato,

53) This distinction is likely the crucial point in Diotima’s argument since it provides the basis

for Socrates’ view that love of the individual should be abandoned in pursuit of love of wisdom.

To say that the function of love is to give birth in beauty in body is to speak of those individuals

who yearn to reproduce on earth. This yearning for reproduction may be motivated by a number

of things: the desire to experience childbirth, the desire to have children, the desire to have

children with a specific other, the desire to have grandchildren, etc. All of these desires are

closely related to immortality in the sense that having children “is the closest mortals can come

to being permanently alive and immortal.” (Plato, 54) The mortality of human beings is an

unavoidable fact. It is impossible to deny that at some point in the future, sooner or later, one will

die and there is nothing that can be done to deter the event of death from taking place. The

inevitability of death can motivate the desire for reproduction since by having children, one will

be assured that some part of him- or herself will “live on”. According to Diotima, if “the object

of love is to have the good always, it follows that we must desire immortality along with the

good.” (Plato, 54) Since death is unavoidable, the manner in which one can gain immortality is

through reproduction. Diotima goes on to say, “it follows from this argument that the object of

16
love must be immortality as well.” (Plato, 54) When love is present between two individuals, it is

only natural for the two to desire that love to last forever. Since both will die, the only way to

ensure that their love will “live on” is to make love and reproduce in order to leave a product of

their love behind on earth.

The problem with giving birth in beauty in body, or reproducing, is that it is not particular

to human beings. As Diotima writes, “The point made about humans applies also to animals;

mortal nature does all it can to live forever and to be immortal. It can only do this by

reproduction: it always leaves behind another, new generation to replace the old.” (Plato, 55) The

fact that immortality is sought through reproduction by both animals and human beings is

troublesome because it implies that a relevant difference does not exist between the two. While

this may certainly be true in regards to the capacity for physical reproduction, human beings do

seem to be different by virtue of the mind. That is to say, human beings possess the capacity for

thought, which is to say that there are “men who are pregnant in mind.” (Plato, 57) This type of

pregnancy is to give birth in beauty in the mind, which means that there are those individuals

whose minds “are pregnant with what it is suitable for a mind to bear and bring to birth.” (Plato,

57-58) When attempting to determine exactly what is suitable for a mind to be pregnant with, the

answer should be clear: thoughts, ideas, beliefs, opinions, etc; all of which comprise knowledge,

or wisdom. To be a lover of wisdom then, is to desire immortality in the form of wisdom.

Immortality in the form of wisdom is acquired through relationships with others who are capable

of being impregnated in a mental form. When an individual finds “someone like this, he

immediately finds he has the resources to talk about virtue and about what a good man should be

like and should do, and tries to educate him.” (Plato, 58)

The act of finding one who is capable of being impregnated in the mind is similar to

17
finding one who is capable of being impregnated in the body. Beauty plays an important role in

this pursuit of another, which is expressed by Diotima when she says that “we cannot give birth

in what is ugly, only in what is beautiful.” (Plato, 54) Regardless of whether or not impregnation

occurs in the body or in the mind, one is attracted to those who possess beauty. This emphasis on

beauty however, becomes rather troublesome when one realizes that beauty is not restricted to a

specific other. That is to say, “...the beauty of any one body is closely related to that of another...”

and if one “is to pursue beauty of form, it’s very foolish not to regard the beauty of all bodies as

one and the same.” (Plato, 59) Now, the crucial aspect of accepting that the beauty of all bodies

is one and the same is that the particularity of an individual is lost. While this is the conclusion

that Diotima wants Socrates to reach, the peril of doing so is the willful neglect of the fact that

there tends to be a specific other whom one has a desire to impregnate, whether in body or in

mind. The problem is that Diotima, and therefore Socrates, speak about beauty as though it is

nothing more than the perception or appreciation of certain characteristics, like the symmetry

perceived in one’s face or the color of one’s hair or the shade of one’s eyes or one’s ability to

converse about intelligent subjects. These characteristics, as important as they may be, are not

the source of love, if love is to be understood as a phenomenological quality that transcends

form.

The manner in which one tends to choose a specific other is not restricted to reproduction

since there are those who have no interest in reproducing. There may be a desire for

companionship, a partner with whom to share comfortable silences, a body to sleep beside, a

voice to listen to, a familiar face in the crowd, one to call one’s own. The underlying and

significant idea behind these desires is that all of them require some type of specificity4. As

4 As I intend to argue further in this section with Alciabides, as well as in the next two sections,
this specificity is a necessary and sufficient condition for love because love cannot occur without
the awareness of “quality of oneness”, a phenomenological quality that can only be perceived in

18
previously stated, Diotima sets forth the notion that the beauty perceived in an individual should

be replaced with the realization that there are others who are beautiful. Once one recognizes that

beauty is not discriminate, one should “become a lover of all beautiful bodies.” (Plato, 59)

However, it is not enough to remain a lover of the body because “the beauty of minds” should be

regarded “as more valuable than that of the body, so that, if someone has goodness of mind even

if he has little of the bloom of beauty, he will be content with him, and will love and care for

him, and give birth to the kinds of discourse that help young men to become better.” (Plato, 60)

The first problem with Diotima’s argument is that she assumes that such a relationship can only

occur between two men, which may be due to the fact that sexual reproduction is not a

possibility between the two. As previously stated however, there are heterosexuals who have

absolutely no interest in reproducing. Diotima cannot proceed to argue that the desire for sexual

pleasure is more intense in heterosexual couples because the desire is present between

homosexual couples. More importantly, once one, regardless of sex, realizes that beauty is not

restricted to one body, the desire for one body should be resisted, especially since beauty of the

body pales in comparison to beauty of the mind.

Diotima’s purpose in relaying the ascent from the love of a particular body to the love of

all bodies is to present each as a rung in a type of ladder of love, which she refers to in the

following passage:

“Like someone using a staircase, he should go from one to two and from

two to all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to beautiful practices,

and from practices to beautiful forms of learning. From forms of learning,

he should end up at that form of learning which is of nothing other than that

beauty itself, so that he can complete the process of learning what beauty

specific others.

19
 really is.” (Plato, 61)

The ladder of love, as described by Diotima, is idealistic because it represents the pursuit of a

love of forms, not individuals5. The separation between romantic love and idealistic love occurs

in the early rungs of the ladder when love for the individual, whether of body or of mind, is

relinquished for the sake of something higher. The purpose of relinquishing the individual is to

reach a point of enlightenment where beauty “will appear as in itself and by itself; always single

in form; other beautiful things share its character, but do so in such a way that, when other things

come to be or cease, it is not increased or decreased in any way nor does it undergo any change.”

(Plato, 61) What this essentially means is that the beauty perceived on earth, whether of body or

of mind, is related to the divine form of beauty, which is to say that there is no specificity in

beautiful objects or people. Beauty is to be recognized as it is, without any type of attachment to

the earth in the sense that the appreciation of beauty is not contingent upon a particular object or

a particular person. Beauty just is. For Diotima, to recognize semblances of beauty is to come

closer to seeing beauty as it really is (the form of beauty). Once beauty is recognized as a form,

one is then able to give “birth to true virtue” because one’s conception of beauty is “absolute,

pure, unmixed, not cluttered up with human flesh and colours and a great mass of mortal

rubbish.” (Plato, 62)

While such a pursuit is a worthy venture, it is not entirely feasible when considering the

fact that most human beings strive to feel as though they are an important part of the earthly

realm. This importance is often acquired through the relationship that one has with a specific

other. In order to make this point clear, consider the events that unfold when Alciabides walks

into the party (Plato, 63 - 80). When he realizes that he has sat down next to Socrates, he is

5 Since theprimary focus of this paper is romantic love, I will not delve too deep into Plato’s
conception of forms, which is discussed further in his other texts.

