ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Name- Shreya Dubey

Course- BBA LLB (Hons.)
Semester- IV
Course code- SLL 2709
Enrollment No.- 200060403010
Admission No.- 20210294
Submitted to/ Faculty name- Mr. Sumit Aggarwal
Case 1
A.P. Pollution Control Board vs Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) &
Others on 27 January, 1999
Petitioner A.P. Pollution Control Board
Respondent Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) & Others
Date of Judgement 27/01/1999
Bench (Division bench) Justice S.B. Majmudar, Justice M. Jagannadha
Facts of the Case
(a) the respondent’s industry decided to set up a new factory for production of
vegetable oils in village peddashpur Andhra Pradesh. Respondent industry
purchased land which was within a radius of 10 Kms from two major
reservoirs that provided drinking water for the 5 million people around the
area.
(b)Government of India, notified a list of hazardous industries, which included
the industries producing vegetable oil. Notification stated that an industry
that wished to set up a factory had to seek consent from respective Pollution
Control Board for which a NOC was to be issued ensuring that the industry
does not cause any harm or pollution to the environment.
(c) In 1994 As per the Government, state of Andhra Pradesh issued a
notification and prohibited industries from setting up factories within 10
Kms from the reservoirs.
(d)The industry applied for a NOC in1995 to the appellant Board in Andhra
Pradesh. The state of Andhra Pradesh’s wrote to the Government of India
seeking relaxation to the 10 Km rule. The Government of India responded by
stating that the industry should get a NOC from the Environment Authority
of the State Government.
(e) The Pollution Control Board in Andhra Pradesh rejected the application
upholding the 10 K.M. rule and stated that the industry came under the ‘Red
List’
(f) Even though the Board rejected the application, the respondents obtained
permission from the Gram Panchayat & Although the Commissioner of
Industries suggested the industry to choose an alternative site, the industry
proceeded with their work.
(g) After that once again, respondent applied for an NOC under section 25 of the
Water Act from the board. Board observed that the pollutants were likely to
get discharged directly or indirectly into the lake and hence, rejected the
application.
 (h)The industry approached the State Government once again, on the ground
that it had invested huge capital in establishing & operating the industry. The
State Government granted an exemption and directed the industry with the
guidelines to have proper waste treatment mechanisms in place.
(i) AP Pollution Control Board prepared a list of precaution to be followed but
did not accept the application of NOC by the respondent.
(j) After that respondent filed an appeal in front of appellate authority under
Section 28 of Water Act along with an affidavit issued by Prof. M. Santappa
who was the scientific officer of Tamil Nadu Pollution Board in their favour
(k)Appellate Authority reverse the orders made by the state of Andhra Pradesh
Pollution Control Board by giving reasoning that the respondent had used
the latest means of to prevent environmental pollution. Finally, the issuing of
NOC is permissible to the respondent.
Issues raised
(a) Whether the respondent’s industry is a hazardous one and what is its pollution
potential?
(b) Whether the operation of the industry is likely to affect the sensitive catchment
area resulting in pollution of the Lakes?
(c) The validity of the orders passed by the Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board?
Judgement
The court reversed the decision made by the appellate authority and held that
the authorities could not grant a NOC to set up industries within 10 K.M
First of all, court focus on a question that whether Central government can
exempt a hazardous industry within the 10 km area around the reservoir if he is
following all the procedures and protection measures to safeguard environment.
For this court comes to a conclusion that for the protection of environment and
with the regard of 10 km rule the exemption should not to be appropriate in
nature and NOC to the respondent could not be issued.
Court considered second issue that whether as per the report submitted in the
court, respondent could claim exemption from the court or not. In the light of
this question court came to an outcome that the respondent industry will not
cause any water pollution even if it was established under the 10-km area of
reservoirs because respondent promised to take necessary actions and measures
to safeguard environment. But Court rejected & came to the conclusion that
reservoirs is significant as millions of public relied upon his reservoirs for
drinking water and to give safeguard measures to respondent. Court held that
safeguard could be failed because of any error human operation or by an
accident
The reports observed that granting the NOC in favour of the industry was
arbitrary as it violated several statutes. In addition to this, it was observed that
the permission granted to the industries in the Red List was hazardous to water
reservoirs and had dangerous implications on the public health and safety of
those dependent on the drinking water from the reservoirs. The report also
stated that a mere assurance with respect to care and caution would not be
sufficient, as there was a likeliness of occurrence of accidents.
In the judgment, the Supreme Court relied on the judicial doctrine of the
Precautionary Principle and also the new Burden of Proof place forth in the
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union of India and Others. The
Precautionary Principle is based on the theory that it is better to be on the side
of caution and safety than in the wrong way wherever environmental damage,
once done, is irreversible.
