A Bipolar Balance of Power (Congress of Vienna) Kraehe

A Bipolar Balance of Power
Author(s): Enno E. Kraehe

Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992), pp. 707-715
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association
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A Bipolar Balance of Power
ENNO E. KRAEHE
IN THE BOLD AND INCISIVE LANGUAGE that we have all come to admire in his work,
Paul Schroeder insists he is not merely tinkering with the definition of the term
balance of power but discarding the concept altogether, at least as an interpreta-
tion of the Vienna settlement. The settlement's "essential power relations were
hegemonic, not balanced," he says, and further, this is what made the system
work. In this respect, he adds, the Vienna settlement of 1815 differed from all
other settlements in modern times, most particularly the predatory balance of
power politics practiced in the eighteenth century.'
Before challenging this thesis, as this rejoinder is meant to do, it is important to
acknowledge broad areas of agreement with the picture Schroeder paints of
hegemonic politics. First of all, his critique of the conventional explanations for
relative stability is essentially sound though not entirely free of inconsistencies.
War weariness there certainly was but unevenly distributed. Britain was physically
unscathed and financially sound; Russia in 1815 was just reaching the peak of its
military build-up, which in turn depended heavily on British subsidies and
foreign enlistments; Prussia actually favored war over Saxony; Austria was
bankrupt, but that was its normal condition. Nor does war weariness explain why
peace reigned after 1815 but not long after many other debilitating conflicts such
as the War of the Austrian Succession.
Schroeder likewise doubts that a common fear of revolution drove fearful
monarchs to huddle together in a common front against their rebellious peoples.
This version of the Concert, parading the Holy Alliance and the Troppau
Protocol as its prime exhibits, became liberal, and nationalist orthodoxy until well
into this century; and until just recently it continued to reign in the countries of
the former eastern bloc, representing the Congress of Vienna as a ruling-class
conspiracy, a classic demonstration of a class struggle across international bound-
aries.2 Schroeder's refutation is valid; in making it, however, he comes close to
crediting war weariness after all. "European leaders," he writes, "were not driven
to seek lasting peace in 1815 because they feared revolution. They did so because
I Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?"AHR, 97 (une
1992): 684, 702, 705.
fur Geschicht-
2 See, for instance, Karl Obermann, "Der Wiener Kongress 1814/1815," Zeitschrift
swissenschaft,13 (1965): 474-92. See Andreas Dorpalen, "The German Struggle against Napoleon:
The East German View,"Journal of ModernHistory,41 (1969): 485-516, for other examples.
707
708 Enno E. Kraehe
they feared war." Technically, fear of war may not be quite the same as war
weariness, but in this context, where it is advanced to explain the peculiar quest
for consensus at Vienna and the grounds for "ruling out the use of force," we face
a muddle that deserves more explanation than provided here.3 As first presented,
however, the downgrading of fear of both war and revolution is well taken, and
the notions ought to be retired from our textbooks.
A more significant area of agreement is Schroeder's description of the power
relationships established in 1815 and consolidated in the next eight years or so; it
is essentially correct, a considerable improvement over restoration, legitimacy,
compensation, and similar cliches often used to describe the settlement. In
contrast to the greater measure of equality among the powers during the
eighteenth century, the Vienna settlement clearly marked the emergence of two
superpowers. Britain and Russia were not only immensely stronger than any of
the others but were also invulnerable to each other. Each exercised a hegemony
in a sphere that it was capable of defending: Britain on the high seas and in the
colonial world, Russia in Eastern Europe and much of northern Asia. The best
that the powers in between, the middle powers as they are now frequently called,
could hope for was to stake out sub-hegemonies of their own. This they indeed
tried to do: France in Western Europe, Austria in Central Europe, and Prussia in
northern Germany. One could go further even than Schroeder does to point out
that, within these spheres, each deliberately rejected regional balances in favor of
hegemonic solutions, although with varying degrees of success. Instead of the nice
balance between Austria and Prussia that Talleyrand had hoped for in Germany,
Metternich strove for Austrian dominance through the German Confederation
and by 1820 achieved it-over Russian opposition even more than Prussian, it
should be noted.4 Similarly in Italy, a three-power balance among Austria,
France, and Britain was a possibility, but that was not enough; Metternich wanted
Austrian hegemony and in 1820 was ready to fight for it. The "Comte de
Balance," as he was rightly called at the Congress of Vienna for his exertions for
a European equilibrium, thus had his limits; in fact, self-serving though it may
have been, his premise was that the Continental equilibrium required Austrian
preponderance in the center.
Prussian and French aspirations to regional hegemony fared less well. From
1815 to 1820, Prussia strove to impose its military control over northern Germany
but was no more successful in this endeavor than it had been earlier in the political
realm. France did better, though gradually, in stages. In 1818, with generous
Russian support, France regained control of its own soil. In 1823, France
conquered Spain and laid the groundwork for a possible three-power challenge to
Britain's position in Latin America. Though shared to some extent with England
in the 1830s, French influence in Madrid was paramount with few interruptions
until the Hohenzollern candidature in 1870. The neutralization of Belgium and
the razing of the barrier fortresses in the 1830s were further French gains, and
3 Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest," 700, 701.