20
bothered by his presence. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Socrates had chosen to sit down next

to Agathon, the most beautiful of all the men who are present. Given his idealistic notion of love,

it is clear that Socrates’ decision to sit beside Agathon is deliberate since a lover of beauty

surrounds himself with all that is beautiful. A more feasible explanation for Alciabides’

discomfort at the sight of Socrates is that their relationship was one of unrequited love on the

part of Alciabides. In his inebriated state, Alciabides is asked to present a eulogy of love and he

says to Socrates, “If I say anything that isn’t true, interrupt, if you like, and point out that what

I’m saying is false. I don’t want to say anything that’s false. But if I don’t remember things in the

right order, don’t be surprised. It isn’t easy for someone in my condition to list all the aspects of

your peculiarity in a fluent and orderly sequence.” (Plato, 67) His mention of Socrates’

peculiarity is the key feature of his eulogy, as well as the reason why he is so drunk and upset. To

speak of the peculiarity of Socrates is to speak of how he differs from all other individuals. This

difference is essential because of the effect that Socrates has on Alciabides, an effect that no

other individual has had. This is clear when he says, “If it weren’t for the fact that you’d think I

was completely drunk, gentlemen, I’d take an oath on the truth of what I’m saying about the

effect his words have had on me - an effect they still have now. Whenever I listen to him, my

frenzy is greater than that of the Corybantes.” (Plato, 68)

The phenomenological experience of love cannot be discredited as nothing more than a

feeling or a rung on a ladder because it is unique and essential. If one did not experience some-

thing phenomenological, then it would seem as though the experience of love could fit within a

sphere of reason. That is, it could be rationalized in the same clear and concise manner as a

mathematical equation. The problem with such rationalization however, is that it fails to take into

account the nuances of the heart, which is to say that it fails to capture the butterflies, the seem-

21
ingly irresistible flush of happiness, the skip in one's step, the sudden desire to write poetry or

dance in the rain or sing to the heavens. All of these things may seem trivial and unimportant but

they are significant because they are particular manifestations of love. Consider Socrates, a man

who is capable of such rationalization because he is not interested in earthly forms of love. His

disinterest is the cause of conflict between Alciabides and himself because Alciabides loves

Socrates and wants to be with him in an earthly manner. He does not want to appreciate the

beauty of Socrates’ mind without also appreciating his body. The reason why he is so upset is be-

cause Socrates refuses to appreciate him in his earthly form. Of course, Socrates perceives his

beauty but such perception is not specific to him in the sense that Socrates knows that beauty can

be recognized in a number of other individuals, like Agathon.

Alciabides goes on to explain that Socrates “doesn’t care at all if someone is beautiful -

he regards this with unbelievable contempt - or is rich or has any of the other advantages prized

by ordinary people.” (Plato, 70) The contempt that Socrates displays is hurtful because Alcia-

bides is overwhelmed by the peculiarity of Socrates to the point where he does not want to climb

the ladder of love. He wants to remain exactly how he is, in love with an earthly, and therefore

mortal, person. The peril of remaining in his state of love however, is the knowledge that

Socrates does not love him as a particularity. If Alciabides is a drop in the sea of beauty, Socrates

is concerned with seeing the ocean. He has no concern for some particular part but rather, he

wants to see it whole. It is important to realize that Socrates appreciates Alciabides in the sense

that without him, and without other beautiful forms, such an ocean could not exist. Without the

sea, Socrates would be unable to reach an enlightened state because the presence of the sea pro-

vides proof that beauty must exist in and of itself.

22
 The emotional plight of Alciabides raises an important question: when confronted by the

particularity of an individual, how is one supposed to move on to the love of all individuals? To

encounter an individual who is relevantly different from everyone else, like Socrates for Alcia-

bides, makes it slightly impossible to move on or relinquish the difference because such a differ-

ence exists. The existence of a specific other means that this specific other cannot be lumped into

the same category as everyone else. In relation to the ladder of love, one cannot step on to the

second rung because one has encountered a specific other who is unlike anyone else. This en-

counter should motivate one to pursue a specific other in an attempt to understand exactly what it

is that makes him or her different. Hence, Diotima’s claim that beauty is not particular to one in-

dividual since it can be recognized in others is flawed by virtue of the existence of an other who

is relevantly different from the rest.

As I proceed to argue in the next two sections, the function of love may not be immortal-

ity but rather, meaning, which is to say that it provides meaning to one’s life. The fact that this

meaning is restricted to the mortal life of the one who loves does not strip away its meaning.

Consider Socrates. He is a mortal being, which is to say that in spite of his pursuit of the divine,

he will remain a part of the earthly realm until he ceases to exist. Despite the manner in which he

chooses to abandon the particularity of the individual for the sake of forms, he has still chosen

that type of life as the most meaningful and significant for him. In this paper, I do not intend to

dispute the claim that the pursuit of the divine is more meaningful than the pursuit of an individ-

ual because both represent a choice an individual makes.

If there is a ladder of love that ascends to a metaphysical form of beauty, as Diotima de-

scribes, then it is difficult to deny that one should abandon the pursuit of a specific other for the

23
sake of reaching the metaphysical form6. If Aristophanes is correct and soulmates do exist, then

it is difficult to claim that one should abandon the pursuit of a specific other since such a pursuit

would culminate in a sense of completion, as well as the freedom to pursue the realm of the di-

vine. If the particularity of the individual is an essential feature of love, as expounded by Alcia-

bides, then it is difficult to deny that one should pursue that individual who is relevantly different

from everybody else. Regardless of which account is accepted as truth, all of them involve some

degree of particularity: two specific halves that combine to perform a perfect whole, individuals

who are considered beautiful, in body or in mind, by others, and individuals who cannot be

lumped into the same category as everyone else. Although there will always be those who strive

to reach the metaphysical without becoming involved with a specific other, the primary interests

in the next two sections are to discover why some choose to be with a specific other, as well as

provide some account as to what happens when confronted with the choice to be with a specific

other.

6 Plato elaborates upon this metaphysical, or divine, circuit of forms in other texts; namely, Phaedrus. For
the sake of this paper, I will not be addressing the nature of this circuit. The point is that beauty is a form
within the circuit, along with the original form of other virtues.

24
 II
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard introduces two individuals: the knight of infinite

resignation and the knight of faith. In order to understand both the significance and differences

between these two individuals, both need to be explained within the context of faith before

moving on to the context of love. The primary focus of Fear and Trembling is Abraham's

decision to sacrifice his son, Isaac. After spending a considerable amount of time looking

forward to God's promise that Sarah and he would have a son in spite of all the earthly odds

against them, Isaac was born and Abraham was commanded to sacrifice him. This command was

heavy-laden for Abraham because he was “God's chosen one, and it was the Lord who put him to

the test. Now everything would be lost! The glorious remembrance of posterity, the promise in

Abraham's seed, was only a whim, a passing thought of the Lord's which Abraham now must

obliterate” (Kierkegaard, 16). The reason why Abraham was able to follow through with God’s

command and sacrifice Isaac was because he had faith that God would honor His promise. This

faith was preposterous because the loss of Isaac seemed to deny the “promise that in his seed all

of the generations of the earth would be blessed” (Kierkegaard, 15). The preposterousness of

faith is a source of tremendous anxiety, the nature of which will be discussed through

Heidegger’s conception of “the nothing” as set forth in his “What is Metaphysics”. The leap of

faith in the face of anxiety is what distinguishes the knight of faith from the knight of infinite

resignation. In this section, I intend to elaborate upon the knight of infinite resignation and the

25
knight of faith in order to illustrate how the leap of faith, as well as the anxiety that accompanies

it, are both essential features of love.

