IV.

Lex Fori - the law of the forum, where the case if filed
Lex loci domicilii - the law of the place of the domicile of the person
Lex loci - A Latin term meaning the "law of [the] place". The principle that the law of the place giving rise to
particular rights is the law that governs the rights of parties to a legal proceeding.
Lex loci contractus - the proper law applicable in deciding the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties
Lex loci rei sitae (lex situs) - the law of the place where a thing is situated
Lex situs - the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to property is the law
where the property is located
Lex loci actus - the law of the place where the act is done
Lex loci celebrationis - the law of the place where the contract is entered into
lex loci solutionis - the law of the place of performance of a contract
Lex loci delicti commissi - means the law of the place where the tort was committed.
Lex mercatoria (from the Latin for "merchant law"), often referred to as "the Law Merchant" in English, is the body
of commercial law used by merchants throughout Europe during the medieval period. It evolved similar to English
common law as a system of custom and best practice, which was enforced through a system of merchant courts
along the main trade routes. It developed into an integrated body of law that was voluntarily produced, adjudicated
and enforced on a voluntary basis, alleviating the friction stemming from the diverse backgrounds and local
traditions of the participants. Due to the international background local state law was not always applicable and the
merchant law provided a leveled framework to conduct transactions reducing the preliminary of a trusted second
party.
Lex non scripta is a Latin expression that means "'law not written'" or "'unwritten law'". It is a term that embraces all
the laws which do not come under the definition of written law or "lex scripta" and it is composed, principally, of the
law of nature, the law of nations, the common law, and customs.
Lex patriae is Latin for the law of nationality in the conflict of laws which is the system of public law applied to any
lawsuit where there is a choice to be made between several possibly relevant laws and a different result will be
achieved depending on which law is selected.

NATURE, COMPOSITION & CHARACTERIZATION OF CONFLICTS RULES

Conflict Rules
A provision found in our own law which governs a factual situation possessed of a foreign element. It is usually
expressed in the form of an abstract proposition that a given legal question is governed by the law of a particular
country (which may be an internal law or the proper foreign law), to be ascertained in the manner indicated in the
provision (SEMPIO-DIY, Conflict, supra at 22).

Ordinary Internal Rules v. Conflict Rules

Ordinary Internal Rules

Authorize, command, or prohibit certain mode of conduct (e.g., Art. 796 of the Civil Code). Its legal effects are
immediately indicated (e.g., Express prohibition). (ld. at 22)

Conflict Rules
Decides on which law or jurisdiction will give the final solution to the question (e.g., Art. 16, par. 1 and Art. 17, par. 2
of the Civil Code).

Two Kinds of Conflict Rules

1. One-sided rule - indicates when Philippine law will apply, e.g., Art. 15 and Art. 818 of the Civil Code only apply to
Filipinos (SEMPIO-DIY, Conflict, supra at 23).
2. All-sided or multilateral rule indicates whether to apply the local law or the proper foreign law, e.g., First
paragraphs of Art. 16 and Art. 17, Art. 1763 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code (ld. at 23).

Note: Justice Sempio-Diy observes that while Art. 15 of the Civil Code applies only to Filipinos and is actually a one-
sided rule, the Supreme Court has given it a multi-lateral application when it held that foreigners, in their status and
legal capacities, are governed by their national laws (Gibbs v. The Government of the Philippine Islands., G.R. No. L
35694, December 23, 1933).
The nationality theory has been applied by the Supreme Court even to persons who are citizens of countries
following the domiciliary theory (SEMPIO DIY, Conflict, supra at 38)

Parts of Conflict Rules

1. Object or the Factual Situation the set of facts or situation presenting a Conflicts problem because there is a
foreign element involved (ld. at 24).
2. Legal Consequences or the Point of Contact or Connecting Factor the law of the country with which the factual
situation is most intimately connected (ld. at 24)

Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification or Classification

Before a choice of applicable law can be made, it is necessary to determine under what category a certain set of
facts or rules fall. This determination process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is
the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule." The
purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122191, October 8, 1998).
The law chosen should be applied only insofar as it brings about the good it intended to bring. The selected proper
law is applied to the factual situation to decide: (1) legal consequences resulting from the situation; or (2) interests
created in the thing in question.

Steps in Characterization: (FSR-PProPleA)

1. The determination of the Facts involved;
2. The characterization of the factual Situation; 3. The determination of the conflicts Rule which is
to be applied;
4. The characterization of the Point of contact where the connecting factor;
5. The characterization of the Problem as procedural or substantive;
6. The Pleading and proving of the proper foreign law and
7. The Application of the proper foreign law to the problem (PARAS, Conflict, supra at 88).

Note: Only steps 2-5 concern themselves with characterization proper (PARAS, Conflict, supra at 88).
Note: As to the first step, the starting point of analysis is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of
contact." One or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law.

These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the following:
1. The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
2. The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation,
3. The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex
situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
4. The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in
contracts and torts;
5. The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g.. the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
6 The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis,
7. The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori the law of the
forum is particularly important because matters of 'procedure' not going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and 8. The flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts of affreightment. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, supra.)

Single-Aspect Method·
In order to connect the case to a particular legal community, choice-of-law theories have concentrated on one
element of a situation to' foster simplicity, convenience, arid uniformity of.' Results

Two Types of Characterization under the Single Aspect Method

1. Subject-matter Characterization Calls for classification by a court of a factual situation into a legal category. It is
relevant in a single-aspect method because the legal category to which an issue is assigned determines the
governing law (ld. at 84).
2. Substance-Procedure Characterization Directs the court to the extent it will apply foreign law. If the issue is
substantive, the court may apply foreign law but if it is procedural, it is supposed to follow the law of the forum (Id.
at (88).

Rules on Characterization of Procedural and Substantive Rules

General Rule: If an issue is substantive, apply foreign law. If it is procedural, apply the forum law or lex fori.

Determinants of an Issue as Procedural or Substantive

1. Questions of Evidence - procedural
2. Statute of Frauds
a. Substantive if the law forbids the obligation. i.e. void contracts.
b. Procedural if the law forbids the enforcement of the obligation. i.e. unenforceable contracts, Art. 1403 of Civil
Code. (Id. supra at 92).
3. Borrowing Statutes and Statute of Limitations

Borrowing Statutes
Directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law
(LWV Construction Corp. v. Dupo, G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009).

Statute of Limitations
Specificity Test - Limitation is substantive when it is directed at the newly created liability, warranting a qualification
of the right (Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd., 220 F. 2d 152, February 10, 1955).

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION v. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, FARRALES, MAMASIG

[G.R. No. 61594. September 28, 1990.]