4Enno E. Kraehe, "Austria, Russia and the German Confederation 1813-1820," DeutscherBund
und deutscheFrage 1815-1866, Helmut Rumpler, ed. (Vienna, 1990), 264-80; WienerBeitrdgefur
Geschichteder Neuzeit, 16-17 (1989-90): 264-80.
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992
A Bipolar Balance of Power 709
even though they did not constitute hegemony, France's position vis-'a-visthe low
countries was henceforth stronger than it had been in most of the eighteenth
century, even if its overall position in the world, as Schroeder reminds us, was a
far cry from former glories.
One important exception to the establishment of regional hegemonies was the
territory covered by the Ottoman empire. Here the great-power groping to
determine a regional winner had no conclusive or lasting outcome, which is why
it became the primary theater of confrontation down to Sarajevo. To sum up,
although I would prefer the term "spheres of influence" to hegemony/sub-
hegemony to describe the outcome of the Vienna settlement, I have no objection
to the pattern of relationships Schroeder means to convey. We shall return to this
issue.
IN THE MEANTIME, there are several other terms that require definition. One is
balance of power itself, and here again Schroeder's minimal definition is perfectly
serviceable for present purposes: a system "in which the power possessed and
exercised by states ... is checked and balanced by the power of others."5 What
does it mean, however, to ask if the Vienna settlement (or any other) rested on
such a system? Are we talking merely about a de facto condition resulting
when the powers, each a predator, each pursuing its selfish interests, fortuitously
find themselves checked one by the other? (Recall the words of George Canning,
who exultantly called the breakdown after the Congress of Verona "a whole-
some state: every nation for itself and God for all!"6) Or do we mean that
the Vienna settlement represented an intelligent design deliberately crafted
by a generation of statesmen steeped in the doctrine or philosophy of balance
of power-"equilibrists" as Edward Vose Gulick called them?7 The latter, rein-
forced by various instruments of international cooperation such as Quadruple
Alliance, Holy Alliance, Concert, Pentarchy, is the definition most conspicuous in
the literature, and Schroeder is right to reject it, arguing that in reality the
so-called equilibrists were pursuing hegemony, however much they preached
balance.
Nevertheless, the author is obviously not denying any of the benign qualities
that the model imputes to doctrinaire equilibrists. On the contrary, his central
point is that their restraint and conciliatory ways were real but derived from other
premises: namely, a concern for the rule of law, with its foundations in the
security and legitimacy of all thrones, "a principle as vital for the rights and
security of the peoples of Europe as of their rulers." European equilibrium, he
proclaims, meant "'rule of law' more centrally than 'balance of power."'8 At this
point, our patient acquiescence runs out; it is time to mutiny.
5Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest," 685.
6 Cited by Irby Nichols, TheEuropeanPentarchyand theCongressof Verona1822 (The Hague, 1971),
315.
7 Europe'sClassicalBalanceof Power(Ithaca, N.Y., 1955). Gulick'sequilibristsare strikingly different
from the one in the dictionary definition: "one who balances himself in unnatural positions and
hazardous movements as in rope dancing."
8 Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest," 696.
710 Enno E. Kraehe
In making these judgments, Schroeder writes like a jurist rather than a

