I.

NATIONAL TERRITORY

I. Constitutional Provisions
A. What comprises the Philippine territory of the Philippines?

Under Article I of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippine territory comprises the Philippine archipelago
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas.

B. What does and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
mean?

The phrase “and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction” means
that the Philippine territory includes any territory which presently belongs or might belong to the
Philippines through any of the internationally recognized modes of acquiring territories such as
discovery and occupation, prescription, cession, subjugation, and accretion.

C. What are considered to be within the country’s internal waters?

Those that are to be within the country’s internal waters include all waters landwards from the baseline
of the territory. Under Article I of the 1987 Constitution, the waters around, between and connecting the
islands regardless of their breadth and dimension form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

II. UNCLOS

A. What is the archipelagic doctrine?

The archipelagic doctrine states that an archipelago or a group of islands shall be regarded as a single
unit so that the waters around, between and connecting the islands regardless of their breadth and dimensions
form part of the internal waters of the state. The rationale of the archipelagic doctrine is to determine the metes
and bounds of an archipelago.
A. Concepts
a) What is the Straight baseline method?

By using the straight baseline method, the outermost point of the outermost islands of an
archipelago are joined by using straight lines provided that the baselines shall not depart from
the general configuration of the archipelago. The water within the baselines shall be considered
as internal waters and the territorial sea shall be measured from the baselines.

b) What are considered Internal waters?

Internal waters refer to all waters within the baseline of the territory and. The waters around,
between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

As internal waters, they are subject to sovereignty. All the Philippine laws are applicable in this
area.

Except: archipelagic sea lanes where the right of passage may be given to vessels as if they
were open seas.

B. What are the maritime classifications?

a) Territorial Sea

• A territorial sea is the area extending up to12 nautical miles from the baselines of
a coastal state.
 • Within this area, the state exercises absolute sovereignty subject to exceptions:
the right of innocent passage by foreign ships and the right of transit passage.

b) Contiguous Zone

• The exclusive economic zone refers to the area extending up to 200 nautical
miles from the baselines of the coastal state.

• Within this area, the state can exercise only sovereign rights.

• Here, states exercise protective jurisdiction. The state has power to enforce
customs, fiscal, sanitary, and immigration laws, such as those that prohibit
smuggling or illegal immigration.

Protective jurisdiction includes:

i. Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;
ii. Punish infringement of above regulations within its territory or territorial sea.

c) Exclusive Economic Zone vs. Extended continental shelf

EEZ Extended Continental Shelf

The exclusive economic zone refers to
the area extending up to 200 nautical
miles from the baselines of the coastal
state.
Also known as the patrimonial sea.
Within this area, the state can exercise
only sovereign rights. The power of the
state is limited to the right to explore and
exploit and the responsibility to conserve
and manage both living and non-living
resources.
The extended continental shelf comprises
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas that extends up to extends up to
320 nautical miles from the territorial
baseline.
Here, the state can exercise only
sovereign rights only over resources in
the seabed. The Philippines may also
establish and use artificial islands,
installations and structures, conduct
marine scientific research, and protect
and preserve the marine environment.

In the extended continental shelf, no one

may undertake activities for exploring and
exploiting mineral and other non-living
resources of the seabed and subsoil
without the express consent of the
Philippines, which also has the exclusive
right to authorize and regulate drilling on
the continental shelf for all purposes.

Under the UNCLOS, however, all states

have the right of freedom of navigation
and overflight, as well as the right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines and other
lawful uses.

d) High seas

Also known as open seas.

Is that part of the sea that is not included in exclusive economic zone, the territorial sea, or the
interna waters of the coastal state.
The area is not owned by anyone.
 It is available to the use of all states for purposes of navigation, flying over them, laying
submarine cables or fishing. In times of war, hostilities may be waged in the open seas.

Note however, that a state may exercise jurisdiction over the high seas:
1. Over its vessels;
2. Over pirates;
3. In the exercise of the right of visit and search
4. Under the doctrine of hot pursuit

C. What is the difference between sovereignty and sovereign rights?

Sovereignty refers to the full right and power of the state over itself without any restrictions or
interferences from outside sources. In relation to territory, the Philippines has sovereignty up to
the 12-nautical miles from its baselines.

On the other hand, Sovereign rights is a term under international law that refers to limited
rights or privileges of a state to a defined area of sea called the exclusive economic zone. In
relation to territory, the Philippines has sovereign rights beyond the 12-nautical mile from the
baselines up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines.