Nature of the Case: A complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses
against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

Facts of the Case:

Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent
Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. The contracts provided
that (1) the Duration of Employment is for a period of 3 years, (2) PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary;
and (3) the agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the
Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this
agreement. Farrales and Mamasig then commenced training in Pakistan and after such, they began
discharging their job functions as flight attendants with base station in Manila and flying assignments to
different parts of the Middle East and Europe. Roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the
expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters to private respondents advising both
that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated. PIA claimed that both were habitual
absentees, were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of "personal effects". Prior
Proceedings: Regional Director of MOLE ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full
backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their salaries for the
remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts having attained the status of regular
employees. On appeal the Deputy Minister of MOLE, adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of the
Regional Director and affirmed the latter’s award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of
reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . ." Hence, this instant Petition for Certiorari by PIA.

Issue: Were the orders issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner’s rights under the employment
contracts with private respondents?

Held and Ratio:

NO. PIA contends that the provisions of the contract must govern rather than the general provisions of the
Labor Code. PIA invokes paragraphs 5 of the contract that set a term of three (3) years for that relationship,
extendible by agreement between the parties and paragraph 6 which provided that PIA had the right to
terminate the employment agreement at any time by giving one-month’s notice to the employee or, in lieu
of such notice, one-month’s salary. A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as PIA
argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. The principle of party autonomy in contracts is not,
however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations as they may deem convenient," provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy." Thus, counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of
contracting parties is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating
to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. The law relating to labor and
employment is heavily impressed with public interest and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
It is thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their
consistency with applicable Philippine law and regulations. The entire purpose behind the development of
legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee’s right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in
said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the
concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that
the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure.
Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and
private respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so read, the fixed
period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the
provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed
three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one
at the option of the employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term, at any
time and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the
employee a month’s salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is
to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the
pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any
security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3)
years, 13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. Petitioner
PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of
Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan." The circumstances
of the case show substantive contacts between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one hand, and
the relationship between the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in the Philippines,
it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and residents,
while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business)
and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between
their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts
and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the
parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so
as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally,
and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on
the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same
as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. RULING: We conclude that private respondents Farrales and
Mamasig were illegally dismissed. Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the
Order dated 12 August 1982 of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without deduction or qualification; and (2) should
reinstatement of private respondents to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions not be
feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to one
(1)month’s salary for every year of service actually rendered by them and for the three (3) years putative
service by private respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13 September 1982 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM G.r. No. 193707 December
10, 2014

I. Nature of the Case

The case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the
dismissal of the criminal case against respondent for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. II.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Del Socorro and respondent Van Wilsem got married in Holland sometime 1990 and were
blessed with a son. Five years after they were separated by a divorce decree issued by the Court of
Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. Petitioner alleged that since their
arrival, respondent failed to fulfil his promise to give monthly support for their son. Thereafter, respondent
came to the Philippines, remarried and established a business with his new wife in Cebu City. On August
28, 2009, petitioner demanded for the above mentioned promise to support through a letter but the
respondent refused to receive the same. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, a Resolution was issued
recommending the filing of an information at RTC-Cebu for the crime charged.

III. ISSUE/S RAISED FOR PETITION ON REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.

IV. RULING OF RTC, CA, SUPREME COURT

RTC-Cebu dismissed the criminal case against respondent as well as the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent
who is an alien who is not subject to the Philippine law. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the petition
directly lodged to it without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as the case involves issues which
raised questions of law. Thus, the Supreme court ruled:
The petition was meritorious but the petitioner's contentions is not fully agreeable.

V. REASON
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Thus, the
respondent is subject to the laws of his country which does not oblige him to support his son. However,
although the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland, this does not, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. In the instant case, the respondent failed to prove the
national law of the Netherlands in his favour. Thus, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. The court resolved further that with regards to the
second issue, the court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in
the Philippines and committed the offense here. Territoriality Principle under Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, which provides that: "penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." applies. The alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of
Cebu City. As such, the Philippine courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent.
TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-
16749 January 31, 1963

FACTS:
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will,
which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to
his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child
of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
“national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of California
of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile,
which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should
apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled
in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should
be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by
the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.

LLORENTE VS. CA, G.R. No. 124371 , November 23, 2000

FACTS:
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente
got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.
In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living
illicitly with Ceferino Llorente, a brother of Lorenzo and the two even have a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo
and Paula agreed in writing that Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the she will agree to waive all
monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the US.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an
American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their children
and left nothing for Paula. In 1983, Lorenzo went to the court for the will’s probate and to have Alicia as the
administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate.
RTC ruled that Lorenzo’s marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.
The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the National Law shall apply.

HELD:
1. YES. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when
he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen.
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides, Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no
longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule is:
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of the
divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Regarding on the issue of Lorenzo’s last will and testament, it must be respected because he is an alien
and is not covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for
probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to
prove the validity of the will.
2. Yes. Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Such was also the
situation when he married Alicia and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the divorce
obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law
since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law
allowed divorce.
The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorente’s
will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles
Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II,
and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974

FACTS: 
Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges executed wills wherein they both made a provision bequething their
respective estates to the other spouse upon his/her death subject to the condition that upon the death of
whoever would survive, the remainder of what was inherited would be given to he siblings of the spouse
who would die earlier. Linnie Jane, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), died first.
Charles was appointed special administrator and eventually executor of the will. However, no liquidation of
the conjugal properties was undertaken. When Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here),
Magno was appointed Administratix of the estate of Linnie. She was also the special administratix of the
estate of Charles but was later on replaced by PCIB. PCIB claims that inasmuch as the Sps. Hodges were
residents of the Philippines, the estate left by the wife could not be more than ½ her share of the conjugal
partnership in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. On the other hand,
Magno claims that the applicable law was that of Texas. It Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas,
there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be not less that one-half of all the
conjugal properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof
as to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question
of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court
however emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at
any other time).

RATIO: 
Precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may be
considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Art. 16 of the Civil Code should be
applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines
at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of
the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal
properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code)
which she could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other
hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of America,
and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of
Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said
State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties
consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had
renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching
on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner
seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In
the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting
claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do
so, for the simple reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties nor their discussion, in their
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of
grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the
possibly applicable laws of Texas are. It should be borne in mind that the question of what are the laws of
Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the
rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute
between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already
within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have
been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually
the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in
estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for
admissions by a party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any
other controverted fact, create estoppel.

Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 576 US (2015)

1. Facts of the case

The petitioners were two men whose same-sex partners had died and fourteen same-sex couples who all
brought cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right to marry or the
right to have their marriage performed elsewhere recognised in their own state. The cases were heard in
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee, each of which defines marriage as between a woman and a
man. In each case, the relevant District Court found in favour of the petitioner. Each of the respondents,
who were state officials responsible for enforcing the relevant laws, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit consolidated the respondents’ appeals and reversed the decisions, finding in favour of the
respondents. The petitioners then
sought certiorari in the Supreme Court. The situation of three of the petitioners illustrates the nature of the
cases. James Obergefell and his partner of over twenty years, John Arthur travelled from Ohio to Maryland
in order to marry. John died three months later of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis but Ohio law prevented
James being listed on John’s death certificate as surviving spouse. Same-sex partners April DeBoer and
Jayne Rowse have three adopted children; however, Michigan permits only opposite-sex married couples
or single persons to adopt, with the result that each child is treated as having only one
parent, and if that partner passed away, the other would have no legal right to the children. Ijpe DeKoe and
Thomas Kostura married in New York, where same-sex marriage was legal, before Ijpe was deployed to
Afghanistan. Upon his return, they settled in Tennessee where their marriage is not recognised, with the
result that their legal status in relation to each other changes as they travel between states.