The Court in the present judgment directed that the authority to be appointed
under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 that shall
implement the Precautionary Principle and also the Polluter Pays Principle.
Further, it had been discovered that the new conception envisages that when a
risk of great or irreversible damage to the environment is perceived, the burden
of proof lies on the one that is proposing to undertake the activity in question.
The Apex Court, command that the Government can’t grant exemption to a
specified industry located within or making an attempt to locate within area
wherever there was total prohibition against the establishment of industries. The
Water Act, 1974 doesn’t allow the State Government to exempt an industry
from the applying of the prohibitive order under Section 3(2)(v) of the
Environment Protection Act, 1986. So, the consent of the A.P. Pollution Control
Board was validly refused.
Analysis and conclusion
Access to drinking water is an essential element for life, and it is the duty of the
state under Article 21 to provide clean drinking water to its citizens.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan vs Union of India, it was observed, “Water is the
basic need for the survival of human beings and is part of the right of life and
human rights as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”
As observed by the Supreme Court in this case, there is a need to set up
environmental courts in order to ensure speedy disposal of environment
litigations. It is also necessary to take measures that will help reduce
environmental degradation to create specific criteria for such hazardous
industries.
As per my view the judgement given by the honourable judges is reasonable
and justified as court cannot exercise its power in favour of any particular
individual or an industry. This exercise of power in such a manner will lead to
the arbitral behaviour of the court which is against the public interest as the two
reservoirs which were in question are very significant for that area because
millions of people are relied on that reservoir for getting fresh drinking water. If
the court act arbitrarily they will surely affect people at large.
Along with this, it will be in violation of Right to clean water under the ambit of
Article 21 of Constitution of India. Therefore, by applying Precautionary
Principal court act in a justified manner and ensures public morality.

Case 2
Rural litigation and entitlement vs State of UP. 1988
Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 652, 1985 SCR (3) 169
Petitioner: Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra & Ors.
Respondent: State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
Date of Judgement:12/03/1985
Bench: Bhagwati, P.N. Sen, Amarendra Nath (J) Misra Rangnath
Introduction
Forest resources are required by all sectors of the economy. Sacrifice of forest
land for large-scale project construction. The raw material source of woodland
for paper, pulp and rayons is used by large industries. It is no surprise that the
deforestation issue has attracted major public attention given the broad demand
for Indian forests and that intensive debate has arisen as a result of the
implementation of conservation and reforestation programmes. Rural
Litigation & Entitlement Kendra v. State Of UP1 is the first in which the
Supreme Court has been asked to strike a balance between environmental and
ecological integrity and economic demands on forest resources. This case is also
famously known as the ‘Dehradun Valley litigation’. The very first case in
which the Supreme Court requires an equilibrium of environmental and
1
environmental integrity against industrial forest resource claims is the Dehradun
Valley lawsuit.
Facts of the Case
● Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra (RLEK) is a non-governmental
organization with its work base situated in Uttarakhand, India.
● In Mussoorie hill range of Himalayas, the activity of quarrying was being
carried out on a large scale.
● Limestone was extracted by blasting out the hills with dynamite. This also
resulted in cave-ins and slumping because the mines dug deep into the
hillsides.
● All this was being done in an illegal manner.
● Due to lack of vegetation, many landslides occurred which killed villagers
along with animals and destroyed their homes, cattle and agricultural lands.
Perennial water springs were being affected adversely. 
● River courses were choked by the sludge and rubble of mines which
increased the danger of floods.
● In 1961, mining was prohibited in the state by the state minister of mines.
But, again mining work started and lease for mining for a period of 20 years
was given. Ths revived the hazardous mining and illegal activities without
any safety measures and continuously causing harm to the environment. 
● In 1982, eighteen leases came up for renewal, and the same were rejected by
the state government on the grounds of ecological destruction. However, an
injunction on this cancellation of lease was granted by the Allahabad High
Court which allowed the applicants to continue mining, giving the reason
that ecological factors cannot outweigh economic benefits.
● In the year 1983, the Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra sent a letter of
complaint to the Supreme Court which was concerning the environmental
degradation in the Mussoorie hills due to excessive mining and quarrying
activities and the damages caused to the environment by those activities.
● The Hon’ble Supreme Court treated that application as a writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution.
● The Supreme Court issued Show Cause Notice to the mine-owners in return
of which more than 100 mine-owners joined this litigation and it became
more complex.
Issues 
Whether environmental conservation should be given priority over the
economic benefits of the nation?
Whether the requirement of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 applied to
renewal of mining leases or not, which had originally been granted by the Uttar
Pradesh government before the Act came into force?
Contentions Raised
Petitioner 
● Mining work is causing large scale pollution in the area and therefore it
requires that it should be stopped immediately.
● Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra pleaded that Article 21 of the
Constitution provides Right to life and personal liberty and pollution free
environment is a part of it. If mining and quarrying continues in that area
then it would affect the environment and lives of people which would be a
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Defendant 
● It was contended by the defendants (mining operators) that the case should
be dismissed by the court and the entire issue should be left to the
administrative authorities under the Environment Protection.
● The counsel for the miners relied on the statement issued in a case which
stated that: ‘It is for the Government and the Nation and not for the court to
decide whether the deposits should be exploited at the cost of ecology and
environmental consideration or the industrial requirement should be
otherwise satisfied’. 
● Also, it was contended by the mine owners that if mining work is stopped
then they will lose their livelihoods and this will be a great economic loss to
the entire region.
Judgement
In the Dehradun Valley Litigation case, the Central Government had become
concerned about the destructive mining operations in the Valley at the same
time when the Supreme Court took up the issue. In 1983, the Government of
India appointed a Working Group to inspect the limestone quarries in the
Dehradun-Mussoorie area. The same individual, D.N. Bhargava, headed both
the government’s Working Group and the court’s committee came to similar
conclusions as to the harmful effect of the mines on the environment. The
Working Group also prepared reports for the court on the few mining
operations, which were allowed to remain open. During the course of the
litigation, in 1986, Parliament enacted the Environment Protection Act.
After this, the Valley was designated as an ecologically fragile area under the
Environment Protection Act. In addition, the centre appointed a Doon Valley
Board, under the chairmanship of the Minister for Environment and Forests,
which was charged with conserving and restoring degraded areas of the Valley. 
The Supreme Court concluded that mining in reserved forests in the Dehradun
valley violated the Forest Conservation Act. However, the Forest Conservation
Act only prohibits non-forest activities on forest lands that do not have the
approval of the Central Government.  In addition to ecological integrity and
national interests, the Supreme Court was also concerned with the welfare of
mine operators and laborers left unemployed by closure of the Dehradun Valley
operations. The Court issued the following directions:
a. Orders that mine lessees whose operations were terminated by the court
would be given priority for leases in new areas open to limestone mining.
b. Orders that the Eco-Task Force of the central department of Environment
reclaim and reforest the area damaged by mining and that worker
displaced by mine closure be given priority for jobs with the Eco-Task
Force operations in the region.
The Court concluded that if mining activities continue in the Dehradun Valley,
then it will cause great harm to the environment and will also violate provisions
of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
Analysis of the Judgement
Like industrialization, almost everything has both beneficial and negative
consequences. As stated in the principle of Sustainable Development, I think
there always should be a balance between both, progress and deterioration. In its
decision, the Supreme Court used the concept of sustainable development by
creating employment opportunities for the jobless workers as well as shutting
down mining activities in environmentally hazardous regions. As a result, in my
opinion, the judgement is completely warranted in its own right.
The right to a healthy environment is protected as a basic right under Article 21
of the Indian Constitution. Advancement leads to industrialization, which leads
to environmental deterioration. The concept of acceptable improvement has
come up as a way to continue this discussion. i.e., there should be a balance
between progress and environmental protection. On the stake of public
attention, ordinary humiliation is not pushed. Administrative and decisive
processes for putting things straight normal and developmental features should
be developed, as shown by the country’s cash related requirements.
Courts play an important role in defining the scope of powers and sections of
final agreements, as well as whether the environment and development are
compatible. The most important thing is to find a common ground amongst the
two, i.e., progress on one side and a tainted-free atmosphere on the other.
A cycle in which progress may be sustained endlessly by focusing on the
potential of a man’s existence while also living in peace with environment and
deferring the post-trial phase of life-sustaining eco-structures. Its typical
neighbourhood consists of the synchronisation of developmental and mundane
goals. As a result, the only viable solution is acceptable progress, and
persuasive exercises should be pursued to that end.

Case 3
M. C. Mehta Vs. Kamal Nath & Ors - The diversion of river Beas
case
Equivalent Citations: (1997)1 SCC 388
Petitioner: M.C. Mehta
Respondent: Kamal Nath & Ors.
Bench: Kuldip Singh, S. Saghnar Ahmad
Date of judgment: 13/12/1996
Background and Facts of the Case 
The facts of the case are as follows: One of the Respondents, Span Hotels Pvt.
Ltd. a private company had built motels on the forest land adjacent to River
Beas. The same was taken on lease from the government for a period of 99
years. Subsequently, the respondents tried to divert the flow of Beas River using
heavy earthmovers. They also constructed heavily cemented embankments
along the river and further tried to encroach upon the surrounding barren forest
land. Moreover, it transpired that the various acts of the Respondents were
authorized by the Forest Department of Kullu. It is further alleged that Mr.
