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 THE AMERICAN

JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
VOLUME X MARCH, I 905 NUMBER 5

THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE1

The problemsof social structurewe findin a ratherconfused
stateat the presentmoment. In an earlierstage of sociological
thinking considerableexpectations wereattachedto the interpre-
tationof social phenomenaby meansof biologicalanalogies,or
whatwas calledtheorganictheoryof society. These expectations
maynow be said to have been disappointed.The organictheory
has almostuniversallybeen abandoned. Yet even its severest
criticsare likelyto admitthatthereis some truthin or behind
it, althoughtheyseem to be at a loss to explainproperlywhat
kindoftruthit is.
By a curiouscoincidence, the threemostnotablerepresenta-
tivesofthatdoctrine -the Russian,Paul vonLilienfeld, a manof
highsocialstanding;the German,AlbertSchaiffle, witha reputa-
tion as a politicaleconomist; and the Englishman,Herbert
Spencer,whosefameneedsnot to be emphasized - all departed
fromlifein theyear I903, thetwolatterin themonthof Decem-
ber; all in advancedold age. To thesethreemensociologyowes
a debtof gratitude,because,afterComte,theywere the first-
at least in Europe-to formulate a theoryof social life in large
outline. From all, but especiallyfromSchaiffle and Spencer,we
receive,and shallcontinueto receive,constantand fertileimpulses
1A paper read at the Congressof Arts and Science, Departmentof Sociology,
St. Louis, September,I904.
569
570 THE AMERICAN IOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

or suggestions. But I feelsafe in predicting thatit will soon be

universallyacknowledgedthatthe foundations of theirtheories
were not laid firmlyenough for permanently supportingthose
boldlyplannedstructures of thought.
For a long timepast I have cherishedthe opinionthatthese
authors,as well as nearlyall theirsuccessorsand critics,are
hamperedby a fundamental lack of clearnessas to the subject
of their inquiries -a subject which they are in the habit of
designatingby the veryindefinite name of "a society,"or, as
Schuiffleputsit," thesocialbody." Confusionof ideas invariably
proceedsfroma defectof analyticalreasoning;thatis to say,of
properdistinction.
I believeand assertthatthreedistinctconceptions, the com-
mon object of whichis social life in its broadestsense,are not
or notat all, keptapartnor evenrecognizedas being
sufficiently,
distinct,viz.,thebiological,thepsychological, and thesociological
in what I call the exclusivesense,the subjectof thisthird-con-
ceptiononly being entirelynew, as comparedwiththe subjects
of othersciencesor departments of philosophy. It seemsto me
to be our fundamental taskas philosophical sociologiststo deduce
fromthis last conception, and othersimpliedin it, a systemof
social structurewhich shall contain the different notions of
collectiveentitiesin theirmutualdependenceand connection;and
I firmly trustthatout of such a systemwill be gained a better
and moreprofoundinsightintothe evolutionof societyat large,
and intoitshistorical phases,as thelifeof thesecollectiveentities.
It is thereforein thestruggles, betweenanyof thesegroups
first,
and theindividualscomposingit; second,betweentheirdifferent
formsand kinds- forinstance,thestrugglesbetweenchurchand
empire; betweenchurchand cities; betweenchurchand state;
betweencities and other corporations;betweenthe sovereign
stateand feudalcommunities, and consequently established orders
or estates; betweensingle states and a federalstate- it is in
theseand similarstruggles,presupposing the existenceof those
collectiveentities,thatthe growthand decayof higherciviliza-
tionsexhibitthemselves mostmarkedly.
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 571

I
When we speak of a house, a village, or a city,the idea
immediately arisingin our mindsis that of a visiblebuilding,
or of largeror smallergroupsof buildings; but soon we also
recollectthe visiblecontentsof these buildings,such as rooms
and cellarsand theirfurniture;or, when groups of buildings
are concerned, the roads and streetsbetweenthem. The words
"house," "village," and "city" are,however,used in a different
sensewhenwe have in mindtheparticularcontentsof buildings
whichwe call theirinhabitants, especiallytheirhumanoccupants.
Veryoften,at least in manylanguages,peopleare not onlycon-
ceivedof as theinhabitants of,butas identicalwith,thebuildings.
We say,forinstance,"the entirehouse,""the wholevillage" -
meaninga lot of peoplethe idea of whom is closelyconnected
withtheidea of theirusual dwelling-place.We thinkof themas
beingone withtheircommonhabitation. Neverthelessit is still
a visibleunion of individualswhich we have in mind. This
visibleunion,however,changesintoan invisibleone, whenit is
conceived ofas lastingthrough severalgenerations.Nowthehouse
willbecomeidentified witha familyor perhapswitha clan. In the
samemannera villagecommunity or a townshipwillbe imagined
as a collectivebeing,which-although not in all, yet in certain
important respects-remains the same in essence,notwithstand-
ing a shiftingof matter;thatis to say, an incessantelimination
of waste portions- men who die - and a constant accretion of
fresh elements- born children. Here the analogy with the
essentialcharacteristicsof an organismis obvious. Vegetable
and animal organismslikewiseare only representedby such
elementsas are visibleat anytime,and thelaw of lifeconsistsin
this,that the remainingportionsalways predominateover the
eliminatedand the reproducedones, and thatthe latterby and
by moveand fillup thevacantspaces,whiletherelationsof parts
of cellsas tissues,or of tissuesas organs
e. g., theco-operation
-do notundergoa substantial change. Thus suchan application
of biological notions
to thesocial lifeof mankind - as theorgani-
cist theoriesor methodsset out to do is not to be rejectedon
-
principle. We may,in fact,look upon any community of this
572 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