Within the ethical, or earthly, sphere of morality, Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his

son should be considered the will to commit murder. He traveled to a mountain in the land of

Moriah with the intent to murder his son in cold blood. If Abraham's story was actually that of a

simple man with no mention of God, one would go up to this man and shout: “You detestable

person, you pariah of society, what devil has so possessed you that you want to murder your

son?” (Kierkegaard, 23) To commit murder is a punishable offense in society but once such an

act is ordained by God, it becomes a sacrifice. There is a paradox of faith, which is illustrated by

Abraham's belief “that God would not demand Isaac of him, while he still was willing to

sacrifice him if it was demanded.” (Kierkegaard, 25) To believe that he would still be granted

posterity after sacrificing his only heir was absurd in the sense that the latter negates the former.

Yet “he believed by virtue of the absurd, for human calculation was out of the question, and it

was indeed absurd that God, who demanded it of him, in the next instant would revoke the

demand” (Kierkegaard, 25). In order to have faith, one must be willing to make a certain leap,

which is to say that one must accept the paradox. For the sake of clarification, the paradox of

faith consists of choosing to perform a particular action for the sake of something that is not

guaranteed to occur. The knight of faith then, is one like Abraham, one who chooses to perform a

particular action despite not truly knowing if the action will lead to the desired, or intended,

consequence(s). This action is to be understood as a movement, or leap, of faith.

In order to distinguish between the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith,

Kierkegaard himself uses love as an example (Kierkegaard, 34-35). Analogous to the knight of

infinite resignation, Kierkegaard presents a man who has fallen in love with a princess. Although

26
the man “feels a blissful sensual pleasure in letting love palpitate through every nerve”, he knows

that the two will never form a relationship in this world because he has left no stone unturned in

pursuit of the slightest possibility that the two can ever be together. When he realizes that they

are indeed an impossibility, he isolates himself and makes a movement. This movement is not

one of faith because faith requires the acceptance of that which is impossible while maintaining

the belief that the impossible will still occur. The man, or the knight of infinite resignation,

accepts that being with her is impossible by discovering “the deep secret that even in loving

another person one must be self-sufficient” (Kierkegaard, 37). He gives up his hope of ever being

with her in this world but that does not mean that he also gives up his love. No, he remains in

love but it is an internal affair in the sense that “he does not need those erotic palpitations of the

nerves from seeing the beloved etc., nor in a finite sense does he constantly need to take leave of

her, because he recollects her in an eternal sense...” (Kierkegaard, 37). The knight of infinite

resignation resigns himself to the fact that he will never be with the one he loves and yet his love

is infinite in the sense that he does not need to be with her finite, earthly form in order to love

her.

The knight of faith differs from the knight of infinite resignation in the sense that the

knight of faith accepts the impossibility of ever being with the one he loves but never stops

believing that he will be with her regardless of that impossibility. His belief that he will be with

her is a leap of faith because it requires a disregard for the impossibility of actually being with

her. He constantly repeats to himself, “And yet it must be glorious to get the princess.”, knowing

that getting the princess is impossible in this earthly realm (Kierkegaard, 42). This is parallel to

Abraham's belief that God's promise of posterity will be fulfilled despite the death of his only

heir. How can God's promise be fulfilled if Isaac, his only heir, is dead? How can the knight of

27
faith get the princess if it is impossible to get her? For the knight of faith, the impossibility of an

event is contingent upon earthly circumstances, which is to say that an event is only impossible

given circumstances that cannot be changed by human beings. The knight of faith must make the

leap of faith in order to transcend the earthly realm and thereby eradicate earthly impossibilities

and replace them with divine possibilities. At this point, it is important to note that both the

knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith are confronted by a terrible pain once the

earthly impossibility is recognized. While the knight of infinite resignation finds “peace and rest

and consolation in the pain” because it enables him to know that he is alive and a part of this

earthly realm, the knight of faith does not resign himself to the pain in order to verify his earthly

existence. (Kierkegaard, 38) Rather, he “makes yet another movement more wonderful than

anything, for he says: “I nevertheless believe that I shall get her, namely by virtue of the absurd,

by virtue of the fact that for God everything is possible.” (Kierkegaard, 39).

Although it may seem as though both the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of

faith do not really have sufficient roles to play in an everyday conception of love, they are

actually of significant importance. The knight of infinite resignation is an individual who loves

another but is incapable of actually being with this person. In Kierkegaard's example, it is an

earthly impossibility for the two to be together. However, in order to understand the knight of

infinite resignation within the context of love in everyday life, the earthly impossibility needs to

be replaced with a willful decision not to be with a specific other7. If it is assumed that any

earthly impediment is not severe enough to be considered an impossibility, then the knight of

7 If Kierkegaard’s example of the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith is under-
stood literally, then it is harder to explain the difference between the two. This modification will
allow me to not only elaborate upon the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith but
also, explain the roles that each play in the context of love. Also, when considering the circum-
stances of everyday life now, it is relatively rare for such an impossibility to exist. There seems
to be a number of alternative possibilities; specifically, two people could choose to be together
regardless of the potential consequences.

28
infinite resignation is one who is incapable of making the leap of faith and choosing to be with

the one he or she loves. This leap is difficult to make because there is no guarantee as to what the

outcome will be, which is to say that the future is unknowable. In the same way that Abraham

could not know that God would keep His promise of posterity, one who is in love cannot know

that choosing to be with another will be a worthy venture. It is this unknowable aspect that

invokes a great sense of anxiety when one finds one's self at the precipice of faith.

In “What is Metaphysics?”, Heidegger asks, “How is it with the nothing?” (Heidegger,

96) “The nothing” is to be understood as the absence of anything, which implies that it is, in fact,

something. Something needs to exist in order to be questioned. The anxiety comes from the

inability to formulate an answer that encompasses “the nothing.” When one finds one’s self

sleepless in the middle of the night, one may feel the weight of one’s inability to conceptualize

what “the nothing” is. It is important to note that this anxiety is not to be understood as fear. Fear

tends to be of something. One is afraid of spiders, of zombies inhabiting the earth, of being left

behind, and so on. Fear can also be abstract in the sense that one may be afraid of what has the

potential to happen in the event of an earthquake or the downturn of the economy or the effects

that global warming will have on the planet. To be afraid is to have a source of fear. Anxiety

however, is different from fear in the sense that it comes from “the nothing.” Rather than the

specificity of fear, anxiety is for “the nothing” in the sense that “the indeterminateness of that in

the face of which and for which we become anxious is no mere lack of determination but rather

the essential impossibility of determining it.” (Heidegger, 100-101) There is “nothing” that

explains the anxiety because it is the absence of everything that instills a peculiar sense of dread8.

If Heidegger is interpreted in a particular way, this anxiety seems to be related to the mortality of

8 This “anxiety” was originally articulated in Kierkegaard's book, The Concept of Anxiety. The Danish word that
he uses, angest, is akin to “dread”.

29
human beings9.

