Nternational Ourt OF Ustice: Nalsar Unhcr P I L M C C, 2021

22A
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE PEACE PALACE,
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
CASE CONCERNING
The Differences between the Three States
Concerning the Okuzan Refugees from Mayzan
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF PEMOLA

(APPLICANT)
v.
THE STATE OF BOLIRIA & REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA

(RESPONDENTS)
M E MOR I AL FO R A PPL I C A N T [A R GUME NT S A DVANC E D ]
MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANT
[ II ]
NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................IV
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................XIV
STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................................XV
ISSUES RAISED.............................................................................................................XVIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS........................................................................................XIX
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................1
ISSUE I: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO OKUZANS ASYLUM
SEEKERS ..............................................................................................................................1
A. THE OKUZANS ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
1
1. REASONS FOR SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS IN BOLIRIA______________________1
a. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution..................................................................1
b. Membership in a Particular Social Group.......................................................2
2. REASONS FOR SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS IN MAKONDA____________________3
B. COUNTRIES HAVE NOT CONFORMED WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW____________________________________________________4
1. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO LIFE OF REFUGEES_____________________________5
a. Deprivation of Right to Food...........................................................................5
b. Deprivation of Right to Housing......................................................................6
2. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM BY MAKONDA_____________________6
ISSUE II: BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS & MAKONDA’S

MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW................................................................................7
A. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS ARE IN VIOLATION
OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW__________________________7

1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF REVOKING THE REFUGEE STATUS STILL EXIST ___________7
a. There exists no ‘Fundamental Change' in Circumstances...............................8
b. The ‘Particular Cause of fear of Persecution’ has not been Eliminated.........9
[ III ]

2. EVEN IF CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT PERSIST, THE REFUGEE STATUS CANNOT BE
REVOKED_____________________________________________________________9
B. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW___________________________________________________10
1. INTERDICTION OF OKUZANS VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT_11
a. Applicability of Non-Refoulement on High Seas............................................12
2. INTERDICTION VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF THE UNCLOS___________________13
a. Makonda was duty-bound to assist Migrants in Distress..............................13
i. Okuzan Migrants were in Distress________________________________13
ii. Makonda was duty-bound to assist such Migrants___________________14
b. Makonda did not possess the right to interdict Refugee Boats......................15
ISSUE III: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES

OBLIGATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT..............................15
A. COUNTRIES HAVE TREATY OBLIGATIONS_______________________________16
1. OBLIGATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT__________________________________16
2. TREATIES MUST BE KEPT___________________________________________17
B. THE PRINCIPLE IS AN OBLIGATION ERGA OMNES PARTES_________________18
1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS_______________________18
a. Purpose of the Conventions...........................................................................18
b. Community Interest........................................................................................19
c. Fulfilment of the Purpose...............................................................................19
2. IN ACCORDANCE TO THE ARTICLE ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY______________20
a. Owed to a group of States..............................................................................20
b. Established for the protection of a collective interest....................................21
C. THE APPLICANT CAN INVOKE THE RESPONSIBILITY______________________21
ISSUE IV: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PREVENT OKUZAN PEOPLE BEING LEFT
STATELESS ....................................................................................................................22
A. SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS ARISES IN THIS CASE_____________________22
B. THERE IS PRESUMPTION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW____________23
C. LEAVING PEOPLE STATELESS WOULD VIOLATE MULTILATERAL TREATIES
AND CONVENTIONS_____________________________________________________24
PRAYER..............................................................................................................................XXI
[ IV ]

[V]

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

1. ¶ Paragraph
2. & and
3. % percent
4. Applicant Pemola
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
5. ARSIWA
Wrongful Acts
6. Art. Article
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
7. CAT
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Elimination of All
8. CEDAW
Forms of Discrimination against Women
9. CIL Customary International Law
10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989
11. Ed. Edition
12. HRC Human Rights Commission
13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
14. ICJ International Court of Justice
15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
16. IHL International Humanitarian Law
17. ILC International Law Commission
18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding
19. p. Page number
20. para. Paragraph
21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda
22. UN Charter United Nations Charter
23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution
25. v. Versus
[ VI ]

26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
[ VII ]

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
SR . PG.
CASES
NO. NO.
1. Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 128. 22
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and
2. Montenegro), [2007] ICJ 2; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 20
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL
No 116 [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ 31 (ICJ 2005), 19th December 2005.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

3. Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) Judgement no. 2020/3 (Jan. 21
23, 2020).
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)

4. (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) Jurisdiction and 21
Admissibility (Judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep 6 para 64.
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain),

5. 15
1970 I.C.J. Rep. 304 (Feb. 5).
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica
6. 20
v. Nicaragua), ICGJ 490 (ICJ 2013).
Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR

7. 3
593.
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Greece, ECSR, Complaint No.

8. 6
15/2003, Merits, 8 December 2004, ¶24.
Gulf of Maine Area, Canada v United States, Merits, Judgment, [1984] ICJ
9. 23
Rep 246.
10. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], No. 27765/09, (Feb. 23, 2012) ¶79-81. 12
11. Huicochea Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001). 3
[ VIII ]

12. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 3
13. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 3
Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449; Yean v. Dominican

14. 24
Republic, Judgement IACHR Series C No 130.
15. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), 2012 I.C.J. 99. 23
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

16. Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004, No. 131, at 36, ¶106 & 109 12
(July 9).
17. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). 3
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.

18. United States of America), Merits, Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Jun. 27), 18
p. 137.
Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),

19. Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL No 90, 2003 ICJ Rep 161, ICGJ 74 (ICJ 2003), 18
p. 814, para. 28.
20. Penate v. Canada, [1994] 2 FC 79 (Can. FCA, Nov. 26, 1993). 8
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium

21. v. Senegal), Case No. 2012/24, International Court of Justice Press Release, 18
(July 20, 2012).
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, Ex parte

22. 4
Aitseguer, 2 WLR 143 (2001).
Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v.

23. 18
United States of America), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27), p. 196.
24. Scaramanga v. Stamp, [1880] 5 CPD 295, 304. 7
The case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
25. 23
10.
26. United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294-95 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008). 2
[ IX ]

Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada, (1990),

27. 3
113 N.R. 123 (FCA).
X v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 C.P.R.

28. 3
(2d) 7.
SR . PG.
OTHER AUTHORITIES
NO. NO.
45th International Labour Conference, Workers’ Housing Recommendation

1. 6
(R115) (June 28 1961).
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Cessation of

2. Status No. 69 (XLIII) - 1992, 9 October 1992, No. 69 (XLIII), para. a) & c), 8
(Oct. 9, 1992), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68c431c.html.
Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, A/RES/31/109

3. 6
(Dec. 16 1976).
HRC Communication No 458/1991 (1994) UN Doc

4. 4
CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para 9.3.
International Maritime Organisation, Interim Measures for Combating

5. Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants 14
by Sea, Doc. MSC/Circ.896/Rev.1, (June 12, 2001).
James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc

6. 4
A/CN.4/507/Add. 4, 2000, 386 et seq.
Report of the International Law Commission of its Fifty-ninth session, UN

7. 18
Doc (A/62/10), 3.6.1 (2007).
Resolution on Obligations erga omnes in International Law, M Giorgio

8. 15
Gaja, Institut de Droit International, 5th Commission, art. 2 (Aug. 27, 2005).
9. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 16

(CEDAW), General recommendation No. 32 on the gender-related
dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of
[X]

women, ¶ 22-23, CEDAW/C/GC/32 (Nov. 5, 2014).
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding observations

10. on the fourth periodic report of the Netherlands, ¶33, U.N. Doc. 24
CRC/C/NDL/CO/4 (Jun. 8, 2015).
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 6

11. (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their 16
Country of Origin, ¶ 27, CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1 2005).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the

Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951
12. 16
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Jan. 26,
2007).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Background Note on the

13. Protection of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea (Final version, 13
including Annexes) (Mar. 18, 2002).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on

International Protection Adopted by the Executive Committee of the
14. 11
UNHCR Programme 1975 – 2017 (Conclusion No. 1 – 114), “Non-
Refoulement” at para. (a), HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV. 2017 (Oct. 2017).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of

International Protection (DIP), Guidelines on International Protection No. 3:
15. Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 9
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances"
Clauses), HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10 2003).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Interpreting Article 1 of

16. 10
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (April 2001).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ministerial Meeting of

States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the
17. Status of Refugees, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and 11
or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN doc.
HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16, 2002), at ¶4.
[ XI ]

UNHCR, Expert Meeting – The Concept of Stateless Persons Under

18. 22
International Law (Summary Conclusions) (2010), at para 2.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive

19. Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Refugees Without an 14
Asylum Country No. 15 (XXX) - 1979, No. 15 (XXX), (Oct. 16, 1979).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive

Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme; Standing Committee,
20. Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework 13
and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, EC/50/SC/CRP.17
(June 9, 2000).
SR. PG.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND RULES
NO. NO.
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), 189 UNTS
1. 1
137.
ARSIWA. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art.