Kamal Nath, one of the Respondents too was an interested party in the deal. He
was further the Minister-in-charge, Department of Environment and Forests at
the time of signing of the lease deed between Span Hotels and the Himachal
Government. The Supreme Court took suo motto notice of a news article that
appeared in the Indian Express on February 25, 1999. The article read, “Kamal
Nath dares the mighty Beas to keep his dreams afloat”. The Apex Court ordered
the Central Pollution Control Board to file a report post the inspection of the
area. The Report stated that the area is a question that was highly vulnerable
with Beas being in an unstable state. It further advised a long-term planning and
flood control in Kullu
Issues Raised
1. Whether the court has wrongly inducted Mr. Kama Nath as a Respondent in
the present petition?
2. Whether the construction activity carried out by the Motel Company
justified?
3. The main issue in the case was: Applicability of Public Trust Doctrine in
India.
Summary of court decision and judgment
1. The public trust doctrine, as discussed by us in this judgment is a part of the
law of the land.
2. The Court quashed the lease-deed by which forested land was leased to the
Motel Company and held that the construction activity carried out by the
Motel Company was not justified.
3. The Motel was ordered to pay compensation by way of cost for the
restitution of the environment and ecology of the area.
4. The Motel was ordered to construct a boundary wall at a distance of not
more than 4 meters for the building of the motel beyond which they were not
allowed to use the land of the river basin.
5. The Court restricted the Motel from discharging untreated effluent into the
river. Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board was directed to inspect and
keep a check.

6. The court categorically asserted that the Public Trust doctrine was a part of
the Indian legal system. The court in fact referred to a number of foreign
precedents and legal statutes in support of the doctrine. The court based its
conclusion on the idea of the finiteness of resources that in turn prompts the
 limitation on human activity. It further held that in its role as a public trustee
of natural resources, the government was bound by three different
restrictions: one, the trust property must be available for public use, two, the
same cannot be sold at any price, three, the trust must be maintained for only
certain uses. However, the court also carved out an exception to the public
trust doctrine in cases of practical necessity that makes an appropriation of
such property inevitable. Even in such scenarios, the government must not
forget its duty as a public trustee to such property. Thus, by applying the
doctrine of Public Trust in India, the court directed to cancel the lease deed
that was granted to the Respondents on the public land. They were further
asked to pay compensation as a means to restore the environment of the area.
Analysis
The judgment is a landmark decision and one of the most important cases
relating to Environmental law in India since the court decided to transcend the
traditional boundaries of Environmental jurisprudence in India. This led to the
birth of a new concept that was otherwise alien to the law of the land. The
Public Trust doctrine was successfully transplanted into the Indian legal system.
In addition to applying the Public Trust Doctrine, the court also rightfully
applied two other principles of equal importance under Environmental Law.
One, the polluter pays principle, by ordering the respondents to ensure the
restoration and restitution of the ecology of the area. This is an important
principle under the Environmental jurisprudence as it seeks to maintain a fine
balance between the harm done and the subsequent correction. And the
principle of deterrence, whereby the court imposes exemplary damages and
additional fines on the Respondents to deter similar acts in the future. The
imposition of exemplary costs can prove to be an effective deterrence for the
polluters. Moreover, the money so received can be used to create a common
fund. The same can be utilized in mitigating the harm done to our resources.
The court by recognizing the doctrine of public trust has also upheld the spirit of
the Indian Constitution. Article 48A under the Directive Principles of State
Policy holds that the state as a duty to protect and preserve the environment,
forest, and wildlife. A similar duty is also enshrined under Fundamental Duties
of Indian citizens mentioned under Article 51A.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that post M.C. Mehta vs. Kamal Nath, the Public Trust
Doctrine has been firmly ingrained in our legal system. This has been further
affirmed by subsequent decisions on the same. In Shree Santh Dasganu
Maharaja Singh v. Indian Oil Corporation, the National Green Tribunal in its
order dated 28.08.2015 held that the doctrine was now a part and parcel of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the state is under an obligation to
protect the natural resources. In M.I. Builders v Radhey Shyam Sahu, the
Supreme Court upheld the Public Trust doctrine by preventing the construction
of a shopping complex in a park. Thus, repeatedly, the courts in India have
applied the doctrine of public trust to hold that the state is not an owner but a
trustee of natural resources and is in turn responsible for their protection.
Doctrine of Public Trust
The Supreme Court applied the ‘Doctrine of Public Trust’ to the present case.
Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like
air, sea, water and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a
whole that it would be unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership.
The said resources being a gift of nature should be made freely available to
everyone irrespective of the status in life.
Application of the Doctrine of Public Trust
In the present case there is a large river basin which is a part of a protected
forest land. This land was leased by the Government of Himachal Pradesh to the
Motel Company for a commercial purpose. The Himachal Pradesh Government
was held to have committed a patent breach of Public Trust by leasing an
ecologically fragile land to the Motel management.
