© Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,

JulyñSeptember 2010, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 21ñ38.

Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya

T.S. RUKMINI

INTRODUCTION

Vij¤ånabhik¶u (Bhik¶u) has not been taken seriously as a Vedånta-

åcårya by scholars in general. The reason for that is obvious.
According to Vedånta the ultimate reality is only Brahman. Thus
whether in Advaita, Vi‹i¶¢ådvaita, Dvaita, ›uddhådvaita, Svåbhåvika-
bheda-abheda or Acintyabheda-abheda interpretations of Vedånta,
the ultimate reality is accorded to Brahman and Brahman alone
called variously as Brahman, Nåråyaƒa, Gopåla K涃a etc. Bhik¶u
has compromised that basic fundamental premise of Vedånta by
according a status of reality to his Så√khyan categories of prakæti
and puru¶as as well, and then trying to explain their relationship to
Brahman not very satisfactorily in his avibhåga-advaita (Advaita of
inseparables) interpretation of Vedånta1. This leads him to make
many twists and turns to accommodate the real and all pervading
prakæti and puru¶as into Brahman and explain avibhåga-advaita
variously, in which task he was bound to stumble because of the
initial false moves that he has made.
Bhik¶u is committed to Yoga primarily and secondarily to
Så√khya when it suits him. I shall try to point out in this paper,
how Bhik¶u strains himself to accommodate the Så√khya-Yoga
categories into the avibhåga-advaita-Vedånta school he propounds. I
use his commentary on the Brahmasµutras of Bådaråyaƒa (BS) called
the Vij¤ånåmætabhå¶yam (Vij.Bh) for this purpose. In the process one
clearly sees the partiality that Bhik¶u displays towards Så√khya-Yoga
(SY).
22 T.S. RUKMINI

Bhik¶uís avibhåga-Brahman is basically the Yoga ∫‹vara. His

puru¶as and prakæti retain their ontological reality status as depicted
in SY. His analysis of the nature of sa√såra as being du¨kha is also
vey much like that of SY. His avibhåga Vedånta liberation is also
the discernment of the difference between prakæti and puru¶a/
åtman like in SY2 or a realization of the difference between ∫‹vara/
Brahman and j∂va3 which can happen through the double reflection
theory of knowledge proposed by Bhik¶u4. In the Vij.Bh he shows
his preference for sa√praj¤åta and asa√praj¤åta yoga which alone
can discern the ultimate ∫‹vara5. Thus, in all essential details, Bhik¶u
follows the SY metaphysics and epistemology in his avibhåga-Vedånta
analysis as well. It is also worth noticing that Bhik¶u depends a lot
on the evidence of the Puråƒas to buttress his avibhåga-advaita
arguments; he is also greatly influenced by the theistic trends of the
period he lived in (sixteenth century CE).
Some might welcome all this as a syncretist approach on the part
of Bhik¶u. But in the context of the Indian philosophical tradition
which expects loyalty to the metaphysics and epistemology of the
respective traditions in the bhå¶yas, this would be frowned upon.
While a syncretist approach might be accepted in religion, in
philosophy where an intellectual rigour is called for, this mixing
up of SY ideas into Vedånta, is a travesty of the methodology of the
Indian philosophical tradition itself.
In all his writings on SY, Bhik¶u has exhibited his strong opposition
to ›a∆karaís Advaita Vedånta interpretation (Vij.Bh, Yogavårttika,
Så√khyapravacana-bhå¶ya, Så√khyasåra and Yogasårasa√graha) and
his one mission seems to be to stand up to ›a∆kara and his followers;
it seems he retained the term Advaita in his avibhåga-advaita in order
to prove that avibhåga-advaita (non-duality of inseparables) is the
right understanding of Advaita as opposed to ›a∆karaís Advaita.
It appears that Bhik¶u has set himself a very difficult task in his
avibhåga-advaita when he tries to explain (1) the nature of the reality
of both Brahman and the j∂vas/puru¶as, (2) when he attempts to find
a logical relationship between prakæti and Brahman and also (3)tries
to assimilate the SY real categories of prakæti and puru¶as into the
ultimate reality Brahman. In all of these tasks he does not display
much originality but tries to fit in whatever comes in handy from
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 23