Are the following considered Philippine territory?

1. Spratly Islands;

No, Sratlys Islands is not a Philippine territory.

Under the Constitution, the Philippine territory comprises the Philippine archipelago with
all the islands and waters embraced therein. Moreover, under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Philippine territory extends up to 12-nautical miles from the
baselines. Beyond the 12 nautical miles up to 200 nautical only grants the state sovereign
rights. Further, the Regime of Islands doctrine states that an island refers to those naturally
formed areas of land above water during high tide and has its own territorial sea, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf. Lastly, under the archipelagic doctrine,
these group of islands are connected and regarded as one single unit using straight baselines
so that the waters around, between and connecting the islands form part of its internal waters.

Applying these provisions, Spratly Islands is not a Philippine territory for which it can
exercise sovereignty over Spratly for the following reasons: First, it is beyond the 12 nautical-
mile territorial limit recognized under international law; Second, most features in the Spratly
Islands are not regime of islands for they are merely rocks and reefs which have no exclusive
economic zone which can sustain human habitation for a long period of time. Third,
considering that they cannot be regarded as regime of islands, then they cannot also be
connected and considered as a single unit using the straight baselines method.

On the other hand, subject to the UNCLOS recognition of the exercise of sovereign
rights beyond the 12 nautical mile up to 200 nautical miles, the Philippines did not lose its
jurisdiction and the power to exercise these sovereign rights over these areas.

The right of innocent passage is available in that area.

2. Scarborough shoal

No, Scarborough shoal is not a Philippine territory.

Under the Constitution, the Philippine territory comprises the Philippine archipelago with
all the islands and waters embraced therein. Moreover, under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Philippine territory extends up to 12-nautical miles from the
baselines upon which the State exercise its sovereignty. Also, the Regime of Islands doctrine
 states that an island refers to those naturally formed areas of land above water during high tide
and has its own territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental
shelf. Lastly, under the archipelagic doctrine, these group of islands are connected and
regarded as one single unit using straight baselines so that the waters around, between and
connecting the islands form part of its internal waters.

Applying these provisions, Scarborough shoal is not a Philippine territory for the
following reasons: First, it is beyond the 12 nautical-mile territorial limit recognized under
international law; Second, most features in the Scarborough shoal are mere rocks and reefs
for they have no exclusive economic zone which can sustain human habitation for a long
period of time. Third, considering that they cannot be regarded as regime of islands, they
cannot be connected and considered as a single unit using the straight baselines method.

On the other hand, subject to the UNCLOS recognition of the exercise of sovereign
rights beyond the 12 nautical mile up to 200 nautical miles, the Philippines did not lose its
jurisdiction and the power to exercise these sovereign rights over these areas.

(Transcript from Atty’s Lecture)

Not a Philippine territory. Beyond the 12- nautical mile Philippine territory. Under the
UNCLOS, no sovereignty. Only jurisdiction. Did we lose jurisdiction because not enclosed?
Can you enclose Scarborough and KIG? No, because they are not regime of islands. Since
KIG and Scarborough shoal are not islands, they cannot be connected using the straight
baseline. Nevertheless, we cannot lose jurisdiction over them because under the UNCLOS,
sovereign rights extend up to 200nautical miles.

3. Philippine Rise

No, Philippine Rise is not a Philippine territory.

Under the Constitution, the Philippine territory comprises the Philippine archipelago with
all the islands and waters embraced therein. Moreover, under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the Philippine territory extends up to 12-nautical miles from the
baselines. Beyond the 12 nautical miles up to 200 nautical only grants the state sovereign
rights and another extension up to 320 nautical miles in cases of extended continental shelf.

Applying these provisions, Philippine Rise is beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial limit.
Nonetheless, the Philippines has sovereign rights only over resources in the seabed. The
Philippines may also establish and use artificial islands, installations and structures, conduct
marine scientific research, and protect and preserve the marine environment.

Within this area, no one may undertake activities for exploring and exploiting mineral
and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil without the express consent of the
Philippines, which also has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the
continental shelf for all purposes.

Under the UNCLOS, however, all states have the right of freedom of navigation and
overflight, as well as the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines and other lawful uses.

1) What is the Regime of Islands Doctrine?

The “regime of islands” as defined by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in
Article 121 are islands that are naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water, which are
above water at high tide.