kind-maintainingitselfby receivingits parts-as beinga living

wholeor unity. This view is the moreplausibleif the renewal
itselfis merelybiological,as indeed is the case in the human
family,and, as we think,to a still greaterextent-because a
familysoon dispersesitself-in certainlargergroups: a tribe,
a nation,or a race; althoughthereis involvedin this view the
questionwhether thereis a samenessof nature-or, as we usually
say, of blood-guaranteed, as it should be, by an in-and-in
breedingof parents (German, Inzucht). Indeed, this self-
conservation of a group is the less to be expected,the smaller
thegroup; and it is well knownamongbreedersthatit is neces-
saryforthelifeof a herdnotto continuetoo long selectingsires
of thesame breed,but fromtimeto timeto refreshthe blood by
goingbeyondthe limitsof a narrowparentage,and crossingthe
race by mixtureswitha different stock.
At anyrate,thisis whatI shouldcall a purelybiologicalaspect
of collectivehumanlife,in so faras theirconception is restricted
to the mereexistenceof a humangroup,which,so to speak,is
self-active in itsmaintenance of life.
This aspect,however,does notsuffice whenwe considersocial
units of a local character,whichalso continuetheirexistence,
partlyin thesame,butpartlyin a different manner. Withrefer-
enceto themwe do notthinkexclusivelyof a naturalStoffwech-
sel, as it is effected by birthsand deathsof the individualscom-
posingthebody,butwe also considerthemovingto and froof liv-
ingmen,women,and children, theratioof which,liketheratioof
birthsand deaths,may cause an increaseor a decreaseof the
whiolemass, and must cause one or the otherif they do not
balance. In consequenceof this, we also have less reason to
expecta biologicalidentity of thestockof inhabitantsat different
times,than a lastingconnectionbetweena part of space (the
place), or rathera piece of the soil, and a certaingroupof men
who dwell in that place and have intercourse with each other,
althoughtheplace itselfgrowswiththenumberof its inhabitants,
and althoughevenamongtheseinhabitants therebe, forinstance,
not one directdescendantof thosewho occupiedthe place, say,
a hundredyearsago. We may,it is true,take it to be the rule
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 573

thatat least a certainnucleusof directdescendantskeeps alive

through manygenerations- a rule so muchmorecertainif it is
a largeplace,a wholeregion,or even a countrythatwe have in
mind. Still we shall not hold thisto be a conditiosine qua non
foracknowledging thevillageor thecityto be thesame; it being
in thisrespectmuchmorerelevantthatthe nucleusof the place,
ofthe" settlement," has enduredand has preserveditselfthrough
theages. Now, sinceplace and region,air and climate,have a
veryconsiderable effect upontheintelligence and sentiment of the
inhabitants,and seeingthata considerable changemaynot justly
be expectedwithrespectto this,exceptwhenthe mindsas well
as theexternalconditionsof the newcomersare totallydifferent
fromthoseof theolderstrata,we mayconsiderthe identity of a
place,in so faras it is foundeduponthesocialconnection of men
witha partof the soil, as a psychological identity,and call this
aspectof sociallifea psychological aspect. Therecan be no doubt
thatthispsychological aspectis in greatpartdependentuponthe
biologicalaspect,and is, as a rule, closelyinterwovenwith it.
Yet it needs but littlereflection to recognizethat both are also
to a certainextentseparateand independent of each other. The
subject-matter of a socialpsychology is differentfromthesubject-
matterof a socialbiology,thoughthereexista greatmanypoints
of contactbetweenthem,and thoughboth,apartfromthefounda-
tionsheregivento them,may be appliedto animalas well as to
humansocieties.
II
Neitherof the above-mentioned conceptionsof a continuous
unityor wholeimplies that theessential of theunity
characteristic
is perceivedand recognizedby thosewho belongto it, muchless
thatit is perceivedby others,by outsiders. And thisis the third
idea, by farthemostimportant one forthepresentconsideration
the idea of what I purposeto designateby the name of a
corporation, includingunder it all social units whatever,in so
faras theyhave thistraitin common,thatthemodeof existence
of theunityor wholeitselfis foundeduponthe consciousness of
its existence,and consequently it
that perpetuates itselfby the
conception of its realitybeingtransmitted fromone generationto
574 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