2. 21
48(1), November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

3. 11
Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 9 1975, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

4. 6
Women, art. 14(2), 18 December 1979, U.N.T.S. 34/180.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 62, 7 March 1990,

5. 5
E/CN.4/RES/1990/.
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Annex, ¶ 1.3.13,

6. 13
Aug. 27 1985, 1405 U.N.T.S.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

7. 6
Discrimination, art. 5(e)(iii), 12 March 1969, U.N.T.S. vol. 660, p. 195.
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, 16 December 2
[ XII ]

1966, 99 UNTS 171.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

9. 12
art. 1, Mar. 23 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), 189
10. 3
UNTS 137.
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), 28
11. 22
September 1954, U.N.T.S., vol. 360, p. 117.
12. U.N. Charter art. 2(2). 17
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, art. 58(2) and 86, Dec.
13. 7
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
United Nations Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, Apr. 29 1958, 450
14. 14
U.N.T.S. 82.
SR . PG.
BOOKS
NO. NO.
C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

1. 23
253–254 (3rd ed. Oceana Publications 1964).
CJ COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 29 (3rd ed. Cambridge

2. 7
University 2009).
3. E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 17 (J Chitty, trans 1934). 7
EFTHYMIOS PAPASTAVRIDIS THE INTERCEPTION OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH

4. SEAS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE OCEANS 14
(1st ed. Bloomsbury Publishing 2013).
FRANCES NICHOLSON AND JUDITH KUMIN, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
5. REFUGEES (UNHCR), A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION 19

AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS, (2017).
6. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN 16
[ XIII ]

INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (3rd ed. Oxford University Press 2007).
J. FITZPATRICK AND R. BONOAN, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL

7. 10
PROTECTION, “Cessation of Refugee Protection”(E. Feller, et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

8. 8
LAW, 920 (1st ed. Cambridge University Press 2005).
JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY

9. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2147 (3rd ed. Cambridge University 23
Press 2009).
M.E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE

10. 17
LAW OF TREATIES 359-368 (1st ed. Brill Nijhoff 2009).
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,

11. 4
CCPR COMMENTARY 188 (2nd ed. N.P. Engel Publishers 2005).
MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 37 (1st ed. Rutledge

12. 3
2001).
MICHAEL HASS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE

13. 5
INTRODUCTION 3 (2nd ed. Routledge Taylor & Francis group 2008).
OLIVIER CORTEN AND PIERRE KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
14. LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 33, 43 (1st ed. Oxford University Press 4
2011).
PAUL WEIS ET AL., THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX

15. PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BY THE LATE DR. PAUL 11
WEIS, 341 (Cambridge University Press 1995).
ROBIN CHURCHILL AND VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 214
16. 15
(Manchester University Press, 1983).
SHIPS IN DISTRESS, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC

17. 13
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Oct. 2007).
[ XIV ]

UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), GUIDELINES ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION NO. 7: THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 1A(2)

18. OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE 2
STATUS OF REFUGEES TO VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING AND PERSONS AT RISK
OF BEING TRAFFICKED, 6, HCR/GIP/06/07 (Apr. 7, 2006).
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND
19. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951 1

CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES, 21 (April 2019).
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK -

20. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 6 (January 8
1996).
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), THE 1951

21. CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 18
PROTOCOL (Sept. 2011).
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR],

HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
22. DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 2
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, p. 21 ¶51 (Dec.
2011).
23. II YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1973). 13
SR. PG.
ARTICLES AND JOURNALS
NO. NO.
Andre Renzaho, Human right to food security in refugee settings: Rhetoric

1. 5
versus reality, 47 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8(1) (2002).
2. Barbara Miltner, Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in 13

Rescue and Interception, 30(1) FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 75
[ XV ]

(2006).
Bruno, Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International

3. Law, 250 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 4
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 308 (1994).
Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality

4. 22
Status, 10 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGE LAW 156-182 (1998).
Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their

5. Will, 241 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 4
INTERNATIONAL LAW 209,295 (1993).
Gregory S. Porter, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpretation of

6. the Refugee Act of 1980, 25 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 4
(1992).
Institute of International Law: Resolutions Adopted at Its Bath Session,

7. September, 1950, 45 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 6
(1951).
Karl Zemanek, New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations,

8. 4
1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. ON U.N.L. 4 (2000).
Martin Ratcovich, International Law and the Rescue of Refugees at Sea

9. 15
(Sept. 20, 2019) (Ph.D Dissertation, Stockholm University).
10. Michell Moussalli, Who is a Refugee?, 42 REFUGEE MAGAZINE (1982). 6
SR. PG.
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
NO. NO.
G.A. Res. 896 (IX), Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness (Dec.

1. 24
4, 1954).
G.A. Res. 217 (lll) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble ¶1

2. 4
(Dec. 10, 1948). [hereinafter UDHR].
3. G.A. Res. 2542(XXIV), art. 10, Declaration on Social Progress and 6
[ XVI ]

Development (Dec. 11 1969).
4. G.A. Res. 538 (VI) (Feb. 2, 1952). 24
5. G.A. Res. 55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001). 24
6. G.A. Res. 64/127, ¶¶ 4, 7– 8 (Dec. 18, 2009). 24
7. G.A. Res. 8 (I) (Feb. 12, 1946). 24
G.A. Res. No. 41/128, art. 8(1) Declaration on the Right to Development
8.
(Dec. 4 1986).
[ XVII ]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is hereinafter most respectfully submitted that the Parties have submitted the questions
contained in the Special Agreement (together with Corrections and Clarifications to follow)
(“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court’s Statute.1
Therefore, pursuant to Art. 36(1)2 of the ICJ statute read with Article 40(1)3, this
Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the present case.
1
Art. 1, Special Agreement submitted to the International Court of Justice by the Federal Republic of Pemola,
the State of Boliria and Republic of Makonda on the differences between them concerning the Okuzan refugees
from Mayzan.
2
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”
3
“Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or
by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall
be indicated.”
[ XVIII ]

STATEMENT OF FACTS
[BACKGROUND OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MAYZAN]

The Democratic Republic of Mayzan, is a sovereign coastal country that shares its
border with three other countries. These countries are part of the continent of Kuwei. The
Republic of Mayzan is a secular, democratic, and republic country and the President is
responsible for deciding and supervising its general policies. Mayzan has diverse
demography having 67% people as ethnic Mayzanos and Okuzans make up 28% of the
population.
[PLIGHT OF OKUZANS]
The ethnic characteristics of the Okuzans are very similar to those of the Bolirians,
and their settlements are very close to the Bolirian frontier. There is general misconception
among Mayzan people that Okuzans are illegal immigrants from Boliria and hence, they have
been a marginalised group in Mayzan. They have very limited opportunities and do not even
have access to basic requirements. However, National Democratic Party (NDP) government
brought affirmative action for the welfare of Okuzans and enacted the Okuzan Protection
Against Violence Act, 2006 to curb the cases of ethnic violence against the Okuzans.
[RISE OF THE MAYZAN NATIONALIST FRONT]

The MNF was formed in 1984 by Doler Raz having political manifesto for a
homogenous Mayzano state – “for the Mayzano People by the Mayzano people, one Nation
under one religion”. Over the decades, the MNF steadily gained popularity among the
majority Mayzano ethnic group and won 2008 elections and got re-elected in 2013.
[MNF’S APPROACH TOWARDS OKUZANS]

The MNF government gradually abolished minority rights and eliminated affirmative
action programmes and initiatives placed by previous governments, the Okuzan Protection
Against Violence Act, 2006 was also repealed. The Okuzan people protested against the
MNF government however, there was not any considerable change in their favour. The
Okuzan People Front (OPF) with Okuzan people peacefully demonstrated against the MNF
government and they quickly grew a strong social media presence. In late 2017, Mr. Baden
Haler gave numerous speeches in which he incited anti-Okuzan sentiment among the
[ XIX ]

audience. As a result of this, violence against Okuzan people increased sharply in 2017-18. In
2018, the MNF government was re-elected and made an announcement to review the
citizenship of the people of Mayzan.
[OUTRAGE AGAINST CITIZENSHIP SCRUTINY PROCESS]

The announcement of reviewing of citizenship was met by outrage among rights
groups. Organisations and intellectuals from all over the world raised their voices against this
announcement. On 01 July 2018, 3 bombs exploded at parking garages at the 3 busiest
market centres of Mayzan. Freedom Fighters of Okuzan (FFO) claimed responsibility for the
attacks and warned the government to stop the citizenship scrutiny process.
[RESPONSE OF MNF GOVERNMENT]

The Ministry for Interior Affairs stated that the government would take all necessary
measures to maintain law and order in Mayzan. The President declared a state of emergency
and cut access to internet in the Eastern Province. Police forces started arresting Okuzan people
under the Mayzan Terrorism Law, 2015. Curfews were imposed, and residents were not
permitted to leave their homes after 6 p.m. on any given night. Exacerbating the situation,
military forces were deployed to track movement between villages and towns. Okuzans who
were living in other parts of Mayzan were also being arrested without an option to seek bail.
Fearing for their future, the Okuzan people began to flee across the border to Boliria, seeking
asylum.
[OKUZAN PEOPLE IN BOLIRIA]