Furthermore, this principle recognizes that each island has its own territorial sea, contiguous
zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. Conversely, water and below-
water areas and rocks that cannot sustain human or economic life of their own, are exempt
from having any EEZ or continental shelf.
 In other words, the “regime of islands” principle forces claimant states to maintain peace in the
area, because no one country can claim exclusive ownership of any of these islands.

2) Jurisdiction

1) North Cotabato v. Government of RP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 20082.

2) Philippines vs. China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 20163.

3) Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, January 12, 2016and G.R. No. 212426, July 26, 20164.

4) Capitol Wireless, Inc, vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas G.R. No. 180110, May 30, 20165.

5) Prof. Merlin Magallona et.al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et.al. G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 20116.

6) Republic vs. Provincial Government of Palawan. G.R. No. 170867, December 04, 20187.

7) Arigo vs. Swift G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

 1. North Cotabato v. Government of RP, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008.
Facts:
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines thru the Peace
Panel On Ancestral Domain entered into peace negotiations. The instrument containing
these series of negotiations is called the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement.

As regards the territory:

The MOA-AD unequivocally and unilaterally vest ownership of vast territory to the
Bangsamoro People through the Bangsamoro Juridical entity; an entity to which it was
granted authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands of the
Bangsamoro.

As regards governance:
MOA-AD emphasizes the “associative relationship” between the Central Government
and BJE. Associative relationship means shared authority and responsibility.

Issue:

Whether by signing the MOA-AD, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or
a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

Ruling:
No.
By signing the MOA-AD, the GRP would NOT be binding itself to create and recognize BJE as
a separate state, juridical, territorial or political subdivision.

1. First, given that MOA-AD involves sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State which
directly affects the lives of the public at large, then MOA-AD is a matter of public
concern which needs free and prior consultations. This requirement was not recognized
under the MOA-AD.

a. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the
executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically
ruled:

x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to

the consummation of the transaction."

b. The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all
national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions.
 Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained:
Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.

In the case, the MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify
its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, which entails,
among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
ICCs/IPs.

2. *** Second, the concept of associative relationship (a state within a state) is not
recognized under the present Constitution.

The MOA-AD most clearly uses the concept of association to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. [An] association is formed
when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links.

Accordingly, the relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure
of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. This implies the recognition of
the associated entity as a state.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No

province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. The Constitution does not contemplate any state other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.

While it is true that the people's right to self-determination is recognized as one of the
rights of the State, this should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral
right of secession.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 state in Article 1 of both covenants, that all
peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political,
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state.

A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even
then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration
on Friendly Relations, supra, as the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the
free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of
self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)

Respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof
regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government,
have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March
1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x
the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)
 Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government
is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an
implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing
amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.

3. Third, even the mere concept of animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions require for
its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following
provisions of Article X of the Constitution: These mechanisms were not complied with.

• SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)

Again, on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the
MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision.
The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said
constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE
the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution.

• SECTION 3 The lumping together of identities of Bangsamoro and other indigenous people contradicts
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral
domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By
paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the
agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land
mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial
domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region."

4. Fourth, the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government
under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept
of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region."
(Emphasis supplied).

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming
that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted,
the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

5. Fifth, MOA-AD, in granting the BJE to enter freely into any economic cooperation and
trade relations is against the Constitution.
 Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v.
Executive Secretary155 instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

2. Philippines vs. China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 20163.

1. The 9-dash line and China’s claim to historic right in the maritime areas of the South
China Sea

Historic usage of the waters of the South China Sea cannot lead to rights with respect to the
islands there. (Not a question of sovereignty)

Arguments:

Philippines: The Philippines argues, “the concept of ‘historic title’ as used in Article 298 has a
specific and limited meaning: it pertains only to near-shore areas of sea that are susceptible to
a claim of sovereignty as such.” Because the Philippines understands China’s claims to fall
short of sovereignty over the maritime areas of the South China Sea (beyond the “islands” and
“adjacent waters”), the Philippines considers that China’s claim cannot be one of historic title.

China: The “nine-dash line” . . . is called by China the dotted line. I want to stress that China’s
sovereignty and relevant rights in the South China Sea were formed throughout the long
course of history and have been maintained by the Chinese Government consistently.

Ruling:

The Tribunal concluded that, as between the Philippines and China, there was no legal basis for
China to claim historic rights to resources, in excess of the rights provided for by the Convention,
within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.