thenextone; whichwillnothappenunlessit be doneon purpose

by teaching,and generallyin the formof tradition. This evi-
dentlypresupposeshumanreason and humanwill, markingoff
sharplythis thirdgenus fromany kind of animal subhuman
society.
We are now to give closerattention to thisconception. For
themostpart,thoughnot always,it is the conceptionof a unity
different fromtheaggregateof members;theidea of a psychical
or moral body,capable of willingand of acting like a single
human being; the idea of a self or person. This person,of
course,is an artificial or fictitious one. It represents indeed,as
the formertwo conceptionsdid, a unitypersistingthroughthe
changeof its parts,but thisunityand identitypersistingin the
multitudeare neitherbiologicalnor directlyand properlypsy-
chological,but must,in distinction fromthese,be consideredas
specifically sociological; that is to say, while the second is the
social consciousness or social minditself,thisis theproductof it,
and can be understoodonlyby lookingintothehumansoul, and
by perceivingthoughtsand willswhichnot onlyhave a common
driftand tendency, butare creatorsof a commonwork.
The idea, however,of a body capable of willingand acting
is, as said above,not always,and not necessarily, impliedin the
idea of a sociologicalunit. There is a conception precedingit,as
protoplasmprecedesindividualbodies; namely,the generalidea
of a society(or a community, if this importantdistinctionis
advertedto), whichis not essentiallydifferent fromour second
idea of a psychological unit,exceptin thisone respect,accessory
to it,thatthe idea of thisunitbe presentsomehowin the minds
of the people who feel or know themselvesas belongingto it.
This conception is of far-reaching beingthebasis of
significaince,
all conceptions of a social,as contrasted witha political,corpora-
tion. It therefore comprisesespeciallythosespheresof social life
whicharemoreorlessindependent of politicalorganization,
among
whichthe economicalactivity ofmenis themostimportant, includ-
ing, as it does, domesticlife as well as the most remoteinter-
nationalrelationsbetweenthose who are connectedexclusively
by the ties of commercialinterest. But practicallyit is of little
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 575

consequencewhetherthis general idea be consideredas psy-

chologicalor as sociological,unlesswe preciselycontemplate men
whoconsciously maintaintheirownconception of theirown social
existence,in distinctionfromotherideas relatingto it, chiefly
whenit is put in contrastto the idea of a politicalcorporation,
and thepoliticalcorporation of highestimportis concerned -the
state. And it was exactlyin these its shiftingrelationsto the
statethattheidea of societyproper-though withoutrecognition
of itssubjectivecharacter - was evolvedaboutfifty yearsago by
someGermantheorists -notably Lorenz Stein,RudolphGneist,
and RobertMohl- who were moreor less stronglyunderthe
sway of Hegelian philosophy, seeingthat Hegel in his Rechts-
philosophiedevelopshis idea of humancorporateexistenceunder
the threefoldheadingof (i) the family,as "thesis," (2) civil
societyas "antithesis,"and (3) the state,as "synthesis"of the
two former.
But,thoughI myselflay considerable stressuponthisgeneral
notionof society,in juxtapositionand oppositionto the stateor
politicalsociety,I stillregardit as moreindispensable to a theory
of social structure to inquireintothe natureand causes of what
may be called,fromthe presentpointof view,genuinecorpora-
tions; thatis, thoseconceivedof as beingcapableof willingand
acting like a single individualendowedwith reason and self-
consciousness.The questionariseshow a "moral person" may
be consideredas possessingthispower.
Evidentlythisis an impossibility, unlessone singleindividual,
or severaltogether,are willingand actingin the name of that
fictitiousbeing. And in orderjustlyto be takenforthevolitions
and acts of an individualdistinctfromtheirown individualities,
thosevolitionsand actsmustbe distinguishable by certaindefinite
marks from therest of theirwilling and acting,whichtheydo in
theirown name; theymustbe differentiated formally. There
mustbe a tacitor an open understanding, a sortof covenantor
convention, thatonlyvolitionsand acts so differentiated shall be
consideredas volitionsand acts of the said moralpersonwhom
thatone or thoseseveralindividualsare supposedto represent.
By theway,thisquestionof marksand signs,consensualor con-
576 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

ventional,by whicha thing,physicalor moral,notonlyis recog-

nizedas such,butby whichits value (or what it is good for) is
differentiated fromits existence(or what it is), pervadesall
sociallifeand mind,and maybe calledthesecretof it. It is clear
that certainsigns may easilybe fixedor inventedwherebythe
volitionsand acts of a single individualmay be differentiated
fromtherestas beingrepresentative.But how if thereare more
thanone, who onlyoccasionallyhave one will and act together,
and who cannotbe supposedto agree in theirfeelingsas soon as
theyare requiredto representtheirmoral person? It is well
knownthatthesemustbe "constituted"as an assemblyor as a
wholecapableby its constitution to deliberateand,whatis more,
to resolveand act. It mustbe settledby theirown or by thewill
of anotherperson (i) underwhat conditions,and withrespect
to what subject-matters, theirresolutionsshall be consideredas
representing declarationsof will of theirown body; and (2)
underwhatconditions, and withrespectto whatsubject-matters,
declarationsof will of this body shall be valid as declarations
of willofthemoralpersontheyrepresent.
It is thereforethe constitution of a multitudeinto a unity
whichwe proposeas a fourthmode,and as a necessaryconse-
quenceof the thirdone, unlessthe moralpersonbe represented
exclusivelyby a singleman or womanas a naturalperson. The
Many constitute themselvesor are constituted as a body,which
is, as faras it maybe,similarto a naturalpersonin suchrelations
as are essentialpreciselyfor the notionof a person. Conse-
quently,thisbodyalso is a unity,but a unityconceiveda priori
as beingdestinedfora definite purpose,viz.,therepresentation of
a moralperson-the thirdor sociologicalkindof unity. And it
is different fromthat thirdnotionby this very relationonly,
whichevidently cannotbe inherentin thatpersonhimself. That,
in consequenceof this relation,it has a visibleexistenceapart
fromits own idea,whilethemoralpersonrepresented is nothing
his
beyond own idea. We may distinguish, therefore, between
fivemodesof existencein a moralpersonrepresented by a body:
(i) the ideal existencein the mindsof its members; (2) the
idealexistenceof thebodyconstituted, whichrepresents themoral
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 577