When confronted with one’s mortality, certain questions arise: What happens when we

die? What is the reason for living? Is there more than one reason? How can one uncover this

reason (or, as the case may be, reasons)? If love is to be understood as a means of attaining

immortality, as claimed by Diotima, then it is a source of comfort against “the nothing”. It is only

through anxiety that one is able to discover the comfort of love because anxiety “removes all

things and human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference”

(Heidegger, 99). That is to say, anxiety forces one to acknowledge that one is an indiscriminate

part of a whole by overcoming an individual at various moments. There is no particularity in

anxiety because one transcends one's self and the particularities of one’s everyday life, thereby

enabling one to confront “the nothing” of one’s existence. The dissolution of particularities is

described by Heidegger when he writes, “..., anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the

slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we ourselves - we humans who are in being

- in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though “you” or

“I” feel ill at ease; rather, it is this way for some one.”” (Heidegger, 101) This slipping away is

difficult to grasp with words but it is reminiscent of mortality because of the loss of one’s sense

of individuality in death. When one acts in the world, a sense of individuality is maintained

through the use of “I” or “You”. Once these terms of identity fade (through anxiety), there is “the

nothing”, which is the absence of everything that is typically used to maintain a particular

identity.

The maintenance of identity occurs through actions. If “the nothing” is the absence of

identity, then it logically follows that once one decides to perform an action, one thereby asserts

9 To be mortal is to be a being-towards-death, a term expressed by Heidegger in his book, Being and Time.

30
one’s self as a being in the world10. In the face of “the nothing”, this assertion is often nothing

more than a quick attempt to “shatter the vacant stillness with compulsive talk,” which “only

proves the presence of the nothing.” (Heidegger, 101) What this seems to mean is that when one

loses his or her sense of identity in the face of “the nothing”, one tries to diminish the experience

by asserting one’s existence in any way possible11. In his book, Walden, there is a passage in

which Henry David Thoreau explains why he chose to live in a cabin by Walden Pond by writing

the following: “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to face only the

essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to

die, discover that I had not lived.” (Walden, 303-04) The point of “the nothing” then, seems to be

that it should serve as inspiration for one to live a life that is deliberate. To live deliberately is to

live in a manner that is meaningful and significant. By filling the “the nothing” with idle

chitchat, one is not living deliberately but rather, escaping “the nothing” as fast as possible

because it is too intense to handle. The intensity however, should not be escaped with arbitrary

words, but rather meaningful actions.

According to Heidegger, when one conceives of “the nothing”, there is the possibility that

“such revelation is concealed in our joy in the presence of the Dasein – and not simply of the

person – of a human being whom we love” (Heidegger, 99). What this seems to mean is that “the

nothing” is confronted when one is in love with another because love abolishes the particularities

that accompany everyday life. The anxiety that is experienced in the face of “the nothing” is

replaced with the joy of love. Love then, is not a distraction from “the nothing” but rather, a

reason for being. Rather than escaping “the nothing” with idle chitchat or by concretizing anxiety

into a fear of some particular thing, one can embrace it and choose to give his or her life meaning

10 This term is used by Heidegger in Being and Time.

11 To remain in constant contemplation of “the nothing” however, is akin to existing, rather than living.

31
through love12. If “the nothing” is understood as the dissolution of every thing, then love is

transformative in the sense that it not only asserts that one is a part of the world but also, the

world has meaning. This is best understood by conceiving of the manner in which the world

seems to be transformed when one is in love. The rain is not wet and cold but a reason to go for a

walk and hold hands. The snow is not troublesome but rather, a reason to make snowmen and

have snowball fights and drink hot chocolate with little marshmallows. Everything that was once

dreary and commonplace is rendered interesting and enticing. In the same way that the sun casts

a brilliant glow upon the world, love casts a similar glow upon the overlooked nuances of

everyday life.

To love is to do something meaningful and significant because it serves as a means to go

beyond the finitude of one's self. In love, one is infinite. Why? To love another is to realize that

one is not alone. One is not an ineffectual being. No, to love another is to realize that one need

not be constrained to one’s own singularity or the particularities of one’s everyday life. Love

expands the horizon of one's own existence, thereby enabling one to recognize that the universe

is so much bigger than one’s own experiences. Although this may seem confusing when

considering the manner in which love transforms one’s perception of the world and instills a

newfound sense of meaning in the particularities of everyday life, it makes sense when

conceiving of the manner in which individuals tend to take those particularities of everyday life

for granted. That is, they are usually accepted as rather commonplace. Love however, offers

meaning by asserting one’s sense of individuality in the world. To say that one is not an

ineffectual being then, is to say that one loves another, which is a purpose of one’s being. To

have a purpose, like loving another, is to have meaning in one’s life. This meaning enables one to
12 It is important to note that love is not the only way life can have meaning. The reason why I have cho-
sen love is because love is the primary focus of this paper. If the point is to inject meaning in one’s life,
then this meaning can be discovered through any pursuit that involves willful actions on behalf of the indi-
vidual (ie. a profession, like medicine or law or writing or passion, like painting or drawing).

32
go beyond the finitude of one’s self because the act of loving another implies that there is a

specific other who exists in the world. The importance of this specific other existing in the world

is that it is the same world that one occupies. The particularities of one’s everyday life may seem

inconsequential and unimportant because they have been accepted as a part of one’s everyday

life. There is nothing interesting or enticing about them until there is a newfound awareness of a

specific other who inhabits the same world, thereby allowing one’s perception of the world to be

transformed.

According to Kierkegaard, the leap of faith “cannot be mediated, for it is due precisely to

the fact that the single individual is only the single individual” (Kierkegaard, 61). The experience

of love is particular to the individual. To attempt to explain or describe what the experience is

like is to attempt to share the experience with another. There are two significant problems with

this: the first and foremost is that if the experience can be shared with an outsider, how special or

significant is the experience itself? Secondly, an outsider can attempt to offer advice or solace,

both of which require a particular type of understanding of the experience. This understanding

however, demands more than an empathetic response. To be empathetic is to relate the

experience to one's own experiences, which may be valuable in and of itself but still says nothing

about the one who is having the experience. The problem with empathy is best illustrated

through instances of unrequited love13. There is really nothing worse than the pain of loving

another who does not reciprocate those feelings. It is the realization that one has made the leap of

faith for love alone. One has stood at the precipice of faith and made the decision to be with

another only to find one's self alone at the other side. In this isolation, there is the feeling that one

13 In instances of unrequited love, one has chosen to perform a deliberate action (the leap of faith for
love) as a mode of making one’s life meaningful. The fact that the beloved does not reciprocate the feel-
ings can cause the lover to return to a state of anxiety, completely unsure as to how his or her life can be
rendered meaningful again. Due to the constraints of this paper, I cannot adequately address the perilous
and, as the case may be, fortunate consequences of unrequited love.

33
was not good enough. If one was, the other would have made the leap of faith or at least been

willing to. Mostly, there is just pain. A deep heart-wrenching type of pain that begins in the pit of

the stomach until it courses through one's veins. The all-consuming nature of the feelings of love

are transformed into an all-consuming pain that wracks the body and mind; both of which are

parallel in magnitude. To attempt to talk about this pain would require understanding by another,

an understanding that simply cannot exist.

The reason why such understanding cannot exist is because the leap is a solitary affair.

The experiences of the individual serve as a montage in his or her mind. There is a collection of

memories: the way he laughs when he thinks that something is actually funny, the highlights in

her hair, the curve of his lips, the way she loves crossword puzzles, and the list goes on. There

are also a number of sensations, most of which are closely attached to the collection of

memories. There is happiness, sadness, giddiness, flightiness, excitement, and a number of other

emotions, all of which are particular to the individual in relation to each experience. There is also

the emotional response invoked by the montage in one's own mind14. Since an other is incapable

of seeing this montage and feeling the exact same emotions, an other is condemned to be an

outsider. The inability to articulate and share the necessary feelings renders true understanding an

impossibility15. The best an other can do is reflect upon his or her own experiences and offer

advice or solace. This is best illustrated by thinking about the manner in which friends attempt to

understand the emotional plight of another. They will converse about the experiences and share

their thoughts. The important thing to note however, is that friends are also the quickest to say

something like, “Well, I know it sucks but you need to get over him.” or “You cannot hold onto

14 This montage is relevantly similar to the manner in which one’s perception of the world is transformed
through the awareness of the existence of a particular other. One cannot actually make others perceive of
these transformations because the anxiety, as well as the actions performed, are specific to the individual.
15 The inarticulable nature of the experience is inextricably linked to anxiety because without anxiety, one
would not have been able to recognize the particularity of an other. The particularity cannot be talked
about or attributed to some recognizable quality. This will be addressed in section III.