The Tribunal found that China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the
detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the Convention and concluded that, to the extent
China had historic rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were
extinguished by the entry into force of the Convention to the extent they were incompatible with the
Convention’s system of maritime zones.

2. Status of the features as Above or Below water at high tide in the South China Sea

Arguments:

The Philippines sought a determination as to whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands
claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide
elevations (LTEs), or submerged banks.

Under UNCLOS,

• an “island” generates both a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) of up to 200 nautical miles, subject to delimitation of a maritime boundary with any other
countries’ overlapping territorial seas or EEZs.
• A “rock” is entitled to a territorial sea no greater than 12 nautical miles, but not an EEZ. LTEs
and submerged banks do not generate any such entitlements.

Ruling:

None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can the Spratly Islands
generate an EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the Tribunal declared certain areas are within
the Philippines’ EEZ and not overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement.

The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their “natural condition” (i.e., not
after construction of artificial islands, installation of desalination plants, etc.). Based on
historical evidence, none of the features in the Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable
community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely
extractive in nature. The current presence of personnel on the features is dependent on
outside support and does not reflect the capacity of the features in their natural condition.

3. Alleged interference with the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZs and Continental
Shelf

Arguments:

The Philippines sought a declaration that China violated UNCLOS by interfering with the
Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its EEZs. This includes preventing Philippine fishing
around Scarborough Shoal, violating UNCLOS’s environmental protection provisions through
construction and fishing activities that have harmed the marine environment (including at
Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and Mischief Reef), and by dangerously operating
law enforcement vessels around Scarborough Shoal.

Ruling:

China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. It did so by interfering with
Philippine fishing and hydrocarbon exploration; constructing artificial islands; and failing to
prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ. China also interfered with
Philippine fishermen’s traditional fishing rights near Scarborough Shoal (without prejudice to
the question of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal). China’s construction of artificial islands
at seven features in the Spratly Islands, as well as illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese
nationals, violate UNCLOS obligations to protect the marine environment. Finally, Chinese law
enforcement vessels unlawfully created a serious risk of collision by physically obstructing
Philippine vessels at Scarborough Shoal in 2012

The Tribunal considered Chinese activities in the relevant areas and found that China had

(a) interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to prohibit
fishing by Philippine vessels within the Philippine EEZ, (c) protected and failed to prevent
Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippine EEZ at Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed artificial islands/installations at Mischief Reef without the
Philippines’ authorization.

4. China’s actions in respect of traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal

Ruling:

As for Scarborough Shoal, regardless of who has sovereignty, both Philippine and Chinese
fishermen have “traditional fishing rights” at the Shoal that were not extinguished by UNCLOS,
and China violated the Philippines’ rights by entirely preventing Filipino fishermen from fishing
near Scarborough Shoal after May 2012. In addition, Chinese artificial island construction has
caused “severe harm to the coral reef environment” and China has failed to stop its nationals
from engaging in “harmful” and “destructive” harvesting and fishing of endangered sea turtles,
coral, and giant clams in violation of UNCLOS. Finally, Chinese law enforcement vessels
violated maritime safety obligations by creating a serious risk of collision on two occasions in
April and May 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff.
3. Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, January 12, 2016and G.R. No. 212426, July 26,
20164.
Facts:
The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America (U.S.).
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an agreement between the United
States and the Philippines intended to bolster the U.S.–Philippine alliance. The agreement allows the
United States to rotate troops into the Philippines for extended stays and allows the United States to
build and operate facilities on Philippine bases, for both American and Philippine forces. The US is
not allowed to establish any permanent military bases. It also gives Philippine personnel access to
American ships and planes.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the instrument
violated multiple constitutional provisions.

1. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, contains stringent requirements that must be
fulfilled by the international agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in the Philippines: (a) the agreement must be in the form of a treaty, and (b) it must
be duly concurred in by the Senate.

2. If the agreement is not covered by the above situation, then the President may choose the
form of the agreement (i.e., either an executive agreement or a treaty), provided that the
agreement dealing with foreign military bases, troops, or facilities is not the principal
agreement that first allows their entry or presence in the Philippines.

3. The executive agreement must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set
by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to implement; and must not unduly expand the
international obligation expressly mentioned or necessarily implied in the law or treaty.