chronicler of the real world. It is easy to find dozens of expressions of such
idealism, as it always is in human affairs; but to document the cogency and
relevancy of such principles in concrete cases is more difficult, often enough is
merely conjured out of thin air. His language is abstract as in speaking of "the
allies" doing this or desiring that, as if they constituted a collective entity with a
common will, a common purpose, a common philosophy.
Take his explanation for the relatively gentle treatment of defeated France.
From the beginning, he maintains, all the allies wished to keep France reasonably
strong. Instead of imposing a solution, they negotiated (the standard procedure
in the eighteenth century, as it happens). True, but largely because Metternich,
threatening to make a separate peace, insisted on it in the interests of the balance
of power, not even, one should note, for the sake of the Habsburg-Bonaparte
dynastic bond. Prussia always demanded a severe reduction of French power and,
after the Hundred Days, the detachment of Alsace-Lorraine in particular. Against
a Napoleonic France, the tsar asserted the right of conquest, resisted a negotiated
peace, and later intrigued to dictate the nature of the successor regime. Fearing
that a Franco-Russian entente would result, Castlereagh joined Metternich in the
(successful) effort to keep France in their camp. Thus France remained strong
because, even before the fighting was over, the other powers were scrambling for
the postwar affections of the late enemy, just as happened with Germany after
World War II, only faster.
Even so, the treatment of France was mild primarily by the standards of 1871
or 1919 and on the assumption that 1792 was the proper point of departure. That
has a nice legitimist ring, the year the Bourbon monarchy fell; but no other power
wished its territory reduced to that measure, and it was granted to France because
of competitive promises earlier made to leave France stronger than under its
kings. Castlereagh for one considered it an unheard-of humiliation for a great
power to be excluded, as France was, from a voice in the settlement beyond its
frontiers. The eighteenth century had never been so predatory as that! Before
taking his indignation too seriously, however, we should consider that he still
wanted the French voice to be available in the balance against Russia.
As we all know, the French card came into play most conspicuously in the heat
of the crisis over Saxony and Poland, allowing Talleyrand, the main booster of
legitimacy, his finest hour. Schroeder's treatment of this subject is not only
abstract but illogical and often factually wrong. We are told that, although
Talleyrand's preaching was "freighted with" self-interest, his doctrine of legiti-
macy was sincere and widely shared.9 Maybe, but it was not the grand universal
principle usually claimed for it; rather, it was an exceedingly narrow and arbitrary
doctrine, asserting merely that all thrones were legitimate that had not been
signed away in treaty.'0 This formulation covered the reigning king of Saxony
and also the ousted Bourbon king of Naples, the victim of conquest, but it made