34
her forever.” However intelligent and well-meaning such sentiments may actually be, they fail to

capture the solitude of the leap. It is almost as though they are watching the leap take place from

a distance and they can see that their friend has ended up alone and they keep beckoning for him

or her to return to safer ground but there is something missing in their perception of events;

namely, they cannot understand what propelled the leap.

Given the solitary nature of the leap of faith for love, it may seem as though the

individual who is confronted with the leap is somehow separate from the rest of the world.

Kierkegaard stresses that Abraham could not talk to anyone about sacrificing Isaac. If he had

attempted to communicate with others, they would not have been able to understand how he

could even think of performing such an action. They would have called him a murderer and

admonished his role as a father. However, the important thing to realize is that Abraham had to

suspend the ethical, which is to say that the ethical sphere in which the moral judgments of him

could be made, still existed. It is not as though he entered some divine realm where he was not

subject to the laws of the ethical sphere. Rather, what made his decision so difficult is that while

he remained a part of the ethical sphere, he had to choose to perform an action that could not be

understood within it. This lack of understanding does not imply that he was outside the ethical

sphere because he still had the capacity to be judged since he was performing an action for the

sake of the divine within the ethical sphere. Similarly, one who makes the leap of faith for love

does not enter a different realm simply because the reasons for making the leap, as well as the

nature of the leap itself, are uncommunicable. The uncommunicable nature of the leap implies

that the individual has remained in the earthly realm and must choose to act in virtue of that

which is uncommunicable. Perhaps the purpose of the earthly realm then, is that it serves as a

sphere of objectivity, whether this objectivity comes in the form of what is traditionally

35
considered right and wrong or opinions of friends or family in relation to the object of one’s love.

Without this sphere of objectivity, one would only be confronted by one’s subjectivity, which is

to say that one would only have one’s own experiences to appeal to when choosing to make the

leap16.

The inability to speak about the experience can also construct a gap between the lover

and the one who is loved. In instances of requited love, both may attempt to fill this gap because

there is a mutual desire for understanding. The lover wants the beloved to know the depth of his

or her feelings. This knowledge seems to be necessary for the beloved to understand that he or

she is, in fact, loved. The beloved attempts to understand in a number of different ways, two of

which are intricately connected. First, there is the attempt to relate the lover's feelings to his or

her own feelings. By comparing and contrasting the two, the beloved can confirm that the lover

is indeed feeling the same way as him- or herself. This similarity is important because one's own

experiences provide a context for love. In order to understand this point, imagine that each

person has a dictionary of love. The definitions provided in this dictionary are acquired through

one's experiences with love, whether these experiences are events in one's own life, perceived in

the lives of others, or gained through various mediums, like books, television shows, movies, etc
17
. Regardless of how these definitions are acquired, the point is that each experience provides a

16 This objectivity is necessary, especially in those cases when one’s subjective standard of judgment is
flawed. For instance, it may be the case that one views abuse as a form of love, which then leads one to
engage in abusive relationships. In the objective sphere, abuse is hurtful and wrong, which can potentially
change one’s subjective standard for the better.
17 The dictionary of love is generally composed of experiences that involve the objective sphere, like wit-
nessing the relationship between one’s parents or the parents of friends, movies, books, etc. Without this
sphere of objectivity, one would only have one’s own experiences to appeal to, which implies that one
would have to exist outside the objective, or ethical, sphere. To exist outside the objective sphere then,
would require one to remain in constant appeal to what he or she feels to be right without considering
what happens within the objective sphere. This lack of objectivity is extremely dangerous, especially when
considering Abraham’s decision to sacrifice his son, which is murder within the ethical, or objective,
sphere. Without the objective sphere, one can do anything one wants because he or she is the ultimate
standard of judgment, which is to say that one can say, “Oh, well, the voice of God in my head told me to
kill him.” without guilt or judgment. Part of the anxiety experienced by Abraham was due to his awareness
of the ethical, or objective, sphere.

36
definition of some aspect of love. The consequence is that the contents of one's dictionary

provide a basis of comparison, or standards of judgment, for one's relationships.

Second, there is the asking of questions, like “What do you love about me?” or “What is

your favorite thing about me?” At first, this question may seem like nothing more than an

exercise in building self-esteem. However, it does not seem to be motivated by a mere desire for

a listing of one's more favorable qualities. Rather, the beloved wants to see him- or herself

through the lover's eyes. The beloved does not, and cannot, love him- or herself in the same way

as the lover. The consequence is that the beloved yearns to discover why he or she is loved. Now,

the experience of love is particular to the lover to the point where it does not really seem feasible

for the beloved to possess a complete and total understanding of the lover’s experience. In order

to facilitate some semblance of understanding, the lover and beloved ask each other questions

and compare the answers provided with the contents of each other’s dictionary of love. For

example, imagine a couple who have been together for a fair amount of time. While cuddling one

evening, the woman looks at the man and asks: “What do you love about me?” He thinks about it

for a few seconds and replies: “You’re nice.” His response irritates her because she knows plenty

of people who are nice. Does that mean that she is just like everyone else who is nice?18 What

this example is supposed to illustrate is that by asking questions of this sort, the beloved wants to

be assured of his or her particularity in the lover’s life. The beloved wants to know that he or she

is relevantly different from others in the sense that he or she yearns to create an entry in the

lover’s dictionary of love19. To relate this back to Kierkegaard, one wants to know why he or she

is worth making the leap of faith for love. Hence, this paves the way for the final section, which

18 Recall Socrates’ view that if love is of qualities, like kindness or intelligence, there is nothing distinct or
special about that love because the possession of those qualities is not restricted to a particular individ-
ual.
19 The creation of an entry in another’s dictionary of love is significant because it implies that one is un-
precedented. Recall Section I and Augustus’ use of the word. To be unprecedented is to be relevantly dif-
ferent from everyone else.

37
will be directed towards providing an account of “quality of oneness”, a phenomenological

quality that explains why one is worth making the leap of faith for love.

III
“Quality of oneness” is the idea that, out of the seven billion people on the planet, there

are those individuals who contain the potential for one to form a relationship with. These individ-

uals are recognized as different by virtue of who they are in relation to everyone else that one has

met throughout one’s life. It is difficult to describe this difference without appealing to some

phenomenological quality. This phenomenological quality is best described by Charlotte Bronte's

character, Mr. Rochester, when he is confronted by the possibility of Jane Eyre's departure from

his life. He chooses to disclose his affection for her by saying the following:

“I sometimes have a queer feeling with regard to you – especially when you

are near me, as now; it is as if I had a string somewhere under my left ribs,

tightly and inextricably knotted to a similar string situated in the corre-

sponding quarter of your little frame. And if that boisterous Channel, and

two hundred miles or so of land come broad between us, I am afraid that

cord of communion will be snapped; and then I've a nervous notion I should

take to bleeding inwardly. As for you – you'd forget me.” (Bronte, 252)

38
The “cord of communion” described by Mr. Rochester is interesting in the sense that it denotes

an attachment to Jane that does not have a material form. It is not elaborated upon as a result of

her possessing some particular quality or qualities. Rather, it seems to be a result of who she is in

a total sense. “Quality of oneness” then, is a phenomenological quality that is hard to grasp with

words. It is not possessed so much as it is felt. That is to say, it is not a quality like kindness or

compassion, both of which can be displayed in some manner. “Quality of oneness” is felt for an-

other by virtue of who that other is not only as a summation of all of his or her qualities but also,

in relation to others that one has met without feeling a similar way for. In section I, it was argued

that a love of qualities is not indicative of the particularity of an individual when those qualities

can be possessed by others. In section II, the leap of faith for love was introduced. The leap of

faith for love is relevantly different from the revelation of love, which I intend to elaborate upon

as a phenomenological experience that has the potential to occur with those particular individuals

who possess “quality of oneness.” This final section then, will be directed towards the particular

nature of “quality of oneness” with the hopeful intent of explaining how its particularity renders

it an important feature of love.