Advaita and Vi‹i¶¢a-advaita (Vi‹.Ad) and also introduces a certain

type of relation like svarµupa-sa√bandha6 over and above sa√yoga and
samavåya to explain this relation between Brahman and prakæti and
the puru¶as, without trying to satisfactorily integrate them into his
avibhåga-advaita. His avibhåga-advaita also displays a lot of similarities
with the bhakti schools and in particular with Råmånujaís Vi‹.Ad. For
instance his avibhåga and Råmånujaís apæthaksiddhi have much in
common conceptually.
Vi‹i¶¢ådvaita scholars like P.N. Srinivasachari seem to understand
both avibhåga and apæthaksiddhi to have the same meaning in such
statements as ìThe Sµutrakåra [Råmånuja] reconciles all the texts
and their truths by the all-comprehensive concept of avibhågaî
(1978:483-84). Råmånuja looks upon the j∂va/j∂vas as vi‹e¶aƒas
(inseparable modes), which though inseparable, are still separate
entities. There is a marked resemblance to this way of delineating
the j∂va in Vi‹.Ad and Bhik¶uís way of conceptualizing the many
åtmans as being real and inseparable from Brahman. Commenting
on BS IV.4.4 (avibhågena d涢atvåt).
Ramanuja makes it clear that in mukti there is an experience
of the nature, ëI am Brahmaní which is not ìabsolute identity but
vi‹i¶¢a-aikya in which the self is realized as apæthak-siddha-vi‹e¶aƒa
or inseparable mode [avibhåga]î. (ibid) Srinivasachari goes on
to say that ìThe avinåbhåva or inseparability abolishes the sense
of exclusiveness and externality that belongs to the bodily self
of ahaƒkåra or egoism, but it does not annul the aham or ego
consciousness of the åtmanî (1978: 483-484). The same author
again uses the expression avibhåga to explain the bliss of unitive
experience in Råmånujaís system. ìAvibhåga or non-division thus
connotes existential difference between Brahman and the mukta and
experienced unity...and it is not the same as the loss of personalityî
(1978:484).

PURU®AS AND BRAHMAN

Bhik¶u defines puru¶as as being real and existing before s涢i7 and also
as having sat (existence) as their intrinsic property8 . He also says that
even though j∂vas have consciousness, that is brought into existence
24 T.S. RUKMINI

through ∫‹vara at the time of s涢i9. He goes further by stating that

the j∂vas are secondary (gauƒa) åtmans while ∫‹vara alone is the
primary åtman10. (Vij.Bh: 29). He also classifies all åtmans, including
Brahman which is para- åtman (higher åtman), and the j∂vas which
are apara-åtmans (lower åtmans), under the genus of åtmatva. Thus
Brahman according to Bhik¶u, has para-åtmatva while the j∂vas have
apara-åtmatva, both sharing the såmånya guƒa (universal property)
of åtmatva . One thus concludes that Bhik¶u assigns two grades of
meaning to åtmatva, a higher for Brahman and a lower for j∂vas.
Bhik¶u also understands the meaning of the word åtman to denote
ëanything from which there is something that issues forth and then
having stayed there for a while again merges into ití11. His standard
example for that is the sea and the waves that arise out of it and
again submerge in it. Surely this is stretching the meaning too far.
The accepted characteristic of åtman is ëconsciousnessí in avibhåga-
advaita as much as in other systems of Indian philosophy. Bhik¶u also
states that the åtman possess consciousness in a secondary sense i.e it
is that which ëpossesses the power of consciousnessí12. If possessing
consciousness/power of consciousness characterizes åtman then
ëåtmatvaí defines that which possesses consciousness or has the
capacity to possess consciousness. It cannot be applied to anything
like the sea or praƒa as Bhik¶u makes out13. So one concludes
that however much Bhik¶u tries to gloss over the word åtman, he
is committed to the idea of both åtman and Brahman having the
universal property of consciousness and yet calls one (puru¶a) as
an inferior åtman and the other Brahman as a superior åtman. As
Das Gupta remarks: ìIn the conception of j∂va or individuals...there
seems to be an apparent contradiction. For while the puru¶as are
sometimes described as pure consciousness, they are at other times
described as inert and wholly under the domination of paramåtmanî
(1961:451)
According to Nyåya, on which the philosophical schools including
Bhik¶uís avibhåga-advaita depend for their argumentative techniques,
there are certain conditions that have to be taken into consideration
before a property (guƒa) can be designated as a såmånya-guƒa. It is
laid down in detail in the Kiraƒåval∂ of Udayanåcårya. Udayanåcårya
has mentioned six entities that cannot come under the genus of jåti
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 25

as (1) unity of the object (åkå‹atva); (2) identity of things though

names are different (gha¢atva and kala‹atva); (3) cross-division
(bhµutatva and mµurtatva); (4) want of finality i.e., jåti cannot have jåti
on it; (5) violation of essence like the vi‹esas being innumerable still
cannot have a jåti (vi‹e¶atva) as it is opposed to the concept of jåti;
and (6) want of proper connection prevents jåti like samavåyatva14.
Matilal translates them as: (1) ìA proper universal property cannot
belong to only one individual. (2) If a class property is found, then
they must not be construed as two distinct universal properties.
(3) The same individual or individuals cannot be the locus of two
universal properties unless one of them is totally included within the
other. (4) The category universal property cannot be said to possess
another universal property because of the infinite regress to which
that would lead. (5) If by our admission of a universal property in
an entity we run counter to the arguments by which that very entity
was posited, we should give up that claim. (6) Inherence combines
a universal property with an individual, but inherence itself cannot
be combined by a further inherence; hence there is no universal
property in inherence (Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol.
II,1995:590). If we follow this general understanding of universals
then the ultimate indivituators like the atom in Nyåya and the åtman
in Vedånta cannot have universal properties since the ìultimate
individuators are by nature things which differentiate without
assimilatingî (ibid: 136); in other words, an ultimate individuator
is an entity ìwhich differentiates without assimilating, which is not
common to and shared by several entities but is unique and self-
individuatingî (ibid:134).
In the Taittir∂yopani¶ad-Bhå¶ya-Vårttika Sure‹vara makes a
similar remark that Brahman/Consciousness is adæ‹ya as it has no
perceptible characteristics. He emphasizes the fact that Brahman is
anåtmya because it has no class characteristic in it. He also states that
the commonly present characteristic in particular objects ìwhich are
perceptible is...said to be the universal. Having no existence in itself
it [universal] comes to have existence (only through the particular)
as conveyed by the suffix yatî (Balasubramaniam, 1974: 296)15.
Thus the commonly accepted view in the tradition, supported
by Nyåya logic as well, is that åtman being unique can have no jåti
26 T.S. RUKMINI