Facing persecution in Mayzan, thousands of Okuzans fled to Boliria. UNHCR
assisted the Bolirian Government by providing food supplies, tents and sanitation facilities to
the incoming refugees. However, the condition of the camps was reported to be deplorable.
The Bolirian Times reported the paucity of food supply and sanitary amenities. Meanwhile,
the Bolirian government started the process of RSD for the Okuzan people. Despite their best
efforts, Boliria, as a developing nation, could not keep up with influx of Okuzan people.
There was also a growing feeling of resentment among the Bolirian people for Okuzans who
had received basic amenities at the taxpayers’ expense and now giving them competition in
the job market.
[AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAYZAN AND BOLIRIA]
[ XX ]

Seeing a potential crisis, the Bolirian Prime Minister visited Mayzan and they reached
a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Okuzan refugees. The MoU stated that
Mayzan agreed to welcome back all Mayzan citizens who were currently living in Boliria and
would provide citizenship documentation after detaining them for two weeks. After the
announcement of MoU, rights groups in both countries expressed their concerns regarding
the detention. The Government of Mayzan clarified that this was part of the procedure
established by law under the Mayzan Immigration Control Act, 1988. Meanwhile, the
Government of Boliria announced that it would begin the process of cessation of refugee
status of Okuzan refugees.
[OKUZAN FLEEING TO REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA]

Once again fearing for their lives, Okuzan refugees started fleeing to Makonda. They
were assisted by smugglers and in September 2020, the Makonda government stated that it
had received more than 3000 Okuzans at its ports. Over the next month, Makonda’s
neighbouring countries, Joran and Ligos also reported receiving Okuzan people at their ports.
All three countries signed an MoU which states that countries would take every measure to
prevent illegal migration and would also comply with its obligations under international law
for the protection of Okuzan refugees. As a part of marine surveillance, countries interdicted
more than 10,000 Okuzan people in a period of two months. At the same time, in Boliria, the
Jinoras, an Okuzan family were the first to be sent back to Mayzan.
[THE DISPUTE]
On 15 January 2021, the Makonda Daily newspaper broke the story that more than
200 Okuzan people, who were attempting to reach Makonda, drowned in the Calasian Sea.
This incident drew the attention of the international community. On 20 January 2021 the
international NGO Human Rights Alert (HRA) released a report named ‘The Innocent, The
Imprisoned, and The Impunity: The Situation of Okuzans in Mayzan’. This report shows the
pathetic condition of Okuzans in Mayzan, the report also highlighted the maritime security
measures taken by Makonda as well as the cessation of refugee status by Boliria. According
to the report, all these measures were in clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
On 25 January 2021, the Federal Republic of Pemola initiated a trilateral dialogue
between Boliria and Makonda. However, the negotiation between the countries ended
inconclusively. Pemola has now brought the matter before International Court of Justice (ICJ)
invoking Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
[ XXI ]

[ XXII ]

ISSUES RAISED
-I-
WHETHER BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
PROVIDE PROTECTION TO ALL THOSE OKUZAN ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM MAYZAN WHO SEEK
ITS PROTECTION?
- II -
WHETHER BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS AND MAKONDA’S
MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ON THE CALASIAN SEA ARE IN VIOLATION OF
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
- III -
WHETHER BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES OBLIGATION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF ‘NON- REFOULEMENT’?
- IV -
WHETHER BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
PREVENT THE OKUZAN PEOPLE FROM BEING LEFT STATELESS?
[ XXIII ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
-I-
The Applicant submits that the respondents, i.e., Boliria and Makonda have an
obligation under international law to provide protection to Okuzan asylum seekers as they
qualify as refugees. The asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of being persecuted and the
persecution was based on their membership of a particular social group. Moreover, there was
a reasonable possibility of persecution in Boliria which compelled Okuzan asylum seekers to
fled to Makonda, and this reasonable possibility is sufficient to qualify them as refugees.
Further, the respondents have not conformed with their international obligations as the
Okuzan refugees did not have minimum standard for humane living conditions. The make-
shift buildings were in deplorable condition and there was shortage of food and sanitary
amenities, depriving refugees of their right to food and right to housing in Boliria. Moreover,
the security measures taken by Makonda have deprived refugees their right to seek at least
temporary refuge. Even, Makonda had not conformed with its obligations under UNCLS as
they did not provide any rescue or assistance to Okuzan refugees who drowned in Calasian
sea.
- II -
It is submitted that Boliria’s measures regarding cessation of refugee status is in

violation of their obligations under International Law. This is so, as firstly, the circumstances
under which the refugee status was granted have no ceased to exist, and hence cannot be held
as a valid ground for the cessation. In arguendo even if the situations have ceased, they
cannot be used as a basis for revoking the refugee status of the Okuzan people.
Additionally, Makonda’s measures interdicting the Okuzan people are also in
violation of their obligations under International Law; firstly, because they violated the
provisions of non-refoulement provided in the Refugee Convention; and secondly, because
they violated the provisions of UNCLOS by not assisting the refugees in distress, and by
interdicting the refugees.
[ XXIV ]

- III -
The principle of non-refoulement is recognised extensively in varied treaties to which

both the states of Boliria and Makonda are parties to. These treaties infer upon the states an
obligation to fulfil the duties assumed through these instruments in good faith. The principle
being an 'obligation erga omnes partes', both according to the judicial pronouncements and
the state responsibility, allow the applicant to invoke the responsibility of the Respondent
States towards the alleged breach of the principle of non-refoulement.
- IV -
The Respondents have an obligation under international law to prevent Okuzan

people being left stateless. The Okuzan people are not recognized as a national by any State
under the operation of its law, hence, they are stateless. Further, prohibition of statelessness
has been presumed as a part of customary international law as its prohibition is “vital” for
international cooperation. Moreover, there are various multilateral treaties like, CRC, ICCPR,
ICERD, and CEDAW which talk about prevention of statelessness and leaving people
stateless would violate these treaties to which applicant and respondents are parties.
[ XXV ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
A. BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO OKUZANS ASYLUM
SEEKERS
[¶1.] Fearing of their future, the Okuzans people left Mayzan and fled to Boliria and
afterwards to Makonda. Both the countries have an obligation to provide protection to these
asylum seekers, and the Okuzans asylum seekers are refugees under international law [A.].
Further, the countries have not conformed with their obligation under international law [B.]
B. THE OKUZANS ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶2.] Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention 4 and 1967 Protocol5 Relating to the Status of
Refugees defines “a refugee is an individual who is outside his or her country of nationality
or habitual residence who is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of
persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in
a particular social group.” Further, it should be recalled in this context that, to use the words
of the UNHCR Handbook, an individual does not become a refugee because of recognition;
rather, is recognised because he/she is refugee.6
C. REASONS FOR SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS IN BOLIRIA
[¶3.] Pursuant to the definition given in 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have
a well-founded fear of persecution and the persecution must be based on his or her race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.7
D. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
[¶4.] The 1951 Refugee Convention requires asylum seekers to show that there is a
reasonable possibility that they will suffer persecution if returned to their country of
nationality or habitual residence.8 What constitutes a well-founded fear of being persecuted
4
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), 189 UNTS 137 [hereinafter the 1951
Refugee Convention].
5
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), 189 UNTS 137 [hereinafter the 1951 Refugee
Protocol].
6
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 21 (April 2019).
7
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4.
8
[1]

rests on the circumstances of the case, including the person’s background, profile and
experiences, considered in light of the up-to-date information about the country of origin.9
Persecution includes threats to life or liberty, as well as other serious human rights abuses, for
the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention.10
[¶5.] In United States v. Geiser11, the Court noted that Black’s Law Dictionary defines
‘persecution’ as “violent, cruel, oppressive treatment directed towards a person or a group of
persons because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, politics or other beliefs.” 12
Persecution is established when a person faces a threat to his or her life or freedom, 13 as well
as other serious human rights abuses or harm.14
[¶6.] People misbelieved Okuzans as illegal immigrants, and they were subjected to
physical violence.15 When the Freedom Fighters of Okuzan incident happened, the Okuzans
who were living in other parts of Mayzan were also arrested without an option to seek bail. 16
Curfews were placed and people were not allowed to leave their homes after 6 P.M. every
night.17
[¶7.] This situation of armed conflict and violence frequently involving exposure to serious
human rights violations or other serious harm amounts to persecution.18 Thus, there was a
well-founded fear of persecution in the Okuzan people in Mayzan.
E. Membership in a Particular Social Group
[¶8.] Individuals who believe in or are perceived to believe in values and standards at odds
with the social mores of the society in which they live may, in principle, constitute a
“particular social group” within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention.19 A social group is made up of people who share some basic traits that
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor or public in general.20
9
Supra note 6, 190.
10
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 21 (Dec. 2011).
11
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294-95 (3d Cir. Pa. 2008).
12
Persecution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
13
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1).
14
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The
Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to
Victims of Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being Trafficked, p. 6, HCR/GIP/06/07 (Apr. 7, 2006).
15
Compromis, p. 6.
16
Compromis, p. 17.
17
Id.
18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16 1966, 99 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
19
20
Huicochea Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001).
[2]