When talking about “quality of oneness”, it is not enough to provide an example of at-

traction, which can occur with anyone who is either aesthetically pleasing or intellectually stimu-

lating. A more adequate account is that of the man and the princess in the example set forth by

Kierkegaard. In his example, it is not explained why the man feels the way that he does. He does

however, ensure “that it really is the content of his life, and his soul is too healthy and too proud

to waste the least thing on an intoxication.” (Kierkegaard, 35). What this seems to imply is that

the man knows that his feelings for the princess are not an infatuation. It is not a result of her

beauty or her intellect, though they may certainly play a part. Rather, his feelings for her are

39
grounded in something more complex. The inability to articulate exactly what it is that invokes

one’s feelings of love is significant because it rules out the possibility of it being the result of

some tangible quality (or qualities). Recall Alciabides and the way he perceived Socrates to be

different from everyone else. He could not abandon his feelings, nor could he attribute them to

an infatuation with some feature possessed by Socrates, because an infatuation with one on be-

half of some feature can be replaced with an infatuation for another with a similar feature. Like

Alciabides, the man cannot consider his feelings to be nothing more than an intoxication because

he “knows” that it is not. Perhaps, as stated in section I, this knowledge is acquired through the

unprecedented nature of the princess.

Before elaborating further upon Kierkegaard’s example, it is crucial to note that there is a

significant difference between the revelation of love and the leap of faith for love. The revelation

of love is involuntary in the sense that it is the falling in love, something that usually happens

without any real effort or thought exercised by the individual. One of the more eloquent descrip-

tions of the revelation of love is provided in Marisa De Los Santos’ novel, Love Walked In,:

“When I woke, I saw Teo’s hands on the steering wheel, his wrists emerging

from the once-rolled cuffs of his soft denim shirt. The shirt, blue; the wrists

and hands, brown, dusted over with a light, gold-dust dusting of glittery,

butterscotch-colored hair. Shirt, wrists, hands. I saw them more clearly than

I’d ever seen anything, and the sight of them moved me as I’d never been

moved in my life.

This person, I said to myself, this one person, of course, of course, of

course. The words became my breathing and my pulse, the whole world re-

verberated with them. “Of course.” I didn’t think the words “I love you,” so

40
 obvious were they, so given, thinking them would have been sheer super-

fluity.

But I did love him. Teo. I was in love with him. I would always be in love

with him. Of course, I was. Of course, I am. Of course.

So, you see that I didn’t fall in love with Teo Sandoval. Falling is a process

and what happened to me wasn’t process. It wasn’t sequential or gradual. It

wasn’t falling.

A sea change. Transubstantiation. One minute, I was a woman not in love

with Teo, and the next minute, I was a woman in love with him. Bones,

blood, skin, every cell changed over into something new.” (Love Walked In,

219-220)

The fact that Cornelia Brown, the character, repeats to herself, “Of course.” implies that there is

something about Teo that warrants such affection. He seems to have possessed “quality of one-

ness” throughout the course of their relationship, which manifested itself in her revelation of

love. In relation to Kierkegaard, the man cannot explain why he loves the princess, neither is he

compelled to provide such an explanation because doing so would not necessitate understanding

on behalf of the one who hears his tale of ‘why’.20 The revelation of love is restricted to those

who possess “quality of oneness” because the possession of objectively recognizable qualities is

not sufficient for the revelation to take place.

To have a revelation of love however, does not necessitate a leap of faith for love. In the

film, Chasing Liberty, Ben Calder is talking to Anna Foster about why his mother decided to

leave his father and he says, “My mother wanted him to make the big gesture.” (Chasing Liberty)

20 In Section II, I provided an explanation as to why others cannot truly understand another’s experiences
with love.

41
When asked what “the big gesture” means, he replies, “You know, ‘I’ll quit for you.’ ‘I’ll stay

home for you, darling.’ But he didn’t. Because... Well, people don’t really do that, do they?”

(Chasing Liberty) “The big gesture” seems relevantly similar to Kierkegaard’s leap of faith since

both represent a deliberate decision to be with a specific other. To experience the revelation of

love is to be confronted by sentiments of the sort: “I love you.” or “I am falling in love with

you.” or “I am in love with you.” All of these sentiments describe a feeling that one has for a

specific other. This feeling however, does not imply that a leap of faith will be made for a spe-

cific other. The expression of a revelation of love to another does not qualify as a leap of faith

because loving another does not necessarily imply that one is prepared to make a leap of faith for

love. The importance of making “the big gesture”, or the leap of faith, is that there is a concrete

action in the world that can be recognized as a manifestation of one’s sentiments of love. For the

sake of clarification, consider Abraham. He experienced a revelation in the sense that he believed

in the existence of God. The existence of God was not subject to doubt, and, if expressed with

words, would likely assume the form, “I believe in God.” or “I have faith in God.” Both of these

expressions are proclamations of faith but such proclamations are relatively groundless without

some type of corresponding action in the world21. In relation to love, one may hint towards the

willingness to perform a “big gesture” with phrases like, “I would move in with you.” or “I

would marry you.” Once the opportunity to perform a “big gesture” presents itself however, one

may refrain from doing so. In the case of Abraham, he had to sacrifice Isaac in order to prove

that his proclamation of faith could actually manifest itself as an external action in an external

world. Hence, while the expression of a revelation of love is certainly important, it is not essen-

21 This groundlessness is extremely important when distinguishing between the knight of faith and the
knight of infinite resignation.

42
tial in the potential formation of a relationship because loving another is not indicative of what

one will actually do to be with (and remain with) a specific other.

The leap of faith for love, or “the big gesture”, is an essential component in the potential

formation of a relationship because it represents the willful decision to be with a specific other

through some action. This willful decision can take a number of different forms: quitting a par-

ticular job, alienating one’s entire family, deciding to stay at home to be with one’s family, the

proposal of marriage, the decision to be a couple, moving in together, etc. Any one of these ac-

tions is relevantly similar to Abraham’s leap of faith because each of them represents a willing-

ness to perform some action in the world. The emphasis on an action being in the world is impor-

tant because the revelation of love is internal until it is revealed to a specific other. As stated ear-

lier however, the revealing of the revelation is not the leap of faith since it does not imply that

one will do anything to be with a specific other in the world. In order to clarify this point, con-

sider the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of faith. Both individuals are identical up to

a point. Abraham knew that by killing his son, he was eliminating the earthly possibility of his

progeny. Despite this elimination, he chose to believe, by virtue of the absurd, that God’s prom-

ise of his progeny would be fulfilled. The crucial component is that he absurdly believed that he

would be granted his progeny on earth. He did not hope for Isaac to be saved in heaven. He did

not hope for the promise of progeny to be fulfilled in heaven. No, he “believed precisely for this

life, that he would grow old in the land, honored by the people, blessed by posterity, forever re-

membered in Isaac, his dearest one in life, whom he embraced with a love for which it would be

only a poor expression to say that he faithfully fulfilled a father’s duty to love the son, as indeed

it goes in the summons: “the son whom you love.”” (Kierkegaard, 17)