Case 4
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Gas Leak in Shriram Factory)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: P. N. BHAGWATI, C.J.I., RANGANATH MISRA, G. L. OZA, M. M.
DUTT AND K. N. SINGH, JJ.
Petitioner: M.C. Mehta
Respondent: Union of India
Citation: (1987 SCR (1) 819, AIR 1987 965)
Introduction
The case also popularly known as oleum gas leak case is one of the landmark
judgements of the Indian Judiciary. The case came after the Bhopal gas disaster
which had already acquired everyone’s attention towards the issue of the
environment. This case added more to that issue. The case dealt with the
substantial play of various Fundamental Rights of the people. The case has also
laid down a new and important principle of “Absolute Liability” which has
served as a principle of massive importance in Indian Judiciary.
FACTS
In the centre of a population of 200,000 people in the area of Kirti Nagar,
Shriram’s Food and Fertiliser factory, Delhi was situated, which produced
products like hard technical oil and glycerin soaps. M.C. Mehta, a social activist
lawyer, submitted before the Supreme Court a writ petition seeking an order for
closure and relocation of the Shriram Caustic Chlorine and Sulphuric Acid Plant
to an area where no real danger to the people’s health and security will exist.
Pending disposal of the petition, the Supreme Court allowed the plant to restart
its capacity and work. On 4 and 6 December 1985, Oleum gas leaked from one
of its units during the pending lawsuit, causing substantial harm to local
residents as a result of the plant’s gas leakage.
As stated by the petitioner, a lawyer who practised in the Tis Hazari Courts also
died as a result of oleum gas inhalation. As a result of the collapse of the
structure on which it was built, the leakage resulted from the bursting of the
tank containing oleum gas, and it generated fear among the citizens residing
there. The people had hardly recovered from the shock of this tragedy when,
within two days, another leakage occurred, though this time a minor one, due to
the escape of oleum gas from a pipe’s joints, after which the claims for
compensation were filed, for the people who had suffered damage as a  result of
Oleum Gas escape, by the Delhi Legal Aid & Advice Board and the Delhi Bar
Association.
The Delhi administrations immediate response to these two leaks was to issue
an order dated 6th December 1985 by the Delhi Magistrate, in accordance to
sub-section(1) of Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordering and
requiring Shriram to cease the occupation of manufacturing and processing of
dangerous and lethal chemicals and gasses, including chlorine, Oleum, Super
Chlorine, phosphate, etc. at their facility in Delhi and to remove such chemicals
and gasses from the facility within 7 days and to refrain from storing them in
the same place again or to appear in the District Magistrate Court on 17
December 1985, to show cause as to why this order should not be enforced.
The Supreme Court held that the case should be referred to a larger bench
because the questions raised involve substantial law issues relating to the
interpretation of Articles 21 and 32 of the Constitution. In order to assess
whether a writ in conjunction with compensation could be awarded, the court
had to interpret Article 32. In relation to the private companies Article 21,
which establishes the right to protect life and freedom, was also to be
interpreted as being essential in the public interest. 
Issues
The oleum gas leak case led to various issues to come into the light, which was:
● Whether these harmful industries should be permitted to operate in these
areas?
● Whether a regulating mechanism should be established if they are
permitted to function in such areas?
● How should the liability and amount of compensation be determined in
such cases?
● How does Article 32 of the Constitution extend in these cases?
The court in this case referred to the judgement of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.   
Union of India4 in which court held that scope under Article 32 not only
includes preventive measures when Fundamental Rights are under the threat of
violation but it also includes remedial measures when rights are already being
violated. This is necessary for the purpose of securing enforcement of the
Fundamental Rights especially when it comes to the involvement of the rights
of poor, underprivileged and disadvantaged section of the society.
● Whether the rule of Absolute Liability or Ryland v Fletcher is to be
followed?
In  Ryland v. Fletcher, the principle of Strict Liability was laid down by the
English Court in the year 1866. This principle states that “any person who keeps
any hazardous substances on his premises will be held responsible if such
substances escape the premises and causes any damage”6. But there are certain
exceptions to the rule like Act of God, Plaintiff’s fault and third party’s fault. 
The courts in India were reluctant to accept the concept of Strict liability as it
was believed that with the advancement and technological development the
involvement of hazardous and harmful material in the industry has increased
manifold and this has posed a greater threat and in order to not make it easy
enough for the industries to take the help of exceptions and get away easily, the
courts decided not to follow any foreign principle and came up with a new
principle in this case. This principle is known as Absolute Liability.