as åtmatva associated with it whether one refers to Brahman (para

åtman) or to j∂va (apara åtman). In this case both Brahman and j∂vas
have sattå and cit/ciccha‹akti also according to Bhik¶u, and they are
also ultimately real; therefore they cannot be considered as inferior
(apara) or superior (para) based on the universals. The point at
issue is that the sattå of Brahman and the sattå of the puru¶as are
not different in essence. According to Bhik¶u, åtmatva is an ultimate
jåti and it is also the ultimate essence or individuator; so on both
counts one cannot have a para and apara åtman, based on the notion
of a jåti called åtmatva. Since he seems to depend on Nyåya logic,
unless he can come up with an alternate explanation for having
an universal category called åtmatva, his analysis again lands him
into admitting two levels of åtman very much like ›a∆kara. ›a∆kara
at least only admits the difference due to the upådhis and not to
the åtmans themselves (Vij.Bh:30). Also Bhik¶uís quoting a Puråƒa
source (Vij.Bh:30) to justify his notion of para and apara-åtman only
weakens his argument16.

NIRGU°NA BRAHMAN

Bhik¶u defines nirguƒa Brahman in the same way as Yoga defines

∫‹vara.17 He also believes in the upådhi of kle‹as for the puru¶as like
Yoga wherein ignorance (avidyå) is only one of the kle‹as even
though the most important one18.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Bhik¶u relies on his own double reflection theory of knowledge for

the perception of the world before its manifestation/creation by
∫‹vara. ì∫‹vara continues to perceive with the aid of its pure sattva-
adjunct, the mode reflecting the universe, otherwise the creation
of the universe by it would be rendered untenableî (Kanshi Ram,
1995:93)19. In order to perceive the world, according to Bhik¶u,
who follows the SY epistemology, ∫‹vara needs the intellect without
which there can be no knowledge of the world, which comes into
existence later. Bhik¶u therefore brings in the concept of ‹uddha-
sattva which was suggested by Vyåsa under his commentary on YS
1.2420. For Vyåsa the authority of the ‹åstras is because it is ìcreated...
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 27

from the knowledge of the meaning which is directly perceived by

the ëpure-sattva limitationí of ∫‹varaî (Rukmani, 1981: 139)21. Bhik¶u
goes further than Vyåsa when he assumes that it is the reflection of
Brahman in ‹uddha-sattva which is transformed as knowledge, which,
then, through Brahmanís will, brings the world and the j∂vas into
existence22. In this approach he brings in his interpretation of the
epistemology of SY, wherein the rise of knowledge and the will to
create comes through a reflection of puru¶a in the intellect/prakæti.
In the case of ∫‹vara, similarly, his reflection in ‹uddha-sattva gives
rise to the creation of the world according to Bhik¶u.
According to SY prakæti has the constituents sattva, rajas and tamas
in an organic sense and the sattva intellect which gets the reflection
of puru¶a in any knowledge event is a combination of sattva, rajas
and tamas, even if sattva is dominant in it. One presumes this
combination is what brings into being the intellect, aha∆kåra and
manas as the first three evolutes in the first place, to perceive an
object, and which then leads to the modification of the intellect as
the object image. One fails to understand how pure-sattva will be
able to serve the same function in SY epistemology. Having assumed
sattva, rajas and tamas as guƒas in prakæti even in his avibhåga-advaita,
Bhik¶u introduces another category of ‹uddha-sattva for the same
purpose of knowledge and creation of the world. Is sattva which is
‹uddha-sattva a different kind of sattva altogether or the same sattva
that is in prakæti without being contaminated by ërajas and tamasí.
Then do we need to assume different kinds of sattva : one that enters
into combination with rajas and tamas and the other a stand alone
pure-sattva with nothing whatsoever to do with the other two guƒas.
Indian philosophy does not support that and only a theological stand
can admit such a category as we witness in Vi‹.Ad, for instance. It
seems that the assumption of a category as ë‹uddha-sattvaí by Bhik¶u
is also more theological than philosophical. This is quite plausible
given Bhik¶uís theistic leanings for which there is ample evidence in
all his works (Rukmani, 1981:126)23
Bhik¶u seems to have borrowed the concept of ‹uddha-sattva from
Vi‹. Ad. as much as from the utk涢a-sattva mentioned by Vyåsa in
his commentary on YS.I.24 . In Vi‹.Ad. ‹uddha-sattva also known as
nityavibhµuti, is a theological category posited as consisting of pure-
28 T.S. RUKMINI