[¶9.] Persecution on account of membership in a particular social group refers to

“persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons, all
of whom share a common, immutable characteristic, i.e., a characteristic that either is beyond
the power of the individual members of the group to change.” 21 People can be perceived by
society as a social group by reason of their origin or social background.22
[¶10.] Okuzans share very similar ethnic features to the Bolirians and their language is very
close in sound and structure to the Bolirian language 23, which is different from the people of
Mayzan. Due to this reason, the Okuzans were victim of hostility and violence. Their social
background was also different as they are predominantly dependent on agriculture and
livestock rearing for their livelihood.24
[¶11.] The applicant has to show that their apprehension was caused by heinous acts
committed or likely to be committed against members of a community to which they
belonged.25 Hence, it has been established that Okuzans are members of a particular social
group, which is different from ethnic Mayzanos, having a fear of persecution, making them
refugees under international law.
F. REASONS FOR SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS IN MAKONDA
[¶12.] Once a stateless person has been determined as a refugee in relation to “the country of
his former habitual residence”, any further change of the country of habitual residence will
not affect his refugee status.26 Any situation that denies someone the right to live in the bare
necessities of a decent human life should be a ground for claiming refuge elsewhere.27
[¶13.] The seminal judgement of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of INS v. Elias-
Zacarias28 laid down the phrase ‘well-founded fear’ as the cornerstone for asylum seekers. In
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,29 the Supreme Court of the
United States of America determined that an applicant need not show that persecution is a
21
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985); Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR 593.
22
X v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 C.P.R. (2d) 7.
23
Compromis, p. 5.
24
Compromis, p. 6.
25
Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada, (1990), 113 N.R. 123 (FCA).
26
Supra note 14.
27
MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 37 (1st ed. Rutledge 2001).
28
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
29
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
[3]

probability, but only that it is a reasonable possibility. 30

The Cardoza Fonseca case also
implied that a one in ten of chances would be sufficient to create a reasonable possibility.31
[¶14.] In the instant case, the fear of persecution taking place was quite possible, as the
refugees did not have basic rights to life, food and shelter. 32 The condition of the camps were
deplorable and there was paucity of food suapply and sanitary amenities, 33 hence reflecting
‘well-founded fear’. Thus, the Okuzans, who fled Boliria, are refugees in Makonda and
should be provided with the protection which is given to the refugees under international law.
G. COUNTRIES HAVE NOT CONFORMED WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶15.] The cornerstone of freedom, justice and peace in the world is the recognition of
intrinsic dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of human family.34 It is
essential for a treaty that the parties intend to create legal relations between themselves by
means of their agreement.35 States have a right to invoke the violator’s liability on behalf of
international law subjects who are unable to bring a claim themselves, or simply as
representatives of the international community of States.36
[¶16.] Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] not
only mandates that a person be treated humanely, but also requires States to take proactive
steps to maintain a minimum standard for humane living conditions, regardless of economic
or budgetary constraints.37 In the instant case, Boliria and Makonda have not conformed with
their obligations under international law.
1. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO LIFE OF REFUGEES
30
Gregory S. Porter, Persecution Based on Political Opinion: Interpretation of the Refugee Act of 1980, 25
CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (1992).
31
Id.
32
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, Ex parte Aitseguer, 2 WLR 143 (2001).
33
Compromis, p. 18.
34
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble para. 1 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., UN
Doc A/RES/3/217 A (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
35
OLIVIER CORTEN AND PIERRE KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY 33, 43 (1st ed. Oxford University Press 2011).
36
Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will, 241 COLLECTED COURSES
OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 209,295 (1993); Bruno, Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law, 250 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 217, 308 (1994); Karl Zemanek, New Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes
Obligations, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. ON U.N.L. 4 (2000).; James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility,
U.N. Doc A/CN.4/507/Add. 4, 2000, 386 et seq.
37
MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY 188 (2nd ed.
N.P. Engel Publishers 2005); HRC Communication No 458/1991 (1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para
9.3.
[4]

[¶17.] As per Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] which
rightfully states that, “each and every person has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.”38 The right to life is a basic human right which is promised to each and every human
being born on this planet.39
[¶18.] Furthermore, as per the celebrated ICCPR, Article 6 (1) states that, “the inherent right
to life of every human being is protected by law. Not a single person could be unreasonably
deprived of his or her life.”40 Likewise, Article 6 (2) of Convention on the Rights of the Child
[CRC] mentions that, “it is duty of the state to maximize the possible extent of survival and
development of the child.”41
[¶19.] In the instant case, it was unimaginable for Okuzans refugees to have optimal quality
of life with liberty, equality and means to fulfil basic cultural, economic and social needs. 42
Further, right to life incorporates right to food and right to shelter.
a. Deprivation of Right to Food
[¶20.] In refugee settings, the human right to sufficient and nutritious food ensures that every
refugee has physical and economic access to enough food to provide the nutrition needed for
effective physical and physiological functions and well-being.43
[¶21.] Further, article 25 (1) of the UDHR states with utmost clarity that each and every
person is born with the right to a basic standard of living which is sufficient to maintain the
health and well-being of any human being and his or her family. Also, it further states that
health and well-being includes food, clothing, housing and medical facilities along with
social services.44
[¶22.] States have a responsibility to fight disease and malnutrition through providing
adequate healthy foods and safe drinking water.45 However, in the present case, the condition
of the camps were deplorable and there was acute shortage of food and sanitary amenities 46
which deprived the refugees of their basic human right to food.
38
UDHR, supra note 34, art. 3.
39
Id.
40
ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 6(1).
41
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 62, 7 March 1990, E/CN.4/RES/1990/74 [hereinafter CRC].
42
MICHAEL HASS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 3 (2nd ed. Routledge
Taylor & Francis group 2008).
43
Andre Renzaho, Human right to food security in refugee settings: Rhetoric versus reality, 47 AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8(1) (2002).
44
UDHR, supra note 34, art. 25(1).
45
CRC, supra note 41, art. 24(2)(c).
46
Compromis, p. 18.
[5]

B. Deprivation of Right to Housing
[¶23.] Article 25(1) of UDHR states that housing is a necessary social service which is
promised to a human being for maintenance of a decent or even a bare minimum standard of
living. The well-being of a person can only be guaranteed if they have a roof over their head
to come back to at the end of the day. 47 Article 5e(3) of International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [ICERD] also contemplates right to
housing as a necessary human right.48
[¶24.] The right to adequate housing49 is likely to be of particular relevance to migrants.

Housing that is habitable, clean, and provides sufficient space while also protecting against
the elements and disease; housing that is accessible to those entitled to it; and that is
conveniently located near employment, health-care services, schools, child-care centres, and
other social services.50
[¶25.] In the present case, Boliria could not cater the needs of lakhs of Okuzan Refugees.
The make-shift camps, which were the shelter for refugees, were in deplorable conditions. 51
Thus, the Okuzan refugees have been deprived of their inherent right to have adequate
housing.
C. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM BY MAKONDA
[¶26.] Article 14 (1) of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution.”52 Asylum is defined “as the protection which a
State grants on its territory or some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a
person who comes to seek it.”53
47
CRC, supra note 41.
48
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(e)(iii), 12 March
1969, U.N.T.S. vol. 660, p. 195. [hereinafter ICERD].
49
UDHR, supra note 34, art. 25(1); Supra note 48.; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, art. 14(2), 18 December 1979, U.N.T.S. 34/180 [hereinafter CEDAW].; CRC,
supra note 41, art. 27(3).; G.A. Res. 2542(XXIV), art. 10, Declaration on Social Progress and Development
(Dec. 11 1969); Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, A/RES/31/109 (Dec. 16 1976);
G.A. Res. No. 41/128, art. 8(1) Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4 1986).; 45th International
Labour Conference, Workers’ Housing Recommendation (R115) (June 28 1961).
50
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Greece, ECSR, Complaint No. 15/2003, Merits, 8 December 2004,
¶24.
51
Compromis p. 18.
52
UDHR, supra note 34, art. 14(1).
53
Institute of International Law: Resolutions Adopted at Its Bath Session, September, 1950, 45 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1951).
[6]

[¶27.] It should be noted that the UNHCR's fundamental principal is that “in cases of large-
scale influx, persons seeking asylum should always receive at least temporary refuge.” 54
However, Makonda has taken security measures which deprived refugees of this temporary
refuge, and violated their human right to seek the same.
[¶28.] Further, one of the most ancient and important aspects of the rule of the sea is the
obligation to rescue persons in distress.55 It is generally accepted as a conventional rule and
may be regarded as a part of Customary International Law. 56 The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] obliges coastal States to provide rescue and assistance in
the Exclusive Economic Zone and high seas.57 However, more than 200 Okuzan refugees
were drowned in Calesian sea, which shows that they did not get any assistance from
Makonda.
[¶29.] Hence, in the light of above arguments Makonda has not conformed with its
obligation under international law to protect Okuzan refugees.
D. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS & MAKONDA’S

MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS ARE IN VIOLATION

OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶30.] Boliria’s measures of cessation of the refugee status on the pretext of changed
circumstances is in violation of their obligations under the International Law, more
specifically the Refugee Convention. This is so because the circumstances under which the
Refugee status was granted still exist [1.], and even if they did not persist, the status granted
still cannot be revoked [2.].
1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF REVOKING THE REFUGEE STATUS STILL EXIST
[¶31.] Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention states that the refugee status provided to an
individual under Article 1A shall cease to apply if the circumstances under which the
individual had been recognized as a refugee have themselves ceased to exist. However, this
54
Michell Moussalli, Who is a Refugee?, 42 REFUGEE MAGAZINE (1982).
55
E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 17 (J Chitty, trans 1934).
56
Scaramanga v. Stamp, [1880] 5 CPD 295, 304; CJ COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 29 (3rd ed.
Cambridge University 2009).
57
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea, art. 58(2) and 86, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
[7]

article shall not apply to refugees that can invoke compelling reasons to not avail the
protection of the refugee’s country of nationality, out of previous persecution.58
a. There exists no ‘Fundamental Change' in Circumstances
[¶32.] ‘Circumstances’ as used in the article mentioned refer to fundamental changes in the
country of origin, that must be stable and relevant to the refugees’ fear of persecution, 59 and
must be strong enough to eliminate the refugee’s need for surrogate protection from another
nation.60 Factors such as durability, effectiveness and substantiality are also held relevant
when evaluating changed circumstances of a country.61
[¶33.] Although Mayzan has lifted the state of emergency from the Eastern province and has
agreed to admit Okuzan people without the requisite documents, 62 that alone cannot be
regarded as fundamental change durable, effective, and substantive enough to amount to a
‘fundamental change’.
[¶34.] Specifically, UNHCR has noted many factors such as “the existence of non-
discriminatory laws to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, including both civil and
political and economic, social and cultural rights” and “the general level of respect for
human rights and ability to exercise and enjoy human rights” which should be taken into
account to determine or assess the existence of a fundamental change;63 which are not being
fulfilled in the present circumstance.
[¶35.] As per the report released by the NGO Human Rights Alert, armed forces continue to
be stationed in the Eastern Province, and multiple human right violations continue to occur,
such as Okuzan woman being brutally raped, crops being burned, and homes being razed to
the ground.64 The government of Mayzan itself refused to disclose any information with HRA
regarding the families that had returned to Mayzan from Boliria, making it furthermore
worrying.65
58
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
59
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Cessation of Status No. 69 (XLIII) - 1992, 9
October 1992, No. 69 (XLIII), para. a) & c), (Oct. 9, 1992), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68c431c.html.
60
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 920 (1st ed. Cambridge
University Press 2005).
61
Penate v. Canada, [1994] 2 FC 79 (Can. FCA, Nov. 26, 1993).
62
Compromis, p. 10.
63
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme; Standing Committee, Note on Cessation Clauses, EC/47/SC/CPR.30 (May 30,
1997); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on
Their Application, (April 26, 1999).
64
Compromis, p. 15.
65
Id.
[8]

[¶36.] A mere change in facts concerned with the fear of persecution is not enough to
amount for a fundamental change,66 since ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ implies the
consolidation, over time, of a process of stabilization. 67 Hence, as the circumstances have not
changed enough, nor has enough time passed to warrant so, the circumstances cannot be
called as fundamentally changed.
B. The ‘Particular Cause of fear of Persecution’ has not been Eliminated
[¶37.] In such circumstances wherein a particular cause of fear of persecution 68 has been
identified, the elimination of that specific cause carries more weight than a change in other
related factors, especially in circumstances of armed conflict, serious violations of human
rights, and severe discrimination against minorities, among others.69
[¶38.] Since the Okuzan population has faced persecution in their home country owing to
discrimination against their race and ethnicity, 70 the same cannot be eliminated by removing
the requirement of citizenship documents, as it does not address the persecution owing to
discrimination.
[¶39.] Thus, the cessation of the Refugee Status by Boliria is violative of its obligations
under international law, and the circumstances relevant to it still persist.
C. EVEN IF CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT PERSIST, THE REFUGEE STATUS CANNOT BE REVOKED
[¶40.] Even if the circumstances have sufficiently changed to an extent to no longer warrant
for a refugee status, there may always be specific circumstance on an individual basis that
may require international protection. This is supported by the fact that a strict interpretation
of Article 1C (5) & (6) permits for their application on an individual basis.71
[¶41.] Additionally, a proper designation of a country as a ‘safe country of origin’ does not,
just by the virtue of the fact, serve as a declaration of cessation of refugee status in regard to
refugees from that country.72
[¶42.] This is also supported by Article 1C(5) which accepts all such individuals who can
invoke “compelling reasons” arising out of past persecution or experiences leading to their
66
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK- VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 6 (January 1996).
67
Supra note 66.
68
Supra note 59, para. a.
69
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of International Protection (DIP), Guidelines on
International Protection No. 3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances" Clauses), HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10 2003).
70
Compromis, 15.
71
Supra, ‘The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application’ note 64.
72
Supra, ‘Note on Cessation Clauses’ note 63, ¶7.
[9]

recognition as refugees should not involuntarily cease to be refugees, despite a relevant,

fundamental, stable and durable change.73 The exception essentially recognizes that some
forms and experiences of persecution are so atrocious, and have such devastating
psychological effects, that even after a fundamental change in circumstances, individuals
should not be forced to return against their will. 74 This is reflective of a general humanitarian
principle, that is well grounded in State practice.75
[¶43.] As is evident, the Okuzan people have suffered various atrocities at the hands of the
local population, including sexual violence, 76 curfews and other drastic measures by the State,
including being arrested by the police without trials or the option of bail. 77 Their houses have
been burned and crops have been razed to the ground by the Army stationed in their province.
Hence, it is clear that such experiences would have devastating psychological effects, and
hence does not make it prudent to return individuals back to their country of origin against
their will.
[¶44.] Therefore, even if the circumstances continue to persist, the refugee’s status of the
Okuzan people cannot be revoked.
D. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶45.] Makonda’s measures of interdicting the Okuzan people at the high seas of the
Calasian Sea contravene their obligations under International Law as it violates the principle
of Non-Refoulement enshrined in the Refugee Convention [1.], as well as provisions
provided in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [2.].
1. INTERDICTION OF OKUZANS VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
[¶46.] Article 33 of the Refugee Convention provides that “no contracting state shall expel
or return a refugee to a territory or country where their life or freedom is threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
73
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, (April 2001).
74
Id; Supra, note 66.
75
See generally, J. FITZPATRICK AND R. BONOAN, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, “Cessation of Refugee Protection”(E. Feller, et al.
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2003).
76
Compromis, p. 15.
77
Compromis, p. 15 & 11.
[ 10 ]

opinion”.78 Non-refoulement is an established fundamental humanitarian principle, 79 that has

attained the status of Customary International Law.80
[¶47.] Non-refoulement is also taken as a component part of prohibition on torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; as is evidenced by Article 3 of the UNCAT.
It states, “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”81
[¶48.] The same obligation has also been construed in Article 7 of the ICCPR, which
prohibits torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, by the UN Human Rights
Committee through its General Comment No. 20 to include a non-refoulement component as
well.82
[¶49.] In the present case, the Okuzan people were fleeing persecution from Mayzan and the
deplorable conditions in Boliria,83 paired with the unjustified cessation of the refugee status, 84
to seek asylum in Makonda. However, they were interdicted on the high seas of the Calasian
Sea which violates the principle of non-refoulement.
[¶50.] While the principle of non-refoulement in itself does not entail the right of an
individual to be granted asylum,85 the same does not equal to the contracting states resorting
to refoulement when not prepared to grant asylum to those seeking international protection.
Rather, the states must adopt a course of action which results in the refugees gaining
protection elsewhere, where their lives or freedom are not in danger on account of their
religion, race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 86 This
could include their transfer to a third country, giving temporary refuge, or other solutions. 87
78
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33.
79
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on International Protection Adopted by the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme 1975 – 2017 (Conclusion No. 1 – 114), “Non-Refoulement”
at para. (a), HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV. 2017 (Oct. 2017).
80
See, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951
Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951
Convention and or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (Jan. 16,
2002), at ¶4; Id, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 25 (XXXII); Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel
Bethlehem, The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion, in Supra, note 75.
81
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 9
1975, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. [hereinafter CAT].
82
ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 7.
83
Compromis, p.12.
84
Compromis, p. 13.
85
PAUL WEIS ET AL., THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A
COMMENTARY BY THE LATE DR. PAUL WEIS, 341 (Cambridge University Press 1995).
86
Supra, ‘The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion’, note 80, ¶76.
87
Id.
[ 11 ]