10 Enno E. Kraehe, Metternich'sGermanPolicy, Volume 2: The Congressof Vienna 1814-1815
(Princeton, N.J., 1983), 140-41.
no allowance for duress: too bad that the hundreds of mediatized (that is,
suppressed) houses and cities in Germany had acquiesced in the Imperial Recess
of 1803, that the pope had signed various treaties dictating territorial losses, and
almost everybody had had to accept the unforgiving results of lost battles.
But let us stick to the Saxon-Polish situation. If Russia and Prussia recognized
no legitimist claims and if Metternich's and Castlereagh's first formula called for
Prussian annexation of the kingdom, who was left to carry Talleyrand's banner?
Answer: a few smaller German states like Bavaria and Saxe-Coburg, terrified at
the threatened expansion of Prussia."IAs for the major figures, how can we take
seriously any later professions in defense of law and justice? Schroeder, resource-
ful as ever, has a riposte: namely, that with the collapse of Metternich's and
Hardenberg's balance of power strategy in November 1814, "the real crisis"arose
later because of Russia's continuing threat to the "political equilibrium."'2 If this
expression denotes Russia's loyalty to her engagements with Prussia until the last
minute, when the tsar backed down, what have we but balance of power
maneuvering again?
But if, on the other hand, the crisis arose because Metternich feared a Polish
constitution even more than Russia's territorial gains, why did he, contrary to
Schroeder's version, first agree to accept such a constitution if Russia allowed the
German powers stronger frontiers; 13 and why did the alliance partners of January
1815 not make their sine qua non the abandonment of a constitution rather than
the survival of Saxony? Schroeder implies that it was simply a matter of facing
facts, of obtaining what little could be had. Where is the gentlemanly concern for
other states' security and status? His account of how the tsar forced his ally (in
violation of all solemn understandings, one might add) to pay the price is
absolutely correct, but this is a description of naked power politics at work,
reminiscent of Britain's treatment of Frederick II in 1763,'4 not a quest for
''political equilibrium," an expression never defined but apparently meant to be
equated with the observance of a certain civility and a high-minded concern for
other powers' rights and security, none of which induced Alexander to abandon
his Polish constitution project or his territorial demands. Schroeder is right about
one thing: the resulting system was highly unstable and threatened the central
powers down to World War 1, that is, long after the Polish constitution had
vanished; but how this "confirmed and strengthened .., political equilibrium,"
however defined, remains a mystery.15
The author's strained interpretation of this recurrent phrase creates so many
problems and proves so difficult to apply with consistency, at least in reference to
the Vienna settlement, that one wonders why he invests so much capital in it. The
reason is crucial: his need to explain why, in the absence of a balance of power,
hegemonic politics did not degenerate into naked power struggles and recurrent
wars, not only at the Congress of Vienna but for most of the ensuing century. This
" Kraehe, Metternich'sGermanPolicy, 2: 266.
13 Kraehe, Metternich'sGermanPolicy, 2: 228-30.
14 That is, in the treaty of Paris wherein Britain required France only to evacuate Prussian
provinces but not to retrocede them, forcing Frederick to bargain for their return.
712 Enno E. Kraehe
need arises, however, from a slippery use of the term "hegemony." The problem
is not one of definition-Schroeder intends nothing more than a simple dictio-
nary definition in which hegemony means domination-but its application to the
Vienna settlement. Whether a system be "hegemonic" or "balanced,"we need to
be clear about the geographical limits in which it operates. It is one thing to say
that the superpowers achieved hegemony in their separate spheres, the one on
the high seas, the other in Eastern Europe and northern Asia, quite another to
speak, as Schroeder does, of an Anglo-Russian hegemony over the whole. He
himself explains that neither of these powers could conquer the other, which is to
say that at a global level we are not talking about hegemony at all but the rivalry
of the two powers. Perhaps, he concedes, but the rivalry was low key, the two
powers had few points of friction, and in any case, on the few occasions that found
them acting in unison, they easily had their way.
This picture is distorted. The rivalry, even if less than life-threatening to either
of the powers, was real, keenly felt, and on Russia's side at any rate vigorously
pressed. The tensions in Central Asia, Persia, and the Ottoman empire are too
familiar to review here save to note that they began earlier than Schroeder
suggests (not in 1828 but with the Anglo-Persian alliance of December 1814) and
that Russia's vacillating preference for preserving the Ottoman empire was less an
example of benevolent restraint than a practical calculation that indirect Russian
preponderance in the whole was better than the annexation of a part-precisely
the reasoning that Catherine II had applied to Poland in the 1760s. However that
may be, it is part of Schroeder's argument that whatever rivalries existed outside
of Europe, they could safely be pursued because of their condominium over
Europe, where they respected the so-called political equilibrium. Let us return to
that.
IT IS THE CONTENTION HERE that the Saxon-Polish crisis marked not the transition
from power politics to political equilibrium but the point at which, stalemated
(checked? balanced?) in the military realm, the superpowers had no choice but to
pursue their goals by other than military means; and, as long as their contest
continued, the middle powers could enjoy some degree of independence. On
Britain's part, the task on the Continent remained, as always, to prevent the
concentration of the Continent's resources under a single organizing authority-
that is, to maintain a balance of power. By the same token, Tsar Alexander tried
to do just that-not by conquest, which the lesson of the Triple Alliance put out
of reach, but by cooperative arrangements embodied in such instruments as the
Holy Alliance, the Troppau Protocol, and the several international congresses
that he alone initiated, all of which in the end had the effect of drawing the
Continental states closer together and further from Britain. He could probably
have controlled Central Europe more effectively than he did by playing the two
powers against each other and heeding the lesser states' appeals for his protection.
For a time, he tried this in a gingerly way; but, by 1819, when he saw that this
course was alienating the German powers and Britain as well, thus jeopardizing
his larger pan-European projects, Alexander decided to permit Austria its