sattva alone; ì...it is a spiritual substance characterized...by unalloyed

sattvaî (S.M.Shrinivasa Chari,1988: 340). According to Vi‹.Ad
Vaikuƒ¢ha is made of the stuff of ‹uddha-sattva/nityavibµuti. So also
the bodies of muktas and nityamuktas are made of this stuff. The body
of vyµuhas, vibhavas and årcå forms are all made of vityavibhµuti (see
Hebbar,2004 ) ìThe j∂vas also in the state of mukti can assume bodies
out of free will for purpose of divine service. Such bodies are not the
products of karma but are made out of ‹uddha-sattvaî (S.M.Shrinivasa
Chari, ibid:341) Nåråyaƒa does not need ‹uddha-sattva for creating
sa√såra as in Vi‹.Ad ìs涢i is the self-differentiation of the same sat
into the universe. The creative act gives content and outward form
to the cosmic willî (P.N.Srinivasachari,1978: 105-106); the tattvas
are created by the will of Nåråyaƒa/Brahman by using the three
guƒas of prakæti. Bhik¶u, on the other hand, needs ‹uddha-sattva as an
upådhi for the sake of creating the world based on his interpretation
of Yoga epistemology. ›uddha-sattva also serves another purpose of
Bhik¶u because of his reluctance to allow the self-luminosity (svayam-
prakå‹a) of Brahman in his form of advaita. The ‹uddha-sattva
adjunct thus allows him to believe both in the vættivyåpyatva and
phalavyåpyatva24 at the time of discriminate-discernment, without
there being any kartæ-karma virodha (contradiction in the subject and
the object being one and the same)25.
The description of the coming into being of the universe (s涢i)
through a reflection in ‹uddha-sattva/prakæti in avibhåga-advaita
resembles in some ways the Vivaraƒa school of Advaita wherein the
upådånakåraƒa (material cause) is Brahman through its reflection
in måyå. So, in a sense, Bhik¶uís cosmogonic theory of the origin
of the world resembles that of the Vivaraƒa school in spite of his
virulent opposition to ›a∆karaís Advaita.

BRAHMAN, PRAK°RTI AND PURU®AS/J∫VAS

Brahman is the ultimate absolute reality in Bhik¶uís avibhåga-advaita

but much like Vi‹. Ad. he finds a place for prakæti/nature and
puru¶as within Brahman in an inseparable special relation which
he calls svarµupa-sa√bandha-vi‹e¶a or a sa√yogådi-vi‹e¶a¨. There is
no rigorous discussion on what kind of a relation this avibhåga is.
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 29

Is it different from the relata (sa√yoga-vi‹e¶a) or is it non-different

from the relata (svarµupa-vi‹e¶a). Bhik¶u skirts the issue and asserts
that it is a non-separable relation and this can be perceived as an
identity relationship (svarµupa-sa√bandha)26 and just leaves it at that.
His analogy of milk and sugar as two entities becoming one does
not help as then there would be a sense of oneness more like the
›ar∂ri-›ar∂ra-bhåva in Råmånujaís system. Are the puru¶as and prakæti
inseparable as a unit in Brahman or are they outside Brahman.
If within Brahman then there is no difference from Råmånujaís
apæthaksiddhi; if outside then a whole lot of additional problems
to clarify the existence of all these vibhu (all-pervasive) entities in
an inseparable relationship has to be explained which Bhik¶u
fails to do. The language in which avibhåga is described does not
help us much. For instance ì[Regarding the j∂vas, Bhik¶u] says
that God perceives within Himself (svåntargatau) as parts of Him
the j∂vas (svåm‹asva‹ar∂råm‹atulyau) and their conditioning factors
(j∂vatadupådh∂) as associated with merit and demerit (dharma and
adharma); associating these conditions with the j∂vas He brings
them out of Himselfî (Das Gupta, 1961:453. see Vij.Bh.II.I.13 cited
in Das Gupta ibid note 2).
This does not give the impression of the j∂vas lying outside of
paramåtman but within Brahman which again smacks very much like
Vi‹.Ad. Bhik¶u is reluctant to give up the many puru¶as and prakæti
of SY and has not been able to come up with a neat solution to the
matter of the relationship between the j∂vas, prakæti and Brahman.

BRAHMAN/∫›VARAíS ROLE IN S°R®§TI

Bhik¶u realizes the weakness of the co-existence of Brahman, puru¶as

and prakæti in a free floating manner and tries to explain it away
through bringing in the svarµupa-sa√bandha relationship as pointed
out earlier. His reluctance to give up the real puru¶as and the real
prakæti of the Yoga system makes him try hard to fit them into his
overall creation theory. His partiality for SY also comes in when he
also sticks to the evolution theory of SY in preference to the Vedånta
pa¤cikaraƒa model of evolution of the tattvas27.
He calls ∫‹vara/Brahman as the ådhåra and niyantå (which,
by the way, are how Råmånuja describes Nåråyaƒa in Vi‹.Ad.)
30 T.S. RUKMINI