person,being as well in the mindsof the naturalpersonswho

composethatbody,as in themindsof membersof thecorporation
generally; (3) the visible existenceof this body, being the
assemblyof naturalpersons,willingand acting under certain
forms;(4) the intelligible existenceof thisassembly,beingcon-
ditionedby a knowledge,on thepartof thosewho externally or
theoretically perceiveit,of its constitution and its meaning; (5)
theintelligible existenceof the moralpersonor the body repre-
sented,beingconditioned of a knowledgeof the relationbetween
thiscorporation and thebodyrepresenting it, implyingthestruc-
tureof the formerin the first,and of the latterin the second
instance.
The visibleexistenceof an assemblymeansthatmembersare
visibleas being assembled,but the assemblyas a body can be
recognizedonlyby a reflecting spectatorwho knowswhat those
formsmean, who "realizes" their who thinksthe
significance,
assembly. Of course,a corporationalso, apart fromits repre-
sentation, can be perceivedonlymentally, by outsidersas well as
by its own members,and these are different perceptions(dis-
tinguishedhere as ideal and intelligibleexistence): members
perceiving it directly as a productof theirown will,and therefore
in a way as theirproperty(a thingwhichtheyown); and out-
sidersperceiving itonlyindirectly, byknowingthepersonor body
tllatrepresents it; thisbeingan externalperception only,unless
it be supplemented by a knowledgeof its peculiarmodeof being,
that is, of its constitution and of the relationswhichmembers
bear to the whole, and the whole to its members.
But it is, above all, in thisrespectthatgreatdifferences exist
betweendifferent kinds of corporations.The firstquestionis
whetherindividualsfeel and thinkthemselvesas foundersor
authorsor at least as representative ideal authorsof theirown
corporation.Let us take an obviousexample. Suppose a man
and a womancontracta marriage(we waive here all questions
of churchor stateregulations formakingthemarriagetiepublic).
They are said to founda family. Now, the childrenspringing
fromthisunionand growingup in thisfamilycannotjustlyfeel
and thinkthemselves as the creatorsor authorsof it, as long as
 578 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

theyare dependent upontheirparents. However,theypartakeof

it moreand moreconsciously, and someday theymaytake'upon
themselves the representation of thiswholeinternally and exter-
nally,in place of theirfatherand mother. They may learn to
feel and to thinkof themselvesas bearersof the personality of
thisidealbeing,playing,so to speak,thepartsof theauthorsand
founders,whomtheyalso may survive,and will survivein the
normalcourse of human events; and they may continuethe
identityof the familybeyondthe deathof theirparents. They
may maintainthe continuity of this identicalfamily,even when
new familieshave sprungfromi it whichmayor maynot regard
themselves as membersof theoriginalone. The proposition that
it exists still is true at least for those who will its truth,and
who act upon thisprinciple;nay,it is by theirthoughtand will
thattheyare creatingit anew,as it was made originallyby the
wills of the firsttwo persons. A different questionis whether
theexistenceof thiscorporation will be recognizedand acknowl-
edged by others,who may standin relationsto its members,or
maysimplybe impartialtheoretical spectators.
But, further, thereis thisfundamental differencein the rela-
tionof individualsto thatideal entitywhichtheythinkand will,
whethertheybe its realor merelyits representative authors,viz.:
(i) theymaylookuponthecorporation, whichtheyhave created
reallyor ideally,as upon a thingexistingfor its own sake, as
an endin itself,althoughit be at thesametimea meansforother
ends; or (2) theymay conceiveit clearlyas a mere tool, as
nothingbut an instrument for theirprivateends, which they
eithernaturallyhave in common,or whichaccidentally meetin a
certainpoint.
The firstcase appearsin a strongerlight,if theyconsiderthe
social entityas reallyexisting,and especiallyif they consider
theircorporation as a livingbeing; fora realthing,and especially
a livingthing,has alwayssomeproperties of its own. The latter
has evensomething likea will of its own; it cannotbe conceived
as beingdisposable,divisible,applicable,and adaptableat pleasure
to anypurpose,as a meansto anyend-this beingthenotionof
pure matter,as it existsonlyin our imagination;and therefore
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 579