2. Law
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
(…) nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

3. Legal Arguments
Each petitioner sought certiorari (review of the decision of the Court of Appeals). They each argued that the
actions of the relevant respondent violated the Fourteenth Amendment by either denying them their right to
marry, or by denying the recognition of their marriage legally performed in another state. The petitioners
argued that rather than intending to devalue marriage, it was their respect for the institution of marriage
which meant that they sought it for themselves. The respondents argued that the petitioners did not seek
recognition of the right to marry, but sought recognition of a new and non-existent “right to same-sex
marriage”. They argued that marriage was by nature between a man and a woman and recognition of
same-sex marriage would demean the institution of marriage. Further, the respondents warned that there
had not been sufficient democratic discourse to decide on an issue as important as the definition of
marriage. In addition, they argued that if same-sex couples are allowed to marry, fewer oppositesex
couples would marry because the connection between marriage and procreation would be severed. This
would further harm the institution of marriage.

4. Decision
The Court ruled by a majority of 5 to 4 in favour of the petitioners. The majority decision, delivered by
Justice Kennedy (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. joined), first considered the issue arising
from the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, of whether states are required to register same-sex
marriages.

Requirement to Register Same-Sex Marriages

The majority began by noting that the institution of marriage has evolved over time both legally and socially
and that the states were now divided on the issue of same-sex marriage, before turning to consider the Due
Process Clause (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law”). The liberties protected by this Clause extend to choices that are central to a person’s dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices about personal beliefs and identity. Injustice is not always recognised
in our own times and when new insights reveal a conflict between Constitutional provisions and legislation,
the Court must consider a claim to liberty. Applying these considerations, the Court has long recognised
that the
Constitution protected the right to marry, including in Loving v Virginia 388 US 1, 12 (1967), in which the
Court invalidated bans on interracial marriage.
Although these previous cases concerned opposite-sex marriages, they established more farreaching
constitutional principles, including four essential principles relating to the right to marry: the right to personal
choice in relation to marriage as an inherent aspect of an individual’s autonomy; the importance of the
union of marriage to the two individuals which was “unlike any other”; that marriage provides a safeguard
for children and families; and that marriage was central to social order, with states offering married couples
rights, benefits and responsibilities. Each of these principles applies equally to same-sex marriages and
while limiting marriage may have previously been seen as just and natural, it is now manifest that limiting
marriage to
opposite-sex partners is inconsistent with the “central meaning of the right to marry”. Such knowledge must
lead to recognition that banning of same-sex marriage imposes “stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by
our basic charter.” The respondents’ argument that the petitioners did not seek to exercise their right to
marry but rather sought a new “right to same-sex marriage” was inconsistent with the Court’s previous
approach to fundamental rights, including marriage. Rights cannot be restricted only to those who have
exercised them in the past. Such a restriction would allow accepted practice to provide its own continuing
justification and prevent groups from invoking rights previously denied to them. Rights do not come only
from history, but from a better understanding of how liberty should be defined in our own time. It would
diminish the personhood of same-sex couples and disparage their choices if they were denied the same
rights to marry as opposite-sex couples under the Constitution. The right to same-sex marriage is also
guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. In interpreting this Clause, the Court has “recognized that new
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”. The marriage laws challenged by the petitioners
are “in essence unequal”. They denied same-sex couples all the benefits granted to opposite-sex couples
and work as a “grave and continuing harm”, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. The
respondents warned that the recognition of the right to same-sex marriage has been the subject of too little
democratic discourse. While it is recognised in the Constitution that democracy is the appropriate process
for changes to be made, that process cannot impair fundamental rights. The Constitution allows an
individual to seek protection for a violation of their rights, even if the public disagrees and the legislature
does not wish to act. The issue is whether the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage and not
whether same-sex marriage currently has or lacks popular support. The respondents showed no foundation
to conclude that recognising same-sex marriage would harm the institution of marriage.

Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in Other States

If the current state of affairs is left in place (being married in one place but not another), the result would be
instability and uncertainty. It follows from the decision that same-sex couples may marry in all states, that
there is no lawful basis on which a state can refuse to recognise a samesex marriage lawfully performed in
another state because of its same-sex character.
Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated Inc 26 SCRA 242 [GR No. L-23145 November 27,1968]

Facts: County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is the domiciliary administration of
the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins who owned 33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic
corporation, Benguet Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A dispute arose between the appellee,
Tayag who is the appointed ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines and the domiciliary administration as to
who is entitled to the possession of the certificate of shares, however, County Trust Company refuses to
transfer the said certificate to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the appellee was compelled to
petition the court for the appellant to declare the subject certificates as lost to which appellant allegeed that
no new certificate can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in accordance with their by-laws.

Issue: Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be declared lost.

Held: Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly extends to the assets of a decedent found
within the state or country where it was granted.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property located in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had
in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent’s last domicile is termed the principal
administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the
latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of
the country in which it is granted.Hence, an administration appointed in a foreign state has no authority in
the Philippines. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other
than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of the deceased’s liable for his
individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administration in New York, to deliver the
shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administration in the
Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them lost and requiring the
appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administration could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws and the command of a court decree, the
latter is to be followed.
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received
the imprimatur of state according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have rights and
privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator, more than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield
obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor
son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124110.April 20, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila. three “Visit
the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC,
Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Anice to changed their
itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding
passes with the words: “Check-in-required.”
They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked.
The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up the bone of
contention of this controversy
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The appellate court found that there was
an admission on the part of United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact observe the check-in requirement.
It ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines
failed to comply with the procedure laid down in cases where a passenger is denied boarding. The
appellate court likewise gave credence to the claim of Aniceto Fontanilla that the employees of United
Airlines were discourteous and arbitrary and, worse, discriminatory. In light of such treatment, the
Fontanillas were entitled to moral damages.

Issue(s):
Whether the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

Ruling:
No.
The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar,
Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United
States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were
"rewritten" in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of
carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.
In the case of Zalanea vs. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the doctrine of lex loci contractus. According
to the doctrine, as a general rule, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs
with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even
though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and
particularly so, if the place of the making and the place of performance are the same.
Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, when the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY,
executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust.
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
His illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground
that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if Philippine law were to
apply.

Issue(s):
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate
children.