(Srinivasachari, 1978:96) and has to introduce a relation called

ådhåratå to explain his theory of avibhåga. But what is ådhåratå if not
the quality of being an ådhåra or support. A support has to have a
relation to its relata, in this case prakæti and puru¶as. Is that an identity
relation or what? Since all the three entities here i.e. Brahman, prakæti
and puru¶as are all pervading, to explain the relation between these
all-pervasive entities is not easy. Bhik¶u realizes this difficulty and
offers alternate explanations for the co-existence of all pervading
puru¶as and prakæti in an ådhåra-ådheya relation with Brahman during
pralaya through what is known as svarµupa-sa√bandha which lacks a
logical explanation as already pointed out.
He, also, at one stage says that the superintendent (adhyak¶a)
of the actions of puru¶a is Brahman as its locus (ådhåratå), while
in another context he brings in the idea of superintendence both
in case of Brahman and in the case of the j∂vas in the world. This
is very much like the Vi‹i¶¢ådvaita concept of ‹ar∂rin on whom the
j∂vas depend for their support. In Srinivasachariís words ìBrahman
sustains the j∂va as its Self and the inner ruler, and uses the j∂va for its
satisfaction in the same way in which the j∂va animates and sustains
the body and uses it for its own satisfactionî (1978:96). The ∫svara/
‹ar∂rin in Vi‹i¶¢ådvaita thus appears as the superintendent very much
like Bhik¶uís Brahman in avibhåga-advaita. The problem does not
go away when Bhik¶u interprets the superintendence of puru¶as in a
secondary sense. One is therefore left with the feeling that there is
not much difference between the apætaksiddhi of Råmånuja and the
avibhåga of Bhik¶u wherein the j∂vas exist in a relationship of part
and whole in Brahman.28 In fact the Vi‹i¶¢ådvaitins understand their
apæthaksiddhi as the same as avibhåga. According to Srinivasachari,
the well known Sr∂ Vai¶ƒava scholar ìRåmånuja reconciles all the
texts and their truths by the all comprehensive concept of avibhågaî
(1978:483).

PRAK°RTI

When it comes to the concept of prakæti, Bhik¶u is not consistent and

is ambivalent. He wants the cake and eat it too. Prakæti in Bhik¶uís
SY writings has constant motion and replicates itself when there is
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 31

no evolution of the tattvas. However, when he comes to his avibhåga-

advaita Vedånta, Bhik¶u flounders. He says that prakæti and puru¶a
without activity lie submerged in the absolute at the time of pralaya.
In one place he says that prakæti and puru¶as lie asleep withdrawing
their activities in pralaya. In another place they lie as dead snakes in
a pit and in yet another context he likens them to insentient logs of
wood and iron submerged in paramåtman29.
The nature of prakæti has not changed in his form of advaita; it still
has the three guƒa constituents (sattva, rajas, tamas) and evolution
of the 24 tattvas is still explained in terms of sattva, rajas and tamas.
Thus Bhik¶u cannot conveniently get rid off prakæti and its activity
arbitrarily in his avibhåga-advaita. Using the SY categories of prakæti
and puru¶as and retaining them as real in his avibhåga-advaita as in
SY, creates problems for Bhik¶u. While in SY prakæti is always in flux
even in pralaya, Bhik¶u cannot afford to have constant action in
prakæti in his advaita model, where only Brahman is the absolute. He
thus changes the way prakæti is understood in his avibhåga-advaita.
However, he is halfhearted about the change as he still retains the
character of prakæti as in SY. Thus his argument suffers from the
defect of ardha-jarjar∂-nyåya. If, as he says, I‹vara brings prakæti and
puru¶as in contact and also enters them as well, his view again smacks
very much like that of Råmånuja.

J∫VAS/PURU®AS

Bhik¶u mentions in many places, as we have seen, that j∂vas are

insentient at the time of pralaya. But if j∂va is vibhu and nitya,
and also has the jåti of åtmatva and also shares the qualities of
sat and cit along with Brahman, which is again an åtman, (Vij.Bh:
28) what happens to the intrinsic property of cit if it is absent in
pralaya30. How can it come into being again? There is no satisfactory
explanation forthcoming except to say that due to ∫‹varaís desire
there is the association of sentience with the j∂va much like that of
the connection of the intellect with the j∂va31. But he has already
stated that the j∂vas are real or possess åtmatva, as buddhi and the
other senses emerge from it and are sustained by it and they also
submerge in it32. So, in effect there are two levels of reality in his
32 T.S. RUKMINI

formulation and the sole reality of Brahman is compromised in his

avibhåga-advaita.
Looked at from another angle, Bhik¶u has to explain how the real
puru¶as can lie dormant in Brahman at the time of pralaya without
compromising the sole reality of Brahman. Even though he brings
in a secondary definition of sat as arthakriyåkåritva (which by the
way goes for Brahman as well), that only belongs to puru¶as during
creation and not during pralaya33. But that cannot satisfactorily
explain away the intrinsic reality (sat) of puru¶as which he has
already accorded to them in keeping with his SY partiality and can
also compromise his statement that puru¶as lie like dead logs of
wood etc., at the time of pralaya.
If j∂va is insentient in pralaya, as already mentioned, and has
consciousness invested at the time of evolution/creation by
Brahman, is j∂va/åtman a ja฀a padårtha existing like prakæti in an
avibhåga relationship in Brahman at the time of pralaya. This will
lead to two kinds of insentient padårthas in Brahman even while
compromising puru¶así intrinsic property of existence (sat) which he
has already accorded to them. Not explaining his avibhåga-advaita to
accommodate all these factors lands Bhik¶u in many such awkward
situations.