German sub-hegemony after all, that is, by acquiescing in the Carlsbad Decrees.
Shortly thereafter, he adopted a similar solution for Italy, allowing Metternich his
unilateral incursion into the peninsula in exchange for the Troppau Protocol,
which paid lip service to the principle of a collective, great-power right of
intervention against revolution. Schroeder is right to call these results sub-
hegemonies for they were imposed with the consent of both the true hegemons,
but for opposite reasons: Britain for the sake of a Central European barrier to
France and Russia, and Russia for the sake of Alexander's larger Continental
goals designed to leap that barrier.
In the pursuit of these goals, meanwhile, the tsar endeavored to forge tighter
links with the secondary sea powers. Portugal, always subject to British intimida-
tion, proved to be out of reach. With the Netherlands, his success was modest,
producing the marriage of his sister Anna to the young prince of Orange but
never budging the Dutch from their scrupulous neutrality. With France, his
leverage was greater. As noted, Russian courting of France began with the fall of
Napoleon, encouraged a moderate peace, in large measure inspired the Holy
Alliance, spurred the early evacuation of France, and produced numerous
schemes for a formal entente, preferably sealed by a marriage with the duke de
Berri.
Alexander's patronage of Spain was even more conspicuous, because it meant
the steadfast support of the reactionary Ferdinand VII at a time when elsewhere
he stridently encouraged liberals and nationalists. Recent scholarship as well as
newly published Russian documents illuminate this relationship better than ever
before.16 On some issues, which involved complications with other clients, actual
and prospective, the tsar sometimes disappointed Ferdinand, but in regard to
Latin America he was a friend indeed. Apart from the conquest of India, perhaps,
one could strike no greater blow to Britain's global position than to snatch the
rebellious colonies away from exclusive British influence, especially British trade.
This subject was on Alexander's agenda at every one of the post-1815 congresses.
Material aid he rendered with the sale of Russian ships for transporting troops to
the New World.'7 With the rebellion in Cadiz, however, the main question was
now the fate of Spain itself. Although the tsar's plans for pan-European
intervention ran aground at the Congress of Verona, the French invasion, which
he had encouraged from the beginning, strenigthened his ties with both countries
as never before, routing British influence in Madrid and raising for Britain the
specter of a new concerted attempt to recover the colonies. As we all know,
Canning's swashbuckling response was to call "the New World into existence to
redress the balance of the old,"'8 in the process grudgingly accepting the new
16 Anna Maria Schop Soler, Un siglo de relationesdiplomaticas y commercialesentreEspafia y Rusia

1733-1833 (Madrid, 1984); and U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VneshniaiapolitikaRossiixix i
nachalaxx veka:DokumentyrossiiskogoMinisterstvainostrannykhdel, vols. 8-12 (Moscow, 1960-80).
17 Contrary to legend, the ships were generally seaworthy and were sold rather than given to
minimize the alarm in other world capitals. Schop Soler, Un siglo de relationesdiplomaticas,210-33.
18 Address to Parliament, December 12, 1826, text in Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of
Canning 1822-1827: England, the Neo-HolyAlliance,and the New World(London, 1925), 579-84.
714 Enno E. Kraehe
sub-hegemony proclaimed by the United States. Is that political equilibrium or.