43
 When confronted with the choice to make the leap of faith for love or walk away, one

may not understand why the leap should be made. One possible answer is provided in the follow-

ing quote:

“Go after her. Fuck, don’t sit there and wait for her to call. Go after her be-

cause that is what you should do if you love someone. Don’t wait for them

to give you a sign because it might never come. Don’t let people happen to

you. Don’t let me happen to you or her. She’s not a fucking television show

or tornado. There are people I might have loved had they gotten on the air-

plane or run down the street after me or called me up drunk at four in the

morning because they need to tell me right now and because they cannot re-

gret this and I always thought I’d be the only one doing crazy things for peo-

ple who would never give enough of a fuck to do it back or to act like idiots

or be entirely vulnerable and honest. Making someone fall in love with you

is easy and flying 3000 miles on four days notice because you can’t just sit

there and do nothing and breathing into telephones is not everyone’s idea of

love but it is the way I can recognize it because that is what I do. Go scream

it and be with her in meaningful ways because that is beautiful and that is

generous and that is what loving someone is. That is raw. That is unguarded.

And that is all that is worth anything, really.” 22

From this, it seems that the importance of making the leap of faith for love is that it is an action

in the world. To remain at a standstill on the precipice of faith or to walk away from it is to deny

one’s self the opportunity to be vulnerable and open to the potential for love. The reason why
22 It is not entirely clear who wrote this. Although it is often attributed to Harvey Milk, I could not trace it
back to any of his writings or speeches or film adaptations of him. There is also a web page in which a
woman, Helena Kvarnström, claims that she is responsible (http://sippor.tumblr.com/post/328371164/i-
wrote-this-i-wrote-this-when-i-was-twenty-two)

44
one should be vulnerable and open to the potential for love relates back to Heidegger’s concep-

tion of “the nothing.” Recall that anxiety is directed towards “the nothing” in the sense that one

is overwhelmed by all that is ungraspable about the world, as well as one’s finite life. The over-

whelming nature of anxiety is important because it forces one to choose between the comfort of

the knowable and the discomfort of the unknowable. One can either escape anxiety through

meaningless actions or use anxiety as inspiration to perform meaningful actions in the world. To

be vulnerable and open to the potential for love then, is to allow one’s self the opportunity to use

anxiety as a means of performing a meaningful action in the world. As stated in section II, one of

the main reasons why one should choose to give one’s life meaning through deliberate actions is

because it is transformative. The realization that the source of meaning, like one’s beloved, exists

in the world alters one’s perception of the world. This alterity is important for two reasons: first,

it enables one to avoid having a fatalistic approach to life and secondly, it inspires future deliber-

ate actions because the world seems to have a sense of purpose.

Perhaps the ultimate reason why one should choose to make the leap of faith for love is

because such an opportunity only presents itself with those who possess “quality of oneness”.

What lends credence to “quality of oneness” is the fact that one potentially meets hundreds of

people throughout his or her life. These hundreds of people are a small percentage of the seven

billion people who inhabit the earth. Of this small percentage, some of the people that one en-

counters will be annoying or frustrating or seemingly insignificant in the grand scheme of one’s

life. Some will be important for a time; others will prove to be important with time. And then

there are those select few individuals whom one will meet and be confronted by the desire to

pursue these individuals. In order to understand the significance of this desire, an appeal must be

made to the experience that some people just feel different. An account of this difference is pro-

45
vided in those instances when one decides to date a number of different people and feels as

though there may be something missing in all of them. The missing part cannot be attributed to a

quality or feature because there is nothing particularly wrong with any of them. They are intelli-

gent and beautiful and kind and compassionate and fun23. Despite the presence of these qualities,

there is a distinct feeling that some essential quality is absent. One cannot explain this absence in

the sense that one cannot explain why certain individuals may be ideal on paper but lacking in

reality. It is only by encountering an individual who possesses “quality of oneness” that one is

able to express a sentiment like, “Ah yes, this is what I have been looking for all along.” The dif-

ference is a confrontation of sorts in the sense that it cannot be avoided. The unavoidable nature

can be attributed to a sense of relativity; that is, by meeting a number of different people

throughout one’s life, one has a distinct and intrinsic awareness that some of them are worth get-

ting to know in relation to those who are not. The unavoidable difference of certain individuals is

phenomenological, which is to say that even if one cannot account for such a difference with

words, the difference is felt in some manner.

In the same way that one cannot explain why “quality of oneness” exists with a specific

other, one cannot explain why it does not exist. It is not a willful experience in the sense that it is

not within the control of human beings. It is not something that can be manipulated at will. If this

were the case, then Romeo and Juliet could have avoided their fatal end by eliminating the at-

traction that each felt for the other. The peril of love then, is that it seems to have a mind of its

own. It is not something that can be manipulated or coerced or forced into submission. Rather, it

is powerful by virtue of its uncontrollable nature. It slips into the spaces between the two in-

volved and takes its place. Regardless of whether or not the leaps of faith for love are actually

23 These qualities and features can be replaced with any qualities and features. The choice of these five
is not intended to be exemplary.

46
made, the love, as experienced through the revelation (or revelations, if it is experienced by

both), exists. Both the revelation of love and the leap of faith for love are solitary, which means

that both can be experienced for one who possesses “quality of oneness” without the beloved ex-

periencing either24. Due to the solitary nature of both, there is a pervasive sense of doubt as to

whether or not the revelation of love should be revealed to the beloved through a leap of faith for

love. In the film, The Last Flight, there is a part in which the two main characters, Marie and An-

toine, are arguing because he thinks that she is foolish for being in love with a married man. He

worries that she is wasting her time and that the man will never leave his wife for her. She re-

sponds by saying, “Love and doubt are inseparable.” (The Last Flight) The inseparability of love

and doubt is precisely what renders the leap of faith for love so important.

If love was of particular qualities, then there would not be a pervasive sense of wonder as

to whether the leap of faith for love is worth making because the presence of those qualities can

be detected in a more objective manner than “quality of oneness”. This objectivity can be per-

ceived in concrete actions, like a woman who volunteers at a homeless shelter every Thursday or

a man who is always there for his friends. “Quality of oneness” is not objective because it cannot

be perceived in the physical features of an individual or an action (or actions). Rather, it is inex-

plicably felt for a specific other by virtue of who the other is as a whole. The inexplicable nature

of the quality is a source of doubt because the only standards of judgment that one has are the

emotions invoked by the individual who possesses the quality. The fact that one cannot articulate

the precise origin of the quality can lead one to compose reasons as to why one feels a particular

way. Recall the difference between fear and anxiety that was set forth in section II. In the same

way that one may attempt to concretize anxiety as a fear of something, one who recognizes

24 If either were not solitary, it would not be possible to have instances of unrequited love.

47
“quality of oneness” in another may attempt to concretize the quality by attributing it to more ob-

jective qualities.

Concretization has two implications: first, it explains why there is a gap between the

lover and beloved when the lover attempts to explain why he or she loves the beloved. The lover

cannot formulate the appropriate words to capture “quality of oneness”, which results in the

lover’s picking and choosing of various qualities that the beloved is capable of recognizing25.