Ruling:
Appellants are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased.
The doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never
invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
In Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 110263 July 20,
2001 DELEON, JR., J.:

Facts:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of
Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly
incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
It appears that sometime in 1983, petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then
known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in
Kuala Lumpur entitled "Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines."
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private
respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan it extended to
Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.
On September 13, 1985, the High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner and against the private respondent which is also designated therein as the "2nd Defendant.

Issue(s):
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MALAYSIAN COURT DID NOT
ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PNCC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT (a) THE FOREIGN
COURT HAD SERVED SUMMONS ON PNCC AT ITS MALAYSlA OFFICE, AND (b) PNCC ITSELF
APPEARED BY COUNSEL IN THE CASE BEFORE THAT COURT.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT TO (SIC)
THE MALAYSIAN COURT JUDGMENT.

Ruling:
1. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;13 however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that
there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the
trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and
that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting
or fraud in procuring the judgment
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum Under Section 50(b),1 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at
the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against
a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting
in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the
party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, the evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign
judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity,
herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it - to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court
judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private
respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of
authority of its counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is
allegedly tainted by evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the
requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian judgment
is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the "every decision must state the facts and law
on which it is based

2. In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the
validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to
what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial
notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what
that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a
financial officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of
Malaya must stand.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,, Petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,

respondent. G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They
lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha.
Recio married Grace J. Garcia at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church,Cabanatuan City. Since October 22,
1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she learned only in November 1997 of Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

Issue(s):
Whether the decree of divorce is valid
Ruling:
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground
of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner
as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this
case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 104235 November
18, 1993NOCON, J.

Facts:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight
to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations
for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than
the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who
had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared
as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two."
Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked
lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among
the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed
to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied
boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding his
daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated
because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two
tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of
air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145.

Issue(s):
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US
Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA?

Ruling:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea
and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his
office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,
no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board
their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can
the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody.
The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in
her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as
evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."
"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at
bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals
of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and
issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."

(Yaraon na sa memaid su mga sunod kani.)

(Dai man nacacopy)

 1. Nationality
2. Domicile
3. Principles on Personal Status and Capacity

F. Choice of Law in Family Relations

1. Marriage
2. Divorce and Separation
3. Annulment and Declaration of Nullity
4. Parental Relations
5. Adoption
E. Choice of Law in Property
1. The Controlling Law
2. Capacity to Transfer or Acquire Property
3. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Conveyance
4. Exceptions to Lex Situs Rule
5. Situs of Certain Properties
6. Patents, Trademarks, Trade Name and Copyright
F. Choice of Law in Contracts
1. Contracts Involving a Foreign Element
2. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Contracts
3. Capacity to Enter into Contracts
4. Choice of Law Issues in Conflicts Contracts Cases
5. Limitations to Choice of Law
G. Choice of Law in Wills, Succession and Administration of Estates
1. Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity of Wills
2. Probate
3. Administration of Estates
4. Interpretation of Wills
5. Revocations
5. Administration of Estates
H. Choice of Law in Torts and Crimes
1. Policies Behind Conflicts Tort Law
2. Lex Loci Delicti Commissi
3. Modern Theories on Foreign Tort Liability
4. Foreign Tort Claims
5. Lex Loci Delicti
I. Choice in Crimes
1. lex Loci Delicti
2. Exceptions

V.

PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

Facts:
Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala and Philsec in the
sum of US$2,500,000.00, secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a market value of
P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
president, private respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat’s obligation under an Agreement, dated January
27, 1983, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor’s Lien by which it sold to petitioner
Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called ATHONA) a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas, U.S.A., for
US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of
US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid
by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their
receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his
indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
• As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire amount covered by the
note became due and demandable.
• Private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for
payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc.
under the Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District Court of Texas, 165th Judicial
District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-57746, the venue of the action was later transferred to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where 1488, Inc. filed an amended
complaint, reiterating its allegations in the original complaint.
• While Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint “For Sum of
Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment” against private respondents in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the allegation of
petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District Court
of Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent
more than its true value of US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private respondents’
fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement
and to purchase the Houston property. Petitioners prayed that private respondents be ordered to return to
ATHONA the excess payment of US$1,700,000.00 and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the trial court
issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-
a-vis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3)
failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action. Ducat contended that the alleged
overpricing of the property prejudiced only petitioner ATHONA, as buyer, but not PHILSEC and BPI-IFL
which were not parties to the sale and whose only participation was to extend financial accommodation to
ATHONA under a separate loan agreement.
The trial court granted Ducat’s motion to dismiss, stating that “the evidentiary requirements of the
controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the
principle in private international law of forum non conveniens,” even as it noted that Ducat was not a party
in the U.S. case.
• A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic’s motion to dismiss. On March 9, 1988,
the trial court 3 granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground plaintiff ATHONA
is the subject matter of the pending case in the United States District Court which, under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, is the better (if not exclusive) forum to litigate matters needed to determine the
assessment and/or fluctuations of the fair market value of real estate situated in Houston, Texas, U.S.A.
The Court of Appeals also held that Civil Case No. 16563 was an action in personam for the recovery of a
sum of money for alleged tortious acts, so that service of summons by publication did not vest the trial court
with jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Drago Daic. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563 on the ground of
forum non conveniens was likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the case can be
better tried and decided by the U.S. court:
The U.S. case and the case at bar arose from only one main transaction, and involve foreign elements, to
wit: 2) the seller, 1488 Inc. is a non-resident foreign corporation; 3) although the buyer, Athona Holdings, a
foreign corporation which does not claim to be doing business in the Philippines, is wholly owned by
Philsec, a domestic corporation, Athona Holdings is also owned by BPI-IFL, also a foreign corporation; 4)
the Warranty Deed was executed in Texas, U.S.A.
• It is important to note in connection with the first point that while the present case was pending in the
Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered judgment 5 in
the case before it. The judgment, which was in favor of private respondents, was affirmed on appeal by the
Circuit Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.

HELD:
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 16563 is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati for consolidation with Civil Case No. 92-1070 and for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision
Jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 9 Rule 39, §50
provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence
of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that petitioners’ action is barred by the
principle of res judicata. Petitioners in fact questioned the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over their persons,
but their claim was brushed aside by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by
private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs
(PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it
was the extinguishment of the latter’s debt which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial
court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
• It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and
Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by
extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a non-
resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, “the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.” 18 It is not disputed that the properties,
real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under the
Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises GR 137378; 12 October 2000

Facts:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (“FASGI”), a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship
arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (“PAWI”), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli
Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (“FPS”), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase,
importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI
then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be
defective and in non-compliance with the contract.
On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and
recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on
failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI’s persistent default, FASGI filed with the US
District Court of the Central District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI.
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final
judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for “enforcement of foreign judgment”, before
RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted
with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment
ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by
PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and
fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI.
Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for
having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.