Absolute Liability – The rule is almost as similar as strict liability but there are
no exceptions here. According to this rule, any person involved in inherently
dangerous or hazardous activity, or any harm is caused to anyone because of
any accident occurred during carrying out those activities, the person who
carried out those activities would be absolutely liable. 
Judgement
Justice J. Bhagwati, while showing great concern for the people of Delhi, stated
that the total elimination of hazardous chemical factories is not a solution as
they contribute to social and economic development. And the complete closure
of the factory would only result in unemployment and job losses of about 4000
workers in the caustic soda factory. Since hazardous chemical factories are
harmful to the public, but cannot be closed completely, it can be expected that
the hazard can be reduced by taking all preventive measures. As result, the
company was allowed to open under 11 conditions and a committee was formed
to oversee all the activities of the company.
Some of the most important provisions enacted by the government: –
1. In accordance with the Water Act (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
of 1974 and the Air Act (Prevention and Control of Pollution) of 1981,
the Central Pollution Control Board shall establish an inspector to verify
the level of pollutants.
2. Establishing an employee’s safety board.
3. Industry to publicly disclose the effects and proper chlorine treatment.
4. Train and educate workers in terms of plant safety through audio-visual
facilities and install loudspeakers in case of gas leakage to alert
neighbors.
5. Equipment such as helmets and belts should be used by workers.
6. Shriram’s employees shall provide the Chairman of Delhi Cloth Mills
Limited with the undertaking that the employees will be responsible for
the liability paid for any accident or damage resulting in death or injury to
workers or individuals living nearby in connection with the gas escape.
These provisions have been formulated in response to the reports of the
Manmohan Singh Committee and Nilay Choudhary Committee in order to
ensure continued safety and compliance standards and procedures, thus
reducing the possible danger and risk to workers. Furthermore, enterprises
cannot escape liability by proving that they are not irresponsible about the
hazardous material or that they have taken all necessary and sufficient measures
to deal with it. 
In addition to issuing guidelines, the court noted that under Article 32 and the
Supreme Court, new techniques and methods for upholding fundamental rights
could be established. The power under Article 32 in the event of a threat to
fundamental rights does not apply only to preventive actions, but also to
remedial acts where rights have already been violated, as found in the case of
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India. Furthermore, the court has held that
it has the power to grant remedial relief in situations where a fundamental right
infringement is egregious and affects a significant number of citizens or people
who are vulnerable and backward.
The court also looked at the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which divided
the industries into three classes based on the position the government could play
in each of them. The first was solely the state’s fault. The Court also applied
Industrial Policy Resolution 1956, which split the industries into three classes
based on their position in each of them. The first, the state is alone liable. The
second category were those sectors that were eventually state-owned, of which
the State usually took the initiative to start new projects but would still have to
supplement the State’s efforts by funding and starting up businesses or by
involving the State. The third group would encompass all other sectors which
would normally be left to the effort and organizations of the private sector.
An analysis of the provisions in the Policy Resolution Acts finds that the
operations of manufacturing chemicals and fertilizers are regarded as a critical
part of the public sector, the activities of the state itself, with State funding and
under state supervision, should eventually be carried out during the interim term
by the state itself. Though the court did not finally determine if a private
company was covered by Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, it emphasized
that it would be necessary to do so in the future.
The concept of absolute liability was implemented. Rylands v. Fletcher’s rule
cannot be applied in the case of hazardous chemical factories because third-
party work and natural disasters are out of bounds the leak was caused by a
human and mechanical error that did not involve any third party or natural
disaster, so the principle of absolute liable is applicable. Any industry that is
involved in any hazardous activity that may harm public health is obliged to
take reasonable care and cause no harm to anyone. Any Industries should
compensate for the loss caused due to escape of its hazardous substance, as a
part of the social cost for storing such hazardous substance in its premises. 
Shriram’s case is very important in the advocacy of the environment, as it
shows the Supreme Court as the representative of the people against the biggest
establishment Shriram Food and Fertilizers. The Supreme Court applied the
principle of absolute liability as it conserved the principle of strict liability
insufficient for the protection of citizens. Under Article 21, the Supreme Court
not only protects the fundamental right to life, but also the pollution-free and
safe environment. Prior to this case, India also uses the concept of strict liability
which states that if an owner/operator is responsible for the unnatural use of his
land in spite of his negligence or misconduct, he/she is held liable but this has
principle have defense of “Act of God”. Strict liability is replaced by absolute
liability as strict liability has limited provisions as well. 