a thingwhichhas merelya nominalexistencewould be really

nothingbuta mass of such imaginarymatter,absolutelyat one's
disposal,offeringno resistance,being stuffin itself,that is to
say,potentially anythingone may be able to make,to knead,to
shape,or to construeout of it (of course,real mattermay and
willmoreor less approachto thisidea). On the otherhand,to
thinkof an ideal thingas beingideal is not the same as to think
of it as imaginarymatter;but if one aims at a certainobject,if
onefollowsoutone's designs,one is constrained bya psychological
necessityto break resistancesand to subject thingsas well as
willsto one'sownwill; one tendsto makethemall alike,as " wax
in one's hand," to removeor to oppresstheirown qualitiesand
theirown wills,so as to leave, as far as possible,nothingbut a
dead and unqualified heap of atoms,a something of whichimagi-
narymatteris theprototype.Of course,it is onlyas a tendency
thatthis dissolvingand revolutionary principleis always active,
but its activityis manifesteverywherein social life,especially
in modernsociety,and characterizes a considerableportionof the
relationsof individualsto eaclhotherand consequently to their
corporations.As long as men thinkand regard "society"-
thatis to say,theirclan or theirpolis,theirchurchor theircom-
monwealth -as real and as trulyexisting; nay,whentheyeven
thinkof it as being alive, as a mysticalbody, a supernatural
person-so long will theynot feel themselvesas its masters;
theywill not be likelyto attemptusing it as a meretool, as a
machineforpromoting theirown interests;theywill look upon
it ratherwithawe and humilitythanwitha sense of theirown
interestand superiority.And, in consequenceof feelingsof this
kind,theyeven forgettheirown authorship-which,as a rule,
will indeedbe an ideal one only; theywill feeland thinkthem-
selves,notcreators,butcreaturesof theirowncorporations.This
is thesame processas thatwhichshowsitselfin thedevelopment
of men's regularbehaviortoward theirgods, and the feeling
and thinkingjust mentionedare always closelyrelatedto, or
even essentiallyidenticalwith, religiousfeelingand thinking.
Like the gods themselves, to whomso regularlyla cite antique,
its and
with temples sanctuaries, is dedicated,thecityor corpora-
 58o THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

tionitselfis supposedto be a supernatural eternalbeing,and con-

sequentlyexistingnotonlyin a real,butin an eminentsense.
But, of course,all feelingsof thiskind are but to a limited
extentliable to retardthe progressof a consciousnessof indi-
vidualinterests, or,as it is commonly spokenof-with a taintof
moral reproach -of selfishness.As a matterof fact,it is the
natural ripeningof consciousnessand thinkingitself which
makes reflection prevail over sentiment,and which manifests
itself,firstand foremost, in reflectionupona man'sown personal
interest,in theweighingand measuringof costsand results;but,
secondly,also in a similarreflection upon some commoninterest
or businesswhicha person,fromwhatevermotive,selfishor not,
hiasmade his own affair;and, thirdly,in thatunbiasedinterest
in and reflectionuponthenatureand causes of thingsand events,
of man's happinessand social existence,whichwe call scientific
or philosophical.
is,in thefirstinstance,analytical. I have spoken
All reflection
alreadyof the dissolvingprinciplewhichlies in the pursuingof
one's own personalaffairs,of whichthe chase afterprofitis but
themostcharacteristic form. But thesame individualistic stand-
point is the standpoint, or at least the prevailingtendency,of
sciencealso. It is nomninalism whichpervadesscienceand opposes
itselfto all confusedand obscureconceptions, closelyconnected, as
it is, witha strivingafterdistinctness and clearnessand mathe-
maticalreasoning. This nominalismalso penetratesinto men's
supposedcollectiverealities(supernatural or not), declaringthem
to be void and unreal,exceptin so faras individualand real men
haveconsentedto makesuchan artificial being,to constructit,and
to build it up -mentally.Knowledgeand criticismopposethem-
selvesto faithand intuition, in thisas in mostotherrespects,and
tryto supplantthem. To knowhow a churchor a stateis created
meansthe downfallof thatbeliefin its supernatural essenceand
existencewhichmanifestly is so naturalto human feelingand
intellect. The spiritof scienceis at the same timethe spiritof
freedomand of individualistic in contradiction
self-assertion, and
in oppositionto the laws and ties of custom- as well as of
religion,so intimately connectedand homologouswithcustom
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 58I