4. The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing
laws and treaties.

Issues:
1. Whether the recognition under EDCA of the presence in the country of three distinct
classes of individuals who will be conducting different types of activities within the Agreed
Locations: (1) U.S. military personnel; (2) U.S. civilian personnel; and (3) U.S. contractors is
valid
2. Whether the activities of the U.S military and civilian personnel within the Philippine
territory under EDCA are valid

3. Whether the authorized activities performed by US. contractors within Philippine territory -
who were legitimately permitted to enter the country independent of EDCA - are subject to
relevant Philippine statutes and regulations and consistent with the MDT and the VFA
4. Whether the “Agreed Locations” in EDCA are valid
Ruling:
1. Yes, valid. Admission of U.S. military and civilian personnel into Philippine territory is
already allowed under the VFA.

EDCA merely provides for the mechanism to identify the locations in which the U.S. personnel
may perform allowed activities pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement.

By virtue of Articles I and III of the VFA, the Philippines already allows U.S. military and
civilian personnel to be "temporarily in the Philippines," so long as their presence is "in
connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government." The Philippines,
through Article III, even guarantees that it shall facilitate the admission of U.S. personnel into
 the country and grant exemptions from passport and visa regulations. The VFA does not even
limit their temporary presence to specific locations.

Based on the above provisions, the admission and presence of U.S. military and civilian
personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the VFA, the treaty supposedly
being implemented by EDCA. What EDCA has effectively done, in fact, is merely provide
the mechanism to identify the locations in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed
activities pursuant to the VFA. As the implementing agreement, it regulates and limits
the presence of U.S. personnel in the country.

2. Yes, valid. The authorized activities of U.S. military and civilian personnel within
Philippine territory are in furtherance of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting
Forces Agreement

• MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY: Article II: In order more effectively to achieve the objective of
this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
• VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT: Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense
Treaty of August 30, 1951; Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed
forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines; Considering that cooperation between the
United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security interests;

Thus, EDCA seeks to be an instrument that enumerates the Philippine-approved

activities of U.S. personnel referred to in the VFA. EDCA allows U.S. military and civilian
personnel to perform "activities approved by the Philippines, as those terms are defined
in the VFA and clarifies that these activities include those conducted within the Agreed
Locations:

After a thorough examination of the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and
the VFA, we find that EDCA has remained within the parameters set in these two
treaties.

3. Yes, valid and consistent with the MDT and VFA.

Petitioners also raise concerns about the U.S. government's purported practice of hiring
private security contractors in other countries.

EDCA requires that all activities within Philippine territory be in accordance with
Philippine law. This means that certain privileges denied to aliens are likewise denied to
foreign military contractors. Relevantly, providing security300 and carrying, owning,
and possessing firearms301 are illegal for foreign civilians.

Hence, any other entity brought into the Philippines by virtue of EDCA must subscribe
to corporate and civil requirements imposed by the law, depending on the entity's
corporate structure and the nature of its business.

That Philippine laws extraneous to EDCA shall govern the regulation of the activities of
U.S. contractors has been clear even to some of the present members of the Senate.

4. Yes, valid. By definition, Agreed Locations are facilities and areas that are provided by the
Government of the Philippines through the AFP and that United States forces, United States
contractors, and others as mutually agreed, shall have the right to access and use pursuant to
this Agreement. Such Agreed Locations may be listed in an annex to be appended to this
Agreement, and may be further described in implementing arrangements.

Article III of EDCA provides for Agreed Locations, in which the U.S. is authorized by the
Philippines to "conduct the following activities: "training; transit; support and related activities;
refueling of aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels and
aircraft; temporary accommodation of personnel; communications; prepositioning of
equipment, supplies and materiel; deploying forces and materiel; and such other activities as
the Parties may agree."
i. First standard: independence from foreign control

Very clearly, much of the opposition to the U.S. bases at the time of the Constitution's drafting was
aimed at asserting Philippine independence from the U.S., as well as control over our country's
territory and military. Quite clearly, the Agreed Locations are contained within a property for public
use, be it within a government military camp or property that belongs to the Philippines

In this case, EDCA explicitly provides that ownership of the Agreed Locations remains with the
Philippine govemment. What U.S. personnel have a right to, pending mutual agreement, is access to
and use of these locations.

The right of the owner of the property to allow access and use is consistent with the Civil Code, since
the owner may dispose of the property in whatever way deemed fit, subject to the limits of the law. So
long as the right of ownership itself is not transferred, then whatever rights are transmitted by
agreement does not completely divest the owner of the rights over the property, but may only limit
them in accordance with law.