[¶51.] However, the same was not done with respect to the Okuzan refugees, thus violating
the principle of Non-Refoulement.
a. Applicability of Non-Refoulement on High Seas
[¶52.] It is well established that the responsibility of the States party to the Convention is not
limited to their respective territories, rather such responsibility hinges on the relevant conduct
that can be attributed to the State.88
[¶53.] As a general proposition, States are responsible for conduct in relation to persons
‘subject to or within their jurisdiction’, words that appear frequently in treaties on human
rights.89 Therefore, whether a person is subject to the jurisdiction of a State will not depend
on whether they were within the territory of the State concerned but on whether, in respect of
the conduct alleged, they were under the effective control of, or were affected by those acting
on behalf of, the State in question.90
[¶54.] As is further established in the Hirsi case, state officials on the high seas are bound by
the principle of non-refoulement, since the act of interdicting refugees on sea provides them
with physical control. It is this ‘full’ or ‘effective’ control which then makes the principle
applicable. Actions undertaken on the high seas vis-à-vis another vessel trigger jurisdiction if
migrants are taken on board and if the authorities exercise de facto or de jure control over the
intercepted migrants. Such control is also exercised if people are returned, directed,
instructed, ordered to return, disembarked, forced to enter, conducted to or handed over to the
authorities or territory of another state.91
[¶55.] The Okuzan refugees that were fleeing persecution to seek refuge in Makonda, were
interdicted by their authorities on the high seas of the Calasian sea, wherein they had
effective control over the refugees. Therefore, it can be established that principle of non-
refoulement is extra-territorially applicable on the high seas, and thus the Okuzan refugees
cannot be interdicted.
B. INTERDICTION VIOLATES PROVISIONS OF THE UNCLOS
[¶56.] The definition of ‘Interception’ was proposed by the UNHCR to include “all
measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt, or
88
Supra, ‘Scope and content of the principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion’, note 80.
89
See, ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2(1); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 1, Mar. 23 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
90
Supra, ‘Scope and content of the principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion’, note 80.
91
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], No. 27765/09, (Feb. 23, 2012) ¶79-81; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004, No. 131, at 36, ¶106 &
109 (July 9).
[ 12 ]

stop the movement of persons without the required documentation crossing international
borders by land, air or sea, and making their way to the country of prospective destination.”92
Since the term ‘Interdiction’ is used in synonymous terms with interception in International
Law,93 this definition can be applied on interdiction as well.
[¶57.] Makonda’s measures that were taken regarding the Okuzan people at the high seas of
the Calasian Sea violate the provisions of the UNCLOS, as they had an obligation to assist
the refugees in distress in the Calasian Sea [a.], and Makonda did not possess the right to
interdict the refigees [b.]
a. Makonda was duty-bound to assist Migrants in Distress
[¶58.] The UNCLOS explicitly contains the obligation to come to the assistance of persons
in distress at sea,94 and this obligation is unaffected by the status of the persons in question,
their mode of travel, or the numbers involved. Further, the obligation of States to render
assistance to persons in distress at sea is an enshrined principle of maritime law.95
B. Okuzan Migrants were in Distress
[¶59.] The state of distress requires reasonable certainty that a person or vessel is threatened
by grave and imminent danger and needs immediate assistance, 96 that may or may not be life
threatening.97 The distress or danger must be urgent, and must indicate towards a well-
grounded apprehension towards loss of vessel and cargo, or of the lives of the crew and the
other members on board.98
[¶60.] The Okuzan refugees were travelling in boats that was filled beyond its capacity, 99
making it reasonably certain that such a vessel could require assistance, and can be threatened
by grave and imminent danger. Since the same had been happening over the course of a few
months,100 it was reasonably foreseeable as well. Since 200 people drowned in the Calasian
92
Commissioner's Programme; Standing Committee, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The
International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (June 9,
2000).
93
Barbara Miltner, Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception, 30(1)
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 75 (2006).
94
UNCLOS, supra note 58, art. 98(1).
95
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Background Note on the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and
Refugees Rescued at Sea (Final version, including Annexes) (Mar. 18, 2002).
96
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Annex, ¶ 1.3.13, Aug. 27 1985, 1405 U.N.T.S.;
Ships in Distress, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oct. 2007).
97
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. II (1973).
98
Supra note 96.
99
Compromis, p.15
100
Compromis, p. 15 & 14.
[ 13 ]

Sea and lost their lives, it could be easily ascertained that the refugees were in distress and
required assistance, which they were not provided with.
C. Makonda was duty-bound to assist such Migrants
[¶61.] It is well established that “it is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal States to
allow vessels in distress to seek haven in their waters and to grant asylum, or at least
temporary refuge, to persons on board wishing to seek asylum”. 101 Further, the fact that the
persons to be saved are migrants should not in any way hinder their right to be saved from
distress. 102
[¶62.] Article 98 of UNCLOS requires every coastal State to promote the establishment,
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding
safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional
arrangements, to co-operate with neighboring states for this purpose.103
[¶63.] Despite Makonda coordinating activities regarding maritime security with Joran and
Ligos on the Calasian Sea,104 the states failed to rescue 200 Okuzan refugees that were
attempting to reach Makonda from the Eastern Province of Mayzan, on 13 th January 2021.
The refugees were travelling on a boat, and there were no suspected survivors of the
tragedy.105
[¶64.] Hence, Makonda was duty bound by humanitarian obligations, as well as under
UNCLOS to assist the 200 refugees that lost their lives in the Calasian Sea, on the night of
13th January 2021.106
D. Makonda did not possess the right to interdict Refugee Boats
[¶65.] In the high seas, states can only exercise exhaustive powers as listed in the UNCLOS,
which is exercised in limited cases.107 Vessels are thus, only subject to the authority of their
flag state.108
101
Commissioner’s Programme, Refugees Without an Asylum Country No. 15 (XXX) - 1979, No. 15 (XXX), (Oct.
16, 1979).
102
International Maritime Organisation, Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the
Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea, Doc. MSC/Circ.896/Rev.1, (June 12, 2001).
103
UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 98.
104
Compromis, p. 15.
105
Compromis, p.15.
106
Compromis, p.15.
107
UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 92(1) and 87; United Nations Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, Apr. 29
1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
108
UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 99, 100, 109, 110 & 11; See further, EFTHYMIOS PAPASTAVRIDIS THE
INTERCEPTION OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE
OCEANS (1st ed. Bloomsbury Publishing 2013).
[ 14 ]

[¶66.] In case of flagless ships, which are routinely used by asylum seekers, all states enjoy a
‘right of visit’.109 The powers under the right of visit are limited by the purpose of the visit,
that is, the right to approach, and then board the vessel to firstly, verify the ship’s right to fly
its flag and secondly, to confirm or remove a suspicion of piracy, slave trade or unauthorized
broadcasting.110 However, the powers to arrest and interdict a refugee are not included within
this perogative, except in cases where it is expressly conferred by treaty.111
[¶67.] In the present case, Okuzan refugees displayed no suspicion of any such illegal
activities and neither there existed such treaty. Hence, Makonda did not possess the right to
interdict the Okuzan Refugees.
E. BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES

OBLIGATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT
[¶68.] An erga omnes obligation defines the obligations of a State towards the International
Community and is owed by States towards the community of States as a whole. 112 However,
in some cases, when there exists involvement of multilateral treaties, states owe an obligation
to the other State parties of the instrument.
[¶69.] The terminology “erga omnes partes” was attempted to be defined as “an obligation
under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes in any given case to all the
other States parties to the same treaty, in view of their common values and concern for
compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these States to take action”.113
A. COUNTRIES HAVE TREATY OBLIGATIONS
[¶70.] In the present case, Boliria and Makonda as well as the Applicant are all members of
the United Nations114 and are parties to treaties such as; 1951 Refugee Convention and its
Protocol of 1967, ICCPR of 1966, CAT of 1984, CRC of 1989, CEDAW, Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties [VCLT] of 1969, etc.115
109
UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 92(2) & 110.
110
UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 110(2); Martin Ratcovich, International Law and the Rescue of Refugees at Sea
(Sept. 20, 2019) (Ph.D Dissertation, Stockholm University).
111
UNCLOS, supra, art. 110(1); ROBIN CHURCHILL AND VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 214
(Manchester University Press, 1983).
112
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 304 (Feb. 5)
[hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case].
113
Resolution on Obligations erga omnes in International Law, M Giorgio Gaja, Institut de Droit International,
5th Commission, art. 2 (Aug. 27, 2005).
114
Compromis, Special Agreement to the ICJ.
115
Compromis, ¶ 34.
[ 15 ]