whichseem entirelyunnaturaland irrationalto analyticalrea-

soning. This reasoningalwaysputs the questions: What is it
good for? Does it conduceto the welfareof those whom it
pretendsto bindor to rule? Is it in consonancewithrightreason
thatmenshouldimposeupon themselves the despotismof those
laws and of the beliefssanctioning them? The classicalanswer
has beengivenin a startlingfashionby one whomComtecalled
the fatherof revolutionary philosophy.There is, says Thomas
Hobbes,a realmof darknessand misery,foundedupon supersti-
tionand falsephilosophy, whichis the church; and thereis, or
theremightbe, a realmof-lightand of happiness,foundedupon
theknowledgeof whatis rightand wrong; thatis to say,of the
laws of nature,dictatedby reasonand by experience,to check
hostileand warlikeindividualimpulsesby a collectivewill and
pover; this realmis the truestate,thatis to say, the idea and
modelof its purelyrationalstructure, whetherit may exist any-
whereas yet or not. Hobbesianismis the most elaborateand
mostconsistent systemof thedoctrinecomimonly knownas thatof
" naturallaw " (Naturrecht),including, as it alwaysdid,a theory
ofthestate.As a matterof fact,thisdoctrinehas beenabandoned
almostentirely, especiallyin Germany, whereit had beenexerting
a veryconsiderableinfluence in the centurywhichprecededthe
French Revolution,when even kings and absolutiststatesmen
were among its open adherents. It has been controverted and
abandonedeversincethefirstquarterof thenineteenth century-
a factwhichstandsin manifest connection withthegreatreaction
and restoration in the politicalfieldfollowingthe stormsof that
revolutionand of Bonapartistrule in Europe. There is hardly
a liberalschoolleftnow whichdares openlyprofessthatmuch-
deridedtheoryof a "'social compact." This, I believe,is some-
what different in the United States. As far as my knowledge
goes, thistheory - thatis to say, an individualistic construction
of societyand of thestate-is stilltheordinarymethodemployed
in this countryfora deductionof the normalrelationsbetween
stateor society,on the one hand,and individuals,on the other;
for,as needs no emphasis,it is not the opinionof an original
contractin thehistoricalsensethatis to be held in any way as a
582 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

substantialelementof thetheory. And yettheobviouscriticism

of that pseudo-element has been the most powerfulargument
against the whole theory,which consequentlyhas seldom met
with an intelligentand just appreciationin these latterdays.
And it is in oppositionto it that,apartfroma revivalof theologi-
cal interpretations, the recentdoctrineof societyor state as an
organismhas becomeso popularfora time. This doctrine,of
course,was an old one. Not to speak of the ancients,in the
so-calledMiddle Ages it had precededthe contracttheory,as it
has supplemented itin moremoderntimes.It was,indeed,coupled
withthetheologicalconceptions and religiousidealsso universally
acceptedin thosedaysalthoughit was not dependent uponthem.
The doctrineof St. Thomas and of Dante, however,containsa
theoryof the universalstate; thatis to say, of the empire,not
a theoryof society,of whichthe conceptionhad not yet been
formed,as we may safelysay thata consciousness of it did not
exist. This traditional organicism appliedas wellto thechurch,
-
the mysticbody,of whichChristwas the supposedhead- has
beentransferred of late to " society,"afterit had regainedfresh
authorityas a politicaldoctrine. However,the conceptionof a
"society,"as distinguished frompoliticalor religiousbodies,is
muchmorevague and indefinite.Eitherit is to be takenin the
firstand secondsense,whichI have pointedout as a biological
or a psychological aspectof collectivelife,in whichcase organic
analogieshold,butthewholeconsideration is not properlysocio-
logical; or it maybe takenin our third,or sociological,sense,in
whichcase it impliesmuchless thanany corporation the idea of
whatmaybe calledan organization.It is wellknownthata lively
controversy has beenarousedaboutthenew organicisttheory,as
proposedby Mr. Spencerand others,chiefly amongthosesociolo-
gistswho centeraboutthe Institutinternational of Paris, where
thelatelamentedM. Tarde playedso prominent a part. M. Tarde
has been among the foremostcombatantsagainst the vague
analogies of organicism; and I fullyagree with most of his
arguments as set forthin thethirdsociologicalcongressof i897.
I even flattermyselfon havinganticipatedsome of them,in an
earlypaperof nfineuponMr. Spencer'ssociologicalwork; which
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 583

paper,however,did not becomeknownbeyondthe small public

of the PhilosophischeMonatshefte(i888). I have especially,
and to a greaterdegreethanM. Tarde, insisteduponthe radical
difference betweena physiologicaldivisionof labor and that
divisionwhichis a cardinalphenomenon of society. I said: If
we justlycall it a divisionof labor that England manufactures
cotton and China produces tea, and that the two countries
exchangetheirproducts,thenthereis not and has not been a
commonlabor or functionprecedingthis divisionand dividing
itself,as in the case of an organism; no state of societybeing
historically knownwhere China and England were one whole,
workingin harmonyupon the spinning-wheel and upon the tea
plant. This is far frombeingtrue; each had its own historical
development, untiltheymet in the mutualwant of barter; and
eventhisconsideration impliesthatthecountriesthemselves may
justlybe said to entertaintradeand commercewitheach other,
thoughthisis hardlymorethana faponde parlerwithrespectto
a countrylike China. It may be objectedthatthereis a better
analogy,if we thinkof a primitivehousehold,where labor is
indeedone and is shiftingamong membersof the community,
while at a later stage it splits up into several families,some
cultivating thesoil,somebecomingwarriorsor priests,or artisans
and tradesmen.And in thesame way a villagecommunity, even
an independent townshiplike the ancientor mediaevalcity,and
a whole territory of whicha cityis the center,may reasonably
be conceivedof as one real household,of whichall singlehouse-
holds formorganicparts. They would thusbe contrastedwith
modernsociety,which is more adequatelyconceivedof as a
mereaggregateof individualhouseholds,each pursuingits own
interest,maybeat the cost of all the others. This is my own
objection,and this view is containedin my own theoryof
Gemeinschaftand Gesellschaft,meaning the dualism of that
primitive economicalcondition,survivingin manyrespectsdown
to ourown days,on theone hand,and " commercial " or " capital-
"
istic society,of whichthe germsare traceablein any formof
what,withan abstractterm,may be called communism, on the
other. It is the formersensethatevenmodernpoliticaleconomy
584 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