EDCA, in respect of its provisions on Agreed Locations, is essentially a contract of use and access.
Limited control does not violate the Constitution. More important, limited control does not mean an
abdication or derogation of Philippine sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over the Agreed Locations. It
is more akin to the extension of diplomatic courtesies and rights to diplomatic agents, which is a
waiver of control on a limited scale and subject to the terms of the treaty.
ii. Second standard: Philippine sovereignty and applicable law
Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power, while jurisdiction is the conferment by law of power
and authority to apply the law.

From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories of the Philippines that the U.S. forces
are allowed to access and use. By withholding ownership of these areas and retaining unrestricted
access to them, the government asserts sovereignty over its territory. That sovereignty exists so long
as the Filipino people exist.

Significantly, the Philippines retains primary responsibility for security with respect to the Agreed
Locations. Hence, Philippine law remains in force therein, and it cannot be said that jurisdiction has
been transferred to the U.S. Even the previously discussed necessary measures for operational
control and defense over U.S. forces must be coordinated with Philippine authorities. EDCA retains
the primary jurisdiction of the Philippines over the security of the Agreed Locations, an important
provision that gives it actual control over those locations.

iii. Third standard: must respect national security and territorial integrity
The last standard this Court must set is that the EDCA provisions on the Agreed Locations must not
impair or threaten the national security and territorial integrity of the Philippines.
Petitioners make the point that the Agreed Locations, by granting access, they claim that the
Agreed Locations invite instances of attack on the Philippines from enemies of the U.S.
International law disallows any attack on the Agreed Locations simply because of the presence of
U.S. personnel. Any unlawful attack on the Philippines breaches the treaty, and triggers Article 51 of
the same charter, which guarantees the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.
There is, then, ample legal protection for the Philippines under international law that would ensure its
territorial integrity and national security in the event an Agreed Location is subjected to attack. As
EDCA stands, it does not create the situation so feared by petitioners - one in which the Philippines,
while not participating in an armed conflict, would be legitimately targeted by an enemy of the U.S.
4. Capitol Wireless, Inc, vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas G.R. No. 180110, May 30,
20165.

Facts:

Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing
international telecommunications services

In essence, the Provincial Assessor had determined that the submarine cable systems described in
Capwire's Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property, a
determination that was contested by Capwire in an exchange of letters between the company and the
public respondent. The reason cited by Capwire is that the cable system lies outside of Philippine
territory, i.e., on international waters.

Issue:

Whether the waters found in Nasugbu wherein the cable/s owned by Capwire is/are laid are
entirely outside of Philippine territorial or inland waters as not to subject them to Philippine
tax

Ruling:

No, the cables in dispute are not outside the Philippine territory as not to subject them to
Philippine tax.

a. As the Court takes judicial notice that Nasugbu is a coastal town and the surrounding sea
falls within what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) would
define as the country's territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical miles outward from the
nearest baseline, under Part II, Sections 1 and 2) over which the country has sovereignty,
including the seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of the submarine cable
system lies within Philippine territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the said local
taxing authorities. It easily belies Capwire's contention that the cable system is entirely in
international waters.

b. And even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial sea but further
inward, in Prof Magallona v. Hon. Ermita, et al. the Court held that "whether referred to as
Philippine 'internal waters' under A1iicle I of the Constitution44 or as 'archipelagic waters' under
UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2, 4),45 the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath." Further, under Part VI, Article 7946 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly has
jurisdiction with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in support of other installations
and structures under its jurisdiction.

c. And as far as local government units are concerned, the areas described above are to be
considered subsumed under the term "municipal waters" which, under the Local Government
Code, includes "not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the
subject of private ownership and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber
lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines
drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general coastline and
fifteen (15) kilometers from it." Although the term "municipal waters" appears in the Code in the
context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a fee by local governments, its
inclusion in the Code's Book II which covers local taxation means that it may also apply as guide
in determining the territorial extent of the local authorities' power to levy real property taxation.

Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over such part of the subject submarine cable system lying
within Philippine jurisdiction includes the authority to tax the same, for taxation is one of the three
basic and necessary attributes of sovereignty, and such authority has been delegated by the
national legislature to the local governments with respect to real property. taxation.
5. Prof. Merlin Magallona et.al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et.al. G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 20116.