[¶71.] All of these treaties, reflect upon the principle of non-refoulment in some way and
bestow upon the states an obligation to practice it.
1. OBLIGATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT
[¶72.] The present case focuses on the principle of non-refoulment, which constitutes the
cornerstone of international refugee protection. It is the most vital tool that asylum seekers
have in order to be able to enter the State’s territory and seek protection. 116 The principle of
non-refoulement does not only apply to refugees but also applies to asylum-seekers
irrespective of whether they have been formally acknowledged as refugees.117
[¶73.] This non-refoulement obligation is firmly enshrined in Article 33(1) of the Refugee
Convention.118 According to the Convention, “a State shall not expel or return a refugee to a
place where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Beyond that,
Article 6 and 7 of the ICCPR implicitly entail a more extensive non-refoulement
obligation.119 Persecution is here substituted by the threat of “cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment”.
[¶74.] Additionally, under the CRC 1989, states are “not to return a child to a country where
there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the
child, such as, but by no means limited to, those contemplated under Articles 6 and 37 of the
Convention, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to
which the child may subsequently be removed”.120
[¶75.] Further, the CEDAW also asks the state parties to “refrain from engaging in any act or
practice of discrimination against women”121. This duty carries within itself the obligation to
protect women from non-refoulement.122 Article 3 of the CAT too, forbids the expulsion of a
116
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (3rd ed. Oxford
University Press 2007).
117
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of
Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol (Jan. 26, 2007).
118
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1).
119
ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 6 & 7.
120
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, ¶ 27, CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1 2005).
121
CEDAW, supra note 49, art. 2(d).
122
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General recommendation
No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, ¶
22-23, CEDAW/C/GC/32 (Nov. 5, 2014).
[ 16 ]

person to a place where there are fair reasons to suspect that he or she may be subjected to
torture.123
[¶76.] According to these above-mentioned provisions, no asylum claimant or refugee shall

be expelled or deported in any way to the territory where his or her life, liberty, or the right to
be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment will be
jeopardized. Non-refoulment is a thus, a basic principle that is mentioned in the treaties to
which the Respondent states are parties.
B. TREATIES MUST BE KEPT
[¶77.] In addition, the treaties are always read along with the rule of Pacta Sunt Servanda,
i.e., treaties must be kept.124 It has been applied since time immemorial while forming
treaties. This is one of the central canons of the International Law of treaties and is anchored
in various forms. 125
[¶78.] The Law of Treaties says that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.” 126 Following the same essence, the UN
Charter bestows upon its member states the duty to fulfil its obligations assumed in good
faith.127 Also, the interpretation in good faith is firstly to be done according to the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and keeping in mind the object
and purpose of the treaty and not in isolation.128
[¶79.] Hence, Boliria and Makonda are bound by the principle of non-refoulment and have
the obligation under treaty law. So, the principle is to be followed by both Boliria and
Makonda in good faith.
C. THE PRINCIPLE IS AN OBLIGATION ERGA OMNES PARTES
[¶80.] Boliria and Makonda, being parties to various treaties mentioned above, owe an
obligation to implement the provisions mentioned in these instruments to other State parties
of the Conventions. Such an obligation, that lies upon the countries is that of the principle of
non-refoulement. These obligations are referred to as ‘obligation erga omnes partes’.
1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

123
CAT, supra note 81, art. 3.
124
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 26, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
125
M.E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 359-368 (1st
ed. Brill Nijhoff 2009).
126
VCLT, supra note 124, art. 26.
127
U.N. Charter art. 2(2).
128
VCLT, supra note 124, art. 31(1).
[ 17 ]

[¶81.] This Hon’ble court in majority has demonstrated how obligations erga omnes partes
may be identified129. Firstly, the object and purpose of the Convention and the community
interest that the treaty seeks should be ascertained. Then, the purpose of the convention
should be brought out so as to determine if the obligation at issue was incorporated to fulfil
this very purpose.
a. Purpose of the Conventions
[¶82.] To determine the object and purpose of a treaty, particulars like “the title of the treaty,
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where
appropriate, the subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties” 130 can be taken into account.
This court itself has used these particulars in a number of cases131 to deduce the object and
purpose of a treaty. Using these particulars as a guide, the object and purpose of the
Conventions in use are;
[¶83.] The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to the Convention are the first
and the only instruments at the global level that directly govern the care of those who are
forced to leave their homes due to a rupture with their country of origin, and they represent a
basic human principle on which there is global consensus. 132 The Preamble also adds the
protection of refugees and the guarantee of their fundamental rights and freedoms to the
object and purpose of the Convention.133
[¶84.] The CAT of 1984 in its preamble states that it desires to “make more effective the
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
throughout the world” and to recognize the “inherent dignity of the human person”. 134 The
ICCPR too thrives to give recognition to the dignity and equal rights of all humans and for
them to enjoy all the freedom and rights available.135
129
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Case No. 2012/24,
International Court of Justice Press Release, (July 20, 2012) [hereinafter Belgium v. Senegal Case].
130
Report of the International Law Commission of its Fifty-ninth session, UN Doc (A/62/10), 3.6.1 (2007).
131
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Jun. 27), p. 137; Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in
Morocco (France v. United States of America), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27), p. 196; Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL No 90, 2003 ICJ Rep 161, ICGJ 74
(ICJ 2003), p. 814, para. 28.
132
UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL (Sept. 2011).
133
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 4, Preamble.
134
CAT, supra note 81, Preamble.
135
ICCPR, supra note 18.
[ 18 ]

[¶85.] Hence, a common purpose that can be inferred from all these treaties is that of
protecting the people from various brutalities of the world and to ensure their equal rights and
freedom.
B. Community Interest
[¶86.] In conventions like the ones at hand, “the contracting States do not have any interests
of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment
of those high purposes”.136
[¶87.] Without corresponding immunity from refoulement, the right to seek asylum has no
meaning.137 To put it another way, if an asylum seeker is given access to territory or asylum
procedures, there must be an assurance that the person will not be returned to persecution,
death, or torture. So, the International community should act as a common group with
collective interest so as to offer protection and safeguard the rights of asylum claimants and
refugees, especially in states with adherence to non–refoulement obligations.
C. Fulfilment of the Purpose
[¶88.] The obligation at issue in the present case is that of non-refoulement. The aim of the
concept of non-refoulement is to protect refugees from being forcibly returned to dangerous
circumstances. Protection against return to a country where a person has reason to fear
persecution and threat is the most important aspect of refugee status and asylum.138
[¶89.] This clearly supports that the principle of non-refoulement was incorporated to fulfil
the very purpose of the convention i.e., to save the people from various brutalities of the
world and ensure their equal rights and freedom.
[¶90.] Clearly, the purpose of the Convention and the common interest into the principle of
non-refoulement fulfil the purpose well. This is in confirmation with the observations made
by the majority in the case of Belgium v. Senegal139. Hence, the principle of non-refoulement
is an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ as it fulfils the criteria of being one, based on this courts
observation.
136
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
137
FRANCES NICHOLSON AND JUDITH KUMIN, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS, (2017). [hereinafter Refugee
Handbook]
138
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
(November 1997).
139
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 129.
[ 19 ]

D. IN ACCORDANCE TO THE ARTICLE ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
[¶91.] The “Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”
[ARSIWA] by the International Law Commission [ILC] has developed the theory of State
responsibility through the codification of such a law. It primarily governs the matter of the
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The Articles have been referred by
this Court in various cases.140
[¶92.] Art. 48 (1) (a) of the same, enables the state other than the injured state to invoke
responsibility in respect of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ only if the prerequisite of;
firstly, the obligation having been owed to a group of States and; secondly, it being
established for the protection of a collective interest are met.141
a. Owed to a group of States
[¶93.] The phrase “Group of States” in this context, refers to a group made up of all or a
considerable number of states from around the world or a region, that have come together to
achieve some common goal and which, for that matter, can be thought of as forming a
functional group of States.142
[¶94.] All the contracting parties of conventions like the 1951 Refugee Convention and its
Protocol of 1967, ICCPR of 1966, CAT of 1984, CRC of 1989, etc. form a group as they are
the contracting parties to the respective conventions.
[¶95.] All the contracting state parties have come together with the common motive of
providing for the protection of the refugees, protection of humans from torture, protection
and harmonious development of the child through the respective above-mentioned treaties.
[¶96.] These common goals make the contracting parties of a convention a functional group
of states who have gathered together to achieve the goals stated in the preamble of the
conventions. Hence, being a member state of the groups of states, i.e. party to the convention,
the applicant too is entitled to be owed the obligation.
140
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), [2007] ICJ 2; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL No 116 [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ
31 (ICJ 2005), 19th December 2005, International Court of Justice [ICJ].; Certain Activities Carried Out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICGJ 490 (ICJ 2013).
141
Art. 48, commentary, ¶ 6, p. 126.
142
Art. 42, commentary, ¶ 11 p. 118-119.
[ 20 ]