may be spokenof (as we style it in German) as "national"

economy. But even if thisbe allowed,theorganicanalogydoes
notholdotherthanin a ratherindefinite way. Whereis theone
" socialbody,"whichthusevolvesits organsand members, being
in its earlystage likea singlehouseholdor a villagecommunity,
and growingto be a complexensembleof manorsand municipali-
ties and great cities,some of which have their manufactures
workingforforeignexport,some forinlandconsumption?Is it
England that has taken a developmentof this kind? Or is
Englandand Wales? Or are Scotland,and evenpoor conquered
Ireland,to be included?
The morewe shouldtryto followout the admirableattempt
whichHerbertSpencerhas made in thisdirectionof employing
theorganicistview as a workinghypothesis, the morewe should
becomeconvincedthatour real insightintothelinesalong which
social evolutiontravelsis morehamperedthanpromotedby that
methodof biologicalanalogies.
III
But did I notsay therewas truthin thebiologicalconception
of social life? Indeed I did, and I say so again, if social lifeis
consideredexternally, and if we speak of a group as a living
whole,wherelifeis understood in itsgenuinesense,thatis to say,
biologically.And fromthispointof view,as thatfamousterm,
"phlysiological divisionof labor," is borrowedfromeconomical
factand theory,we mayvice versa applyphysiological termsto
social life,consideredexternally.We may speak of organsand
functions in a nationor society,or evenwithrespectto mankind
at large. We may metaphorically call the civilizednationsthe
"brain" of humanity, and we may say that the United States
has becomean independent lobe of the cortexin the courseof
thelast fortyyears. In thesame way it was onlylately,I under-
stand, that your Presidentspoke of railwaysas the arteries
throughwhichthe blood of trade is circulating. The forceof
this metaphorwill, I believe,not be impairedby the fact that
severaltheoristspointin morethana figurative senseto money,
or credit,as the social fluidinto whichall substancesof com-
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 585

moditiesare changed,and whichnourishesagain thesocial brain

and socialmuscles; thatis to say,menand womenwho perform
mentaland physicalwork; in consequenceof which analogy
banks,and theircorrespondence by lettersand bills and checks,
would, more than railways, resemble arteriesand veins. Of
course,it would be smalltroubleto adduce a numberof similar
ambiguities,whichmakesociologicalinquiriesof thiskindappear
as a matterof rhetoric and poetry,butnotof science.
Is thereno other,no philosophical, truthat least in the com-
parisonof a corporationto a livingbody? If thereis, it can,
accordingto the presentview, be only in this respect,that a
corporation may be thoughtand feltas an organicwhole,upon
whichthemembersthinkand feelthemselves dependent in sucha
waythattheyconsidertheirown individualexistenceas subservi-
entto thelifeof thewhole. The questionwhethera " society" is
an organismmustbe keptapartfromthe questionwhetherthere
are " societies" the relationsof whichto theirmembersare so
qualifiedas to implythoughtsand feelingsof that kind on the
partof theirmembers. We are well aware thatsocial systems,
whichhave been called by some eminentauthors" ancientsoci-
ety,"trulyexhibitedthischaracteristic trait. Why is notmodern
society- and, above all, the modern state- an organism in this
peculiarsense?
I believe,indeed,thatthereis strongreasonforcontroverting
the theoryin its applicationto these collectivebeings as they
actuallyare. We live,as everybody knows,in an individualistic
age, and we seek each other'ssocietychieflyforthe benefitthat
accruesfromit; thatis to say, in a comparatively small degree
frommotivesof sentiment, and to a comparatively greatextent
fromconsciousreflection.It is thiswhichmakesus regardthe
statealso as an instrument fitforservingour particularinterests,
or thosewe have in commonwithsomeor withall of our fellow-
citizens,ratherthanas an organism,ideallypre-existent to our-
selves,livingits own life,and beingentitledto sacrifices of our
life and property in its behalf. It is truethat in extraordinary
timeswe live up to thisview,but thenwe do not speakso much
of societyand of the stateas of the fatherhood whichputs for-
586 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