balance of power at work?
On this note, we return to the question of nomenclature. While alluding to the
protean character of "balance of power," Schroeder in practice adopts the
severely predatory model of the eighteenth century as his standard of judgment.
In the real world, however, including the eighteenth century, balance of power
decisions rest on worst-case estimates. Nothing in the system requires that all
states at all times scheme for advantage, expansion, and conquest or cease to
balance the costs of war against domestic strain and hardship. Divided counsels,
personal interests and capabilities, moral preferences, human prudence or
incompetence, even an enlightened regard for other states' interests-these
always operate and coexist within any system. Balance of power is at bottom a
matter of perceived capabilities more than demonstrated intentions, and one is as
hard to gauge as the other.
Since all peace settlements consist of some mixture of the above ingredients, we
should also ask how the Vienna settlement compares to others. It was not based
on the dynastic principle or on religion (the monarchical principle and the Holy
Alliance notwithstanding) as had been usual until the Peace of Westphalia. In fact,
except in the vaguest sense, it was not founded on ideology of any kind, not even
the concept of restoration so monotonously associated with its name. It did not
restore the mediatized houses or ecclesiastical estates in Germany or the Knights
of St. John of Malta or all of the pope's former rights. Instead, it allowed most of
Napoleon's creations to stand, and in France itself the Charter of 1814 was in part
meant to protect Napoleonic institutions from counter-revolution. Neither was
the settlement a one-sided Diktat like the peace treaties of 1866 and 1871,
although these were tempered by Bismarck's fear of European intervention. Most
emphatically, it was not based on the idea of national self-determination like the
Versailles settlement of 1919, which according to Woodrow Wilson was expressly
to repudiate "the great game, now forever discredited," of the balance of power. 19
What did distinguish the Vienna settlement was its relatively dispassionate
appreciation of power, which discouraged utopian schemes and risky experimen-
tation. Compare the attempt in 1919 to curb Germany by short-lived artificial
restrictions with the Vienna formula of creating physical counterweights against
France and then continuing intact the four-power coalition that had won the
war-pure balance of power thirnking even if not completely shared by a
vindictive Prussia and an all-forgiving Russia.
Thus, on comparative grounds alone, it is reasonable to say that the Congress
of.Vienna was uncommonly attentive to the balance of power no matter how that
term is defined. This is not to challenge Schroeder's compelling argument that
each of the powers pursued hegemony in a sphere it regarded as its own, only to
deny that there emerged a global or European hegemony, which he invents by
making Britain and Russia out to be a single hegemon. Rather, as argued here,
19Address to Congress, February 11, 1918, text in Woodrow Wilson, The PublishedPapers of
WoodrowWilson, Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., 6 vols. (New York, 1925-27), 5:
182-83.
their relationship was adversarial, constituting a bipolar balance of power,20which

in turn fostered the development of other regional spheres of influence that
neither could easily menace without the risk of provoking a hostile coalition. If
that polarity was more sedate, less nerve-racking than that after 1945, it was
because the superpowers by force of circumstances possessed mutual security
from each other, not the power of mutual annihilation.
20 I am reminded of a recent contention that the resurgence of marriage in the United States is not
based on the old father-knows-best relationship but on an uneasy "balance of power between
husband and wife." If Paul Schroeder wishes to reply that the partnership nevertheless exists as an
entity, I think I can afford to yield the point. See Abigail Trafford, "Domestic Tranquility: Modern
Marriage in America and the Balance of Power," WashingtonPost, December 27, 1991.

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3 Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest," 700, 701.

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

In making these judgments, Schroeder writes like a jurist rather than a

9 Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest," 696.

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

his larger pan-European projects, Alexander decided to permit Austria its

16 Anna Maria Schop Soler, Un siglo de relationesdiplomaticas y commercialesentreEspafia y Rusia

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

sub-hegemony proclaimed by the United States. Is that political equilibrium or.

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

their relationship was adversarial, constituting a bipolar balance of power,20which

AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW JUNE 1992

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