MOK®A/KAIVALYA

In Bhik¶uís avibhåga-advaita the purpose of mok¶a is to be free of

du¨kha or the experience of du¨kha much like SY. While the means
for liberation has been debated to be either j¤åna alone or j¤åna
and karma in combination or j¤åna and bhakti in the various Vedånta
schools, Bhik¶u opts for the Så√khya model of insight into the
difference between puru¶a and prakæti, as well as the Yoga model of
sa√praj¤åta and asa√praj¤åta-yoga for mok¶a. He also goes back to
his two fold nature of liberation which he had already described in
his Yoga works like the Yogasårasa∆graha (YSSa∆) and Yogavårttika
(YV), as firstly the realization of puru¶a the 25th principle and then
the realization of ∫vara/Brahman, the 26th principle of Yoga.34 In
fact, he specifically mentions that the Yoga liberation is superior to
the Så√khya viviktaj¤åna, thus indicating his preference for the Yoga
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 33

model of mok¶a35. While in the YSSa∆ and the YV he mentions this

as the realization of ∫‹vara, in the Vij.Bh he calls it the realization
of Brahman. Thus, there is just the substitution of Brahman for the
Yoga ∫‹vara in the Vij.Bh.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to point out the many similarities
that the Vedånta interpretation of Bhik¶u has with his Såmkhya-
Yoga understanding and in particular his partiality for Yoga. Bhik¶u
has also strong theistic leanings which brings his avibhåga-advaita
close to Råmånujaís Vi‹i¶¢ådvaita as well. When one reads the
Vij¤ånåmætabhå¶yam there is also a certain vagueness regarding the
highest reality in Bhik¶uís avibhåga-advaita. Is Brahman the para-
åtman the highest reality or is it ∫‹vara with his upådhi sattva-‹uddhi the
highest reality. Thus in one place he attributes the start of evolution
of the mahadådi-tattvas when ∫‹vara brings about the contact of prakæti
and puru¶a (prakætipuru¶asamyoga ∫‹vareƒa kriyata ityabhyupagamyate,
Vij.Bh:18); whereas in another context he mentions that paramåtman
of his free will sends the j∂vas out and makes them act (svecchayå...
tånupådhisambandhena svato vibhajyåntaryåm∂ san prerayati, Vij.
Bh:306). This paramåtman cannot be pure consciousness, as Bhik¶uís
ìmetaphysical position does not allow any personal relation between
the human beings and the Ultimate Entityî (Das Gupta, 1961:451)
but it can only be paramåtman associated with ‹uddha-sattva. Thus
there are many places that Bhik¶uís overall commitment to
Såmkhya-Yoga and his theistic inclinations colour his approach to
metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology and in the ultimate value
called mok¶a/kailvalya in his avibhåga-advaita. This raises the moot
question as to whether Bhik¶u can be called a Vedånta-åcårya rather
than a Så√khya-Yoga-Vedånta-åcårya.
T.S. RUKMINI,
Department of Religion,
Faculty of Arts and Science,
Concordia University, Canada.
34 T.S. RUKMINI

NOTES AND REFERENCES

• I have found Kanshi Ramís book on Integral Non-Dualism (1995)
very helpful in preparing this paper.
1. The word itself could have been suggested by its occurrence in the
Brahmasµutra itself (see BS IV.2.16 and IV.4.4).
Bhik¶u himself says avibhågo vacanåt ityådisµutraií‹ceti gæhåƒa, Vij.
Bh:59.
2. Kim ca samyagj¤ånatvena hetunå bhedåkhyavivekaj¤ånasyaiva
såk¶ånmok¶ahetutvam ‹rutisiddham,Vij.Bh:21.
3. yathå hi dehendriyåd∂nåm buddhiparyantånåm-utpattilayådhåratayå
tatsåk¶itvena-adhi¶¢håtætvådinå ca j∂vaste¶åmåtmå tatsvarµupaj¤ånåcca
te¶vaham-ityabhimåno nivartate ënåham buddhyådi¨í iti vidyayeti
såmkhyasiddhånta¨, Vij.Bh:29.
4. a) så ca vættirjåyamåneva cetane pratibimbitå bhavati....tata‹ca
svapratibimbitåm vi¶ayoparaktåm tåm buddhivættim sa eva pratibimb
ådhi¶¢hånacetanoívabhåsayati, yathå svapratibimbitakusumbharakt
avastram sphå¢ikabhitti¨....tadåkåråpattau buddhisamåkåråpattau
satyåm apratisamkramåyå buddhåvasa¤cåriƒyå asa∆gåyå api cite¨
sv∂yopådhibuddhisamvedanam bhavati-ityartha¨....tathå ca cetane
pratibimbanådeva buddhivættitadvi¶ayorbhånam marumar∂cikådhyasta
jalasyeva mar∂cinå prakå‹anamiti, Vij.Bh: 39-40.
b) yå ceyam j¤ånotpattiprakriyå bahirvi¶aye¶vavadhåritå e¶aivåtmanyapi
pratyetavyå, ekarµupakalpanåyå¨ sarvathå-aucityåt. tathåhi,
‹åstrådinå yogajadharmeƒa vå buddhestamoíbhibhave sati nirmalåyåm
buddhåvåtmåkårå vættirjåyate ëaham brahmåsmií ityådirµupå.
så pramåƒam. så ca vættirjåyamånaiva cetane pratibimbitå sat∂
bhåsate. tadetat puru¶ani¶¢ham phalam-åtmaj¤ånmucyate. gha¢ådij
¤ånåccåtmaj¤ånasyåyam vi‹e¶o yadåtmatattvåkåravættyå abhimåno
nivartyate, gha¢ådyåkårabuddhivættibhistu mithyåj¤ånam na
niyamena nivartyata iti. cetanapratibimbitabuddhivættivyåpyatvameva
båhyåbhyantarasådhåraƒam j¤eyatvam boddhyam, Vij.Bh: 41.
5. kim ca jåteípi såk¶åtkåre såk¶åtkårasantånarµupasampraj¤åtasamådhau
dra¶¢avya ityådirµupavidhi¨ sambhavati, tasya ca phalamasampraj¤åtasamå
dhiriti påta¤cale spa¶¢am....uttamam yogamasampraj¤åtam. etena ‹abdasya
såk¶åtkårajanakatveípi na tåvanmåtreƒa kætakætyatå kimtu-asampraj¤åtas
amådhinaiveti mantavyam, Vij.Bh:62.
6. a) avibhåga‹cådhåratåvat svarµupasambandhavi‹e¶oítyantasammi‹raƒarµu
po dugdhajalådyekatåpratyayaniyåmaka, Vij.Bh:17.
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 35