ward its claim to what we call our patriotism. A feelingof

brotherhoodand fellowship,of which in ordinarytimes the
tracesare as sadly scarce among compatriots as thosewho are
foreigners to eachother,rises,in moments of public danger,from
the bottomsof our souls in effervescent bubbles. The feeling,
to be sure,is moreof thenatureof an emotionthanof a lasting
sentiment. Our normalrelationstoward our presentsocieties
and states must not be taken as being accommodatedto this
extraordinary standard. They are, howsoevermen may boast
of theirpatriotism, generallyof a calm and calculatingcharacter.
We look upon the state,represented as it is by its government,
as upon a personwho standsin contractual ratherthanin senti-
mentalrelationsto ourselves. Certainly this viewis moreor less
developedin different countries,under different circumstances,
withdifferent individuals. But it is the one thatis indorsedby
the mostadvancedand the mostconsciousmembersof modern
societies,by thosepowerfulindividualswho feel themselvesas
mastersof theirown social relations. Societiesand states are
chieflyinstitutionsforthe peacefulacquisition,and forthe pro-
tection,of property.It is therefore the ownersof propertyto
whomwe mustlookwhenwe are inquiringintotheprevailingand
growingconceptions of societyand of thestate. Now, it cannot
be doubtedthattheydo not considereithersocietyor the state
as representing that early communitywhich has always been
supposedto be the originalproprietor of the soil and of all its
treasures,sincethiswould implythattheirown privateproperty
had onlya derivativeright- derivedfromthe rightand law of
publicproperty. It is just the oppositewhichtheythinkand
feel: the statehas a derivativerightof property by theirallow-
ance and theircontributions; thestateis supposedto act as their
mandatary. And it is thisview whichcorresponds to the facts.
A modern state- it is by no means always the youngest states
thatare themostcharacteristic typesof it-has littleor no power
overproperty.
I cannotrefrainfromquotinghere,as I have doneelsewhere,
a fewsentencesof the eminentAmericansociologist,Mr. Lewis
 PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 587

Morgan,in whichhe sums up his reflections

upon modernas
with" ancientsociety:"
contrasted
Since the advent of civilizationthe outgrowthof propertyhas been so
immense, its formsso diversified, its uses so expanding,and its management
so
intelligent
in the interestsof its owners,thatit has become,on the partof the
people,an unmanageablepower. The humanmind stands bewilderedin the
presenceof its own creation.
He thinks,it is true,that
the time will come when human intelligencewill rise to the masteryover
property,
and will be able to definethe relationsof the stateto the property
it
protects,
as well as the obligationsand the limitsof the rightsof its owners.
declaringhimselfunwilling,as he does,to accept" a mereprop-
ertycareer" as thefinaldestinyof mankind.
But this outlookintoa futurefar distant- althoughit was
written,I believe,beforethere were any of the giant trusts
established,and ere anybodyin thesestatesseemedto realizethe
dangersof the enormouspowerof combinedcapital- does not
touchimmediately thepresentquestion. It is the actualand real
relationof thestateto individualswhichbestreflects itselfin the
of as
lack poweroverproperty, pointedout by Mr. Morgan,or,
in otherwords,in thesubservientpositionwhichthegovernments
hold,in all countriesmoreor less, towardthe wealth-possessing
classes. I do not say - although maybe I think- that this ought
to be different;" je ne propose rien, j'expose." It is merely as
a theoreticalquestionthat I touchupon this point. But I am
not preparedto denythat it is also the great practicalproblem
of social structure- to reconstructthe state upon a new and
enlargedfoundation;thatis to say, to make it,by commonand
naturaleffort,a real and independent being,an end in itself,a
commonwealth(spelledin twowords) administered notso much
forthebenefit of eithera minorityor a majority,or evenof the
whole numberof its citizens,as for its own perpetualinterests,
which should includethe interestsof an indefinite numberof
futuregenerations -the interestsof the race. It cannot be
overlookedthatthereare at presentmanytendenciesat workin
thisdirection,but I believetheyare in partmoreapparentthan
real. The problem,we shouldconfess,is an overwhelming one;
588 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

and I forone do not feelat all surethatthissplendidand trans-

cendentconstitution that
of ours will overcomeits difficulties;
therewillbe sufficient moralpowerevenif intelligence shouldrise
to a sufficient height,for solving in a trulyrationalway the
" social question" as a questionof social structure.

To sumup theargument, I put it in the formof a fewtheses

or propositions:
i. The objectof sociological theoryproper,in distinction from
eitherbiologicalor psychological, though these be never so closely
connectedwith it, is the corporation, for the most part repre-
sented,as it is, by a constituted body.
2. Religiousfaithmakessomeof themostimportant corpora-
tionsappearas real,organic,mystic, and evensupernatural beings.
Philosophicalcriticism is rightin discovering and explainingthat
all are creationsof man,and thattheyhave no existenceexceptin
so faras humanintellectand humanwill are embodiedin them.
3. But nominalism is notthelast wordof a scientific philoso-
phy. The existenceof a corporation is fictitiousindeed,but still
is sometimes morethannominal. The truecriterion is whetherit
be conceivedand felt as a mere tool or machine, without a lifeof
itsown,or as something organic,superiorto its temporary memn-
bers. The truenature,however,of thisconception is legibleonly
fromfacts.
4. As a matterof fact,modernsocietyand the modernstate
are prevailingly of a natureto correspond to an individualistic and
nominalisticconceptionand standpoint. This is distinctly per-
ceptiblein therelationof thepublicpowerto privateproperty.
5. This relation,and therelationdependent uponit,maysub-
stantiallychange in the courseof time. An organiccommon-
wealthmayspringintoexistencewhich,thoughnotsanctionedby
any religiousidea, and not claimingany supernaturaldignity,
still,as a productofhumanreasonand consciouswill,maybe con-
sideredto be realin a highersensethanthoseproducts, as longas
theyare conceivedas mereinstruments servingthe interests and
objectsof privateindividuals.
FERDINAND T6NNIES.
UNIVERSITY OF KIEL.