Conclusion
The decision had to be made in such a manner so as not to hinder the economic
development of the country and also to ensure justice for the victims. Only a
few months before the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 came into force did
this incident become a guiding force for the implementation of such an effective
law. The case set a precedent for all the industries to establish more stringent
safety measures. The gas leak case of Shriram was also noteworthy because it
was the first time that a company had been held exclusively responsible for an
incident and had to pay compensation irrespective of its claims in defence. The
reasons for the decision have also been found not only on a legal basis but also
on a scientific basis, which is why a special judicial function has been
undertaken by the Supreme Court. The decision was made also in view of the
importance of industrialization and the fact that it may eventually result in
accidents. The decision was also determined considering the terms of the need
for industrialization and the inevitable possibility and the impact of injuries. In
general, it was a rational decision, taking all social, economic, and legal factors
into account, which made the Supreme Court a defender of the environment and
public rights.
Case 5
The Tarun Bharat Sangh vs. Union of India and Ors. (1991)
PETITIONER: TARUN BHARAT SANGH, ALWAR
RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT 08/04/1993
BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)
VENKATACHALA N. (J)
Statutes/Constitution Involved- Indian Constitution, Forest Act, Rajasthan
Forest Act, Environment Act
Important Sections/ Articles- Article 32 of Indian Constitution; Sec 2 of
Forest (Conservation) Act; Sec 29 of Rajasthan Forest Act; Sec 3 of
Environment (Protection) Act
INTRODUCTION
This case dealt with illegal mining activity in an area declared as Tiger Reserve.
The petitioner, a voluntary organization interested in protecting the
environment, approached the court complaining of the widespread illegal
mining activity going on in the area declared as a Tiger Reserve in the State of
Rajasthan. It prayed that in the interest of ecology, environment and rule of law,
the activity should stop. It was alleged that there were notifications prohibiting
all mining activity, and yet the State Government had granted hundreds of
licences for mining marble, dolomite and other materials and that such section
was contrary to law. The Court appointed a committee to ensure due observance
of the various Acts and Notifications that had been issued in respect of the
protected area. The committee stated that there were 215 mines completely
falling within the areas declared as protected forest while 47 mines fell partly
inside and partly outside the areas declared as protected forest. The court
emphasized that this was not a case where the court was called upon to shut
down an activity being carried on lawfully, in the name of higher considerations
of ecology and environment. It was a simple case to ensure observance of
enacted laws made by the State to protect the environment and ecology of the
area. In such a case, there was no need to be oppressed by considerations of
balancing the interest of economy and ecology. That had already been done by
the Legislature and Parliament. It observed that no mining lease could have
been granted or renewed within the forest without clearance from the Central
Government in accordance with the forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and the
Rules made there-under. Admittedly, no such prior approval or clearance of
central Government was obtained. It concluded that the mining activity was
illegal and had to stop. In view of the inherent illegality attaching to them, there
was no option but to close them. Besides that, it was directed that the mining
activity in the mines situated outside the protected forest areas but within the
tiger reserve could continue for a period of four months. If no permission to
continue mining was obtained from the Central Government within the said
period of four months, the mining activity in the entire area declared as tiger
reserve had to stop.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The present case is related to illegal mining in the Alwar District of Rajasthan.
Tarun Bharat Sangh is a voluntary organization interested in the protection of
environment, they filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India regarding the illegal mining activity that was taking place in an area
declared as a tiger reserve under Rajasthan Wild Animals and Birds Protection
Act, 1951 and as a protected forest under the Rajasthan Forest Act, 1953.
Petitioners submitted that the Rajasthan government had granted licenses to
allow for mining marble, dolomite, and other minerals in the concerned area,
which was contrary to law. The Court issued notices to the Government of
Rajasthan and the mine-owners who were the respondents in the case. On
October 11, 1991, the Court issued an interlocutory direction to the effect that
“no mining operation of whatever nature shall be carried on in the protected
area.”
A committee under the chairmanship of Justice M. L. Jain (former judge of the
Rajasthan High Court) was appointed to ensure the due observance of the
various acts and notifications issued with respect to the said protected area. The
Committee demarcated and identified the areas, which were declared as
protected forest. The Committee after tracing maps that were furnished by the
forest department and the Revenue Department found that the mines were
comprised in several areas. According to the Committee, 215 mines listed in
Appendix-A of the report fell within the areas of declared forest, and 46 mines
listed in Appendix-B fell partly inside and partly outside the areas declared as
protected forest. Furthermore, the Committee recommended that the mining
operations in mines listed in Appendix-A and in areas declared as protected
forest under Appendix-B should be stopped.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the area where mining activity was carried on, was a ‘protected
forest’? 
2. Whether the application filed by the State of Rajasthan to delete an extent
of 5.02 Sq. Km. from the protected forest was valid? 
3. Whether the map produced by the Rajasthan Government concerning the
tiger reserve was valid? 
4. Whether the mining activity within the tiger reserve but outside the
protected forest areas was illegal? 