Held:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that
there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial
upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and
that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting
or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority.
Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action
or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his
client’s interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the
foreign judgment must be enforced.
Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this
cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the
signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on
raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment,
must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is
rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine,
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action – such as fraud in
obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against
the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.

GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, v. RON ZABARTE, respondent. G.R. No. 1411536. February 26,
2001

Facts:

On January 24, 1994, Ron Zabarte commenced to enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior
Court for the State of California on petitioner. On 18 March 1994, petitioner said that the said court had no
jurisdiction over the people involved. Respondent on the other hand said that petitioner’s appeal is not
material. Petitioner maintained that that said Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment was obtained
without the assistance of counsel and without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was rendered in
violation of his constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due process.
Respondent said that petitioner can no longer question the judgment of the said court because he failed to
raise the issue of jurisdiction in his answer. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Zabarte. The claim for
moral damages, not having been substantiated, is denied. Petitioner said that the RTC should have
dismissed the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum non conveniens. It
reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign judgment was based on comity, reciprocity and res judicata.
The CA denied this appeal, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA acted in a manner contrary to law when it affirmed the Order of the trial court
granting respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment and rendering judgment against the petitioner.

Ruling:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as to any material fact. It is resorted to in order to avoid long
drawn out litigations and useless delays. Petitioner contends that by allowing summary judgment, the two
courts a quo prevented him from presenting evidence to substantiate his claims. The court does not agree.
Summary judgment is based on facts directly proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In this case,
the CA and the RTC both merely ruled that trial was not necessary to resolve the case. Petitioner’s affidavit
of facts had raised no genuine issue, thus no necessity for a resolution of issues.
In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, we presume that such law, if any, is
similar to Philippine law. The court based this conclusion on the presumption of identity or similarity, also
known as processual presumption. Petitioner failed to establish substantial proof that the foreign court had
no jurisdiction over the case. In any event, contrary to petitioner’s contention, unjust enrichment or solutio
indebiti does not apply to this case. This doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and
the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. In this case, petitioner merely argues that
the other two defendants whom he represented were liable together with him. This is not a case of unjust
enrichment. The court does not also see this case to be contrary to law, morals, public policy or the canons
of morality obtaining in the country. Petitioner owed money, and the judgment required him to pay it. That is
the long and the short of this case. The petition is denied.

(different issue)
FACTS:
Gil Miguel Puyat, a foreigner, lost a collection suit filed against him by Ron Zabarte in a court in California,
USA. The California court ordered Puyat to pay the amount of $241k. Puyat was only able to pay $5k.
In January 1994, Zabarte filed an action to enforce the California judgment here in the Philippines against
Puyat. Puyat filed an Answer where he alleged, among others, that the California court had no jurisdiction
over the case, hence, the foreign judgment is void. He likewise averred that the trial court had no
jurisdiction because the issue involved are partnership matters which are under the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Zabarte then filed a motion for summary judgment as he argued that Puyat’s Answer tendered no issue.
The trial court granted the motion and eventually gave a favorable judgment for Zabarte. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Puyat now avers that the trial court should have never taken cognizance of the case because it
had no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the forum non conveniens rule. He averred that under this
principle, since all the transaction involved in this case occurred in California, he being a foreigner, and the
California law was not properly determined, the trial court had no jurisdiction. He also assailed the validity
of the trial court’s act in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Zabarte.

ISSUE: Whether or not Puyat is correct.

HELD: No. The allowance of summary judgment is proper. In this case, Puyat’s Answer did not really
tender an issue. Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact
to be tried, the Rules allow a party to pierce the allegations in the pleadings and to obtain immediate relief
by way of summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the
case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. In this case, Puyat’s Answer merely alleged that
the California court, a civil court, had no jurisdiction because the case involved was a partnership issue. He
however admitted that the issue involved is the payment of money upon promissory notes with damages.
Puyat also did not attach a copy of the complaint filed by Zabarte with the California court. As such, the trial
court properly presumed, applying the principle of processual presumption, that the California law is the
same as Philippine law – that cases involving collection of money is cognizable by civil courts. And by
applying the principle of processual presumption, there’s no longer a need to try the facts in this case,
hence, a summary judgment was in order.
Anent the issue of forum non conveniens, such does not exist in this case. Under the principle of forum non
conveniens, even if the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to
entertain a case for any of the following practical reasons:
1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main
aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum shopping[,]
merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket may
already be overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be maintained; and
The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.”
None of the above existed in this case, hence, the trial court properly took cognizance of the case.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 114323, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the private
respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. Petitioner is a foreign corporation owned
and controlled by the Government of India while private respondent is a private corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
They entered into a contract on February 26, 1983 whereby the private respondent undertook to supply the
petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration
therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an
irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on
board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and
Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo
was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private
respondent had already received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private
respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and
they agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with
Class G cement cost free at the petitioners designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class G cement
did not conform to the petitioners specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it
was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue
for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth
the arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court
of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court"
in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's
objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the
foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent
refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the
enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision,
the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the
dispute between the parties; thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The
petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

HELD:
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that
the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that
an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before
Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED.

G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005 PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, et. al., Petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO
JAVIER RANADA, et. al., Respondents.

Facts: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime filed a
complaint with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of
former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis
for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations
of international law. On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC
issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice because the subject matter of the
complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of definite sums of money. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was
approximately Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00), which obviously had not been
paid. Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the
suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or
recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay said amount would
negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action. Petitioners
invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty," a mandate which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant filing fee.
Issue: Whether or not the filing fee to be paid by the petitioners is proper.

Held:
Yes. Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment,
the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local
judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. A real
action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery
of possession of real property. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages adjudicated by the US
District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate. The party aggrieved by the foreign judgment
is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions
that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. It bears
noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but
presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate.

QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA & NOLASCO LAW OFFICE and LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS,
LIMITED, vs. THE SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION of the COURT OF APPEALS, KHOO BOO BOON and the
Law Firm of PICAZO BUYCO TAN FIDER & SANTOS, G.R. No. 182013 December 4, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Quasha Law Office is the duly authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL in the Philippines. Petitioner
LIRL is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong and licensed to operate a resort
casino hotel in Subic Bay, Philippines, on the basis of the 19 March 1993 Agreement it entered into with
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA),
which was later amended in July, 2000. It is doing business in the Philippines through its branch, LIRL-
Subic.
Private respondent Khoo Boo Boon was the former Chief Executive Officer of LIRL-Subic. Private
respondent Picazo Buyco Tan Fider and Santos Law Office (Picazo Law Office) was the former counsel of
petitioner LIRL in the Philippines.
The controversy in this case arose from the following facts:
Petitioner LIRL filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract, Specific Performance with Damages and
Application for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 72, docketed as Civil Case No. 219-0-2004, against PAGCOR and SBMA
for amending the 19 March 1993 Agreement, notwithstanding the total absence of any consideration
supporting petitioner LIRL’s additional obligations imposed under the amended Agreement.
On 28 December 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision2 annulling the amendment to the 19 March 1993
Agreement executed between petitioner LIRL, PAGCOR and SBMA, as well as all the agreements that
may have been entered into by PAGCOR pursuant thereto. The trial court also restrained PAGCOR from
enforcing the amendment. It further enjoined PAGCOR from terminating the Agreement dated 19 March
1993 or from otherwise suspending, limiting, reducing or modifying petitioner LIRL’s license to operate the
Subic Bay Casinos and from entering into or continuing with any agreement with other entities for the
operation of other casinos in the Subic Freeport Zone or from any such acts, which would in any way
reduce or mitigate petitioner LIRL’s right under the aforesaid Agreement.31awphi1
Resultantly, PAGCOR filed its Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam before the Special Sixth Division of the Court
of Appeals, and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 87281.
Meanwhile, in relation to petitioner LIRL Companies’ Winding-Up No. 1139 of 2004 filed before the Hong
Kong Court of First Instance (Hong Kong Court), the said foreign court issued Orders dated 9 June 2006
appointing Kelvin Edward Flynn (Flynn) and Cosimo Borrelli (Borrelli) as the joint and several liquidators of
petitioner LIRL and granting them the power to carry on and manage the business of petitioner LIRL,
including its business in Subic, Philippines. Pursuant to the said Orders, Flynn sent a letter4 dated 10 July
2006 to private respondent Khoo Boo Boon informing him that he had already been terminated from his
position as Chief Executive Officer of LIRL-Subic. On the same date, Flynn also sent a letter5 to private
respondent Picazo Law Office notifying it that its legal services as counsel of petitioner LIRL had also been
terminated. Petitioner LIRL later engaged the legal services of petitioner Quasha Law Office as its new
counsel to represent it in all proceedings in the Philippines.
Accordingly, petitioner Quasha Law Office filed its Entry of Appearance as counsel for petitioner LIRL in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87281 pending before the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, through a
Manifestation and Motion Ex Abudante Cautelam attaching thereto a copy of the letter dated 10 July 2006
terminating the services of Picazo Law Office and engaging the services of petitioner Quasha Law Office.
In a Resolution6 dated 19 October 2007, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals refused to
recognize the Entry of Appearance of petitioner Quasha Law Office as the new counsel of petitioner LIRL.
The appellate court ratiocinated that a mere photocopy of a letter dated 10 July 2006, which was sent by
one of the appointed liquidators of petitioner LIRL, informing private respondent Picazo Law Office that its
legal services as counsel of LIRL had been terminated, had no probative value. Further the appointment of
petitioner LIRL’s joint and several liquidators were made pursuant to an Order of the Hong Kong Court.
Because it was a foreign judgment, our courts could not take judicial notice thereof, as the final orders of
foreign tribunals could only be enforced in Philippine courts after appropriate proceedings filed therein.
Thus, the appellate court concluded that until the alleged Order of the Hong Kong Court had been validated
and recognized in an appropriate proceeding before our local courts, private respondent Picazo Law Office
was recognized as the only counsel entitled to represent and file pleadings for and on behalf of petitioner
LIRL.7
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, but their Motion was denied in a
Resolution8 dated 9 January 2008.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation with the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals that in a related case
filed before the Special Tenth Division of the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96717, the said
Division issued a Decision9 dated 14 December 2007 recognizing petitioner Quasha Law Office as the duly
authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL. In such Manifestation, petitioner Quasha Law Office attached a copy
of the aforesaid 14 December 2007 Decision of the Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
On 22 January 2008, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution
wherein it simply noted petitioners’ aforesaid Manifestation. The appellate court then pointed out that
decisions of a division of the Court of Appeals is not binding on the other divisions, for only decisions of the
Supreme Court form part of the legal system from which all other inferior courts must take its bearing. The
appellate court even directed the petitioners to elevate the matter to this Court to settle who between
petitioner Quasha Law Office and private respondent Picazo Law Office can legally represent petitioner
LIRL in the instant case.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
(1) whether the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in considering
that the Orders of the Hong Kong Court appointing liquidators for petitioner LIRL involved enforcement and
recognition of a foreign judgment.

RULING:
The same is already barred by the principle of res judicata—conclusiveness of judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept – conclusiveness of judgment – states that a fact or question, which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not
required, but merely identity of issues.13
Legarda v. Savellano elucidates the rationale for respecting the conclusiveness of judgment, thus –
As we have repeatedly enunciated, public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle
upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same
issues more than once. It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of
facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should
forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of
law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a
fundamental concept in the organization of every jural sytem. Public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
It must be stressed that the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals was appealed to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 and was docketed as G.R No. 184463. The said Decision resolved the issue of petitioner
LIRL’s proper legal representation in favor of petitioner Quasha Law Office. It also ruled that there was no
enforcement of a foreign judgment when one of the appointed liquidators terminated the legal services of
private respondent Picazo Law Office and engaged in its stead petitioner Quasha Law Office to be the duly
authorized counsel of petitioner LIRL. What is involved is the prerogative of petitioner LIRL, through its duly
authorized representative -- which, in this case, is its appointed liquidators -- to terminate and engage the
services of a counsel, which is an internal affair that requires no prior recognition in a separate action.15
On 20 October 2008, this Court issued a Resolution denying the said Petition for Review for being filed out
of time and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Thus, the 14 December 2007 Decision of the
Special Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 became final and executory.
In a related case filed before the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
98893,16 petitioner LIRL’s proper legal representation and Quasha Law Office’s entry of appearance as
tantamount to an enforcement of a foreign judgment, were also raised. On 26 February 2009, the said
division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision stating that no enforcement of a foreign judgment was
involved in the said case. It further decreed that petitioner LIRL’s appointed liquidators had been duly
authorized to manage petitioner LIRL. The authority of the said liquidators extended to all of petitioner
LIRL’s branches, wherever situated, the branch in the Philippines included. Pursuant to 9 June 2006
Orders of the Hong Kong Court, the appointed liquidators were given the power to, among other powers,
"bring or defend any action or other legal proceeding in the name and on behalf of the company or
themselves in Hong Kong, the Republic of the Philippines or attorneys in the Republic of the Philippines or
elsewhere and appoint a solicitor in Hong Kong and lawyers or assist the Liquidators in the performance of
their duties generally." No cogent reason existed to prevent petitioner LIRL from exercising its prerogative
in terminating the services of one counsel and in engaging the services of another. Such act was purely an
internal affair of the corporation, which did not require prior recognition in a separate action.17
The aforesaid Decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals was appealed to this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as
G.R. No. 189265. On 12 October 2009, this Court rendered a Resolution denying the Petition for late filing,
for failure to serve a copy of the Petition to the Court of Appeals, for lack of the required number of plain
copies of the Petition, and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error. Thus, the Decision dated 26
February 2009 of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98893 became final and
executory.
It has already been settled in the aforesaid two Decisions that the Orders of the Hong Kong Court
appointing liquidators for petitioner LIRL did not involve the enforcement of a foreign judgment. The act of
terminating the legal services of private respondent Picazo Law Office and engaging in its place petitioner
Quasha Law Office was a mere exercise of petitioner LIRL’s prerogative, through its appointed liquidators,
which was an internal affair that required no prior recognition in a separate action. Therefore, this Court can
no longer pass upon the said issue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari, is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
Borthwick vs Bartolome 152 SCRA 229 [GR No. L-57338 July 23, 1987]