B. Established for the protection of a collective interest
[¶97.] The right to seek asylum is meaningless unless it is accompanied by exemption from
refoulement.143 To put it another way, once an asylum claimant is granted entry to territories
or asylum proceedings, there must be assurances that the person will not be subjected to
abuse, death, or torture.
[¶98.] Non-refoulement arises from the special responsibility to provide for the international
protection of refugees and asylum-seekers. The International community has a collective
interest in protecting asylum claimants and refugees from being refouled back to their
country of origin to face mass atrocities. So, the International community should take positive
action to prevent the refoulement of asylum claimants or refugees to the same.
[¶99.] Hence, since the prerequisites are met, the principle of non-refoulment can very well
be held to be an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ according to the Articles of State
Responsibility.
C. THE APPLICANT CAN INVOKE THE RESPONSIBILITY
[¶100.]As the obligation in discussion, has mostly been used where the issues to be addressed
were that of jurisdiction and admissibility 144, it is only fair to deduce the point that the
Applicant has the right to invoke the responsibility of the Respondent States to the principle
of non-refoulement.
[¶101.]The primary consequence of breach of an obligation erga omnes is that all states, even
those that did not suffer any material damages and which were not therefore materially
injured by that breach, have a legal standing to invoke the responsibility of the state that has
violated the obligation.145 They may also require cessation of the violation, some assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition and ask reparation in the interest of the injured state.146
[¶102.]It has been confirmed that “when a State commits a breach of an obligation erga
omnes, all the States to which the obligation is owed are entitled, even if they are not
specially affected by the breach, to claim from the responsible State… a cessation of the
143
Refugee Handbook, supra note 137.
144
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v Rwanda) Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep 6 para 64; Belgium v. Senegal
Case, supra note 129; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar) Judgement no. 2020/3 (Jan. 23, 2020).
145
ARSIWA. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 48(1), November 2001,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 [hereinafter ARSIWA].
146
Id, 48 (2).
[ 21 ]

internationally wrongful act.”147 Furthermore, before commencing proceedings, a state need

not show actual injury to its interests where breaches of erga omnes partes or erga omnes
obligations are concerned.
[¶103.]Thus, the applicant being a party to the treaties that infer the obligation of the
principle of non-refoulment on the Respondent States, can very well invoke the obligations
on part of the respondents despite being a state other that the injured State. The standing is
valid as the respondents are under the breach of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ i.e., the
principle of non-refoulement.
D. BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PREVENT OKUZAN PEOPLE BEING LEFT
STATELESS
[¶104.]The possession of a nationality is a necessary requirement for enjoying certain civil

and human rights and protections.148 In principle no human individual ought to be rendered
stateless as statelessness affects a person's ability to enjoy various fundamental privileges and
rights.149 Situation of statelessness arises in this case [A.]; there is a presumption of
customary international law [B.]; and leaving people stateless would violate multilateral
treaties [C.].
A. SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS ARISES IN THIS CASE
[¶105.]Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines
a stateless person as “a person who is not recognized as a national by any State under the
operation of its law.”150 This definition has now become a part of customary international
law.151
[¶106.]In light of this definition, it can clearly be established that Okuzan people are stateless
as they are not recognized as citizens by any country under the operation of its law.
B. THERE IS PRESUMPTION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
147
Supra note 5.
148
Andrejeva v. Latvia, II Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) 71, 128.
149
Carol A. Batchelor, Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status, 10 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF REFUGE LAW 156-182 (1998).
150
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), 28 September 1954, U.N.T.S., vol.
360, p. 117.
151
UNHCR, Expert Meeting – The Concept of Stateless Persons Under International Law (Summary
Conclusions) (2010), at para 2 (commonly referred to as the UNHCR Prato Summary Conclusions).
[ 22 ]

[¶107.]In the Gulf of Maine case and others152, this Hon’ble Court held that certain
customary international standards can be identified with a lower evidentiary threshold. When
considering the presence of standards that are “vital” for international cooperation, we can
have a presumption of customary international law. We can even apply this presumption
when the existence of a rule of customary international law is otherwise logical. 153 The
prohibition on statelessness is unquestionably vital for international cooperation and follows
logically from sovereignty and international co-existence norms.
[¶108.]The prohibition on statelessness implicates important values, i.e., human rights.

Everyone has the right to be recognised as a citizen in the eyes of the law 154, and having a
nationality is a requirement for many civil and human right protections. 155 Hence, protection
against statelessness qualifies as a matter of jus cogens, that is, a peremptory norm of
international law that trumps even treaty obligations.156
[¶109.]In a few cases, courts have held rules exist under Customary International Law where
the concordant practice leads to presumption of opinio juris.157 Since prohibition of
statelessness has consistently been regarded as a matter of concern for the international
community, it qualifies for the presumption in favour of customary international law, as
expressed in UNGA resolutions.158 The Assembly has also adopted many other statements
that argue that statelessness in general should be addressed.159
[¶110.]Thus, in the light of the mentioned authorities there is a presumption of Customary

International Law in favour of prevention of statelessness and Boliria and Makonda have a
customary obligation to prevent the Okuzan people from being left stateless.
C. LEAVING PEOPLE STATELESS WOULD VIOLATE MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND

CONVENTIONS
152
Gulf of Maine Area, Canada v United States, Merits, Judgment, [1984] ICJ Rep 246 [hereinafter Gulf of
Maine Judgment].
153
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), 2012 I.C.J. 99.; The case of the S.S. “Lotus”
(France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
154
155
Supra, note 148.
156
VCLT, supra note 124, art. 53; JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 2147 (3rd ed. Cambridge University Press 2009).
157
C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 253–254 (3rd ed. Oceana
Publications 1964).
158
Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449; Yean v. Dominican Republic, Judgement IACHR
Series C No 130.
159
UDHR, art. 15(2); G.A. Res. 8 (I) (Feb. 12, 1946); G.A. Res. 538 (VI) (Feb. 2, 1952); G.A. Res. 896 (IX),
Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness (Dec. 4, 1954); G.A. Res. 55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001); G.A. Res.
64/127, ¶¶ 4, 7– 8 (Dec. 18, 2009).
[ 23 ]

[¶111.]Every treaty in force binds the parties to it, and they must perform it out in good
faith.160 Leaving Okuzan People without nationality would directly defeat the provisions of
various multilateral treaties to which Boliria and Makonda are parties.
[¶112.]Article 7 of the CRC recognizes and protects children from being left stateless and
gives them a right from their birth itself to acquire a nationality. 161 The CRC has also been
interpreted to require states to grant their nationality to children born on their territory who
would otherwise be stateless.162
[¶113.]Article 5(d) (iii) of the ICERD and article 9 of the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW] states that, “the right to nationality is
to be enjoyed without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, descent, national or
ethnic origin, or sex.”163 The ICCPR also states, in article 24(3), that every child has the right
to acquire a nationality.164 Additionally, according to article 15 of the UDHR, “everyone has
the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor denied the
right to change his nationality.”165
[¶114.]Here, it is very well established that Okuzan people are stateless. Thus, if Boliria and
Makonda do not address this issue, it would lead to violation of various multilateral treaties.
160
VCLT, supra note 124, art. 26.
161
CRC, supra note 41, art. 7.
162
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of
the Netherlands, ¶33, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/NDL/CO/4 (Jun. 8, 2015).
163
ICERD, art. 5(d) (iii); CEDAW, supra note 49, art. 9.
164
ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 24(3).
165
[ 24 ]

PRAYER
For reasons stated above, the Applicant hereby requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:
-I-
BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE

PROTECTION TO ALL THOSE OKUZAN ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM MAYZAN WHO SEEK ITS
PROTECTION.
- II -
BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS AND MAKONDA’S MEASURES

INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ON THE CALASIAN SEA ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- III -
BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES OBLIGATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON- REFOULEMENT.
- IV -
BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PREVENT

THE OKUZAN PEOPLE FROM BEING LEFT STATELESS.
-V-
ANY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
Respectfully submitted,
AGENTS FOR THE APPLICANT
[ XXI ]

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22A

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF PEMOLA

THE STATE OF BOLIRIA & REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA

MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANT

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

ISSUE I: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

ISSUE II: BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS & MAKONDA’S

OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW__________________________7

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

2. EVEN IF CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT PERSIST, THE REFUGEE STATUS CANNOT BE

B. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

ISSUE III: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES

ISSUE IV: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN OBLIGATION UNDER

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

1. Andrejeva v. Latvia, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 128. 22

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)

Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain),

Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR

European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v. Greece, ECSR, Complaint No.

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

12. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 3

13. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 3

Janko Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. I-1449; Yean v. Dominican

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

17. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). 3

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.

Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),

20. Penate v. Canada, [1994] 2 FC 79 (Can. FCA, Nov. 26, 1993). 8

Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium

R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, Ex parte

Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v.

24. Scaramanga v. Stamp, [1880] 5 CPD 295, 304. 7

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada, (1990),

X v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 C.P.R.

45th International Labour Conference, Workers’ Housing Recommendation

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Cessation of

Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, A/RES/31/109

HRC Communication No 458/1991 (1994) UN Doc

International Maritime Organisation, Interim Measures for Combating

James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc

Report of the International Law Commission of its Fifty-ninth session, UN

Resolution on Obligations erga omnes in International Law, M Giorgio

9. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 16

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

women, ¶ 22-23, CEDAW/C/GC/32 (Nov. 5, 2014).

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding observations

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 6

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Background Note on the

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Interpreting Article 1 of

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ministerial Meeting of