Secondly, the concretization can serve as a means of avoiding the leap of faith for love by en-

couraging a false belief that the one who possesses “quality of oneness” is really just a composi-

tion of objective qualities, most of which can be recognized in others through various concrete

actions. Rather than acknowledging the inexplicable nature of the quality, which encompasses

the whole of an individual, one attempts to break the individual down into objective pieces,

thereby enabling one to avoid the intensity of encountering one who is relevantly different from

anyone else that one has previously encountered. This display of avoidance is akin to one who

chooses to escape “the nothing” with fear. Rather than allowing one’s self to be confronted by

the inexplicable, and therefore unknowable, potential of one who possesses “quality of oneness”,

one retreats into the safety of that which is explicable and recognizable.

“Quality of oneness” is very different from the account of soulmates provided by Aristo-

phanes. In his account, two specific halves make a specific whole, which means that each half is

perfect for the other. When imagining what an encounter between two specific halves must feel

like, it seems like there must be a degree of certainty. If there is only one person in the whole

universe who is destined for another, one must just know who this other is once they meet.

More appropriately, both must know because they were made specifically for each other. This
25 This concretization has the potential to upset the beloved, especially if the beloved has experienced
the revelation of love (who is, in effect, a love), because the beloved (or lover) is internally aware that the
lover (or beloved, as the case may be) cannot be encompassed with words or qualities. Hence, it is a vi-
cious cycle of misunderstanding.

48
shared knowledge is very different from my account of the solitary nature of both the revelation

of love and the leap of faith for love. The awareness that one possesses “quality of oneness” is

not certainty that the two belong together or that the two will be together for all of time if the

leaps of faith for love are made. Rather, “quality of oneness” is a subtle recognition of the partic-

ularity of an individual. Consider Jane Eyre’s experience after meeting Mr. Rochester for the

first time:

“I took up my muff and walked on. The incident had occurred and was gone

for me: it was an incident of no moment, no romance, no interest in a sense;

yet it marked with change one single hour of a monotonous life. My help

had been needed and claimed; I had given it: I was pleased to have done

something; trivial, transitory though the deed was, it was yet an active thing

and I was wearing of an existence all passive. The new face, too, was like a

new picture introduced to the gallery of memory, and it was dissimilar to all

the others hanging there: firstly, because it was masculine; and secondly, be-

cause it was dark, strong, and stern. I had it still before me when I entered

Hay, and slipped the letter into the post-office; I saw it as I walked fast

down-hill all the way home. When I came to the stile, I stopped a minute,

looked round and listened, with an idea that a horse’s hoofs might ring on

the causeway again, and that a rider in a cloak, and a Gytrash-like New-

foundland dog, might be again apparent...” (Jane Eyre, 117)

The purpose of sharing this passage is to illustrate that when “quality of oneness” is recognized

in a particular other, it is not some grandiose experience. There are no fireworks or strikes of

lightning. There is no voice in the clouds that proclaims, “You two were made for each other.”,

49
neither is there a chorus of angels that can be heard in the background. Chances are, if any one of

these events occurred, one would likely feel inclined to check one’s self into the nearest mental

institution. The power of “quality of oneness” resides in the fact that it is the subtle and unavoid-

able realization that one has encountered a particular individual who is relevantly different from

anyone else that one has ever met.

Since the leap of faith for love can only occur with a particular individual who possesses

“quality of oneness”, the consequence of not making the leap is that one is left with a persistent

sense of longing. The longing for what could have been, the longing for a replay of that instant in

time so that one can make a different choice, the longing for the sense of longing to disappear.

To walk away from this particular individual is to walk away from the potential for love. Now,

one may attribute the decision to walk away as destiny, especially if one ends up with someone

else who possesses “quality of oneness”. Perhaps it was fate, a type of conspiring on the part of

the universe. The problem with this train of thought is that it represents willful negligence of

one’s ability to choose, or instill meaning in one’s life through an action in the world. To end up

with another or without a specific other is due to one’s choice. The fact of the matter is that one

may be unwilling to make the leap of faith for love in one instant and willing to make it another.

Perhaps the willfulness in the latter is inspired by the fact that one did not act the first time such a

chance presented itself. Regardless of where the will to act, or make the leap of faith for love,

originates, the importance is that one recognizes that he or she is responsible for making the

choice. Whether this choice results in the desired consequence(s) or not, the point is to perform a

deliberate action in virtue of all that is unknowable because by doing so, one has thereby chosen

to be an active participant in the world26.

26 Until this point, I have presented the leap of faith for love as a decision to be with a specific other.
However, it is important to realize that the leap of faith for love does not necessarily consist of deciding to
be with a particular person. Rather, such a leap can actually be the decision not to be with someone.
While it is lovely to believe that all odds are surmountable, such a belief can be foolish when considering

50
 Conclusion
Upon arriving at this conclusion, it is unclear as to whether or not I have said anything

significant about love. If anything, the writing of the previous three sections have reassured me

of the complex nature of love. The attempt to capture something significant and essential about it

seems like an impossible endeavor when considering the fact that the most fundamental aspects

of love are incommunicable. To speak of love is to condemn others to be an outsider because

there is always something that gets lost in translation. When speaking about the revelation of

love and the ability, or inability as the case may be, to make the leap of faith for love, it still

seems as though there is something fundamental that has not been said. Perhaps this lack can be

attributed to the montage that plays in one’s mind and the emotions that accompany the contents

of this montage. This lack may also be attributed to one’s dictionary of love, which is not re-

stricted to one’s own experiences but rather, includes one’s perception of the experiences of oth-

ers. Regardless of why the lack is present, it exists. The purpose of this thesis then, was not to

capture all aspects of romantic love since such a feat would prove to be impossible, especially in

light of that which is incommunicable. Rather, the intent was to attempt to discover if there was

some way to describe what happens when one is confronted with the potential for love with a

particular other.

the reality of certain situations.

Due to the constraints of this paper, I cannot elaborate further upon these types of situations, nor am I
able to provide an adequate account of the effects of the end of a relationship with one who possesses
“quality of oneness”.

51
 Although it would certainly be romantic to accept Aristophanes account of soulmates, it

does not seem entirely feasible that there is one person, out of the seven billion people on earth,

who is perfect for another. The existence of this perfect other half is not only unlikely, but also

distant from the imperfections that permeate being a part of this world. What I essentially mean

by this is that human beings are not perfect but rather, fundamentally flawed creatures. We snore.

We do not say the right things at the right times. We hurt one another’s feelings. We instigate

conflict when there need not be discord. We get angry. We have the potential to be incredibly ir-

rational despite our propensity to claim that we are the most rational of creatures. The idea that

each of us has a perfect half who exists somewhere in the universe may be comforting since it of-

fers a specific purpose in love and yet it is also terrifying. The existence of this perfect other half

in the face of our very imperfect nature implies that we have the potential to be negligent and

make mistakes that would wreck it all. Even in those instances when we are not responsible for

the end of a relationship and death or some external calamity is, does that mean that we are des-

tined to settle for a lackluster life?

The idealistic conception of love advanced by Socrates is difficult to accept because it re-

quires one to abandon the particularity of an individual. If physical beauty is taken to be the ulti-

mate standard for love, then it would make sense to say that physical beauty is not restricted to

one individual but rather, many individuals. If non-physical features, like intelligence or kind-

ness or compassion, are taken to be the ultimate standard for love, then it would, once again,

make sense to say that non-physical features are not restricted to one individual. Once it becomes

clear that individuals are not different by virtue of some feature that can be ascertained,

one is left with a phenomenological particularity, or “quality of oneness”. To encounter an indi-

vidual who possesses this quality is to realize that one cannot lump all individuals into an indis-

52
criminate whole. Even though one may not be able to feel the same sense of certainty as one

likely would if soulmates did exist, “quality of oneness” has the potential to serve as a sufficient

indicator as to who is worthy of the leap of faith for love.

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