Facts: By action commenced in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A., Joseph E.
Scallon sought to Compel payment by William B. Borthwick on four (4) promissory notes in the amounts of
$32,408.95, $29,584.94, $2,832.59 and $40,000.00, plus stipulated interest. Scallon’s complaint alleged,
inter alia, that Borthwick, an American citizen living in the Philippines, owned real property interests in
Hawaii where he last resided and transacted business therein; that business dealings which transpired in
Honolulu, Hawaii had given rise to the promissory notes sued upon, and Borthwick had failed to pay the
sums thereunder owing upon maturity and despite demand. Attached to the complaint were the promissory
notes, which although uniformly specifying the city of Palos Verdes, Los Angeles, California as the place of
payment. Borthwick being then in Monterey, California, summons was served upon him personally in that
place, pursuant to Hawaiian law allowing service of process on a person outside the territorial confines of
the State, if he had otherwise submitted himself to the jurisdiction of its courts as to causes of action arising
from, among others, the act of transacting any business within Hawaii — alleged to consist as to Borthwick
in the negotiation and dealings regarding the promissory notes. Borthwick ignored the summons. Default
was entered against him, and in due course a default judgment was rendered. However, Scallon’s attempts
to have the judgment executed in Hawaii and California failed, because no assets of Borthwick could be
found in those states. Scallon and his wife, Jewell, then came to the Philippines and on March 15, 1980
brought suit against Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of Makati, seeking enforcement of the default
judgment of the Hawaii Court and asserting two other alternative causes of action.

Issue: Whether or not the court of Hawaii acquired jurisdiction over the case rendering the default
judgement valid.

Held: Yes. It is true that a foreign judgment against a person is merely “presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties,” and rejection thereof may be justified, among others, by “evidence of a want of
jurisdiction” of the issuing authority, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.In the case at bar, the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court of Hawaii hinged entirely on the existence of either of two facts in accordance with its
State laws, i.e., either Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii, or the promissory notes sued upon resulted
from his business transactions therein. Scallon’s complaint clearly alleged both facts. Borthwick was
accorded opportunity to answer the complaint and impugn those facts, but he failed to appear and was in
consequence declared in default. There thus exists no evidence in the record of the Hawaii case upon
which to lay a conclusion of lack of jurisdiction, as Borthwick now urges.
The opportunity to negate the foreign court’s competence by proving the non-existence of said jurisdictional
facts established in the original action, was again afforded to Borthwick in the Court of First Instance of
Makati, where enforcement of the Hawaii judgment was sought. This time it was the summons of the
domestic court which Borthwick chose to ignore, but with the same result: he was declared in default. And
in the default judgment subsequently promulgated, the Court a quo decreed enforcement of the judgment
affirming among others the jurisdictional facts, that Borthwick owned real property in Hawaii and transacted
business therein.
It is not for this Court to disturb the express finding of the Court of First Instance that Daniel was
Borthwick’s resident domestic houseboy, and of sufficient age and discretion to accept substituted service
of summons for Borthwick. Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, a party appealling from the Courts of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court may “raise only questions of law (and) no
other question,”23 and is thus precluded from impugning the factual findings of the trial court, being
deemed to have admitted the correctness of such findings24 and waived his right to open them to question.

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. - 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941)

FACTS:
Respondent, a New York corporation, transferred its entire business to petitioner, a Delaware corporation.
Petitioner contracted to use its best efforts to further the manufacture and sale of certain patented devices
covered by the agreement, and respondent was to have a share of petitioner's profits. The agreement was
executed in New York, the assets were transferred there, and petitioner began performance there although
later it moved its operations to other states. Respondent was voluntarily dissolved under New York law in
1919. Ten years later it instituted this action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
alleging that petitioner had failed to perform its agreement to use its best efforts. Jurisdiction rested on
diversity of citizenship. In 1939 respondent recovered a jury verdict of $100,000, upon which judgment was
entered. Respondent then moved to correct the judgment by adding interest at the rate of six percent from
June 1, 1929, the date the action had been brought. The District Court granted the motion, taking the view
that the rights of the parties were governed by New York law and that under New York law the addition of
such interest was mandatory. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:
In diversity cases, should the federal courts follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states in which they
sit?

ANSWER:
Yes.

RULE:
The prohibition against independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of
laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those
prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly
disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. Whatever
lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to the federal
system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local
policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by
enforcing an independent "general law" of conflict of laws.
CONCLUSION:
The court upheld the ruling in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 that states: “In diversity of citizenship
cases, the federal courts, when deciding questions of conflict of laws, must follow the rules prevailing in the
States in which they sit.”

Siedler v. Jacobson 86 Misc. 2d 1010 (N.Y. Misc. 1976) 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 Decided Apr 28, 1976

FACTS:
While on a week's holiday in Vienna, defendant and his companion purchased an antique porcelain figure
from plaintiff dealer, but subsequently refused to honor payment on the ground that plaintiff had
misrepresented the article's age and value. Two years later, defendant was served in New York with
process (in German) issued out of the Austrian Superior Court, based upon that Nation's counterpart to
New York's "long-arm" statute (CPLR 302). Upon defendant's default, plaintiff instituted this action pursuant
to CPLR article 53 to enforce the foreign judgment.

HELD:
We agree with Special Term's conclusion that the judgment should not be enforceable in New York for lack
of jurisdiction over the defendant.
Analysis of the legislative history of *1011 article 53 makes clear that it was not within the intendment of
that statute to adopt the broad definition of "transacting any business" applicable under CPLR 302 as the
criterion for extending recognition to foreign country judgments themselves bottomed upon correspondingly
liberal bases of jurisdiction (CPLR 5305, subd [a], par 5; Thirteenth Annual Report of N Y Judicial
Conference, 1968, p 223; 6 Weinstein-KornMiller, N Y Civ Prac, par 5305.02). While we are cognizant of
the desirability of affording recognition to foreign country judgments so that judgments obtained in our own
courts will receive reciprocally favorable treatment abroad, the nature of defendant's solitary act in this case
was so casual and incidental to the foreign forum that it could not possibly serve as a jurisdictional
predicate sufficient to grant conclusive effect to the default judgment sued upon (CPLR 5304, subd [a], par
5; see Falcon Mfg. v Ames, 53 Misc.2d 332).
1011 Order, entered October 16, 1975 affirmed, with $10 costs.