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, who represented the petitioners, submitted, “All the mining
activities in the areas which were declared as a protected forest should stop
forthwith keeping in view of the earlier orders of this Court and the report
submitted by the Committee”. The Petitioners pointed out that the mining lease
which were granted by the Rajasthan Government were ex facie illegal since no
prior permission was obtained from the Central government as mandated under
the Forest (Conservation) Act and rule 4(6) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral
Concession Rules. The Petitioners further argued that continuance of such
mining activity was in the nature of contempt of court as it clearly violated the
Court’s order. The Petitioners also submitted that the Government of Rajasthan
was equally guilty of contempt of court, as they did not take stringent actions
against the mine-owners.
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT
On behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Shri. Aruneshwar Gupta submitted that
according to the certificate issued by the forest department, the said area did not
fall within the protected forest area. The respondents argued that the protected
areas were not clearly known, as there was no demarcation on the spot. The
respondents further pointed out that the Government of Rajasthan had already
shut down 54 mines and therefore, it was evident that they did not collude with
the mine-owners nor did they have any intention to flout the orders of the Court.
The Counsel for the respondents further requested the Court to exclude the areas
of the mines from the protected forest in the public interest.
JUDGEMENT
The following are the observations of the Honourable Supreme Court
concerning each of the issues framed
● Whether the area where mining activity was carried on, was a ‘protected
forest’?
Section 29 of the Rajasthan Forest Act empowers the state government to
declare any forestland or wasteland as a protected forest. Sub-section (1) states
that “the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette declare
the provisions of this chapter applicable to any forest land or wasteland which is
not included in a reserve forest but which is the property of the State
government or over which the State government has proprietary rights.” The
land that was discussed in the case is the property of the state government. The
Court held that the notification that the respondents contended as an interim
notification was not preliminary or provisional and hence it was valid and
effectual as section 29 contemplated that “only one notification declaring an
area as a protected forest.”
● Whether the report submitted by Justice M. L. Jain Committee, which was
appointed by the Court to determine the boundaries of areas that have been
declared as the protected forest, were invalid?
The Court observed that the main aim of the Committee was to demarcate and
identify the areas declared as protected forest under the notification issued on
January 1, 1975. The Committee was composed of high officials of the
Government of Rajasthan and was headed by a former judge of the Rajasthan
High Court. The Court held that “the Committee has undertaken an elaborative
and intensive exercise and have demarcated the areas declared as protected
forest with the help of official maps and records.” Therefore, the Court did not
find any reason not to accept the said report.
● Whether a prior approval from the central government necessary for mining
activities in the said area? And if yes, when was it taken by the mine-
owners?
The Court observed that once an area was declared as a protected forest, it came
under the purview of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. According to section
2 of the act, the area was a forestland, and therefore, no non-forest activity
could be carried out in the area except “with the prior approval by the Central
government.” Even the state government was not allowed to carry on any such
activity without prior approval from the Central government. According to
Rule 4(6) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986, “no mining
lease could be granted or renewed without clearance from the Central
Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and the rules made
thereunder.” Therefore, the Court held that mining activities after January 11,
1975, were illegal.
● Whether the application filed by the State of Rajasthan to delete an extent of
5.02 Sq. Km. from the protected forest was valid?
The application filed by the Rajasthan state government was confined only to
208 mines out of 262 mines. R. C. Bhandare who appeared on behalf of the
mine-owners submitted that there were several mines around and outside the
area of the declared forests and no purpose would be served if the mines under
the protected areas would be closed and mines, which are within the tiger
reserve, would be opened. Therefore, the Court opined that said proposal was to
be examined by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India
and a report on the same was to be submitted to the Court within three months.
● Whether the map produced by the Rajasthan Government concerning the
tiger reserve was valid?
The Court stated that the state government approached the Supreme Court with
a detailed plan, and the map was prepared with great care. The Court rejected
the Counsel’s contention that the area declared as a tiger reserve in Alwar
district was not correctly identified. The Court held that both central and the
state governments had demarcated the area properly and hence, there was no
legitimate dispute concerning the correctness of the map.
● Whether the mining activity within the tiger reserve but outside the protected
forest areas was illegal?
The Court on this question observed that the mining activities outside the
protected forest areas but within the tiger reserve after May 7, 1992, was illegal.
The Court further added that if there was any illegality attached to the mines
that came under the tiger reserve but outside the protected forest areas, the
concerned mine-owners should approach the Department of forest and
Environment, Government of India, for permission to continue mining
operations in those mines only.
CONCLUSION
The present case can be considered as one of the landmark cases against state
agencies wherein the executives failed to perform the proper enactment of the
law of the land, particularly concerning environment protection. The Court
observed, “This is not a case where the court is called upon to shut down an
activity being carried on lawfully, in the name of higher consideration of
ecology and environment.” The Court, in this case, proved that “protection and
improvement” would prevail if the laws were violated.