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 , on the following grounds:

(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and

(2) Petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA
9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or
Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime
zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Issue:

1. Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional as it reduces the Philippine maritime territory

2. Whether RA 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands contradicts the Philippines’
claim of sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal

3. Whether UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are Incompatible with the Constitution’s Delineation of
Internal Waters

Ruling:

1. RA 9522 is constitutional since is it is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s

maritime zones and continental shelf in accordance to the provisions of UNCLOS, not to
delineate the Philippine territory.

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it
discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties
to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.

2. RA 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands is only to determine the maritime
zones of the KIG and Scarborough Shoal and is not inconsistent with the Philippines’ claim
of sovereignty over the areas.

Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because
the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself.
Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
 SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains
to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and
the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside
our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states:
"The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga
islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

3. UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitution’s Delineation of Internal
Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to
nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as

"archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over
the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III,
operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to
the treaty’s limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of
Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of
innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-
vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic
States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of
their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty.
6. Republic vs. Provincial Government of Palawan. G.R. No. 170867, December 04, 20187

Facts:

The parties ask this Court to reconsider its December 4, 2018 Decision in which it declared,
among others, that the Province of Palawan was not entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of
the Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project (Natural Gas Project).

In a December 4, 2018 Decision, this Court held :

• This Court held that since no law grants the Province of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the Natural Gas Project was located, the province was not entitled to an equitable
share in the project's proceeds.

• It likewise held that a local government unit's territorial jurisdiction requires contiguity and is
limited only to land area or land mass. Since the Camago-Malampaya gas reservoirs were
located in the continental shelf, this territory would be beyond the Province of Palawan's
territorial jurisdiction.

• This Court pointed out that the Constitution did not apportion the territories of the Philippines
among the local government units. It also ruled that the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea conferred no continental shelves on local government units

Issue: Whether or not the Province of Palawan is entitled, under Article X, Section 1 of the
Constitution and Section 290 of the Local Government Code, to a 40% equitable share in the
proceeds from the Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project.

Ruling:

No, Province of Palawan is not entitled to such a share.

The Constitution does not define a local government unit's territorial jurisdiction in relation to its
entitlement to an equitable share in the utilization and development of the natural wealth.

Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution mandates that local government units shall be entitled to an
equitable share in the utilization and development of the natural wealth within their area.

Pursuant to this, the Local Government Code provides that local government units shall be entitled to
a 40% share in the gross collection the State derives from the utilization and development of these
natural resources "within their territorial jurisdiction."

This Court concluded that territorial jurisdiction referred to "the [local government unit's]
territorial boundaries," or that jurisdiction "pertaining to a physical location or area as
identified by its boundaries" In view of this definition, this Court then went on to state that a
local government unit's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area. Thus, its 40% share
only pertains to the proceeds from the use and development of natural resources found only
in its land area:

Unfortunately, none of the maps on record or the relevant laws could conclusively prove that the
Province of Palawan has territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoirs.

The area is beyond the province's territory when the 15-kilometer boundary of the Local Government
Code and the Philippine Fisheries Code is applied:

The area is also beyond the Province of Palawan's territory when the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Republic Act No. 9522, and the 1898 Treaty of Paris are applied:

Likewise, the area is beyond the province's territory when Presidential Decree No. 1596 is applied:
7. Arigo vs. Swift G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

Facts:

The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language
which means "long reef exposed at low tide."

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and conservation of
the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the
Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the USS
Guardian, an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship, "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on
the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan.

On April 1 7, 2013, petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective

sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed a petition for
the issuance of Writ of Kalikasan against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the
US 7th Fleet et al. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a
directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the
grounding incident.

Issue: Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents

Ruling:

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability
of the State,17 is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.(Emphasis supplied.)

It must be noted that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the
observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an
immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

How is diplomatic immunity invoked? The acts must involve jure imperii,

In one case, involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his
employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages
filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent.

In that case, the Court held that petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter
testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which
distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and
proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).

Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.

Thus, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued
in their individual capacity. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

May the defense of diplomatic immunity be invoked by Swift et al. so as to preclude the
Philippine courts to exercise jurisdiction over them?

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The
alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

With the inapplicability of the doctrine of diplomatic immunity to US respondents Swift et al.,
is the Philippines left with no other remedy?

On the other hand, the conduct of the US, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of
R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS
creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although
the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.

Is there a waiver of immunity from suit on the part of the US found in the Visiting Forces
Agreement?

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.