BRIDGEWAY CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CITIBANK, N.A., Defendant. Nos. 97 CIV. 8884(DC), 00 CIV.
3598(DC). United States District Court, S.D. New York. March 2, 2001.

FACTS:
In November 1992, plaintiff Bridgeway Corporation ("Bridgeway") sued defendant Citibank, N.A.
("Citibank"), in Monrovia, Liberia, to recover monies it deposited in Citibank's Liberian branch. After the
Supreme Court of Liberia granted judgment against defendant in the amount of US$189,376.66 (the
"Liberian judgment"), plaintiff sought to enforce the Liberian judgment in the United States. On March 31,
1999, this Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted, sua sponte, summary
judgment for defendant after finding as a matter of law that the Liberian judicial system did not comport with
the requirements of due process. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y.1999).
The Second Circuit affirmed. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff now moves to be relieved from the March 31, 1999, judgment and for leave to file an amended
complaint. Defendant opposes plaintiff's motion and also moves to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1)
plaintiff's claims breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment are untimely, (2) plaintiff failed to state a
claim for breach of contract, (3) plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity, and (4) plaintiff failed to state
a claim for unjust enrichment. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion to be relieved from the
March 31, 1999, judgment and to file an amended complaint is granted, and defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint is denied in part and granted in part.

HELD;
Plaintiff's Claims
1. Fraud
Plaintiff alleges that it was: induced to enter into its contract with [defendant], and to deposit U.S. dollars in
account No. B35677, upon the representations of [defendant] that these monies were to be repaid in U.S.
dollars, and would not have entered into this contract nor deposited this money but for [defendant]'s
fraudulent withholding of the fact that it intended to repay the amounts in local currency if that proved more
beneficial to [defendant]. (Am.Compl. ¶ 23). Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) for claims of fraud. I agree.
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud ..., the
circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). To plead fraud with
"particularity," the amended complaint must: (1) specify the statements that plaintiff contends were
fraudulent; (2) identify the speaker; (3) state where and when the statements were made; and (4) explain
why the statements were fraudulent. See Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1995)
(citations omitted). Plaintiff must also allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. Id.
at 52; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.1994). Here, plaintiff has not
satisfied any of these elements. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-26).
The amended complaint does not specify what statements were fraudulent. It does not allege who made
the allegedly fraudulent statements or who was involved in the allegedly fraudulent conduct. There is no
allegation of where or when the statements were made, and plaintiff does not allege facts that give rise to a
strong inference of defendant's fraudulent intent.
Moreover, it is well settled under New York law that a plaintiff cannot convert a breach of contract claim into
a fraud claim merely by adding "an allegation that defendant never intended to uphold [its] end of the deal."
Sudul v. Computer Outsourcing Services, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 59, 62 (S.D.N.Y.1994). As Judge Martin
explained in Sudul: where a fraud claim arises out of the same facts as plaintiff's breach of contract claim,
with the addition only of an allegation that defendant never intended to perform the precise promises
spelled out in the contract between the parties, the fraud claim is redundant and plaintiff's sole remedy is for
breach of contract.
Id. (citing New York cases).
Here, as paragraph 23 of the amended complaint makes clear, plaintiff alleges that defendant defrauded it
because defendant only intended to repay plaintiff in U.S. dollars "if that proved more beneficial to
[defendant]." Hence, the fraud claim is "redundant," and plaintiff's "sole remedy" is for breach of contract.
The Second Circuit has explained that a fraud claim in the context of a failure to perform under a contract
may be brought in three circumstances: (1) there exists a legal duty separate from the duty to perform
under the contract; (2) there exists "a fraudulent misrepresentation collateral or extraneous to the contract";
or *305 (3) the misrepresentation causes special damages that are "unrecoverable" as contract damages.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir.1996). Here, the
amended complaint fails to allege the existence of any of these circumstances.
Accordingly, plaintiff's cause of action for fraud is dismissed.

2. Breach of Contract
Under New York law, for an actionable breach of contract claim, plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of an
agreement, (2) performance of the contract by plaintiff, (3) breach of the agreement by defendant, and (4)
damages. See Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 348 (2d Cir. 1996); D'Accord Financial Services v.
Metsa-Serla Oy, No. 98 Civ. 5847(DLC), 1999 WL 58916, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999). Each element
need not be separately pleaded. Spirit Partners, L.P. v. audiohighway.com, No. 99 Civ. 9020(RJW), 2000
WL 685022, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2000). Plaintiff must simply provide "a short and plain statement of the
claim[ ] showing that [it is] entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2); see also Spirit Partners, 2000 WL
685022, at *3. Here, plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a breach of contract claim.
There is no dispute that, in June 1982, plaintiff began depositing money in defendant's Liberian branch in
savings account No. B35667. Plaintiff alleges that it "maintained account No. B35667 pursuant to a contract
with [defendant].... Under the terms of that contract, [defendant] was obligated to return the balance in
account No. B35667 in U.S. dollars ...." (Am. Compl.¶¶ 14-15). In addition, plaintiff alleges that "in a
January, 1990, letter agreement with [plaintiff], [defendant] further agreed to repay any balances in the
subject account in U.S. dollars." (Id. ¶ 16).
In November 1992, plaintiff demanded return of its money "in U.S. dollars." (Id. ¶¶ 9, 15). Defendant
refused, and plaintiff alleges that it has been damaged in the amount of $189,376.66. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18).
Accordingly, accepting plaintiff's factual allegations as true and drawing all inferences in its favor, plaintiff
has shown that it is entitled to offer evidence to support its breach of contract claim. Defendant's motion to
dismiss the claim, therefore, is denied.

3. Unjust Enrichment
Generally, quasi-contractual relief, such as unjust enrichment, is not permitted when an express agreement
exists that governs the dispute between the parties. See Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70
N.Y.2d 382, 388, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987) (citations omitted). Because there is a dispute
as to defendant's obligations under the contract, however, plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim survives,
although solely as an alternative to the breach of contract claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (2) ("When two or
more statements [of a claim] are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements."); Seiden Assocs., Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 37, 40 (S.D.N.Y.1991) ("Dismissal
of plaintiff's alternative theories at this stage would violate the liberal policy of Rule 8(e) (2) which allows
plaintiffs wide `latitude' in framing their right to recover." (citation omitted)).

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion for relief from the March 31, 1999, judgment and to file an amended complaint is granted.
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds is denied, as
is its motion to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. Its motion to dismiss
plaintiff's fraud claim is granted.
*306 The parties shall appear for a pre-trial conference on March 12, 2001, at 3 p.m., in Courtroom 11A,
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York.
SO ORDERED.