b) athavåstu avibhåga¨samyogavi‹e¶a svarµupasambandho vå ådheyatvådi-

vat, Vij.Bh:26.
c) ayam ca sårvakålo brahmaƒi prapa¤cåbhedo buddhipuru¶ayoriva
guƒapradhånabhåvena-atyantasammi‹raƒarµ u pa¨samyogavi‹e¶a¨
svarµupasambandhavi‹eso våístu...Vij.Bh:59.
7. atra s涢e¨ prågapi ∫‹varådhi¶¢heyo jivoíst∂tyavagamyate, ibid. p.25.
8. yadyapi jivå api brahmavadeva vibhucinmåtrarµupåstathåpyupådhyavaccc
hedenaiva-abhivyaktaparicchinnacaitanyatayåvisphuli∆gatulyå bhavanti...
ibid.p. 28.
9. sargakåle ca tadicchayå tata eva labdhacaitanyaphalopadhånå åvirbhavanti
pituriva putrå¨, ato j∂vå brahmåm‹å bhavanti, ibid. p.27.
10. jivå‹cicchaktiguƒayogåd gauƒåtmåna eva, yathåídhyak¶atvaguƒayogena
pråƒa¨ karaƒånåmåtmå, tadvat. mukhyastvåtme‹vara eva, ibid. p.29.
11. yo yata ågatya yadadhi¶¢hitam yatra j∂vitvå yatra l∂yate samudratara∆gådivat
tadbuddhyådivacca sa tasyåtmå bhavati, ibid p.28.
12. cf. note 10 above.
13. cf. notes 10 and 11 above. William James, in another context,
makes the same argument much more forcefully when he says ìIt
is an argument from analogy, drawn from rivers, reflex actions and
other material phenomena where no consciousness appears to
exist at all, and extended to cases where consciousness seems the
phenomenonís essential featureî cited by Richard L.Gregory in his
article ìRegarding Consciousnessî in Consciousness and the Physical
World: 40.
14. vyakterabhedastulyatvam sa∆karoíthånavasthiti¨ rµupahånirasa√bandho
jåtibådhakasa∆graha, cited in Tarkasa∆graha of Annambha¢¢a: Notes,
page 92.
15. dæ‹yånvayi hi yadvastu tadåtmyamiti bhaƒyate, svato hyasyåtmadåridryåd-
arhårthe labhate ca yat. Brahmavalli verse 445.
16. atmånam dvidham pråhu¨ paråparavibhedata¨, parastu nirguƒa¨ prokto
hyaha∆kårayutoípara¨, Nårada Puråƒa quoted in Vij.Bh:30.
17. a) ...yata¨ parame‹varådantarl∂naprakætipuru¶ådyakhila‹aktikåt svata-
‹cinmåtråd vi‹uddhasattvåkhyamåyopådhikåt kle‹akarmavipåkå‹ayair
aparåm涢åccetanavi‹e¶åd bhavati Vij.Bh: 17.
b) kle‹akarmavipåkå‹ayairaparåm涢a¨ ∫‹vara¨ (YS. I.24).
18. tatra kle‹ådivåsanåmalinasattvam j∂vopadhi¨, Vij.Bh:53.
19. brahmacetanasya tu layo nåsti....‹rutibhi¨-brahmaƒo vi‹våvabhåsanarµu
pavyåpårasya pralayeípi sattvåt. ∫‹varopådhau vi‹våkåravætternityatvåt
icchåkætivat, anyathå vi‹vanirmåƒånupapatte¨, Vij.Bh:51.
36 T.S. RUKMINI

20. Vyåsa uses ëprak涢a-sattvaí instead of ‹uddha-sattvaí in this context.

21. ∫‹varasyopådhiryatprak涢asattvam tatpratyak¶arµupavåkyårthaj¤ånajanyat
våcchåstrasya pråmåƒyamityartha¨, Bhik¶uís YV on YS. and YSBh I.24.
22. cf. note 18 above.
23. a) api tu ad涢e‹varånugrahådidvårairevåvidyånivættau mok¶e ca hetu-
tvamabhyupagantavyam (Vij.Bh: 30).
b) etena pr∂yatåm∂‹o ya åtmå sarvadehinåm YV under YS. and YSBh.
IV.4.34.
c) brahmåtmanå cintanarµupatayå premalak¶aƒabhaktirµupådvak¶yamåƒå
tpraƒidhånådåvarjitoíbhimukh∂kæta ∫‹varastam dhyåyinambhidhyåna
måtreƒa asya samådhimok¶åvåsannatamau bhavetåmit∂cchåmåtreƒa...
anugæhƒåti ånukµulyam bhajate ityartha¨. YV on YS and YSBh I.23.
24. In Advaita perception involves the modified object(vætti) to be
illuminated by consciousness/witness for knowledge to take place.
But in the knowledge of Brahman if the same method is followed it
will reduce Brahman to being another object like all others. In order
to avoid that the Advaitins admit the mental mode of vætti pervading
the object (here åtman) during deep meditation but do not allow the
self luminous åtman to illumine itself as that would contradict the
subject object relationship. Therefore they allow only vættivyåpyatva
but not phalavyåpyatva for the realization of Brahman/åtman.
25. aj¤eyatvarµupam tåvat svaprakå‹atvam asmåbhirnåbhyupagamyate. nåpi
j∂vabrahmaƒorakhaƒ฀atvam yena j∂vasya brahmaj¤åne karmakartævirodha¨
syåt. akhaƒ฀aikåtmyamateípi så√khyayogoktayå j∂vasya svasåk¶åtkåra
prakriyayaiva brahmasåk¶åtkåreípi nåsti karmakartævirodha¨ sva‹åstre
j¤ånotpattiprakriyåyå abhåvena tayo¨ prakriyaiva gråhyåíntara∆gatvåt,
(Vij.Bh:39).
26. cf.note 6,(b) above.
27. asmin‹ca ‹åstre s涢iprakriyå mahadådikrameƒaiva såmkhyayogayoriva
vak¶yate viyadådipåde s涢iprakaraƒe, Vij.Bh:18.
28. am‹å‹yavibhågena kiraƒasµuryayoriva j∂vabrahmaƒorekapiƒ฀∫bhåvena jvena
am‹ai¨ nånåbuddhipratibimbanådityavehi, Vij.Bh:23.
29. a) tasmåt pralayamok¶ådau vi¶ayasambandhåbhåvåt ka¶¢halo¶¢hådi-
vajja฀å¨ santo j∂vå¨ madhyandinådityavat sadå sarvåbhåsake
parmåtmani vil∂yante samudre nadanadya iva, Vij.Bh:306.
b) nås∂diti viratavyåpåratayå karaƒarµupeƒa gartasthamætasarpavad
vil∂namås∂dityartha¨, ibid:19.
c) ...j∂vådaya¨ sarve andhå eva pralaye, ibid: 273.
 Vij¤ånabhik¶u: The Så√khya-Yoga-Vedåntåcårya 37

d) pralayådau caitanyphalopadhånåbhåvåt sargakåle caityaphalopadh

ånasye‹varecchådh∂natvåd buddhyådivadeva j∂vasya ja฀atvamato na
mukhyamåtmatvamityartha¨, ibid: 305.
30. see note 8 above.
31. see note nine (a) and note 29 (d).
32. see note 11 above.
33. puru¶årthakriyåkåritvameva ca loke sattvamiti vyavahæyate, Vij.Bh:58.
34. a) asyå‹cåsmitåyå dvau vi‹ayau caturvim‹atitattvavivekata åtmasåmån-
yam pa¤cavim‹atitattvavivekata¨ paramåtmå ca. tayorapi-autsargiko
åtmasåmånyam bhµumikåkramoísti, caturvim‹atitattvebhya¨ khyato ya¨
pa¤cavim‹aka¨ vivekåtkeval∂bhµuta¨ ¶a฀vim‹a¨ soínupa‹yati, iti smæte¨,
Yogasarasangraha:21-22.
b) kaivalye puru¶årthamåha tadå sukhadu¨khamohåtmakasattvådiguƒå
dar‹ane cittajyotirviyogåtsvarµupamåtrajyotirato du¨khådipratibimbarµu
pamalarahita¨ san keval∂ bhavati, kevale¶u mukte¶u nityamukta-∫‹vare
vå avibhågam gacchati ityartha, YV under YS. and YSBh. III.55.
35. ata idam brahmåtmaj¤ånam viviktaj∂vaj¤ånåt så√khyoktådapi ‹re¶¢am,
natoídhikam j¤ånamasti, Vij.Bh:28.

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38 T.S. RUKMINI

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